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**Title:** Comparative local and global discursive strategies of the Suidlanders

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# Abstract

Right-wing extremism, nationalism and populism are increasingly prominent in the global political landscape (Toscano, 2019: 1). This dissertation argues that these phenomena are partial products of discursively constructed identities conveyed to audiences using a variety of strategies. It critically examines how the South African Christian survivalist right-wing extremist organization, the Suidlanders, uses political communication to discursively construct identities. Using the discourse-historical approach (Wodak, 2015; Reisigl & Wodak, 2017) to analyse the 2018 and 2019 YouTube videos of the Suidlanders' spokesperson, Simon Roche, the argument is made that his discursive constructions of difference and sameness are the product of the complex socio-political history of the Afrikaner nation in South Africa as well as of contemporary transnational constructions of far-right identity. In Roche's construction of in-groups and out-groups, he conceives the Afrikaner in-group as deeply fractured by political difference, and the black South African Other as one component of a larger, transnational Other – the globalists. Departing from the history of nationalist identity in South Africa, the Suidlanders find “belonging” in a loosely defined transnational populist alliance engaged in a struggle for survival against globalism. The analysis shows how - through the frequent use of the various strategies, such as intensification, positive self-preservation, negative-other presentation, victim perpetrator reversal, and strategic ambiguity - Roche portrays the Suidlanders' identity as a product of historical Afrikaner nationalism rooted in colonialism and apartheid and post-apartheid victimhood. The analysis also shows the ways that allegiances can be formed by far-right groups in different countries as well as how ideology can be used for opportunistic purposes.

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# Introduction

The proliferation of political forces inspired by far-right, nationalist, and populist sentiments have become increasingly entrenched in the global political landscape in the new millennium (Toscano, 2019: p. 1). As Mudde (2019: p.3) highlights, “one of the defining features of the far-right is the increasing acceptance, mainstreaming, and normalization of their ideas within society.”

Much of the scholarship on the rise of the far-right has focused on Europe and the North Atlantic, emphasizing the impact of the 2007 financial crisis, the Mediterranean and Syrian migrant crises, the anti-immigrant rhetoric of Trumpism and Brexit, and the increasing prevalence of far-right terrorist attacks on minority groups (Butcher & Luxen, 2019). These events have cultivated the long-held fear in far-right circles of the destruction of Western civilization by undesirable outsiders and has fostered the growth of a transnational far-right movement intent on “taking back the West (Villet, 2017).” However, the scholarly emphasis on the growth of nationalism, populism, and right-wing extremism in “the West” has left similar developments in the Global South underexplored, a gap which will be addressed in this dissertation (Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018: p. 2674).

This dissertation explores the trajectory of nationalist, populist, and right-wing extremist politics of an Afrikaner nationalist group in South Africa. Afrikaner nationalists, who identify as an ethno-cultural group descended from Dutch settlers, are best known for their role in constructing and consolidating the *apartheid* regime (1948-1994) and have been the subject of many academic studies on political identity and right-wing politics (see Harrison, 1981; den Besten, 1989; Serfontein, 1990; Welsh, 1995; Van der Watt, 1997; Coombes, 2000; Steyn, 2004, 2008; Dubow, 2014).

Afrikaner political identity is complex and contested. The primacy of Christian nationalism, which was central to Afrikaner political consciousness during colonialism and apartheid has been eroded in the post-apartheid era. The uniformity of Afrikaner nationalist identity has splintered, and the loss of political power has ruptured nationalists’ “sense of belonging,” replacing it with

uncertainty, collective fear, victimhood, and misplaced nostalgia (Knoetze, 2020). The increasingly popular narrative of “white genocide,” which is based on the debunked conspiracy theory of “farm murders” has intensified the notion of “Afrikanerdom under threat,” and led to the emergence of fringe, reactionary Afrikaner right-wing extremist organizations to safeguard the Afrikaner nation (ibid, Pretorius, 2014; Steyn, 2019).

This dissertation focuses on the case study of the Suidlanders, a whites-only “civil defence organization,” which asserts that a race war aiming to exterminate the white race in South Africa is inevitable. The Suidlanders argue that they have a moral duty before God to protect the white *behoudende* (conservatives) and Christian *Boerevolk* (literally translated as “farmer people” but refers more generally to the Afrikaner nation) in pre-planned “safe zones” situated in rural South Africa (Roche: 2018, 2019). The Suidlanders’ chief spokesperson, Simon Roche, has formed deep ties with the transnational far-right, tapping into the fear that “South Africa’s present is the West’s future if it continues down its current path” and that South Africa is the proverbial “canary in the coal-mine” which signifies the destruction of Western civilization by the Other. (Suidlanders, 2021; Lyster, 2018; McEwen, 2021).

The narratives of race war and “white genocide” that the Suidlanders propagate can be potentially deadly, as has been shown in several right-wing extremist attacks in post-apartheid South Africa [1]. As Lyster (2017) notes, “imagined inaction in the face of an imaginary genocide becomes the *casus belli* for a real race war.” Ware (2020) reiterates that “in the age of social media radicalization and lone actor terrorism, all it takes is one [attacker].” Suidlanders have not been charged with any serious crimes but have been linked with convicted terrorists and investigated for sabotage (Potgieter, 2010; Mitchell, 2019; Selebi & Van Den Berg, 2013).

Understanding the Suidlanders’ ideology, discourse, and discursive strategies is therefore an important activity, necessitating the interrogation of primary data. Suidlanders advertise their ideologies on several mediums, including social media, its two websites, and on local and international speaking tours. Sengul (2019: p. 89) demonstrates that it is an important exercise to investigate how populist and far-right right actors “exploit the affordances of social media and digital technologies.” This suggestion, coupled with ethical considerations, made the

Suidlanders' YouTube channel the most suitable data source for analysis, and 51 "talking head" videos (2018-2019) of spokesperson Simon Roche, were transcribed to form a corpus.

The theoretical grounding of the data interpretation drew on the discursive-historical approach of critical discourse analysis associated with Ruth Wodak (1999) and is based on the following key assumptions. Nationalism, populism, and right-wing extremism are dynamic, intersecting discursive constructs predicated on constructions of *sameness* and *difference*, and the creation of in-groups and out-groups. These constructs cannot be viewed in a vacuum, as they are intrinsically tied to their historical, situative and socio-political contexts (de Cillia et al., 1999: p. 156). Political actors reify the principles of the discursive constructions of far-right politics using *discursive strategies*, reflecting de Vreese et al.'s. (2018: p. 425) assertion that political ideology is a *communication phenomenon*. In order to understand how nationalism, populism, and right-wing extremism function as discourse, it is imperative to understand the contexts through which they appeared, as well as how they are communicated to an audience, both in terms of medium and discursive strategy.

These assumptions create the following research questions: What are the historical roots of the Suidlanders' expressions of nationalism, populism and right-wing extremism? How do the Suidlanders use discursive strategies to politically communicate these discursive constructions of *sameness* and *difference* to their audience?

Guided by these research questions and the tenets of the discourse-historical approach, data analysis revealed how Roche's articulations of nationalism are deeply historical, often reflecting dominant conceptions of Afrikaner national identity in colonialism and apartheid. In addition, his discursive constructions of victimhood mirror that of much of the literature on post-apartheid Afrikaner national identity. However, Roche's articulations of *difference* and *sameness* which distinguish Suidlanders as in the in-group from the Other is more nuanced than a simple binary of identities. Roche conceives the Afrikaner in-group as deeply fractured by political difference, and the black South African "Other" as one component of a larger, transnational Other – the globalists, a cabal of economic and cultural elites seeking to undermine Western civilization through open borders, multiculturalism and anti-Christian sentiments (Stack, 2017).



As a consequence, Suidlanders find allyship and “belonging” in a loosely defined *transnational* populist identity engaged in a struggle for survival against globalism (Kuyper & Moffit, 2020: p. 28). In this way, Roche's narrative demonstrates a coalescence of nationalism, populism, and transnational populism, constructing multiple in-groups and out-groups. As a communication phenomenon, Roche conveys these identities using several discursive strategies most frequently *intensification, positive self-presentation, negative-other presentation, victim perpetrator reversal, and strategic ambiguity* (Rejsigl & Wodak, 2017; Wodak, 2015).

The dissertation comprises 5 Chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the key concepts as they are used through the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides a literature review, which traces the changing trajectory of Afrikaner political identity through colonialism, apartheid, and the post-apartheid era, and reviews the emergence of the Suidlanders grouping selected as the case study. The end of Chapter 2 situates the primary data in context by examining previous studies of the far-right on YouTube. Chapter 3 discusses methodological choices in more detail, clarifying sampling and selection choices, and describing the discourse-historical approach used as an analytical framework. Chapter 4 analyses relevant extracts taken from transcriptions of Roche's YouTube videos, and Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the findings, followed by concluding remarks, which complete the dissertation.

## **Chapter 1: Conceptual Framing**

For the purposes of clarity, it is necessary to define the recurring concepts and assumptions as they are understood throughout this dissertation, namely the interrelated concepts of nation, national identity, and nationalism, as well as populism and right-wing extremism.

Anderson's (1983: p. 15) seminal definition describes nations as "imagined political communities" as not all citizens will ever meet or interact, but nonetheless believe that they are constituents of “a unique community” (de Cillia et al., 1999: p. 153). Importantly, as Connor (1978: p. 382) observes, the term "nation" should not be used synonymously with "state," as multiple "imagined communities" can exist within the bordered sovereign territory of the state.

Rather, the term nation-state should only be used when a dominant *national identity* exists within the borders of its own territorial state (ibid).

A national identity is conceived as "a specific form of social identity constructed *discursively* by means of language and other semiotic systems" (de Cillia et al., 1999: p. 153). To Reisigl and Wodak (2017: p. 89), discourse refers to "a socially constituted and socially constitutive cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action." Moreover, discourses have dynamic boundaries and operate in texts – written, visual or oral objects which perform "linguistic actions" (ibid). De Cillia et al. (1999: p. 153) emphasise Bourdieu's (1993, 1994) notion that national identity can be understood as "habitus", or "a complex set of common ideas, concepts or perception schemes intersubjectively shared within a specific group of people".

This combination of factors creates a shared "sense of belonging," constituting a national identity. This discursive construction is reified in the "realm of convictions and beliefs" by a variety of agents, including mass communication, politicians, academics, and schooling, all of which use various discursive strategies, or "the intentional plan of practices adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal" to effectively communicate the national identity (Reisigl & Wodak, 2017: p. 94; de Cillia et al., 1999: p. 153; Pretorius, 2014: p. 32).

A scholarly consensus exists which asserts that the notion of "difference" is a formative process in the discursive construction of national identity (see Hall, 1994; Wodak, 2015; Said, 1978; de Cleen, 2017). As Benhabib (1996: p. 3) states: "every search for identity includes differentiating itself from what one is not." The idea of difference provides a useful link to distinguish between the interrelated concepts of national identity and nationalism.

Creating a working definition of nationalism is complex, as the literature on the phenomenon is extensive, and different scholars place emphasis on distinctive characteristics of the nation (e.g., ethnicity, race, language) and use different theoretical frameworks (see Gellner, 1983; Norval,

1996; Waever, 2005; Sutherland, 2005). Moreover, the discursive boundaries between nationalism, populism, and right-wing extremism are often fluid and unstable.

This dissertation is concerned with the *exclusionary nationalism* characteristic, and therefore focuses on how the “people” - often defined in genealogical or ethno-cultural terms - attempt to promote and consolidate an “imagined community” at the expense of an out-group, who are negatively presented “the Others,” or “outsiders” (de Cleen, 2017: p. 308). This ethno-cultural group see themselves as “the only legitimate collective of ‘the people’ deserving of political representation within the nation state (Abizadeh, 2012).”

Mudde (2015, 2007) distinguishes nationalism from populism by noting that populist discourse is more concerned with pitting “the *people*,” conceived of as the true “natives” of the state, against the “*elite*” who aim to strip them of their sovereign rights and “suppress their legitimate demands.” Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: p. 5) note that radical populists also recognize the existential threat of the out-group, asserting that populist leaders propagate the idea that “the people” are “depicted as being under siege from *above* by the elites and from *below* by a range of dangerous others”(Moffitt, 2016: p. 45). In this way, populism can also display the xenophobia of exclusionary nationalism, as ‘Others’ must be excluded from ‘the people’ as they “embody alien and threatening cultural values” (de la Torre, 2015: p. 11).

Defining right-wing extremism is also challenging due to its interconnections with radical populism and exclusionary nationalism. This is compounded by Forchtner et al.’s. (2018: p. 589-604) assertion that right-wing extremism encapsulates a diversity of definitions, and no consensus exists on the meaning of the term. Muddle (2000: p. 10) highlights that “some definitions are the size of shopping lists” but that recurring features can be identified. In a literature of 26 definitions of right-wing extremism, 58 qualities are mentioned by more than half the scholars. These include at least one reference to: “nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state.”

Macridis’ (1989: p. 231) short definition of right-wing extremism captures the essence of many other interpretations, defining the phenomenon as an “ideology [that revolves around] the same

old staples: racism, xenophobia, and nationalism.” Populism could also be feasibly added to this list, as Wodak (2015) highlights that populist radical right “is the most dominant ideology within the contemporary far-right” As Sengul (2021, p. 4) points out, the far-right acts as an umbrella term for the different variations of radical right and will be used as such throughout this dissertation.

Nationalism, populism, far-right extremism, and far-right politics are intersecting concepts. This dissertation assumes that their different iterations are discursively constructed, as they all are predicated on the idea of a “people” characterised by some conception of *sameness*, in contrast to an out-group predicated by *difference*. This is reiterated by Benhabib’s (1996: p. 3) assertion that “every search for identity includes differentiating itself from what one is not.” This discursive construction of nationalist, populist and right-wing extremist identity will be discussed using the case study of the Afrikaner fringe organization, the Suidlanders.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

This dissertation does not aim to homogenise Afrikaner identity but to interrogate the emergence of nationalist, populist and right-wing extremist *factions* of Afrikanerdom past and present. As Knoetze (2020: p. 50) points out: “Afrikaner identity is by no means hegemonic or singular,” an assertion which is particularly relevant in the post-apartheid era.

An analysis of the macro-semantic strategies and local discursive strategies used by Suidlanders to construct difference requires a literature review which situates Afrikaner nationalism, right-wing extremism, and populism within the political history of South Africa. Populism rarely features in the relevant literature, as the following chapter will show.

The history and contemporary political landscape of the modern Republic of South Africa is intrinsically tied to the structures of white supremacy initiated by colonialism, extended by apartheid, and retained in the democratic era (see Atuahene, 2011; Adhikari, 2009; Gibson, 2003; Gobodo-Madikizela, 2004; Noble & Wright; 2013, van der Berg, 2007; Rogerson & Nel, 2016, Turner, 2016). However, the scope of this dissertation does not allow for a full discussion

of the complex "structure" of these political processes, and the provided history is therefore inevitably simplified (Wolfe, 2006: p. 390). This review is divided into two sections: colonial and apartheid nationalist identity, and post-apartheid identity.

## Colonialism and apartheid: the birth and consolidation of Afrikaner nationalism

The arrival of the Dutch East India Trading Company (VOC) at the Cape in 1652 kickstarted centuries of systematic dispossession and disenfranchisement of the native populations of Southern Africa (Yanou, 2009: p. 9). To the European settlers, the land was considered *terra nullius*, or legally unoccupied (Boisen, 2017: p. 321; McLachlan, 2019: p. 100). Over the first century of Dutch settlement, the descendants of Dutch pastoralists known as *Free Burghers* developed a distinctive cultural identity, with many self-identifying as *Boers* (farmers) or semi-nomadic *Trekboers* (Pretorius, 2011).

Over the course of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the language of Afrikaans emerged from European Dutch, and the Dutch pidgin spoken by Khoisan, and African and Asian slaves, with the white speakers of Dutch descent referring to themselves as *Afrikaners* (den Besten, 1989: p. 207-210; Harrison, 1981: p. 58). The cultural identity of white Afrikaners was further distinguished by the Dutch Reformed Church, which was exported to South Africa with the early Dutch settlers. Afrikaner readings of Dutch Calvinism developed into distinctive interpretations loosely labelled "Afrikaner-Calvinism" and sometimes "*Boer-Calvinism*" (Langer 2007; Du Plessis, 1998: p. 34).

The meaning of *Boer* is highly contextual, and often refers to the Afrikaner people in general as opposed to Afrikaner agriculturalists. This dissertation adopts Knoetze's (2020, p. 49) interpretation that the term *Boer* describes the specific *whiteness* of the Afrikaner people, which alongside language, distinguished the Afrikaners as an ethno-cultural identity distinctive from English-speaking British settlers. These features characterize the term the *Boerevolk* (the Afrikaner people or nation) which will be discussed later.

The establishment of the British Cape Colony in 1806 frustrated many Afrikaners seeking self-determination, culminating in the Great Trek (1835-1840), a mass migration of *voortrekkers* (forward-movers or pioneers) to the interior of the country (Giliomee, 2003: p. 161). To Harrison

(1981: p. 48), the *Voortrekkers* sought to escape their “Othering” by the British Cape Colony, which sought to destroy their language and make them subjects of the Crown. Territorial conflicts with the Xhosa and Zulu peoples followed, and adherence to Afrikaner Calvinism was consolidated following the perceived God-given victory of the *Voortrekkers* against a numerically superior, albeit technologically inferior, Zulu army at Battle of Blood River (1838) (Dubow, 2014: p. 16-17; Britz, 2018: p. 2). A *laager*, or circle of wagons, was used as a defensive military position by the *Voortrekkers*, a formation which would become a metaphor central to Afrikaner nationalist consciousness signifying self-defence and isolationism (Steyn, 2018: p. 78; Britz, 2018). Prior to the battle, the *Voortrekkers* publicly vowed to keep the day as a holy Sabbath were God to grant the *Boers* victory. The original vow taken by the *Voortrekkers* is unknown, but a popular interpretation was coined by Reverend L.E. Brandt in 1938:

*My brothers and fellow countrymen  
Here we stand presently on a moment before a holy God of heaven and earth, to  
make a promise to him that:  
If he, in terms of his protection, be with us and give our enemy into our hands, that  
we will conquer him,  
that we (then):  
shall keep this day and date every year as an annual anniversary and a day of  
thanksgiving like a Sabbath to his glory  
and that we shall erect a temple to his honour wherever it should please him,  
and that we also will tell our children that they should share in that with us in  
memory also for our future generations.  
For the honour of his name will be glorified by giving him the fame and honour of  
our victory.*

(Translation from Afrikaans by Britz, 2018: p. 6).

The victory at Blood River was a seminal moment in consolidating Christian nationalism as the dominant “sense of belonging” in Afrikaner political consciousness. The perceived God-given victory over the Zulus signified that the Afrikaners were a “chosen people” to live separately from other races, as God-fearing, sovereign *volk* - the *Boerevolk* (Spangenburg, 2020: p. 4; Cloete, 1992: p. 45). As Dubow (2014: p. 17) expands, Afrikaners perceived themselves to be “white Africans” and the “torchbearers of Christian civilization drawn together by a unique culture and God-sent calling.” This was compounded by the ideas of prominent Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper's (1837-1920) philosophy of “*soweriniteit in eie kring*,” (sovereignty in one's

own circle), which was used to justify apartheid (du Plessis, 1998: p. 35). Kuyper's idea can be understood as a racial-religious articulation of *nativism*, which is defined by Mudde (2007: p. 19) as an ideology "which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state."

However, the sovereignty of the *Boer* Republics established following the Great Trek was short-lived, and they were dissolved following British victory in the South African War (1899-1902), and the Union of all Republics in 1910 (Pretorius, 2011). Afrikaner nationalism steadily gained momentum following defeat in the South African War and would be the dominant force in politics by the 1940s (Dubow, 2014: p. 3). Steyn (2004: p. 147) makes the crucial point that Afrikaner supremacy over non-white natives was combined with its desire to be "freed" from the "white-on-white overlordship" of the British and ascend from the status of "subaltern whiteness" to dominance. As Kressel (2002) notes: "It is important to remember that virtually all perpetrators of great evil in the world...believed that they were victims of some long-standing prior outrage that justified their militancy."

The World War II years saw an influential faction of Afrikaner Christian nationalists adopt right-wing extremist German *volksnationalisme* or "the blood and soil" ethnonationalism characteristic of the Nazi Party (du Plessis, 1998: p. 34). The pro-Nazi *Ossewabrandwag* (Ox Wagon Sentinel) paramilitary organization and *Nuwe Order* (New Order) party gained considerable influence in Afrikaner politics in the 1940s, but by the end of the war, adherence to Nazism had almost entirely dissipated (Dubow, 2014: p. 6). Total loyalty to a single leader or *Fuhrer* was seen as a blasphemous affront to the ultimate authority of God and Christian nationalism was recentred in the Afrikaner political consciousness (ibid).

Christian-nationalism was consolidated by the victory *Herenigde Nasionale Party* (Reunited National Party) in the 1948 election, an event which kickstarted the construction of the apartheid system, a more sophisticated articulation of pre-existing policies of racial segregation (ibid., 1). Despite being a staunch anti-Semite and Nazi sympathizer, Hendrik Verwoerd, the so-called "Architect of Apartheid", believed that the most effective means of maintaining the divinely

ordained integrity of the *volk* was through complex social engineering, both "on the ground" (spatial segregation) and in law (Bunting, 1964: p. 60-63; Goodman, 2002: p. 143; Dubow, 2014: p. 294).

The apartheid system limited the rights of South Africans deemed "non-white" according to the racial categories of Indian, Coloured and Black. Whiteness was often assigned arbitrarily and based on rudimentary pseudoscience – for instance, the infamous “pencil test,” was commonplace following the Population Registration Act of 1950 (Watson, 2007: p. 65) [2].

Penna (1990: p. 5) asserts that the racial hierarchy constructed by apartheid can be best described as a legal structure based on at least two types of laws: “laws that make *racial distinctions* either explicitly or through reference, and laws that are *racially-neutral* on their face but are designed to control dissent” (ibid). While it is crucial to reiterate that apartheid law privileged *whiteness* as the signifier of legal privilege, the state bureaucracy privileged Afrikaner males throughout apartheid (Dubow, 2014: p. 37).

The belief in the superiority of the white race, and the God-given right to political power in South Africa was shrouded by the recourse to justifying apartheid to the international community as a project of "separate development," which was described by apartheid's last President and later Nobel Peace Laureate F.W. de Klerk as a system that was "separate but equal" (Dubow, 2014: p. 238). The persuasiveness of apartheid as an ideology was strengthened by channelling racial awareness into a discourse of cultural difference. As Dubow (2014: p. 205) explains, "insistence based on difference based on culture was in any case more flexible and durable, and in many cases more insidious." This assertion is embodied by Verwoerd's (1961) description of apartheid:

*"It [apartheid] could just as easily, and, perhaps, much better be described as a policy of good neighbourliness. Accepting that there are differences between people, and that while these differences exist, and you have to acknowledge them, at the same time you can live together, aid one another, but that can best be done when you act as good neighbours always do."*



Verwoerd's characterisation of apartheid as a mutually beneficial arrangement of "good neighbourliness" inevitably excludes the fact that it was predicated on the *racial supremacy* of whites over their "neighbours" and would be institutionalized in all sectors of all social, economic, and political life.

Apartheid endured for over 30 years following Verwoerd's speech, but the government would eventually be unable to adapt to national and global geopolitical developments. The National Party was economically burdened by international sanctions, and the withdrawal of anti-communist Western support following the end of the Cold War (Dubow, 2014: p. 279). The United States, a key ally of the staunchly anti-communist South African government, was no longer threatened by the Soviet bloc, and could no longer "turn a blind eye" to apartheid (Shubin, 2008). Facing increasing pressure from the global anti-apartheid movement, civil unrest on the ground and a war of attrition in the "South African Border War," the National Party reversed apartheid policies in the early 1990s, and Nelson Mandela, the international face of the apartheid struggle, was released on April 11, 1990 (ibid).

The state's willingness to negotiate was met with significant opposition by the burgeoning right-wing extremist movements in the late 1980s and 1990s, particularly the *Afrikaner Volksfront* (AVF) alliance (Afrikaner People's Front) (1993-1996), a coalition of right-wing and far-right organizations, civil groups, paramilitaries, and agricultural unions unified by extreme articulations of Christian nationalism (Du Plessis, 1998: p. 32). Du Plessis (ibid) posits that Calvinist religious values were used as a "communication medium" to convince followers of joining what they perceived to be a "Holy Cause." To the AVF, a black government would mean a regime led-by "communist atheists" and the movement encouraged their followers to ready themselves for a "holy war" against the "forces of darkness" (Du Plessis, 1998: p. 35). To the AVF, and its supporters, the National Party's surrender to "devilish communist mass murderers" and 'tyranny" justified the legitimacy of a secessionist *volkstaat* – a state controlled and inhabited by the Afrikaner *volk* (ibid).

Welsh (1996: p. 252) points out that the only significant radical populist movement of the 1990s was the neo-Nazi paramilitary organization, the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* or AWB

(Afrikaner Resistance Movement). Led by charismatic leader Eugene Terre'Blanche, the core membership of the group consisted of poor, less-educated Afrikaners - "the people" - who condemned the *geldsmag* – the money/power elite - for selling out the *volk* by favouring a negotiated transition (ibid).

However, the resurgence of the far-right extremism and radical populism in South Africa was short-lived. In March 1994, a convoy of AWB members drove into the Bophuthatswana *bantustan* - the pseudo-independent "homeland" of the Tswana people - and began indiscriminately shooting at black civilians from their vehicles (Dubow, 2014: p. 271). They were engaged by police, culminating in three wounded AWB members being executed by a black police constable on the roadside (Welsh, 1995: 254). The executions were broadcast on national television and "finally punctured fantasies of far-right power and a return to the apartheid era" (Dubow, 2014: p. 271). Although several far-right terrorist attacks by AWB attempted to thwart a democratic transition in the months leading up to the election, the African National Congress won in April 1994 in a landslide victory (ibid).

Nelson Mandela's government faced the immediate challenge of preventing racial conflict and fostering a harmonious, multicultural society encapsulated by the Archbishop Desmond Tutu's term "the Rainbow Nation" (Rassool, 2019: p. 345). The non-partisan Truth and Reconciliation Commission attempted to heal racial divisions, but the unhealed traumas of the past, the slow pace of economic transformation, entrenched race-wealth disparities, combined with black landlessness and rampant state corruption has created a fraught political situation in modern South Africa (Mamdani, 2015: p. 77; Scharnick-Udemans, 2020: p. 1).

This literature review has shown that the historical trajectory of Afrikaner nationalism, populism and far-right extremism has evolved through a process spanning several hundred years. The *volk* or Afrikaner nation was conceived in differing ways, with the common threads of Calvinist nationalism, racial awareness, and cultural distinctiveness (Knoetze, 2020; Moodie, 1975; Smith; 1981; Du Plessis, 1998; Van der Merwe, 2001; Dubow, 2014; Steyn, 2019).

Christian nationalism was dominant following the Battle of Blood River but was challenged by Nazism in the 1940s and far-right extremism in the late 1980s and 1990s. Populism is largely absent from the literature as Afrikaners constituted both the “people” and the “elite” following their capture of political power. The right-wing extremist AWB espoused populist politics at part of its strategy to derail the democratic transition in the early 1990s, but their movement was short-lived, and the democratic transition would force Afrikaner and white consciousness to “publicly interrogate itself and the mythologies it accepted as truth (Falkof, 2015: p. 114-115).

### "Afrikanerdom under threat" - the post-apartheid era

Post-apartheid Afrikaner identity has received substantial attention in academic scholarship, interrogated with various theoretical approaches including filmic analysis (Steyn, 2019), post-colonial psychology (Pretorius, 2014), discourse analysis (Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018), and critical whiteness studies (Knoetze, 2020; Steyn; 2004, 2008). The literature reveals the following recurring themes: nostalgia, collective fear, victimhood, and assertiveness (Steyn, 2004; Steyn, 2019; Knoetze, 2020; Pretorius, 2014, Van Vyck Smith, 2008). Interestingly, much of the literature refers to Afrikaner identity in general and refers to political ideology more implicitly.

To many white South Africans, the 1994 democratic transition was "nothing less than traumatic" (Visser, 2007: p. 1). The loss of political power led to the “implosion” of the divine *telos* which had sustained Afrikaner Christian nationalism for centuries (Steyn, 2004: p. 143). Moreover, amidst the dominant discourses of reconciliation and nation building, the “old Afrikaner identity” had become synonymous with apartheid, leaving nationalists afraid or reluctant to express their endorsement or belief in a *volk* (ibid., 63). Steyn highlights that the rupture in Afrikaner identity was distinct from English-speaking South Africans of British descent – whose Anglo “international ideological centre” allowed for the stable continuity of the in-group. In contrast, the Afrikaners were faced with the existential question: “*who are we?*” (ibid, Louw, 1999: p. 200; De Lange, 2001; De Klerk, 2000).

Some Afrikaners found their answer through embracing populist politics. A discourse analysis by Van Zyl-Hermann (2018: p. 2675-2681) based on extensive fieldwork within the Afrikaner

social movement "Solidarity" revealed that the group has utilized a populist style of politics pitting Afrikaners as "the people" against the black Other. To Van Zyl Hermann (2018: p. 2687), Solidarity displayed overtly racist sentiments identifying Afrikaners, and whites more generally, as "moral, biological and indeed racial superiors" to blacks, who lack a 'self-doing' culture, are callous, and easily corruptible." This reflects more of a traditional, apartheid-era conception of Afrikanerdom-as-*volk*, adapted to the post-apartheid political landscape.

Other strategies utilized by Afrikaners involved a retreat into nostalgic "comfort zones" of a time and place which they [nationalists] believed they controlled (Ballard, 2004; Van der Merwe, 2001: p. 161). This reflects Boym's (2006) assertion that "outbreaks of nostalgia, as collective expressions of longing for a lost object, often follow revolutions," or in this case, a political transition.

A key site of nostalgia which re-emerged into the Afrikaner collective consciousness was the *platteland* (countryside), as it was emblematic of the mythologized idealism of rural life that had been supplanted in Afrikaner nationalism since the early settlers (Van der Merwe, 2001: p. 161). As Van den Heever (1935: p. 16) elaborates, the vitality of the *Boerevolk* and their myth of origin is inexorably "tied to their relationship with the earth, the soil to which they were mystically united through a dark love."

However, to assume that the *platteland* was suspended in a traditionalist vacuum would be a simplification - the re-mystification of the countryside as a site of true Afrikanerdom was a response to the loss of political power. At the height of apartheid in the 1960s and 1970s, economic development saw *urban* life become the "new utopia" as it was associated with economic prosperity, materialism, and status (Van Zyl, 2008: p. 135). Urbanization saw the creation of a "modern, unchallenged nationalist identity," and urban dwellers associated the *platteland* with underdevelopment and backwardness (Steyn, 2019: p. 66). Urban Afrikaners referred to "rural *Boers*" using a range of derogatory terms like "hairyback," "rock spider" and "bywoner" (backyard dweller) (Van der Westhuizen, 2018). After the democratic transition, urban life was undesirable due to desegregation and the *platteland* resumed its status as a site of

sanctuary from the violent crime of the city, and an escape from the apartheid trope of the *swart gevaar* (black danger) (Steyn, 2019: p. 77).

However, the romanticization of the *platteland* as a symbol of the *volk* was quickly challenged by South Africa's violent crime, leading the farm to take on dual identities in the post-apartheid era. The sparsely populated rural areas and isolated location of farms makes them soft targets for criminals, with attacks and murders on farm spiking in the early 2000s. These often-brutal attacks coincided with the seizure of white-owned farms in neighbouring Zimbabwe – leaving Afrikaner rural dwellers, and white South Africans in general, fearing for their future in a democratic South Africa, and asking the questions: “could whites lose their land? Could whites be driven from South Africa? (Pretorius, 2014: p. 35).” These fears have been compounded in recent times by the controversial Expropriation Bill proposed by the South African government in 2018 and the divisive rhetoric of political parties like the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) (Steyn 2016: p. 267; Knoetze, 2020: p. 58) [3].

The escapist nostalgia which characterised the farm in the early post-apartheid period has therefore been ruptured. Although the farm embodied the symbolic remnants of the *volk*, it has also become a space characterized by "a limbo of menace and insecurity" (Steyn, 2019: p. 69; Van-Wyk Smith, 2008). Consequently, as Steyn (2019: p. 59) observes, increasing numbers of Afrikaners believe a conspiracy theory that “black people are taking revenge for apartheid and that a low-intensity genocide is afoot,” due to white farmers and rural dwellers being targeted by race.” This conspiracy is debunked in the following section.

### The “white genocide” and “farm murder” conspiracies

*Plaasmoorde* (farm murder) has become a euphemism for “white genocide” which is also sometimes referred to as “Boer genocide” or *volksmoord* (ibid, Pretorius, 2014: p. 21). These narratives have been endorsed by the global far-right and have entered popular culture with fictional feature films (*Treurgrond*, 2015), and national and international documentaries (*War of the Flea*, 2011; *Farmlands*, 2018) (Ward, 2018; Steyn, 2019: p. 57). Moreover, farm crime

novels have a long history in South African literature and have become increasingly popular in the post-apartheid era (Naidu, 2016: p. 10; Davis, 2018).

As Whitehead (2020: p. 302) accurately puts it, “farm murders” are referred to by the far-right in *racialized* terms – the victims are always white, and perpetrators are therefore necessarily black. Consequently, a farm murder does not refer to a white person killing another white person on a farm, nor a white person killing a black person, despite several such incidents of the latter in recent years (see de Villiers et al., 2021; Taylor, 2017). This fabrication not only obscures the many black farmers and farm workers killed in farm attacks but reaffirms racist tropes of the “barbaric [black] savage” as the inevitable perpetrator of violence (Pretorius, 2014: p. 32).

This belief that Afrikaners are deliberately targeted has led to what Comaroff and Comaroff (2006: p. 233) call a “culture of vicarious victimhood” where a single attack is marked as an attack on the collective – creating the perception that “we are all victims...we have all lost our freedom to violence.” Knoetze (2020: p. 48) notes that that victimhood embodied in the “white genocide” narrative is a perverse method of assertiveness, as it seeks to foreground the white experience in a country where the majority of those affected by violent crime and poverty are black. In self-identifying as “the new oppressed” and advertising their perceived suffering, victimhood is used assertively for sympathy and attention from the broader global right-wing [4]. In some cases, assertiveness is more proactive: farmers have created self-protection units, and agricultural unions and Afrikaner civil rights organizations have actively lobbied for more state action to be taken over “farm murders.”

While data on farm murders remain contested, associated claims of “white genocide” have been widely debunked. The latter continues to gain currency in far-right circles both locally and globally [5]. According to the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) statistics, attacks on farms have steadily declined since their peak in the early 2000s (de Villiers, 2020). The deadliest year of farm attacks and murders was recorded in 2001/2002, registering 140 murders and 1069 attacks. In comparison, the 2017/2018 financial year registered 561 farm attacks and 62 murders. In a broader perspective, South Africa registered 20,336 murders over the same period, of which

2930 were women, and 985 were children (Wilkinson, 2018). “Farm murders” accounted for 0.3 percent of murders.

Moreover, SAPS’s definition of a “farm attack” makes it impossible to calculate how many murders are perpetrated against *farmers*, as opposed to people killed while present on a farm or smallholding. The 2011 Rural Safety Strategy define attacks as “acts of violence against persons on farms and smallholding refer to acts aimed at a person/s “residing on, working on, or visiting farms or smallholdings, whether to murder, rape, rob, or inflict bodily harm” (Wilkinson, 2017). The definition of a farmer is also absent from government policy, and Statistics South Africa (2017) estimates that 2.3 million South Africans live in households involved in agriculture, either commercial or subsistence (Wilkinson, 2017).

The difficulties involved with recording accurate statistics of violent crimes on farms and murders are used as ammunition by the white right, both to present their own statistics, and to emphasize that attacks are racially targeted. For instance, Roche (22 May 2018, 10:06) claims that: “we don’t have all of the facts - but there is a reasonable, unexaggerated, non-hysterical, sensible, sane, sober-minded argument that the murder rate of white farmers is as high as 200 per 100 000 per year.” As aforementioned, South African Police figures suggested 62 people of varying races and occupations were killed on farms in 2017/2018, making Roche’s claim, for which he provides no evidence, highly improbable. Roche’s statement is more reliant on appealing to emotion and the discursive strategy of *intensification*, as will be discussed later.

Although experts have acknowledged that a minority of attacks have had elements of “racial hatred,” Newham (2018) stresses that “there is no evidence that a group of people are killing farmers for political purpose. There is no epidemic of ‘farm murders’ in South Africa, there is an epidemic of murders.” Most farm attacks are made for economic gain, and instances of torture have been attributed in most instances to criminals having more time to gain information as to how to access valuables (e.g., safes and pin numbers) as police response times are slow due the geographical isolation of the farms (de Villiers, 2020). Moreover, the more gruesome the attack, the more publicity it receives in the Afrikaner press and on social media. Each incident is widely

publicized by far-right propaganda websites, agricultural unions, and right-wing groups (Steyn, 2019: p. 77).

The section has shown various methodologies which have been used to address articulations of post-apartheid Afrikaner nationalism, and an identifiable set of themes that has appeared in the literature, including victimhood, collective fear, nostalgia and assertiveness. However, except for Van Zyl-Hermann (2008), there is little scholarship analysing the discourse of organized post-apartheid Afrikaner political movements. This makes the Suidlanders' a worthy topic of study, particularly due to their unorthodox ideology, and the discursive strategies through which they are expressed.

### About the Suidlanders

The Suidlanders are a whites-only “civil defence organization” headquartered in the small town of Vanderkloof in South Africa’s arid and sparsely populated Northern Cape Province (Roche, 2017). The group was established in 2006 by Afrikaner Gustav Muller, a former apartheid military intelligence officer and suspected fraudster (Naidoo, 2008). Simon Roche, a white South African of Irish descent joined the Suidlanders in 2015, and quickly became the face of the organization on the internet (Powell, 2019). Roche has created significant ties with the American and Western European far-right, appearing on online platforms including Infowars, Red Ice TV, Radio Renaissance, The Ark, and Mike Cernovich.

In 2017, Roche travelled to the United States on “a concerted strategic campaign” to raise money and “awareness of and support for the Caucasian Christian conservative *volk*” (Davis & Onishi, 2018). He was also present at the Unite the Right march in Charlottesville (August 2017), where a counter-protestor was murdered by a right-wing extremist after being rammed by his car (McKenzie & Swails, 2018). The Suidlanders have capitalized on their Western support by creating two websites: one in Afrikaans, and one English. A comprehensive analysis of the Suidlanders’ transnational ties is beyond the scope of this dissertation but forms a key component of the organization’s activities (Lyster, 2018; Pogue, 2019).



The Suidlanders state that they are a legal organization constituted under the first two provisions of the Geneva Conventions (1945) and are committed to protecting whites in demarcated “safe zones” in the inevitable event of a race war (McKenzie & Swails, 2019). They have been accurately described as “survivalists” as they encourage their followers to “prepare for medium to long term survival” in the event of anarchy (Suidlanders, 2021; Mills, 2021: p. 338).

Their slogans “*Wees Gereed*” (Be Ready) and “Prepping for a Revolution” encapsulate the group’s emphasis on the inevitability of nationwide unrest and the importance of self-sufficiency. As of 2018, the group claimed to have over 130 00 members in more than 30 districts in the country, although this cannot be verified as the organization keeps no membership lists (McKenzie & Swails, 2019). Members pay a monthly fee of R89 (around \$6.25) for a daily newsletter, extraction coordinates (a point of collection and escort to the “safe zones” at the outbreak of civil war) and an emergency plan college, which informs members of the details of evacuation (Suidlanders, 2021). The Suidlanders encourage donations to support increasing its food and fuel stockpiles, and to improve its independent radio communication network (Powell, 2019; Suidlanders, 2021).

The Suidlanders are ideologically influenced by the Christian Nationalism characteristic of apartheid, the “white genocide” conspiracy theory, and modern interpretations of the prophecies of Nikolaas “Siener” Van Rensburg (1864-1926) (Grundlingh, 1996; Mitchell, 2019; du Plessis, 1998; p. 2). Van Rensburg was given the nickname “*Siener*” meaning “seer” due to a series of fulfilled prophecies during the South African War (1899-1902) impressive enough to earn the confidence of legendary *Boer* General Koos De La Rey during the South African War and the 1914-1915 Afrikaner Rebellion (Grundlingh, 1996: p. 225). Although Van Rensburg's presence in the Afrikaner nationalist collective consciousness was revered, his prophecies were viewed as a product of his time and did not extend past his death (*ibid*).

However, at the dawn of democracy, several books attempted to breathe new life in Van Rensburg’s prophecies, which consisted of ambiguous visions involving generic rural objects, often interwoven with biblical texts (*ibid*). The modern interpretations argued that Van Rensburg's prophecies could be used as a blueprint to predict the fate of the *Boers* for the entire

20<sup>th</sup> century, and beyond (See Snyman, 1993; Raath, 1994). This argument was wholeheartedly endorsed by factions of the ideologically depleted far-right, thereby aligning with Overholt's (1989: p. 81) assertion that “prophets tend to appear in times of crisis – in which the normal order of things seems to be threatened with collapse.” In contrast, the progressive Afrikaner newspaper *Vrye Weekblad* (Free Weekly) (1993) saw the far-right's endorsement of Van Rensburg as a denial of the loss of political power, noting that “one had to be intellectually bankrupt to build one’s future on a *flentergat boereprofeet* [tattered Boer prophet] who had already died in 1926” (Grundlingh, 1994: p. 239).

The most important modern interpretation of a Van Rensburg prophecy was adapted from the seer’s vision of “a bucket of blood falling over Johannesburg” (de Wet, 2013). In a convoluted manner, the Suidlanders interpreted the vision to mean that the Afrikaner *volk* would face a mass uprising by the black population, catalysed by an event called *Die Nag Van Die Lang Messe* (The Night of the Long Knives) or Operation White-Clean-up (ibid, Mitchell, 2019: p. 267). The uprising would lead to an anarchic race war, which the *Boers* would eventually win, after pushing all the black populations of Southern Africa to the equator with military aid from Germany (Grundlingh, 1996: p. 238; Carlin, 2004).

In this way, the perverse new currency of Siener's prophecies in right-wing extremist circles saw “history-as-tradition or folklore merged with history-as-praxis” to provide hope for their future political prospects of the Afrikaner *volk* (Grundlingh, 1994: p. 228). Suidlanders’ leader Gustav Muller is the interpreter of Van Rensburg, and “is known to see himself as the Joshua of the Afrikaner *volk* appointed by God to lead it to Freedom” (Pogue, 2019; Venter, 2007). The Suidlanders justify their belief in Van Rensburg’s supposed prophecy of inevitable race war by arguing that “white genocide,” and “farm murders” are part of a broader conspiracy against Afrikaners and white South Africans.

Categorizing the Suidlanders is challenging due to the absence of analysis in academic scholarship, and its unorthodox adoption of quasi-religious prophecies. Knoetze (2020: p. 59) defines the group as an “ethnonationalist, racist, white Afrikaner survivalist group.” A sample of 9 newspaper articles from different South African media houses (2012-2019) describes the

Suidlanders by various terms including right-wing, far-right wing, ultra-right-wing, white nationalist, white Christian survivalists, and Afrikaans ethnonationalist survivalists [6]. Interestingly, none of these descriptions identified populism as a feature of the Suidlanders' politics. The diversity and interconnectedness of these descriptions demonstrate that it is difficult to categorize the Suidlanders with fixity. However, due to the group's adherence to Calvinist nationalism, its whites-only membership policy, and its apocalyptic interpretations of Siener Van Rensburg's prophecies, the Suidlanders can be best described as a Christian survivalist right-wing extremist organization.

Although the Suidlanders are a fringe organization in South Africa, they are a useful example of the growth of potentially dangerous far-right politics. An analysis of the Suidlanders' political communication and the discursive strategies that the group uses to disseminate its ideology, therefore becomes a valuable exercise.

## Far-right political communication on YouTube

The ability of the Suidlanders to communicate and market their message to national and transnational audiences has been empowered by the internet. As Finlayson (2020: p. 5) observes, the participatory internet culture sparked by the Web 2.0 revolution "fundamentally changed the production and consumption of political communication" through the creation of social platforms and unfettered access to information.

A brief discussion of the existing literature which focuses on discursive strategies of right-wing extremists on YouTube is required to situate the chosen methodology within context. YouTube (created 2005) has democratized the medium of audio-visual communication through providing easy and unlimited access to videos hosted on the platform to consumers, and low-entry barriers for content producers (Munger & Phillips, 2020: p. 1; Finlayson 2020: p. 6).

As such, YouTube is one of the largest online facilitators of political communication, which is defined by McNair (2011: p. 4) as "purposeful communication about politics." This communication does not only refer to verbal or written texts, but any form of semiotics constituting a political identity. Qualitative scholars have long recognized YouTube as an

"important site of discourse" (Antony & Thomas, 2010; Van Zoonen et al., 2011). This can be extended to "political discourse" as YouTube has facilitated the transnationalization of divisive political ideas and remains the only major social network platform "more popular among right-leaning users" (ibid, Garrett et al., 2012.)

Studies on the far-right on YouTube have been approached from various angles, such as analyses focusing on YouTube's facilitatory role in radicalization (Forestal, 2020; Costello et al., 2016; Alvares and Dahlgren, 2016), the ideological links between comments and video content (Ribeiro et al., 2020; Raichfleisch & Kaiser, 2020), and the applicability of using supply and demand theory on right-wing YouTube (Munger & Phillips, 2020). These studies are *audience* focused, and thus have limited utility for this dissertation, which is concerned with the discursive strategies of *producers*.

Studies on the rhetoric (Barnett, 2007; Thiesmeyer, 1999) and political discourse (Ferber, 2000; Etton, 2000) of the extreme right online are well-documented, but scholarship emphasising the discursive *strategies* of far-right YouTubers is still emerging (Ekman, 2014; Finlayson, 2020; Lewis, 2018). Ekman (2014) analyses a large corpus of 5 Swedish far-right YouTube channels, and analyses their political discourse, ideological functions, aesthetic features, styles and modes of communication. The videos are diverse in form, and include interviews, combat clips, phone calls, and public demonstrations. Ekman utilizes critical discourse analysis to interpret the content, but the large dataset did not allow for a close reading of each text, with the result that political discourse was discussed only in generalized terms.

Lewis (2018) adopts a more comprehensive approach, creating a template explaining the strategies far-right Youtubers have collectively used to create an "Alternative Influence Network." Lewis (2018: p. 1-3) outlines how strategic controversy, ideological testimonials, and political self-branding, are deliberately harnessed to cultivate political countercultural appeal, relatability, and credibility. These strategies are used to "sell" an ideology, as a company would sell a brand (ibid).

In contrast, Finlayson (2020: p. 1) limits analysis to a single far-right YouTuber, Paul Joseph Anderson, and addresses the strategic value of the "talking head" genre of video characteristic of Anderson. Finlayson highlights that DIY-style videos often recorded in a "private space" like a dining room or bedroom create a personalized atmosphere which often sees the commentator adopt a conversational style punctuated with "subjective storytelling and affective cues" (ibid, p. 3). This artificially created environment has therapeutic benefits for the audience and creates an environment where "revelatory" truth-telling can be communicated through pseudo journalism (ibid, p. 14).

There is a substantial body of scholarship analysing the far-right on YouTube – but few analysts emphasise the discursive and rhetorical strategies of far-right YouTubers at the level of "*micro-politics*" - that is "the linguistic strategies in text and talk which keep right-wing populism [on this case, far-right politics more generally] kicking (Wodak, 2015: pg. 3). Such micro-politics were identified from close readings of transcriptions taken from the Suidlanders YouTube channel.

## **Chapter 3: Methodology**

### **Sampling and selection**

The Suidlanders have been widely publicized in the Western media outlets, including CNN, the Washington Post, Harpers, The New York Times (all 2019), and Vice, Reuters, The Guardian and the British Broadcasting Corporation (2018). They have received relatively less attention in the South African press. However, the primary data in the popular media was limited, making independent data collection preferable for a more rigorous analysis.

The Suidlanders broadcast their ideology through online platforms including Twitter, YouTube, forums, podcasts and talk shows. The richness of data, as well as ethical and privacy concerns made the Suidlanders YouTube channel the most feasible candidate for data extraction. The channel was created in 2015, and as of July 2021 had just under 30 000 subscribers, and over 230 videos of various lengths and genres. As an ethical disclaimer, neither the Suidlanders or Roche

were contacted or interviewed at any stage of the research process. The comment sections on the videos were also not utilised for data collection.

Data sources were restricted to videos featuring spokesperson Simon Roche released on the English language YouTube channel of the Suidlanders. This excluded the Suidlanders' early videos – as they are several hours long and spoken in complex Afrikaans. Professional translation would be required, and the cost and time constraints would outweigh the benefits of an analysis of such a limited size. Moreover, the Suidlanders also release distinctive styles of video with varying visual and narrative strategies, such as documentary, and the use of news footage, archival video, and music. A complex, mixed methods analysis would be required to analyse data of such diversity, and this was beyond the scope of this dissertation.

The most useful data was extracted from transcripts of videos involving spokesperson Simon Roche, who has been central to the Suidlanders' media campaigns both locally and abroad. Roche appears in two categories of video – "the talking head" genre as discussed previously by Finlayson (2020) and interview appearances on Western platforms. For the purposes of methodological and analytical consistency, the "talking head" style of video was used exclusively, as Roche's "speeches" were not influenced by other forms of media or other people, creating uninterrupted bodies of text when transcribed. Moreover, Roche's texts were the most practical to use, as he speaks in English and only occasionally uses Afrikaans, which was easily translatable from my existing knowledge of the language, and Google Translate. The audio was clear, and transcribed verbatim.

Every "talking head" (Figure 1) video featuring Roche was transcribed in a data sampling period from May 2018 to November 2019. The end of 2019 was chosen as a cut-off period as the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 significantly altered the content of Suidlanders videos, therefore complicating the research questions. Over the chosen data capture period, 51 videos were transcribed, totalling 6:25 hours and 43 113 words. The details of the selected videos can be found in the appendix (Table 1).

## Data interpretation

The interpretation of the transcribed text was done by a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, using the python application *Textstat*, and the discourse-historical approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA)

*Textstat*, a library used to calculate statistics from text, was used to generate word frequencies and concordances which were arranged into the categories of personal pronouns, nouns, and proper nouns (Bansal, 2021). As Fairclough (1995: p. 145) highlights, “Pronouns (as always) are worth noting” with Suleiman et al. (2002) elaborating that as they can be easily quantitatively measured and are useful as they “form an identity marker” particularly “we” and “they,” which can denote the binaries of in-groups and out-groups.

Moreover, recurring nouns can help identify discourse topics. As the word frequencies tabulated in the appendix (Table 2) demonstrate, several different actors are mentioned, with the most recurring word “people” (291), being an idea central to nationalism, populism and right-wing extremism. This quantitative grouping of data was used to guide the qualitative process of extracting passages of text from the corpus which would be most useful to identify recurring discourse topics and interrogate Roche’s discursive and rhetorical strategies. As Sengul (2019, p. 389) notes, it is important that CDA embraces holistic research and to recognize that computer-assisted and quantitative analyses of social phenomena should be used concurrently with – not instead of – qualitative techniques like the discourse-historical approach.

## Analytical framework

This analysis is concerned with identifying and discussing the discursive strategies used by Roche to construct difference and sameness, how they reflect pre-existing conceptions of nationalism, populism and right-wing extremism in Afrikaner political consciousness, and the new articulations they reveal. In this way, what is of interest is not only *what* Roche says, but *how* he says it. An appropriate analytical framework needed to accomplish these goals was identified as discourse-historical approach, a subset of CDA. The fundamental distinction

between conventional discourse analysis and CDA is that the latter seeks not only to understand the social world, but to disrupt unequal power relations and seek political emancipation, which makes it an appropriate qualitative methodology to interrogate the encoded language and ideology of right-wing extremists and the Suidlanders to expose and disrupt their political agenda (Sengul, 2019: p. 379).

Machin and Mayr (2012: p. 5) demonstrate that CDA encompasses a variety of approaches which share the goal of “aiming to expose strategies that may appear normal or neutral on the surface but may in fact be ideological and seek to shape the representation of events and persons for particular ends.” In this way, CDA assumes an intrinsic interrelationship between language, power and ideology, and asserts that “discourse does *ideological* work” (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 371). To Reisigl and Wodak (2017: p. 41), racist ideology manifests itself discursively, and “through discourse, discriminatory exclusionary practices are prepared, promulgated and legitimized.”

The discourse-historical approach of CDA was developed in Vienna in the 1990s to probe and dissect how discursive strategies construct intranational *sameness* (assimilation), and national *difference* (dissimilation) (de Cillia et al., 1999: p. 149). The interpretation of the discourse-historical approach associated with Ruth Wodak (1999, 2003, 2008, 2015) has been preferred by scholars of the discourses of racism, right-wing populism, nationalism, and ethnicism, as Wodak (2015: p. 50) explains that “traditional, quantitative methods of measurement encounter enormous obstacles when trying to account for racist, anti-Semitic or homophobic attitudes.” More specifically, far-right ideologies are often embedded in texts in the form of various rhetorical devices, including *metaphors*, *euphemisms*, *strategic ambiguity*, *presuppositions*, *topoi*, *fallacies*, *stereotypes*, *allusions*, *hyperbole*, among other discursive strategies mentioned later (Sengul, 2019: p. 383). As Feldman and Jackson (2015): put it: “to comprehend the contemporary far-right is to understand their deliberately crafted slogans.”

The discourse-historical approach is also favoured by scholars of the far-right due to its “particular focus on the strategic and historical nature of discourse,” and its attempt to strategically harness all available background information and historical context to enrich its



analysis (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 364; Reisigl & Wodak, 2017). This necessitated the comprehensive literature review which outlined the changing trajectory of Afrikaner political identity, as discursive strategies cannot be viewed in a historical vacuum. This point is reiterated by Filardo-Llamas and Boyd (2018: p. 312-313) who stress that CDA "needs to consider the immediate and wider contexts which define the text...which includes socio-cultural and historical context."

Two typologies offered by Reisigl and Wodak (2017) and Van Dijk (1994, 1997) provide useful models to analyse far-right texts; these are adaptable to this context. Reisigl and Wodak (2017: p. 104) outline a model of five discursive strategies frequently used by the far-right: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, and intensification. These strategies often appear simultaneously and should be considered ideal types. Donald Trump's comments about Mexicans at a 2015 campaign speech provides a useful example to identify how multiple strategies can be used in a few words.

Trump (2015): "They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people."

**(1) *Nomination*:** How are groups referred to?

Trump's reference of a "they" nominates an out-group' and creates a Manichean division of "us" and "them."

**2) *Predication*:** What characteristics and qualities are attributed to certain individuals/groups?

Trump uses the strategy of predication to the nominated group, assigning the group with the qualities of criminality, and sexual violence.

**(3) *Intensification/mitigation*:** Are the respective utterances articulated overtly or downplayed - are they intensified or mitigated?

Trump intensifies the undesirability of the out-group, in this case, Mexicans, by consecutively listing different illegal activities. However, he mitigates or downplays this statement with the disclaimer, "and some, I assume, are good people."

Wodak and Reisigl's model of discursive strategies are often used in combination with three argumentation strategies described by van Dijk (1997) below:

- (1) Strategies of positive self-presentation** – presenting the in-group positively.
- (2) Strategies of negative other-presentation** - presenting the out-group negatively.
- (3) Strategies of disclaimers and denial of racism** - linguistic devices which attempt to prove that one's negative cognitions of an out-group are not racist (e.g., "I have black friends").

These discursive and argumentation strategies are useful to analyse Roche's extracts as de Vreese et al., 2018: p. 425) argue that 'the communicative tools used for spreading populist ideas are just as central as the populist ideas themselves.' However, as the findings will demonstrate, this utility extends to analysing the intersections of nationalism, populism and right-wing extremism, as the discursive boundaries of these phenomena are dynamic, and often are displayed simultaneously.

## Chapter 4: Analysis

Recurring features in Roche's videos can be briefly explained to avoid redundancy in the extracts. Roche begins each video by formally greeting the imaginary audience with the phrase "Ladies and Gentlemen" and often engages in trivialities regarding the weather in the Suidlanders' headquarters in Vanderkloof. Roche then reaffirms the leadership hierarchy of the Suidlanders, by stating that "Mr Muller [founder Gustav Muller] has instructed me to talk about..." the given subject of the video, such as "farm murders." Roche then discusses the assigned topic, often tangentially, and usually concludes each video with an encouraging message of solidarity, and a variation of "God bless you." Where they were present, these recurrences have been excluded from the extracts in the analysis.

Roche's discursive constructions of *sameness* and *difference* are complex and even contradictory. These different constructions have been compartmentalized into four categories which will be discussed in the following order: the construction of the national in-group, the

construction of factions in the national in-group, the construction of the national Other, the construction of the transnational in-group, and the construction of the transnational Other.

## The construction of the national in-group

Chapter 1 outlined the trajectory of Afrikaner political identity from colonialism to the post-apartheid era. These extracts demonstrate how the discursive strategies Roche uses to construct in-group identity can be broadly identified by particular *racial*, *political*, and *religious* categories characteristic of the dominant Christian nationalist identity of colonialism and apartheid.

**Extract 1:** We follow our Holy Bible and the prophecies of Oom Siener van Rensburg... many of which we don't fully understand - and what is happening in the country. We are not necessarily socialists, or necessarily fascists or necessarily this or necessarily that - we are white *behoudende* [conservative] Christians (Roche, 25 June 2018, 3:27).

This above extract exemplifies the discursive strategies of *nomination* and *mitigation* and reveals Roche's interpretation of the Suidlanders group identity and belief system. Roche's use of *nomination* - the pronoun "we" - refers to the Suidlanders as a specific in-group unified by Christian piety, adherence to the prophecies of Siener van Rensburg, whiteness and *behoudende* (conservative) politics. This construction of sameness reflects the *nationalism* of the post-Blood River and apartheid era, with the distinguishing feature of the belief in modern interpretations of Van Rensburg's prophecies which are characteristic of post-apartheid right-wing extremists like the *Boeremag* [7]. Roche also carefully uses the discursive strategy of *mitigation* to absolve the Suidlanders of responsibility should the group's leadership incorrectly interpret one of Siener's Van Rensburg's prophecies, noting that the group "do "not understand" all of them. Suidlanders had previously incorrectly predicted that the Night of the Long Knives would occur after the death of Nelson Mandela in 2013 (Myburgh, 2013). The following extract refines the in-group by referring to further populations in the imagined political community:

**Extract 2:** It is vital for the time that lies ahead that Suidlanders, that the *behoudende*, the *Boerevolk* of South Africa, be the fittest, strongest, healthiest, most-sober, most well-read, best informed, and best prepared of all the competing groups of people in the crisis that is to come (Roche, 16 July 2018, 1:43)

In the above extract, Roche uses the discursive strategies of *nomination*, and *intensification* to clarify group identity. Roche's refers to the *Boerevolk* as part of the in-group, using language consistent with the dominant conception of apartheid and colonial nationalism. This identification also demonstrates that Roche perceives the Suidlanders to be representative Afrikaner *volk* and *behoudende*. Roche uses *intensification* by listing the important qualities the in-group require to face the "competing groups" in the coming "crisis." The call for *Boerevolk* and *behoudende* to prepare for "the crisis to come" echoes Albertazzi and McDonnell's (2008: p. 5) assertion that "*populists* frequently invoke a sense of the crisis and the idea that soon it will be too late." Roche infers that the crisis will anarchic, as the Suidlanders will be in *competition* with other groups, alluding to a Hobbesian state of nature, reiterating populist conceptions of crisis. This extract demonstrates that Roche uses *nomination* characteristic of Afrikaner nationalism *in combination* with populist politics. These strategies are used again in the extract below:

**Extract 3:** We Suidlanders, are preparing a national emergency plan for a particular group of people, our people, who we are entitled under international law, and most especially before God, to love and to care for. To get them out of the cities, out of the built-up areas, in the event of a crisis and to put them in a safe place where we can look after our mummies, sisters, daughters and grannies, the elderly and of course the non-able-bodied (Roche, 18 June 2018, 1:33).

The above extract marks the first example of the discursive strategy of *positive self-representation*, as well as further use of *nomination*, and *intensification*. *Nomination* is used to identify the in-group using the phrase "our people," which implies the presence of an Other. Roche positively represents the Suidlanders by stating that the group is mandated by God to safeguard "the people" in the event of a "crisis" reaffirming Christian nationalist sentiments and populist conceptions of urgency. This also reflects Wodak's assertion that (2015: p. 151), right-wing populists and their leaders convey empathy, address discontent and anger in simplistic terms and position themselves as saviours of the people who feel "left behind."

Roche further *positively presents* the Suidlanders as the protectors of the vulnerable: women, the elderly, and the "non-able bodied." This also serves to reinforce the "normative construction of the heteronormative *Boer* as the head of the family" reflecting the "traditional values" of the Suidlanders characteristic of traditionalist nationalism (Knoetze, 2020: p. 57). Roche is also

implicitly reinforcing the post-apartheid discursive construction of the *platteland* as a haven, or natural home of the Afrikaners in contrast to the "built-up" crime-ridden urban areas, which are likely to face crisis first. The below extract sees Roche again stress the populist tropes of crisis, in combination with other strategies:

**Extract 4:** We thank you for listening, and we urge you please prepare. Prepare legally, lawfully, decently and respectably. Prepare with your heritage, and your forefathers, your culture and your civilization in mind. We are not maniacs, we are decent people, who can see the writing on the wall. Let's prepare together. Together, we will be stronger (Roche, 22 May 2018, 12:10).

Roche uses several discursive strategies in this extract, including *nomination*, *positive self-presentation*, *intensification*, *mitigation*, and *metaphor and fallacy*. The pronoun "we" is used in the first two incidences to refer to the Suidlanders, and but also refers to a broader in-group identity in the final sentence - "we will be stronger." Roche reminds the *behoudende* to prepare for civil war with strong morals, listing values to *intensify* his message and present the Suidlanders as virtuous Christians. He further reinforces his message encouraging his followers to prepare by referring to the historical foundations of the *behoudende* characteristic of post-Blood River nationalism - ancestry, culture, and civilization. However, this message also embodies the *logical fallacy* of the *appeal to tradition*, as Roche implies that everything about the common history of the in-group is "good" when, in fact, it includes slavery, apartheid state-sanctioned murder and so forth (Van Vleet, 2011: p. 17). This *appeal to tradition* reflects the nostalgic escapism of post-apartheid Afrikaner victimhood – as Roche appeals to his followers to prepare with a romanticised past "where they [whites] were in control" (Van der Merwe, 2001: p. 161). Roche follows this appeal for preparation by contrasting *mitigation* and *positive self-presentation* by arguing that the Suidlanders are "not maniacs, but decent people." Roche's nebulous use of the metaphor "we can see the writing on the wall" reflects populist tropes of crisis, but there is no elaboration as to what this "writing" or outcome is, creating a fallacy of "alleged certainty" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2017: p. 103). The following extract again demonstrates populist rhetoric and ambiguity, but also portrays the Suidlanders as an *authority figure* for outgroups using the discursive strategy of the *denial of racism*.

**Extract 5:** We Suidlanders, we conservative whites, we Christian right-wingers in South Africa are not unique in believing that our country is headed towards a severe crisis. Many population groups around us are taking note of the preparations that we're making and they're making their own... Trust me there are many many such examples that I alone can give you, and I'm sure Mr. Muller and our manager Koenie Maria and can as well, of other population groups saying, "hey how do we get involved, how do we participate if we can't be a member of your organization." (Roche, 26 May 2018, 2:33).

The above extract illustrates the discursive strategies of *nomination*, *intensification*, and *positive self-presentation*. Roche does not use the term *behoudende* to describe the in-group, but instead highlights three groups which fall under the umbrella of the overall in-group: conservative whites, Christian right-wingers, and Suidlanders. This expanded in-group remains grouped by the recurring categories denoting sameness: whiteness, shared religion and conservative politics. Roche uses *intensification* and *positive self-presentation* to present the Suidlanders as the leading prepper organization, noting that "many, many" other South African population groups seek to emulate Suidlanders preparations. Roche's unverified anecdote also serves as an implicit "*denial of racism*" strategy. It can be assumed that the other "population groups" are not white, as the last sentence asserts that they cannot be members of Suidlanders, a white-only organization.

However, despite their knowledge of Suidlanders' racist membership policy, the unspecified groups purportedly cast this racism aside, as they view the Suidlanders' prediction of impending crisis to be a result of astute political foresight as opposed to racist tropes of *swart gevaar*. Put differently, if non-white groups support the ideas of the Suidlanders, the Suidlanders cannot be racist. Roche's subtle "Othering" reflects the apartheid government's strategy of using euphemisms to denote racist policies like "separate development," and Verwoerd's famous description of apartheid as "a policy of good neighbourliness." Moreover, echoing Verwoerd's positive presentation of apartheid, Roche consistently highlights that non-white South Africans *support* the Suidlanders, and wish to join them. This obscures the Suidlanders' whites-only policy and inherent fear of the "Black Other" through portraying themselves as objective political forecasters supported by all population groups, rather than being racists.

This section demonstrated Roche's discursive construction of in-group identity is dominated by nomination strategies which reflect colonial and apartheid conceptions of nationalism - the belief

in a Christian Afrikaner *volk*, conservative politics, and the supremacy of whiteness. Importantly, Roche's discursive strategies of *intensification* also exhibit elements of populism, such as his recurring references to the inevitability of crisis or breakdown, although this is compounded by apocalyptic interpretations of Siener Van Rensburg's prophecies.

### The construction of factions in the national in-group

In contrast to the signifiers of group identity highlighted previously, in this section the analysis shows how Roche demonstrates that the construction of difference and sameness is more nuanced than creating two oppositional, monolithic wholes, as factions can exist *within* a constructed in-group. Kotze (2012) explains how internal differences in Afrikaner organizations were historically commonplace - as exhibited by the short life of the *Ossewabrandwag* and Nazism during World War II. Welsh (1996: p. 257) echoes this assertion, arguing that the failure of the far-right in the 1990s reflects the inability of groups to "agree upon *any* long-term policy goal, let alone strategy." Kotze (*ibid*) asserts that right-wing groups in the 2010s faced similar problems, notably a lack of ideological cohesion, personality clashes, and a lack of centralization. The Suidlanders' disdain of Afriforum and the Vryheidsfront and their recent disputes with the AWB, illustrate the continuity of this problem (Eyes on the Right, 2018). The extract below sees Roche identify Afriforum as such a faction within the in-group.

**Extract 6:** We know very well, that Afriforum is an organization allied to what Nikolaas [Siener] van Rensburg called the *Doringbos*. However, the simple truth is that Afriforum has not exaggerated the farm murder crisis, they have understated it (Roche, 22 May 2018, 00:46).

Afriforum exemplifies many of the categories Roche describes as necessary to be a part of the in-group. Afriforum's website describes the group as "a trustworthy Afrikaner interest organization and civil rights watchdog which forms part of the Solidarity movement" (Afriforum, 2021). As mentioned in Chapter 2, an analysis by Van-Zyl Hermann (2018) described Solidarity as a social movement characterised by racist populism. Afriforum has internationally advertised the so-called "white genocide," and states that its organizational culture is based on "Christian values" (Afriforum, 2021, McKenzie & Swails, 2018). Moreover, one of their slogans is "Protect Your Culture" echoing Roche's sentiments in Extract 4 (Afriforum, 2021).

However, Roche *negatively presents* Afriforum as being allied to the *Doringbos* (thorn tree), a term which he defines in a later video to mean "left wing, establishment, globalist, whites" (Roche, 18 September 2018). Roche cites the prophet Nikolaas (Siener) Van Rensburg as the inventor of the term, thus reinforcing its legitimacy through the discursive strategy of *appealing to authority*. Roche provides no evidence for the claim that Afriforum is part of a globalist or left-wing plot, nor does he reveal why it would understate the farm murder crisis. Rather, Roche uses the discursive strategy *positive-self presentation* by showing Suidlanders as an authority on "farm murders" and Afriforum's activities, as they know "the simple truth" about "farm murders," inferring they have access to information that others don't, and that they "know very well" that Afriforum is a *Doringbos* organization.

It is important not to dismiss non-ideological factors to Roche's disdain of Afriforum. Afriforum has enjoyed far more mainstream political success than Suidlanders, both globally and locally. Afriforum have a larger membership than Suidlanders, enjoy larger revenues from membership fees, and have a more sophisticated economic structure, providing legal and financial services (du Preez, 2018). In sum, Suidlanders sell a specific ideology, and Afriforum are their more successful competition, and it is within the Suidlanders' interest to condemn their opposition to attract followers and funding, and represent itself as the true leaders of the *behoudende* (Lewis, 2018: p. 1). A further grievance Roche has with factions of the in-group is their perceived indecisiveness and lack of conviction, as demonstrated below:

**Extract 7:** People have also been exposed to the narrative of the *draadsitters* [fence sitters]. We all know what that narrative is - On the one hand - *Ek is lief vir my Boerevolk* - [I love my Boer people], on the other hand reconciliation rainbows and all of this stuff - you don't need me to explain that nonsense to you (Roche, 25 June 2018: 1:57)

This extract sees Roche use the discursive strategies of *nomination*, and *false dichotomy* to condemn a faction within the in-group he terms *draadsitters* – or those who “sit on the fence” with regard to a political issue. Roche's twice uses *nomination* – first using “we” to identify the Suidlanders and its followers, and “*Boerevolk*” to highlight the in-group more generally. Roche then uses a *false dichotomy* by arguing that condemning “farm murders” and supporting reconciliation are incompatible sentiments, without explaining the underlying logic. However, it



can be assumed that Roche believes that the *Boerevolk* should disavow the New South Africa as a betrayal of divine blessing that the Afrikaners should live separately from other races as a sovereign *volk* (Spangenburg, 2020: p. 4; Cloete, 1992: p. 45). Moreover, Roche's disdain for the "reconciliation rainbows" (a sarcastic reference to the Rainbow Nation) embodies Gallagher and Winddance's (2014) assertion that "anti-racism and multiculturalism are often prime targets of racist discourses". This is illustrated in the extract below where Roche articulates the same false dichotomy:

**Extract 8:** We know full well that the ostensible political representatives of white and Afrikaner interests in South Africa have been speaking with a forked tongue for many years. On the one hand they say "oh farm murder is no good, but we love the new South Africa, the spirit of Nelson Mandela reconciliation - we should try harder" - blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah. You only have to go and look in the archives of the things that Afriforum and the *Vryheidsfront* have said over years and years and years and years... forked tongue (Roche, 13 August 2018, 7:24).

In this extract, Roche uses the discursive strategy *intensification* through twice using the idiom (once in an abbreviated form) "they speak with a forked tongue," to negatively present Afriforum and *Vryheidsfront* as duplicitous actors, which do not represent white and Afrikaner interests. Roche further dismisses their views as meaningless through the *intensifier* "blah-blah." The implications of this statement indicate that Suidlanders are further to the right on the political spectrum than Afriforum and *Vryheidsfront*, and that Roche sees his organization as the true representatives of the *volk*.

Roche attempts to foreground his objectivity by suggesting that the audience view "the archives" again using the discursive strategy of *intensification* ("years and years") to demonstrate the abundance of evidence which demonstrate Afriforum and *Vryheidsfront*'s deceitfulness. However, Roche does not specify where these archives can be found. Roche uses the same *false dichotomy* in the dichotomy in this extract as in the previous one, but refers more specifically to Afrikaner political actors as opposed to *draadsitters*. Pretorius (2014: p. 25) points out that accusing former apartheid leaders as being sell-outs was a common occurrence by the far-right in the early 1990s, reflecting nationalists' fear of "not belonging" in the new South Africa, and fearing having to abandon their identity to remain in the country.

This section has demonstrated that the Afrikaner in-group is not a static discursive construct, and experiences internal instability, reiterating Wodak's (2015, p. 94) assertion that "identity and identities are dynamic, fluid and fragmented; they can always be renegotiated according to socio-political and situative contexts." However, it is useful to recognize the nuanced ways in which Afrikaner far-right extremism and nationalism are fractured, as this complicates the conventional discursive construction of an in-group as a unified entity. This following section demonstrates that the discursive construction of the Other is equally dynamic.

## The construction of the Other

This section will demonstrate the discursive strategies Roche uses to construct the out-group – which often reflects Hall's assertion (1994: p. 216) that the in-group sees itself to be everything the out-group is not. Interestingly, just as the in-group is factionalized, dualism -indeed multiplicity - also feature in the construction of the Other. This following extract demonstrates that Roche presents the Suidlanders as an authority figure for the unspecified "outsiders," and portrays the out-group ambiguously.

**Extract 9:** People are panicking, not our members, not the people who know the plan - but the outsiders. They are terrified, they want an answer now. If they send an email at ten o'clock, they expect to reply by quarter past ten. They simply don't understand that we are deluged, we are inundated - by thousands and thousands of people across South Africa asking us for advice and for information (Roche, 25 June 2018: 6:45).

The above extract sees Roche contrast *positive self-presentation* and *negative other presentation*, among other strategies. Roche represents Suidlanders positively as calm and prepared in the face of uncertainty, whereas the unspecified "outsiders" are panicked. This contrast is strengthened by the discursive strategy of *nomination* which separates an in-group ("our members") with the out-group ("the outsiders"). The *outsiders* are unspecified – they are likely a cross-section of different racial groups, as Roche mentions in Extract 4 that "non-whites" also seek to participate in Suidlanders' preparations. This makes the out-group, in this instance, difficult to specify, as those contacting the Suidlanders could be concerned white Afrikaners. Roche uses *intensification* to demonstrate how many people are attempting to contact the group using the verbs "deluged," and "inundated" and *hyperbole* to describe how it is impossible to respond to the volume of

enquiries. Suidlanders are a fringe organization - it is unlikely that the number of people emailing amount to "thousands and thousands." The identity of the out-group is ambiguous in this extract, but is identified explicitly below:

**Extract 10:** You'd have to be a fool, you'd have to be an absolute fool, to say that everything is hunky-dory in the new South Africa, and those minor blemishes which may exist are the responsibility of white people. It's just silly... it is clear that the crisis that the country is in now can be laid fairly and squarely at the door of the African National Congress (Roche, 20 September 2018, 5:06).

In the extract above, Roche uses several strategies to designate the ANC as part of the out-group. Roche uses *euphemism* and *intensification* to minimize the responsibility whites have in causing "crisis" in South Africa, as they are only responsible for "minor blemishes," which "may" exist, pinning all responsibility on the ANC. This embodies the discursive strategy of "*shifting the blame*" and "*victim-perpetrator reversal*." Roche pays no attention to the role whites played in creating a so-called "crisis" through centuries of colonialism and the apartheid system, from which they continue to reap the rewards. Roche uses several instances of *intensification* ("a fool, an absolute fool;" "it is just silly, it is clear") as well as the *idiom* "laid fairly and squarely at the door", to contrast *negative-other presentation* and *positive-self-presentation* and create the binary of an in-group and out-group. This is not a new representation of this binary, as Griffen (1999) demonstrates that the Afrikaner nationalists have been pinning "negative development" in South Africa on the ANC since the democratic transition and creating the narrative that "the New South Africa *is the problem*, rather than that the New South Africa *has problems*." Whites are presented as the real victims in the new South Africa, subjected to the incompetence of the black-majority government. The next extract reinforces the victimhood of Afrikaner and white populations' characteristic of post-apartheid era, pinning all responsibility for violence on the black out-group:

**Extract 11:** It is your police force, your armies, and your own controversies and firearms that are perpetrating these murders. This is where we have to begin the discussion right at the bottom. For too long our people have been acquiescent because we were brow-beaten, cowed, bullied into believing that we were wrong. We were wrong if we were Afrikaners, we were wrong if we were *Boere*, we were wrong if we were white, we were wrong if we were male, but the time is coming now, when we have to say this law doesn't make sense - that government policy doesn't make sense (Roche, 13 August 2018, 6:33).

Roche uses a *discursive strategy of nomination* by identifying the out-group through using the pronoun "your" followed by *intensification* by listing all the organs of state responsible for murders. This use of *negative other-presentation*, absolves the in-group(s), which Roche lists in full, of responsibility for these crimes. Roche uses *victim-perpetrator reversal* and several emotive verbs to *intensify* his assertion that the in-group(s), (which are among the most socio-economically privileged in South African society), are the real victims of government policy, and have been dismissed and oppressed due to their identity. This is reflective of Sharples and Blairs' (2020) assertion that "claims of 'anti-white racism' are underpinned by the belief that white national identity is under threat." Roche's discursive strategies in this extract represent a combination of *nationalist* and *populist* discourse – Roche asserts that "the time is coming now" for the "people" to stand up to the government elite, reinforcing this necessity through the portrayal of post-apartheid white victimhood. The extent of this victimhood is embodied by Roche's factually incorrect claim in the next extract that the out-group, or the government, is conspiring to kill white South Africans.

**Extract 12:** Suidlanders will not speak forever and ever and ever about the farm murders because it's not our mandate. Our mandate is to prepare for an impending civil war in this country, a civil war that has been promised to us by no less than the Minister of Defence, who three days after black Monday in on the 31st of October last year, said that if white South Africans protest like that again - peacefully by the way, no rape, no murder, no burning of buses, no torching of schools, no setting fire to municipal offices - they will cause a civil war and they will bring a genocide upon themselves. This is the reality in which we are living, not because I say so, but because the government of the Republic says so (Roche, 22 May 2018, 10:49).

This extract uses multiple discursive strategies, some simultaneously. In the opening sentence, Roche uses *intensification* by repetition to demonstrate that the Suidlanders are more concerned with civil war than "farm murders" ("forever and ever and ever"). To Roche, the problem facing whites is larger than "farm murders," which are a *symptom* of an inevitable civil war – as stipulated by the prophecies of Siener Van Rensburg.

Roche contrasts *positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation* – by claiming that whites protest "peacefully" without "rape, murder...etc.," - the perceived characteristics of how the unspecified Other protests. This marks an example of both *predication* and *intensification* – it

is a fair assertion that Roche is attributing these characteristics to black protestors, alluding to the apartheid tropes of the *swart gevaar*, or that blacks are inherently dangerous (Pretorius, 2014: 31). This presentation of black protestors also uses the rhetorical device of *stereotyping*, homogenising their protest strategies as dangerous and unlawful.

Moreover, the extract demonstrates an example of *misinformation*. The claim Roche makes about what the Minister of Defence, Nosiviwe Mapiswa-Nqakula said following Black Monday is untrue. The Minister did not say "they [whites] will cause a civil war, and they bring a genocide upon themselves." Rather, in a television interview with South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Mapiswa-Nqakula stated: "My view is that here you have people who are inciting racial divisions. Here are a people who have no clue of what a war can do in a country" (Nqakula, 2017). It is therefore apparent that Roche's statement is spurious and misleads the audience into adhering to the Suidlanders' political agenda, that there is a state-sanctioned genocidal plot against whites. However, it is important to note that Mapiswa-Nqakula also strengthens the Manichean "Us/Them" binary with the strategy of *nomination* – as she refers to the protestors as "a people" – an outgroup. In this way, we can see that the creation of the in-group and the out-group is constructed by both poles of the binary. The following extract complicates Roche's discursive construction of the out-group, as he acknowledges black people's intelligence, albeit in an underhand fashion.

**Extract 13:** These guys are not as clueless as they might seem. We white people are very quick to criticize black people and to call them stupid and to say can't they see what they're doing, and all this kind of stuff - come on guys give them a little bit of credit - they didn't get to where they are whether you like it or not by being the idiots of the bunch (Roche, 20 September 2018, 12:00).

This extract, which uses the discursive strategies of *perspectivisation*, and *mitigation* and *nomination*, demonstrates that Roche's perception of the government is more nuanced than the previous extract suggests. We can see that Roche uses *perspectivisation* and *nomination* by using the phrase "we white people." Upon assuming this group identity, Roche uses *mitigatory*, underhanded admissions to admit "these guys" (presumably the government elite), are "not as clueless as they might see," and are "not the idiots of the bunch." Although Roche's claim is *fallacious*, as he is not a representative of "white people" as a whole – it is worth noting that

Roche's suggestion to the audience that "that they [the government] deserve a little credit" acts outside of the *positive self-presentation – negative other-presentation* binary. The below extract demonstrates a further deviation from the presentation that the in-group is everything that the out-group is not, as Roche acknowledges the intelligence of the constructed Other more sincerely:

**Extract 14:** The African National Congress and very much more importantly the South African Communist Party and very very very very very much more importantly the people in the back corridors of the South African Communist Party, the intelligentsia of the South African Communist Party are truly truly, truly bright, shrewd, sly-cutting perspicacious people, and they are deploying every ounce of intelligence that they have into the situation which may seem to you and me just to be chaos, just to be anarchy, just to be inept, completely incompetent and incapable - it's not - they are a wolf in sheep's clothing (Roche, 20 September 2018, 12:34).

In this extract, Roche uses *intensification* and a combination of *positive other-presentation and negative other-presentation* strategies Roche repeatedly compliments the ANC, and more so the "intelligentsia" of the SACP using the discursive strategy of *intensification* - listing complimentary adjectives and repeatedly using the grammatical intensifiers with the adverbs "very," and "truly." However, Roche follows these assertions with the strategy of *negative-other presentation* – as he conspiratorially qualifies that these qualities are being used for larger nefarious intentions and refers to the SACP with the idiom "a wolf in sheep's clothing." Roche suggests that the SACP are using a strategy of diversion by deliberately constructing an environment of uncertainty and "anarchy" for the purposes of a broader agenda. This conspiratorial approach is heightened by the fact that the SACP is a marginal political actor in South African politics and does not participate independently in national Elections. Roche's sentiment reflects the apartheid-era paranoia regarding communism, which was seen as the antipathy of Christian nationalism, as demonstrated by the rhetoric of the AVF, mentioned earlier. Apartheid Prime Minister and President P.W. Botha (1978-1989) popularized the idea that white South Africa was facing a "total onslaught" by the communist alliance of the SACP, and ANC. The concept of "total onslaught" demonstrated the joint threat of the "*rooi gevaar*" (red [communist] danger) and "*swart [black] gevaar*" (Cloete, 1992: pg. 43).

This section demonstrates that the discursive construction of the out-group is more multifaceted than the binary representations of difference. In some instances, Roche uses explicit binaries to differentiate the Other from the in-group, such as presenting black South Africans as inherently violent protestors unlike peaceful whites. In this case, Roche's strategy of presenting the in-group and out-group in binary terms is characteristic of Hall (1994) and Said's (1985) interpretation of "Othering" and Hulmes' (1986: p. 49-50) concept of "stereotypical dualism." However, Hulmes' conception of "stereotypical dualism" is taken a step further, given that the Other is then itself split into "camps" representing oppositional categories, "its good and bad sides" (Hall, 1994: p. 216). Roche uses Hulmes' strategy more subtly to portray the Other. On the one hand, he portrays the ANC as to blame for the country's problems and the black masses" as fundamentally violent. On the other hand, Roche compliments the ANC, by claiming that they are shrewd leaders, who "didn't get to where they are by being the idiots of the bunch." However, Roche's conspiratorial thinking of the ANC and SACP as "wolves in sheep's clothing" reiterates the populist notion that the elite is fundamentally corrupt and seeks to undermine "the pure people" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012: p. 8).

Roche is subtle when describing the outgroup, and never refers directly to "the blacks," nor does he use racial slurs. This is likely an attempt to not alienate more moderate prospective supporters, as well as being mindful of YouTube's Hate Speech policy. Thus, it is evident that Roche's strategic use of *mitigation* makes his rhetorical style more insidious than explicit racism would do.

### The construction of the transnational in-group

This chapter has thus far discussed the discursive strategies used to construct an in-group, the fractured character of the in-group, and the internal Other. The use of the discourse-historical approach to examine the *internal differences* within a group identity is necessitated by Roche's discursive descriptions of his adversaries within Afrikaner nationalism. Existing scholarship which uses the discourse-historical approach to interrogate the discursive strategies of nationalism and populism usually restricts its analysis to the construction of in-group and out-group identity at the *national* level. However, an analysis of the corpus reveals that Roche is

equally concerned with fostering a *transnational* in-group identity, which faces a common fight with an *external* Other. As these extracts will demonstrate, Roche situates the Suidlanders within a transnational white Christian movement, which is united against a nebulously described “globalist enemy.”

**Extract 15:** We wish you [the Americans] everything of the best in your endeavours to build a truly conservative hardcore in the USA. You are keeping your culture, traditions, history, and people alive single-handedly - and I look forward to speaking on this exact theme of what you guys are in a sense, single-handedly...what small groups are doing... when I am back in the USA in two months' time (Roche, 27 July 2018, 10:08).

Identifying the discursive strategy used in the above extract is more complicated, as Roche uses the strategy *positive self-presentation* in a transnational context. Roche identifies common goals between the "conservative hardcore" in the United States and the *behoudende*, as mentioned in Extract 4: "prepare with your heritage, and your forefathers, your culture and your civilization in mind." This suggests an alliance, a transnational *collective* identity of a threatened white majority fighting for survival. Therefore, a cross-border conception of the in-group can be observed. This is emphasised by Roche's statement that he will be visiting the United States in two months' time to praise, advertise and endorse the activities of the “conservative hardcore” and to talk about what “other small groups” like the Suidlanders are doing to preserve their way of life. The below extract provides further evidence that Roche situates the Suidlanders in a transnational movement, albeit more indirectly.

**Extract 16:** Many of our supporters in the USA support us because we're an embattled minority, but they have no interest in the prophecies or in our biblical guidance. By contrast there are even supporters in the USA who are conservative Christians but who are slightly uncomfortable with anything to do with race. By contrast again, we've received support from black people in the USA who've written to us and said – I am so and so - there was a gentleman called Mr. Howard, somebody other who sent me a few long emails declaring his passionate support for us (Roche, 18 September 2018, 1:46).

Roche uses *intensification* to demonstrate that American allies express support given that the Suidlanders are an "embattled minority," reflecting the strategy of victim-perpetrator reversal characteristic of post-apartheid collective fear victimhood. Hill (2018) argues that despite white people being the demographic majority in the United States, white supremacist Americans



support the Suidlanders, as they believe the plight of the white population in South Africa to be “a microcosm of what is possible in the United States.” Roche acknowledges that American support for the Suidlanders is diverse – as some allies are more interested in racial solidarity than religion or prophecy, whereas others are "slightly" uncomfortable (*mitigation*) to involve themselves in racial issues. Interestingly, Roche implicitly uses the discursive strategy of *denial of racism* by asserting that the Suidlanders also receive support from black Americans, naming a "Mr. Howard" thus reiterating the strategy highlighted in Extract 5. This anecdotal evidence intensifies the authenticity of Roche’s claim that white people are an "embattled minority" as this oppression is recognised by a member of the black outgroup. The extract below marks a further example of a transnational cause and introduces a new element regarding how Roche distinguishes between the in-group and the out-group: pseudo-science.

**Extract 17:** Try on YouTube - I can't remember the full title of the video but if you search Professor Edward Dutton "Mutants" - in other words the mutation of genes as manifested... you know, as it's realized. Genes mutate and so the person you could describe as a mutant - people who are abnormal. Brilliant. If you want to learn - it's a fantastic thing, so that's all I wanted to tell you about - Professor Edward Dutton - very educational and very beneficial for us on the right wing of the conservative Christian Caucasian cause in the world (Roche, 31 October 2019, 2:00).

The video Roche is referring to is entitled *The Rise of the Spiteful Mutants* (reuploaded on 13 October 2019), an interview with Dutton published on the now-defunct YouTube channel “On The Offensive.” This was hypothesised due to a similar title referred to by Roche, and the fact that it was reuploaded on a different channel two weeks before Roche discusses it. In the video, Dutton espouses a range of pseudo-scientific theories, in which he argues that "spiteful mutations" hinder the survival of genetic groups. Dutton refers to the rejection of nationalism, "deviant sexuality," feminism, multiculturalism, and the decline of religiosity as genetic mutations, and argues "that they influence their society to destroy itself." Dutton argues that higher levels of religion are beneficial for society, which likely explains Roche's consistent praise of Dutton and his ideas as well as his endorsement of the video as "beneficial" for the transnational "Christian Caucasian cause”. Roche's praise of Dutton is the only time Roche embraces pseudo-science in the corpus, and he does so promote a *global* racial-religious cause.

This section has illustrated that Roche situates the Suidlanders in a *transnational* alliance, based on shared race, politics, and religion. More specifically, while the national in-group is predicated on a specific construction of Afrikaner national identity, the transnational in-group privileges *whiteness* as the primary common denominator, with politics and religion secondary. The construction of a common *enemy* or out-group – the globalists – acts as a further unifier of the transnational far-right, as is demonstrated in the following extracts.

### The construction of the transnational Other: the globalists

Globalism is generally understood to mean the "cultural conditions of globalisation," such as free trade, interconnectivity, and the free movement of people, which anti-globalists perceived to be the foundational ideas for the dominance of multilateral institutions like the United Nations and European Union (Hermannson et al., 2020: p. 26). Globalism has been used by many in the far-right as a euphemism for the long-standing antisemitic conspiracy theory that Jewish elites control global institutions, but more generally to describe an elite cabal seeking to destroy white Western civilization through the free movement of people and trade (ibid, p. 24; Sommerlad, 2018). "Globalist elites" quickly became the invisible nemesis of the far right and were described by conspiracy theorist and former *Infowars* host, Alex Jones, as a secret cabal of corporate and political elites controlling a "global digital panopticon system" (Stack, 2016).

Hermannson et al., (2020: p. 29) explain that this oxymoronic global anti-globalist alliance has been enabled and fostered by the internet, which has allowed people to communicate, network, crowdfund and propagandize with increasingly sophisticated methods, such as the use of cryptocurrency and encrypted chats. This has created a "white *ethnoscape*" which frames descendants of white Europeans across the world as a diasporic community, and "the struggles of each Western nation to that of all people of Western European descent (Hermannson et al., 2020: p. 26)." These developments further reinforce the sentiments that white civilization is under threat by "outside aliens" calling for the need to foster transnational far-right to protect the integrity of a (mythologized) "white, Christian, European heritage" (ibid).

In this way, anti-globalism signifies a type of *transnational* populism – as it pits the “people,” – a far-right alliance – against an amorphous global elite. Globalism adds a new dimension to the discursive construction of the in-group and out-group – as Roche strategically describes globalists in vague terms, creating the sense that they could be “anything and everywhere.”

**Extract 18:** The crisis in South Africa is being ultimately precipitated by globalist liberalism. It's not difficult now to find the evidence, no more is it a matter of conspiracy theories, neurosis, hysteria, hyperbole, polemic and paranoia. Now it's a matter of simply looking for the evidence. It is there to be found, and if you're in any doubt, if you need clues, if you need evidence, if you need to be pointed in the right direction, go and look at the archives of our website (Roche, 18 June 2018, 7:20).

In Extract 10, Roche asserted that "it is clear that the crisis that the country is in now can be laid fairly and squarely at the door of the African National Congress." However, in Extract 18 above, Roche pins responsibility for the national crisis on "globalist liberalism," suggesting that the ANC are part of a broader campaign to destabilize South Africa. Roche's identification of globalist liberalism as the “ultimate cause” of the crisis in South Africa is making the case that the Suidlanders are victims of a conspiracy. Roche uses a discursive strategy of *intensification* by listing several qualities that his claims are *not* (including conspiracy), paradoxically creating a sensationalized effect when attempting to demonstrate the rationality of his claims. Roche tempers this through using a strategy of *positive self-presentation* by claiming that Suidlanders are an objective source, and that their followers should seek the information they need on their website – which does not actually have archives (Suidlanders, 2021). This extract marks an example of "*strategic ambiguity*," described by Eisenburg (1984: p. 230) as "situations in which ambiguous communication can be more helpful than clear communication, particularly in periods of rapid change and uncertainty." This is how Roche pins uncertainties on an undefined Other, “the globalists” when he is unable to explain or predict events. This strategy is also used to create a sense of urgency and impending doom. This discursive strategy is reflected in this extract below:

**Extract 20:** But we urge you Mr. Ndlozi not to look at us if you look at us - you are looking at the puppets. We are the puppets, the servants, of God Almighty. Just as the ANC are the puppets of the globalists. My job is to speak on behalf of Suidlanders about what is happening in the country - but if you imagine a puppet show in front of you, Punch and Judy - show the two little characters bashing one another. I'm standing there commenting on what's going

on stage but there's a man standing behind me, a man by the name of Mr Gustav Muller, who is talking about the puppet master (Roche, 18 June 2018, 6:11).

Roche is referring to a parliamentary speech by Mbuyiseni Ndlozi of the Economic Freedom Fighters, where Ndlozi argued that the EFF were facing false claims of planning a genocide against white people, due to the land expropriation without compensation debate (Daniels, 2018). Ndlozi did not name any organization specifically in his speech, but Roche assumes he is referring to the Suidlanders. Roche makes unverified claims that Ndlozi should not view the Suidlanders as right-wingers propagating a conspiracy theory and uses *positive self-presentation* to portray Suidlanders as pious Christians, and "servants" of God, reinforcing a post-Blood River conception of Christian nationalism. Rather, Roche argues that the *real puppets* are the ANC, as they are puppets of the globalists. Roche uses *metaphor* to liken the ANC to Punch and Judy, puppet show characters which first appeared in 17<sup>th</sup> century England (Speaight, 1995: p. 200). Roche continues the puppet metaphor by suggesting that while he observes current events on South Africa's "stage," Suidlanders' leader Gustav Muller analyses the presence and power of an unspecified "puppet master," presumably the ANC's globalist leaders. This echoes the globalist rhetoric that "shadowy forces" are sabotaging countries or preventing the right-wing from gaining momentum (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Moreover, it is well documented in the literature that populists have a propensity for engaging in conspiracy theories (Bergmann, 2018; Müller, 2016; Wodak, 2015).

**Extract 21:** Worldwide, the globalist powers are cracking down on anything that is remotely right-wing as hard as they can. Now is a time for us, excuse me, to come together, to stand together and to look after one another. Because if we don't look after ourselves, and after one another, after our people nobody is going to do it for us. We urge you to keep your fingers on the pulse of what is happening in the world, there are big things happening, things which do not bode well for our people. Please wake up, arise, stand together, we don't have much time left. (Roche, 29 May 2018, 1:59).

Roche uses strategic ambiguity and *intensification* and *nomination* to make the case that the right-wing is under worldwide threat by globalists. He does not elaborate who the globalists are, or the methods they are using to "crack down" on the right wing, therefore using *strategic ambiguity* to mobilise the Suidlanders' followers. Roche broadly refers to the "big things"

happening on a global scale which threaten "our people" – which could be interpreted as the transnational far-right globally, and the Suidlanders and its followers nationally. Roche urges unity, emphasising that the Suidlanders are an “embattled minority”, as no one will come to their aid.

In this section, the analysis has shown how Roche uses several discursive strategies to construct the in-group and out-group, using *intensification*, and an exaggerated rhetorical style to disseminate ideas which can be considered an intersection of traditionalist Christian nationalism, and transnational populism. Roche also alludes to a broader transnational “people” which he describes as the “Christian Caucasian cause in the world,” which is facing the existential threat of globalists.

## Chapter 5: Discussion

### New forms of the old *laager*

Roche's discursive construction of the national identity of the Suidlanders reveals recurring themes: the dominant discursive constructions of colonial and Afrikaner nationalism, which valorise shared race (white), political ideology (conservative, right-wing) and religion (Christian). Roche consistently identifies Christianity, whiteness, and conservative politics as the unifiers of the *behoudende*. He uses the term "*Boerevolk*," a term central in Afrikaner nationalist consciousness following the Battle of Blood River. He stresses that the Suidlanders have a duty to God to protect "our people" in the event of a crisis and to maintain the integrity of the *volk*. In this way, Roche's emphasis on traditional elements of Afrikaner nationalist identity creates a bridge from the old to the new, making the Suidlanders' apocalyptic survivalism appear to have historical roots within Afrikanerdom, a strategy compounded by the mythological figure of Siener Van Rensburg.

In this way, Roche constructs a narrative of a "collective political history" and “collective memory,” what Halbwach (1985) referred to as "the selective recollection of past events which are thought to be important for a specific community” such as “myths of genesis and origin

(Blood River), mythical figures (Siener Van Rensburg), times of flourishing and prosperity (apartheid), and decline, defeat and crisis (the post-apartheid era)(de Cillia et al., 1999: p. 158).

The Suidlanders' interpretation of the "decline, defeat and crisis" period described by Halbwach is embodied in the "Afrikanerdom under threat" narrative of post-apartheid, which can be considered a manifestation of the nostalgia, victimhood and collective fear and assertiveness described in much of the literature of post-apartheid identity. The victimhood of the Suidlanders personifies the "*laager* mentality" – or a self-defensive, "ideologically impenetrable enclosure" which disavows accountability for their past role in structuring the South Africa they despise (Van Schalkwyk, 2004: 268).

The Suidlander stronghold in the rural Northern Cape, which Roche often refers to as "the *Boer Kaap*" represents a return to the mythologized *platteland* romanticised in post-apartheid Afrikaner-identity – Vanderkloof is presented as an Afrikaner micro-republic. This seeks to present the Suidlanders as the colonial *Boer* characterized by the "heroic suffering and resistance" of the *Voortrekkers* (Van der Waal & Robins, p. 2011: 265). The remote, rural outpost of Vanderkloof represents what Van der Westhuizen (2018) terms "enclave neo-nationalism" - an anachronistic, segregated den of a victimized group which protects their power and privilege. Rather than attempting to build a more equitable country, the Suidlanders seek to compensate for the anxieties of losing political power through attempting to reconstruct themselves as "the new minority", or the "new oppressed." As Berich (2018) explains: "You want to be the victim, you don't want to be the aggressor, or you will get no sympathy."

The Suidlanders position themselves as the "new Other" which needs to be "defended, salvaged and protected" (Shome, 2000: p. 368). The intolerance of difference and the existential threat of the "black savage," as expressed in the farm murder conspiracy creates the imperative to form a self-protective *laager* or "safe zone." This need for a *laager* echoes and embodies mythologies of the heroic *Boer*, as at The Battle of Blood River. The Suidlanders offer themselves as the saviour of *Boerevolk*, which will protect the *behoudende*, during the inevitable race war. In this way, Roche counterbalances a *politics of fear* – which presents black South Africans as dangerous "others" who pose both an existential and material threat to *behoudende*, with a

stubborn, nostalgic sense of pride. As Roche boasts to a journalist visiting Vanderkloof: “welcome to the safest place in South Africa” (Pogue, 2019).

The self-defensive outpost of Vanderkloof represents a key distinction between Suidlanders and other forms of far-right extremism in the final phase of apartheid in the late 1980s and 1990. Organizations like the AWB were based on “aggressive nationalism,” and launched offensive and terrorist tactics to defend the *volk* (McKenzie & Swails, 2018). The Suidlanders’ Emergency Plan reflects a combination of assertiveness and self-defensiveness – again, representing the metaphor of the *laager* – with the Suidlanders’ safe zones acting as wall of defence against the onslaught of the Other. But, unlike others, Suidlanders, according to their history and their online pronouncements, will only attack in self-defence.

### Ideology or opportunism?

Roche's frequent use of the catch-all term “globalism” should be considered a key component of a discursive construction of *ambiguity*, as the globalists represent an unknown enemy, allowing Roche to label internal political opponents (such as Afriforum) and external political opponents (including the ANC and the mainstream media) as “globalists” without providing evidence. Moreover, Roche is eager to situate the Suidlanders in a broader transnational movement, referring to the “conservative Christian cause in the world”, and praising the American far-right for “protecting their culture, and keeping traditions and history alive” (Extract 15).

Transnational solidarity between the Suidlanders and their foreign allies is further fostered by shared beliefs in the superiority of white civilization and the threat of “the globalists”. It also feeds into Western fears that the alleged purging and murder of whites in South Africa represents the existential threat facing the white race in all former British settler colonies and in white nations (Moses, 2019: p. 208).

Opportunism is also a factor that cannot be discounted when considering Roche's use of discursive strategies and particularly his instrumentalization of the ambiguous concept of “globalism”, an idea which gained increased currency in the right-wing political mainstream during Donald Trump’s presidency (2016-2020). It was then that globalism became a useful term

to the Suidlanders. Roche has represented the Suidlanders on several fundraising trips, and it is within the Suidlanders' interest to exhibit their shared hatred of globalists through selling the Suidlanders' ideology to foreign patrons. Roche's complimentary remarks about the American far-right in Extract 15 could therefore be considered a financially strategic move, as American individuals and groups donate substantial sums of money to the Suidlanders. This can be clearly seen in a video the Suidlanders released entitled "Thank You" (27 July 2018) where Roche expresses his gratitude for the generosity for American donations which sometimes amount to several thousand dollars. Their international English website provides donors five methods of donating, including cryptocurrency, and transfers through the American bank, Western Union (Suidlanders, 2021).

This malleability of key terms in the Suidlanders' ideological lexicon demonstrates their opportunism in capitalizing on potentially profitable trends in far-right ideology. An example of the mutable use of the term *Doringbos*. In an Afrikaans article posted on the Suidlanders' website in 2015 – the term *Doringbos* was attributed to Siener Van Rensburg, who allegedly used it to describe "*n nie-opregte blanke tussentydse regering*" - or an "insincere black interim government" (the ANC) which would rule South Africa prior to the race war (Suidlanders, 2015). By contrast, in a Suidlanders YouTube video posted 3 years later, Roche defines the *Doringbos* as "left wing, establishment, globalist, whites" (Roche, 18 September 2018). This complete change of meaning should not be considered arbitrary, but deliberate. Roche's rearticulation of *Doringbos* simultaneously echoes a narrative endorsed by the Suidlanders' international allies, who in many cases are Trump supporters. It also makes globalism accessible to his local audience by presenting the idea through the recognisable lexicon of Siener Van Rensburg's prophecies. Roche's misleading use of language reflects Sartre's (1944) comments on the flawed logic of the Anti-Semite: "it is their adversary who is obliged to use words responsibly, since he believes in words." To Roche, words are a means to further the Suidlanders' political agenda, and potential weapons for profit making.



## Identities in flux

An issue which arises from this analysis is that of the changing nature of Afrikaner identity. This reflects the dynamism of the discursive construction of identity, and reiterates Fairclough's (1989, p. 89) assertion that discourse is a "site of social struggle." The Suidlanders claim to represent the *behoudende* and its offshoots but dismiss any other group which claims to do the same. In this way, Roche attempts to "establish one version of the world in face of competition" (Bloor & Bloor, 2007: p. 15).

One of the key questions that arises from this analysis is who is a "true" Afrikaner? The fragmentation of Afrikaner identity in the post-apartheid era is explained by Goodman and Schiff (1995: p. 46) who highlight that: "If Afrikaners lie down on their couches and talk about what it means to be an Afrikaner, one thing leads to another, until they contradict each other and start pointing fingers at who is and who is not." Serfontein (1990) elaborates on this debate, asserting that Afrikaners began to identify as separate groups in the final years of apartheid. Descriptions proliferated including Afrikaners, Afrikaans-speaking whites, the Afrikaner *volk*, *Boere*, South Africans, and Afrikaans-speaking Africans. Moreover, some "Afrikaners" disavow their Afrikaner heritage entirely and become "Anglicised" (ibid). Serfontein's point is reflected by Roche's own identity, as he has professed that he is *not Afrikaans* in the *ethnic* sense but is of Irish descent (Young, 2019). Roche's heritage negates the concept of *volkseie* - translated as "the nation's own" – or "the pure identity that would be left when all others – had been exteriorized (Steyn, 2004: p. 149)."

The fact that Roche occupies a position of senior leadership in the Suidlanders demonstrates the extent to which the Christian nationalist conception of *volk* has mutated. The Suidlanders use terms that aim to demonstrate that they are the representatives of the true Afrikaner people (e.g., *Boerevolk*, *behoudende*), but the face of their organization is not Afrikaans by lineage, even if their spokesperson is fluent in its language. This highlights the *fluidity* and contradiction of Afrikaner identity in the post-apartheid era and provides a good example of de Cillia et al's. (1999: p. 154) assertion that national identities should be understood as "dynamic, fragile, vulnerable and often incoherent." As during apartheid, the historical struggle for supremacy

between English and Afrikaner nationalists over the dominant conception of whiteness is superseded by the alliance against the *swart gevaar*, which marks an existential threat to all white people. This is reflected by this use of the term “white genocide” in *addition* to “Boer genocide.” This logic has been extended to the international stage – whiteness has become the greatest unifier of the Suidlanders' cause.

## Conclusion

The “mainstreaming” of far-right politics in recent times has been demonstrated by the increasing prevalence of right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in Western Europe and North America (Mudde, 2019). This has rightly led to a substantial response in scholarship on the far-right, which has largely limited itself to these areas, inevitably leaving a gap in the literature on far-right politics in the Global South, specifically in South Africa (Van Zyl-Hermann, 2018: p. 2674). The perceived delusional or “laughable” politics of far-right actors might also have left them ignored in academic scholarship (Lyster, 2018). This downplays the potential threat of organizations like the Suidlanders, which are fuelled by the conspiracy theories of “white genocide,” racially targeted “farm murders” and doomsday prophecies. Given the historical propensity of far-right actors for violence, a renewed focus on the relevant histories, ideologies and rhetorical strategies of the contemporary South African far-right is crucial.

As a progressive-oriented methodology of “political intervention,” the discourse-historical approach provides a useful means of bridging the gap between context and discursive constructions *difference* and *sameness*, allowing a close-reading of the “micro-politics” of far-right actors – or “how they actually produce and reproduce their ideologies and exclusionary agenda in everyday politics” (Wodak, 2015: p. 23). This analytical framework enables the understanding of far-right discursive strategies necessary to *disrupt* them, and thereby further the emancipatory aims of critical discourse analysis (Sengul, 2019: p. 388). We should therefore heed Sengul’s (2019: p. 88) assertion that “communication research should not be treated as peripheral, but core to understanding far-right politics.”

I have argued that discursive constructions of political ideology and their historical roots are manifested in the political communication strategies of political leaders. This dissertation has demonstrated the ways in which, in the universe of far-right politics, the ideology and identity of the Suidlanders is simultaneously contemporary and historical.

As has been demonstrated, discursive strategies are used to espouse a contradictory cross-section of ideologies and identities – from atavistic conceptions of Afrikaner Christian nationalism from the 19th century to the evocation of collective victimhood in the post-apartheid era, to the transnational, anti-globalist populism of the internet age. The spokesperson for the Suidlanders privileges the historical and ethno-cultural sanctity of the Afrikaner nation, although he himself does not have Afrikaans lineage. He finds a sense of belonging and allyship in transnational far-right movements which view white South Africans as the diaspora of Western civilization, and as part of a white supremacist alliance. These findings highlight shortcoming of the discourse-historical approach, as while it acknowledges the “instability” of national identity, it *underestimates* to the extent to which discourse is a “site of social struggle,” which can result in the construction of *multiple* in-groups and out-groups which have varying motivations (de Cillia et al., 1999: p. 154; Fairclough, 1989: p. 89). Interdisciplinary studies on the internal factions of the far-right in South Africa, and the transnationalization of the far-right should therefore be welcomed.

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### **Endnotes:**

[1] The *Boeremag* were an Afrikaner right-wing extremist terrorist group which detonated several bombs targeting black South Africans in the Soweto township in 2002. The group were adherents of the prophecies of Siener Van Rensburg and used their interpretations of his visions to justify violence (Mitchell, 2019: p. 82). In 2007, police probed links between the *Boeremag* and the Suidlanders, after three trialists referred to themselves as Suidlanders, and documents containing a Suidlander oath were found on a *Boeremag* member's computer (IOL News 2007). Furthermore, the emblem used by the Suidlanders, has also been used by the *Boeremag*. In 2014, in an unrelated case, Suidlanders leader Gustav Muller was linked with The Mangaung bomb plotters, two men jailed for sabotage after conspiring to blow up the ANC's 2014 National Elective Conference in the Free State Province. Suidlanders were not charged in either case (Selebi & Van Den Berg, 2013; Herskovitz, 2012).

[2] When a person's racial background was uncertain, a pencil was placed into their hair, and their head shaken. If the pencil fell out, the person was categorized white. If it remained, the person was classified as Coloured (Watson, 2007, p. 65).

[3] On the EFF: The Economic Freedom Fighters, emerged in 2012 under the leadership of disgraced ANC Youth League President Julius Malema, and styled itself as a radically leftist party representing - "the people" of the disenfranchised, black poor. The EFF quickly became the nemesis of the right-wing, due to its radical socialist policies and often racially inflammatory language. As President of the ANC Youth League, Malema's controversial singing of Zulu and Xhosa anti-apartheid song "Dubul' Ibhunu" (Shoot the *Boer*) at a 2009 public meeting led to him being taken to court and the song being subsequently banned by the High Court for hate speech (BBC, 2011). In 2016, the South African Human Rights Commission investigated Malema after receiving four complaints of hate speech. One of the incidents involved an address to EFF supporters where Malema stated: "we are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now." The Commission found that although offensive, the statement did not legally constitute hate speech, and all charges were dropped (Mthethwa, 2019).

On Land expropriation: racial disparities in land ownership remain significant in the post-apartheid era. According to the South African government's 2017 Land Audit Report, 72% of farms and agricultural holdings were owned by whites, who constitute 9% of South Africa's population (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2018). In 2018, the ANC supported the EFF's motion to amend the constitution to allow for expropriation of land without compensation for the purposes of redistribution of white-owned land to black South Africans. As of July 2021, the Expropriation Bill has not passed, and some analysts have labelled it political point-scoring, and an attempt by the ANC to cover up its own failings in addressing black landlessness (Merten, 2017; 2018, 2021).

[4] The "farm murder" conspiracy theory has been endorsed by several far-right figures like Anne Coulter, Katie Hopkins, Lauren Southern, Alex Jones, Christopher Cantwell as well as high-profile politicians like former Australian Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton and former United States President Donald Trump (McKenzie & Swails, 2018).

[5] The myth of "white genocide" conspiracy theory has several manifestations and has a long history in far-right circles. Levine-Rasky (2018) asserts the roots of the conspiracy theory can be traced to the idea of "race suicide," promoted by European and American pseudoscientists and intellectuals in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The thesis of the theory posited that "racially-inferior immigrant races" would outbreed the "superior Anglo-Saxon races, leading to the white race dying out." In the mid-1990s, French writer Renaud Camus outlined a similar idea, that growing immigrant populations in Europe would amount to "genocide by substitution." The latter interpretation was used as a justification by the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooter and several other right-wing extremists (Gartenstein-Ross & Hodgson, 2021: p. 10). The belief in population replacement or the "dilution of the white race" has also been endorsed by the Suidlanders (McKenzie & Swails, 2018).

[6] Articles were sampled from Pretoria News, The Sowetan, The Weekend Argus, the Daily Maverick, the Mail and Guardian, the Weekend Post, and the Star, and are available in the bibliography.

[7] Refer to endnote 1.

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# Appendix

**Table 1: Transcribed videos**

CORPUS				
	Date	Title	Minutes	URL
1	22 May 2018	Simon on Farm Murders	12:49	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lk4A7is_axs&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=180">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lk4A7is_axs&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=180</a>
2	24 May 2018	Simon tells us about Suidlander radio config.	2:48	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWYOFwyUcOw&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=179">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWYOFwyUcOw&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=179</a>
3	25 May 2018	Simon with some advice about prepping	7:28	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivddEOK-iDU&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=178">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivddEOK-iDU&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=178</a>
4	26 May 2018	Simon tells a story about race	4:42	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugB2ramPcOc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=176">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugB2ramPcOc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=176</a>
5	29 May 2018	Simon Roche on Tommy Robinson	2:57	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyPfkCE-awM&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=175">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyPfkCE-awM&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=175</a>
6	4 June 2018	Simon Roche on Staying Calm	6:09	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vs5JCNTMRP4&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=172">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vs5JCNTMRP4&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=172</a>
7	16 June 2018	The Facts are important	4:55	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpQ_F4aCTxQ&amp;t=5s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpQ_F4aCTxQ&amp;t=5s</a>
8	18 June 2018	South African Intelligence Agencies take note	10:28	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9TJUKYr6f0&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=171">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9TJUKYr6f0&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=171</a>
9	21 June 2018	Suidlander Talking About Suidlander Activity	6:58	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBk1803F9yc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=170">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBk1803F9yc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=170</a>
10	25 June 2018	Watch this to avoid panic	11:14	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rGE---2Ogk&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=167">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rGE---2Ogk&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=167</a>
11	10 July 2018	Important points on Land Expropriation without Compensation	33:27	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TJtNb4-Phk&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=166">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TJtNb4-Phk&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=166</a>
12	10 July 2018	The facts are important	4:55	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpQ_F4aCTxQ&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=165">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpQ_F4aCTxQ&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=165</a>
13	17 July 2018	Our plan for the end of the year	4:06	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xmjZs6fwPME&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=164">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xmjZs6fwPME&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=164</a>
14	23 July 2018	Consider this while prepping	3:02	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tqgxNh0SjM&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=163">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tqgxNh0SjM&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=163</a>
15	27 July 2018	Thank you	11:10	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pouP2fBaoWg&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=162">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pouP2fBaoWg&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=162</a>
16	2 August 2018	Suidlanders view on Secession	8:42	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucxVmoPi4Mk">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucxVmoPi4Mk</a>
17	13 August 2018	South Africa and Gun Control	15:12	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFCiYOufdfo&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=159">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFCiYOufdfo&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=159</a>
18	3 September 2018	For this reason, beware	5:16	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1s4mkRpfWCA&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=156">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1s4mkRpfWCA&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=156</a>

19	6 September 2018	This is why we are so open	5:06	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6uLC5n9qqE&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=155">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6uLC5n9qqE&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=155</a>
20	8 September 2018	About Tommy Robinson and Money	6:21	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moo5qF7dZyg&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=154">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moo5qF7dZyg&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=154</a>
21	17 September 2018	What a leaked state security agency report says about Suidlanders	7:20	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2UYEysQVNZI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=152">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2UYEysQVNZI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=152</a>
22	18 September 2018	Concerning our meeting with the Germans	7:05	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qaODxMYmgdY&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=151">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qaODxMYmgdY&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=151</a>
23	20 September 2018	They're saying now, what we've been saying all along	16:00	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJYR1IWTZSU&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=150">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJYR1IWTZSU&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=150</a>
24	1 October 2018	An urgent message concerning our training	7:08	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6aE6Nj64pHE&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=148">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6aE6Nj64pHE&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=148</a>
25	1 November 2018	Dangerous media	4:26	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fZiPXE2ns8&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=147">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fZiPXE2ns8&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=147</a>
26	1 November 2018	Vanderkloof Get Together Activities canceled but still welcome to visit	4:47	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_8dsNlfoSI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=145">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_8dsNlfoSI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=145</a>
27	29 November 2018	Storage Space in a Safe Area	3:32	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4OK-wfeMbb0&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=143">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4OK-wfeMbb0&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=143</a>
28	1 December 2018	Things are getting worse	13:57	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecl1w7LTxj4&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=142">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecl1w7LTxj4&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=142</a>
29	12 December 2018	Some points on expropriation without compensation	11:35	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiY1Em3oUAc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=140">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiY1Em3oUAc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=140</a>
30	1 January 2019	Suidlanders stance on genocide	11:33	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vd2h1q7cHI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=139">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vd2h1q7cHI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=139</a>
31	3 January 2019	What is happening to farm prices?	12:34	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_195aXtWCxo&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=138">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_195aXtWCxo&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=138</a>
32	7 January 2019	How we work with our info	10:02	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A3ZM-JwlrHs&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=137">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A3ZM-JwlrHs&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=137</a>
33	30 January 2019	A message from Simon out of the US	7:40	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQ5uJRUE9zc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=135">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQ5uJRUE9zc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=135</a>
34	14 March 2019	The dangers of an Eskom Blackout	10:56	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRzRSMY0seI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=131">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRzRSMY0seI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=131</a>
35	18 March 2019	We're in no competition while saving lives	7:51	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1WpS8ex3J4&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=130">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1WpS8ex3J4&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=130</a>
36	19 March 2019	Quick Eskom Update	1:56	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUPh0NOfpu4&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=129">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUPh0NOfpu4&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=129</a>
37	20 March 2019	Another Eskom Update: The Power Lines from Mozambique	2:03	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQh4v20shds&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=128">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQh4v20shds&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=128</a>
38	21 March 2019	Eskom update: tweet from Magnus Heystek	2:39	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D82r7PxbheA&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=127">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D82r7PxbheA&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=127</a>

39	29 March 2019	Get departments in order	7:50	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cQ6D-43hOQ&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=126">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cQ6D-43hOQ&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=126</a>
40	17 June 2019	Plans for a European Tour	9:03	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Smj3NBftcNE&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=123">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Smj3NBftcNE&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=123</a>
41	3 September 2019	Consider the consequences	5:51	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MoxVTwivCaI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=119">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MoxVTwivCaI&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=119</a>
42	9 September 2019	European tour (fixed tour)	4:01	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=utudJjTbppE&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=118">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=utudJjTbppE&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=118</a>
43	10 September 2019	Tough times lie ahead for South Africa	15:01	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cGQMZfCFMug&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=117">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cGQMZfCFMug&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=117</a>
44	14 September 2019	Tough times worldwide	12:50	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Q6TX2aghGk&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=116">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Q6TX2aghGk&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=116</a>
45	25 September 2019	More media lies	8:56	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WCiiuYrghY&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=113">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WCiiuYrghY&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=113</a>
46	28 October 2019	Some feedback from the USA	2:59	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeUSza6Klic&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=109">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeUSza6Klic&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=109</a>
47	28 October 2019	Another quick US update	2:57	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sH_mM0u8DNk&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=108">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sH_mM0u8DNk&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=108</a>
48	29 October 2019	The class of the right-wing in the US	2:36	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVl_rHgyr4U&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=107">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVl_rHgyr4U&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=107</a>
49	31 October 2019	Recap on World Economy Issues	2:56	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIV24v-Xlfc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=105">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIV24v-Xlfc&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=105</a>
50	31 October 2019	A mention to Prof Edward Dutton	2:53	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZcRRpEmfg&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=106">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZcRRpEmfg&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=106</a>
51	1 November 2019	Expect a big announcement from us in the future	2:30	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZvsvk2EdU&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=104">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZvsvk2EdU&amp;list=UUjcNtFJSzCjj-bfJidqbJMw&amp;index=104</a>
			6 h 25 m	




**Table 2: Word concordances from corpus**

Position:	Noun	Frequency
1	people	291
2	south Africa/n/s	212
3	thing(s)	99
4	time	98
5	Suidlanders	94
6	years	76
7	USA / United States	69
8	land	68
9	crisis	65
10	thing(s)	55
11	“ladies and gentlemen”	54
12	media	54
13	day	52
14	world	51
15	Mr. Muller	49
16	country	48
17	organization	48
18	money	47
19	plan (v+n).	47
20	year	47
21	video	43
22	government	41
23	national	40
24	fact	36
25	members	36

Personal pronoun	Frequency
You	724
<b>We</b>	584
I	264
<b>They</b>	222
He	93
She	8

**Figure 1: An example of one of Roche's videos**



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