

ABSTRACT

Russia and the US have both articulated their willingness to develop a regime for counter cyberterrorism. Yet, to date, they have been unsuccessful in following through with this goal. Their failure to form such a regime can best be explained through the lens of social constructivism, and most specifically, through the concept of strategic culture, given that such an approach allows for the examination of ideological, historical, and cultural issues that have shaped the strategy choices of both countries. Russia and the US have successfully formed regimes with other countries in which issues of counter cyberterrorism come to play. Russia has entered into agreements with BRICS and with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The US has involved itself in cybersecurity regimes both with its NATO allies and with its Latin American and Caribbean allies. Russia and the US have furthermore entered into a number of agreements with each other, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and New-START. A strategic culture perspective, which focuses primarily on historical factors, such as a history of invasion or lack thereof, and the relations of both countries with their respective neighbors, reveals how the discourse of human rights and the freedoms of expression and access to information have informed the prospective of the formation of a counter cyberterrorism regime differently than is the case with treaties concerning, for instance, nuclear issues. Moreover, recent historical events have fomented increasing distrust between the two nations. What is necessary, in this case, is the development of a culture of trust between Russia and the US. This will be best achieved through one-and-one-half or two-track diplomacy.

Key words: Counter Cyberterrorism, Cybersecurity, Regime Formation, Trust, Track One-and-a-Half Diplomacy, Track Two Diplomacy