CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of International Relations

Master's Thesis

2021 **Amedeo Gasparini**

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Selected elements of global politics: Theoretical aspects, common threads, and empirical divergences in three "liberal" International Relations' approaches

Master's thesis

Author: Amedeo Gasparini

Study programme: International Relations

Supervisor: Doc. PhDr. Jan Karlas, M.A., Ph.D.

Year of the defence: 2021

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on May 1st, 2021 Amedeo Gasparini

References

GASPARINI, Amedeo. *Selected elements of global politics: Theoretical aspects, common threads, and empirical divergences in three "liberal" International Relations' approaches.* Praha, 2021. 105 pages. Master's thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of International Relations. Supervisor: Doc. PhDr. Jan Karlas, M.A., Ph.D.

Length of the thesis: 258.965 characters with spaces, 37.912 words.

Abstract

Liberalism encompasses many disciplines. Individual freedom, free-market capitalism, republican form of government, and rule of law are considered to be among its main pillars. The Thesis illustrates an original analysis of three partial "liberal" theories of International Relations (IR) – referred to as "approaches" because of their interdisciplinarity – and their main scholars' considerations *vis-à-vis* important selected elements of global politics, with peace as the general background. The three analyzed approaches are Economic Liberalism, Democratic Peace Theory, and Democratic Realism. Keeping into account their differences, traditions, and purposes, the approaches are operationalized through five subchapters – institutions, free-market, international law, conflict intervention, and nationalism – to prove their compatibility, non-contradiction, and possible juxtaposition *vis-à-vis* these features. Despite some "empirical differences", while looking at the selected-IR issues, the approaches have "common threads", and this is visible when the three frameworks and their top-selected scholars are confronted with the elements. After a general introduction on liberalism, a definition of peace in IR, and a quick overview of Peace Studies, the three approaches are presented in their theoretical formulation, along with their main content, inspirational figures and theorists, salient literature, and weaknesses. These are the theoretical tools that will allow understanding the approaches' positions and thoughts on the selected IR features. Together, the three approaches can be defined as "liberal" since they share a commitment towards the individual, free trade, interstate cooperation, rule of law – but also the similar concerns on the international institutions and law, conflict, war, security, and autocracies. However, most of all, along with freedom, it is their link to the background issue and desirable outcome, the "invisible guideline" of peace, that – with limits – ties them together.

Keywords

Liberalism, International Relations, Economic Liberalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Democratic Peace Theory, Democratic Realism, Peace, Freedom, International institutions

Title

Selected elements of global politics: Theoretical aspects, common threads, and empirical divergences in three "liberal" International Relations' approaches

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to those who in many ways helped me during this Thesis, which started in early June 2020.

My family, that unconditionally always supported me throughout my Master's experience.

Doc. PhDr. Jan Karlas, M.A., Ph.D., whose opinions were appreciated, and the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University, particularly Mgr. Viera Martinková, Ph.D.

William Kristol, who helped a young student from across the ocean.

My friends Pietro and Giovanni, for the support.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Liberalism is a complex, universalistic, harmony-based, pluralist doctrine, encompassing International Relations (IR), economics, politics, and philosophy. Liberalism is concerned with cooperation, freedom, and peace, which allow states to flourish and thrive in the international system and among them. Liberalism shapes political realities and foreign relations, and in each of its versions, it is essentially based on four issues. First, the centrality of the individual, which is regarded as the ultimate owner of its self-determination, personal liberty, dignity, human and inalienable rights. All individuals are born with natural equality – however, this does not mean they were born in the same material conditions or that their achievements should be the same; they have personal preferences based on rational economic self-interest. The second characteristic is free trade based on the free-market regime, providing widespread society's wellbeing, forged on competition, openness, and states' interdependence, with opposition to mercantilism, protectionism, and State centralization. The third element is the assumption of intrinsic peaceful cooperation among actors, based on mutual respect and tolerance between them; low conflicts' occurrences, war-adversity, collaboration within the international institutions. The fourth characteristic is constitutionalism, based on rule of law and, formal division of powers, legal barriers, checks and balances. The liberal State is often based on the liberal-democratic republican form of government, opposed to the authoritarian ruling, built on the State's role limitation in the citizens' life and activities, regulated by free elections, and constraints to the majority's rule.

Liberalism in IR proposes itself as a theory promoting peace, cooperation, democracy, and freedom both nationally and internationally, idealistically aiming at a peaceful world order (Burchill 2013). For liberalism, peace is the normal state of things in IR (*ibid.*), where individuals and states are free agents and rational utility-maximizers (Watson 2017). Son of the Enlightenment, liberalism is against political and economic hegemony and favors cooperation and institutionalism, as well as it emphasizes agents' preferences (Moravcsik 1997), and participation in/of the international institutions. States' goals evolve (Zacher-Matthew 1995) and actors' constellations of interests must deal with states' power (Hasenclever *et al.* 1997), but peaceful cooperation among them may help to solve policy concerns. Liberalism puts faith in institutionalism since institutions

incentivize structures and mechanisms inducing states to cooperate (Chernoff 2004) to achieve their goals. Thus, liberalism favors multilateral governance: international, interconnected, and interdependent global organizations influence national interests' perceptions and shape actors' expectations (Richardson 2017). According to liberalism, institutionalism, democratization, and economic interdependence promote peace (Chernoff 2004). Like liberalism in IR, political liberalism – whose task is to govern over diversity (Fukuyama 2020) – proposes itself as a force of cooperation, with emphasis on freedom and individuality. Its incarnation in the government, liberal democracy, satisfies basic human needs, making liberalism more durable than other regimes (Fukuyama 1995).

Peaceful coexistence among states is impossible if people live under constant threat of force (Rand 1967). Thus, in liberal democratic states, physical force is banned from human relationships; only the State manages it (*ibid.*). Promoting a harmonious and peaceful society, where free people and states coexist in accord with others, is among liberalism's linchpins. However, peace cannot exist without freedom and the presence of war – irrational and unnatural (Burchill 2013). War and conflict can be cured «with the twin medicines of democracy and free trade» (*ibid.* 61). As Montesquieu (quoted in Polachek 1997, 307) said, «peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent: if one has the interest in buying, the other has the interest in selling; […] their union is founded on the mutual necessities». Trade potentially helps nations towards pacific interactions. Panke and Risse (2016) say that if nations are interconnected through trade and investment, they are not likely to go to war since thus would disrupt their mutual gains; «trade does not flourish on the battlefield» (Rand 1967, 34). Liberalism values commerce because is a social coolant (Holmes 1993) prompting the pathway to freedom and peace in IR. States' economic interdependence helps them to remove conflict's motives (Gartzke-Li 2003) and theoretically discourages the actors from using force against each other. Furthermore, «the spread of market would place societies on an entirely new foundation […]. Trade would create relations of mutual dependence which would foster understanding between people» (Burchill 2013, 66). *Laissez-faire* and a free-market economy contribute to reducing war outbreaks since they are positive incentives augmenting people's wealth (Huntington 1984) and offering solutions to global problems (Williams 2017). Classical economic liberalism was against monopolies, mercantilism, and protectionism, and wanted to end royal charters granting

privileges just to the few (Fulcher 2004). This witness liberalism's concerns *vis-à-vis* the State, which should not intervene in the exchanges among nations and people. In each of its declination – IR, philosophy, economics, and politics – liberalism stresses the idea of peace as a possible and rational way to self-interest. Thus, there is no need for conflict among actors. Wealth and power are not fixed.

In IR there is no official definition or description of liberalism (Doyle 1986), which, however, is not associated with human perfectibility (Gray 1986), and stresses freedom. Many IR theories can be mixed with it – from constructivism to institutionalism –, as well as political elements – from peace to idealism –, and economic factors – from cooperation to trade. Liberalism is a flexible and heterogeneous framework, not in contradiction with other theories of IR. Socially, politically, and economically relevant, it is multifaced (Stein 1990), based on the faith in individuality, rationality, the human capacity to improve (Devetak 2017) and to realize greater personal freedom (Zacher-Matthew 1995). Thus, liberalism can be analyzed in conjunction with other subjects. This Thesis intends to show that different "liberal" theories in IR – with different stories, traditions, priorities, and concerns – may coexist with each other without being in contradiction among themselves while dealing with the complex world of IR. Rather, different IR theories may have common aspects and share insights over some issues. Liberal theories aim and are oriented to freedom and peace, and they do not necessarily contradict each other when analyzing IR's realities; thus, they are comparable and compatible. The Thesis shows how three relatively "liberal" theories of IR are coherent *vis-à-vis* selected elements of global politics. The first proposed theory took into consideration is Economic Liberalism (EL), an economic theory; broad field condensed here in classical economics (based on Adam Smith) and benefits of peaceful free trade (based on Norman Angell) plus internationalism. This third element differs from scholars to scholars and is based on Neoliberal Institutionalism (NI), by theorists such as Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (who add rationalism) and Andrew Moravcsik (who adds neoliberal intergovernmentalism). The second theoretical framework is the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), an official IR theory; based on Immanuel Kant's and Woodrow Wilson's liberal legacy in global affairs, revised by Michael Doyle (focused on Kantian-republican liberalism), but also Rudolph Rummel, (focused on commercial liberalism). The third IR approach is Democratic Realism (DR), an informal foreign policy framework; based on

economic neoliberalism and political neoconservatism. Beyond these two aspects some add realism (Charles Krauthammer); others liberal institutionalism (Francis Fukuyama); others globalism (William Kristol and Robert Kagan). The three theoretical approaches and their scholars have connections with liberalism in IR and are examined in their differences ("empirical divergences") and similarities ("common threads") concerning their vision of selected IR-elements. These issues of global politics are watched in the Thesis through the three theories' and their scholars' lenses, making differences and similarities emerge. Juxtaposing and operationalizing the approaches in the light of features of IR not only shows that these frameworks are compatible and connected to liberalism, but it also clarifies their orientation towards peace. The following scheme summarizes liberalism in IR's interdisciplinarity in relation to the three approaches.



Liberalism is the crossroads of many traditions (Richardson 2017); it privileges interdisciplinarity and is adaptable to many contexts. Indeed, it «provides a general theory of IR linking unrelated areas of inquiry» (Moravcsik 1997, 515) – though marginally, the Thesis includes IR as well as politics and economics. By the way, these fields correspond to the core area the theories are concerned with – DPT-IR, DR-politics, EL-economics. EL is transversal among the frameworks – and is the backbone of NI; DPT is more theoretical (and designed to satisfy academics); while DR, the most informal, has a practical and political significance (designed to for the United States' early 2000s foreign policy). As the Thesis' title suggests, the three theories are referred to as "approaches", and this is *because* of their interdisciplinarity, among IR, politics, and economics – a symbol of mutual integration and possible adaptation to many fields. It was Kenneth

Waltz (1979) who said that realism is not a theory properly speaking, but a set of axioms – the same could be said about liberalism's tradition. Officially defined as a mix of realism and liberalism in IR (Chernoff 2007), DR would appear the group's outcast because of its semi-realist orientation. However, is founder Charles Krauthammer (2004a) takes distances from realism, but DR has undeniable realist features as well as liberal ones. Along with EL and DPT, it can be considered as marginally "liberal" because it shares roughly share with them the four already mentioned elements: the centrality of the individual; the stress of free trade and free-market; peaceful cooperation among states; and rule of law. DR is included in the comparison between typical liberal approaches because of its commitments to liberalism in economics, appreciation of liberal democracy, emphasis on human rights, concerns on international anarchy, contempt for authoritarianism. However, the appreciation of freedom and peace may be considered the main tacit background guideline and desirable condition the three approaches share.

The Thesis' interdisciplinarity rises attention on the interconnections among the three approaches and this testifies the integration and interrelation between them. Indeed, one of the contributions the Thesis might bring to the academic world is that despite the three approaches' literature is abundant, these have never been analyzed together or revised based on the common perspectives and divergences over selected elements of global politics. The approaches belong to different traditions and thus it is interesting examining them in conjunction with some IR-related elements. The operationalization of the three "liberal" approaches *vis-à-vis* IR-selected issues shows not only how the three may be considered "liberal" and closer than one might think, but it also makes emerge similarities and differences in relation to global politics' features. Thus, the Thesis' research question is: how do EL, DPT, and DR – and their main scholars – view elements of IR? Generally, how do the three approaches look at selected elements of global politics? Specifically, what are the theories' theoretical foundations, similarities ("common threads"), and differences ("empirical divergences") and how do they outline IR-related features, with peace and freedom as background? The Thesis consists into four parts. Part 2, "Analyzed Theoretical Approaches", shows a short definition of peace and Peace Studies in IR. Then, it focuses on the three approaches, providing a theoretical insight on their main inspirational figures, literature, features, and weaknesses. Part 3, "Analyzed Empirical Elements", points out the three approaches' differences and similarities *vis-à-vis* five

selected IR-related issues (subchapters): “Institutions and interdependence” (3.1), “Free-market and rationalism” (3.2), “International law and anarchy” (3.3), “Conflict intervention and security” (3.4), and “Nationalism and autocracies” (3.5). Part 4, “Conclusion”, provides also the most common aspects of the three “liberal” approaches.

Throughout the Thesis, there can be some confusion among liberalism“s”. Indeed, political liberalism – European-style conservative center-right vs. American-style progressive center-left – and economic liberalism – classical XVIII century *laissez-faire* based on free-market – accompany the Thesis’ analysis. To overcome the confusion of what is meant with liberalism, the “Table of Liberalism” (Appendix no. 2), presents what liberalism stands for in many disciplines. The Thesis presents some weaknesses. First, a twofold-methodological flaw. The first part of which concerns the interpretation of the authors, and not the interpretation of the theory. The approaches do not always address every IR-related issue (subchapters) per se, thus, some of the positions they maintain concerning the IR topic is occasionally more the interpretation of some scholars, rather than the position of the “theory” itself on the subject. In other words, sometimes, the analysis of Part 3’s five subchapters is more based on the interpretation by the key authors, rather than on the approach itself. However, one must keep into account that the three approaches are highly personalized in their formulation. Thus, it is supposable that the position of the authors will overlap the approach’s position on the specific issue – *e.g.* NI is fundamentally tied with Keohane, DPT with Doyle, DR with Krauthammer. The second part of the twin-methodological flaw is related to the marginal analysis of the author and the generalization. For some IR-related issues, the authors marginally reflect or elaborate on them – thus generalization may be hard to prove. Sometimes it is difficult to qualify the authors’ opinion on a subject as the theory’s position, but this shortcoming is overcome by reporting the opinion of other official scholars that expressed themselves on the issue in question. Thus, to prevent scarcity of insights on a single IR-issue, there are always more authors per subchapter elaborating on the topic.

A second concern of the Thesis is that EL (NI in particular) and DPT are more analytical than normative approaches, meaning that they describe how international politics operates, and not how things in IR work. In other words, they do not prescribe a certain attitude or approach *vis-à-vis* one specific topic, but they simply make a rational description of things and events in IR. On the other hand, DR is practical-oriented and

more normative, meaning that it often prescribes how IR and politics should work *vis-à-vis* political phenomena, and how to behave and act in international politics. However, DR has also some analytical aspects, which are closer to both realism and liberalism. Throughout the Thesis, especially during the analysis of the IR-selected elements in Part 3, there will be an alternation between the analytical and normative frameworks. This mix is purposefully maintained to grasp the full *essence* of the three approaches – without the attempt to modify their nature –, and at the same time to better see how *genuinely* the approaches and their top scholars look at the selected IR-elements. Both from a normative aspect (EL, DPT, and occasionally DR) and analytical (mainly DR). There can be no division between analytical and normative framework, because otherwise, "common threads" and "empirical differences" will not emerge when comparing the approaches' positions *vis-à-vis* the selected issues unless one alters the meaning and content of the theories, which is not this Thesis' goal.

A third and last Thesis' weakness is that while the three approaches say something on the selected elements of IR, there is inevitably a juxtaposition of formal academic IR theories (NI and DPT) vs. an informal foreign policy scheme (DR). This can be problematic since DR is not backed by much official literature and is not fully recognized by many IR scholars (Chernoff 2007). However, mixing official and unofficial approaches reflects the intersubjectivity of both liberalism in IR and the Thesis itself, fostering the concept that the three approaches are compatible with one another. Furthermore, to provide a more theoretical framework to DR and to overcome the approach's inconsistencies, the "Interview to William Kristol" (Appendix no. 1) – one of the accredited DR's scholars according to Chernoff (*ibid.*), met on November 24th, 2020 in an online meeting – can satisfy academic requirements and make up DR's theoretical shortcomings. As anticipated, DR could appear unrelated to the other two more liberalism-oriented approaches, but Chernoff himself (*ibid.*) legitimizes and defines DR as an amalgam of realism *and* liberalism – that is why the Thesis' title includes quotation marks on the adjective "liberal". DR has indeed some liberal features, especially the concern over peace and freedom, liberal democracy, and neoliberal capitalist economy – aka economic rationalism (Slaughter 2017). Furthermore, remember that the main scholar of NI, Keohane (1984) developed his neoliberal doctrine starting from neorealism. Despite this, no one puts in doubts his liberal affiliation. On the contrary, DR's scholars – some of

whom have a liberal orientation – are commonly considered cynical realists. NI has marginal ties and origins with neorealism, but no one complains about it, while DR – which has liberal features – is considered purely realist, thus its ties with liberalism.

2. Analyzed Theoretical Approaches

Since EL, DPT, and DR tacitly deal with peace and peace itself is background feature and desiderate the approaches' conditions, the first part of Part 2 offers a short overview of that subject and Peace Studies, while the second part illustrates the three approaches in a theoretical way, providing the tools which the IR-related features of Part 3 will be watched through. Part 2 illustrates the three approaches – EL (2.1), DPT (2.2), and DR (2.3) – along with an introduction, salient literature, inspirational figures, characteristics, and weaknesses. The theoretical presentation of the "liberal" approaches provides an understanding of the three frameworks, which will be operationalized *vis-à-vis* the five topics in Part 3, to answer the research question. However, Part 3 will not be enough to satisfy the Thesis' objectives: to have a full insight of the compatibility, similarities, and differences among and of the approaches, Part 2's theoretical framework is of capital importance since it already indirectly shows links among the approaches.

The concept of peace – rather a modern invention (Howard 2001) – is crucial in IR and liberalism; it is the desirable condition liberalism and liberal theories aim to. All declinations of liberalism – from politics to economics, from IR to philosophy – show a remarkable interest in peace and freedom. Peace might be looked as a condition for general harmony in liberalism's political, economic, and international dimensions. Peace is an important condition for liberal theories and the Thesis' three examined approaches. Although these latter are ambiguous in identifying peace within a theoretical dimension or main aim, they are concerned with it as a desirable outcome and framework of interaction. Indeed, in liberalism in IR, peace is both a process and a goal (Richmond 2012) and is shaped also through the international institutions, based on norms, and committed to positive relations among actors. Peace is a broad concept, changing across time, epochs, and countries. There are many debates around it (Richmond 2005) and its definition is not agreed by everyone (Galtung 1969). Peace should be distinguished from just peace, utopian peace, liberal peace, or "dictator's peace" (Brunk 2012). Peace assumed many connotations throughout history and disciplines: from the Judaic *shalom* to the Buddhist

karma (Rioux-Neufeld Redekop 2013). Peace can be interpreted for what it is not: neither it is the *Pax Romana* – security achieved through force in the Roman Empire (*ibid.*) – nor peacebuilding or peacekeeping. Peace is an attitude, according to Spinoza (1994), a virtue, a state of mind; the kind manners *vis-à-vis* other actors (Epictetus 2013), the friendship based on trust. Without freedom, there cannot be peace. In peace, people can accomplish goals together without conflict. Here two academic versions, mutually inclusive for a final definition of peace. First, peace is the absence of war or conflict, freedom from fear, and freedom from fear of violence. Peace is concerned with individual survival and it can be the result of power's balance or form of states' government in IR. Peace is opposition to threats (Richmond 2005) and does not entail the absence of insecurity. Second, peace is the prevention of war or conflict and is a settlement of good interstate relations. Freedom from disturbance; tranquillity and quiet in IR. It was Galtung (1969) who coined the term positive peace as conflict prevention (Rogers 2007) and connected it to the concept of positive security. Peace is interpreted as the right state of things in society. Thus, considering these two definitions, a possible final definition might be peace as the simultaneous prevention and absence of war and conflict, both within the domestic and the international system, coupled with the building, within a settlement privileging freedom, of a harmonic way to solve concerns.

As for Peace Studies in IR, they approach a subject – peace – whose interest goes through the centuries (Richmond 2020). Although some do not consider Peace Studies as a proper discipline (Brunk 2012), reflections around it crossed history (Richmond 2005) from Thucydides to Augustine, from Thomas Hobbes to Carl Schmitt, from John Locke to John Stuart Mill, from Immanuel Kant to Norman Angell, from Woodrow Wilson to Johann Galtung. Also, IR-not-related figures such as Thomas Jefferson, Albert Camus, Konrad Lorenz, Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King contributed to Peace Studies (Richmond 2012). There are two main ways to study peace. First, peace can be studied through disciplines that deal primarily with peace itself, such as philosophy, history, political science, or ethics. Peace can be studied concerning democracy (*e.g.* DPT) or economy (*e.g.* EL). Within the disciplines, there are also the main IR schools (Salomon 2012): from realism to liberalism, from constructivism to post-structuralism, from critical to feminist theories (Richmond 2020). Every IR school adds its perspectives to the concept according to its main features – *e.g.* realism would link

peace with power, liberalism with cooperation. Secondly, peace can be studied historically: from the Ancient Greece and Plato's formulations to the theories of Hobbes and the connection with security (Richmond 2005). Throughout the centuries, peace has been regarded as a utopia, an illusion undermined by the states' thirst for power and territorial conquest. With time, peace shifted from politics to academia as an object of study. Peace was an intriguing issue after World War I when liberalism proliferated and was labelled idealism (Fawcett 2017). The League of Nations (established in 1920 as part of the Pact of Versailles) and the Briand-Kellogg Treaty (signed in 1928, representing the signatories' willingness to renounce war as a foreign policy tool) moved towards both attention to peace and peace as the goal in IR. The post-World War I reconstruction was based on liberal-institutionalism, but the end of the 1914-1918 conflict was not followed by the Great Peace (*ibid.*). The study of peace started after World War II, which set the conditions for elaborations and studies that would prevent or analyze the catastrophes produced by the conflict (Rogers 2007). Just as the League of Nations was born after the Great War to reflect on the horrors of the previous four years, from 1945 the United Nations (UN) committed to maintain and preserve peace and security globally. Peace Studies started as an official discipline from the second half of the XX century. In 1959 Galtung founded the PRIO, Peace Research Institute of Oslo, and from that moment on, the discipline proliferated in academia. One of the most important centers for peace, the SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – was born in 1966, while the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* appeared in 1973 (*ibid.*). Awareness of possible conflicts threatening global peace continued until the Cold War's end when with the reduction of the world's great powers, peace treaties have become more common, and threats to peace in the international system stigmatized more than ever.

2.1 Economic Liberalism

It is a broad social discipline simplified here to classical economics (based on Adam Smith's individual and economic freedom) and benefits of free trade (argued by Norman Angell) plus internationalism in IR. This third element differs among scholars: Robert Keohane emphasizes rationalism, while Andrew Moravcsik liberal intergovernmentalism. Liberalism is a reality analysis that «(1) begins with individuals as the relevant actors, (2) seeks to understand how aggregations of individuals make collective decisions […], and

(3) embeds this analysis in a world view that emphasizes individual rights […]. In economics, liberalism 's emphasis […] leads to the analysis of markets, market failure, and international institutions […]; in […] international relations […] it implies attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the reality of strategic interdependence» (Keohane 2002, 45). Against the use of force in every field of its application – war is bad for business and capitalist expansion (Morgan 2007) – liberalism looks for a way where individual actors avoid destructive relations and, instead, promote economic efficiency (Keohane 2002). Classical economics not only prevents warfare-driven disruption (Fulcher 2004), but it is connected to peace. Theoretically, peace promotes free trade and free trade promotes peace (Rosecrance 1986). Baldwin (1993) and Dixon (2004) talk about commercial liberalism, a theory that is not utopian and «does not predict that economic incentives automatically generate universal free trade and peace» (Moravcsik 1997, 528). In a liberal perspective, borders to capital, people, services, or labor are considered economically fruitless (Burchill 2013). Particularly, the "institutional side" of liberalism – NI – keeps into account economic factors within the study of IR. Chapter 2.1 presents EL – a general expression and condition – with reference to NI. EL is a necessary prerogative for NI, which pushes on international institutions and the need for cooperation and interdependence among states, to accomplish actors' rational goals and preferences.

As for the most important inspirational scholars of EL, Adam Smith (1723-1790) is the obvious choice in the classical economic doctrine. He was the father of liberalism in economics, based on individual liberty and bourgeois civil society of the XVIII century. Smith's greatest achievement was to demonstrate that actors' self-interest and greed-driven actions may produce positive social outcomes (Waltz 1979) for the entire society. According to Smith, the free-market entailed the respect of private property, citizens' equality before the law, and the rejection of privileges (Vargas Llosa 2019). Smith, who believed that social harmony and progress were compatible (Berlin 1969), abhorred war and advocated for a self-regulating free market based on individual choice and desires, opposing mercantilism (Steger-Roy 2010), proposing *doux commerce* (Hirschman 1977), division of labor (Mousseau 2000), and *laissez-faire* (von Hayek 1944). This would allow the "invisible hand" to guide personal preferences (Smith 2012 [1776]), as well as assuring labor mobility (Hobson 1915), coupled with borders' openness, and tariffs' elimination. In favor of self-interested action – which possibly leads to peace thank to free

trade regime and market competition – Smith (2012 [1776] 686) explained that as long as a man does not violate the law, he is «free to pursue his own interest his own way […]. The sovereign has only three duties […]: first, […] protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other […] societies; secondly, […] protecting […] every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it […]; and, thirdly, […] erecting and maintaining […] institutions».

Persuaded by the nexus between trade peace – with a close interest in institutions preventing conflict outbreaks and enhancing cooperation among states –, in *The Great Illusion* (2015 [1910]) Norman Angell (1872-1967), explained how commerce and peace were to be preferred to war and instability of the international system. The "great illusion" was the belief that wars were necessary to progress (*ibid.*). Angell worked in a pre-World War I era when the global economy free, internationalism widespread (Howard 2002, Reus-Smit 1999), passports were unnecessary (Rosecrance-Stein 1973): within the then liberal optimism, it was clear that Angell believed that conflict and violence were never the solution to geopolitical, trade, or economic problems. The cost of disrupting economic ties among nations – which is the result of war's outbreak – would not make any sense to him (Owen 1994) and would not benefit anyone. Wars are to be considered anti-economic, irrational, and obsolete since interconnected states could achieve their objectives without resorting to violence (Angell 2015 [1910]). Even if a great superpower invades a small country, Angell (*ibid.*) explains, the first would not get benefits from it. The effects of invasions or conflicts erase benefits since the conqueror cannot destroy the competition of conquered: for instance, if an invader destroys the vanquished population, he will destroy his market (*ibid.*). Interdependence, free trade, and international institutions help the pursuit of cooperation and peace among states, resulting in economic gains for all. War is destructive for anyone.

This is an aspect that Robert Keohane, NI's main exponent, will acknowledge three generations later. In his *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (1984), he explains that since the scope of states' governments has widened in the years, so has the opportunity for conflict. In a neoliberal understanding, war is seen as a negative force (*ibid.*). Starting from neorealist premises and perspective, Keohane uses an institutionalist standpoint to explain possible interstate cooperation, coordination, and interdependence in IR. Interestingly, he develops the concept of hegemony, which relies

on the notion of other states' cooperation. Hegemony can facilitate cooperation among states, but this requires positive commitments to adjust one's policies to meet others' demands – since in a globalized world any country is dependent on the other. Cooperation is thus essential in IR and can help to solve security issues. This is also prompted by international regimes that purposefully fit in the wide and globalized world (*ibid.*). Indeed, in his "Governance in a Partially Globalized World" (2001) essay, Keohane explains how disputes in IR are marginally solved through major interstate cooperation, with the international institutions' help. Globalization is the distance's shrinkage between states and depends on governance. Creating efficient institutions facing globalization is difficult (*ibid.*), especially *vis-à-vis* a growing states' interconnection, which requires effective and proper institutions. This latter, lynchpins of EL and NI, help to limit states' use of large-scale force and costly externalities, as well as provide coordination and information, solve crises and are a guarantee of stability in IR. Global institutions help to "solve things" and help states to achieve goals they could not achieve without institutional mediation; whether the two actors will be effective, depends on mutual collaboration (*ibid.*). NI explains that the institutions provide equilibrium and help to cope within complex realities and to ease possible frictions among states, generated by global interaction (*ibid.*). How to design good institutions, based on states' cooperation and diversity, is a challenge for policymakers, who should privilege interdependence and inclusivity in the international system. In this way, anyone would be potentially better off.

This is also an argument of Keohane's *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (2002) volume. In an open world, interdependence generates gains both for states and non-state actors. International institutions and rules promote states' independence and cooperation. This stimulates Keohane to formulate his "sophisticated liberalism" (*ibid.*), a combination between regulatory politics, commercialism, and, republicanism, put together to tackle the challenges of the globalized world, from a liberal institutionalist perspective. While providing information and regulation, international institutions' role is also to reduce costs within a globalized world. They help states to achieve their gains and to face globalization effectively (*ibid.*). With Joseph Nye, in *Power and Interdependence* (2012) Keohane seeks to build a world politics' liberal modern framework of cooperation based on actors' interdependence, underlying relationships between politics and economics, neorealist power, neoliberal interdependence, and rationalism. Trying to

integrate IR schools of realism and liberalism thanks to the concept of interdependence, Keohane and Nye explain that interdependence and globalization are two different concepts (*ibid.*). In a networked and thick globalized world, international and domestic problems juxtapose one another (*ibid.*); hence, the need for global institutions. States' common membership in institutions can transform IR and prompt more interstate cooperation – which occurs also through the power of information as well as "soft power" (*ibid.*). NI stresses these latter issues, and so does also their broad condition, EL.

International institutions link and provide a bridge between NI and EL. As acknowledged by Lisa Martin in her "Interest, Power, and Multilateralism" (1992) essay, they are important for global economics and states' and citizens' wellbeing. Ensuring peace through commerce is a prerogative of NI and EL, which care about the classical economics' principle such as the Most Favored Nation and non-discrimination in global trade to strengthen interstate cooperation even further, within an agreed pattern of common rules. This is part of the logic according to which economic openness, interdependence among states, and multilateralism emphasize mutual gains among actors. The multilateral posture of EL, NI, and liberalism lowers the costs of interaction among states, especially when they try to solve together complex problems. Multilateralism's beneficial effects help to generate interstate stability (*ibid.*) and require openness and, occasionally, short-terms losses. However, this does not mean that in the NI's tradition states renounce to pursue their preferences and interests. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics" (1997) by Andrew Moravcsik stresses that interdependence in the international system is crucial for the achievement of states' goals. Moravcsik (*ibid.*) presents an innovative analytical liberal theoretical approach, based on internationalism and individual preferences. While proposing free trade, competitiveness, investments, intra-industry trade as winning elements in IR, Moravcsik (*ibid.*) stresses the need for agents of individual preferences, as well as the duty to cooperate in the international system to achieve them. In his attempt to formulate neoliberalism – compatible with NI and EL – Moravcsik (*ibid.* 515) analytically divides indeed ideational liberalism (which «stresses the impact on state behavior of conflict and compatibility among collective social values»), commercial liberalism (which «stresses the impact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals […] in society from transnational economic interchange») and republican liberalism (which «stresses the impact on state

behavior of […] domestic representation») to provide a wider perspective of the interaction between international institutions and economy, trade and freedom, personal behavior and individual preferences in the global system.

As for other theoretical features of EL, free trade and national interdependence play a crucial role in the approach. For some, trade is the path to prosperity and peace among nations, while for others, it is a factor of impoverishment or tension among them (Barbieri 1996). Of course, commerce *alone* «does not ensure peace, but commerce […] within an orderly political framework promotes cooperation based on […] conceptions of self-interest that emphasize production over war» (Keohane 2002, 49). In this, international institutions are crucial, but today «the path to power is through markets» (Zakaria 2012, 121), not military force. This leads back to the liberal Angellian tradition that goes for trade and cooperation instead of conflict and war – according to Moravcsik's (1997) commercial liberalism definition, cooperation leads to more wealth than war does. However, in the long-term, total *laissez-faire* in a globalized world might be short-sighted (Keohane-Nye 2012) or dangerous (see Crouch 2011, Harvey 2003, Klein 2007) and lead to problems in IR, where states might just be interested to achieve material welfare (Mearsheimer 1990). The liberal economic doctrine is based on the individual pursuit of economic self-interest, but outbreaks of conflict can never be excluded. Indeed, there are four propositions about the relationship trade-conflict: «(1) […] that trade promotes peace; (2) […] that symmetrical ties […] promote peace, while asymmetrical trade leads to conflict; (3) […] that trade increases conflict; and (4) […] that trade is irrelevant to conflict» (Barbieri 1996, 30). It is the first that will be considered throughout the Thesis.

Self-interest and actors' preferences – who are atomistic (Grieco 1988) – are stressed in EL. Self-interest has usually a bad connotation and is often contra-posed to global-oriented institutionalism and international institutions. Which, however, are not founded on utopian idealism, but rational self-interest, along with domestic constitutions and international regimes. Keohane (1984) explains that interdependent rational self-interested actors see international regimes as means to increase their ability to get benefits from one another. This is a main difference from the neorealist vision Keohane (*ibid.*) started from. Regimes – agreements on norms and procedures of standards for states – allow satisfying IR actors in terms of personal rational preferences. Regimes favor cooperation among states and help to explain the role of interest in IR (Newell 2017). From a neoliberal

(economic) perspective, preferences are not fixed (Friedman 2007) and are subjected to change. Unlike realist tradition, the liberal conception of power is that «the willingness of states to expend resources […] is itself primarily a function of preferences, not capabilities» (Moravcsik 1997, 523). Moravcsik (*ibid.*) emphasizes the role of preferences in EL and NI. First, preferences underline the primacy of social individual actors who are rational, risk-averse (*ibid.*) and promote the pursuit of personal gain – with unintentional positive repercussions within the system (Smith 2012 [1776]). Second, preferences are crucial to the states, which accordingly orient their policies, aiming to get maximum gain out from cooperation in the international system (Moravcsik 1997). As a notion, globalism plays a crucial role in EL and NI: it does not imply universality but is a type of interdependence (Keohane-Nye 2012) involving transnationally organized networks of interrelation (Keohane 2002); an international economy creating global connections (Wallensteen 2012). Globalism involves «networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances, linked through flows […] of capital and goods, information and ideas» (Keohane-Nye 2012, 225). Globalism must be differentiated by globalization, which is globalism's increasingly thickening (*ibid.*) and is EL's feature *par excellence*. "Globalization" and "economic integration" can be used interchangeably (Gartzke-Li 2003); the former is the result and the promotor of global (economic) interdependence. However, globalism is a powerful force in IR and, along with EL, it is both the playfield and background scenario NI interacts in. Without globalism and progressive globalization, NI's framework would be impossible and unsubstantial.

Within the framework of the so-called "second debate" of IR, according to Moravcsik (*ibid.*), with "his" NI Keohane attempted to reformulate a new theory on liberalism in IR; this one had to respond to neorealism in the IR and geopolitical realm. There are three types of NI (Grieco 1988), connecting liberalism and classical economics: trade liberalism, which presupposes that international trade helps to facilitate inter-state relations (*ibid.*); (Kant's and Wilson's) liberalism, which posits that «democracies based on national self-determination are conducive to greater international cooperation» (*ibid.* 487); and the liberal transaction approach, suggesting that international interactions promote global integration (*ibid.*). NI started challenging realism in the late Seventies-early Eighties. The latter explains that states cannot cooperate because of men's nature (Morgenthau 1973 [1948]), while neorealism attributes this to anarchy in the international

system (Waltz 1979). Realists' pessimism over international institutions is rejected by NI (Keohane 1984). However, Keohane's (2002 3) NI «has nothing to do with the view that commerce leads necessarily to peace; that people are […] good; or that progress in human history is inevitable […]. My liberalism is more pessimistic about human nature». This underlines the fundamental tie with NI's early neorealist starting point, but the approach in general is a neoliberal one since it differs from the realism for the role of the institutions in IR. While establishing differences between "his" liberalism, Keohane (*ibid.*) proposes a neoliberal theory of IR, with EL as background.

According to Keohane (*ibid.*), institutions can help states achieve gains by reducing uncertainty in the international system and the related costs due to barriers to cooperation. Moravcsik (1996) echoes: institutions help states to promote interdependence. According to Keohane (1990 732), international institutions are «connected sets of rules […] that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations». In a very liberal way, Keohane (2002) explains that institutions' creation and maintenance should be encouraged both domestically and internationally. They «provide incentives for the moderation of conflict, […] collective goods, […] promotion of economic growth» (*ibid.* 82). IR and economics are depending on free, transparent, global, and inclusive institutions, which have a significant impact on world politics (Keohane 1990). Two important concepts in Keohane's (2002) NI, tied to EL, are the following. The first is the already mentioned "sophisticated liberalism"; the union of commercial liberalism (which «emphasizes the benefits of the division of labor») and republican liberalism – which «stresses the importance of self-determination and democracy within well-defined boundaries» (*ibid.* 10). Sophisticated liberalism stresses the positive difference that institutions make in IR since they allow easier interstate cooperation. The second aspect of NI is "soft power", «the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction, not coercion» (Keohane-Nye 2012, 216), which is typical of liberalism in IR.

The most important contribution from Keohane and Nye's NI is the concept of complex interdependence (*ibid.*). Interdependence is conceptualized as mutual dependence, resulting in international transactions of people, money, jobs, resources, trade. Nothing guarantees that an "interdependent" relation will always encompass or lead to a mutual benefit (*ibid.*) among actors – despite the liberal tradition explains that individual actors' coordinate action produces mutual gains (Jackson-Jones 2017). Since self-interest affects

others' welfare, the interdependence between actors may produce discord (Keohane 2001). Complex interdependence has three characteristics. First, multiple channels of contact among societies, including informal ties between government and elites, international organizations, and non-governmental actors (Keohane-Nye 2012). Secondly, lack of clear hierarchies of issues (*ibid.*). Finally, the irrelevance of military force, which however may be important in foreign relations (*ibid.*). In EL/NI, international cooperation – and peace – is seen as both a means and a goal. International cooperation is effective when the government's policies facilitate the accomplishment of peoples' objectives (Keohane 1984). However, this intervention should not hamper the individual freedom of choice, especially in the economic realm – individuals or states should not impede other individuals to obtain their good (Mill 2003 [1859]). «Cooperation involves mutual adjustment and can only arise from conflict […]. It must […] be distinguished from harmony. Discord, […] the opposite of harmony, stimulates demands for policy adjustments, which can either lead to cooperation or […] discord» (Keohane 1984, 63). International cooperation is based on reciprocity, which is not a sufficient condition for cooperation (Keohane 1986) but can lead to mutual gains among actors. Openness brings benefits: «reciprocity based on self-interest can generate trust based on mutual experience» (*ibid.* 21), and usually makes it easy for actors to fulfill their goals.

As for the weaknesses of EL and NI, as anticipated, the two should not be confused since they are not synonyms. EL is where NI works and its background condition, meaning that without EL, there would not be any NI possible – this is marginally true also for the other two approaches, DPT and DR. Secondly, there are many critiques to classical economics/EL – particularly to neoliberalism (*e.g.* Crouch 2011, Harvey 2003/2005/2006, Klein 2007) and the so-called Washington Consensus – which will not be addressed in this Thesis, since they are related to economics rather than IR. Third, reasoning just in terms of an individual preferences logic can have its limits in IR, where things are complicated, and everything cannot be explained through rationality or individual economic self-interest. In other words, individuals and states can look for something more than rational preferences (liberal tradition) or power (realist tradition). As for NI, its critical point relies on international institutions, whose role in IR might be too overemphasized by its scholars. Institutions cannot solve all the problems of cooperation in IR and sometimes NI seems to forget this, maybe because of its intrinsic liberal

optimism in relation to possible cooperation among states. They are not almighty and have their interests and preferences, but shortcomings too. Due to the way they are sometimes organized, institutions may be affected by structural fallacies preventing an optimal output in terms of public policy. Institutions might not be as inclusive as they claim to be but might be managed by technocrats (Keohane 2002) with their own interests. Institutions could be dysfunctional and instead of benefitting just those actors and their goals' achievements. It could also be point out that international institutions seem to be unaccountable to anyone: and this could pose legitimacy concerns. However, they remain powerful tools helping to pursue peace, cooperation, and personal gains within the NI understanding and are the premises of smooth interpersonal transactions.

2.2 Democratic Peace Theory

Contemporary liberal theory (Richardson 2017), aka Liberal Peace Theory (Marks 1997) or Republican Liberal Theory (Moravcsik 1997), the DPT is an official analytical IR theory, a powerful liberal contribution to the peace-war debate in IR (Rosato 2003). First set out by Michael Doyle (Richardson 2017), it challenges realists' claims that peace in the international system depends on the balance of power and not the domestic form of government (*ibid.*). DPT finds inspiration in Immanuel Kant's liberal republicanism (Doyle 1986) and his idealistic – but theoretical (Chernoff 2004) – "foreign policy" legacy (Huntley 1996) and economic implications deriving from an open system of republics. Born in the Eighties, DPT finds inspiration in Woodrow Wilson's liberal internationalism (Doyle 1986, Marks 1997) and institutionalism based on free exchange among states and the concept that usually democracies do not go to war and/or against each other – democracies are hesitant to start armed conflict with other democracies. Democratic peace is «the peaceful foreign policy behavior of democratic states towards other democratic states» (Benoit 1996, 637). Capital features of DPT are peace, democracy, interdependence, and international institutions which support one another (Bliss-Russett 1998), limiting the opportunities of conflicts and war. DPT's Kantian legacies have been revised by Doyle, but also Rudolph Rummel, John Oneal, and Bruce Russett. DPT's origins start from the research over the evolution of democracies in the international system over the centuries and their proliferation *vis-à-vis* war and conflict, as well as their intention to go to war. In the XVIII century, there were just three liberal

regimes and pacific unions, based on market economy, sovereignty, and republican government (Doyle 1983a): the Swiss Cantons, the French Republic from 1790 to 1795, the US since 1776, even if at that time Switzerland did not allow women to vote, the US allowed slavery (Spiro 1994), and democracies were rare (Russett *et al.* 1995) in general. From 1800 to 1850 there were just eight democratic regimes, from 1850 to 1900 thirteen, from 1900 to 1945 twenty-nine (Doyle 1983a). From the end of World War II, democracy took off in many countries. Their main characteristic was that they are usually peaceful and stable because of a multilaterally based equilibrium, given also – but not only – by the Cold War's bipolarity (*ibid.*). However, only in the Seventies, many democracies were able to avoid being involved in wars and conflicts (Weede 1984). Doyle argues that many states progressively learned to solve differences without violence (Burchill 2013). The result is that today, democracies are the majority of the world's political systems (Chan 1997): and it is not a coincidence that today the world is a more peaceful place.

As anticipated, DPT's first important inspirational figure is the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who started his elaborations from a Hobbesian perspective (Oneal-Russett 1999c) of a natural conflict between ungoverned people (Huntley 1996) in an anarchic world and the dreadful consequences for the system. Sympathizer and promoter of the republican form of government and opponent of the revolutions of his time (Scruton 2001), Kant formulated a space based on liberal democratic peace (Dixon 1994) with separated legislative and administrative roles (Spiro 1994). This would have led to a peaceful domestic and international zone as well as peaceful relations among states (Doyle 1983). According to Oneal and Russett (1999c), Kant was right when he said that the combination of international institutions, economic interdependence, and democracy would contribute to reducing interstate wars' incidence. In general, public opinion is war-adverse and citizens whose consent would be required to trigger war (Pugh 2005), are cautious towards war, regarded as a destructive "poor game" at the economic, social, institutional, and international level. Within the Kantian perspective, free republics are not war-inclined and share common institutions (Chan 1997). Normally, in liberal democratic republics, citizens should be consulted before going to war (Spiro 1994) since they would directly pay its costs (Richardson 2017). This would make them more reluctant to engage in international conflict. Providing DPT's basis, Kant believed that republics were naturally peace-inclined and based on human rights, freedom, equality,

justice; and wars between them were nonsense (Doyle 1983a). Kant believed that individuals were both cost- and risk-averse (a tie with EL); he was skeptical about the rule of the majority and favourably looked at the State's role containment (typical of liberalism). As a precursor of liberalism, Kant maintained that perpetual peace was based on and could be reached through three elements and known also as definitive articles (Doyle 1983a), legs (Starr 1997), or complementary influences (Oneal-Russett 1997). These would grant liberal peace (Doyle 1986, Oneal *et al.* 1996, Oneal-Russett 1999c, Russett 1993, Russett *et al.* 1998) and should be taken together to achieve this. The first element is the republican constitutions must be based on rule of law – *Rechtstaat* (Waltz 1962) – preventing structural anarchy (Chan 1997) and respecting people's individual liberties. In Kant's view, states' civil constitutions should be republican, despite not all republics are democracies (*ibid.*). The republican government would imply (and defend) a society based on private property, freedom, equality, security, and a market-based economy (Doyle 1983a). Within the liberal-idealistic tradition, Kant believed that the evolution of politics would lead the world towards an international perpetual peace. The second element is the pacific union of free states (Doyle 1986), a federation of pacific republics (Doyle 1983a, Scruton 2001). If every state agrees to a metaphorical treaty of perpetual peace, perpetual peace will come (*ibid.*). Then, liberal states' pacific union should be progressively widened (Doyle 1983b), making people enjoying republican rights, just peace (Doyle 1986), and freedom. World government is seen as a solution to the Hobbesian world, where the *homo homini lupus* principle defines interactions. The third element is the cosmopolitan law – aka law of world citizenship (Huntley 1996) – operating with the pacific union (Doyle 1986) should be based on universal hospitality (Spiro 1994). Each republic under international law will have an interest in respecting it (Scruton 2001), which could also regulate the spirit of commerce (trade as conflict- or war-deterrent), helping states to undertake the pathway to universal peace.

A second significant DPT's inspirational figure is the American President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), the most influential politician after World War I (Knutsen 1994) who determined the rest of the century US foreign policy (Ambrosius 1987). A prophet of peace (Howard 2002), whose ideas of (economic) openness after the 1914-1918 catastrophe was judged utopian, he was the main exponent of liberal internationalism (Doyle 1986) and promoted the creation of global institutions to deal with divergencies

among the states – creating a legal order based collective security (Ashworth 1999) – and preventing outbreaks of armed conflicts. The international institutions born after the Great War should conceal and manage different interests: this, eventually, would be the best means to preserve and endure democracy and peace among nations. Wilson also believed that this could be achieved through the use of active diplomacy, the spread of commerce, dialogue, and liberal democracy among nations, through the creation of an international global order based on interchange, multilateralism, free trade, and free-market. Wilson was not skeptical about international institutions (Moravcsik 1997) and hoped for the establishment of an inclusive association of nations, tied to common covenants granting cooperation and territorial integrity (Russett 1993). His idealism has been discredited by the outbreak of World War II. The accuse is that the principles of liberal internationalism inspiring him, and the League failed to contain totalitarianism's rise in Europe. In the Thirties «the element of international law in the Kantian and Wilsonian vision failed. But […] trade and democracy were never given a fair chance. International trade was damaged first by the imposition of war reparations on defeated Germany […] then by […] "beggar my neighbour" trade restraints» (Russett 1993, 9).

Both Kant and Wilson are examined by DPT scholars and proponents, most of all by the original version formulated by Michael Doyle – who in the essay "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs" Part 1 (1983a) and 2 (1983b) covers DPT's essential features, within the liberal Kantian perspective. Doyle (1983a) explains that liberalism is not inherently peace-loving – as critics assume and accuse –, but rather it stresses individual freedom and choice. Individual private property and *laissez-faire* economics, social welfare, and juridical equality of people, along with states' sovereignty must go together. Doyle brings Kant's perpetual peace into IR to strengthen the DPT proposal. He actualizes Kant and brings him from philosophy to IR, stressing that the establishment of liberal republics based on free-market, rule of law, and individual freedom would bring peace among states. These are the main conditions ensuring wide cooperation among actors in IR and should decrease the conflict's opportunities. Doyle stresses that commercial interdependence can create both wellbeing and conflict and that democracies only rarely fight one another (*ibid.*). Doyle also proposes two pathways to individual freedom: «one is *laissez-faire* or "conservative" liberalism and the other is […] social democratic, or "liberal" liberalism» (1983a 207). Doyle (1983b) helps to make clarity in the political

field and IR, illustrating two variants of liberalism: “conservative liberals” (center-right) vs “welfare liberals” (center-left). The first is more connected to the European political center-right, while the second to the American political center-left (see Appendix no. 2, “Table of Liberalism”). Along with DPT – assessed in Doyle’s “Liberalism and World Politics” (1986) essay – individual rights, free speech, and private property are central to both liberalism“s”. The just mentioned values, however, are the topics liberal democratic republics are grounded on and are among the factors explaining that liberal republics rarely make war with one another. However, republican forms of government do not always imply democracy and are not a sufficient condition. Based on Kant, Doyle (*ibid.*) explains that liberal republics establish peace among them and that only liberal capitalist states maintain peace. Within Kant’s tradition, republics lead to peaceful relations, while wars always result in disasters (*ibid.*). The dramatic past wars’ lessons should make states inclined towards peace and liberal republicanism, which protects and promotes «private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against nonrepublics» (*ibid.* 1162).

However, Rudolph Rummel goes further. In his “Democracies Are Less Warlike Than Other Regimes” (1995) essay he explained that it is the freedom guaranteed within the (liberal) democratic model that makes states go less to wars with each other. Rummel was a fierce advocate of freedom and acknowledged that democracy is the discriminatory variant that divides war-adverse and war-prone states. Rummel (*ibid*.) added that authoritarian states are more bellicose than the liberal democratic; conversely, «the more democratic a regime, the less intense its foreign violence» (*ibid.* 461). The proof would be that from 1900 to 1987 while democracies suffered 55K death in battle, autocracies 145K (*ibid*.). Not only liberal democracies are not supposed to go to war among them, Rummel (*ibid.*) explained, but are also less warlike than authoritarian states. The DPT assumes radical connotations in its Rummelian version. Rummel’s (*ibid.*) conclusions are that democracies are less warlike than other regimes and less violent than nondemocracies. As he explained in “Libertarianism and International Violence” (1983), this would be based on researches conducted in the 1976-1980 period. With critical limits, he stated several DPT-related assumptions: «(1) libertarian states have no violence between themselves. (2) The more libertarian two states, the less their mutual violence. (3) The more libertarian a state, the less its foreign violence» (*ibid*. 27). Civil and political freedoms are important elements that help democracies avoid war with one another. Rummel (*ibid*.) explained

mutual violence is excluded in libertarian states and freedom helps to prevent conflicts.

Less radical than Rummel, in his book *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (1993) Bruce Russett further stresses that democracies have almost never fought each other and connects his acknowledgement to the Kant and Wilsonian tradition. Importantly, he adds to the DPT debate that «democracies are not necessarily peaceful» (*ibid.* 11), which means that democracies *can* go to war, but the majority of them has no interest in engaging in conflict with each other – for economic reason, which goes back to EL's Smith and Angell. Among the elements preventing democracies to go to war against each other, Russett (*ibid.*) explains that alliances, wealth, and political stability help peace construction, but norms within the democracies must be strong. Russett (*ibid*.) concludes that democracies are unlikely to engage in (militarized) disputes with each other and when they do so, they less likely to escalate. «The more democratic each state is, the more peaceful their relations are likely to be» (*ibid.* 119). In his essay with Zeev Maoz "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986" (1993), Russett sets out analytical and theoretical DPTs' guidelines. On the one hand, there is the normative model – «democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clash» (*ibid.* 624); the ultimate interest is war-preventing among democracies. On the other hand, there is a structural model – «political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible» (*ibid.* 624); institutions foster interstate cooperation and wars' diminution. Maoz and Rummel (1993) acknowledge democracies can start conflicts like other regimes – they are not less conflict-prone than nondemocracies as affirmed by Rummel (1995) – but in the last two centuries rarely crashed between each other, because they do not have much to gain by making war (Maoz-Rummel 1993).

As for other theoretical features, DPT's main assumption is that usually, democracies virtually (Dixon 1993) do not go to war against each other (Chernoff 2004, Russett 1993), and do not use violence – aka the physical attack on others' life or property (Rummel 1983). Democracies seldom engage in militarized disputes – which involve the threat or use of military force (Maoz-Abdolali 1989) – since they prefer peaceful relations. DPT does not exclude the possibility of war occurrences among democratic states, but it prefers to affirm that these conflicts do not degenerate into the war (Gochman *et al.*

1996). The main DPT's under-assumption is that «liberal republics are responsible to the majority of electors, who […] cannot regularly displace the costs of going to war on others» (Doyle 2008, 51). Democracies are depicted by DPT theorists as unwilling to resort to violence (among them) since they prefer peaceful means and solutions to solve conflicts. Democracies can be wealthy states, interlinked by trade and commerce, which makes wars' costs prohibitive (Oneal-Ray 1997, 755) and dangerous (Owen 1994) for the states. The costs would cascade over citizens, generally against foreign interventionism (Rummel-Martindale 1984). As explained in Part 1, DPT is more analytical than normative, and this is clear within the following three informal "visions" of the DPT approach, which describe – rather than setting out policy guidelines of – the approach.

The first implies that democracies are more peaceful than nondemocracies (originally stated in Babst 1964/1972) and democracies are not prone or likely to go – and do not go – to war (Chan 1984, Rummel 1995) or fight with other pairs of states *because* they are democratic. According to Rummel (1983), libertarian states (democracies possessing civil and political rights within a free capitalist economic system) are more peaceful and *never* fight each other – Rummels' controversial evidences are significant, but just from 1976 to 1980 (Weede 1984). It is true that from 1815 to 1965 democracies participated in fewer wars than nondemocracies (Small-Singer 1976) but saying that democracies never fight each other is an unconditional (Barbieri 1996) and categorical (Ray 1993) extreme claim. According to Rummel «the more libertarian a state is, the less international violence it will have» (Pugh 2005, 12). Liberal democracies are peaceful according to Rummel and Martindale (1984) and less warlike than other regimes (Rummel 1995); an assumption later proved to be inaccurate. In Rummel's vision, since in libertarian states citizens have (more) economic freedom, civil liberties, and political rights (Spiro 1994) they would not act violently towards one another. Thus, according to him, the more "libertarian" a state, the less likely it uses violence in foreign policy (*ibid.*). Political freedom promotes peace (Chan 1984), while civil liberties reduce international violence and include press freedom, freedom of expression, respect for private property (Rummel 1983).

As for the second vision of DPT, democracies are peaceful only between each other: and are not likely to go to war *with* each other. This is the "classical version" of DPT, controversial (Schweller 1992) but influential (Ray 1998) – proposed by Doyle, supported by Russett (1993). Democracies rarely fight between each other because they have other

means to solve controversies and disputes (*ibid.*) – like negotiations (Mousseau 2002) or compromises (Dixon 1993) – and thus will not fear a surprise attack by other democracies (Russett 1993). However, there are cases where democracies – which can be aggressive (Small-Singer 1976) – have fought against one another in the past. The exceptions to the DPT's norm (Ray 1993) are: the US vs. Great Britain (1812), the Roman Republic vs France (1849), Ecuador vs. Colombia (1863), France vs. Prussia (1870), Spain vs. US (1889), the UK vs. the South African Republic (1899), Finland vs. the Allies (1941), Lebanon vs. Israel (1948, 1967), India vs. Pakistan (1948), and Turkey vs. Cyprus (1974). These cases imply that the type of a regime is not a scientific predictor of war or conflict involvement (Maoz-Abdolali 1989), but it tells something. Democracies are not less war-prone *in general*, but less prone to each other. Wars between liberal and non-liberal states cannot excluded. Indeed, liberal democracies fought many wars against illiberal states (Doyle 1986); liberal democracies «are as aggressive and war-prone as any other form of government […] in their relations with non-liberal states» (Doyle 1983a, 225).

The third vision to DPT is more a critic than a variation. It states that democracies are *neither* more peaceful *nor* less war-prone than nondemocracies. DPT scholars are used to criticism (Kinsella 2005), and DPT detractors argue that democracies go to war *like* other regimes. In other words, there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies in terms of going to war. This assumption is supported by many, who do not agree with DPT's formulation that usually democracies do not go to war and/or to war against others: Barbieri 1996, Cohen 1994, Farber-Gowa 1995, Gleditsch 1992, Kinsella 2005, Polachek 1997, Polacehek *et al.* 1999, Pollins 1989, Rosato 2003, Gowa-Mansfield 1993, Ward-Gleditsch 1998, Layne 1994, Mearsheimer 1990, Starr 1992, Weede 1984/1992. Some do not find relationships between democracy and adversity to war from 1816 to 1914 – which means that «the probability that two democracies will go to war against one another is approximately the same as the probability for any other pair of states» (Gochman *et al.* 1996, 179). However, after 1945 war outbreaks are acknowledged to be far lower among liberal democracies (Farber-Gowa 1995), which makes DPT a restricted post-World War II phenomenon, particularly confined in Western Europe and North America (Rosato 2003). On the other hand, Thompson and Tucker (1997 479) find that not only «democratic dyads are less likely to fight with one another before 1914» but also that «newly democratizing states are not especially prone to warfare» (*ibid.*).

Optimistically, DPT implies that power balance prevents wars' occurrences (Richardson 2017) and that usually, states are peaceful towards each other because of common bonds and international institutions (Russett 1993). Within liberalism's tradition and between the factors inhibiting the use of violence that would confirm DPT, there are democracy and economic interdependence, which reduce the occurrences of states' conflicts (Oneal-Russett 1999a). Secondly, democratic states' pluralism increases the necessity to have international ties with other states, and this limits governments' will to engage in conflict with one another (Russett 1993). Third, cultural and institutional attributes are seen as effective as preventing war escalations, through nonviolent resolutions (Gartzke 1998). Sharing common interests is a powerful war inhibitor (Oneal-Russett 1999a) – which reflects NI's assumption on interdependence and the necessity to cooperate. Democracies share a "live-and-let-live" understanding (Rosato 2003). Important are the institutional constraints (Hensel *et al.* 2000), as well as democratic norms and culture (Layne 1994). International institutions, constraints on political elites moderating political behavior can prevent interstate conflicts (Gochman *et al.* 1996). Rummel (1983) also adds open societies' pluralism limiting violence. Other factors to do so are the natural cross-pressures in democratic societies (Ray 1998), education (Rummel-Martindale 1984), technologies facilitating communication (Hegre 2000, Oneal *et al.* 1996). Sometimes geographical proximity is associated with collaboration between states (Mousseau 2002), but also contiguous countries may have greater conflict potential (Raknerud-Hegre 1997).

As for the weaknesses, DPT has been widely criticized by many – see the third abovementioned "vision" of the approach. However, the absolute and intransigent link that some DPT scholars find between democracy and peace is fragile: the fact that *just because* a country is democratic would ensure peace, has its shortcomings, as shown in some historical cases. The democratic form of government may be *one* of the factors that might prevent or inhibit states – democratic states and/or liberal republics – to go to war (and to war against each other). Though rarely, democracies engage wars – and very rarely between them – and in recent history, they have done so against authoritarian regimes that posed threats to international peace and human rights. Democracy in itself might be seen as a crucial but not *sufficient* war-restraining factor among states. Secondly, DPT scholars are accused of misrepresenting the concept of democracy to find consistency with their assumptions. In general, first, usually «democracy is measured in

terms of American rather than universal standards. Second, students […] ignore changes in the meaning of democracy over time» (Maoz 1997, 182). How scholars configure democracy is crucial to assess the validity of the DPT – democracy and its "Western vision" may not be the same elsewhere, and this could undermine the DPT's framework. The features defining democracy – say – in the XIX century, are not enough to define democracy today. A third DPT's weakness is that "war" may include disputes, and this would change DPT's assumptions. Since World War II, there have been more disputes than wars: «the mere threat of use of force […] suffices to establish […] militarized interstate dispute» (Weede 1992, 381). A last critical point is related to geopolitics. The Cold War's end put DPT under difficulty: before 1989, relations among democratic nations could simply be considered as the result of the deliberately shared security interests of the bipolar world (Oneal-Russett 1999c, Pugh 2005). During the Cold War's bipolarity, Western liberal democracies could have avoided war against each other to show unity before the Soviet Union, rather than an intention to stay together and, as democracies, having peaceful relations among them.

2.3 Democratic Realism

According to Chernoff (2007), DR is an amalgam of realism and liberalism in IR. But also, neoliberalism in economics and neoconservatism in politics and culture, both in vague from the late Seventies (Fukuyama, 1999b) with a revival after the end of the Cold War (coinciding with Democratic-led US multilateral unipolarity) and the early 2000s (Republican-led US unilateral unipolarity). The political cleavage of political liberalism vs. conservatism goes back to the struggle between Adam Smith (father of classical economics, see 2.1) and Edmund Burke (father of modern conservatism). However, their doctrines are not contradictory with one another (Kristol 2011) and, as DR shows, can stay together in a single normative approach of IR. DR's scholars select some principles from both the two main IR schools adding moral elements that reflect idealist principles (Chernoff 2007) plus political-cultural conservative elements. Based on the early 1990s and 2000s American triumphalist foreign policy moments, DR is more a practical foreign policy framework, rather than an IR theory. Normative for its active suggestions in conflict intervention, for example, but also analytical, because of the description of the political situations and realities. As EL and DPT, DR can be thus considered an approach because of its inter- and multidisciplinary nature, among culture and politics. Analyzed

under both the IR and cultural-political profile, DR is based on the mix of political neoconservatism and economic neoliberalism, which gave birth to the political libertarian (neo)conservatism, which found its main representatives in politicians like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the Eighties (see Appendix no. 2, "Table of Liberalism").

Along with neoliberalism in economics and neoconservatism in politics, in IR some DR adds realism – Charles Krauthammer, inventor and founder of DR – while others (the "IR-liberal" voice of DR) liberal intergovernmentalism and institutionalism – Francis Fukuyama (2006), who calls "his" doctrine "Realistic Wilsonianism" – and other globalism – William Kristol and Robert Kagan, who are in favor of democracy promotion abroad in relation to moral commitments. DR is strongly US-based – it bases its both normative and analytical assumptions on this – and emerged after the Cold War with three main threads (Fukuyama 2006) between liberalism and realism. First, concern with democracy and human rights (liberal element), belief that US power can be used for moral purposes (realist element), and skepticism about international law's and international institutions' ability to solve all IR and security problems (realist element) – (*ibid.*). DR is informally divided between the realist-neoconservative side (represented by Krauthammer) and the institutional-neoliberal side (represented by Fukuyama); it is this latter that connects DR to EL/NI and DPT, along with the concerns about peace in IR. Neoliberalism and neoconservatism are not synonyms in politics: both are characterized by neoliberal economics, but the DR's neoliberal side is keener on multilateralism (close to NI), while the neoconservative side more on unilateralism (close to realism). Doctrinal clarity, limitations, and controversies can be found in the "Interview to William Kristol" (Appendix no. 1), which also makes up for DR's academic limitations and scarcity of specialized readings, clarifying important features of this foreign policy scheme.

The theoretical origins of the DR approach are to be found in 2004 – one year after the controversial American invasion of Iraq, a crucial event for the US and its foreign policy (Kristol-Kagan 1998, Kaplan-Kristol 2003) – at the annual dinner of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI, a conservative think tank) in Washington DC. Where, the syndicated columnist and Pulitzer Prize Charles Krauthammer (2004a) delivered a discourse entitled "Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World". Explicitly rejecting realism – even if DR has realist features – Krauthammer (*ibid.*) explained that after the Soviet Union's collapse – Moscow could no longer be

considered as US main challenger (Cesa 2017) –, only one superpower was left on the international stage, and that was Washington. After the Cold War's end, it is true that there was a revival of liberal internationalism, but the US was alone in the international system, as Krauthammer (1990) himself pointed out years before in the article "The Unipolar Moment". In the early 2000s, the US was powerfully at the center of the world as *the* unchallenged superpower, «unchecked by any rival and with decisive reach in every corner of the globe» (Krauthammer 2004a). Krauthammer (2002) argued that the power gap in power between the US and the other countries was unprecedented and originated (US-led) unipolarity – US supremacy «bereft of any comparable power» (Chiaruzzi 2017, 60). After the Cold War, the world «entered a unique period in human history» (Krauthammer 2004b), but after a few years, the world became normal – multilateral – again (Kagan 2008) since the US hegemony was challenged by new concerns: terrorism, geopolitical actors, cultural clashes (Huntington 1993a/1993b), which ended America's exceptional rare power configuration given by the unipolar moment.

While theorizing DR, Krauthammer (2004a) explained that the will to freedom – not power – is the engine of history. This is an abnegation of realism – which, in its classical form, is concerned with power, see Morgenthau (1973 [1948]). Thus, Krauthammer took distances from realism, which allows to marginally associate DR to the liberal theories, but still has realist features. Krauthammer (*ibid.*) influenced President George W. Bush (Fukuyama 2004) who, while running in the 2000 US presidential elections, described his approach to foreign policy as "new realism" (Ikenberry 2002a), but with some neoliberal features – human and individual rights in IR and classical economics in the economy, (Fukuyama 2012). In Krauthammer's vision for the new US foreign policy, the US had to be guided by a unique imperative (normative aspect): intervene abroad only "where it counts" and where it is strategic (2004a/2004b), defending the cause of peace and freedom around the globe (liberal element). Thus, peace as a condition of international politics is highly desirable in the DR's framework. DR differs from democratic globalism (a subgroup of DR, informally represented by Kagan and Kristol) on intervention abroad, to preserve peace. Kristol and Kagan (1996) believe that US foreign policy should be open to a moral purpose. As DR, democratic globalism sees the will to freedom as the ultimate engine of history (Krauthammer 2015); that is also why DR approach can be marginally considered to be "liberal" in IR. Foreign intervention is justified when human

rights are violated, and this is important for democratic globalists (liberal element). DR recasts the IR struggle in a struggle between freedom and unfreedom, observable in the 1947 Truman Doctrine, John Fitzgerald Kennedy's 1961 inaugural speech, and Ronald Reagan's 1983 "Evil Empire" speech (*ibid.*). However, DR is not Wilsonian (*ibid.*).

Wilsonian is more the other soul of DR, the neoliberal-institutionalist one. Francis Fukuyama is put by Chernoff (2007) in the list of DR's scholars, but he advocated for more Wilsonian-institutional liberalism than Krauthammerian realism – from whom, Krauthammer himself took distances when he definiendum freedom, and not power, as DR's main interest. It is thus appropriate to split the currents of DR, precisely because of Fukuyama's more liberal-institutionalist attitude. While being a political neoconservative, Fukuyama emphasizes the role of the international institutions within global politics. Before DR was formulated, he became famous worldwide for his article "The End of History?" (1989), which appeared before the fall of the Berlin Wall (Menand 2018), explaining that the Cold War's end had confirmed an extraordinary consensus in favor of liberalism and capitalism (Macey-Geoffrey 1992, Williams 2017), and liberal democracy (Marks 1997). According to Fukuyama, liberalism defeated all rival ideologies, and in 1989 liberal democracy appeared the most successful system of government left – this opened the "globalization from above" season (Falk 1999), perceived as the triumph of global markets and liberal values (Slaughter 2017). Fukuyama (1989 3) argued that in there were no more credible alternatives to liberal democracy, the «final form of human government». Indeed liberal democracy and capitalist free-markets constituted «the best of the available alternative ways of organizing human societies (or […], if one prefers Churchill's formulation, the least bad way of doing so)» (Fukuyama 1995, 29) – liberal element. Fukuyama's point «is that history may have ended in the sense that the ideology of liberal democracy represents the final stage of political evolution» (Marks 1997, 452). In this sense, there is also a Kantian element: liberal democracy intended as the best form of government that could ensure peace internationally. When DR theory was formulated in 2004, Fukuyama detached from realist drifts, embracing a more IR liberal and Wilsonian orientation (McGlinchey 2009). Despite being in Chernoff's (2007) DR scholars' list, he is *sui generis* and represents DR's connection with NI, because of its institutionalist orientation. As neorealists Mearsheimer and Walt (2003), and unlike DR's realist-neoconservatives and globalist, Fukuyama condemned the 2003 American war in

Iraq, shifting towards a more neoliberal-internationalist approach (Marks 1997).

Fukuyama's "The End of History?" (1989) essay encompasses IR, politics, and history. The author looked positively at the imminent fall of Communist regimes in Central-Eastern Europe in 1989 as both a symbol and certification of the triumph of Western liberal democracy driven by neoliberal capitalism and free-market (Slaughter 2017) – certifying the «total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism» (Fukuyama 1989, 3). Fukuyama (*ibid.*) acknowledged that liberal democracy – which prompts freedom and peace (connection to the DPT) – is a superior government model if compared to Fascism, Socialism, or Communism. 1989 was not just the end of the Cold War, «but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government» (*ibid.* 3). Beyond liberal democracy, there is no other possible system ensuring human rights, freedom, economic prosperity (Bijukumar 2008). Indeed, Fukuyama (1989) emphasized man's universal rights and freedom, which prosper only under liberal democracy. The future threats to peace and freedom are religious fundamentalism and nationalism (*ibid.*). Charles Krauthammer's "The Unipolar Moment" (1990) article prepared DR's future "theorization" by the author who explained that after the Cold War's end, the world ceased to be multipolar. The "unipolar moment" was the period when the US was the only superpower in the world left, and dominant within the international system (*ibid.*). Of course, the unipolar moment would not last forever, and multipolarity would return (*ibid.*).

The post-Cold War American unipolarity – «an international system structure around one major power only» (Cesa 2017, 320) – prompted the formulation of DR. As anticipated, "Democratic Realism" (2004a) is the essay Krauthammer delivered an intervention on February 10th, 2004 at the "Irving Kristol Lecture" at the AEI, and is the most important theoretical contribution on DR, where the author explained his practical-normative IR theory, a neoconservative foreign policy framework. Krauthammer (*ibid.*) defined the (US) national interest, not in terms of power – as Morgenthau (1973 [1948]) did – but in terms of values, particularly liberty. This is a partial rejection of classic realist assumptions, but DR shares realism's concerns over the centrality of power, opposing indiscriminate interventionism of the US abroad. Normatively, DR advocates for a meaningful, targeted, and limited intervention abroad. In synthesis, «we are friends to all,

but we come ashore only where it counts» (Krauthammer 2004a); occasionally, to export peace and freedom. Further insights on DR are provided by Krauthammer in his "In Defence of Democratic Realism" (2004b). Once again, the author started from the fall of the Iron Curtain, and called the anomalous "unipolar moment" (the US alone on the world's stage) an "holiday from history", an «illusionary period during which we imagined that the […] struggles of the past six decades […] had ended for good. September 11th reminded us […] that history had not ended» (*ibid.*). IR and politics, foreign affairs, and US interests are mixed in the DR, which – like EL and DPT – allows to define DR itself as an approach of IR. Krauthammer did not discard the juxtaposition of more theoretical schools of IR: he stated that «pure realism […] fails because it offers no vision beyond power» (*ibid.*), thus DR should be tempered with the American will to spread democracy and freedom in the world (liberal element). Opposing isolationism and embracing neoliberal economics and political neoconservatism, Krauthammer's vision was that US intervention abroad should be determined by strict geopolitical necessities (realist element) to ensure peace and freedom (liberal element). However, «international support is a prudential consideration in any major decision» (*ibid.*).

With Fukuyama being liberal-oriented in IR and Krauthammer more realist, a third marginal version on DR and neoconservative foreign policy theory – democratic globalism – is informally assessed in *On Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*, a book by Robert Kagan (2003). Kagan underlines that the US foreign policy – realist-prone – and Europe's – liberal-prone – do not have a common understanding of the world. After the Cold War, it seems Europe eliminated its need for realist-oriented geopolitics (*ibid.*). Declining in the military and hard power, Europe turned away from power and entered a paradise of Kantian peace and prosperity (*ibid.*), while the US remained mired in history and the Hobbesian world, where (had) power counts, where politics is not harmonious, and cooperation is difficult. In Kagan's vision, the US is examined as a military, hegemonic, messianic republic. It is an illusion to think that the liberal international order will rest on the triumphant ideas of natural human progress, Kagan explains in *The return of history and the end of dreams* (2008). Like Krauthammer, he puts himself in contraposition to Fukuyama – more oriented on an "Angellian illusions" – especially on the "End of History" thesis, but on the threats to the new world after the Cold War (nationalism and terrorism), he agrees with him (*ibid.*). The

moment of US unipolarity in the international system was characterized by Washington's dominant power in IR, the world's moral guide, the "benevolent empire" (*ibid.*).

Under an IR perspective, in DR's view balance of power is rejected and hegemony is embraced; liberal multilateralism is quite neglected. The US must be active in the international system (Vaïsse 2010) – liberal element – and use power unilaterally if necessary (Kagan 2003) – realist element. DR is suspicious of international institutions (Fukuyama 2006) and looks to actors' self-interest. Realist-leaning DR scholars do not believe in the "Kantian paradise" (Kagan 2003), see 2.2. Unilateral intervention – especially the US' (Richardson 2017) – is not rare and is justified «in the name of defending or spreading the cause of liberalism» (Kagan 2003, 137) – liberal element. Democratic globalist Kristol and Kagan (1996 20) explain that US foreign policy should strengthen US security by «supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world». According to DR, the US will support democracies around the world – liberal element – but it will intervene where there is a «strategic necessity – meaning places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom» (Krauthammer 2004a) – realist element. Without embracing isolationism – «intellectually obsolete and politically bankrupt» (*ibid.*) – DR sees the US as the international system's custodian (*ibid.*) which ensures a peaceful world. From neoconservative DR's perspective, the US should use its arsenal power to manage the global order (*ibid.*), maintaining peace – liberal element.

Under a political and cultural perspective, the DR's cleavage between realism and liberalism in IR is the same in politics: (unilateralist) conservatism and (multilateralist) political Western liberalism. Neoliberalism and neoconservatism in politics have overlapping features (Larner 2000) and can appear contradictory (Brown 2006), but they agree with adopting a neoliberal economic scheme, limiting welfare, cutting taxes, liberalize, and privatize – policies embodied in the Washington Consensus, the expression of the neoliberal turn in economics (Williams 2017), far away from the social Keynesian elements of John Ruggie's (1982) embedded liberalism. However, politically the differences are that neoliberalism is favorable for the erase of cultural and national borders, while neoconservatism favors them (*ibid.*). Furthermore, «neoliberalism looks forward to a global order contoured by a universalized market rationality […] while […] neoconservatism looks backward to a […] nationalist order» (*ibid*. 699). As for the latter

– the dominant political pattern of DR – this has its origins in the American environment of Jewish Straussian *émigrés* in the US in the Forties. Neoconservatism was born in the 1960s as a disintegration of the left (Nuechterlein 1996), when ex Marxists and Trotskyists intellectuals, professors, and journalists like Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell (founders of *The Public Interest*) and Norman Podhoretz (editor of *Commentary*) turned from American political liberalism to political right-wing neoconservatism (Vaïsse 2010). They promoted traditional values (Kristol 2011) and went back to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's progressive policies at home, anti-Communism, defending peace, freedom, and democracies abroad (Vaïsse 2010). Neoconservative ideas have roots in Locke, Burke, the US founding fathers (Shirley-Devine 2016). The second wave of neoconservatism matured in the late Eighties-early Nineties (Ryan 2010) – the one that brought indirectly to DR's formulation – and was proposed by Kagan and Kristol, who wanted to create a triumphalist "neo-Reaganite" foreign policy (*ibid.*), described as «Wilsonianism minus international institutions» (Fukuyama 2006, 41) – another link with liberalism in IR. Later on, political neoconservatism became identified with President Bush Jr.'s policies (*ibid.*), characterized by «concepts like regime change, benevolent hegemony, unipolarity, pre-emption, and American exceptionalism» (*ibid.* 3). Krauthammer (2005) called this set of policies the Bush Doctrine, seen as a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy or DR in IR. Culturally, the neoconservative movement found a good terrain after the Cold War, when American neoconservatives argued that the US had to re-orient the world's IR (McGlinchey 2009). William Kristol launched *The Weekly Standard* in 1995 while elaborating on American benevolent empire strategy based on globalism and pre-emptive war (*ibid.*). The new republican neoconservative movement prompted many critics (*e.g.* Dorrien 2004, Prys-Robel 2011, Ryan 2010) since it allegedly wanted to build a "New American Empire" (Mann 2004). Economic neoliberalism, a common issue of liberal-DR (Fukuyama) and realist-DR (Krauthammer) is the update of traditional Smithian EL and is based on the D-L-P Formula: (economic) Deregulation, (trade's) Liberalization, and (State-owned enterprises') Privatization (Steger-Roy 2010). Other neoliberal economic elements – based on Friedrich A. von Hayek (1944/1982) and Milton Friedman (2007) – are market self-regulation, monetarism, downsizing government (Gartzke-Li 2003). Neoliberalism in economics is accused by many (*e.g.* Crouch 2011, Klein 2007, Falk 1999) as a tool of domination.

As for the weaknesses of DR, as already stated in Part 1, first there are methodological shortcomings. Many scholars did and do not consider DR as a legitimate IR theory (Chernoff 2007) because it has not been published in academic journals of IR – but in newspapers, political journals, or publications of think tanks as Project for the New American Century (PNAC, founded in 1997 by Kristol and Kagan) or the AEI (*ibid.*). Controversies lie especially in terms of the lack of academic material and rigorous scientific testing (*ibid.*). However, the fact that DR stands in IR books (*e.g.* Chernoff 2007), reveals its special status. DR's concerns with peace as tacit background and desirable condition and freedom allow to see it through the lenses of liberalism in IR, though with limits. Just like EL/NI and DPT, DR is an "approach" to IR, because of its interdisciplinarity. Indeed, DR is a mix of IR schools (realism and liberalism), cultural-political traditions (neoconservatism), and economics attitude (neoliberalism), mainly serving a *practical* purpose. Which, in DR's proponents' idea, needed to shape the early 2000s' US foreign policy. The second limit of DR is that it is too US-based since the US is its main case-study. Consequently, the selected elements of IR and global politics of Part 3 (3.1-3.5) will be revised and analyzed mainly through this perspective. DR uses both a normative and analytical posture, which derives from the fact that it picks up elements from many disciplines and traditions. Sometimes DR prescribes what states (the US) should do – intervene "where it counts", normative axiom – while sometimes analytically explains how IR works (especially Krauthammer and Kagan). However, since the US is a capital actor in the international system, an approach considering it as a benchmark enriches the discussion around IR-elements. The US was a unique hegemon for a decade (later-Eighties/early-Nineties to early-mid 2000s, the unipolar moment). DR should be regarded as an early 2000s US foreign policy proposal, based on realism plus liberalism in IR, coupled with hegemonic concerns (neoconservative-realist side, Krauthammer), institutionalism (neoliberal-institutionalist side, Fukuyama), and neoliberal economics, with a practical focus on the US. The third concern is that some DR's "realist features" make the approach appear more realist than it is. This is problematic for the juxtaposition of DR with EL and DPT, but as seen and as it will be shown, peace and freedom are the ultimate objects of interest of the three approaches.

3. Analyzed Empirical Elements

After a deep analysis of the three theoretical approaches, the compatibility, similarities, and differences among the three approaches – EL, DPT, and DR and their scholars' insights – *vis-à-vis* five selected elements of IR emerge in Part 3. Not only the compatibility of the three approaches in relation to the issues of global politics is shown, but Part 3 also illustrates the topics through the three frameworks' spectacles. Reinforced by their theoretical aspects and salient literature presented as a methodological tool in Part 2, the IR-related topics are operationalized and seen in the light of EL, DPT, and DR, and their main scholars, to answer the research question and to verify the compatibility of the three approaches. Part 3 shows how the approaches react to features of global politics: of course, this method of analysis has its limits, also because some approaches are more analytical (EL/NI and DPT) while others are more normative (DR). Thus, as explained in Part 1, it is necessary to adopt both in order not to alter the essence of the approaches and provide a wide insight on the five issues. Repeating the process of analyzing the IR elements through the three approaches will make "common threads" and "empirical divergences" emerge. At the beginning of each subchapter, the "introduction" approaches the issue according to the liberal tradition, while at the end, a short "summary" synthesizes differences and similarities of the approaches in relation to the topic.

The five topics are: "Institutions and interdependence" (3.1), "Free-market and rationalism" (3.2), "International law and anarchy" (3.3), "Conflict intervention and anarchy" (3.4), "Nationalism and autocracies" (3.5). As anticipated in Part 1, a limit of Part 3 is that the three approaches do not always address every IR-related issue per se; thus, the position they maintain concerning a specific topic could be seen as an interpretation of the main scholar and not the position of the approach itself. However, since the three approaches are much personalized, the position of the author should be directly overlapping the approach's position on the subject. Secondly, to overcome the fact that one cannot generalize starting from the marginal opinion of the approach or its main scholar, more authors of the same "school" have been taken into consideration while analyzing the topic – this is an advantage since it allows to approach the topic from more perspectives. Thirdly, the fact that the three approaches of the Thesis do not specifically and precisely address some selected issue, is a problem that would encompass every IR

theory in relation to some topics. If the Thesis were to analyze, *e.g.*, post-structuralism, the green theory, and feminism (more ambiguous than DR in some way) in relation to selected IR-issues, the problem would persist. These three IR theories only marginally touch elements of global politics, but this does not mean that it would not be interesting to compare them to make similarities and differences emerge.

3.1 Institutions and interdependence

Introduction. Within the liberal tradition, international institutions are looked at as necessary and helpful policymakers in the international system, since they help states tackling anarchy in IR, cooperating in managing interests and negotiations, dealing with world's complexities, providing rational answers to policy problems, coping with defense and security issues. Of course, to function, institutions should be well and properly designed to reduce uncertainties and costs of those using or participating in them. In the last decades, globalization prompted the proliferation of nonstate agents (Keohane 2002) and the necessary interdependence between them and the states, while the world was getting more and more globalized. Liberalism positively watches institutionalism, which prompts peaceful cooperation, which is the basis of reciprocity increasing mutual gains, according to liberalism (Karns-Mingst 2010). Institutionalism and interdependence approach in IR overlap one another (Wilkinson 2007), thus being involved in international institutions brings greater opportunities for IR's actors. International institutions have many functions: they act as channels, enforce agreements and rules, stimulate dialogue and communication, ease tensions among states, and provide responses (Aggarwal-Dupont 2017) and information to actors in IR. Internationalism encompasses the use of international tools, such as institutions and organizations. Politically, institutions are contested: political (centre-left) liberals welcome their role, «but hesitate to accept that markets, too, can encourage peace. Conservatives […] have the opposite biases» (Russett *et al.* 1998, 462). International institutions and states are interdependent, according to the mainstream of liberal interpretations. Liberalism in IR proposes that democracy and interdependence can reduce the incidence and occurrences of interstate conflicts (Oneal-Russett 1997). Liberalism welcomes a multilateral, institutionalized, commercial, free, society; and maintains that economic competition creates prosperity and states' interdependence (Holmes 1993). In the liberal tradition, institutions can help actors

towards that objective; interdependence can produce amity (Chiaruzzi 2017). Indeed, interdependence is multifaced, a mechanism helping states to pursue their goals. It is often based on multilateralism among nations, which can foster cooperation among them (Hobson 1915). Cooperation and institutions are rational responses to the world economy interdependence (Rittberger-Zangl 2006). In a globalized and interdependent, but anarchic, world no one is in charge. Interdependence among nations is seen by liberalism as a good solution to overcome instability and conflict: institutions, particularly the GEIs, Global Economic Institutions, are the predilected tool to do so (Williams 2017). Cooperation and interdependence are not opposed to individual self-interest, but institutions have their interests and policy goals as well while helping states to cope with policy and non-policy problems that they would not be able to solve alone. While maintaining attention to localism, interdependence is seen as the key of interstate relations in the liberal tradition of IR and is «more the product than a generator of expectations of peace and cooperation» (Jervis 2001, 6). And cooperation between states occurs when actors understand each other's interests, which is a good start for peaceful relations.

EL. The architecture of modern EL relies on international institutions and their actions. They are constructed by states to overcome risks and obstacles of non-cooperation according to NI. Which, while acting within the EL framework, sees institutions and organizations as crucial actors (Keohane 1984) of world politics and global affairs. Within international institutions, states can broaden their self-interest and economic gains (*ibid.*). Despite being sometimes underestimated (Keohane-Nye 2012), institutions potentially increase the welfare of (any) actors involved in the international system and help them to solve policy matters that otherwise they had to solve expending time, resources, and money on – with the risk not to achieve their goals – crippling their performances and efficiency. Those operating based «on reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace» (Keohane-Martin 1995, 50) in IR. International institutions help states to deal with problems and issues too big for states themselves; problems that can be solved only with the help – or intercession – of external agents helping them. In this, the institutions help states to pursue their goals and interests, and thus they are regarded as possible war- and conflict-inhibitors (Keohane-Nye 1974). However, international institutions are not selfless agents but have their interests and goals as well, and to maximize peace in the international environment, they must be inclusive and bound states together towards an

effective and mutual interdependence and cooperation, which depends on mutual expectations (Martin 1992) and it increased in terms of complexity over time (Seabrooke-Kelton 2017). NI explains the degree of international institutions' exercise of power within IR and institutions can maximize the chances of the individual (Gray 1980) or state to realize his or its goals. Since the Eighties, they have been of growing importance in IR: their inclusion in the international system, however, does not mean that they are always successful in their purposes (Keohane 2002) or unamendable. Indeed, institutions are rarely maximally efficient and sometimes are unsatisfactory (Keohane-Nye 1974) in the outcomes they produce. International institutions are not perfect, and improvements are possible in their activity of multilateral transmission belts between them and between them and the states. They help to limit violence and pursue international peace (Keohane 1984) and work only if they can facilitate the bargaining process among their member states, leading them to effective fruitful cooperation (Keohane-Nye 1985). International institutions «are not desirable for their own sake» (*ibid.* 157). To work properly they must be efficient and complementary to the agents; able to adapt to many contexts. Their ability to facilitate transactions is widely acknowledged (Martin 1992, Yarbrough-Yarbrough 1987) and this helps states and individuals pursuing their goals. Since human knowledge is necessarily limited, global regulation and global governance through institutions are essential to assuring positive policy outcomes (Keohane 2002) for anyone. Indeed, the institutions have also a great impact on the states and their behavior (Keohane 1990) since they produce and provide information. Information and communication encourage and ease cooperation among states (Keohane-Nye 1985), making their commitments more credible, establishing coordination, and reciprocity (Keohane-Martin 1995) – possibly trust. International institutions can also help to cope with conflicts among states, promote (common) rules, standards, and norms, help to keep governments accountable. The absence of cooperation in the system increases conflict opportunities and distance from peace; it means just *potential* cooperation, not cooperation *as such*. As for interdependence, this is not enough to grant peace and not always avoids conflicts between partners. Keohane (2002) emphasizes that interdependence may even produce discord, which generates international institutions' need in the system. As anticipated in 2.1, Keohane (*ibid.* 17) invented the concept of "complex interdependence", being in favor of «a world of multiple interactions in which recourse to force is excluded». This

outcome can be achieved only if positive interrelation is strengthened within a framework of economic globalization (EL), coordination, cooperation, and interrelation among states and non-state actors. Interdependence – the result of a positive integration of actors and institutions – affects states' behavior and vice versa (Keohane-Nye 2012). «By creating or accepting […] institutions […], governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations» (*ibid.* 5). Interdependence must be however consistent with states' sovereignty principle (Keohane 1986) and must not be confused with cooperation nor harmony. Cooperation is defined by Keohane (1984 51) as a situation where actors' policies «automatically facilitate the attainment of others' goals», while harmony «requires that the actions of separate […] organizations […] be brought into conformity with one another through […] negotiation» (*ibid.* 51). Particularly, cooperation not always involves negotiation (where usually international institutions play an important role); thus, cooperation is unnecessary where harmony reigns (*ibid.*). Liberalism rejects the presence of utopic harmony of interests among individuals and states within the international system (Moravcsik 1997). On the contrary, EL tells that only rarely preferences are non-conflicting; cooperation is desirable in IR. Only through this, a regime of interdependence will help states and individuals to achieve their desired outcomes. Multilateralism is coordinating policies through arrangements and institutions' tools (Keohane 1990) and it should be based on the fact that «states sacrifice […] flexibility in decision making and resist short-term temptations in favor of long-term benefits» (Martin 1992, 768) deriving from a positive exchange and interactions with other actors.

DPT. International institutions are positively watched by the approach. These help to confirm the DPT's assumptions because provide a possible pacifying effect (Russett *et al.* 1998), as well as they positively guide states' political deliberation (Doyle 2008). Since institutions can help to lead to peaceful relations among actors, DPT scholars favourably see their proliferation within the society. Optimist DPT theorists argue that institutions, especially if free, are inherently peaceful, and widening them means fostering peace (Rummel-Martindale 1984). Institutions can help the cause for human freedom, which leads to peace (Rummel 1983): thus, they are essential for DPT to consider them as stabilizing factors in the global system. International institutions can promote agents' mutual respect, communication, and transparency – which is a step towards peaceful relations –, as well as cross-pressures and peace. «Spreading and enhancing the

institutions of freedom fosters a global and just peace» (*ibid.* 15). A wide set of international institutions helps states preventing to undertake conflict against each other, working like a "brake", and – encouraging individual liberty and responsibility (Oneal *et al.* 2003) of the actors. Furthermore, institutions regulate and facilitate trade (*ibid.*) – which is an assumption connected to EL. Usually, free-market-oriented democracies – "libertarian states" (Rummel 1983) – share membership in international institutions and acknowledge the need for cooperation, to accomplish goals. A network of interconnected institutions can help reducing possible conflicts among democracies (Bliss-Russett 1998) and helps to control large-scale conflicts' outbreaks, coerce norms-breakers, mediate among partners' disputes, reduce uncertainty by conveying information, solve policy problems, shape norms and rules, and finally generate narratives and mutual identification (Russett *et al.* 1998). As seen under the NI's perspective, international institutions have their flaws and can be ambiguous since they might exacerbate conflict among democracies and autocracies (*ibid.*). Secondly, «one would see a correlation between IGOs and peace but not necessarily a causal relationship linking IGOs to peace» (*ibid.* 444). Institutions can help democracies to have positive relations and prevent conflict among them. In the Kantian world, the republics would cooperate and be interdependent on one another (Kant 1957 [1795]). Liberal democracies are maintained relatively pacific because they are also interdependent on one another in a sort of pacific union (*ibid.*). As well as with cooperation, the concept of interdependence is regarded by EL/NI as a factor helping democracies not engaging war between each other. Thus, the interdependence between democracies could be seen both as the cause and the result of democratic peace since it can help to maintain peace among liberal states. Economic interdependence – witnessed by the increasing trade interdependence among nations (Rosecrance 1986) – is crucial for those stressing the link between commerce and democracies – the more democratic the states are, the more they trade. Kim and Rousseau (2005) explain that the interdependence's decline does not cause conflict, but vice versa, conflict causes a decline in interdependence and «the more democratic a state, the less interdependent it is with its adversary. However, if the opponent in the dispute is a democracy, […] interdependence increases» (*ibid.* 540). Interdependence can contribute establishing peaceful relations and it confirms DPT's assumptions. Independence requires openness from the actors and is a feature required by international institutions. Democracies – which work in conjunction

with institutions to create peaceful relations – are usually both open and tied together by independence constraints allowing possible peace among them and absolute gains.

DR. As for the realist-neoconservative component of DR, this does not tolerate strict global institutional constraints (Fukuyama 2006). Specifically, the US – DR's top case-study – should not be bound to international commitments limiting its power. In general, DR's realist-neoconservatives do not look at international institutions as important and effective policymakers (*ibid.*), since they could limit the ray of action of the much more important entities, that are the states (realist element). Institutions «that point to an ultimate world government should be regarded with the deepest suspicion», Kristol (2001 193) warns – detaching himself from the Kantian communitarian vision. DR's realist-neoconservatives do not give dignity to international institutions. They adopt a realist-like posture regarding international institutions, organizations, and regimes, distrustfully watched (Kagan 2008). They would not be able or relevant to achieve or help to achieve states' goals (realist element). On the other hand, the other DR's side, the institutional-neoliberal one, is not as intransigent as the realist-neoconservative in judging the global institutions; rather, these are positively watched by it. Fukuyama casts himself more in the neoliberal and institutionalist tradition (close to NI). Institutions are regarded as helpful in IR: Fukuyama (2006 10) openly writes about a "Realistic Wilsonianism" which «differs from neoconservatism […] as it takes international institutions seriously». Of course, like NI, Fukuyama's doctrine does not want to replace states' sovereignty with global institutions – as some DR scholars fear they would – but it stresses weaknesses and states' limited capacity to solve all IR's policy problems and achieve desired outcomes. Despite reducing actors' actions' costs, international institutions potentially help in the spread of peace, freedom, and democracy abroad. However, like NI's scholars, Fukuyama (2006) admits that the institutions are not perfect and sometimes they move slower than the society would require. Fukuyama (*ibid.*) legitimizes them and favourably watches interdependence, cooperation, and multilateralism global institutions create. Fukuyama's (2006) Wilsonianism acknowledges the importance of the world order, thus of interdependence among nations. On the other hand, neoconservative-realists are reluctant to uncritically embrace a "cooperative vision" of IR since they perceive both interdependence and multilateralism as forms of weakness and impediment in foreign policy. Rather, an "assertive multilateralism" (Ryan 2010) would be more welcomed in

the realist-neoconservative perspective. However, despite being suspicious of these concepts, and criticizing global institutions, they know they cannot do without them. Particularly, despite being the top superpower, the US, must – reluctantly – work within the interdependency framework and be in close contact with the institutions, for its foreign policy interest and influences. However, what is emphasized in DR in general is that the US should continue cultivating unilateralism in the international system – the US shifted from a Democratic-led multilateral unipolarity under Bill Clinton to a Republican-led unilateral unipolarity under George W. Bush. Multilateralism is seen as a power-restringing agent; «a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones» (Krauthammer 2004a). On the other hand, «unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possible. Unilateralism […] means that one does not allow oneself to be hostage to others» (Krauthammer 2002, 17). Unilateralism is not isolationism, but in this perspective openness, multilateral attitude, and institutions are a matter of interest of the single moment. «Multilateral if possible, unilateral if necessary», Kagan (2003 144) says.

Summary. EL, DPT, and DR's neoliberal side have respect for and trust in international institutions as conflict- and problem-simplifiers of IR. Interdependence is stressed by them, and this generates good externalities for the states. The positive effects institutions carry out in their interaction with the states is witnessed by the fact that they ease cooperation between them, solve problems, help to limit violence, conflict, incompatibilities, working as transmission belts and global connectors. Institutions are not perfect according to the three approaches and have shortcomings and personal goals. However, DR's realist-neoconservatives look at them suspiciously since they are not always considered as relevant in states' interests (states' power-shrinking agents). Self-interest is highly regarded by all the approaches and is related to the concept of interdependence. Differences among the approaches are just on the method to achieve it. Interdependence and multilateralism are seen by EL and DPT as desirable and necessary conditions for peace and states' gains. Economic globalization, coordination, interrelation, and interdependence are emphasized and appreciated by NI and DPT. Opportunistically, DR's realist-neoconservatives dissent: cooperation is desirable just in some moments.

3.2 Free-market and rationalism

Introduction. XIX century economist Richard Cobden (quoted in Bliss-Russett 1996, 1128) said that «the more any nation traffics abroad upon free and honest principles, the less it will be in danger of wars». Since its origins and conceptualization by Adam Smith (see 2.1), free-market and free trade have been regarded among the most effective ways to pacify nations and stimulate cooperation among them, while increasing their wellbeing and economic output. Particularly, not only free trade is an expression of the individual preferences, desires, and rational behavior in the market, but it is also a way states establish fruitful relationships with others; as XVII century jurist Samuel Ricard (quoted in Fukuyama 1999, 229) said, «commerce attaches [men] to one another through the mutual utility». Historically, trade and commerce brought different people and nations into contact with one another, and from this encounter common interests emerged (Oneal *et al.* 1996). Free trade is a means to enlarge wealth without the inconveniences of war (Moravcsik 1997), according to the movement of demand and supply in the capitalist free-market. Free trade is a lynchpin of liberalism and is a powerful war deterrent because theoretically commerce advantages all the actors. In a free trade regime, each economy is materially better off than if there were war, conflict, or protectionism or the State directing wealth allocation. Not only free trade unites individuals everywhere (Burchill 2013), but it is the expression of the free will of the single actor and its economic interest. The actors want to satisfy their personal preferences and act in the market driven by offer and supply laws, nonetheless by the freedom that allows the agents – states and individuals – to fulfill their will. This was understood by XVIII century economist David Ricardo, with Smith one of the fathers of classical modern economics. Through the theory of comparative advantage, he advocated for free trade and the countries' individual specialization (Seabrooke-Kelton 2017) that increased benefits and production. Angell (2015 [1910] 235) affirmed that «cooperation does not exclude competition»: commerce and freedom cannot exist and thrive with war tradition; institutions and regimes ensure them for all in a free-market regime. As Montesquieu (quoted in Hirschman 1977, 71) said, «the spirit of commerce brings with it the spirit of frugality, of economy, of moderation, of work, of wisdom, of tranquility, of order, and regularity». Trade is better than territorial conquest (Angell 2015 [1910]) and, along with its generalized benefits, makes war less attractive (Morrow 1999). Economic activity is crucial for states and free

trade is an essential feature of liberal theories (Nye 1988), prompting the pathway to peaceful relations among increasingly globalized and better-off nations. Individualist free trade is one of the bases for prosperity and peace (Friedman 1999), while the free-market is a symbol of individual choice and will in society. Economic goals can be analyzed and explained in IR by the rational choice approach and are acknowledged as the result of individual self-realization, which sees man «not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another man», as John Locke (quoted in Hirschman 1977, 73) said. Adam Smith himself for example held private property as fundamental, sacred, and inviolable (Vargas Llosa 2019), so did Locke (2020 [1689]). Liberty is essential to individuality, affirmed XIX century philosopher John Stuart Mill (2003 [1859]), while Lord Acton (quoted in Waltz 1962, 332) affirmed that «liberty is the only end of government that can be generally pursued without producing tyranny». This is consistent with a limitation of the government (von Hayek 1944), which should leave space to the individual and its preferences on the market (Gray 1980). Property – at risk in the Hobbesian world – is connected with individualism and the free-market. According to Locke, the government has no other end but to preserve individual private property (Holmes 1993), whose right, according to Rand (1964) is man's right to action. In this regard, the individual is celebrated for its capability to project rational choices, which – through the lenses of IR theories – can be translated into self-interest. Rational choice is how the actors maximize their gains, typical from liberalism in IR and liberalism in economics. Given the correct information, the individual will choose the pathway it thinks to be the most convenient – usually the least expensive – to get its goals accomplished. Classical economics' *homo economicus* principle is based on the single rational individual interest and decisions; and it will try to increase its assets as much as it can (Brown 2015), possibly efficiently, surely rationally. And the individual will lower the costs of the pursuit of its interest when acting within the market and the society. Peace is its main assurance for the pursuit of its goals and preferences in the free-market capitalist regime.

EL. The world's economy and peace are in danger if there are political conflicts among nations (Keohane 1984). Within the framework of international institutions, free trade can help to promote peace in IR both nationally and internationally. Smithian *laissez-faire* explains that economic output can be indefinitely extended thanks to the individual's inventiveness and effort (Carr 1968) and division of labor, which maximized efficiency

and production (Smith 2012 [1776]). Smithian *laissez-faire* is regarded as necessary in the exchange-based relations among free and peaceful states by EL. So is the free-market regime, that makes the individual, the consumer, the author of its wellbeing and preferences. Free trade is an incentive helping to maintain openness, harmony, and prosperity (Starr 1997) within the international system. Market and economic liberties are positive social elements and benefit actors. Liberal economists and institutionalists abhor monopolies (Carr 1968) and corporativism. Dangerously and unfairly, barriers to competition confer privileges only to a few (Keohane 2001) and hamper the opportunities to the many. Indeed, Smith (2012 [1776] 604) argued that monopolies' effects are «always and necessarily hurtful». «Restrictions on trade, or production for purposes of trade, are […] restraints; and all restraint […] is an evil» echoed Mill (2003 [1859] 157). As stated in Wilson's Fourteen Points after World War I, peace could be reached by removing economic barriers and establishing a free regime among nations (Ambrosius 1987, Howard 2002). Economic openness provides incentives for peaceful instead of aggressive expansion according to Keohane (2002) and this prompts the international system's openness, corroborated with cooperative institutions' framework. The economic interrelation that derives from this, Oneal *et al.* (1996) say, is that trade expansion reduces the conflict's likelihood and increases ("complex", Keohane would say) interdependence. This latter is a concept NI is based on, and it is always correlated to a much greater probability of peace (Oneal-Ray 1997, 752). As classical EL scholar Benjamin Constant (2011 [1816] 9) said, «commerce inspires in men a vivid love of individual independence. Commerce supplies their needs, satisfies their desires». Free trade is thus seen as a force «transforming individuals, society, and relations between societies. Within the liberal tradition, a clear link is […] established between expanded trade and peace» (Barbieri 2002, 27). However, in EL/NI's perspectives, free trade and interdependence are not just looked at for their positive effects, since the former has both good and bad consequences (Keohane 1984) and externalities (Gowa-Mansfield 1993). Free trade *alone* is only a necessary – nor a sufficient – condition for interstate peace. Trade can also raise disputes: Pollins (1989) stresses that trade relations affect interstate conflict and cooperation. Keohane (1984 54) admits that among states and interrelated economies, «discord on trade issues may prevail because governments do not […] reduce the adverse consequences of their own policies». As for private property, the result of the conjunction between free-market and rational choice, Smith (2012 [1776]) explained that this is sacred

and inviolable. EL is based on the concept of *homo economicus*, the individual with its rational economic desires, and self-interest (Steger-Roy 2020). It is the single individual with its aims and preferences acting within the free-market regime, to accomplish its rational-determined goals. *Homo economicus* is risks- and costs-adverse and desires to achieve its goals in respect of other actors' freedom and institutions, state, and non-state actors. Smithian classical EL preserves the centrality of the single man and acknowledges his preferences within the system, in both individual but the cooperative pursuit of wealth (Keohane 1984). Individuals constitute the actors in the international system (Moravcsik 1996), where they rationally pursue their welfare (Moravcsik 1997). As for the NI's perspective, building efficient institutions is not enough for the individual, who must have the belief that those institutions will preserve and enforce human freedom (Keohane 2001). Institutions are created by individuals and for the individual to help to accomplish their preferences. Theoretically, they assure and check general compliance and preservation of economic individual rights, promoting pluralism. Within the NI perspective, there is the assumption that man is rational, since states and individuals calculate risks and benefits connected to their interests and courses of actions according to their preferences and chose the pathway that leads to a satisfying payoff. On the other hand, the private property needs to be preserved (Schwarz 1962), but to do so, the individual gives up its capacity of engaging violence to the State which, in return, protects every citizen's freedom and assets from aggression. As Keohane (1984 28) says, «rational egoist calculations of whether to cooperate […] will depend […] on the expectations of actors about others' behavior». Expectations are important in liberal theories, but «rationality may be confused with egoism», Keohane (*ibid.* 70) warns. However, «rational-egoist models do not necessarily predict that discord will prevail in relations among independent actors» (*ibid.* 83). Rather, the rational-choice model reduces insecurity in interstate bargaining. Egoism is not condemned in an economic- and institutionalist-centric world view (von Hayek 1982) and has not the meaning commonly given of greed. It follows that harmony is never given per se; but institutions – and GEIs – preserve people's rights to pursue their own preferences, which are the direct cause of cooperation among actors (Moravcsik 1997). Institutions reduce the costs of actor's preferences, through coordination (Keohane 1984).

DPT. Much of its literature stresses its link with the intense faith and trust in trade and

free market as a decisive contributor to interstate peace, in relation with the democratic form of government. Gartzke (2007) speaks about a "capitalist peace" and that shows the liaison between free-market capitalism and peace. Within a capitalist free-market system, democracies are likely to strengthen their commitments, ties, understandings, interests – elements of connection with EL. Markets are and should be self-regulating (Rummel 1983) and trade has pacifying impacts and must be regarded as an element that drives interstate conflict away while promoting peaceful relations and mutual gains. Democracy and trade reduce conflicts' likelihood (Oneal-Russett 1997) – Angellian-Wilsonian tradition – and citizens appreciate the benefits of trade under peace (Doyle 1986, Oneal-Russett 1999b). Free trade is both the result – and one of the main conditions necessary to – peace in IR. From a Kantian perspective, trade may teach tolerance to people (Holmes 1993) and economic decisions are shaped by the rationality of demand and supply (Doyle 1983a) in the free-market. Trade helps to create transnational links (Doyle 1986), accommodating states' potentially peaceful interrelations. This brings benefits to democracies and their relations with each other. The absence of conflict among democracies allowed them to grow economically (Maoz-Russett 1993). DPT despises autarky – which does not allow democracies to establish free trade, thus war-reducing ties (Doyle 1983a, Oneal-Russett 1997). DPT acknowledges that while interacting in IR or the market, actors have individual choices, free will (Mousseau 2000), expectations of mutual rewards (Starr 1997), and preferences (Dixon 1994). Actors' preferences – unfixed (*ibid.*) and unpredictable (Mousseau 2000) – are symbols of the free market (Gartzke 2000). Of course, states' economic preferences may lead to both peace and war (Gasiorowski 1986). In this regard, two informal "schools" exist. The first affirms that interdependence makes conflict decline, while the second that interdependence produces greater conflict among nations (*ibid.*). As for the first school, causes of the democratic peace are found in liberal economics (Gartzke 2000/2007). In general, «although trade may not necessarily produce peace, democracies are apparently more inclined to trade with each other» (Chan 1997, 76). The first school advocates that there is a link between economic interdependence and democracy as a form of government (Burkhart-Lewis-Beck 1994). Democracy and economic prosperity are interrelated (Mousseau 2000). Thus, trade has pacifying effects (Oneal *et al.* 1996) and stimulates interdependence and cooperation among states. Rummel and Martindale (1984) explain that trade among free states would promote both harmony of interests and a distribution of benefits that will forestall war outbreaks.

Economic interdependence in a free-market regime plays important roles in lessening war occurrences or militarized conflicts – in this regard, Gartzke (2007) speaks about a "capitalist peace". Doyle (1983b) too finds a positive link between economic interdependence and democratic peace, even if the contrary is possible (Hegre 2000). Bliss and Russett (1998 1126) explain that «economically interdependent states are less likely to engage in militarized disputes or war with each other», which means that economic freedom «is not in itself a relevant indicator for distinguishing libertarian states from nonlibertarian states» (Chan 1984, 629). On the other hand, according to the second informal – DPT-critical – school there is no evidence of the economic interdependence's pacifying effects (Kim-Rousseau 2005). Which «may not promote interstate peace» as Barbieri (1996 44) acknowledges. Barbieri (2002 93) criticizes liberal tendencies that affirm that free trade and interstate ties' expansion will unite former adversaries: «transmission of cultural norms and […] establishment of institutional mechanisms to mediate conflict […] have little effect in inhibiting […] conflict». A middle point between the two schools could be that free trade is just a *necessary* but not *sufficient* cause helping states to peaceful relations among them. «The optimistic […] interpret[s] the infrequency of war as a sign that the growth of the global economy has produced a more peaceful world. The […] pessimistic […] note[s] that militarized conflict […] plague[s] the international community, despite […] systemwide interdependence» (Barbieri 2002, 108). Within this system, however, people in the democratic states are free to pursue their rational economic goals: freedom is one of the main features guarantying peace among democracies (Rummel 1983). The adjective "liberal" of "liberal democracy", precisely stresses this aspect. In this regard, DPT embraces Kant's legacy. The philosopher stressed human freedom and liberty are essential elements to guarantee international peace (Kant 1957 [1795]). Kant identified property rights as important (Scruton 2001), and that only liberal states will respect individual and human rights (private property included); tyrannies will not (Kant 1957 [1795]). Thus, personal freedoms shall be respected, protected, and preserved – typical of liberal democracy. According to Kant, «the source of the individual's rights lies outside of the State» (Waltz 1962, 339). In IR, «when states respect each other's rights, individuals are free to establish private international ties without state interference» (Doyle 1983a, 213). It is typical from the liberal tradition to promote State's containment to allow the individual to pursue its own goals. Human rights' promotion goes hand in hand with democracy promotion, which reduces the

opportunity to escalate to war (Gartzke 1998), but Doyle (2008) is skeptical about wars based on humanitarian grounds – in the XX century, liberal democracies often failed to promote individual rights abroad (Doyle 1983b). Promoting freedom is a DPT's central issue and capital concept of Rummel's libertarian state: «the more freedom that individuals have in a state, the less the state engages in foreign violence» (Rummel 1983, 27). On this, Rummel (*ibid.* 30) invented two equations: «(1) political freedom = civil liberties + political rights; (2) freedom = political freedom + economic freedom». Economic freedom based on free trade is important in the DPT as an underground element allowing peaceful relations among democratic states. Rummel (*ibid.*) was a strong advocate of property rights, and Kant too said that liberal republics respect private property (Lake 1992). Private property is positively regarded by Doyle (1986) as well: liberty encourages property and property is a symbol of liberty; thus, its protection within liberal states shall be ensured (Doyle 1983a). In a Kantian way, Doyle (*ibid.* 206-7) depicts liberalism as a doctrine based on «freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the law, and the right to hold […] property without fear of arbitrary seizure». Finally, DPT's scholars do not give a bad image of states' egoism, if based on the observance of other actors' freedom. Subjectivity and individualization are considered (Doyle 1986) when states or individuals formulate their preferences. In the Kantian perspective, individuals are diverse (*ibid.*): thus, they have their own – abstract (Oneal-Russett 1999a) – rational economic preferences.

DR. The approach is not properly focused on economic ties, free-market, free trade, rationalism, but both the realist-neoconservatives and the institutionalist-neoliberals it is based on capitalist economic neoliberalism, favouring Washington Consensus as a winning and desirable model in IR. The Cold War was won by the First World also because of its open system and economy that made its participants thriving. Trade and property rights are linked to freedom and are essential for the states and strengthen positive ties, thus possible peace, among them. Krauthammer (2004a) saw the US as a commercial republic, committed to free trade: the power of the market is respected since it is a tool granting US hegemony in the international system. Stressing the importance of free trade in a free-market regime Kagan (2008 24) explains however that «historically the spread of commerce […] has not necessarily produced greater global harmony» – a concern shared by DPT-critics. «Often it has only spurred greater global competition. The

hope at the end of the Cold War was that nations would pursue economic integration as an alternative to the geopolitical competition, that they would seek the soft power of commercial engagement and economic growth as an alternative to the hard power of military strength» (*ibid.* 24). On the other hand, DR's main case-study, the US, was able to impose itself as a dominant worldwide actor also through free trade and economic freedom, and promoted this regime abroad, as a condition for good relations with the partners. Free trade might ensure more advantage and centrality to the US and can be interpreted as one of the features of DR's most favorite concept: freedom. Based on economic neoliberalism, neoconservatives look at the Washington Consensus' policies as the best approach of development (Weber-Berger 2017), an important tool of economic and geopolitical expansion with a focus on the macropolitical structuring (*ibid.*). However, DR stresses that interests depend on the moment (here the link with rationalism) and was born out of concern over human freedom over power (Krauthammer 2004a). DR scholars believe in the "modern liberalism" that «cherished the rights and liberties of the individual […] providing […] protection to these rights and liberties across the globe» (Kagan 2003, 133). Politically speaking, Vaïsse (2010) asserts that, unlike traditional conservatives and liberals, neoconservatives are universalists, especially in foreign policy. They wish democracy for anyone (*ibid.*) – liberal element. In the liberal DR perspective, human rights and individual rights should be respected and protected through intergovernmental institutionalism – Fukuyama's (2006) Realistic Wilsonianism. With the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy in 1989 (Brown 2015), some optimists thought that along with economic integration (Huntington 1993a) and political development, liberal universal values would prevail (Kagan 2008). And, obsessed with the democratic world's enlargement (Vaïsse 2010) and promoting worldwide peace and adherence to the "Western" values (free-market, rule of law, democracy, *etc.*), democratic globalists particularly were in favor of many US intervention to foster freedom abroad. As for property rights, these are important in liberal society (Fukuyama 2020); so are people's rational choices. Values of individualism, pluralism, and tolerance are considered by DR's neoliberals (Fukuyama 1999), while neoconservatives see egoism in IR as a justification to accomplish their goals (realist element). Krauthammer's (2004a) "where it counts" intervention motivation is a form of rational choice, after all. It considers costs of intervention abroad as well as the strategic interest of the US, which cannot intervene everywhere, and must rationalize its "foreign commitment".

Summary. The free-market regime and free trade have both positive effects on the states' relations and are frameworks where actors can have their (policy and personal rational) goals accomplished. The approaches and their scholars favor classical-based economic liberalism, and the global connections it originates. The fact that trade helps to promote peace and prompts liberty is the approaches' common aspect. *Laissez-faire* and economic openness are regarded as necessary to contribute to personal, national, and international prosperity. Free-market and free trade foster positive cooperation and ties among nations, creating the wellbeing of states and citizens, with some (contested) pacifying effects. However, especially in DPT, some critics do not agree with this link, and in DR too, the economic leverage could be used for geopolitical purposes. *Homo economicus* paradigm and rationalist-based interest are positively seen by the approaches too. The individual dimension finds a special place in the liberal understanding. EL, DPT, and DR emphasize the importance of the individual and its freedom, along with its individuality, rationality, rights, private property (which should be preserved). Fostering individual freedom can lead to interstate peace, but differences in the approaches are whether if freedom and democracy should be promoted elsewhere – rational choice plays a role in this.

3.3 International law and anarchy

Introduction. The father of liberalism, John Locke (quoted in Holmes 1993, 172) affirmed that «the end of law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge freedom». Liberalism was historically capital to have the rule of law respected and perceived as the founding stone of the modern State; modern liberalism, in all its related disciplines, agree on the importance of it. International law and transnational constraints are highly regarded by liberalism in IR and should be respected by states and non-state actors – this subchapter considers international law, but also rules and norms in general. Liberals are not skeptical about international law, since this is connected with international institutions and ensures smooth management of the IR's policy issues among states. Within a regulated (liberal) international order, there is the opportunity to find a solution to anarchy, uncertainty, and pursue interstate peace – liberalism, like realism, acknowledges that agents interact within anarchy in the international system (Jackson-Jones 2017). Rules are necessary and ensure that common frameworks are respected by the actors. Locke (2020 [1689]) also added that if there is no law, there can be no freedom, law is the guarantee of freedom. Liberalism and neoliberalism in IR care about

international norms – reciprocal for states – since they can harmonize otherwise complicated relations among geopolitical entities. Liberalism puts faith in international law, defined by Bull (1977 122) as «a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law». International law «exists around us» (Percy 2017, 267) and is based on multilateralism, arbitration patterns, and dispute-resolution mechanism (Hobson 1915). Instability and political change are usually associated with the likelihood of conflict and possible escalation to war (Ward-Gleditsch 1998). That is why in the liberal tradition rules, norms, and international institutions are strengthened. International norms and rules can help states to construct more peaceful settlements and relations among them, making up for the inevitable consequences of anarchy in IR. Anarchy is a central topic in IR. States move in IR within anarchy, which is the absence of an above international government controlling events and states (Waltz 1979). Realism and neorealism, as well as liberalism and neoliberalism in IR, agree on the fat that anarchy in IR is dangerous and have addressed the issue of anarchy for decades. However, their approach to it is different. Liberalism and neoliberalism do not look at anarchy with the same obsession of with realism and neorealism. According to liberalism, anarchy – limited by common laws, agreements, and norms respected by all in IR – does not oblige states to be aggressive with one another. Anarchy is acknowledged to be an important player, and the multilateral cooperation between states, international institutions, and law can mitigate it. Anarchy is the realm of insecurity: under it, states face the constant possibility that another state will use force against it (Ward-Gleditsch 1998). Liberalism concentrates on possible cooperation easing anarchy's insecurity, pointing out that interstate exchanges, free trade, international law, and institutions as elements could mitigate the anarchic *homo homini lupus* principle's impacts. In the liberal understanding, anarchy is less dangerous if states cooperate peacefully; and the security dilemma is mitigated through the help of institutions and trade, making positive interaction among states possible, increasing security. Anarchy is simultaneously the guarantee of preserving peace (states will not breach tense relations, because otherwise, war may occur) and the certainty preventing it (since there is no global government, states' interests are conflicting). If observed by actors, international law, norms, rules might prevent anarchy's dreadful consequences.

EL. Liberalism is often associated with the advocacy of international law (Moravcsik

1997) and rule of law. EL respects international law and acts within it. NI too cares about norms, and rules; thus, it positively looks at the international frameworks, structures, and regimes that indicate the guidelines for states and non-state actors. International law can be institutionally defined as the «product of the continent will and actual practice of the states» (Chiaruzzi 2019, 59). It is a regulative element of the international system that should be applied in the relation between states and between states and institutions to assure general agents' conformity to common patterns regulating behaviors, actions, and preventing conflict in IR. According to Keohane (2002), international law governs and guides possible cooperation among states and may be used by them as their interests' tools, mitigating insecurity and conflict outbreaks. In other words, the possibility to escape from anarchy in IR is given by international law, coupled with cooperation and intuitions (Suganami 1989). States can cooperate through it and its guidelines for long-term interests (Keohane 1984) – international law itself assists states and actors to pursue their interests (Percy 2017). Of course, international law can limit states' actions but is essential to ensure potential participation in the free market. Most of all, the preservation of the regime through shared and just norms is a further guarantee against the risks generated by the anarchic absence of overarching authority in IR. Some classical NI scholars acknowledge the positivity of the international law's contribution within the IR and NI cares about rules and norms since they are "IR regulators", defining limits and roles of the actors – without hampering their bargaining opportunities. Norms give salient significance to international institutions and EL. Keohane (1986 21) explains that «norms can consist of standards of behavior […] regarded as legitimate; they do not necessarily embody ethical principles». NI/EL scholars focus on communication (Moravcsik 1997, Oneal-Russett 1999c) and its impact on IR: effective and multilateral, communication is an acknowledged feature in the toolkit of successful international institutions (Keohane-Nye 2012). According to Keohane (2002 50) these latter «need to be constructed both to facilitate the purposes that governments espouse […] and […] to alter governmental conceptions of self-interest […] to widen the scope for cooperation». Keohane (*ibid.* 33) admits there has been a progressive shift towards norms in IR after the Cold War's end, which «made scholars increasingly aware of the importance of ideas […] and information». This could be the result of more globalization and interactions among the states, which impose more common compliance to the international rules. NI explains how cooperation between states may occur and be overcome under international anarchy

and global insecurity. World politics is the result of a decentralized authority rather than hierarchy (Reus-Smit 2013). Following NI, institutions are created to mitigate anarchy within international politics; they can help to prevent conflict in IR. NI does not deny anarchy and commits to finding a solution to mitigate it and its impact on the states. States need to cooperate to decrease the dangers connected with instability – and the possibility of the spiral of distrust – in the international system: following international law and norms is the best way to do so. If some neorealists – skeptical about international law (Percy 2017) – explain that cooperation is only possible under conditions of regional hegemony, NI scholars propose a neoliberal theory of international cooperation based on respect of and compliance to common rules. Anarchy can shape (economic) actors' and states' behaviors and interests. In EL/NI there is an "economic approach" to anarchy, which sees the risks associated with anarchy as costly for the states, always concerned about potential attacks from other states. In this sense, anarchy and uncertainty in IR are costly: this explains EL/NI's intention to strengthen economic ties and institutional patterns. Proponents of NI and EL believe that uncertainty in IR is reduced by the creation of stable international institutions and frameworks helping states to cope with anarchy. Institutions and cooperation reduce anarchic insecurity, generating information (Keohane 1990/2002) and reliability. This is an opposite vision to realism, which states there is no way out of anarchy. On the contrary, inspired by institutionalism and cooperation among states, NI and liberalism do not look at anarchy as a historical predominance (Chiaruzzi 2017). Institutions help states choosing for stability in IR through inclusivity and inter-cooperation. This could lead to peace because states can cooperate among them if there is a reduction in terms of uncertainty in the international system (Gartzke-Li 2003). In EL's perspective, the idea of an economically fruitful and peaceful environment should convince states to interconnect with one another. Facilitating communication between states and institutions is an antidote against anarchy (Keohane-Nye 2012).

DPT. International law, norms, and rules are part of the necessary elements pacifying democratic states and, possibly, a community of democratic states that entertain relations among them according to commonly agreed rules. Democracies are thought to be more pacific also thanks to the constraints and guarantees of international law and norms in general. Within an international law framework, states know what is and what is not allowed. Thus, international law is a war- and conflict-deterrent, and democracies are

likely to respect it. The development of international law – along with institutions and rules – is the only cooperative way to avoid the dangers related to anarchy and, in general, security concerns (Burke 2017). Democracies usually respect international law and norms – since they are built on rule of law domestically – and are interested in the preservation of the *status quo*, also because of their conflict-adversity. International law and rules are to be considered as stabilizers of IR, that "Wilsonianly" help the global community towards the pathway of peace among (democratic) states. Scholars have faith in international law, which can help to guide states' political action (Doyle 2008) in the IR. International law and norms give important dispositions among and for the (democratic) states: violations should be punished. Liberalism prompts the rule of law; DPT, as liberal theory, implies it. Remember that the cosmopolitan law – as seen in 2.2 – was the third element of the Kantian perpetual peace condition. Compliance with international law can be a further step to peaceful relations among states. Emphasized by Doyle (1983b/1986) and Spiro (1994), international law is a decisive element for IR's actors, since it is (and provides) a set of regulations that can help harmony in IR. Democracies privilege the use and the respect of clear laws and norms to regulate their relations and orientation towards peace. DPT implies that peaceful relations are likely between countries sharing a particular normative asset, (liberal) democracy. Although "democratic values" – such as freedom and rule of law – do not necessarily guarantee trust and respect among states (Rosato 2003), sharing common norms between democracies is emphasized in DPT. Norms are crucial for DPT, and if they are not fully developed and implemented in the liberal democratic regime, governments will be seen as unstable (Russett 1993). Norms allow the efficient construction of the (liberal) democratic State and its role within the international community. Norms are not just of the international institutions' regulators, but also the regulators of relations between states (democracies). Benoit (1996) explains that democracies are thought to enhance norms against the use of force, limit the conflict, and stimulate the resolution of interstate controversies. DPT favors institutional constraints and norms; and these must be implemented within democracies (Russett 1993, Russett *et al.* 1995). «Liberals emphasize the potential of institutions for communicating information and facilitating bargaining» (Oneal-Russett 1999c, 6): norms shape democracies, and democracies shape norms. If shared and reinforced, norms can promote for example trade agreements (Bliss-Russett 1998), with positive outcomes for the states involved. If anyone complies with international law and agreed norms, the rules of the

"game" will be respected – especially among democracies – and interstate conflict would be prevented and avoided and not just because states are democracies, but because they comply with the international law. Clear regulation is better than non-regulation that exposes individuals and states to uncertainty and the law of the jungle given by the lack of an overarching authority – anarchy. Through DPT's lenses, no one is safe and free in anarchy – the spread of democracies could conversely mitigate the role of anarchy in IR. And that is why democracies and rule of law are built. It is not a coincidence that Kant (1957 [1795]) proposed a sort of global government regulated by a common code, the cosmopolitan law. DPT and its main scholars are not much specific on anarchy as such, but if anarchy prevails in IR, "realistically", only the strongest actor of the system will emerge and impose its rule, which is an undesirable effect in the DPT mindset. States are peaceful if citizens are free – Rummel's (1983) libertarian state. Anarchy is seen as a possible threat to peace and it should be solved through international institutions' corroboration and cooperation. Russett (1993 137) explains that «democracy and the expectation of international peace can […] mitigate both the real and the perceived dangers of a still anarchic international system». In this view, democracy could prevent anarchy's instability effects in IR; and to do that, states might foster (political and economic) freedom – based on rule of law, not anarchic self-help – embracing mutual nonaggression (Doyle 1986). The establishment of liberal democratic republics – considered unwilling to go to war among them often – might help states to mitigate the effects of anarchy – the absence of an overarching authority – by getting along with one another, being in peace, and establish good relations with each other, reducing conflicts.

DR. The approach is skeptical towards international law and common norms (Chernoff 2007, Fukuyama 2006), especially in its realist-neoconservative perspective. In relation to their main case-study and its normative essence, realist-neoconservatives see international law and norms as part of a limitation to US power and action. Rules and laws are assumed to be constraining *vis-à-vis* the states and considered to hamper its foreign policy. DR's neoconservatives «agree with the realists that international law is too weak to enforce rules and restrain aggression» (Fukuyama 2006, 49). Rather than a Kantian system with international law helping states preventing war and circumscribing anarchy in IR, neoconservatives see a Hobbesian world where military force plays an important role (Vaïsse 2010). However, DR's neoliberal-institutionalist side sees international law

skeptically as well. Rules and norms are regarded as constraining agents limiting the states' (US) will. Furthermore, they are considered largely ineffective in solving policy matters (realist element). Sometimes, international law is unable and unfit to solve and defense, security, or justice-related topics (Fukuyama 2006). Indeed, just to take the 2003 Iraq case, the US was in clear violation of the international law, since the then neoconservative Republican administration did not recognize its authority and constraints. In violation of the UN Charter (UNC), with the 2003 intervention the US did not wait the authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The opposition to the US-led war in Iraq showed that international law and norms matter; and was breached by political neoconservative officials. However, the vision of the liberal version of DR is aligned in seeing laws as an expression of institutions, thus binding and important – as said, DR's liberal-institutionalist Fukuyama was against the war in Iraq. As for anarchy in IR, this is not specifically addressed in DR approach, but interestingly, the absence of an overarching authority in IR was partially made up with US hegemony in the international system during the unipolar moment. The Cold War was based on the stability of the system, but with the 1989-1991 Soviet Union's collapse, the unipolar US was widely acknowledged not only as of the winner of the conflict but also the kingmaker, the only superpower left. After the Cold War, the US was the hegemonic actor in the international system, and thus, in a certain sense, anarchy in IR (absence of international above authority) was informally overcome for a while – no one could compete with the US or dare to challenge it. The then US could be regarded as a system stabilizer since it was the hegemon in the international system in its unipolar moment (Krauthammer 1990). Indeed, in the early Nineties, the US freely moved and acted alone across the unipolar world: it was the American world, with the US as ruler of IR, far distant from anarchic concerns, since Washington was the sole "IR-regulator". However, the cleavage splitting DR (institutionalist-neoliberal and realist-neoconservative) would approach the issue of anarchy according to IR theoretical traditions: following the framework of liberalism (the former) and realism (the latter). Indeed, neoliberal Fukuyama (2006) assumes that international institutions – but also commerce and trade – might help to strengthen interstate cooperation and decrease war occurrences. On the other hand, neoconservatives, do not prioritize cooperation through institutions and prefer to adopt a hegemonic posture, that overcomes international anarchy more easily – a condition only limited to the historically determined unipolar moment. Otherwise, as Krauthammer (1990) explained,

international stability – and partial absence of international anarchy during the US unipolar moment – is neither given in the system nor is the norm.

Summary. Like in the institutions' case, the approaches and the scholars disagree on the role international law, norms, and rules must assume in the international system and its impacts on the states. NI does not see norms limiting economic outcomes and includes them in the wider framework of international institutions' framework fostering interstate cooperation and peace. So does partially DPT which stresses the benefits of complying with international rules to strengthen ties among democracies and mitigate anarchy. DR, especially realist-neoconservatives, look at international law and norms with skepticism and detach themselves from the typical liberal posture on the subject. EL and DPT and their scholars stress that they should be respected since they are useful for states and guide possible cooperation among them. Instability and anarchy in IR are a concern to the international system for every approach. Except for DR's neoconservatives, the three approaches agree that institutions might help to decrease global uncertainty. Cooperation, norms, rules, regimes, and institutions can help decreasing conflicts and insecurity among states and overcome "anarchic insecurity" generated by the absence of an overarching authority in IR. Free trade is acknowledged as another medicine against anarchy in IR. However, the three approaches differ on how international institutions and law are effective in preventing threats to peace and limiting anarchy's effects.

3.4 Conflict intervention and security

Introduction. «War is not merely an act of polity but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried out with other means», as von Clausewitz (1989 [1832] 87) famously said. Liberalism opposed this classical realism's claim and does not look at war as a means to solve disputes or concerns. War and conflict are among the main features of IR and are looked at as the antithesis of peace. Historically, as Zakaria (quoted in Keohane-Nye 2012) explains, war has been regarded as an opportunity for great powers to advance in in the past – Angell (2015 [1910]) defined this the "great illusion" – while today, however, war is badly watched by almost every IR theory. Particularly, the liberal tradition looks at war as a danger and as a powerful irrational threat to States, citizens, interstate relations, commerce, and trade. In a nutshell, war is organized violence imposing high costs on anyone (Starr 1997) within the international

system. Liberalism in IR argues that war – obsolescent – can be prevented with cooperation, interdependence, trade, cooperation, and international institutions and law. Considered as dangerous, war would not cancel the deep (commercial) interdependence nations have (Angell 2015 [1910], Howard 2002). Because of the mutual economic gains between states, liberalism considers war irrational and unnatural (Burchill 2013), preceded by the question of whether states should or should not intervene in the disputes and conflict among states (Morrow 1999). War is the result of a conflictual escalation, though there is no linear pathway to conflict. Liberalism is unwilling to support war per se, and thus emphasizes alternatives to conflict such as the wellbeing generated by more ties among nations, that with war would be broken. Since «most wars arise out of calculation and miscalculation of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions» (Doyle 1986, 1157), the pre-intervention phase should also be closely watched and considered for a de-escalation opportunity. Peace Studies – see Part 2 – also emphasize the methods to prevent a war among states: inhibiting war factors and occurrences should be considered also in terms of actors' interests and rational behavior. Avoid wars' outbreaks has historically been among liberalism's missions. Among possible restraints to conflict, in IR there are liberal positions – concerned with democracy, the importance of the economy and trade for nations – and realist influences – power and interest of the nations, territorial proximity, strategic alliances (Oneal-Ray 1997, Oneal-Russett 1999a). Of course, states are entitled to defend themselves when attacked – this is also stressed within the UNC with clear limitations – using force in IR is an *extrema ratio* according to the liberal tradition in IR. The UNC is the centrepiece of international law (Shakman Hurd 2017), the embodiment of the world's collective security, and it says that peace should be maintained in the international system. However, liberalism is war-adverse and does not look favourably to the use of force as such. As George (2017) explains, liberalism analyzes the alternatives of force projection as means to maintain order, and contrary to what one may think, liberalism is also concerned with security and defense. «Peaceful coexistence is impossible if a man has to live under the constant threat of force to be unleashed against him by any of his neighbors at any moment […]. Government is the means of placing the […] use of physical force under objective control» (Rand 1964, 127-8). Security and security issues are crucial in IR and are a major focus of global governance and policy (Burke 2017). Both domestically and abroad, liberal states are committed to ensuring rule of law, protection, and defense over their territory, to protect

their citizens and interests, private property, and individual rights (Locke 2020 [1689]). Liberalism stresses human freedom and rule of law, which is the guarantee of the system itself and the protection of the citizens and their property. In the liberal mindset, security – a coordinated multi-layered effort among states to eliminate mutual harm – must be addressed by international actors. Security finds a concrete response within the UN, which in its founders' intentions, had to be a "custodian" of the (peaceful) international order and the monopoly of violence. The UNSC has the task to maintain peace and security worldwide: it must evaluate whether to intervene or not in conflicts – delegating the intervention to other bodies – according to the UNC's provisions. Based on collective security and sponsored by a liberal worldview, the UN – a product of liberal internationalism – has been an extraordinary agent preventing violence and war outbreaks in the last decades. Posing, thus, the seeds for international peace.

EL. War is economically fruitless, useless, undesirable for liberal democracies, their economies, and their citizens' wellbeing. International institutions may help states with the prevention of the outbreak of violent conflict. NI emphasizes the damages in terms of cooperation and the destruction of the institutional design and intra-collaboration at different levels that war causes. NI abhors war – institutions are constructed to help states to cope with problems, that otherwise may also degenerate into conflict. In general – and this is a connection with DPT – pacific countries are reluctant to go to war or to intervene the conflict in general (Keohane 2002). EL – and NI – presents war as nonsense in the globalized world: war itself is seen as irrational in the liberal understanding (Burchill 2013), also because of the relevant economic damages, and the rupture of prolific ties among states and partners. The absence of international institutions leads to economic losses eventually (Fulcher 2004) to actors and makes war and conflict in IR more plausible. And this destroys international trade and investment – costs of wars have impacts on the civil society – as well as on commerce. And, as Angell (2015 [1910]) remembered, warfare produces poverty. Thus, in general, liberalism is hostile to military institutions (Huntington 1967). As Constant (2011 [1816] 7) wrote, «war precedes commerce. War and commerce are only two different means of achieving the same end, that of getting what one wants». According to him, war is impulse, commerce is calculation (*ibid.*). Trade and peace are the first victims of war according to EL and NI. Particularly, liberal institutionalists also look at institutions through the spectacles of EL

and thus are against the use of force in IR which would bring terrible losses under many fronts. Violence is not the solution to address or solve complicated problems within the international system. The use of force deteriorates and undermines cooperative opportunities among states. Indeed, «the farther one gets away from physical force, in the acquisition of wealth, the greater is the result for the effort expended», Angell (2015 [1910] 158) wrote. In a liberal economic view, trade and international institutions could and should prevent conflict and war outbreaks. NI and liberal institutionalists explicitly condemn war, as states should maintain ties within an interdependent network to prevent conflict and get absolute gains. Keohane's and Nye's (2012) complex interdependence does not contemplate the use of force in a world of multilateral states' interactions. «The minimal role of military force means that governments turn to other instruments, such as manipulation of economic interdependence or transnational actors» (*ibid.* 192). The use of force has consequences and should be carefully considered before resorting to war. Four conditions make war and war intervention costly to the states. First, the risk of a nuclear escalation; second, the resistance of poor people in poor countries of the world; third, the uncertainties linked to negative effects on economic goals' achievement; fourth, a domestic opinion reluctant to war and opposed to the inevitable human costs that the use of force would entail (*ibid.*). Despite the use of force in IR will not disappear – and NI is focused on the social constraints preventing that – NI is optimistic about the evolution of positive relations among states. Military force triggering conflicts and wars have been diminishing in the last years (*ibid.*), making peace and cooperation more likely and attractive. Security concerns are to be solved institutionally. International institutions can serve the purpose of secure global stability since they help to manage insecurity in IR. Of course, «institution-building may be more difficult where security issues are concerned but is equally essential if cooperation is to be achieved» (Keohane 1984, 247). Institutions help to limit the use of force and large-scale violence (Keohane 2001) and thus help in fostering security. Arrangements of multilateral security «make exclusion from protection extremely difficult» (Martin 1992, 772). Security in IR is achieved through mutual understanding, cooperation, and working together in the international institutions, also because no nation can cope with it alone. NI has a conception of the world according to which conflict is reduced by the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), cooperation, international law, and institutions. As anticipated, the UN was created in a post-war "liberal spirit", to preserve security and peace worldwide. In NI's perspective, conflict

intervention is enshrined with and determined by the UNC's dispositions – which contains the criteria of the use of force in IR. NI has respect for the UN, its codes, and subagencies, which are part of a wider universe of institutions ensuring compliance to common standards lowering interstate conflict. The UN system affects the other institutions and how states manage their relations (Keohane-Nye 2012). The UN is based on multilateralism, cooperation, and states' interdependence. Despite it is seen as part of the solution of more cooperation, it is subject to criticisms, since sometimes it seems «more a forum for scoring points […] than an instrument for problem-solving cooperation» (Keohane 2002, 28). Thus, it should «be wary about excessive ambition and institutional overload» (*ibid.* 82), which could undermine its credibility and effectiveness.

DPT. Kant, Cobden, and Doyle argued that in history war was created by undemocratic, centralized governments because of their interests (Burchill 2013). Russett (1993 12) defines war as a «large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence»; sterile and costly. Rummel (1983) found a strong relationship between nonfreedom and international conflict – denied by Vincent 1987a/1987b, Weede 1984. Libertarian states are considered by the author to be more peaceful (Rummel 1983). On the other hand, Oneal and Ray (1997) argue that the more democratic the state, the less it is likely to get involved in militarized disputes. Liberal democracies have no interest in the use of force – this would undermine, theoretically, the Kantian project of liberal republics' pacific union (see 2.2) – but in DPT's wider framework and analysis, there is a lack of consensus whether democracies are going less to war than other kinds of regimes (Benoit 1996). Some argue that democracies do not go to war (Rummel 1983), others that democracies are generally less likely to go to war (Russett 1993), initiate a crisis (Chan 1997) and fight between each other (Doyle 1986). Although democracies have been to war and war between each other in the past, liberal democracies want to preserve the institutional *status quo* in the international order, while peacefully solving possible conflicts. While democracies are generally unwilling to escalate in violent confrontations, they are willing to enter *nonviolent* arguments (Maoz-Abdolali 1989). Russett (1993) explains that the reasons for democratic peace – and the resulting reluctance to war – may be rooted within the nature of the democracy itself. Democracies are credited to be more pacific than other regimes and unlikely to fight each other (*ibid.*), but much depends on how democracy is defined – the Western conceptualization is not agreed by anyone in the world. On their definition,

Small and Singer (1976) include regularly scheduled elections, at least ten percent of adult population voting, economic and political freedoms are granted, as well as private property. Democracy is a time-dependent concept (Ray 1998) and changes across eras and areas. Owen (1994) explains that liberal democracies have liberal features such as free speech and political elections, but with officials able to declare war, especially when threatened. DPT has a strong Kantian legacy and inspiration. Kant defined war as a "poor game" (Panke-Risse 2016) and believed that the spirit of commerce, along with cosmopolitan law and republican form of government, could foster both peaceful relations among free and liberal republics, as well as stimulate individual human enterprise that would make war obsolete. However, critics say, contrary to Kant's wishes, liberal democracies are not less likely to go to and to fight wars than are democratic states are, but they simply do not fight wars between each other (Gartzke 1998), since they have anything to lose in conflict. War is a great concern of DPT and peace: the outcomes of potential economic disruption resulting from conflict should be powerful disincentives and self-restraint factors preventing war outbreak. Lake (1992) observes that generally, democracies win the wars they engage, while Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (1998) state that democracies seem to be reluctant to engage in wars unless their leaders are confident of winning. Democratic countries' leaders will probably avoid unnecessary wars, also maintain their political office (Russett *et al.* 2000). War causes institutional chaos and struggle (a concern that NI has too): thus, democracies in conflict are unlikely to escalate into the war (Kegley-Hermann 1995). Democracies are thought to solve conflicts among states in IR peacefully *because* of the freedom they leave to their citizens. According to DPT, liberal democracies have no interest *in* the use of force and only under the UNSC's approval and provision the use of force may be legal and legitimate. The UNC explicitly forbids the use of force in IR or its threat, but the rights of states' self-defence in case of attack are acknowledged. Pre-emption is not tolerated, but preventive war is possible both for offensive and defensive reasons and should be within a legal paradigm resulting from an attack (Doyle 2008). States must evaluate and wait for an armed attack (*ibid.*) to react. Indeed, according to the UNC, states' self-defence must be: first, motivated by defensive concerns; second, aimed to stop an armed attack; third, targeted against the responsible parties; fourth, limited and proportional; and finally, reported to the UNSC (*ibid.*). However, in IR states are inherently coercive, since all forms of government use force in one way or another, to enforce the law, maintain legal internal order, and defend the state

from aggressors and threats (Wilkinson 2007). Doyle (2008) calls for a need for jurisprudence of conflict and war prevention and he (*ibid.* 60) examines the standards of the anticipatory conflict intervention of use of force in IR, calling them the 4 "L"s: Lethality («loss of life if the threat is not eliminated»); Likelihood («probability that the threat will occur»); Legitimacy («just war criteria of proportionality»); Legality («threatening situation […] produced by legal or illegal actions»). Peace should be preserved, and those threatening it are stigmatized: threats to national and international security should be solved (also) with the intervention of global institutions. «To attain security, states engage in both internal and external balancing for […] deterring aggressors» (Layne 1994, 11). Arguing – as DPT's scholars do – that democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other, this does not include that interstate relations between states be *always* pacific. Democracies are not to be considered regimes where everything is allowed: security is highly considered in democratic states as well. War prevention is related both to the internal state system and the international system (Doyle 2008). States' behavior in IR is contextual (Benoit 1996), which does not mean that democracies do not defend themselves when attacked or that in the DPT's understanding insecurity is tolerated. Rather, security is something that can be achieved together with other states in and through peaceful cooperation. To work efficiently, democracies must consider security issues. And they do so: democracies are «willing to abandon their normative commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes in the face of a threat to their survival by another state» (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* 1998, 792). In the DPT's framework, the UN system is looked at favourably as "IR balancers". Rummel urged that the UN's peacekeeping should be strengthened, along with the UN's global power (Ray 1982). This explains how the UN has peaceful intentions since it prompts the maintenance of peace among states. Usually, the UN looks for pacific solutions and since many states are (formal) democracies, they are not likely to use violence. Furthermore, attacked states must refer to the UNSC about their counterattack (Doyle 2008), which – if the attacking and attacked states are two democracies – would undermine DPT's assumptions. Doyle (*ibid.* 59) acknowledges the role of the preventive war, even if «no state should resort to […] unilateral action unless this remedy has been exhausted». Doyle (*ibid.*) acknowledges that international institutions are not perfect and neither the UN is. He reproaches the UNSC for past misjudgements about the use of force, because of disagreements regarding the kind of action that constitutes self-defence (Rosato 2003).

DR. War and international conflict are usually approached in realist terms by the neoconservatives and condemned by the neoliberals. Seen as economically undesirable, in the neoliberal perspective should be according to the UNC's rules (Fukuyama 2006), while neoconservatives (Krauthammer 2004a/2004b) normatively justify interventions "where it counts" and where the country's interests lay; thus, they do not exclude war a priori. The 2003 war in Iraq was DR's greatest test. As for DPT, the legitimacy of going to war is an important issue in DR. Legitimacy criteria for armed intervention need to be re-examined (Kagan 2003), even if after 1989 Communism's fall, realist-neoconservatives overestimated the threats faced by the US (Fukuyama 2006). Thus, critics say, they are more war-prone. Doves and hawks split DR: and they correspond to institutionalist-neoliberals – Fukuyama, who broke with the neoconservatives over intervention in Iraq – and realist-neoconservatives – war should be engaged where and if it is necessary, according to Kagan (2003). The neoliberal side is more reluctant to war. Fukuyama (1992 262) presents the typical Angellian motivation to support its thesis: «Given […] that […] resources can be obtained peacefully through […] free trade; war makes much less economic sense» – war is bad for commerce. On the neoconservative side, scholars underline the regional differences of the war-process in the world. Indeed, there are differences between the US (realist, pragmatic) and Europe (idealist, moralistic) according to Kagan (2003). Contrary to the UNC's provisions, DR's neoconservatives emphasize pre-emption over prevention. Neoliberals reluctantly resort to violence and armed conflict; the use of force should be declared by UNSC, based on the UNC. Fukuyama (2006) focuses on the controversies around the preventive-war doctrine. Critics of American "moral imperialism" made him change towards a more liberal-institutionalist area. The US cannot always show its toughness since this would undermine its authority and credibility (Fukuyama 2004). On the other hand, the realist-neoconservatives look at the use of force in IR as possible if necessary (Kagan 2003), to spread democracy according to the US interest (Krauthammer 2004a/2004b). Considerations about the use of force before the war cannot be excluded (Kagan 2003). DR welcomes the possible utility of using force in IR, especially by the US and unilaterally – realist element. Kagan (*ibid.*) stresses the differences between the US and Europe regarding peace, use of force, and armed intervention. Europe is liberal and idealistic, while America is more realist and cynical (*ibid.*). When confronting adversaries, usually the US goes for policies of coercion rather than persuasion, contemplating punitive sanctions and using the stick instead of

carrots (Kagan 2002) with its partners and adversaries. The doctrine of pre-emption has been attacked for violating international law, but Krauthammer (2004a) explained that in a world of terrorists, pre-emption is necessary, but «in the absence of a strategic imperative, it is better to keep one's powder dry» (Krauthammer 2004b) – this stresses DR's practical and interpretivist attitude to policy issues. While formulating his practical-normative DR features, Krauthammer (2004a) explained also were to intervene abroad, which are the criteria and the aims. «Where to bring democracy? […]. I propose a single criterion: where it counts. Call it democratic realism […]: We will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood […] only in places where there is a strategic necessity – meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom. Where does it count? Fifty years ago, Germany and Japan counted. Why? Because they were the seeds of the […] threat to freedom» (*ibid.*). Freedom and peace preservations are the *conditio sine qua non* for intervention abroad according to DR's original formulation. This, however, reveals the intrinsic limitations of the approach which does not rely on rigorous criteria. As for security, this can be strengthened through multilateralism and institutions (neoliberals), or war pre-emption (neoconservatives). The realist-neoconservative version of DR stresses how security is important to the US interests and suggests skepticism about international law's and institutions' ability not just to solve, but also to cope with states' security concerns. DR's realist-neoconservatives want a stable and secure world, with the implicit need for the US to dominate and moderate it, and address security threats by non-state actors, *e.g.* al-Qaida (Kristol-Kagan 1996). Fukuyama (1999b 135) explains this by the fact that «people tend to become Hobbesian when faced with the prospect of disorder». On the other hand, the institution granting worldwide security and peace, the UN, attracts concerns of both neoliberals and neoconservatives. Fukuyama (2006) speaks of a general distrust regarding the UN; particularly, the UNSC «was deliberately designed to be a weak institution» (*ibid.* 160). For the more liberal inclined, war is legitimate only within the UN framework (Fukuyama 2004), and here is the main concern for DR scholars: is pre-emptive war legitimate? According to the UNC, it is not; according to realist-neoconservatives, it is. Fukuyama (*ibid.*) considers the UN having legitimacy problems, but the strongest attack comes from Krauthammer (1990 25), who regarded the UN as «the guarantor of nothing. Except in a formal sense, it can hardly be said to exist». Another neoconservative political figure, John Bolton, said also the UN does not exist

(Shakman Hurd 2017) – this was clear in 2003 when the US acted without the UNSC's mandate in Iraq (*ibid.*). DR scholars see the UN as a weak actor that limits US autonomous foreign action. And most of all, it is inefficient in dealing with the state's interests. The UNSC «has never functioned as its […] authors intended» (Kagan 2003, 122). During the Cold War, it was paralyzed because of the mutual vetoes among the US and the Soviet Union (Weiss 2017), but in general, the US has always been «less inclined to cooperatively work with other nations to pursue common goals, more skeptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its structures», Kagan (2002) summarizes. However, when the US strikes in solitude (whether to "promote peace" or to affirm its interests), Kagan (2003 144) argues that UNSC's «authorization is always desirable but never essential», which reveal DR's general ambiguity.

Summary. War is destabilizing. Every approach considers it as undesirable and dangerous for many reasons: from the economic to institutional damages (EL/NI) to the threats to peace, from the disharmony between democracies to the uselessness of the intervention itself (DPT), to the unwillingness to spread blood and waste resources without a clear purpose (DR). However, the approaches (especially DPT and DR) and their scholars differ on when a country should intervene in a conflict. The former justifies an active response if democracies are attacked, while the latter is more open on this option according to its interests, especially promoting democracy abroad. However, for all three approaches, legitimacy is an important concern. They are generally against the use of force in IR but cannot exclude it, especially if peace and freedom are at stake, and the country is unjustly attacked. Differences among the approaches and their scholars' evaluations are also on pre-emptive and preventive war, and the action before the conflict's outbreak EL, DPT, and DR's neoliberals agree that security threats should be solved through a multilateral and cooperative scheme – DR's neoconservatives do not exclude it. International ties should be strengthened to foster security favouring peace among states. DR's neoconservatives prefer a more aggressive policy in security and defense matters. EL/NI and DPT regard the UN(SC)' institutional universe with respect and conform to it; acknowledging its role. They agree with DR's criticisms on the necessity to amend it. The UN plays an important role in establishing ties in preserving peace worldwide, but DR is concerned with its legitimacy and effectiveness.

3.5 Nationalism and autocracies

Introduction. Liberalism in IR and its scholars are quite skeptical of borders and general-collective identarian labels for the states and their people. National identity is not the same as nationalism. While the first assumes a positive connotation, the second has a negative one. Usually, the first is a marginal issue of IR theories (Mount 2017); essentially approached by constructivism. The second finds an informal space in IR theories since it is one of the background conditions allowing interstate conflict. Nationalism presupposes that one ethnicity, or one country is "better" than the other. Nationalism is a threat to peace because puts nations and people against each other, undermining international stability and the relations among actors. Nationalism – a mass phenomenon (*ibid.*), a distinctive species of patriotism (Gellner 1983) – threatens the peaceful coexistence of states within the international system because it foresees the emerge of one people at the expense of another, occasionally undermining these latter's freedom. Instead of narrow-minded nationalism, in many of its forms, liberalism privileges internationalism and openness. National identities can be positively regarded in the liberal theory, which is not the case of (hyper)nationalism, which – and neorealists agree on that – «is the most important domestic cause of war» (Mearsheimer 1990, 21) and interstate war (Carr 1968) too. Nationalism could escalate into autocracy and dictatorship, where freedom, the individual, and human rights are suppressed – but also true harmonic peace – where institutions are despised and corrupted, and the economic system is used to enslave people (von Hayek 1944), and the rule of law is undermined. However, «liberal democracies do not automatically fight all illiberal states in an endless crusade to spread freedom» (Owen 1994, 96). Usually, autocracies are quite isolated from the international system, thus the global economy and exchange. Dictatorships prevent people's freedom, preferences, and desires – lynchpins of liberalism in every field: economics, philosophy, politics, and IR. Liberals arguing for generally limited State intervention (von Hayek 1944) see the tyrant as a ruler treating the State as private property (Holmes 1993). Thus, not only do they support the individual and its rights, but they are also firmly against authoritarianism and one of its most common practical enablers, nationalism, which is a concerning and direct threat to peace. In this last subchapter, a concrete case, the US, is watched through the lenses of the three approaches, because of its relevance in IR. When dealing with IR, it is almost impossible

to avoid speaking of the US, which has been depicted by critics much sensible to the issue of nationalism (Harvey 2003) – that is why it is included in this subchapter – and some argue that American traditional nationalism was and is the source of the US engaging war abroad. During the Cold War, the US-sponsored an open, multilateral, and liberal economic regime based on liberalized trade, foreign direct investment, and currency convertibility (McMahon 2003), as well as the ascendency of liberal institutionalism since the end of World War II (Kegley 1993). US-sponsored the system of free trade (Seabrooke-Kelton 2017) and that of Bretton Woods in 1944, with the creation of liberal "world institutions" such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – World Bank the International Monetary Fund. These institutions have been refined over time, partially changed objectives, and have always been dominated by the US. The US – a democracy not interested in the territorial expansion (Ikenberry 2002b) – was and is the lynchpin of liberal democracy in the world – one of the oldest –, and a tireless promoter of liberal values of openness and liberal economics – often opposed to authoritarian rule. This makes it an interesting case, despite, historically, the US altered periods of openness and closure, liberalism, and realism *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. After the Cold War, the US – the only superpower left – was perceived as the world kingmaker. Economically and militarily hegemonic, in the unipolar moment US economy boomed, and do its commitment to democracies abroad and attempt to strengthen peace, democracy, and freedom. What differentiates the US from the other powers is the former's ability to project military power with unrivaled speed and might everywhere (Wilkinson 2007). And this – along with free-market, human rights respect, and institutions – might help to promote peace, tackling autocracies and nationalism globally.

EL. Classical and neoclassical economists of the XVIII and XX centuries respectively argued against nationalism (mercantilism and protectionism), which weakened trade and economic ties and was a symbol of the State's presence in economic activity. Similarly, they condemned the tyrants and dictators of their times, standing for individual civil and political liberties. According to Angell, nationalism was a distorted and parochial form of militarism (Mount 2017). Interdependence and international institutions limit sovereignty, but in the long run, they are a much powerful force than any nationalist claim, which on the contrary make states more vulnerable. Economic interdependence requires mutual adjustments (Keohane 1984) and might create insecurity among groups (Keohane-Nye

2012). In Keohane's "partially globalized world" nationalism seems nonsense and not helpful within NI's design. On the other hand, «national identities are unlikely to dissolve into the sense of a larger community» (Keohane 2001, 9). EL and NI see nationalism with suspicion: Nye (2011) elaborates on the possible rise of nationalism through the concepts of power transfer (shift in global centers of power in the interstate system) and power diffusion (shift of power from the State to the international system). Some scholars think it will lead to economic catastrophe; «classical and neoclassical economists have seen protectionism as a pathology» (Keohane 1984, 211). Within the liberal tradition, Moravcsik (1997) underlines that Mill's and Wilson's ideational liberalism stressed the relationship between borders and national identities. Nationalism in EL is represented by protectionism, whose involvement in national economies was one of the reasons why liberalism was born four centuries ago. Protectionism does not prompt a peaceful free trade regime, which is desirable in the EL/NI perspective, and benefits just a tiny élite. Protectionism – by the way, one of the favorite systems of autocracies worldwide in history – gives to an unchecked State the task to determine people's preferences. This is unacceptable to any kind of liberalism, being it in IR or politics or economics. Nationalism is a synonym of borders, quite indigested to EL since it denies the international institutions' design and vision, crippling global trade. NI is worried also about authoritarian regimes threatening international cooperation and interdependence among nations. A struggle for liberty is underlined by classical liberals like Mill (2003 [1859]) – and neoclassical like von Hayek (1944) – when dealing with autocracies. Institutions are demolished, corrupted, and undermined under authoritarian and totalitarian rule, which cannot ensure global welfare to the citizens. The model of EL/NI does not contemplate authoritarianism, and «tyrants who murder their people may need to be restrained or removed by outsiders» (Keohane 2001, 3). As for the US case-study, throughout the centuries, the proponents of EL made many comparisons among Europe and the US, most of all in terms of trade and commerce. The US is acknowledged to be a crucial country in the EL's analysis. The US «is central to all four forms of globalization: economic, military, social, and environmental», Keohane and Nye (2012 252) acknowledge. The US has a huge impact in any field of IR and economics: when formulating his NI's assumptions, Keohane (1984) was indeed thinking of the US as hegemon. In NI's the US is seen as a system leader, a global (norms- and institutions-) shaper, but it may not be appropriate for it to be the custodian of the force (Keohane-Nye

2012). The US shaped the international system and the international system shaped the US (Keohane 1984). However, sharing power with allies and international institution-building is a challenge for it (Jervis 2001). The US is the promoter of international institutions and is "condemned" to lead (Keohane 2002) in many fields. And this presupposes responsibility and openness to the international system. No one could have replaced the US in the Cold War when America was the leader of the anti-communist alliance (Keohane-Nye 2012). It was Nye that coined the fortunate expressions "hard power" and "soft power", with clear reference to the US. The first refers to nations' economic and military might, the second indicates ideological appeals and use of culture in IR (Steger-Roy 2010). Hard power is the «ability to induce others to do what they would not otherwise do» (Keohane-Nye 2012, 253), while soft power is «to persuade others that they should want what the United States desires them to want» (*ibid.* 253). The US has difficulty understanding soft power's potentialities – which, in turn, is difficult to measure (Cesa 2017). NI is a difficult approach for the US, which is tempted to act alone in the international system – also because of the unique early 2000s' lack of rivals (Mann 2004). NI sees the US positively, also because it established the 1944 Bretton Woods' architecture based on the so-called embedded liberalism – which ensured both classical liberal economics coupled with welfare social policies (Ruggie 1982) – but it does not share the hegemonic vision that sometimes tempts the US (Harvey 2003). The US-sponsored the GEIs, consequently ameliorating globalization (Williams 2017), and thus, as institutions are positively watched by NI. It was the US-led institutionalism that won the Cold War (Kegley 1993). NI acknowledges US role in free trade and the international system. As a hegemonic actor, but never an authoritarian one, Washington was and is sometimes tempted to use its leadership for its specific purposes (Keohane-Nye 2012). Indeed, the greatest challenge of the US is to see how to exercise its leadership in the international system without hegemonize it (*ibid.*), with nationalist tendencies.

DPT. Nationalism is looked as an opportunity for conflict among nations since it puts differences before commonalities between states. Nationalism is an element that possibly prevents the creation of a pacific union of republics and could undermine democracies' willingness to get along well with one another. Nationalism might be a cause of war among states; democracies, especially weak ones, included. Democracies are not immune to that and thus its presence could undermine the (Kantian) peace project. Kant was a

universalist: in his perspective, nationalism would make little sense due to his cosmopolitanism (Pogge 1994). In the liberal mindset, nationalism undermines the concept of internationalism and potentially it might undermine the pacific agreements and accords between liberal democracies, as well as leading to humanitarian catastrophes and wars, if not tempered and controlled. Peaceful cohabitation on the international stage within a framework of clash of nationalisms would be deleterious and at odds with DPT. This does not mean that states do not have to express their identity in IR or pursue their aims. As for nondemocracies, these kinds of regimes are condemned in the DPT framework as a threat to democracy and peace. Some could charge Kant of creating a global order, but the philosopher rejected the idea of a world State (Huntely 1996) and authoritarian and illiberal solutions. Sometimes «the very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and neoliberal societies» (Doyle 1983b, 324-5). Doyle (*ibid.*) explains that liberal states rarely launch wars to rescue vulnerable populations, while autocratic states launch aggressive wars when they fear getting weaker or to capitalize on their strength. According to Doyle, «democracies maintain a healthy appetite for conflict with authoritarian states» (Burchill 2013, 62). The debate on whether authoritarian states are more conflict-prone or democracies are more likely to attack autocratic states, is open. As seen in 2.2, Rummel (1983 67) affirmed that «libertarian states do not exert violence on each other; and […] the less freedom in states, the more violence between them». In DPT there are two informal "schools" regarding the relations between democracies and autocracies. In a very analytical way, one examines autocracies attacking democracies, and the other examining democracies attacking autocracies. As for the first school, Russett (1993) explains that dictatorships attack if given both power and opportunity. On the one hand, «democracies engage in fewer militarized disputes with each other than they do with autocracies» (Bliss-Russett 1998, 1126). Authoritarian states are more expansionist than democracies, thus more war-prone (Lake 1992). On the other hand, democracies prefer to devote resources to their state's security. As for the second school, Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (1998) say that liberal democracies are more likely to start wars against autocracies than the contrary. Usually, democracies win against autocracies: «the relationship between democracy and victory is quite robust» (Lake 1992, 31). The reason for that is twofold.

«First, if they need to, democrats try hard […] to advance their public policy goal […]. Second, fearing public policy failure, democrats try to avoid contests they do not think they can win» (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* 1998, 794). Furthermore, «autocrats do not have a great need to produce successful public policies. Consequently, they […] fight wars in which their chances are poor because defeat does not […] affect their […] political survival at home» (*ibid.* 794). Compared to democratic leaders, autocrats better survive foreign policy disasters (Chan 1997), also because of their unaccountability *vis-à-vis* their population. Autocracies are not likely to start conflicts against twin autocracies (Maoz-Abdolali 1989) and «although two democracies are much less likely to fight each other than are two autocracies, democratic-autocratic pairs engage in the most disputes» (Russett *et al.* 1998, 457). Not all authoritarian states are necessarily aggressive, however. «Democracies are more peaceful than autocratic states» (Oneal-Russett 1997, 267) and more "fragile" than authoritarian states, and can break down (Dixon 1994), as occurred *e.g.* in Chile in 1973 (Cohen 1994). Doyle (1983b) informs that democracies are not invincible neither impermeable to authoritarian rule. For example, depression and inflation may create the conditions to undertake the pathway to the autocratic State (*ibid.*). As for the US case-study, the country is not normatively addressed, although some DPT scholars acknowledge its unconventionality in world politics. DPT influenced the policy thinking in the US, according to Richardson (2017), while Doyle (2008) speaks about American exceptionalism in world politics. Many times, in history, the US – since its origins, a liberal democracy – self-committed to spread peace and democracy at home and abroad. However, being hegemonic could be a powerful occasion to spread the harmonious Kantian tripod (Oneal-Russett 1997). Thus, the US must be consistent with its liberal democratic principles of open society and human freedom: and it should not have unconditional alliances with non-liberal democracies (Doyle 1983b). The US (which is a democracy and a libertarian State in the Rummelian sense) is inspired by democratic principles and when it tries to export them, it does so engaging conflict with other nondemocracies. This would confirm DPT's assumptions, according to which democracies can go to war against autocracies, especially if attacked, which is not always the case – it happened in December 1941, when imperial Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. DPT «provides the intellectual justification for the belief that spreading democracy abroad will perform the dual task of enhancing America national security and promoting world

peace» (Rosato 2003, 585). On the other hand, several times throughout history the US violated the DPT rule according to which generally democracies do not go to war with each other – this makes the US an interesting case-study for the DPT. For example (*ibid.*), in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957), British Guyana (1961), Brazil (1961, 1964), Chile (1973), Nicaragua (1984). What is to be excluded, is that democracies will not likely go to war in general because of nationalistic instincts.

DR. The approach and its scholars look at nationalism and autocracies through the spectacles of the US case-study. Deep affection for the country is a partial background of DR, particularly in the realist-neoconservative side (Vaïsse 2010). The American unipolarity is prompted by "intense patriotism", which is quite favored, prompted, and sometimes mistaken with national pride. Kagan (2003 87) compares the US to a vast «empire of liberty» and refers to the American expansionism beyond its cultural conventional borders (*e.g.* Middle East) while engaging a new military commitment. In the US case, Hardt and Negri (2004) see a link between imperialism and nationalism; Washington would be determined by a nationalist hegemonic behavior. Americans «have always been internationalists […] but their internationalism has always been a by-product of their nationalism» (Kagan 2003, 88). On the other hand, Fukuyama (1989/1995) warned that along with religious fundamentalism, nationalism might take the place of illiberal and unpeaceful ideologies like Fascism and Communism – all hostile to peace and freedom, by the way – after the Cold War as the new ideological adversary of liberalism. If not tempered, according to Fukuyama, nationalism is a source of violence and conflict (Marks 1997). Nationalism does not lead to peace in IR and pushes liberal democracies to fall prey to excessive individualism (Fukuyama 1999). Because of its affection for liberty and freedom, DR does not like authoritarian regimes. According to the realist-neoconservatives, they could threaten other democracies and the US, while institutional-neoliberals often violate human rights as well. Both DR's currents are in favor of sanctioning dictatorial regimes threatening international peace and stability – the obvious example is the 2003 US war in Iraq. «The State in a liberal democracy is […] weak: preservation of a sphere of individual rights means […] delimitation of its power. Authoritarian regimes […], by contrast, […] use the power of the State to […] control» (Fukuyama 1992, 15). Authoritarian states are perceived and depicted as a threat in the DR framework. Neoconservatives emphasize democracy and create a Manichean

division: “us” (democracies, the US) versus “them” (autocracies, the US’ enemies). This does not mean that democracies should not deal with such governments; «democracies need not stop trading with autocracies […] over matters of both common interest and divergent interest» (Kagan 2008, 98). As for the US case-study, as already stressed, DR is generally a normative foreign policy approach tailored on the US. The US – the “indispensable nation” (Kagan 1998, Krauthammer 2015) – was the only superpower left after the Cold War and this corroborated its central position in the globalized world. Both DR’s neoliberals and neoconservatives look at the US as an individualist country (Fukuyama 1999) and depict it as the international system’s hegemonic guide especially after 1989. US power can even be used for moral purposes (Kagan 2003) since it is the most powerful country on Earth in terms of military power (realist element) and champion of human rights (liberal element). In DR, the US should act as a self-appointed international sheriff enforcing peace and justice (*ibid.*). Neoliberals emphasize the necessity of the US to be prudent using its power (Fukuyama 2004) and lean on multilateral institutions and soft power (liberal element). Neoconservatives instead do not see constraints to the hegemon and promote its unilateral force as well as hard power in IR (realist element). Kagan (1998) admits the US is sometimes overbearing, selfish, ham-handed in the exercise of (global) power, and he (2003) also explains that the US tends to see the world divided between good and evil, friends and enemies. While addressing the US case – as well as the issues of nationalism and autocracies – globalist scholars of DR proposed in the Nineties a «neo-Reaganite foreign policy [that] would be good […] for the world. It is worth recalling that the most successful Republican presidents […], Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, both inspired Americans to assume […] international responsibilities» (Kristol-Kagan 1996, 32), especially against autocracies, and in defense of human rights (liberal elements). This last aspect could be interpreted as a further bridge between neoconservatism and liberalism in IR – to which one could add Krauthammer’s (2004a) formulation of interest in IR in terms of freedom, rather than power, as Morgenthau (1973 [1948]) did. Kagan (2003) sees the US as anarchic in an unregulated and unchecked, freely acting according to what it finds appropriate for its interests and values. US’ “benevolent hegemony” (Kagan 1998/2008) is sometimes confused by critics with imperialism (Hardt-Negri 2004, Harvey 2003, Mann 2004) and nationalism. However, the content of that benevolent hegemony – which includes

"liberal" features such as worldwide attention for human rights, democracy, peace, freedom – is much different from the typical autocratic and illiberal regime.

Summary. Despite not being among the primary concerns of the three approaches – thus the issues are more addressed by their scholars –, nationalism and the autocracies in IR are seen as a powerful and destructing threat (with the partial exception of DR's neoconservatives), especially in economic terms. They endanger interstate relations and peaceful cooperation. Nationalism prompts possible conflict and does not make sense in the Kantian design (DPT), neither in its economical declination (protectionism). Nationalism can lead to authoritarianism, whose incarnation – autocracy – is despised by the three approaches, for different reasons. EL underlines the damages in terms of economic and institutional designs, while DPT and DR's neoliberals focus on the threats and incompatibility to liberal democracies. International peace can be threatened by autocracies. The three approaches and their scholars agree that the US is a fundamental player in IR and can help in fostering global events. Differences among the approaches are on the role the US assumes in the international system. Some do not exalt its presence in IR (NI and DPT), some emphasize its potential in terms of cooperation, globalism, and soft power use, as well commitment for free-market (EL), others see it as the unipolar moral guide, depositary of hard power in IR – DR, especially the realist-neoconservatives.

4. Conclusion

After a definition of peace in IR – the simultaneous prevention of and absence of war both nationally and internationally coupled with harmonic management of solving concerns – and an overview of Peace Studies, EL, DPT, and DR have been presented, along with the approaches' contents, inspirational figures, salient literature, and theoretical weaknesses (Part 2, "Analyzed Theoretical Approaches"). This was intended to offer interpretative tools – while indirectly showing the differences of the three approaches – starting from their doctrinal aspects. As exposed in Part 3 ("Analyzed Empirical Elements"), the three approaches – and their main scholars' evaluations – have been operationalized and seen in the light of five concrete elements of IR (the subchapters, 3.1-3.5) pointing out differences and similarities in dealing with them. Operationalizing and projecting the three approaches on the IR-issues was intended to give a sense of less abstraction in the IR discipline, while testing the theories on concrete subjects, proving their possible

juxtaposition and non-contradiction with one another. With its limitations, shortcomings, and criticisms, the Thesis presented an original and analytical scheme of three "liberal" multi-disciplinal frameworks *vis-à-vis* important selected elements of global politics and IR with peace – and freedom – as the main background feature. The Thesis showed that while analyzing elements of IR the three approaches are compatible and are not at odds with one another. With occasional exceptions, they hold a more or less liberal infrastructure while assessing issues of global politics, with some peaks of institutionalism (EL/NI), idealism (DPT), and realism (DR). Keeping into account the interdisciplinarity of liberalism itself (Richardson 2017) and the interdisciplinarity of the three approaches – EL-economy, DPT-IR, DR-politics – their attitudes in relation to IR-elements presents similarities and differences. As presented in Part 1, the three frameworks are also "liberal" because of their interest in four elements in particular – the individual, the free trade, the interstate cooperation, and the rule of law – but most of all, it is their tacit link and background desirable condition of peace – and freedom – he most important thread among the three approaches. EL has been presented as a mix of NI and neoclassic economics. DPT is the most authentic and accredited approach. DR is an informal foreign policy design – see the "Interview to William Kristol" (Appendix no. 1). Not only this latter is the most controversial and neorealist-leaning, but also the most practical and normative. Putting DR's realistic considerations *vis-à-vis* accredited liberal approaches has been an interesting experiment. DR's institutionalist-neoliberal side is the most consistent bridge with EL and DPT; and this further testifies possible integration of the three approaches. As witnessed in the subchapters' summaries of Part 3 – but also in the analytical revision of Part 2 – the similarities regarding the five IR elements outrun the differences. Inevitably, EL/NI and DPT are closer between each other than with DR.

Starting with the differences ("empirical divergences"), the three approaches and their top scholars mainly differ on issues such as the attitude towards – the importance given to and the effectiveness of – the international institutions and organizations in the role they have in shaping IR and states' activities, interests and behaviors, but also independence, and economic management. DR, the realist-neoconservative side especially, tends to discredit institutions or at least to marginalize them; furthermore, it is more attracted by the strategic use of force and intervention in conflict and war (security); the other approaches are not. The approaches differ also about the role the US should take on the international

stage and how the country is seen and supposed to behave in international politics. Interdependence and multilateralism are aspects that see the approaches diverging – with EL and DPT more cooperative-inclined with the other states –, as well as the internationalism or the posture towards the UN and international law and norms affecting states interests. Here DR's realist-neoconservatives show realist features. As for the similarities ("common threads"), the three approaches and their top scholars agree that the open and pluralistic regime of liberal democracy is a powerful engine toward peace in IR and among states. The three agree also on the positive role of the free-market and free trade in fostering relations and general wellbeing, co-independence, and cooperation internationally. The individual and its rationality in the (economic-) choice making, is positively regarded by the approaches. Instability – chaos – and anarchy – the absence of an international authority in IR – are unanimously seen as dangerous but can be overcome through more or less cooperation, international institutions, or hegemony. Then, war is undesirable and condemned by the three frameworks, while conflict is regarded costly in terms of money, blood, commerce, and institutional deterioration. Conflict is fruitless for any actor, according to the three approaches and their scholars, which also share contempt towards autocracies, while partially condemning and disregarding nationalist postures. Lastly, the human being, and its rights – as well as private property (to be protected), rational choice, and individual preferences – are framed in the liberal tradition and are emphasized by the three approaches, highly focused on freedom.

As it has been shown in Part 2 theoretical guidelines, and Part 3's analysis and summaries, the three IR approaches do not necessarily contradict each other, especially in connection to the five IR-related topics. Despite they have different origins and traditions, they can look at them with similar eyes. The three approaches have peace – and freedom – as their main tacit background desirable condition and interest. To have a broader perspective of the phenomena of IR it is necessary to see the elements that most characterize them in the light of different theoretical perspectives; if possible, with the help of the top scholars addressing them. Looking at one aspect of IR through the lenses of the three approaches enriches the perspectives over this same issue – though with limits. At the same time, seeing how the top-selected authors and their approaches react when confronted with certain selected IR elements, makes differences and similarities more visible. In this sense, a normative approach (typical from DR) and an analytical

approach (EL/NI and DPT) need to stay together to widen the perspective on a single issue and grasp the essence of IR theories, without altering their theoretical nature. For these reasons, normative and analytical approaches have been used interchangeably throughout in Part 3. A small contribution to the academic community is here in this Thesis, since juxtaposing three apparently unrelated "approaches" of IR – EL, DPT, DR – has never been done yet. The formulation of Krauthammer (2004a) of interest in IR in term of freedom – not power, as Morgenthau (1973 [1948]) said –, or of Rummel's equations (1983 30), «political freedom = civil liberties + political rights» and «freedom = political freedom + economic freedom» reflect the most crucial similarities among the three examined approaches. The three approaches belong to different spheres of social studies – «liberalism provides a general theory of IR linking apparently unrelated areas» (Moravcsik 1997, 515) – and have three main unique aspects in common, that eventually make them "liberal" and not at odds with each other.

First, the accent on the individual and its personal freedom, meaning the centrality of the individual as a unique human being, with its personal preferences (deriving from the rational choice and expected utility, as well as cost-adversity assumptions) and rights (civil and political liberties). Second, an orientation towards a capitalist free-market regime, based on peaceful, open, mutually beneficial free trade, commerce, and independence, self-interest, private property protection, with the reluctance to engage in wars and conflicts against each other. Third, a governmental framework based on republican liberal-democracy, with a limited State, rule of law, and cooperation through interdependent, interconnected, and inclusive international institutions lowering interstate perceived threats and transactions' costs, enhancing mutual gains, transparency, information, and communication. In a tacit way, peace – but also freedom – is the main invisible concern, condition, and objective of the three approaches. Individual freedom, free-market capitalism, and liberal democratic form of government are the basis liberalism was born centuries ago. None of this *alone* can help towards a pathway towards peace in IR – they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for interstate peace. These three elements not only are shared and tie together EL, DPT, and DR (being the most important "common threads" among them and final proof of their juxtaposition and non-contradiction), but they are also key conditions for interstate peace.

Summary

The Thesis showed that different "liberal" theories in International Relations (IR) may coexist with each other and are not in contradiction while analyzing the complex world of global politics. Rather, they may have common aspects and shared insights over some issues, with peace – and freedom – as the main guideline and tacit desirable conditions and aim. Three interdisciplinary "approaches", Economic Liberalism (EL), Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), and Democratic Realism (DR) have been examined in their differences ("empirical divergences") and similarities ("common threads") based on their – and their main scholars' – vision on selected elements of IR. Specifically, these issues were institutions and interdependence; free-market and rationalism; international law and anarchy; conflict intervention and security; and nationalism and autocracies. After a short overview of the subject of peace and Peace Studies, the three approaches have been presented theoretically along with their scholars and inspirational figures, literature, characteristics, and weaknesses. They are regarded as "liberal" because they share the centrality of the individual, the free trade, and the free-market, with the attitude towards peaceful cooperation: their operationalization *vis-à-vis* selected-IR issues witnessed this. The operationalization was also intended to test the approaches on concrete subjects. The Thesis showed that the approaches are compatible while analyzing IR-elements. DPT is the most analytic and accepted by academic theorists. EL has been presented as a mix of NI and classic economics. DR is an informal foreign normative policy design. Quite a neorealist framework, DR is included in the Thesis because of its commitment to freedom, liberalism in economics, appreciation of liberal democracy and peace, shared with the other two approaches. As for the differences among the three in relation to the IR-elements, they differ on international institutions and independence among states, international law and norms, and conflict intervention. As for the similarities, the approaches agree on liberal democracy as an engine of peace in IR, the role of the free-market in fostering wellbeing and cooperation, the centrality of the individual and its rationality, the conflict considered as a cost, the contempt distances from nationalism and the autocracies. The approaches have three main aspects in common, that furtherly make them "liberal" and not at odds with each other: first the accent on the individual and its freedom and preferences; second, an orientation towards a capitalist free-market regime, based on self-interest and private property; third, a governmental framework based on

republican liberal-democracy, limited State, and cooperation with institutions.

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Appendices

Appendix no. 1: "Interview to William Kristol"

William Kristol (1952), American neoconservative journalist, analyst, and politician. PhD at Harvard University (1979), professor in the Eighties, later governmental official. Chief of staff of US Vice President Dan Quayle (1989), he worked at the Bradley Foundation (1993). Co-founder of *The Weekly Standard* (1995) and the PNAC – Project for the New American Century with Robert Kagan (1997), columnist for *TIME* (2007) and *The New York Times* (2008), contributor for ABC News (2014), editor of *The Bulwark* (2018).

Were the early Nineties a period of peace?

Not so much. At that time, I, Robert Kagan, and others became strong advocates for a post-Cold War US leadership – and even intervention when necessary – because it was unreasonable to say that with the Cold War's ending the world would be peaceful. In the early Nineties, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, then the war in the Balkans, Somalia, and Uganda occurred; then again, the Balkans in 1995 … The notion that the Cold War's end would mean the triumph of universal peace was hard to justify. China crashed dissidents in Tiananmen in 1989, but people like me – and I was slower than Kagan on this – thought the world would not transform into a peaceful place without the US leadership.

Maybe it was not peaceful, but it was a unipolar world.

You can be unipolar, but if you do not do anything, people die in Rwanda.

1989 was not the "End of History"?

Not at all. I've never believed that. The "End of History" thesis was greatly overstated, but of course, there was some truth to the argument that the major ideological opponents of liberal-democracy – at least for a while – were discredited, but old-fashioned thuggish authoritarian states can always be a threat.

Thus, you and some colleagues came up with neoconservatism, both in International Relations and foreign policy: which was the movement's main feature?

Political scientists came up with many theses, such as the Democratic Peace Theory, but we were more pragmatic and motivated by practical reactions in response to what was occurring in the world: we had the sense to take responsibility for the world's order.

How would you define neoconservatism?

I would define it as a sense of how the world works, with a real sense and care about liberal democracy. However, the US cannot stand alone as a liberal democracy – in any case, this would be wrong – and I do not think that any neoconservative was trying to impose a theory on the world. We were just reacting to events, such as Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. We always tried to be practical; I am not sure we always succeeded in that, but neoconservatism was not as theoretical as many political scientists might make it out to be. Neoconservatism is a normal way for a great power to behave: Kagan always emphasized the extent whether neoconservatism was a continuation of 1945, when Roosevelt and Churchill thought they could not go back to the Thirties, thus an organizational and economical structure of the world was needed to prevent war from happening again. It is underestimated how neoconservatism is not in the tradition of post-war theories.

Do you acknowledge that in the early Nineties the US had an isolationist posture?

Yes, but many people pushed for that posture; that is why we intervened in the debate. America is not naturally an interventionist nation: as we have seen in the twentieth century, it always takes a long time before getting involved in European wars. It took a lot of effort to convince people that it was important for the US to assume responsibilities in the world. Americans are not isolationist by nature, but sometimes "relaxed" about the world: they believe that things simply cannot go out of control, that some wars – such as those in the Balkans – are just inevitable and they cannot do much about them … Sometimes, there is a kind of fatalism and acceptance of the things around the world, but this attitude is wrong, and we should not some things happen if we can stop them. As a neoconservative, I have always been a minority pushing for a more US internationalist policy.

Many commentators targeted you for neo-imperialism and hegemony.

Well, we used the term "benevolent hegemony"; Max Boot used the term "imperial" several times … But these are just terms: the issue was to evaluate the practical consequences of policies. Any term would have been criticized … We wanted to provoke people; to make people to think. We wanted our critics to confront our arguments on US foreign policy. And the way to do that was to make it in a provocative way.

What does liberalism in International Relations share with neoconservatism?

Neoconservatism is just a muscular form of liberalism in International Relations. Intelligent political liberals have always understood that liberal democracy is not the only or natural order of things; that we cannot impose it everywhere. There were many debates between us and Bill Clinton's people on liberalism and conservatism, but essentially, we

were always arguing on means rather than ends; and this would have been much more evident twenty years later when we stand up together against Donald Trump. And the issue, like in the Nineties, was always about preserving and strengthening liberal democracy, and the disputes were just around what the US should do, how much we should depend on the United Nations, and so on.

When should the US intervene militarily abroad?

It is a hard issue to give theoretical guidance to. Every case is different and there are many cases … I have no theoretical guidelines in general, except if humanitarian rights or strategic reasons are at stake. Sometimes we have made some mistakes by intervening where we did; in Iraq, we have not sent enough troops, for example. However, the issue of the twentieth century has not been if the US has been too quick to intervene, but the opposite: the mistake of intervention is minor in comparison to non-intervention.

No theoretical guidance, but Charles Krauthammer argued the US should intervene "where it counts".

Charles has always been more hesitant about foreign intervention than I was. Intervention depends on interests and necessities.

What is the role of the allies in military intervention according to you?

We were always very pro-alliances: the US cannot intervene alone and alliances with other liberal democracies strengthen liberal democracy itself. NATO had a good effect on this, since the adherence to it positively influenced countries such as Spain or Portugal in the Seventies. We insisted to include allies, with some exceptions, and in general, we tried to maintain the principle that NATO was the alliance of liberal democracies. Of course, alliances are hard to manage because of different interests within them, but in general, it would be hard to argue that the system of alliances with European countries has not been a force for peace and prosperity in the world. And this is the easiest and strongest argument of neoconservatism: reality and history, not theory.

What is the role of international institutions, according to neoconservatism?

Neoconservatism has always been ambivalent about that: I am for them, in general, and I respect many people involved in them. On the other hand, you cannot just sit around and discuss on everything and all the time, while – again – people die in Rwanda. In many sectors, such as health or policing or criminal activities or migration, it makes sense to have international organizations. I am generally friendly toward them, but they are useful

when they have a concrete rather than general and high-sounding purpose. Usually, they allow better international coordination, but it is hard to give a general judgment on them.

However, you criticized many institutions, like the UN.

That is true; with some justice, in the early 2000s, we criticized the UN a lot. This does not mean we were against every international institution; I am more favorable to them today, but – as I said – it depends on how they work and on their purpose. With the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Security Council, the UN is set up in a way that has not changed in decades; and the world was changing. I am for reforms in institutions, not getting rid of them.

Let's talk about Democratic Realism, which was formulated by Krauthammer in the annual American Enterprise Institutes lecture named after your father Irving. What are the doctrinal elements you share with it?

We were all pretty realists and in favor of liberal democracy, but in general, I'm very skeptical about these dogmatic terms capturing policy. Theories cannot give answers to all the problems nations face. The US has always been interested in other countries and thought of itself as a model, but also a force in the world. We intervened in many tiny countries as well as in many debates: The US has always had the sense of being more than itself; this is healthy and good for us, and the world as well. This is a very realistic perspective: liberal democracies should stand together when dealing with global problems.

Should the US moralize the world?

This is perceived very badly now, but of course, there is some truth in this. Moralizing has been an excuse for many bad things that happened in history, but also a good excuse for good things. Ultimately, some countries are very fragile, or preys of extremist movements, dictators, and challenges related to modern civilization; thus, they must be supported. It is naive to think that just because we are in the twenty-first century there are no barbarities anymore in the world.

Why many scholars do not acknowledge Democratic Realism and neoconservatism?

Honestly, I do not know. Sometimes I think that many scholars want theories that explain everything. As Krauthammer and I underlined, Democratic Realism is much more practical: it leads to a debate on what is realistic, what would work, and what would be successful, but it does not give you an easy template or interpretation of the world. And scholars and political scientists would like to have that: a formula, a precise pattern; and

according to me this does not make any sense. Perhaps, Democratic Realism is anti-theoretical; and theorists do not like anti-theoretical theories.

The last topic is democracy: do usually democracies start wars?

In general, democracies tend to be more peaceful: they do not have dictators thinking to invade other countries. However, democracies can react when provoked. But history suggests that democracies – and liberal democracies in particular – are the safest form of government; usually not excited by doing war with other countries, also for economic reasons. Sometimes, liberal democracies can be expansionist and aggressive. And America was sometimes, but this is very different from real authoritarianism. A world of healthy liberal democracies would be a more peaceful world.

Should democracies, and particularly the US, support authoritarian states?

Sometimes you must work with them – see Saudi Arabia and Iran. You can avoid dealing with them to some degree but, again, it would be better if we were able to democratize those states, as we have done in the Cold War in South Korea and Taiwan. However, this is very difficult to enact.

Is international law effective in preventing interstate conflicts?

Of course, we need rules and laws, but international law is useful when it characterizes subjects. I am not sure if it prevents authoritarian states from invading other states.

There will be room for neoconservatism in International Relations in the future?

Yes, because the world is always changing, and we should be able to understand the premises and aspects of disputes. The US has a very important role to play in the world, but it cannot just be carrots, it must be stick as well. Alliance structures matters, US power matters, economic power matters, military power matters. If we think the is the world going forward, neoconservative analysis will be still very relevant in the future.

What is your receipt for peacekeeping within International Relations?

I would follow what we call Democratic Realism. Given the way the world is right now, the US still has a particular responsibility.

Are the spread of peace and democracy the mission of and Democratic Realism?

I would say the main mission is *defending* peace liberal democracy, especially strengthening it at home, while helping other states moving forward in this path. Helping those who fight for freedom around the world is very important.

Appendix no. 2: "Table of Liberalism"

Note that several mentioned scholars are not addressed within the Thesis but provide a general take on the doctrine they support or are affiliated with.

"*" denotes the most famous political interpreter.

Political or/and economic doctrine	Classi-cal	(Politics)		John Locke, David Hume, Montesquieu, Benjamin Constant, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill
		(Economics) **EL**		Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say, Frédéric Bastiat
		Liberal conservatism		Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, *Margaret Thatcher
		Liberal feminism		Mary Wollstonecraft
		Libertarian conservatism or neoconservatism		Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, Norman Podhoretz, *Ronald Reagan
		Conservative liberalism		Michael Oakeshott, Raymond Aron
	Egalitar-ian	Modern liberalism		*Franklin D. Roosevelt
		Embedded liberalism		Karl Polanyi, Harry D. White
		Progressive or new liberalism		*Bill Clinton, Tony Blair
Econo-mic schools	Ordo	Freiburg School		Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm
	Neo	Marginalism		William Jevons, Carl Menger
		Austrian School		Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich A. von Hayek
		Chicago School		Milton Friedman, George Stigler
IR Theory	Libera-lism	**DPT**	Republican	Immanuel Kant, Michael Doyle
			Commercial liberalism	Rudolf Rummel, Bruce Russett, John Oneal
		Regulatory liberalism		Stanley Hoffman
		Liberal internationalism		*Woodrow Wilson
	Neo-lib.	**NI**	(rationalism)	Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye
			Liberal intergov'talism	Andrew Moravcsik
	(NA)	**DR**	(realism)	Charles Krauthammer
			Democratic globalism	Robert Kagan, Bill Kristol
			Realistic Wilsonianism	Francis Fukuyama
Philoso-phy	Liberta-rianism	Anarcho-liberalism		Murray Rothbard, Antony de Jasay
		Miniarchism / objectivism		Robert Nozick, Ayn Rand