

Language and Memory  
in Hegel's Conception of History

Jazyk a paměť v Hegelově koncepci dějin

DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE

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## Declaration

*I hereby declare that this diploma thesis is all my own work, and the sources of information and material I have used have been fully identified and properly acknowledged as required, and that this work has not been used within any other university studies or to obtain this or other university degree.*

## Prohlášení

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# Abstract

This work aims, in a rather contemplative manner phased into three related parts, to discuss two concepts indispensable for Hegel's entire philosophy of life and history: language and memory. In Part I, I examine the triple relation between language and thinking, thinking and reality, and reality and language. I argue that language shares a logical structure with thinking and reality, and is itself the performative principle (or *acteur*) of creating reality, being itself the externalizing tool of the movement of thinking without which any development of the Spirit would not be possible. Part II targets the concept of memory and its function within thinking and action of self-consciousness. It is argued that Hegel's language functions as the modern concept of discourse in terms of its agency in reality. Memory is understood as fundamentally entangled with matter, or the material objectivity that calls in memory to be named, i.e. posited in language. Memory is an interiorizing principle, language is the exteriorizing principle, both deeply rooted in the so-called night of the self of each spirit. I also discuss the subject-objective relation against the background of memory, before moving onto Part III which generally tackles the process of the self-expression of the Spirit in history, the distinction between history and memory in terms of their meaningfulness, and the final paragraphs of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* where the Spirit recollects Its historical figures as pictures in the gallery of its memory that represent world history, which is at the same time only a battlefield of discourses.

## Key words

language, memory, recollection, history, object, subject, S/spirit, (self-)consciousness, discourse, discursivity, reality, objectivity, materiality, matter, word, N/night of the S/self, interiorization, exteriorization

# Abstrakt

Tato práce si klade za cíl vyložit dva koncepty, které sehrávají nezanedbatelnou roli v Hegelově filosofii života a dějin: totiž jazyk a paměť. Práce má spíše kontemplativní povahu a je rozdělena do tří částí. V první části zkoumám trojí vztah: mezi jazykem a myšlením, myšlením a skutečností a skutečností a jazykem. Domnívám se, že jazyk sdílí s myšlením a skutečností logickou strukturu a sám v tomto trojvztahu vystupuje jako performativní princip (či *aktér*) tvořící skutečnost jakožto nástroj externalizace pohybu myšlení, bez něhož by nebyl žádný vývoj Ducha možný. Druhá část práce se soustředí na pojem paměti a její funkce v rámci myšlení a aktivity sebevědomí. Jazyk zde má podobu a funkci moderního pojetí diskurzu, a to s ohledem na jeho aktivní roli ve vytváření skutečnosti. Paměť je pojímána zásadním způsobem vztažena k materii či materiální objektivitě, která si v paměti žádá své pojmenování, své uchopení v jazyce. Paměť je princip zvnitřňování a jazyk je princip zvnějšňování, přičemž oba termíny jsou pevně ukotveny v tzv. noci já, či noci sebevědomí každého ducha. Druhou část uzavírá objasnění vztahu mezi subjektem a objektem na pozadí konceptu paměti. Třetí část práce se přímo zabývá procesem sebevyjádření v rámci dějin, rozdílem mezi dějinami a pamětí co do jejich obsahu a v závěru posledními paragrafy *Fenomenologie ducha*, ve kterých se Duch rozpomíná na své jednotlivé dějinné figury jako obrazy galerie své paměti, která představuje jeho dějiny. Dějiny, které jsou současně pouhým bojištěm diskurzivních proudů.

## Klíčová slova

jazyk, paměť (*Gedächtnis*), vzpomínání (*Erinnerung*), dějiny, objekt, subjekt, D/duch, (sebe)vědomí, diskurz, diskurzivita, realita/skutečnost, objektivita, materialita, materie, slovo, Noc J/já, zvnitřňování, zvnějšňování

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# Three Introductions

## i) Coffee without Cream is not Coffee without Milk

The criticism of Hegel's language is endless and still boisterous these days, and these days especially as we are celebrating his two-hundred-and-fiftieth birthday anniversary. Even though the population has to deal with reality facing quite recent phenomena like ecological Armageddon, economic collapse, and the social scissors opened so wide that one can become uncertain about if we are still talking about the same kind of at-hand-two-knife-like arrow-shaped tool for cutting things, reading and revolting with Hegel or against him seems more relevant than ever before.

On 28 July 2020 Slavoj Žižek in an interview with Shahidha Bari<sup>1</sup> defends the infamous epithet of the philosopher “of the Absolute.” Žižek's Hegel is a philosopher of “radical contingency” (00:30); this Hegel wrote *The Phenomenology of Spirit* – a book about how everything always goes wrong. In this sense, Hegel has already proved himself a mascot of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. And yet, the *opus magnum* is also about the hope that it is precisely only through these errors that something true and positive can emerge as well – whereby we can never be entirely sure (which makes us people very anxious). “How things can go terribly wrong” (02:00) – that is the main interest in Hegel's *Phenomenology* – perhaps it is one of the reasons the book has never gained much popularity. In his recent book *Hegel in The Wired Brain*, Žižek points out that wiring our brains together, so that we can read directly what is in the mind of the other person precludes this fundamental getting through errors and failures, and he demonstrates this preclusion in the impossibility of sexual games supposedly leading to love and partnership (05:00), because “in this sense we don't need language” (05:13). In Sally Rooney's fiercely discussed novel *The Normal People*,<sup>2</sup> we follow the story of two youngsters and university students who again and again, quite annoyingly, I dare say, keep failing in loving

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<sup>1</sup> Slavoj Žižek, “Hegel in a Wired Brain,” by Shahidha Bari, July 28, 2020, Accessed from <http://zizekpodcast.com/2020/08/12/ziz254-hegel-in-a-wired-brain-28-07-2020/>.

<sup>2</sup> Sally Rooney, *The Normal People*, Faber & Faber: London 2019.

one another. If Connell and Marianne were to know immediately what the other thinks, they would either detest each other or love each other, and stay together despite all that has happened between them. But there wouldn't be any space for eroticism – in the case of Connell and Marianne, and moreover, for any relationship whatsoever – which is precisely what Žižek claims: “We will no longer be individuals, we will immediately participate in some collective self-awareness and [...] divinity will become part of our daily life” (06:50). Armageddon. From this part of Žižek's interview, I take these lessons: (i) failure is essential, and (ii) in-itself-enclosed individuality is essential. Both will be important for the final part of this work.

Quite eerie is one of Žižek's favourite examples of the consequences we are starting to face with our far too fast technological progress and progressivism, against the background of which the inner rules of language start to re-emerge for us, as they did for Hegel, but also for Wittgenstein or other later linguistic schools. Image the failure of such a game in practice. When a person asks for “coffee without cream” and the waiter – as if programmed – replies: “we don't have cream, so we can only offer a coffee without milk,” well, we might find ourselves having reached the end of language.<sup>3</sup> One of the claims this joke is regularly used for by Žižek is that the identity of things is determined through negativity. What I *mean* is, thus, at the same time the absolute of all other things that I do not mean. I will deal with this problem in the first chapters of this part of the work.

With the coffee joke, Žižek teaches us an important lesson about the operation of memory, too: like computers we as human subjects are capable of integrating failure into our epistemological *Bildung*, or education (as one of the central terms of Hegel), declining from errors and adhering to right solutions thanks to preceding experiences (13:02). However, comparing humans with AI reveals that humans are capable of subsuming epistemological errors within their experience, and in doing so they gain freedom (which is one of the arguments against the end of the human race facing the challenge of AI that Žižek provides). Freedom here means to master failures by coping with them in further operations, and thus becoming less and less bound to simple experience coming from the perception of simple operations of mind, or getting to be a more and more rationalized creature, one less and less bound to their desires and first-hand perceptive experience.

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<sup>3</sup> From the Facebook profile of Slavoj Žižek, “Zlazloj Zizlek,” July 21, 2019.: [https://www.facebook.com/zlazloj.zizek/photos/a.827405950633270/3058996204140889/?type=3&eid=ARBR A94jYtBAHVOyFcUh6rBIRGgmXwo\\_Ve57dsU3Jb9v1s1gU5tcExUcUcjDfstSnkm9jtMfFXzSCFO](https://www.facebook.com/zlazloj.zizek/photos/a.827405950633270/3058996204140889/?type=3&eid=ARBR A94jYtBAHVOyFcUh6rBIRGgmXwo_Ve57dsU3Jb9v1s1gU5tcExUcUcjDfstSnkm9jtMfFXzSCFO).

If for one reason Hegel chose Christianity as the highest stage of the Spirit's development, it is because Christianity "integrates failure" into the concept of God Himself (13:25). Hegel must have been well aware of this aspect of Christianity as he posited Christianity to be the highest form of the world Spirit in the *Phenomenology*. Christianity also brings about an important figure, namely *recapitulation*, or *re-evaluation* – at the end of each mortal's day (at the confession), or a week (during Sunday mass), or of life, when his or her deeds are valued as good or bad and thus determine the quality of their afterlife. It is the process of externalization and re-internalization of what has been enclosed in each mortal's spirit, or conscience, i.e. *Erinnerung* and *Entäußerung* in practice.

Thus, does memory condition the Spirit, or perhaps language itself? How come that the Spirit *knows* the principles of failure and works with them *dialectically*, as though the failures are integrated *moments* of the Spirit, essential for the dialectical movement of one's *Bildung* [education]? The Spirit indeed does not *erase* these moments, but *sublates* [aufheben] them through the work of memory, or recollection [Erinnerung]. Negativity (which is another meaning of *Aufhebung* in Hegel's terms), therefore, *is not* absolute in this sense, or to put it differently, is only absolute as the principle within which the Spirit's *knowing Itself* simply *preserves* what has been *sublated* into the so-called *night of their selves*. These mechanisms will be thematized particularly in the second part of this work.

The Fall in its biblical sense is human freedom in sense of spirituality. Nothing is before the Fall. (14:28) [...] And that's what I don't like about singularity because the theological implication of singularity is precisely that there is no longer the Fall. (14:45) [...] When we can directly communicate without language and so on, it's as if we rejoined the universe prior to the Fall. (15:01)

To sum up this chapter, let's just say: *we need errors*. We need to make errors. We need to fail in using language, in order to know what language is. We need to fail and keep it in memory, in order to recollect it and come to know who we are. Human thoughts and mixtures of emotions are often so biased, contradictory even; that the possibility of a machine reading a human mind in its entire complexity becomes rather infeasible (25:18). Yet, the poignant question of the difference between humans and computers calls for a better answer than the Turing test. If computers can read and speak human language and augment their experience

through imitation by using erroneous applications as erroneous,<sup>4</sup> the question of the nature of language will not make do. We need to *know* our *story*, to know ourselves – which includes (unlike with software) the knowledge of how our memory operates. And we need to ask about the nature of the real [das real] and the *actual* [das wirklich – also referred to as the real) as well.

## ii) Some Remarks on the Structure and Literature

Before I proceed with the topics listed above, I will go ahead and briefly comment on the way I treat Hegel's works in what follows. I am using a rather wider range of Hegel's texts because the theme of language and memory in Hegel's conception of history is quite disseminated throughout his entire work. Another reason for using all I have enlisted below is that I want to display the variety of questions concerning Hegel's account of language and memory and answer some of them by opening them up in different texts of Hegel, so as to observe differences and similarities between these answers spanning his entire work, and perhaps even find some systematics within them; and because Hegel's work is not entirely consistent in dealing with these issues anyway, I am going to look precisely for those that make up some coherent whole. Indeed, the genre of this work is not appropriate to carry out an adequately extensive study. But I can still try to delineate some problems of Hegel's philosophy of language and philosophy of memory and history.

I am going to examine Hegel mostly based on his middle period of *Phenomenology* (PS) – dealt with mostly in the third part of this work, *Philosophy of Spirit* (EIII) and *Jena Lectures* (JL) and *Philosophy of History* (LPH), and his later (post-Napoleon) period of primarily the first and third parts of the *Encyclopaedia* (E), the *Logic* (L), and work a bit with *History of Philosophy* (LHP), *Philosophy of Right* (PR), as well as others. I have chosen to keep them all at hand to be able to get back to them throughout the entire work, which is rhythmized in a rather contemplative manner, in order to find some common themes and patterns in as wide a range of Hegel's work as possible. I will start with the later, and, in terms of the particular problem, more comprehensive period, i.e. with language and its relation to thinking, logic, and the real,

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<sup>4</sup> Here I am referring to the peculiar story of an on-line interview with a computer program supposed to answer a journalist's questions as though it was the real Václav Havel, the first president of Czechoslovakia after the Velvet Revolution in 1990 (<https://www.zive.cz/clanky/prvni-setkani-vaclava-havla-s-internetem-zpusobilo-kolaps/sc-3-a-30799/default.aspx>). The Castle quite soon withdrew the interview from circulation and erased it from its official website: <https://www.hrad.cz/kpr/on-line>.

or the actual [das wirklich], respectively. In sum, I am going to use the *Encyclopaedias* and *Logic* as the systematic core of Hegel's account of how language, memory (or recollection), and thinking work. As a guide through the third part of this work which deals with the specifics of the role of language and memory within the history of the Spirit, I am going to address predominantly the accounts of *Phenomenology* and the *Philosophy of Right*.

In sum, I am going to use the *Encyclopaedias* and the *Logic* as the systematic core of Hegel's account of how language, memory (or recollection), and thinking work. The *Encyclopaedia Gedächtnis* is a word that I treat here primarily as representing memory, as opposed to the term *Erinnerung*, or recollection. However, in the proceeding chapters, the meaning of *Gedächtnis* will prove to be of a wider meaning under which the term *Erinnerung* can somehow be subsumed.

Throughout the work, there are differences in capitalized or non-capitalized initial letters of certain words: namely in Spirit/spirit, History/history, Subject/subject, Self/self, Night/night, and others. The words starting with a capital letter always denote something related to the absolute Spirit, or world Spirit; the non-capitalized words denote individual subjects, communities, societies, or anything that is somehow linked to these.

Finally, I do not pay special attention to the concept of *Historie* as it is not of much relevance for my discussion. Therefore, the only term *history* that I use throughout the entire work always refers to the German *Geschichte*.

### iii) The Dread of Hegel's "Dreadful Vocabulary"<sup>5</sup>

William James renewed the criticism of Hegel's language. James distinguishes between the "central thought" of dialectic which, he claims, is "easy to catch," from its

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<sup>5</sup> "[Hegel's] passion for the slipshod in the way of sentences, his unprincipled playing fast and loose with terms; his dreadful vocabulary, calling what completes a thing its 'negation,' for example; his systematic refusal to let you know whether he is talking logic or physics or psychology, his whole deliberately adopted policy of ambiguity and vagueness, in short: all these things make his present-day readers wish to tear their hair—or his—out in desperation." William James, "Hegel and His Method," in *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition*, ed. John J. McDermott, University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1977, p. 513.

formulation that, due to the language in which it is expressed, is instead “exceedingly difficult to follow.”<sup>6</sup>

As this work is going to deal with Hegel’s account of language, I feel obliged to make some notes on his own style of writing, or his own oral performance, because I believe Hegel still needs to be defended systematically for his use of such complicated and complex language, even though he has recently been receiving the status of philosophical superstar. As for the two distinguished parts of Hegel’s delivery, we can take William James’ remark more seriously and ask ourselves: is there any reason for the form of Hegel’s language being so exuberantly complicated and the content of his philosophy, by contrast, so “easy to catch”? Is there an explanation for that in the core of Hegel’s philosophy? Let’s remind ourselves of the well-known German proverb: *Du siehst den Wald vor lauter Bäumen nicht*. Hegel would not be very happy about the possible consequences of this assertion. He is a fan of particulars rather than universals, so the goal of seeing the forest in its entirety does make sense, but is not of much use to him. He prefers particulars. With the language of his philosophical works and lectures (received with hatred when he delivered speeches based on *Phenomenology* most of all), he ever seizes to hope for approaching the actual (meaning reality as we usually refer to the matters of fact) as truthfully as possible – only it remained un-grasped because of his fidelity to language. Hegel has been accused of his rather speculative attitude towards actuality [Wirklichkeit] – but he tried to show that it is because the actual has much to do with language itself. Language not only denotes what we take as the actual [wirklich], but it also *is* in some important regard this actual itself. That is also why we say that Hegel loves particulars, because language is an idea dressed up and performed in particularity. Further examination shall hopefully bring some light to this strong assertion.

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<sup>6</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, “The Language of Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy,” in *Hegel & Language*, SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies, ed. Jeffrey O’Neill Surber, State University of New York Press: Albany 2006, p. 75.

# Part I: Language and the Real

“[T]he word gives to thoughts their most worthy and genuine reality.”  
(EIII: 2010, §462/200)

## I.1.1 My Dog is a Dog; or The Happiness of Speaking the Truth

We know from *Logic* that nothing can be said in language that is not universal, because language is “the work of thought,” and thought is always itself and its other (EI: 1991, §20/50). I can think of a dog and that always already implies I am not thinking of all the other particular dogs but this one (so much for Hegel’s preferring the path of observing individual trees over the entirety of the forest). The universal dog in my thought is the idea of dog that is objectively true, as far as there is a dog I can operate with in the objective world. Language operates within particulars and with particulars. It denotes particular objects, and it denotes them with individual words that incline to concreteness, though they never take off the cloak of universality as concepts uttered. I will dare say later on that objectivity is inherently universal in terms of its inner logic, and thus apprehensible by thinking which possesses the same structure – only the objective is cloaked in particularity instead. Thinking is the mediation by which the object comes into consciousness *changed*, or decloaked from its particularity as pure concept (EI: 1991, §22/54). The object and the concept meet halfway between concreteness and universality in language.

*Idea* [die Idee] is an adequate concept, or a concept that is objectively true. Idea is the criterion of something being true objectively. As far as it is an idea, it is true (SL: 2001, §1630/136). Idea is the absolute unity of Concept and Objectivity (EI: 1991, §213/286). This is an absolute idea. But each idea of particular notions are also unities of their concept and their object, or of thoughts and the actual [das wirklich] (EI: 1991, §142/214). Therefore, when I say I have a dog, and I truly have it, and as far as the word dog has its meaning, or concept, it is united in the idea of a dog, and thus, when I say I have a dog it is also objectively true. Speaking of objective truth, we might say, is something that must make people happy – to talk about things when these things do exist and have their own *known* or *knowable* meaning. – Quite

satisfactory. Or to put it otherwise: consciousness that would not be able to express anything objectively true would be a very anxious one. It would actually lose its freedom (similarly as the unhappy consciousness of the *Phenomenology*, §751/664) as his or her connection to objectivity would be cut off, and truth, thus, would not only remain unattainable, but it would not have even existed. For "...we must recognise that everything actual is only in so far as it possesses the Idea and expresses it" (SL: 2001, §1634/137). Thanks to the concepts united with objective truth in Idea, and formulated into particular utterances and syllogisms, we can assure ourselves of having the key to the truly objective world we think of, and further – that there actually *is* this objective world at all. But what is this thinking, what does this expressing of the Idea mean, and how does it relate to our freedom again? Let's go back to the nature of thinking as such, and continue by slowly building its relationship towards language and freedom.

### I.1.2 What *Is*, and What *Is* Thinking

Thought is for words the constituting bond that ties them together in a meaningful way (EI: 1991, §20/51Add.). What is universal in thought carries the value of *matter*, as Hegel puts it. The value of matter is the essence of the thing grasped by thinking, or the truth of matter (EI: 1991, §21/52). Here, I would like to remark in a rather contra-later-Wittgensteinian way, that it is not because of me treating my dog in certain way that the concept of dog is universally apprehensible, and thus carrying the essence of dog, or its objective truth, but the other way around. I treat my dog as my dog because it is an objectively true being, universally apprehensible, and thus apprehensible within my thinking. To that point I posit an assumption that materiality corresponding in its truthful objectivity with the universality of concepts we use in our thinking is quite essential in terms of the possibility of language as such. At the same time, it is through thinking, and more precisely, through language – a kind of objective thinking – that the material world is graspable in understanding and our daily practices. It is "at hand," so to say. We will see later on that materiality and objectivity are eminently connected with *Erinnerung*, or *recollection*, which is one of the two central concepts of this work. I will

elaborate on the relation between recollection, or memory as such, and materiality (as the objectively true world open to our relating to it in everyday life) in the second part of this work.

This has been so far an account of thinking and its relation to objectivity in a nutshell. The important lesson is that somewhere between thinking and materiality language finds its irreplaceable position of a mediator of both thinking and matter through its subject-objective structure and as a medium of essence, or the objective truth of what we take in our thinking as posited. At the same time, it is thinking itself that is essential in enabling us to posit truthfully any object, to *acknowledge* it in its truth:

[What is object] cannot be what the first look or impression already offers us, but that we must first think it over in order to arrive at the genuine constitution of the ob-ject [Gegenstandes],<sup>7</sup> and that by thinking it over this [goal] is indeed achieved. (EI: 1991, §21/52)

This entire process of thinking can only be achieved once our active recollection is at work. This is what the primacy of thinking, or to “first think it over,” means. What this special kind of memory is we will learn in the following chapters. Preliminarily, we shall learn about the relation between concept and ordinary language; language playing the second, but nonetheless important, fiddle to the process of thinking. First, speaking of ordinary language, there is a fascinating turnround in Hegel’s account of the relationship between what *is*, as the material world, i.e. the objective, with the stress on its material side, and thinking *of* this materiality. When I think of a material thing, I do not think of it as of a thought of a material thing, but as of the material thing itself. Therefore, from Kant on we have been happy to rely again on the shared structure of thought and matter that grants the possibility of thinking itself. Hegel here highlights the natural, strong belief of the material world as being of the same nature as our thinking, i.e. of their correspondence (without declaring any correspondence theory right away!). Otherwise, we would have to give into the despair of the “modern philosophy” and resigned on knowing but what our purely subjective consciousness can acknowledge from its

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<sup>7</sup> In the Hackett 1991 translation, the *ob-ject* [*Gegenstandes* in this particular sentence] is intentionally hyphenated. Besides Hegel’s *Gegenstand* we can recall his congenial, and yet not the same, concept of *object*. Here, I read *Gegenstandes* as that which comes to perception and enters the process of thinking as first the intuition of consciousness, through its further transformations into the pure concept. I believe that by *object* Hegel understands the matter of fact with regard to its opposing nature towards subject, and with regard to its logical structure that enables the subject to comprehend it.

purely subjective position – i.e. *not much* (EI: 1991, §21/54). Hegel comes up with a much more optimistic and, for us, quite fundamental claim:

... thinking is therefore the truth of what is ob-jective. [...] this thinking is my activity, this true nature is also the product of my spirit, [of me] as thinking subject. It is mine according to my simple universality as [universality] of the “I” being simply at home with itself, or it is the product of my freedom. (EI: 1991, §§22-23/54)

Moreover, thinking is *genuine* [wahrhaft] in its content only as far as it is “immersed in the matter” (EI: 1991, §23/55). Therefore, what is thinking is fundamentally connected to that what *is*. *What is* is not simply a positedness, but given its subject-objective structure, it is also what I do with it. It is not only a givenness of what comes necessarily or contingently, but also what my free will can *do* with it. And one of the tools of this *doing* is language, too.

### I.1.3 Memory as a Moment of Thinking; or Whereof I Think, Thereof I am Free

Worth noting is that the Hackett 1991 translation of *Enzyklopaedie I* reads the opening of Section C on actuality as though the word *Äußerung* stands for *utterance*, which thus connects us directly with the world of spoken language. It says that “the utterance of the actual is the actual itself,” which brings us back to the ending of the previous chapter: what *is* is *actually* connected to what is thought, or uttered (EI: 1991, §142/231). The consequence is twofold: first, this actuality is a subject-objective reality in which the subject *does* something, *makes* something *actual*, and therefore the role of the subject is not marginal; subject stands here as a free actor, a cocreator of that *what is*. And second, it shows that what we think is closely intertwined with what we utter. The externality of actuality – for actuality is the positedness of the unity of *being* and *existence*, is also internally reflected. There is a self-reflexive movement in what is actual, hence the freedom of the subject involved. The actual is a positedness, an energy; it is not simply an unreflected passing movement of what comes and goes. But does that count for objectivity as such?

Language is a mouthpiece of thinking. At the same time, thinking is essentially affiliated with memory as *Gedächtnis* – the depository and ability to recall what has been sublated into this depository. Memory is the moment [der Moment] of thinking. In a way, memory is

inwardly what is outwardly the intelligence towards the object. It is the *name*, or not yet a word uttered, of the thing, so as thinking is outwardly the word naming the particular thing, giving the thing its meaning [Bedeutung]. Therefore, through intelligence, the purely subjective of memory becomes subject-objective in thinking, or particularly in naming the thing by its meaning that has not yet been called out in memory, but rather sublated into an empty name (EIII/W10, §464/282). Already here we can see a hint of how language as the meaningful-name holder and preserver bridges the depositing memory, or the night of the self, and thinking as the subject-objective synthesizing movement. Language supplies thinking with the meaning not-yet available in memory. Thinking is then the realization of meaning in the flow of its meaningful connections, or the connections thinking creates between individual words or concepts (called out by thinking, aspiring to products of pure reasoning). We shall remark, however, that the entire passage of §§464-465 (EIII: 2010, 2020) is very obscure. Hegel himself admits that the relationship between thinking and memory is one of the most complicated tasks of philosophical anthropology (EIII: 2010, §465/202). Nevertheless, recollection as the sublation of meaning into the depths of the mind, as intelligence withdrawing itself into itself [Erinnerung], is an iron in the fire of the spirit's becoming a *will* [der Wille] – as, too, was the case of each previous moment of thinking. We shall, therefore, keep in mind that memory is not just a Santa's bag of which we expect some magical revelation of our secret wishes, but a mechanism that from the systematic point of view participates in the creation of the free mind (EIII: 2010; §468/205).

#### I.1.4 Thinking is *Thinging*

Object might be first considered as a positedness within the movement of the world's course of events, which proves thereby its subjective site, its affinity to idea (EI: 1991, §194/273). But is it really only that? How could it be graspable by intelligence if it was not itself rationally determined, and vice versa? Well, object *is* rationally determined, and this also means that it is a fundamental part of Hegel's metaphysical frame. Before proceeding with the chapters that will tackle directly the pairs of language-reality and memory-matter, I need to give more account to the complex relationship between thinking and objectivity. Hegel makes clear that objects are not thinking entities, as these chapters might seem to suggest. They are instead said to be "thought-determined" [denkbestimmt, or Denkbestimmungen] (EI: 1991, §24/56). This

enables Hegel to navigate his metaphysics further safely between the reefs of Schelling's Scylla and Kant's Charybdis. The objective world is neither an objective thinking without consciousness, nor a reasonable positedness of a subjective mind. Thought-determination is the principle that overcomes the what appears at first sight antithetical relationship between subject and object. As both thought-determined, subject and object no longer stand on opposite sides of an insurmountable abyss, but relate to each other by this logical principle that also explains their foundation in terms of the peculiar kind of correspondence described above (EI: 1991, §24/56). Their truth, however, consists in the agreement of each of them *with themselves*, i.e. with their concept (EI: 1991, §172/250).

The product of intelligence is thought, or thing [die Sache]. "Thinking is being. Nevertheless, the presupposition of the unity of thinking and being underlies all our activity" – including our language activity (EIII: 2010, §465/203). Fantasy is this self-appropriating activity of mind that makes particular representations into symbolic signs, and thus fundamentally participates in what we call language:

As reason, intelligence starts by appropriating what is immediately found within itself (§445, cf. §455 Remark), [...] i.e. to make itself into being, into the thing. When active in this determination, it is self-*externalising*, *intuition-producing*: (yy) *sign-making fantasy*.

[Remark] Fantasy is the midpoint in which the universal and being, one's own and being-found, the inner and outer, are completely welded into one. The preceding syntheses of intuition, recollection, etc., are unifications of the same moments; but they are syntheses; only in fantasy does intelligence present itself not as the indeterminate pit and the universal, but as individuality, i.e. as concrete subjectivity, in which the self-relation is determined to being as well as to universality (EIII: 2010, §457/192).

This inner and self-externalizing activity of fantasy is something that I take to be as closely related to the concept of Hegel's language as possible within his entire work. Fantasy, and language supposedly as well, is driven by the aim of appropriating the universal concepts it seeks for particular being. It is the media between the outer being and inner universal apprehension by a sign. It is a kind of inner language. Although, it is, after all, only a moment of thinking which is as a whole that which corresponds with language as an external media of representation, we can see how strongly the fantasy bears to language as a universalizing

principle which at the same time enables us to communicate particulars. If fantasy plays an important role in the birth of language, i.e. of a universalizing principle, language itself is a *thinging* business, i.e. a particularizing principle.

## I.2 Language as the Joint, Language as the Orthopaedist

Let us turn to language entirely and ask more generally: how come that language speaks reality (with its objectively true and actual regard)? The question of the form of language and the form in which the reality is present in language (*qua* language) has to turn bottom-up-bottom-down – looking now for the language as the real, rather than a form of it.

“[Language] is rather [than a means of cognition] the intimate structure of reason in its self-development toward the complete system of its logical and real forms. [...] it is rather the objective medium and condition within which all particular, subjective communication and expression becomes possible for the first time. To this extent, it is rather subjective thinking that becomes possible through its linguistic articulation. [...] language works like a trap from which nothing escapes. Language becomes one with the method that it expresses.”<sup>8</sup>

If Spirit is a bone (PS: 2001, §343/303), then language is its joint and its orthopaedist at the same time. Angelica Nuzzo nicely explains how language is the method of Hegel’s logic and science. Furthermore, it is the only possible method, and it is the method which does not enable us to uncover any universal truth but rather the true reality as it is, i.e. by its most natural means of delivery, which is *everyday* or *ordinary language*. The entire philosophical goal of Hegel is to delineate this intimacy, the most peculiar tokens where and when the objective and the subjective are at their closest (the one and yet many, as it were), so that their bond reveals their unity in deference.

The birth of dialectics lies in language, while language is at the same time driven by it. If we take another of Nuzzo’s claims, namely that language is run by contradiction (as part of

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<sup>8</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, “The Language of Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy,” in *Hegel and Language*, ed. by Jere O’Neill Surber, State University of New York Press: Albany 2006, pp. 75-91, pp. 77-78.

the principle of dialectics) as a pillar for Hegel's philosophical journey, then it is itself contradictory in the fact that the principle of contradiction runs the movement of thinking too.<sup>9</sup> If it was not for the principle of the contradictory (the same logical category) immanent to the material world, this brotherhood of language and thinking actually would not exist. This can go further and further between *language*, *thinking*, and *reality* – picture the endless mutual congratulations of the philosophical conference attendants assuring each other of their eternal glory on the pedestals of the philosophical Olympus, and you have the picture. Long story short, Hegel loves triangles and circles (he was not the first, and thanks to J. K. Rowling among others, definitely not the last either). For Hegel, as long as there is human life on the planet Earth, there will be language, and, therefore, there will be an objective world, and vice versa. Language is inherent to the nature of spirit.

Bringing back the metaphor of language as orthopaedist, language as a method emerges from the speculative empiricism of the beginning of the *Phenomenology*, which is soon overcome by the birth of *consciousness* [Bewusstsein], when *perception* [Wahrnehmung] is dialectically overtaken by it. This empirical moment of the Spirit beginning its journey is brought to light again towards the end of the *Phenomenology* as *conceptualized* and *represented* – transformed by all the figures of Spirit, to be finally *recollected* as one of the moments of the Spirit's historical *Bildung*. The principle of the Spirit's journey throughout the *Phenomenology* (and my way of challenging it) can be summarized (again!) by Benjamin recalling Brecht's interpreting the anecdote of the famous philosophical paradox:

One never gets to the next village if one breaks the journey down into its smallest parts. [...] the fallacy lies in the word "one." [...] the true measure of life is memory. Looking back, it traverses the whole of life like lightning. As fast as one can turn back a few pages, it has travelled from the next village to the place where the traveller took the decision to set out. Those for whom life has become transformed into writing [...] can

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<sup>9</sup> For the example see Nuzzo: "Hegel's philosophy validates a statement that formal logic would reject as absurd: the language of contradiction is itself contradictory — and it is so by necessity if contradiction, as dialectic claims, is indeed necessary to the movement of thinking." In Nuzzo: 2006, p. 79.

only read the writing backwards. That is the only way in which they confront themselves, and only thus – by fleeing from the present – can they understand life.<sup>10</sup>

### I.2.1 Dialectics of Subject and Object; or Historical Language Ontology

I have made some preliminary remarks on the ontological status of object and materiality in Hegel's climactic work of the *Encyclopaedia*. Now let me turn to the contemporary currents that join Hegel in understanding the objective world, in both its materiality and *discursivity*, that share their metaphysical basis as a reality depicted, reflected, and created in language.

In the introductory words of the 2020 publication *Subject Lessons: Hegel, Lacan, and the Future of Materialism* edited and introduced by Russell Sbriglia and Slavoj Žižek, the relevance of cultural materialism is discussed in light of recent philosophical and anthropological theories and criticism such as actor-network theory (ANT), new materialism, speculative realism, and object-oriented ontology, with particular regard to its political efficacy.<sup>11</sup> Both the authors follow the analysis of Diana Coole and Samantha Frost's book *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*,<sup>12</sup> arguing that cultural-based materialism overlaps with the radicalism of the culturally dominant discourses driven by the cultural turn, especially social (and I would add *racial*) constructivism (of various forms). These, as the editors and co-authors of *New Materialisms* claim, accelerated a cultural turn that gave birth to a dissuasive attitude toward *the real*, or simply reality, as a significant feature of the discourses and linguistic forms of each cultural theory of such kind.<sup>13</sup> The repudiation of *realist* tendencies, and the accusation of their fundamentalism from past centuries until recent past wreaked the overall resignation on the endeavour to think critically about materiality and the politics of cultural discourses. Currently, unsurprisingly, the aim of the new materialist criticism to redeem materiality in our daily lives is the aim to redefine late-capitalist global politics and economy

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<sup>10</sup> From the excerpts of Walter Benjamin's conversations with Brecht, in *Aesthetics and Politics*, London, New York: Verso 2007, p. 209-210.

<sup>11</sup> See the Introduction of Russell Sbriglia and Slavoj Žižek: "Subject Matters," *Subject Lessons: Hegel, Lacan, and the Future of Materialism*, eds. Russell Sbriglia and Slavoj Žižek, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press 2020, pp. 3-28, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup> Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, "Introducing the New Materialisms," in *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, eds. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, Durham & London: Duke University Press 2010, pp. 1-43.

<sup>13</sup> Diana Coole and Samantha Frost: 2010, 6.

as the anthropomorphic climate changes.<sup>14</sup> The main concern, however, is directed towards the redemption of materiality as such, i.e. to rediscover it as an active and self-organizing, self-transforming objectivity that should not be disrespected or disclaimed. I argue that precisely for the materiality redeemed we may understand Hegelian historical dialectics as though there is one Spirit in which its Objectivity and Subjectivity take turns in overruling the other by the natural development of the world Spirit, i.e. of the entire world history. Hegel's Unhappy consciousness is just one of a series of figures to perform this dynamic in its own reflection – that is, of course, an integral part of the historical Spirit's inner dialectics.

Based on these remarks I would like to invite Hegel to the debate within the following two parts of this work, and propose that the integration of the real world into language as such is part of Hegel's philosophy that always counts on materiality in his *linguistic ontology*<sup>15</sup> (which I will explain further on). I do not assume Hegel to represent some proto-new materialists' criticism. On the contrary, I think of Hegel (with Sbriglia and Žižek) as of a predecessor of the Lacanian *objet petit a* – but instead of focusing on the subject, I would like to accentuate materiality as the foundation of the spirit's discursive operation with the real by recovering its radical *otherness* that can yet – and only – be upheld in the spirit's account in its truth.

## I.2.2 The Real and the Actual(ized)

This chapter will only briefly deal with the terminological issue of the difference in meaning between the real and the real, or the real and the actual (or actualized). In the original, Hegel makes a distinction between *das Reale* and *das Wirkliche*, or *die Wirklichkeit*. In the predominant translations the distinction is sometimes a bit unclear for the two are exchanged for one another. It is not that catastrophic, though. Hegel's term *Wirklichkeit*, according to Lorenzo Cammi, grants reason for *Realität*. *Realität* is the empirical world we perceive and acknowledge every day. It is also the world consisting of tiny particles, like atoms for

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<sup>14</sup> Russell Sbriglia and Slavoj Žižek: 2020, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> I am referring to yet again the current theory of the so-called General Ontology for Linguistic Description that quite pithily addresses certain tendencies corresponding to my understanding of Hegelian linguistic ontology, as I shall call it. See:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic\\_categories#General\\_Ontology\\_for\\_Linguistic\\_Description\\_\(GOLD\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_categories#General_Ontology_for_Linguistic_Description_(GOLD)).

Another source of my direction of thought comes from social ontology, as defined in Brian Epstein, "Social Ontology," March 21, 2018. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-ontology/>.

simplicity's sake – in its common-sense terms.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, this concept of reality is quite distinctively linked to the material world. The clear difference between the two concepts is probably the particularity [Realität] and the understanding of this particularity [Wirklichkeit]. Wirklichkeit grants that we understand the world around us as reasonable, e.g. how this world is made up by these particularities or particles, etc. Therefore, Wirklichkeit aims to reconsider the particularities as not just immediate intuitions we have, but also as mediated through understanding, and thus, obtaining a certain level of universality. Realität is first and foremost the immediate existence of the world as we perceive it; as mediated through understanding we gain *die reale Wirklichkeit*, or *real actuality* – the “concretely existing world.”<sup>17</sup> Actuality is made up by acts, as indicated above. It is the real actualized in the process of understanding, and acting through this understanding; the actual is a *product* (SL: 2010, §11.386/482).

The actual is therefore a process of self-manifestation. It is not drawn into the sphere of alteration by its externality, nor is it the reflective shining of itself in *an other*. It just manifests itself, and this means that in its externality, and only in it, it is itself, that is to say, only as a self-differentiating and self-determining movement. (SL: 2010, §11.381/478)

The question of what the status of the world before being determined by reason or understanding is, thus, correctly answer by Cammi as “nothing.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Lorenzo Cammi, “Hegel and Wittgenstein on Wirklichkeit,” in *Wittgenstein and Hegel - Reevaluation of Difference*, eds. Alexander Berg and Jakub Mácha, Prague 2019, pp. 119-140, p. 120. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110572780-001>.

<sup>17</sup> Cammi: 2019, p. 121.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

### I.3 The Logic of Speaking

*“Die Katze fällt auf ihre Füße, aber der Mensch, der nicht denken gelernt hat, der aus den kurzen, den üblichen Verbindungen des Vorstellens nicht herauskommt, fällt ins ewig Gestrige.”<sup>19</sup>*

Along the analysis of Object-Subject historical dialectics, I am ready to argue for the primacy of the process over the product (or producer), i.e. the unpleasant question of *telos*. Following Nuzzo’s argument, I argue there is no *remnant* or *result* to disclose at the end of history, i.e. nothing lies *outside* of the journey which the Spirit shall undertake, and therefore “there is neither something to be produced nor something that produces”<sup>20</sup> anything that would count for the result, reason, or goal of the journey. The Object and the Subject of the world Spirit are on equal footing in terms of world history. The spirit in general is equally an objective substance and its consciousness, or self-consciousness (PS: 2010, §749/664). And after all, spirit is most of all a movement from interiorization to externalization, and vice versa (PS: 2010, §804/715-715).

Hence, I propose two theses: (i) that of the primacy of process over its result; (ii) and that there is actually no result – the process is also the result itself, there is no remnant to the development of the absolute Spirit. The primacy of process over the result is based on the shared logical structure between language and reality. Moreover, language and reality share a logical structure that cannot be realized without human thinking and the way it is structured, nor without the structure of objectivity as of materiality as such. We will know better when looking closer, especially into Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and the younger *Logic*.


The Logic thus exhibits the self-movement of the absolute idea only as the original word, a word which is an utterance, but one that in being externally uttered has immediately vanished again. The idea is, therefore, only in this self-determination of apprehending itself; it is in pure thought, where difference is not yet otherness, but is and remains perfectly transparent to itself. (SL: 2010, §12.237/736)

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<sup>19</sup> Ernst Bloch, *Subjekt-Objekt: Erläuterung zu Hegel*, Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Mein 1962, p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> Nuzzo: 2006, p. 80.

In this part of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel patiently and attentively discloses the logic of the triangle consisting of three tops: (A) language, (B) reality, and (C) thinking.



Nuzzo suggests that logic itself is the process of the opening up [Äußerung] (EIII/W10, §462/178) of the original word. This opening refers to the process of disclosing the word by utterance – exteriorization. A slight confusion arises over the expression original word [Ursprüngliches Wort]. Where does it come from? How should we understand it within the logical structure of the reality as schematized above?

Nuzzo seems to follow the interpretation of the original word as the word not-yet-conscious, not-yet-uttered, not-yet-subjected to the I, not even perceived. If it was perceived, it would already be accessible by the spirit. As soon as the word is uttered, the word is already determinate as *a sign* [das Zeichen]. The circle in the diagram below substitutes the *absolute Knowing* that is always already present in each moment of the Spirit's development.


In order to disclose the original word, the subject has to know how to *use* the word, it has to know the *web* of meanings (or call it *language games*) related to the particular word, so that the particular use of it preserves its meaning. This web here is actually the *logical structure* within which the meaning of the word is construed, preserved, or transformed (sublation of the word here does not imply complete erasure as we have discussed above).

The logic of the *use*, or the correct (meaningful) utterance of the word, is the key to the word turning from the *original word* (or *name* [Name]), which is nothing less than the thing [das Ding] transformed by the subject as a particular object [Sache], being thus *differentiated* from other such things.<sup>21</sup> Differentiation in the diagram is double-arrowed because the being

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<sup>21</sup> I am working with the supposition that Hegel's *language* coincides with his *concept* as in the conclusion of Marco Kleber's "Rethinking the Limits of Language: Wittgenstein and Hegel on the Unspeakable," in *Wittgenstein and Hegel – Reevaluation of Difference*, eds. Alexander Berg and Jakub Mácha, Prague 2019, pp. 259-271, p. 271: "The Logic certainly does not answer the question of how logic and language coincide, or how language should be philosophically conceived according to the Science of Logic. For there is an 'outside' of

[das Ding] becomes differentiated itself for the self-conscious – that is also self-differentiating – subject through *understanding* and *memory*.



The process of *Äußerung* pictured in the *affirmation in negation* A–B relation is both the exteriorization of the object (by *uttering* it) and the subject (by the utterance itself). The subject uncovers in the object its inner differentiation, and thus acknowledges its differentiation from the object. In this double-externalization, there is also interiorization of the representation of the object-perceived running. The object is perceived, interiorized as representation, exteriorized as a word uttered, and along this double-edged movement, the dialectics negates the object, transforms it, and reveals it as something other to both the object and the self, i.e. negation runs the entire process of naming, which is a process of affirmation of the real by negating it (in this moment of sublation by the subject). What the subject cannot uncover in the process is the logical structure of the object, or objectivity itself.

[...] the way in which this development of mind from sentiment is usually understood, implies that intelligence is originally thoroughly empty and therefore receives all content, as entirely alien to it, from outside. This is an error. For what the intelligence seems to receive from outside is, in truth, none other than the rational and is

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language only within language insofar as language can only refer to itself by presupposing its own existence; there are actually no limitations of language at all—such as limitations between things or facts that are distinguished by the use of language—and hence language is considered to have the same nature as Hegel’s concept of ‘concept,’ which is strict universality and infinity (Ungler: 2014, p. 138). If this proves to be true, there are no ‘limits of language’ (Wittgenstein), but such limits do exist between the finite things that may be referred to by language, but that sublate within the logical forms of language itself (Hegel).”

Source: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110572780-001>.

consequently identical with the mind and immanent in it. The activity of mind has, therefore, no other aim than, by sublation of the ostensible being-external-to-its-own-self of the implicitly rational object, to refute even the semblance of the object's externality to mind. (EIII: 2010, §447/178)

So much for the A–B relation of *affirmation in negation*. As for the circle in the diagram circumscribing the logic of knowing, it is also, and therefore, the entire *knowable* world. For there is nothing outside the *absolute Knowing* either. The *absolute Knowing* is the *Welt Geist* itself. We will come to see that this does not imply the exclusion of matter.

### I.3.1 The Superpower of Fantasy

*“For the animal, the human figure is the highest form in which the mind appears to it. But for the mind it is only its first appearance, and speech is straight away its more perfect expression.”*  
(EIII: 2010, §411/137)

We ought not forget the positive magic of fantasy. The *poète maudit*, the Romantics, the Lake poets. They were able to appreciate the incommutable role of fantasy. Whatever it took, they ran after this special ability of mind. Cultivated it with drugs and live dreams. Hegel was the same as far as he was a committed admirer of intelligence's ability to fantasize. Indeed, his concept of fantasy differs from that of the Romantics', but the innermost principle perseveres – namely, fantasy as the unity of the intuitive and the mind's own creation is the first presumption of freedom. Fantasy is after all the stage of intelligence that dares to *assign being* to the images and intuitions by bringing an *inner content* to them, i.e. we are dealing with a genuinely active power. The transformation of the intuition through fantasy could be described as a process of obtaining a citizenship by a state that *formally* affirms the truth and being of the concrete subject – concrete, intuited content in this case. And as we said before, it is a transformation not unfamiliar with the transforming principle of language; and it is not simply because fantasy operates with signs. The consequence is further extended also to the level of the yet-to-become-consciousness being becoming then the subject (or consciousness) – either for the case of fantasy or language. Later, we will learn that language plays quite an essential role in the birth of individuality.

### I.3.2 To Point at Meaning

The image produced by fantasy is only subjectively intuitive; in the sign it adds intuitability proper; in mechanical memory it completes, inside itself, this form of being. (EIII: 2010, §457/193)

*Recollection* [Erinnerung] as part of the process of transformation from intuition to thinking carries the representation or image of the intuited to the mind as a universal. It is the first principle of psychological process of consciousness that introduces the specific movement of bringing (back) to light that which has been delivered by intuition as pure being (memory). Only through fantasy that – subjugated to the dialectics of mind – re-enacts the representation of the pure image *as subjective* by turning it into an image. It is thanks to this that we can hold a particular image-representation of a universal concept such as dog, as we have actually had this dog in an intuition, and thus are able to recollect it. Contrarily, we cannot create any *concrete* representation of the *universal* idea of dog. There is always my subject proposing various kinds of dogs that I have encountered – fleecy, obscenely bare, idiotically shrimpish, larger-than-my-car, caravan-sized, timid, yappy, niffy... The particular image-representations are created by this kind of subjective intelligence called *symbolizing fantasy*. The image-representation, validated by the universal concept as true and universal, is transformed again into something *material* again (whereby the circle comes *almost* closed) but not any longer in the form of pure intuition, for it is *wilfully chosen*. It is thus not a symbol anymore – it is a *sign* [das Zeichen] (EIII: 2010, §457/193).

So for example, a cockade or a flag or a tomb-stone means something entirely different from what it immediately indicates. The wilfulness, emerging here, of the combination of the sensory material with a universal representation has the necessary consequence that the meaning of the sign must first be learned. This is especially true of linguistic signs. (EIII: 2010, §457/194)

And here we go again, Wittgensteiniacs! For both Hegel and the witty Wittgenstein argue that with language one frees oneself from the tenants of ostension. This is what the entire

opening chapter of the *Phenomenology* on *sense-certainty*, and the paragraphs §6 and further<sup>22</sup> of the *Philosophical Investigations* are about. The definition of ostension is circular; meaningful ostensive communication (or language game, if you please) is only possible once language is already in *use*. I can point at a dog meaningfully at the condition of already understanding the concept *standing behind* that which is pointed at. As a matter of fact, we can assume that the person using names to refer to something is freer than a person using pronouns to do so; nouns are more potent of meaning and do more to outline the being of that which is pointed at because pronouns are a neutral and more abstract kind of a word – it is a poor thing among words precisely because it actually lacks a meaningful reference to the thing at all.

The forthcoming paragraphs of the third part of the *Encyclopaedia* §§458-459 are the cornerstones of Hegel's psychological and phenomenological conception of language. The unity of *individual* representation (created by the wilful and – relatively – free unconscious agency of *subjective* fantasy) and pure intuition refers now to *something else* as Hegel argues cryptically again and again before he reveals it as *meaning*.

## I.4 The Rolling Signs

Hegel's *sign* is a rebel. It profits through winning even greater emancipation from intuition than the symbolic outputs of fantasy. By using signs, we become the masters of spatio-temporal reality, we exteriorize ourselves, run a guerrilla business with matter, i.e. “delete [the] immediate and peculiar content [of intuition], and give it another content as its meaning and soul” (EIII: 2010, §458/194). The activity of using signs is called *productive memory* [*productive Gedächtnis*] and differs from the activity of *abstract Mnemosyne* (*zeichenmachende Phantasie*, or *symbolisierende Phantasie*) (EIII: 2010, §§455-457). Unlike the latter, *productive memory* is not mechanical but constitutes free and personalized meanings

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<sup>22</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, eds. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Blackwell Publishing Ltd: Chichester, UK 2009, p. 7.

encrypted in signs, or *words* in intelligence (yet unuttered); and, unlike recollection, it is only memory that has to do with signs.

So how do these rolling stones of signs actually *affect* reality? One of their important attributes is the greater freedom they obtain by the subject – actually a quite distinguished amount of freedom even for the subject itself. We will look closer at this notion in the following chapters.

#### I.4.1 The Box of Clever Tools

Intelligence [Intelligenz] is principally the negativity necessary for sublating intuition in order to roll reality under the positedness *by subject* and *in time*, i.e. under the positedness as *a sign*. This marvellous tool of sign is used within sound-articulated *speech* and the *system of language*. This is how the most important paragraph of §459 (EIII: 2010, 198pp), with its systematic explanation of what language is, begins. It turns out quite soon that in language there arises the sole possibility of cognizing and knowing that what we call the real. The key moment is the emergence of signs that provide us with a set of clever tools to mark the real as the real, i.e. as particularities. Hegel stresses the externalization of the inner representation of what is intuited. This externalization can be also understood schematically as part of the onto-epistemological structure of reality and language: reality in the cluster of intuition (i.e. reality negated) is captured by subjective intelligence (reality negated for the first time) and uttered (negation of the real for the second time).

This double negation is a classic form of how dialectics is built throughout the whole philosophical system of Hegel's. However, there is a special moment of this logic in Hegel's concept of speech [Sprache]. Speech is not only the quality of sound, the gesture of lips, palate, tongue, as Hegel argues, but the whole *need of civilization* to communicate and express (EIII: 2010, §459/195). The sound is, thus, a mere expression of a much more complex and fundamental phenomenon of the sign. Of course, there is also the logic or grammar of language, which intelligence takes care of. But let us praise for a moment the beauty of the claim that language, written or spoken, is the self-externalization and yet-again-internalization of civilization, which indeed means in Hegelese the essential movement of the absolute Spirit. To finalize the metaphor of the rolling signs, I suggest reading Hegel's concept of language as the mechanics of the absolute Spirit for a moment.

#### I.4.2 Under the Hood of Language, or the Wenkel Engine is Better than the Four-stroke One

Spoken language is the original language; written language is a language that – to quote Hegel – “... ist bloß eine weitere Fortbildung im besonderen Gebiete der Sprache, welche eine äußerlich praktische Tätigkeit zu Hilfe nimmt” (E III/W10, §459/172). The imprint of language (and thought) into the material, into a performative act, remains the same, as the development of the world Spirit evolves from the hieroglyphic system of signs towards the alphabetical sign-of-a-sign one, i.e. in spite of the fact that Spirit passes through a significant initiation towards a more abstract level of thinking. No wonder we arrive at the great confusion of languages (*Genesis*, 1:1–9)! The more we use names variably, in different contexts, with different intentions, within different discourses, we arrive at the concept of a name with quite a permeable membrane that can sustain almost infinite varieties of contents or meanings. This is obviously not a very practical model of language. Too fluid and ephemeral, introducing almost the same amount of uncertainty as the initial intuitions presented to intelligence. This kind of machine cannot obviously run on free and clear. Leaving aside Hegel’s lament on Chinese spoken language and *hieroglyphic* writing of their traditional sign-system, I am going to bugger about directly with the question of meaningful language.

What makes language meaningful in Hegel according to *Enzyklopädie*? Hegel assumes the genius of the alphabetical language is hidden in its simplicity, or the simplicity of ideas brought up with it. Where does this simplicity come from, if we are dealing with a bunch of sensory ideas brought up to the universality of speech? Thanks to intelligence that turns pure intuitions into representations, and thanks to memory (on which we will focus in the following chapters) which balances the universality of the concept with a touch of particularity through recollecting what has been already known, the final output of the spoken word is not just universal as a product of purely speculative reason. It cannot be purely rational because it is also the product of a subjective mind, which means language itself is this synthesis of the rational and universal, and the subjective (EIII: 2010, §459/197).

It is language itself that *makes* the ideas simple. By this *simplicity* I mean *particularity* that is not explicitly addressed here but is, according to my reading, the nitty-gritty of that

genius. Why do I assume so? This question leads us back to the first chapters in which I have defended Hegel as materialist in variety of senses.

It seems that the hieroglyphic language of Chinese as Hegel describes it is of such a nature that there exists an always-already kind of understanding or interpretation of a referent that deprives this language of its material (or intuitive) element (EIII: 2010, §459/197pp). In other words, hieroglyphic language works in general with far too complex representations that detach it from particularities of the material, or the seeds of the whole process of thinking the matter. If exaggerated, it almost seems as though the Chinese written (or drawn) system of signs was not primarily interested in articulating the real as the real. This problematizes the character of hieroglyphic system of language as lacking the fundamental bond with reality: that the sign [das Zeichen] *is* the name [der Name]. Accordingly, there comes the question of linguistic approaches towards reality of which one prefers to address (a) one thing [das Ding] with one sign designating certain reality (to keep Hegel's original distinction between *das Ding* and *die Sache*),<sup>23</sup> or several (incomplete) signs; or parts of one Chinese sign, respectively, designating one object. I do not think that one language can compete with another. However, I do agree with Hegel that in plain logic the second option does not make much sense for it can be reduced to the previous one, or more elementary mathematics – for the mind always aims at simplicity. We can conclude that intuition is not the only guardian of simplicity precisely because there is always-already language to narrow our varied representations and thought, and vice versa (EIII: 2010, §459/197).

...Lesen- und Schreibenlernen einer Buchstabenschrift für ein nicht genug geschätztes, unendliches Bildungsmittel zu achten ist, indem es den Geist von dem sinnlich Konkreten zu der Aufmerksamkeit auf das Formellere, das tönende Wort und dessen abstrakte Elemente, bringt und den Boden der Innerlichkeit im Subjekte zu begründen und rein zu machen ein Wesentliches tut. (EIII/W10, §459/276)

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<sup>23</sup> *Die Sache* refers to objectivity, or reality as such, conceptually captured by intelligence; it denounces the not-yet-intuited thing blurred with all other things conceptualized, but not differentiated in intuition, and as such a more abstract subject of cognition. By *das Ding* I understand the theoretical construct of speculative philosophy which is, however, connected to a real particular thing intuited. That is why I refer to *die Sache* as to an *object* or *reality*. For a complex differentiation between the two and other related concepts see H. S. Harris' introduction to the 1991 edition of the *Encyclopaedia I*, p. xxv. For the definition of the thing, see the *Phenomenology*, e.g. paragraphs §§110, 120, 246, 791-792, which is more or less the account I follow when I refer to *das Ding*.

The primacy of spoken language over the written one becomes legitimate once – and again – we highlight the materiality of spoken language. First, we do not get too self-confused (and self-obsessed) with spoken language because of the materiality of it, or the initial intuitions running the – otherwise perpetual – process of thinking, and then the *sound* of the spoken itself [das tönende Wort], draws the line of its flexibility. Second, we do not get lost in some *cogito ergo sum* if we do not forget to speak with each other. Nevertheless, the elementary particle of the alphabetical language – the sign – enables intelligence to allocate the same meaning onto both the audible (or spoken) and the visible (or written) form of the same sign, word, judgement, syllogism – whatever you please. This is an amazing step out of the ego towards others. And the necessary condition for that is language. Spoken language is, moreover, a movement *per se*. Unlike the written form, the spoken sign, a word, clings tightly to the movement of the real, or life. The dynamics, the dialectics of spoken language unchains it from the fetters of the given. Spoken language performs the *good* infinite and the *good* absolute by its absolute dialectical dynamics.

It would not be Hegel, however, if there wasn't another episode prepared to continue with the yet-again turning of the plot upside down. It actually makes sense (in the overlooked genre of fantasy at least) that Hegel probably used to prefer standing both on his head and feet, rather than on one or the other, and observed thus reality from this truly *dialectical* point(s) of view:

[...] the intelligence expresses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. The mediation of representations by the less sensory element, sounds, also shows its peculiar essentiality for the transition that follows, from representation to thinking – memory. (EIII: 2010, §459/198)

And yet – let's then not forget memory and stay a few more moments with its brother, language.

### I.4.3 Down to Earth: Between the Pit and the Pyramid

Down to earth means to face the reality as it is, or as we think it is. This holds as the task for both Bruno Latour's latest book<sup>24</sup> and Hegel's account of language. There are many reasons why humans cannot forget about being human. Thank god we have memory. And we also have language that does not show us its boundaries – that are, as we know from the last axioms of the *Tractatus*,<sup>25</sup> unknowable – but efficiently enable us to relate ourselves to the concrete reality, notwithstanding the fact that our representations give us only a fallible concreteness of what we perceive. It is, as Nuzzo states, *Logic* that “speaks the language of the concrete concept or the ‘language of the gods’ as opposed to the ‘language of the humans.’”<sup>26</sup> Unlike many critics though, we are going to concentrate on the language of humans and will not dare commute it for the mountain of gods.

“The Pit and the Pyramid: An Introduction to Hegel's Semiology”<sup>27</sup> is the title of Derrida's famous early piece on Hegel's philosophy of language. Catherine Kellog in her *Three Hegels*<sup>28</sup> argues against Kojève's and Hyppolite's notion of a sign functioning primarily as signifier. She plays the game of turning stuff upside down (generally loved by Hegel and children of certain age) and construes the sign not as a tool to represent but primarily as “a representative or delegate of Spirit.”<sup>29</sup> Hence, the knowledge of Hegel's Spirit is absolute; there is no remainder of the meaningful to unfold, or to get to understand as meaningful; rather there is the remainder *in* the Absolute – and this remainder is “the night of the world,” or “the night... in which all cows are black” (PS: 2010, Preface §16/14).

This is also what Kellog criticizes through Derrida's argument, and which uncovers another of Hegel's faces – namely the David-Hume one – that the inner movement of mind transforming intuition into meaningful representations, and into signs, is circular; and Hegel knows and accepts this (EI: 1991, §1/24). The complete sublation of the *singular object* – which

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<sup>24</sup> Bruno Latour, *Down to Earth*, trans. by Catherine Porter, Polity Press: Cambridge 2018.

<sup>25</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge: London, New York, 2001, pp. 88-89.

<sup>26</sup> Nuzzo: 2006, p. 84.

<sup>27</sup> Jacques Derrida, “The Pit and the Pyramid: An Introduction to Hegel's Semiology,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1982.

<sup>28</sup> Catherine Kellog, “The Three Hegels,” in *Hegel and Language*, eds. Jere O'Neill Surber, SUNY series in Hegelian Studies, State University of New York Press: New York 2006, pp. 199-217.

<sup>29</sup> Kellog: 2006, p. 201.

the sign is a representative of – by the emergence (or use) of the sign presupposes the dependency of the object's existence on “an-always-already-existing image of and for the Spirit.”<sup>30</sup> In other words, Derrida (and Kellog accordingly) claims that the signified, or that which we refer to with concepts, is constituted *discursively*. Now, as the concept of e.g. a dog is an offspring of discourse and not of some omniscient mind knowing things in themselves just like that, it is always embedded in the *here* and *now* of the phenomenological world and not in the world of ideas or world of things in themselves, or any other castle in the air (with all my respect for Kant indeed).

If this is so, the claim has other consequences. First, that what we know are phenomena, not things in themselves, i.e. the so-called *singular objects* mentioned above are artefacts of the ancient cooperation between the recollecting mind, its fantasy, intelligence, and memory; yet phenomena are not signs by themselves. The always-already presence of always-already processed phenomena (or intuitions) in language is what makes language possible, and vice versa. And this is the reason why Hegel is such a brilliant phenomenological linguist, despite Derrida's asserting the opposite. This brings me to the second consequence.

Under the pit brought up by Derrida, we shall understand the “black cows' night” as an utter night of the self or mind. Through the pit and the pyramid construction Derrida opposes Hegel by predicting a remainder stemming from the pit between that which we have in mind (the product of recollection) and the sign(ifier) (the actual use of the idea in language), supposing the concrete thing (as part of the concept of the real) and the sign(ifier) are one. However, they are not *one and the same*; they are *one and another* simultaneously. This is probably the general touchstone of interpreting Hegel along the grain – to ceaselessly mind the inner dialectics of any moment, any aspect of the Spirit. As for the pit and the pyramid, I would like to point out that they both are of *one and the same* shape, and they are yet *one and another*. Later on, I will argue that this remainder which Derrida sees in the relation between the sign as representing a pure concept, and the sign as an utterance, is the subject itself – we will again call it with Lacan an *object petit a*.

Kojève's viewpoint is by no means essential for another upside-down moment, namely – to stick to Derrida's metaphor – the accentuation of the human nature of language (against its

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<sup>30</sup> Kellog: 2006, p. 201

putative divinity) and hence, the return from the top of the pyramid down to earth to individual human spirits.<sup>31</sup>

Generally speaking, when we create the concept of an entity, we detach it from its hic et nunc. The concept of a thing is that thing itself as detached from its given hic et nunc. Thus, the concept “this dog” differs in no respect from the real concrete dog to which it is “related” except that this dog is here and now, while its concept is everywhere and nowhere, always and never.<sup>32</sup>

As I read this passage, the concept is always and never because it is nothing else but the uttered word itself, depending thus on this individual human spirit.

Another precondition for the existence, or meaning, is an already presented intuition or representation of what is perceived. Once the representation is recollected by fantasy and intelligence, we get a concept which is not-yet a word proper. It awaits its utterance in order to test the adequacy of the form, i.e. the concept, determining the way the representation is posited. The determining element is the consciousness itself, which is thus one step further on its way to freedom,<sup>33</sup> but there is always the ultimate touchstone – phenomena, the materiality itself respectively – or is there?

#### I.4.4 Plato on Earth, or Language as the Bridge

*“Language is the medium between Nature and Logos.  
It is Being saying itself.”<sup>34</sup>*

Kellog suggests that the freedom that the Spirit naturally strives for is obtained once the Spirit’s “thought becomes entirely independent of the objective natural properties of the entity toward which it points.”<sup>35</sup> This claim turns out to be problematic because language is, as Kellog argues,

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<sup>31</sup> Kellog: 2006, p. 204.

<sup>32</sup> Alexandre Kojève, “The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel,” in *Interpretation 3*, trans. by Joseph Carpino, 1973, pp. 114–56, p. 126.

<sup>33</sup> Katharina Dulckeit, “Language, Objects, and the Missing Link,” in *Hegel and Language*, eds. Jere O’Neill Surber, SUNY series in Hegelian Studies, State University of New York Press: New York 2006, pp. 145-164, p. 156.

<sup>34</sup> Kellog: 2006, p. 207.

<sup>35</sup> Kellog: 2006, p. 208.

the *medium*, the *negation* that is, that bridges over the material world (or Kellog's "Nature") and consciousness. Therefore, language would not have been possible, if it was not for the material world (the bridge shall always lead from one bank to another). This is one of the basic triangles, or dialectical motors, where language plays the role of *synthesis*. So, it is not the reasonable consciousness, not the material world with its armfuls of phenomena, but, if taken by this toxic attitude of categorizing, it is language that plays the synthetic part. What is then the *thesis* element of dialectics? The ball is in the court of materiality.

In the following passage Hegel differentiates between two language realms; though the differentiation itself remains but a *formalistic* distinction. There is only one language as *logos* or *reason*. In terms of content, as Hegel explains, the down-to-earth language, or the language of the *earthlings*, is the every-day-based human language in variety of discursive forms; and when I say "down-to-earth," I mean literally a language fundamentally linked to material. Next, there is a *language of the concrete concept*, or a language of speculative philosophy. Let us see whether or not this distinction is plausible.

[...] just as Homer *says* that some things have two names, one in the language of the gods, the other in the language of the earthlings [übertägige Menschen], so there are two languages for that content, one the language of feeling, representation, and thinking nesting in finite categories and one-sided abstractions of the understanding, the other, the language of the concrete concept. [...] The foundation [Fundament] of scientific knowledge is the inner basic content, the indwelling idea and its vitality vibrant in spirit [inwohnende Idee und deren im Geiste rege Lebendigkeit], just as religion is no less a mind that has been worked through, a spirit awake to mindfulness, a well-developed basic content.<sup>36</sup> (EI: 2010, Preface to the second edition, p. 15. My emphasis on the underlined original.)

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<sup>36</sup> The original reads as follows: "Wie Homer von einigen Gestirnen angibt, welchen Namen sie bei den unsterblichen Göttern, welchen anderen bei den sterblichen Menschen führen, so ist die Sprache der Vorstellung eine andere als die des Begriffs, und der Mensch erkennt die Sache nicht bloß zunächst an dem Namen der Vorstellung, sondern in diesem Namen ist er als lebendig erst bei ihr zu Hause, und die Wissenschaft hat nicht bloß in jene abstrakten Räume, und zwar abstraktere, als die sind, worin jene unsterblichen Götter – nicht der Wahrheit, sondern der Phantasie – wohnen, ihre Figurationen einzuschreiben, sondern deren Menschwerdung, und zwar einer jeden unmittelbar für sich selbst, die Existenz, die sie im wirklichen Geiste erhalten – und diese ist die Vorstellung –, nachzuweisen und zu verzeichnen" (EI/W8, p. 23).

The foundation of each of the differentiated (metaphors of) languages is the same in terms of their field of reference, i.e. the subjective and the objective Spirit, or the material world as such. The distinction, apart from their forms, then, dwells in the means of apprehension of the concept. It is only scientific knowledge that is capable of apprehending the concept as *pure* or *concrete*. The question is what the *concrete concept* that science shall hold as its content is. To my understanding, the language of science, or the speculative language,<sup>37</sup> ought not to be understood as a mere formalistic language of logic because Hegel speaks specifically of “the indwelling idea and its vitality vibrant in spirit” (see above). There is no form of idea outside of spirit that represents some *utterly original* or *purer* idea that cannot be acknowledged (the kind of Kantian *things-in-themselves*), as there is no idea recalled by the spirit that would not have vibrated the vitality of its foundation, i.e. that would not have its independent existence outside of the knowable world. The foundation of an idea is, thus, none other than the Objective, as the Real, or the Objective as the Absolute (Spirit):

Truth is not gained by an improbable flight in the abstractness of thinking [...] Truth is reached instead by recognizing and consequently rectifying (not revoking) its “incarnation” in ordinary language. To put it in Hegel’s figurative way, in speculative philosophy truth speaks the language of an incarnated god. The language of dialectic is not the incomprehensible language of fantastic gods (or of past metaphysics) but the language of “actual spirit” (*wirklicher Geist*). This is the meaning of Hegel’s concept (*Begriff*) and its peculiar “ideality.” The language of dialectic is indeed ideal without ceasing to be real, that is, usable in and fruitful to the scientific community.<sup>38</sup>

Therefore, although speculative philosophy can formally speak the language of universals, it speaks the same content as the ordinary language but in a *truer*, or in the *original*, way in terms of its content, while dialectically peeling off the subjective layers of it with the help of *logical* thinking.<sup>39</sup> Truth is then revealed as a *concrete concept*, and thereby logic is

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<sup>37</sup> According to Nuzzo, further distinction between the language of speculative philosophy and the language of the concept (or the language of science) is to be dissolved. See Angelica Nuzzo, “Vagueness and Meaning Variance in Hegel’s Logic,” in *Hegel and The Analytic Tradition*, ed. Angelica Nuzzo, Continuum Studies in Philosophy, Continuum International Publishing Group: London, New York 2010, pp. 61-82, p. 65.

<sup>38</sup> Nuzzo: 2010, pp. 65-66.

<sup>39</sup> Jefferey Reid nicely summarizes in couple of axiomatic sentences: “For Hegel, scientific objectivity is nonsubjective truth existing as a concrete reality. I am also saying this reality is discourse, scientific discourse itself. [...] exclusively that discourse which deals with the objects of science. [...] All objectivity is not scientific. All discourse is not scientific. The discourse of science does not deal with all objectivity.” in Jefferey Reid,

revealed as the *first science of the system*, which shows Hegel's process of cognition running the opposite direction than Plato's,<sup>40</sup> though it is precisely the same structure of the world as of thinking that reveals Hegel as agreeable towards the ancient philosophies,<sup>41</sup> implying that to make a distinction between the material and conceptual is only possible for their original unity.

#### I.4.5 There are Things, and Things to Say

There are things, and things to say. In this chapter, we will return in some way to the beginning of this part, and look closer under the deck of Hegel's basic logical distinctions. *Die Sache* is a thing sublated [aufgehoben] by the content given its *naming*.<sup>42</sup> It is all the blurred background of what we perceive which is sublated, or internalized into the pit, or the deposit of memory. But it is also what turns up towards the end of the chapter of *Reason* [Vernunft] where its meaning is generally connected with human social activity.<sup>43</sup> Only when it is articulated, or *named*, i.e. particularized by naming, it becomes a thing proper, *das Ding*. Something that is brought up by recollection into its particularity in the form of a *word*, and primarily, something that is posited as the radical opposite to the self, as an object to a subject. Paragraph §713 (PS: 2010, p. 633), in an almost poetic manner, reveals the distinction between language and the thing, or thinghood; a thing represented by a *statuary column* as opposed to the fleeting existence of language. *Die Sache* is also the thing as an object, as a concept of logic, a subject of speculative philosophy, but deprived of its particularity.

Now, John McCumber and Jefferey Reid read the paragraph §451 of the *Encyclopaedia* and further as though the meaningfulness of reality is dependent on whether and how we

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"Objective Language and Scientific Truth in Hegel," in *Hegel and Language*, ed. by Jere O'Neill Surber, SUNY series in Hegelian Studies, State University of New York Press: Albany, NY 2006, pp. 95-110, p. 97.

<sup>40</sup> Nuzzo: 2006, p. 85.

<sup>41</sup> See more in the *Science of Logic*, §42: "Ancient metaphysics had in this respect a higher conception of thinking than is current today. For it based itself on the fact that the knowledge of things obtained through thinking is alone what is really true in them, that is, things not in their immediacy but as first raised into the form of thought, as things thought. Thus this metaphysics believed that thinking (and its determinations) is not anything alien to the object, but rather is its essential nature, or that things and the thinking of them — our language too expresses their kinship — are explicitly in full agreement, thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature of things forming one and the same content" (SL: 2001, §42/14).

<sup>42</sup> Reid: 2006, p. 97.

<sup>43</sup> Perhaps bit confusing is the fact that *das Ding* appears in the *Religion* section as the content of the spirit's activity, too; see PS: 2010, §693/619. This is just a hint of the general confusion about the two concepts that sometimes raps out across Hegel's work.

apprehend it in language. The passage indicates that from the indistinct field of reality, the mind shapes the particular things *in* words and *as* words. Only then, when a thing is *named* in this potent sense of becoming a word, is its meaning brought forth or actualized in itself. To understand this onto-epistemological transformation, it is necessary to understand the nature of *meaning* itself.

The principal condition of a *name* (as *der Name*) to have meaning is the adequation between thought and being which together identifies reality. The synthetic part of the adequacy that is necessary for them (or the objective and subjective Spirit) to be bridged over is language. This does not mean that *what exists* is only *what I think*. I can also give meanings to thoughts that do not unreservedly refer to matters of facts; the real does not exist *because* I think it; the real is the real because it is cognizable for the Spirit, and at the same time it exists because the Spirit can cognize it. Jefferey Reid comes up with perhaps a bit simplistic interpretation of what is objectively true by binding it with language as such – and yet I hereby follow in his tracks: the interdependence of the real and the Spirit (or the thinking subject) is founded in their logical structure externalized in language as such. Consequently, language cannot be based on subjective representations, nor it can be anything else but the existing object or a thing [die Sache] itself, where *itself* means *the real* as the *cognizable* objective world. In fulfilling these conditions, language can be counted as a marriage of being and thought.<sup>44</sup> Reid adds that this structure corresponds with the structure of *Encyclopaedia* as it stems from *The Science of Logic* (thought), continues with *The Philosophy of Nature* (being), and climaxes with the *Philosophy of Spirit* (the discourse or language itself).<sup>45</sup> At the same time, looking up close at the distinction between the subjective and the objective, the delineated border between the two is perhaps not as thick and impermeable as it seems. The subject is supplied with the material of its thoughts by the real, i.e. that what is apprehended by the senses, and thus also by reason, respectively by intuitions grasped and transformed through intelligence and recollection. The subject, thus, always accounts for its thoughts concerning that which exists.

If we put the argument of Reid's on its head (that annoyingly repeated method again), it runs crudely as though thoughts always mirror the objective world, wherefor they are true (objectively true and truly objective!). If language communicates or represents anything else but these thoughts, it fails to fulfil the condition of being true, and therefore language must be

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<sup>44</sup> Reid: 2006, p. 98.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

but a synthesis of what comes from both being and thought, i.e. there is nothing outside language that can be true. Narrowing this argument down a bit, we end up first with a *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*-like structure of the world, i.e. of language; and second, the synthesis turns out a very lazy principle of narrowing things down for the sake of reason.

Reid suggests warding off the panic from the possibility of the objective world collapsing into the rationale of language completely by installing the feature of *der Name*.

#### I.4.6 The Propitiatory Name

Here, we are operating at the level of sense-certainty as it is expressed in the *Encyclopedia*, where denomination can never reach beyond the singular appellation of individual objects, where every object has its name and only its name, which, like the object referred to, is simply found there ready-made, without having been, as McCumber puts it, “worked up by intelligence.”

So much for what Hegel calls the name [der Name] as an element that reconciles the principle of adequation with dialectics of the relationship between the objective and the conceptual (EIII: 2007, §460/198). Name is the propitiatory of both. It floats in a vacuum-like frame of meaninglessness until picked up by intelligence to be matched with an external matter of fact, a being. It is not yet a word [das Wort] until getting its meaning by referring to a particular existence within an objective world. The particular here becomes subjectively true and is transformed into *das Ding* as the particular intuition brought up by intelligence – and, as opposed to the non-particular object referred to by Hegel as *die Sache*, the existence not-yet enclosed into the scheme of things the spirit operates with.<sup>46</sup> The subjective truth is thus the objective truth in the coat of language, in its fully-developed meaningfulness, *true objectivity*.<sup>47</sup> In Reid’s own words: “[...] in order for commentators to discover truth in the relationship

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<sup>46</sup> Reid, 2006, p. 99. I am also referring again to the translators’ introduction to the 1991 Hackett Publishing edition of the *Encyclopaedia I*, where the concept of *die Sache* is understood as matter itself. I more or less follow this path of interpretation, although I still hold to the German terms to make clear that the concept of matter in my work is discussed here in a more complex and narrow way (see EI: 1991, p. xxv).

<sup>47</sup> Reid, 2006, p. 100.

between language and the world, the latter must also be seen as inherently dialectical and thus reflected in dialectical language.”<sup>48</sup>

Besides this precondition of the relationship between language and the objective world, Reid adds another one positing the objective truth of language as though it is dependent on its objectively true content. This enables Reid to come up with the rather radical claim that “philosophical science does not observe natural events [but] reads texts. [...] Science thinks the objective truth and knows itself to be true and objective. This knowledge is the existing discourse of science; it is *logos*.”<sup>49</sup> Scientific objectivity is thus of a different nature than the natural world itself, for the truth of the scientific language is based on the scientifically construed world of pure objectivity (i.e. knowable only speculatively!); science deals with *scientific objects* or *objects of scientific discourse*. Nevertheless, this distinction does not build walls between these two hypothetically distinct worlds, for there is only *one world* indeed, only one reality [Wirklichkeit]. Once again, we shall recall Reid’s reading of *der Name* that is but an *empty token*, a meaningless not-yet-a-sign of reality of individual objects that as themselves do not have any meaningful content until recalled in intelligence as a concept or meaningful word. This anthropocentric view is partly moderated in McCumber’s reading which ascribes to signs the primary function of signification.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Reid, 2006, p. 101.

<sup>49</sup> Reid, 2006, pp. 104-105.

<sup>50</sup> Reid: 2006, 107 (Note 12).

## I.5 The (Privileged) Position of Language

*“For speech is the pure existence of spirit; it is a thing which when once heard goes back within itself.”* (LHPHIII: 1955, 204)

Language is a deed or activity [Tat] and as such it possesses a certain power of operation.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the philosophy of language overlaps, as McCumber recalls, with what is essentially Hegel’s philosophy as such. This provides language with a privileged position within the whole philosophical system, and brings forth the questions concerning the power of language or its general capacities. One of these is the capacity of interiorizing the external and exteriorizing the internal – namely, the capacity of interiorizing the determined (by thought) object of perception and exteriorize this internal apprehension in words [Wörter] (EIII/W10 §462/279). There are arguments<sup>52</sup> that although language plays the central role in Hegel’s philosophy, it is given much lesser space than perhaps expected; we have paragraphs §§459-462 of the *Encyclopaedia III* to understand the mechanism of language in relation to thinking and the external world, and that is basically it. Yet, we shall not arrogate Hegel a fault without taking certain precautions. It seems at first sight that what Hegel’s system provides us with is predominantly the reality of the world than the tools to comprehend it. Nevertheless, these tools are only obsolete and hidden to us as tools for they are, as much as those tools, very reality itself. The way to uncover their use is to live them through in the given reality and synthesize this experience in the power of intelligence and memory which, nonetheless, does not discard the fact there are other intervening factors such as emotions, objects without direct referents in the external world, etc. As in Wittgenstein’s world, we are trapped in the limits of our language, either of its logical system, or, again, the undetectable boundaries of language games. In my reading, Hegel integrates both the logical and the social boundaries in his account of language;

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<sup>51</sup> Hegel’s own formulation from Rauch’s translation: “Language is the activity of theoretical intelligence in the true sense, since it is the outward expression of it.” in G.W.F. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, trans. by Leo Rauch, Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis & Cambridge 1988, p. 66.

<sup>52</sup> See e.g. John McCumber, “Sound—Tone—Word: Toward an Hegelian Philosophy of Language,” in *Hegel and Language*, ed. Jere O’Neill Surber, SUNY series in Hegelian Studies, State University of New York Press: Albany, NY 2006, pp. 111-125, p. 113.

precisely for language is language as far as the deed, the cut to reality, is a social medium where the reality of the social is determined by the logic of this medium.

To add another apology for Hegel not giving enough attention to language: language is so much intertwined with reality that it makes lesser sense to discuss the two separately. Instead, Hegel himself uses the language of speculative philosophy, and therefore, he cannot address it as its subject; we can apply the Wittgensteinian formula that language rather *shows* itself than *speaks* itself (TLP: 2001, 3.262/16). It might also be the reason why McCumber's account here seems to aim at leading us directly to the heart of the forest, but instead – for whatever reason – we all end up in a grove just next to it. For the epigon of Hegel's philosophy of language, and thus philosophy of Spirit or Reason as such, or whatever you like to call it, does concern the philosophy of language itself, but only to the extent possible without endangering the system as such. Again, we can speak *from within* the language – but not *outside of* it. As Hegel famously put it: “The True is the whole” (PS: 2010, §20/), or that “[...]the truth also cannot be thought of as what is lifelessly positive and completely at rest” (PS: 2010, §47/40). The question of what the word is, as the basic unit of Hegel's account of speech, as opposed to the elementary judgement of the language of speculative philosophy (or scientific propositions),<sup>53</sup> is thus central not as much to the logic of the philosophical system but to the logic of the history of the Spirit. It makes perfect sense that the elementary units of this movement are words, or the “moments” of the flow of vocalization (or the whole Spirit) that symbolizes the overall ephemeral character of the principle of speech (and actually written language too, while reading it).<sup>54</sup> Language then integrates both the dialectics of logic and the dialectics of the phenomenal world as the forms of the objective Spirit (the one of *Vernunft* and the one of *Wirklichkeit*) are reconciled in language qua *Logos*. The general capacity of language, as McCumber puts it, is thus to express the *Logos* – or Reason – itself. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with McCumber in subordinating language to the Reason, for language and Reason are dialectically connected; Reason first appears together with language as language is itself the Reason – the Reason expressed, or the exteriorized interiority of the Spirit (who always thinks rationally). There is no teleology between language and Reason as its potentiality to-be-actualized.

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<sup>53</sup> McCumber: 2006, p. 114.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

Reason operates with determined objects; the science of logic and the philosophical system needs particularities to the utmost, so it is not surprising that it is language itself that supplies these determinants for the sole act of speech, i.e. that language is the act of determining (of recognizing particularities). Hegel writes: “[...] a word is not just the general activity [*Tätigkeit*] but a specific ‘deed’ [*Tat*] of the Intelligence” (Werke XII 85f./66).<sup>55</sup> Moreover, this determination is possible because words as the determining power *are* the determined objects or realities as much as they *are not* – loyal to the dialectics of their essential relation. Here, McCumber alludes to Aristotle’s *De anima* III.4 which probably functioned as Hegel’s clue for understanding the mechanism of words’ enclosing reality thanks to their shared basis in *logos*.<sup>56</sup> It is important to note that movement (the principle of thinking, or dialectics as such) is always already part of Logic itself.<sup>57</sup>

### I.5.1 On the Bridge

The unsatisfactory patches between the reality and discourse of description theories, and even the denial of the possibility of their success coming from poststructuralists and deconstruction, show that we have ceased to trust language not even as a denominator but above all as a beholder of what reality actually is.<sup>58</sup> This anti-realism or scepticism that such theories cursed the relationship between language and things, and its possibility itself, with, is virulent with regard to the current society and era. I refer in particular to the society of constant devaluation and tendentious reinterpretation of the past, the immensely over-informed present, and the irrevocably insecure future, the society constantly re-evaluating each word of each speaker or writer, the overwhelming Spirit of illegibility, unreliability, volatility, separability, and violation of value and truth, and the mist of general ephemerality of everything one can even think of. Under this perspective of our present reality, Hegel might offer some consolation:

For [Hegel] all opposition is mediated while, at the same time, mediation is harmless.  
A theory of reference based on Hegel’s unique analysis of mediation thus neither

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<sup>55</sup> McCumber: 2006, p. 120.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> McCumber: 2006, p. 121.

<sup>58</sup> Katharina Dulckeit, “Language, Objects, and the Missing Link: Toward a Hegelian Theory of Reference,” in *Hegel and Language*, ed. Jere O’Neill Surber, SUNY series in Hegelian Studies, State University of New York Press: Albany, NY 2006, p. 146.

commits us to the incompleteness of description nor implies the qua-problem of the causal theory. From a Hegelian perspective, the universal is never cut loose from the particular, the internal from the external, the referring subject from the object referred to, and so forth. Indeed, as things remain “identical” in their difference, in Hegel’s terminology, semantics are not radically divorced from pragmatics and epistemology...<sup>59</sup>

Dulckeit reminds us here of one of Hegel’s turnarounds, namely his reconciliation of mediation. Mediated object, mediated reality does not automatically imply divestment of truth; Hegel’s reconciliation of mediation is a service rendered to all future philosophies tackling various problems in ontology. Thanks to Hegel, we do not need to pupillarily drag our feet standing outside the gate to the palace of truth. Being is actually brought to its truth thanks to language, i.e. through mediation. This assumption does not entail that Hegel is getting rid of oppositions; on the contrary – mediation would not have been possible if it were not for negation, or let’s say opposition; oppositions are not insurmountable or unbridgeable boundaries all over the world as it is. Perhaps only there, where the world ends – and for the Spirit that is nowhere, as far as is known.

#### I.5.2 Under the Condition that My Pet is not My Granny: or The Beauty of Mediation

Approaching the end of this extensive part of the work, we, under the discipline of dialectics, will finish with the idea of a bridge. Let us get briefly back to sense-certainty – the surprising beginning of language where language replaces the magic-effect of cognition. At this beginning, language delivers predicates with which we can refer to our pet as to our pet, even though it is not present at the moment. We say we mean the fluffy, feral, funny, fast, favourite creature, and it is clear as bell that we do not mean our granny. And yet, on some condition, the pet could be confused with the granny – if not granny in general (for we usually do not refer to grannies as fast and feral creatures) then at least with my own granny perhaps; it is vital to expect more from language than just a bundle of predicates. We need to think in language to get to know the objects we refer to, we need to create judgements and syllogisms, tautologies and contradictions, in order to map the limits of language, and, hence, of reality, to get to know

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<sup>59</sup> Dulckeit: 2006, pp. 147-148.

what is, and to get to know ourselves. Copula is the second eureka moment in the history of logic; language is the knowledge – it is the Spirit itself – it is the movement of cognizing, the movement of negation. If we stuck to sense-certainty, we would lose the entire world, because we would not have any (reference). So, language, and I mean the language of Hegel, actually creates the world by supplying us with the field of reference, by *creating* what is.<sup>60</sup> Sense-certainty, thus, successfully vindicates mediation as it clears out how impossible it is to have any direct reference. If the reference is direct, it always-already happens in language, and thus is actually *stricto sensu not* direct but always-already mediated through the entire mechanism of thinking in language, i.e. thinking as such.<sup>61</sup>

So much for the *Tractatus*-moment in Hegel.<sup>62</sup> Now, let's look for the *Philosophical-Investigation* one.

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<sup>60</sup> Dulckeit: 2006, p. 158.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> I am referring to the 4.2 axiom of the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* that reads as follows: "Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form. In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world" (TLP: 2010, 4.2/36).

## Part II: Memory and the Material

“Die Rede ist die reinste Form von Objektivität für das Subjektive.  
Sie ist noch nichts Objectives, aber doch die Bewegung nach Objektivität.”<sup>63</sup>

“Language is the externalization of memory, the existence of names  
as an independent reality.”<sup>64</sup>

The second part of this paper aims to present the concept of Hegel’s memory as described in the *Philosophy of Mind*, and as related to the concept of language, and even strongly with the concept of materiality. I will try to argue that while Hegel is nonetheless a strong idealist, he has also a firm concept of materiality, or matter, that shapes the concepts we think through, and we talk with, and this all thanks to the complex work of memory and its relation to this materiality (or objectivity as such).

### II.1.1 Mechanical Memory

In the paragraph §195 of section B in the 1817 *Encyclopaedia* (EI/W8, 354), Hegel presents us with the so-called *mechanische Gedächtnis* – *mechanical memory*. This is already an indication of Hegel’s distinction between memory and *recollection* [Erinnerung] becoming clearer with his later works from the Nuremburg period on. In the following part of this work, I would like to focus on the climax of Hegel’s later period: namely, again, the third part of the *Encyclopaedia*, where Hegel supplies us with his most comprehensive account of memory. I am talking indeed about the paragraphs §§461-464 directly preceding the (y) subsection of *Denken*; it is not a coincidence that *Gedächtnis* is built out of the word *denken* itself.

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<sup>63</sup> Johannes Hoffmeister, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, Frommanns: Stuttgart 1936, p. 26.

<sup>64</sup> Pini Ifergan, *Hegel’s Discovery of the Philosophy of Spirit*, trans. by Nessa Olshansky-Ashtar, Palgrave Macmillan: London 2014, p. 137.

In the *Philosophy of Mind* part, the mechanical memory from *The Science of Logic I* is relegated as one of the three types of memory: *name-retaining*, *reproductive*, and *mechanical*. Memory [Gedächtnis] as such is said to be a higher spiritual activity [Tätigkeit] as it is no longer dependent on inner images of representations. Contrarily, memory has to do with reality *inside out* [innerhalb ihrer selbst], i.e. with reality from within intelligence. Now, this is immensely interesting for we can see how tightly memory is connected and directly communicating with reality as a determined Being [Dasein]. Reality as *Dasein* also indicates that we are operating on the level of subject-objective reality, or its logical structure. The universality of being is determined by the concreteness of the image, transformed into representation, and, as such, sublated [aufgehoben] into the pit of memory [Gedächtnis].

The principle of intelligence reveals the nature of this pit or vessel-like mechanical memory. As intelligence becomes more and more familiar with words, it gets closer and closer to the objectivity of things, i.e. to their essence or meaning (so much for the objective part) – it fares forth into the world, as it were, with an increasing faculty of using them. Once in memory, the objective being, i.e. existent already as a name, enters the sphere of language, and thus also the sphere of objectivity as reality (the principle we discussed in the first part of this work): “Words thus become a reality animated by thought” (E III, 2001 §462/). Now, memory (as the subjective) empties itself because intelligence does not need its backup anymore. Mechanical memory is, thus, like a vessel, first filled up by recollection [Erinnerung], and second, emptied out simultaneously with the increasing engagement of intelligence (EIII: 2007, §462/199). Memory is thus a language [sprachliche] recollection. It is recollection upside-down as it enables intelligence to externalize what has been internalized by recollection in order to enter language, i.e. capture the meaning, or the objectivity of the word, in its entirety. Because the interconnection of names lies in meaning, i.e. requires *Ent-Äußerung* in language, it does not suffice that we *think* in *names* (EIII: 2007, §§463-464/201-202). We have to *apprehend* names in *words*, so that we understand them in their true objectivity and too – as we will see in the last part of this work – in our own objectivity.

As is obvious, I am not interested in mnemotechnics of memory, i.e. in its mechanism. Rather, I am interested in its connection to the external world, or better, in the externalizing principle of memory, under which names obtain their meanings in language. What we learn by heart after all becomes empty and regains its meaning in words. Therefore, the self-

externalization of memory that I have in mind is not the inside-out [innerhalb-ihrer-selbst] kind of externalization, but externalization proper.

### II.1.2 In the Internal Realm of Objects

We can start to talk about objects once memory is brought into the discussion. No sooner, no later. Memory is the key to the amazing realm of objects. It enables the spirit to recall what is not directly at hand, what is not in the radius of perception. *Gedächtnis* (as opposed to *Erinnerung*, or recollection) is a realm within consciousness for itself; an internal realm of objects. What is recollected in consciousness is the inner object in the form of a name: the first stage of interiorizing object qua a yet-to-become concept or sign. The object (as a name) becomes the concept once it is fished out by memory to consciousness, or exteriorized (within consciousness) from the previous interiorization by recollection (*Erinnerung* from the verb *erinnern*, or *to interiorize*). The object, or the name, exteriorizes itself not as the original *Ding* but as a concrete *Sache*, i.e. as a *material* thing (an organized bundle of properties related conceptually to its materiality!), and thus also as *das Wort*. Memory, therefore, is also the inner principle of transformation, based on the inner movement of consciousness bringing to the light what has been hidden under the night of consciousness (or the self). Language, then, represents an external mode of connection to the objects and operates with concepts as *signs* in order to communicate them already.

In my reading, memory has schematically a triple function (as a dialectical principal proper, indeed): first, it operates with objects as names, and thus preserves their closeness to the originally perceived objects *in the night of the self* or the *unconscious* (preservation which is also in the *Phenomenology* ascribed to recollection). As Victoria Ricci stresses, the principle of *Erinnerung* is both to interiorize and to preserve; finally, *Erinnerung* mediates what has been previously sublated. With this triple function of *Erinnerung* I am referring with Ricci to the account of recollection in the *Phenomenology* where we are talking rather about the knowledge of the absolute Spirit than the anthropological and psychological structure of the individual self-

consciousness and its unconscious. This will be mostly the subject of the last part of this work.<sup>65</sup> In the *Phenomenology*, history becomes *begriffene Geschichte* (PS/W3, 590-591), or – like an open book – the history of pure thinking, pure concept, in which memory functions as “the loss of (real) being: *Dasein* vanishes – but at the same time is also ‘conserved’ [aufbewahrt].”<sup>66</sup> This, as it were, fourth function of memory, or recollection (as both fall into one concept this time) seems at first sight to be a function of oblivion. However, as Nuzzo explains, recollection here still means primarily to lay aside as transformed, or overcome, i.e. not entirely erased, but *conserved* rather.

Second, memory as a reversed movement of recollection<sup>67</sup> brings forth, or brings to the light of consciousness, objects as *signs* (first externalization – to the consciousness). In its third function, memory nullifies the connection to the objects as names necessarily (as names cannot remain names once transformed into signs), although it keeps all its three functions (i) of depositing the object qua names (sublated by recollection), (ii) of exteriorizing names from the pit of the unconscious into conscious concepts (transformed), and finally (iii) of exteriorizing them fully as signs (posited as transformed).<sup>68</sup> That is what we learn mostly from Hegel’s *Jena Lectures*,<sup>69</sup> and what represents the crucial indications for being able to actually say something about the external world of the consciousness, or to say anything whatsoever. Memory is the internal language keeping silent with names and speaking names as concepts, while language is the external memory of objects speaking signs already.<sup>70</sup> Without memory, language would not have been possible – without memory, language would have remained in the blind ostension

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<sup>65</sup> Victoria Ricci, “The Role of *Erinnerung* in absolute Knowing: History and Absoluteness”, in *Essays on Recollection: Essays on the Concept of Erinnerung in Hegel’s System*, eds. Valentina Ricci and Federico Sanguinetti, Cambridge Scholar Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne 2013, p. 15.

<sup>66</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, *Memory, History, Justice in Hegel*, Palgrave Macmillan: London 2012, p. 64.

<sup>67</sup> In the last part of this work, I will return to the concept of recollection and explain its double movement that is here ascribed to memory, in the connection of the last chapters of the *Phenomenology*. I am referring here to Victoria Ricci’s interpretation of the *Phenomenology* recollection: “One might object that the phenomenological and psychological contexts are extremely different, but I insist on the comparison for two reasons: first, the structure of the activity described is the same; second, the subject of such activity is the same—spirit—in both cases.” See Ricci, 2013, p. 13, with the reference to V. Verra in “Storia e memoria,” in *Su Hegel*, ed. C. Cesa, Il Mulino: Bologna 2007, pp. 5-30.

<sup>68</sup> See Ricci 2013, p. 12: “We can thus describe *Erinnerung* as a structure of *Aufhebung*, as it ‘eliminates’ the immediate existence of something, but at the same time preserves it and takes it to a higher level.”

<sup>69</sup> Pini Ifergan, *Hegel’s Discovery of the Philosophy of Spirit: Autonomy, Alienation, and the Ethical Life: The Jena Lectures 1802–1806*, transl. by Nessa Olshansky-Ashtar, Palgrave Macmillan: London 2014, p. 137.

<sup>70</sup> “Das Gedächtnis ist nach Hegel sprachliche Erinnerung; in ihm werden nicht Bilder, sondern Namen aufbewahrt, in denen Bedeutung und Zeichen zusammenfallen” (E III 277 §461) In G.W.F. Hegel, *Rede zum Schuljahrsabschluss*, Secura GmbH: Cologne 2008, p. 32.

<https://books.google.cz/books?id=qXSrBA00hPoC&printsec=frontcover&hl=cs#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

of pointing at them. Ostension, as I remarked earlier, is the blind act of signing, when intelligence does not actually have the apparatus of signing. Therefore, things pointed at do not have names, and the sign has no independent existence. The sign and the thing conditions one another in their existence qua concepts. “The sign mediates between the intuiting subject and the intuited object, but is dependent on the physical presence of natural objects, viz., objects in the outside world.”<sup>71</sup> Ifergan nicely expresses how signs are fundamentally dependent on the existence of objects, wherefor they are independent mediators of these objects for consciousness. This beautiful paradox only stipulates the fact that language is dependent on matters of fact in their material groundedness.<sup>72</sup>

## II.2 The Fuss about Materiality

The reason I am approaching the discussion of memory in larger extension in the context of materialism is that Hegel’s memory *creates* this very context itself. Another reason is the closeness between language and memory. The kernel of the I – the particular form and the universal content – *is* language; otherwise I am just a boring and empty, null for “long since lost” being.<sup>73</sup> To the extent to which I am this form and content, I am aware of my objectivity. And since I am aware of my objectivity, of my extensive body, I am a matter of materiality. The foundation of the opposition between the I and an object is movement, the intentional flow of matters of fact, each negating, sublating – and thus positing at the same time – the other. Both the particular (my individual thoughts and feelings embedded in my extensive body – my outwardness) and the universal (the pure concepts, intelligence doing its best work – my inner movement of thinking) relate to one another, each becoming the negativity of the other. The specificity of the object uttered as a word (thus already a concept) is that it is outwardly both universal and particular. The concept that my intelligence tackles as universal is also understood within the context of my utterance qua particular, or as something so-to-say-with-Heidegger *at hand* – part of the deed I perform by utterance. The stubborn outward universality of an object

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<sup>71</sup> Ifergan: 2014, p. 137.

<sup>72</sup> Pini Ifergan: 2014, p. 137.

<sup>73</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel and the Human Spirit: Translation of Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-06) with Commentary*, trans. by Leo Rauch, Wayne State University Press: Detroit 1983, p. 95.

(as opposed to the I) also remains internally negative – again-to-say-with-Hume *a bundle of properties*. The *bundle* is founded by the necessity due to the work of memory, and it is found already as conceptualized material, i.e. as *das Ding*, once turned into a word by intelligence. Memory is the principle of necessity which at this point enables us to perceive external objects (JL: 1983, 95) and the I as an object as well, i.e. in case of the I, memory facilitates the integrity of the subject's internal and external qualities.

Before we proceed, it is high time to make clear what this objectivity is and how it corresponds with the concept of materiality. What I mean by objectivity is the absolute entirety of all that exists, or the real, that provides the opposite of what we mean by the Subjective, i.e. the external of the spirit in general vs. the internal of the spirit in general, if spirit is this internality itself which is the movement of thought. Contrarily, the objective is that what shares the logical structure of the spirit's internality, but what is at the same time resistant to its movement of thought. This resistance is precisely what creates the borders (always already overcome) between the absolute Object and the Subject (or objectivity and subjectivity); resistance is what Lacan would have called *the Real* and where Hegel sees the *antithetical* or the *negative* of language.<sup>74</sup>

Hence, the relation between the real world and language is posited in the relation between the real [das Real] and the uttered [die Äußerung], where the real is always opposing the uttered by the resistance between the posited and the positing. However, the resistance of the objective to language as such is in the unsurmountable difference of objectivity from the content of language, i.e. by the fact that the objective (as not yet the real – that we read as only turning up with language) has its own immanence (or essence), though they both share their logical structure. Thus, the problem of resistance is based on a double immanence that is, unlike the logical structure, unbridgeable. This immanence is just the ultimate opposition between the Subjective and the Objective.

Immanence is more of a stubborn adult than a child prepared to become experienced by going through all of the crankiness of life. Hegel is much more interested in that which is fluid and subjected to movement as such, rather than in that what resists it. Movement, if we talk about the birth of language, springs out from the movement of memory, which is driven by the ultimate movement of the Spirit striving for Knowledge.

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<sup>74</sup> Daniel W. Smith, "Two Concepts of Resistance: Foucault and Deleuze", in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, Purdue University: 2016, p. 278, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337413772>.

Materiality, then, is the whole of what exists, including the subjective, which is next to objectivity a viewpoint regarding the *material* resistance, or negativity, instead of the *logical* one. Throughout this work, I do not make much difference between the two viewpoints, however, because I after all suggest they to fall into one (only secondarily differing) when it comes to language and memory. In the case of memory, materiality, as I will try to argue, deserves holding the term materiality rather than objectivity (and the real) which I have tried to narrow down in the previous part.

So, once we posit the objectivity, or materiality, we also posit the Spirit's subjectivity in both Its objective and/or material respects. The possibility of Objectivity and the Subjective to be posited as a kind of unity in difference in terms of their logical and material structure, we need the *antithetical* connection of both, which is exactly what language can manage through its unique capacity to be both an "externalization of inwardness" and an "'internalization of externality' because it possesses both spatial and temporal aspects."<sup>75</sup>

### II.2.1 The Object Rises from the Night of the Self

"The thing is. It is not in Being [as content is in space]; rather it itself is" (JL: 1983, 85). It is with this strong assertion that Hegel opens his chapter on Will in the *Jena Lectures*. What this copula *is*, what it actually means, is firmly linked to the whole concept of language. First of all, Hegel makes clear that until the I reaches the level of its own Will, its acting is passive, empty, arbitrary. Until the I obtains its freedom, it consists of these arbitrarily posited images and representations – thanks to active memory. This is a nice paradox, highlighting the productivity of memory and that memory is the active principle of the subject even before it gains its freedom in acting itself, i.e. before becoming the *acteur* itself. The step up to the level of freedom (of *Will*) is an apprehension of language – crossing the border of mere perceptive passivity. In this sense, the emergence of language, logically, is conditioned by the activity of memory.

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<sup>75</sup> Jere O'Neill Surber, "Hegel's Early View of Language in the Jena Period (1804–1806)," in *A Companion to Hegel*, eds. by Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.: Oxford 2011, pp. 248-261, p. 248.

In the following passage from Jena Lectures, however, Hegel gives us an exemplarily romantic vision of what this I without freedom, this I of necessity facilitated by an active memory, is and, therefore, also what the object, both as itself and in language, *is*. It is one of the most expressive parts of Hegel's earlier formulations, almost of a poetic rhythm, almost of a Lacanian spirit:

The image is unconscious, i.e. it is not displayed as an object for representation. The human being is this Night, this empty nothing which contains everything in its simplicity — a wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of which occur to it directly, and none of which are not present. This [is] the Night, the interior of [human] nature, existing here—pure Self — [and] in phantasmagoric representations it is night everywhere: here a bloody head suddenly shoots up and there another white shape, only to disappear as suddenly. We see this Night when we look a human being in the eye, looking into a Night which turns terrifying. [For from his eyes] the night of the world hangs out toward us. (JL: 1983, 87)

*The night of the world hangs out towards us.* Hegel's Being, the universality of what is real, is the Night. Pure nothingness. An almost Sartrean nothingness of the Mind consisting of random catches of perception and plunges back into the darkness. Within the realm of the Spirit's Knowledge – the only realm we can know and we do know, the existence of objects arises in the very moment in which language emerges. This point is the uprising of Memory: I remember, therefore the object *is* real. Because the Romantic and the Hegelian – I dare say – nature, or objective world, is so innocently ignorant of its own determinateness, it is actually indetermined. Only by the magic of Memory, nature becomes what it *is*, the universal for itself, the particular for the other – that which is picked out by this same magic. Memory is the mother of naming. “In names, we actually first overcome the looking [An-schauen], the animal [physiological] aspect, as well as space and time” (JL: 1983, 90).

## II.2.2 Memory is the Bone, Language is the Joint; or the Anatomy of Objectivity

Schelling came in his *System of Transcendental Idealism* with the task of philosophy to inquire to both *Subject-Object* and *Object-Subject* perspectives. This requires the double-viewpoint of

studying the relation of the Subject towards the external world as Object, and the existence of the Subject in an external, or the non-subjective world of objects. For Schelling the *drive* – as Hegel puts it – of this complex relation is language, or as he calls it: “the absolute Subject-Object.”<sup>76</sup> For Hegel it is both language and memory (LPS: 2007, 27). Under Surber’s scrutiny, language is uncovered as something he calls a “Concrete Organism.”<sup>77</sup> Unfortunately, we do not get much of a sense of what is meant by the term until we immerse ourselves deeper into the work of Schelling, Hamann, and Schlegel (among other Romantics). All these authors influenced Hegel in their approach towards language that does not only *serve* the spirit, but *is* the spirit itself, and as such it could perhaps be described not as a product or a tool (supposing that language is something created intentionally) but as an organism that facilitates the bond between the spirit and nature based on their common logical structure. The structure would have been, however, empty in the sense of liveliness. So, this organism is also that what *drives* the spirit through its desires and strivings, and what creates (instead of being created as) the interconnection between the I and the objectivity.

The problem we preponderantly encounter from Kant on is the orientation towards subjectivity which throws philosophy back into the Cartesian duality. Modernity from Kant on has had the tendency to subjectivize what used to be posited as nature or the perceptible world. As even this term – already far away from the self-standing concept of substance – was being depleted, we started to enclose ourselves thoroughly in something galactically far from the matter: to think subject rather than substance.<sup>78</sup> Hegel, and more or less the thinkers of German Idealism, and later psychoanalysis, have already started to counterbalance this overall tendency. Today, we can see these aims of restoring matter in object-oriented-ontologies and new materialisms in general with regard to these previous, and even recent traditions. The thinking subject has been (since Kant for sure) torn between its own weightlessness and the gravity of the material world. Although the subject is always already and necessarily grounded in order to be a subject, as Hegel would argue, it has been persisting in this illogical, impossible, wrong negativity – conceptions embedded in Hegel’s *wrong* [Schlecht] infinite.

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<sup>76</sup> Surber: 2011, p. 246.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Russell Sbriglia and Slavoj Žižek, “Subject Matters: The Subject’s Second Death; or, Materialism, Then and Now,” in *Subject Lessons: Hegel, Lacan, and the Future of Materialism*, eds. Russell Sbriglia and Slavoj Žižek, Diairesis Series, Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois 2020, p. 6.

Sbriglia and Žižek remind us of the famous Lacanian turn-over from “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious”: “[T]he maxim of the subject is not ‘I think, therefore I am,’ but rather [...] ‘I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking.’”<sup>79</sup> This knotty formulation cut out from – and not entirely out from – the Lacanian context, brings to light the utter question of the subject-object relation: “Where is the ‘where I am,’” or ‘where I am not thinking’”? I suggest these to be precisely the lost and found materiality that actually preconditions all thinking. My argument, thus, continues as though the consequence of the former is not the question of egg or chicken, but, as Sbriglia and Žižek argues, it is the fact that subjectivity is not Consciousness but Unconscious,<sup>80</sup> and what else is the Unconscious than the Night of the Self, or the non-linguistic, i.e. the not-yet-recalled, the flash not-yet-formed into the figure of a human. To reach the materiality (or the universal) formed into a body (the particular), we need bones (PS: 2010, §331/291-292).

### II.2.3 A Short Visit to Dr. Freud

The first outward expression that humanity gives to itself is by means of language; whatever we represent to ourselves we represent to ourselves, even in the inmost self, as something spoken. This is the first and simplest form of production and of existence, through which what lies within comes to consciousness. (LHPIII: 1990, 64/97)

Pure thinking cannot aspire to be alone the motor of life anymore, for to think now falls back into the Night of the Self. By this fall, thinking does not count less in Hegel’s system; contrarily, it recovers its significance precisely where we reassess it as that which does not uncover the existent but which uncovers the language. Language is thus thinking in action, or the performance or deed [der Tat] which I understand to be the true motor of Hegel’s history.

Matter, or materiality as concept, has its existence both *in-itself* and *for-the-other*,<sup>81</sup> the latter regardless of our thinking and perceiving them. There are notions today that the Lacano-

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<sup>79</sup> Sbriglia and Žižek: 2020, p. 8.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> See Hegel’s commentary on Kant’s account of matter based on the principles of attraction and repulsion: “It is Kant who deserves the credit for having perfected the theory of matter by considering it as the unity of repulsion and attraction. This involves the correct insight that attraction should certainly be recognised as the other of the two moments in the concept of being-for-itself, and hence attraction belongs to matter just as

Hegelian dialectical materialism is “uncannily proximate”<sup>82</sup> to the so-called new materialisms recently emerging and taking control over the predominant discourse of matter (which we skimmed through a little in the Part 1 already). If we don’t accept the independence of the material and try to take its existence into our own hands, internalize it in order to manipulate it, we misuse its very concept. I see the linkage here to capitalistic escapism concerning the dynamically increasing environmental changes in the past decades. Hegel probably did not see this coming. But he definitely made the distinction between the material (as a linguistic concept) *for-the-other* and materiality *for-itself*. Looking at history from the linguistic viewpoint, history is the history of the discursive colonization of the other, be it of human or other objects. If we do not allow matter (i.e. nature in its non-idealistic, non-romantic meaning, rather the quark-based recent one) to do its job, we get lost in the Night of the Self. This is indeed much safer for us to do; to continue fulfilling our desires – the pure individuality of the self – no matter its costs, we remain in *das Heimlich*,<sup>83</sup> or the innermost, in the safe distance from the ungraspable material. But the material *is* graspable. And it is at the same time that which grasps it – namely, language itself. In this treatment of the Other, or the Material (i.e. the entire world of materiality – our world), we can keep its being graspable only as far as we are able to express it – and, as we will see in a bit, there always has to be at least a small remainder of the synthesis of the Subjective and the Objective. This remainder dwells in the Unconscious, waiting for its colonizing conceptualization, or *Entäußerung*. To colonize means to create a home, *das Heim*.<sup>84</sup>

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essentially as repulsion. But Kant's so-called dynamic construction of matter suffers from the defect that repulsion and attraction are postulated as present without further ado, rather than being deduced. The ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of this merely asserted unity would have followed logically from a proper deduction. Besides, Kant expressly insisted that [...] matter consists in nothing else but [the] unity [of repulsion and attraction].” (EI: 1991 §98/157)

<sup>82</sup> Adrian Johnston, *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014, p. 319; or in Sbriglia and Žižek 2020, p. 8.

<sup>83</sup> Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” trans. by David McLintock, Penguin Books: London 2003, pp. 123-134.

<sup>84</sup> *Das Heimlich* refers to the Freudian account of the unconscious too, later also reflected by Lacan. See Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, trans. by A. R. Price, Polity Press, Cambridge 2014, pp. 41-49, 74-76.

## II.3 Ontological Whiplash<sup>85</sup>

Now, by just briefly recalling the linguistic novelties that became integrated into the ordinary language so fast – as fast as the global pandemic crisis outburst – I will try to exemplify the aforementioned cohesion (and the always-almost complete synthesis) of the Subjective and the Objective (their unity in difference). In the recent past we have been able to observe a massive increase of new vocabulary accompanying the world-spreading virus. In other words, we witness how the spirit is accelerated in *naming* the real with the real changing so fast itself. The matter demands, calls us, to be *named*. And by being *named*, it gains its Reality. It is the dialectical crinkum-crankum of the Real and language itself that we discussed in the previous part of this work.

In the following up-to-date example of the new-words spreading in Corona-world, I will attempt to show how the new representations of new intuitions are quickly internalized and again externalized to imprint themselves onto the matter, whereby taming it. This example also shows that there is certain kind of material memory, the viral kind of memory (the memory imprinted in the virus' family branch and its further mutations) that we can only trace as soon as we grasp the virus linguistically. Hence, only when grasping this new language as our own, as *heimlich*, we are able to react to the virus as to an internalized external, i.e. as to the memorized – *erinnert* – material proper.

Simultaneously, from an article recently published on the BBC,<sup>86</sup> we can deduce several changes in the historical conceptualization of important areas in our lives. Society, or the world Spirit, is now predominantly parted into *covidiots* and the *covideo-parties* nerds,<sup>87</sup> undergoing the period described, in which the Spirit leaps into its next historical era. And the material does not stand aside like a post in a fence. Contrarily, materiality has hands on deck when

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<sup>85</sup> Karen Russell, "How the Coronavirus Has Infected Our Vocabulary," in *The New Yorker*, Issue April 6, 2020. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/04/13/a-temporary-moment-in-time>.

<sup>86</sup> Christine Ro, "Why we've created new language for coronavirus," May 25, 2020, Diplo Blog, Diplomacy, <https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20200522-why-weve-created-new-language-for-coronavirus>. See more from the discussion in e.g. Biljana Scott, "Language in the time of the coronavirus crisis – UK case study," April 22, 2020, <https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/language-time-coronavirus-crisis-uk-case-study>.

<sup>87</sup> For some examples from the range of meanings that had been conceptualized and later integrated to the English language corpus see "New words list April 2020," in *OED*, <https://public.oed.com/updates/new-words-list-april-2020/>.

constructing the new Real with the help of *Erinnerung*, i.e. of the Subjective (or the hands of social activity). As to the historical viewpoint, one of the respondents to the question of linguistic changes accompanying the outburst of the Covid-19 pandemic elaborates on the influence of the newly emerging vocabulary on the socially-founded Actuality (or actively remaking presence through the Unconscious):

[...] “the nuancing of already existing words” can in some cases be subtly harmful. War metaphors invoking “battles” and “front-lines” are being widely applied to the pandemic, yet thinking only in terms of a wartime emergency can detract from longer-term structural changes needed. This has given rise to the project #ReframeCovid, in which linguists collect crowdsourced examples of alternatives to war language.<sup>88</sup>

Hegel would have been proud of what Inés Olza adds in this same article:

[I]t’s useful to reflect on language and to have alternative framings for discussing the pandemic – beyond militaristic language that can obscure the roles of individuals and communities, and toward expressions that communicate collective care and individual responsibility. She says that Germans have been especially good at finding non-war terms. Germans’ compounding of terms, for instance, has allowed for one-off words like *Öffnungsdiskussionsorgien* (“orgies of discussion”) to describe the seemingly endless policy debates over reopening.

Indeed, humour is the ultimate power of rescue, although the general *humor* is now scaled the opposite; and sometimes language just becomes too much of an “oil barrel of greedy optimism.”<sup>89</sup> Still, if *Miss Rona* can make us laugh for just one moment, let’s invite her in, because a sparrow in the hand is *still* better than a pigeon on the roof.

Matter has its own memory that, if violated by human interference, can act back. By this assumption I do not wish to ascribe matter any kind of consciousness, to be sure. This assumption only echoes the fundamental Hegelian (in this case perhaps even Newtonian) dialectics (of action and reaction) under the spell of which matter cooperates on the foundation

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<sup>88</sup> Fiona McPherson in “Why we’ve created new language for coronavirus,”

<https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20200522-why-weve-created-new-language-for-coronavirus>.

<sup>89</sup> Inés Olza in “How the Coronavirus Has Infected Our Vocabulary,”

<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/04/13/a-temporary-moment-in-time>

of new discourses; discourse is a social *and* material concept. Discourse is memory, or knowledge always-already sunk into the material. Reshaping this Other, or the Objective as matter in this case, also implies that Its hitting back in language feels like an ontological whiplash which we even lack the terms for describing. It is a true earthquake that we feel deep in our bones. The Spirit at the same time does not use concepts that It does not know. The loop between that which the Spirit is not capable of coping with because It doesn't recognize the existence of it on the level of materiality, and the material itself, however, – as we argued with Freud above – jumps out of the pit of the Unconscious and, with this sudden flood, it overwhelms the Spirit, it demands its own language. Meaning: the power of matter over language, and thus, over the entire Spirit, is immense. At the same time, only through language does matter arrive at its power – otherwise, as not grasped by language, it remains a cow at Night. The cow still exists at Night, but is not visible, i.e. existent *for* the Spirit, as of yet.

To conclude, we shall take the lesson of language and the (though sublated) memory of matter being constitutive parts of the creation of history, where the reality stemming out of matter to become History calls for its recognition in language, i.e. to be recognized as the actor of actor-network theory (ANT) in the Story of the *Welt Geist*. The “night of the world” (JL: 1983, 87) is the very pit of the Spirit's Unconscious out of which It shall bring it to the light, or recognize it as the Real, or the materiality grasped by language.<sup>90</sup>

## II.4 The Alfa and Omega of Hegelian Materialism and Recent Theories

*“The In-itself inscribes itself precisely into the subjective excess, the subjective gap or inconsistency, that opens up a hole in reality.”<sup>91</sup>*

In the last chapters we hovered between matter as part of the Spirit, and by the end of the last bit we recalled matter as an historical, or social, actor with a reference to the ANT theory in

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<sup>90</sup> I am recalling Hegel's *Phenomenology* Preface assertion that substance is also subject in PS: 2010, §25/21: “That the true is only actual as a system, or that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the representation that expresses the absolute as spirit.” This passage is also widely discussed in Sbriglia and Žižek: 2020, p. 9.

<sup>91</sup> Sbriglia and Žižek: 2020, p. 10.

Bruno Latour's account. ANT approaches the social *and* natural world as being shaped by the constantly shifting networks of relationships that are literally found in both the social and the natural realms. ANT aims, thus, to re-problematize and perhaps re-build sociology as partly metaphysics or ontology of both the subjective and objective world altogether. As Latour briefly notes, the theory was inspired by Diderot's concept of *réseau* that aimed to replace the problems of Cartesian dualism. I find Hegel to be the Diderot of the early nineteenth century, and hence find ANT quite prospective in our context as I claim our Hegelian matter to overlap with Latour's account of both the natural and the social (without remainder! – to which I will respond right below) participation on the shape of the Real, or the Actual.

To make matters more material and more complicated, let's brush up on Lacan's understanding of the only right form of materialism as dialectical materialism that posits the subject as an entity of a purely relational nature. In Hegelian terms, Subject is thus Relationality itself. It relates the perceived into the fantasies of memory; it relates itself to the world and other beings. The interesting moment is that relationality is what actually presupposes human history – it is the Memory of the Spirit that *recalls* that from the Night of the Self and creates material (as language) connections between these intuited moments of Itself.<sup>92</sup>

This makes the spirit in our discussion come up again – because spirit is not only an object amongst other objects as most new materialists suggests,<sup>93</sup> but a kind of Lacanian *objet petit a*<sup>94</sup> as for its objectivity, and the spirit relating the objects into its coherent reality. The more a subject, the freer a spirit.<sup>95</sup> Lacan's *objet petit a* is the remainder of the entire objectivity that cannot be apprehended as other objects. It is the subject's remnant in the Other, the other as an object. This is the *objet petit a*: the subject symbolically imprinted on the Other. So much for the intertwinement of the best-friends-forever Subject and Object. Hegel appreciates the two-sidedness of the coin called the Spirit; the subjective and the objective, intertwined, revealing their interdependency on one another, so that neither the subjective nor the objective prevails in terms of ontological primacy. His *objet petit a* is the Real posited by the subject – something we cannot call objectivity, and yet we shall, for we do not have any other.

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<sup>92</sup> Sbriglia and Žižek: 2020, p. 13.

<sup>93</sup> Sbriglia and Žižek: 2020, pp. 4.

<sup>94</sup> Sbriglia and Žižek 2020, p. 27. The authors recall Lacan's *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Livre XVIII: D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant*, 1971, ed. Jacques Alain Miller, Éditions du Seuil: Paris 2006, p. 28.

<sup>95</sup> Sbriglia and Žižek: 2020, pp. 13-14.

And so: “[...] the self-emptying of self-consciousness turned out to be what posits thinghood. [...] For self-consciousness, the negative of the object, that is, its self-sublation, has as a result a positive meaning” (PS: 2010 §788/700). Only those self-aware of its void, its unconscious, its *Unheimlich*, can sublimate the self in favour of the object, can posit thinghood in its truth. And yet never quite so, as we have just learned. The debate of substance and its general role and nature closely relates to the question of movement and permanence in Hegel’s philosophy. Everything has to dissolved in movement, while this dissolution means both sublation [Aufhebung] and its retreatment in time; nothing sublated is truly sublated without then being retreated: “The force of spirit is only as great as its expression, and its depth goes only as deep as it trusts itself to disperse itself and to lose itself in its explication of itself” (PS: 2010, §10/9). To add a few words from the present: “all essence must appear.”<sup>96</sup> The Spirit has to come to terms with the impossibility of its own totality.<sup>97</sup> Subject as the *object petit a* is the inscription of itself on the Real.<sup>98</sup> According to Heidegger, the difference between a stone and a human being is in the latter’s capacity to contextualize itself against its background.<sup>99</sup> Not that at least the fungi living in proximity of the stone were not capable of something of the same effect and quality. But unlike stones, as McGovan stresses, humans master it all with the invention of language that is from one perspective the entirety of its past sublated (and thus much re-exposed) as the history of Spirit.

#### II.4.1 The Sky is the Limit

In Hegel’s philosophy of language (if we may speak of something like that connected with Hegel – and yet we do) the actual sky is actually the limit. Of course, we do not want to claim that all matter in its particularities is perfectly adequate to the overall logical structure of language, i.e. a kind of correspondence theory. But there is a certain correspondence in the relation between matter (or objects) and language, namely in how they both are to the subject, or the Spirit. So, when Surber lays out the question “Why did Hegel not present language as a

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<sup>96</sup> Mladen Dolar, “What’s the Matter?,” in *Subject Lessons: Hegel, Lacan and the Future of Materialism*, eds. R. Sbriglia and S. Žižek, Dialectic Series, Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois 2020, pp. 31-49, p. 38.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Dolar: 2020, p. 39.

<sup>99</sup> Todd McGovan, “Objects after Subjects” in *Subject lessons: Hegel, Lacan, and the Future of Materialism*, eds. Russell Sbriglia and Slavoj Žižek, Dialectic Series, Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois 2020, pp. 68-81, p. 76.

(relatively) independent ‘moment’ within his broader systematic project?”<sup>100</sup> he tickles the very limits of language that cannot be thought. These limits are, among others, a topic for the following part.

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<sup>100</sup> Surber: 2011, pp. 243-262.

# Part III: Language, Memory and World History

## III.1.1 New Cultural History, or the Origin of the Object

*"[...] reality is not something that people experience but something that they meaningfully construct. The experience that people have of their (social) world always emerges, takes life, in the space of enunciation created by the discursive mediation."<sup>101</sup>*

In the first and second parts of this work, I suggested reconsidering the concepts of language and memory, and reality and materiality. In this chapter, I will try to bring forth these pairs of concepts in order to analyze the former historically and sociologically (or anthropologically) based on a claim that language [Sprache] is the world that we acknowledge as our reality [Realität], and that it is also the way we directly influence, or build, our actual reality [die reale Wirklichkeit]. Language is here understood as discourse, or the conceptual matrix of our reality – both synchronically and diachronically, i.e. reality is always-already trapped between the last active discourse and the currently used discourse fundamentally embedded in the former one. In an exhausting analysis of the recent trends and turnarounds in historical studies, Miguel A. Cabrera et al. discusses so-called *new history* that is occupied primarily with the role of language as discourse in social action that shapes historical events and discourse – the subject-objective matrix of socio-cultural relations and drives.

According to Cabrera, traditional history posits subject to the center of their theory; subject is the only actor constituting the social actions as mere events.<sup>102</sup> Now, I want to show that it is primary reality in the Hegelian sense that we must be concerned about because history is not centralized around subject, but around both subject and object. With the emerging subject, there is always-already an object emerging too, as has been also discussed earlier in this work.

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<sup>101</sup> Miguel A. Cabrera, Anna Fagan and Marie McMahon, "On Language, Culture, and Social Action," in *History and Theory*, Vol. 40, No. 4, Wiley for Wesleyan University: 2001, pp. 82-100, p. 91. Accessed on April 6, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677988>.

<sup>102</sup> Cabrera et al.: 2001, p. 83.

At the same time, it is only in the subject's action that subject performs itself discursively in the subject-objective domain.<sup>103</sup>

While the principles of traditional and social history phase out, a new cultural history, in Cabrera's terms, is on the rise. New history by definition turns the attention to cultural practices and to questions of cultural identity; they have exchanged the field of sociology for the field of anthropology.<sup>104</sup> The meanings of the particular cultural realm are created around the cultural experience, interests, and identities in the field of interaction between social and cultural perceptions. It is a symbolic field of discourse in which the meanings are created. The important feature of this theory is that the meanings, though attributes of socio-cultural position, do not become historical factors unless recognized by the spirit, i.e. of social (or ethical – in Hegel's terms) consciousness. Therefore, in Cabrera's account, history is conditioned by conscious recognition, and subsequently by socio-cultural patterns and memory. Unlike social historians, for new cultural historians, the concept of society and culture, and their history respectively, is of rational creation. In Hegel's terms – for Spirit, history is the rational order of otherwise contingently following events. According to new historians, social and cultural features are the primary components of historical memory, and consequently of history itself. As such, the theory offers an alternative to both idealist and materialist historiographies, and in my reading, it even reconciles the subjective and the objective in their participation in the socio-cultural frame within which consciousness acts and evolves. The frame is a network of socio-cultural relations that the historical subject consists of. This network is the historical discourse itself.<sup>105</sup>

Now, discourse is not just the product of a particular socio-cultural historical period; it co-creates it, too. It is worth recalling Hegel's distinction between *Meinung* and *Bedeutung* at this moment, while Cabrera's article mentions meanings but ascribes them only a personal validity. There is a significant difference for Hegel between what we mean [meinen] and what we say, or what is the meaning of our utterances [bedeuten], while at this point the meaning

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<sup>103</sup> I relate action to Hegel's *Wirklichkeit*, because by definition, *Wirklichkeit*, or the actual(alized), is what rationalizes Reality, *die Realität*, as explained in the first part of this work. See Lorenzo Cammi, "Hegel and Wittgenstein on Wirklichkeit: Sketch of a Comparison," in *Wittgenstein and Hegel - Reevaluation of Difference*, eds. Alexander Berg and Jakub Mácha, Prague 2019, pp. 119-140, p. 121.  
<https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110572780-001>.

<sup>104</sup> Cabrera et al.: 2001, p. 84.

<sup>105</sup> Cabrera et al.: 2001, p. 85.

almost coincides with the concept.<sup>106</sup> The first is a mere empty universality accompanying the deixis, while the latter is the content-filled universal meaning of the uttered words or signs.<sup>107</sup> Cabrera's meaning would overlap with Hegel's *Meinung* which is thus a meaning of certain representation – this is why it remains within the personal realm of a particular spirit. The main difference between *Bedeutung* and concept is thus the accentuation of the logical structure in the letter and the exteriorized representation of the inner representation suppressed by *Erinnerung* in the former. We think the particular but we say the particular in the universal. There is always this tension between the granny I think of and the granny I utter. The latter remains my own granny, but it is encapsulated in the concept that has a universal meaning, i.e. the primary meaningful content [*Bedeutung*] that everyone can understand, with the help of their own representations [*Meinung*]. The capsule is the concept – the marriage between the particular and the universal, the logical form. Discursive concept is something that lies beyond the control of the subject.<sup>108</sup> And yet it is the very means of expressing one's existence, for “[it] is in names that we *think*” (EIII: 2007, §462/199).

Cabrera states that new history cultivates a new notion of language by distinguishing between language as a means of communication and language as discourse, or the network of meanings (like the total sum of Wittgenstein's language games, I assume). This new notion of language is, as Cabrera stresses, *constitutive* and *performative* concerning a particular socio-cultural environment. Moreover, Cabrera thinks that discourse, so to speak, models the objective realm as such<sup>109</sup> – it *creates* meanings, i.e. the objects themselves, as we have declared with Hegel in the first part of this work. Discourse is materially attached to the social base and is mediated by the preceding discourse. This does not mean, however, that discourses are created by people. Rather we can say in Hegel's terms: people are created by discourses. This thought fits well with the idea that spirit's primary attribute is that it always undertakes certain development, or rather, certain education [*Bildung*]. Therefore, what gives rise, shapes, or suppresses certain forms of discourse is another, newly emerging discourse. The realm of discourse is the realm of the struggle between masters and slaves, of the mastering discourse.

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<sup>106</sup> Kleber 2019, p. 264.

<sup>107</sup> Kleber: 2019, p. 264. For the direct reference, see e.g. the sense-certainty passage from the *Phenomenology*: “‘This’, i.e. the universal This; or, ‘it is’, i.e. Being in general. Of course, we do not envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say” (PS: 2010, §97/88).

<sup>108</sup> Cabrera et al. 2001, p. 87.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

What is memory as self-knowledge, as the story of a nation, as the world Spirit? First, we need to reconcile the *Gedächtnis* of the *Jena Lectures* and the *Phenomenology* with the *Gedächtnis* of *Encyclopaedia*, both as the pit or the night of the self. We have seen in the last part of this work that what is internalized by recollection [erinnern] in memory needs to be externalized [entäußern] in language. Language and memory carry the meaning, or the content, of thoughts. History does not carry meaning but only the articulation of the Spirit's forms, or figures respectively (PS: 2010, §756/669), and only when raised to a concept does it obtain its meaning; then the meaning is revealed as if history becomes logically articulated. Language and memory, on the contrary, are always already encumbered with meaning as far as meaning is the content of the spirit's both inner and outer lives. As Federico Orsini suggests: "Erinnerung should be understood as the method of articulating the self-movement, and so the intelligibility, of the fundamental object of such a discipline."<sup>110</sup>

The function of memory as the synthesis of the subjective and the objective has been so far proven on the level of the individual spirit or collective. In this final part of this work, I will examine this synthetizing function further, at the levels of (i) personal memory, (ii) collective or ethical memory, (iii) historical memory and absolute memory – more or less following the ordering in Angelica Nuzzo's *Memory, History, Justice in Hegel*. I will now turn to the closer examination of particular passages from the *Phenomenology*.

### III.1.2 If I Had Known, I Wouldn't Have Taken the Trail; or the Meaning and Knowledge of History

To understand the history of the Spirit presupposes its apprehension conceptually, i.e. logically, or rationally. On the individual level, we can see how people make sense of their lives and how strongly it is connected to the sense of remembering. Life is not a sequence of distinct events chronologically succeeding after one another but rather an always already articulated [entäußert] recollection. If we speak about the meaning of life, we can speak about the peaks of an individual's success, but we can also speak about the overall inner sense of the particular life – let's call it its substance. That is what endows the individual with its irreplaceability in

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<sup>110</sup> Federico Orsini, "Erinnerung and Philosophy of History," in *Hegel on Recollection: Essays on the Concept of Erinnerung in Hegel's System*, eds. Valentina Ricci and Federico Sanguinetti, Cambridge Scholar Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne 2013, pp. 123-124.

the flow of other lives, other histories. And by ascribing it a meaning, we simply understand it within the logical web of the particular relations, events, situations, acts and deeds of this life. So, on the level of the absolute Spirit, there must be something similar. Something that for Hegel creates the substance of the Spirit, and thereby the meaning of the history of the Spirit itself.

Unlike history, memory is a continuum passing by, slowly or wildly bouncing along within the chutes of historical events. History is a sum of events that we understand as closed, but which is actually never closed as far as it is not yet a history but the pure passing of time<sup>111</sup> (PS: 2010, §808/718). In the Preface to the *Phenomenology* we read something that I provocatively offered in Brecht's elaboration on the ancient paradox. Hegel expresses it as follows:

... one must *linger* at every stage on the way, for each stage is itself an entire individual shape, and it is viewed absolutely only insofar as its determinateness is viewed as a whole, that is, as concrete, or insofar as the whole is viewed in terms of the distinctiveness of this determination. – Both because the substance of the individual, the world spirit, has possessed the patience to pass through these forms over a long stretch of time and to take upon itself the prodigious labor of world history, and because it could not have reached consciousness about itself in any lesser way, the individual spirit itself cannot comprehend its own substance with anything less.” (PS: 2010, §29/25)

This passage suggests that it is the knowledge of history that creates the substance, i.e. the meaning of life, or the Life of the Spirit. But only at first sight. It is true that “[t]he movement of propelling forward the form of its self-knowledge is the work which spirit accomplishes as *actual history*” (PS: 2010, §803/713). But unlike history, it is memory that “always [has] a reterritorialization function,”<sup>112</sup> which is essential for self-knowledge, or for knowledge as such.

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<sup>111</sup> See also PS: 2010, §801/712.

As Ricci summarizes: “Hegel claims, moreover, that time is a merely intuited concept, rather than made into the object of a conceptual comprehension (*begreifen*). A basic form of apprehension, therefore, corresponds to a basic form of presence, such as the one the *Dasein* of the concept is.” Ricci: 2013, p. 6.

<sup>112</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. by Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis 1987, p. 294.

So again: when does history become meaningful, or when does history emerge? It is in its dialectical relationship with memory. Memory is what gives meaning to the particular events of history that would otherwise be condemned to absolute forgetfulness, since history is, again, the sequence, not the story,<sup>113</sup> i.e. the passing time of a formally changing reality (yet ungrasped historical figures).<sup>114</sup> Memory is like the ethical force that is capable of judging the past, and thus of giving the past its meaning<sup>115</sup> (PS: 2010, §808/719-710). Memory declares what is meaningful in the past. One of its forms is the literal gallery of pictures – works of art, to which I will briefly return at the end of this work, or by religious or philosophical explanations of it. Memory – like art for Hegel (PS: 2010, §753/667) – is always created with certain regard because it is tightly connected to a particular spirit. Absolute Spirit, or absolute Knowledge respectively, is thus the sum of all these particular memories, whereby I understand the final *Erinnerung* – leaning into the thesis of Victoria Ricci’s that “[w]hat is perhaps most striking about recognizing the central role of *Erinnerung* in absolute knowing (so central, indeed, that we might say absolute knowing is *Erinnerung*) is the fact that it seems to question the absoluteness of its standpoint.”<sup>116</sup>

### III.1.3 The Leaky Truth of Memory

“Truth can only be partially spoken.”<sup>117</sup>

Towards the ending of the *Phenomenology*, the absolute self-knowledge of the Spirit finds its truth falling in one with certainty, or the other way around. The key passing from the certainty of itself to the truth of itself takes place already in Section B of *Self-consciousness* of the *Phenomenology*, and runs throughout the entire *Phenomenology* as the task of the Spirit that comes to terms with Itself in the very last words of the *Phenomenology*. Moreover, this certainty

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<sup>113</sup> Nuzzo: 2012, p. 29.

<sup>114</sup> Reference to the passage from the *Phenomenology* worth being quoted: “The recollection of spiritual forms (Geister) as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their spiritual Their conservation, looked at from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is *History*; looked at from the side of their intellectually comprehended organization, it is the Science of the ways in which knowledge appears” (PS: 2010, §808/724).

<sup>115</sup> Nuzzo: 2012, p. 30.

<sup>116</sup> Ricci: 2013, p. 19.

<sup>117</sup> Julia Kristeva, “My Memory’s Hyperbole,” in *The Portable Kristeva*, ed. by Lawrence D. Kritzman, European Perspectives: A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism, Columbia University Press: New York 2002 (1984), pp. 68-69. Accessed in Apple Books.

which is no other than the sense-certainty from the beginning of the *Phenomenology*, is the form of this self-knowledge; its content is the Spirit itself. Thereby the *form of objectivity* as fundamental part of the existence of the Spirit becomes the Spirit's essence, and that means its concept (PS: 2010, 798/709). This arduous passage clears out the following quotation from Nuzzo:

Memory is a process of mediation. From this it follows that in constituting the memorialized figure that gives historical reality to the ethical community, collective memory is neither truthful to the individual, to the community, nor to the story that it is supposed to tell. *History is based precisely on memory's betrayal of truth. Memory shapes its contents into figures by making them other than what they immediately are. It transforms nature into values, contingent events into consciously performed acts, dead individuality into living, communal universality* (my emphasis).<sup>118</sup>

Now the question of truth is certainly in order. If we say memory betrays the truth, it follows that only in absolute Knowledge the truth is truly absolute, granting that *das Absolute Wissen* is *die Absolute Erinnerung*. This statement unravels the dialectics of memory in its relation to the Spirit as such. The Spirit is the absolute Knowledge, and therefore, it is the truthful form of Itself because it snapshots the whole of the world Spirit as it is, i.e. the whole bunch of ethical memories of each spirit as a community, and makes them Its own truth qua certainty by simply interiorizing them yet again by the final recollection at the end of (one) history. Meanwhile, memory is no master of history in terms of its ethics. If it were so, memory would have gotten the stamp to mark historical events by its own authority. History and memory are in dialectical relation; history advocates the objective site of the Spirit, memory the subjective. So, after all, in Nuzzo's reading, it is history that judges memory – and that by its necessary self-emptying [Entäußerung] and positing itself as absolute Event, or the sum of all historical events [Gegenstand] as itself. Absolute Knowledge comes about once the Spirit sublates itself again [zurückgenommen] in this otherness [Gegenstand], or positing itself as object, and thus returns to itself as this otherness, i.e. It is both the subjective and the objective in its content; this is the totality of each of the Spirit's moments [Momente] (PS: 2010, §788/700).

The truth, or certainty of the absolute Spirit turns up as a former sense-certainty (of time), now conceptualized by absolute Knowledge in which the Spirit knows Itself not as a

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<sup>118</sup> Nuzzo: 2012, p. 31.

mere passing by anymore, but a snapshot of this movement, posited by the Spirit as Itself in front of Itself.

So, what does the truth of memory mean, if understood by certainty? Even though we affirm that truth is in the court of history – as the truth of sense-certainty, or pure being, we ought not to forget that truth is also something leaky *per se*. We read in Hegel that truth is the whole, but we also read – in my poor translation – that a darned stocking is better than a leaky [zerrissen] one; this is not quite so with self-consciousness<sup>119</sup> (AHW/B2, 558). The totality of the world Spirit is not total in terms of Its memories. They are not without remainders. Memory is fundamentally intertwined with forgetfulness and forgetting. So now, the question stands as though whether the truth is truly in the court of history, or is it rather connected with memory due to its essential leakiness that is quite fundamental for self-consciousness.

### III.1.4 The Spirit's Truth and Certainty

On Hegel's account, no truth inhabits the thought determinations arranged in the lifeless tables of formal and transcendental logic, just as *no truth animates the rules of grammar isolated from their concrete use in the living language*.<sup>120</sup> In these cases, all we have are dead forms – forms that were once living but are dead and meaningless when severed from the living connection with the real world of nature and human activity. [...] Now this re-activation of the shadowy logical forms on the basis of the memory of the reality which inhabits them is the task of Hegel's Logic (my emphasis).<sup>121</sup>

I find this a good observation to justify the leaky and yet true nature of memory, and thus its position within world history. History is an accidental flow of particular events succeeding and interdependent by way of an inner causality (either cultural, ethical, political, but primarily simply natural<sup>122</sup>), or better, of inner rules dictated by logic. We cannot say why

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<sup>119</sup> "Ein geflickter Strumpf [ist] besser als ein zerrissener; nicht so das Selbstbewußtsein."

<sup>120</sup> Referring to the passage from WL/B5, p. 53.

<sup>121</sup> Nuzzo: 2012, p. 54.

<sup>122</sup> See PR: 2001, §360/272; more on the natural principle see: "Since history is the embodiment of spirit in the form of events, that is, of direct natural reality, the stages of development are present as direct natural principles. Because they are natural, they conform to the nature of a multiplicity, and exist one outside the other" (PR: 2001, §345/268).

we call a chair *a chair* – we simply do because we *remember* that this is how we do it (we have the concept), and we *know* this is the right thing to do (we follow the rule). This unjustifiability, however, does not imply that we cannot say in language what is true and what is false. I consider this argument passable onto the case of memory, too. Memory is in Wittgenstein’s examples the deliberate description we make without any pretension of seeking the absolute truth in what is, or what we perceive; we take what we recollect as the truth. And we recollect linguistically because that is how we experience reality and ourselves (PI: 2009, §§648-51/176). I think the same applies to the argument advocated by Nuzzo, namely that in the *Phenomenology* truth is what is justified by historical judgement. This is indeed valid for the later account of historical truth in Section C on *Die Weltgeschichte* in the *Philosophy of Right*. In paragraph §345, Hegel writes:

Justice and virtue, wrong, force, and crime, talents and their results, small and great passions, innocence and guilt, the splendour of individuals, national life, independence, the fortune and misfortune of states and individuals, have in the sphere of conscious reality [bewußten Wirklichkeit] their definite meaning and value, and find in that sphere judgment and their due. (PR: 2001, §345/267)

Judgement is an explicit tool of shaping discourse, or the ethics of each spirit within the sphere of their conscious reality. I therefore take judgement, if applicable to the last section of the *Phenomenology*, as the particular shaping of discourse of this reality that also has this corrective and value-making faculty. For judgement is not only an ethical memory, but also a linguistic category; it is a firm principle of the spirit in general that I understand to be – with a short reference to the first part of this work – the joint which controls the way Spirit’s limbs bend. There is simply no space for validating judgement as true or not. It simply is the truth itself, so as is language.

“[World history] is self-caused and self-realized reason” (PR: 2001, §342/267). The rule of reason, or logos, or a particular historical discourse is what shapes the meaningless sequence of events into a meaningful whole of world history, and it reflects in itself the dialectics of memory as well – no matter how leaky it is.

And yet, there will always remain a tension in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and the *Phenomenology* between the self-aware systematization of reality of people, or the spirit, and the all-encompassing *Weltgeist* that submerges these spirits under Itself as Its inner activity, and aims at preserving only the higher forms of Itself, whereby It acquires its freedom. Under the Spirit's activity, particular spirits – communities, or cultures – turn into unconscious tools of a higher metaphysical principle which stands behind the Spirit's development towards freedom (PR: 2001, §344/267). At the end of history (as one of many histories within an absolute History, as I understand the concept) the spirits are recollected in absolute Knowledge as Its content – namely as Its moments, either as free-standing contingent events, i.e. history, or a conceptually grasped organization of these events, i.e. science (PS: 2010, §808/720). Both these forms of grasping the existence of spirit in its moments represent *Erinnerung* and *Golgotha* of absolute Spirit in its actuality – as both its truth and certainty (Ibid.). Only thanks to these as forming the recollection of the Spirit the Spirit claims its infinity; and it is a good infinity because it is embedded in the succeeding forms of the Spirit that take turn one after the other.

### III.1.5 The Temple and the Dorp; the Community and I

With a reference to the very closing passage from the *Phenomenology*, I would like to recall the first pages of the *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, where Hegel seems to suggest a double meaning of *Erinnerung*: (i) the so-called “Temple of Memory,”<sup>123</sup> or the memory from the last words of the *Phenomenology* that grants the Spirit Its infinity (or *immortality*); and (ii) the *debris* of the *original history*, as it were, which includes *legends, folksongs, traditions, or obscure memory* [Weisen] that is ascribed to the pre-literate, i.e. oral communities. The former is the memory that has the power of universalizing what is individual, or – as Nuzzo expressively notes – “destroy[ing] it.”<sup>124</sup> In order to preserve the individual in memory as dead

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<sup>123</sup> The entire quote reads as follows: “These historians bind together what is vanishing down the stream of time, and place it all in the Temple of Memory [Mnemosyne; or as aforementioned *Erinnerung*] to give it immortality. Legends, folksongs, traditions—these are to be excluded from original history, because they are obscure modes of memory [Weisen], proper to the mentality of pre-literate peoples. On the contrary, in original history we are concerned with peoples who knew what they were and what they wanted. The foundation of observed and observable reality provides a firmer ground than the transient soil in which legends and epics have grown; these no longer make up the historic record of those peoples that have risen to a firm individuality” (IPH: 1988, p. 4.).

<sup>124</sup> Nuzzo: 2012, p. 31.

or passed, “collective memory must kill or sacrifice individuality as individuality.”<sup>125</sup> This is how *original history* emerges, i.e. as universal *per se*. However, history is embedded not only in actual events, or *rés gestae*, but also in *historia rerum gestarum*, or in the narration of these events. Now, the final act of recollection in the last paragraph of the *Phenomenology* suggests that history is constituted of both these aspects, i.e. *rés gestae* is always-already accompanied by *historia rerum gestaerum*. As we read in the *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, the so-called *little histories*, or the tribal histories, are not included in the original history as preserving the individuality of their stories. Nevertheless, Hegel asserts that such histories, or the individual events, may “rouse the muse of memory (*Mnemosyne*) to give shape to its image – just as love and religious emotions provoke the imagination into giving form to impulses that had been formless” (IPH: 1998, 64). Therefore, in the final recollection of the Spirit’s figures, even these *little histories* may claim their place in the world history, though only indirectly, as parts of bigger stories. And what are these stories like?

The state arouses the ethical life of the community. Its history is the sum of their deeds (i.e. also their ancestors) that *live through* into the present in peoples’ memory. Interestingly, memory is, thus, the possession of the community, so as it is the community that is possessed by this memory, as far as the memory “constitutes their substance, their being” (IPH 1998, 55), and as far as the content of the spirit’s “speech is the substance of its durable existence; the speech is the assurance of spirit’s certainty within itself” (PS: 2010, §671/598).

Turning back to the ethical judgement, it is worth noting that religious judgement is the judgement that makes it possible, for it is in speech of the community about itself, i.e. a bard song, a myth, legend, a historical narrative, that defines each individual’s relation towards the whole of the community, so as “language is the existence of the pure self as the self” (PS: 2010, §507/448) and speech is this self coming to existence for others.

### III.1.6 How What is Said Comes to be Historical

Spirit certain of itself within its existence has as the element of its *existence* nothing but this knowledge of itself, that is, nothing but its expression [das Aussprechen] that what it does, it does out of the conviction of duty, and that this, its language [diese seine

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

Sprache], is what makes its action count as valid [das Gelten seines Handelns]. (PS: 2010, §793/704)

Hegel is generally much more optimistic about what can be said in language than Wittgenstein. As we see in the passage quoted above, Hegel's language is the touchstone of the validity of the spirit's actions. The question is what we can imagine under this validation through language. We can recall the above-mentioned discourse as judgement. The individual actions of the spirit are judged within the discourse, under which the action gains its discursive meaning – ethical, political, etc. The discourse is thus shaped by these actions, so as it shapes these actions according to the memory of the spirit, or the particular community to be more precise. I imagine this to be related to the turnarounds of the histories of each spirit springing from some critical point of the Spirit's history, in which the Spirit is paralyzed by a certain unsurpassable bias – e.g. the case of Antigone, etc.<sup>126</sup> This is the first interpretation of the quoted passage.

The second interpretation, or rather meaning ascribed, is that of the strainer of what is and what is not valuable in terms of world history. Discourse as an externalized memory, winnows out individuality and leaves in the universal that can become part of the universal history. The result of this is, for example, the ongoing phenomenon of racism stemming from the primeval slave-holding ethos. Slavery as an example is to Hegel a deflection from that what we call ethical life, i.e. from the “rational realization” of freedom, as Pinkard puts it.<sup>127</sup> Therefore, the absolute touchstone of whether society is ethically wrong or not comes from its understanding of justice and freedom, which makes perfect sense as freedom is the above-mentioned metaphysical principle (the movement towards freedom), or the goal (if there is one!) of Hegel's Spirit. The dominating discourse, then, is its *rationale*. Nowadays, we would probably turn to the rather exact historical discourse analysis (HDA) method that would dig up the individual concepts used in ordinary utterances and systematically picture for us the predominant, more or less racist tendencies within each particular e.g. political, ethical, historical, etc. discourse.

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<sup>126</sup> Nuzzo elaborate on this in the following words: “[...] the figure of individual death and its relationship to (and significance for) the community marks for Hegel the crucial moments of the phenomenological and historical development of Spirit. From Antigone's conflict with Creon over her dead brother's body in Greek ethical life, through the unmediated ‘meaningless death’ inflicted upon the anonymous individual in the revolutionary Terror...” In Nuzzo: 2012, p. 31.

<sup>127</sup> Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, Cambridge University: Cambridge 1994, p. 299.

To stay a little longer with the relation of language to freedom and vice versa, we may recall a passage from the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*:

To be here at home with self and in our own domain, to speak, think, and represent in our own language, likewise belongs to the form of liberation. This is of the utmost importance. Without his translation of the Bible into German Luther would not have consummated his Reformation. There would not have been a general Reformation without it; subjective freedom would not have been fostered without this form that consists in thinking in one's own language. (LPHIII: §64/97)

Language is not just the result of the self being at home with itself and in one's community and era. Rather, language is the reason (and *reason* it is) of the self (or certain community) becoming free. Moreover, freedom would not have survived if only occurring with the self, or the individual, for freedom is also a *relational* concept which needs to occur within a particular society, too, if it is to be reached by an individual.

### III.1.7 History Conditioned by Competitive Discourse

Hegel was in his account of language in general quite significantly influenced by Johann Gottfried Herder.<sup>128</sup> One of the decisive thoughts that Hegel takes over from Herder is that the language that we count as *Dasein*, as the (mode) existence of spirit, is always a social language (JS: 1986, §10/226). How decisive a thought and whether it is sufficient for Hegel's account of spirit as such can be observed in his account of *Negro*.

Hegel's African indigenous are humans which have not cut themselves off from natural world (PH: 1956, 111pp). They hang onto it and as such they dwell at the stage of mere souls without further development towards their freedom. Hegel's Negroes do not posit themselves as subjects as opposed to objects, and therefore they remain deeply rooted in objective materiality without being able to posit themselves as opposing this materiality. Materiality, then, plays an important role in the emergence of human identity as such, and hence, too, the emergence of self-consciousness. As trapped in the natural status quo, Hegel's Negro does not

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<sup>128</sup> See for example Michael N. Forster, *German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond*, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2011, pp. 143-177.

have any knowledge, and therefore, any history either. At the same time, Negroes are human beings living in communities and as such they have their own language. In my reading of Hegel's social ontology, history is conditioned by an existence of ethical community, i.e. of ethical judgement, or discourse – or more precisely, of an institutionalized social realm. That which enables the existence of rightful acting, of truth, and of universality and abstractions. This discourse is a competitive, game-like (recalling Wittgenstein and Huizinga) principle of never-ending differentiation, of never-ending struggle between masters and slaves. So, while the Negro is unable to recognize basic principles of moral behaviour (PH: 1956, 113-114), he or she also remains ignorant to the possibility of fighting for their freedom – hence the non-existent history.

### III.1.8 Discourse, the Butterfly

“Language does not simply name subjects, but brings them to life, it makes them appear, and it is in this sense that new historians say that subjects are constituted as a result of the interpellation that discourse addresses to individuals.”<sup>129</sup>

Discourse can connect generations and cultures of societies; discourse can mark those that are discursively alien or simply not quite of its nature or taste. We can wage wars through, because of, and on behalf of discourse. It turns around, it mingles, it traverses, it overcomes, it executes, it ostracizes. Discourse is a slippery partner.<sup>130</sup>

What a historical agent thinks of, or the way she or he conceives of, a social situation, fact, or event (and that induces her or him to act in a certain manner) is not something that depends on that situation, fact, or event, as if this possessed a sort of essential being; it depends, instead, on the categorial network through which that agent has made it meaningful.<sup>131</sup>

Obviously, we are more and more boarding the social branch of Hegelian interpretative tradition. However, what I am trying to make clear is that this is not simply a socially based interpretation of Hegel's spirit but a socio-cultural interpretation of Hegel's language as

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<sup>129</sup> Cabrera et al.: 2001, p. 94.

<sup>130</sup> Cabrera et al.: 2001, p. 90.

<sup>131</sup> Cabrera et al.: 2001, p. 90.

discourse, i.e. as this history-making network of meanings that creates the subject-objective world as such. Spirit's reality [Wirklichkeit] consists of phenomena mediated by discourse (as the network of meanings), but it is not just the real that is constituted here. Discourse is what constantly builds and rebuilds objectivity as such: "[...] the objects [...] are constituted as such in the very process of discursive articulation of the phenomena themselves."<sup>132</sup> At the same time, discourse is a butterfly-like creature. It partly lives its own life and we can hardly keep a hold of its future paths; at the same time, its existence is almost volatile, reacting to the slightest external change. Categories like madness, gender, social class, racism – they do not appear as phenomena by magic. Discourse is like a cocoon hiding them as caterpillars until slowly they become sound within the discourse and start their own lives as other slippery concepts that can change reality. Discourse, flying from one flower-phenomenon to another, disseminates them, while they transform themselves by the mediation of the process. The cocoon is the Night of the socio-cultural consciousness. We cannot say the discourse is good or despicable – it simply exists. This is the discourse of Spirit. This is reality.

Take an example I have borrowed from Cabrera's article, opening with the question: How did it come that women started to demand openly the end of their subordination, creation of their own rights, etc.? Again – there's no magic, magic is just what our fantasy does with intuition, but here we have something else. The answer of why did women, country after country, started to fight for their rights and equality with men is that the discourse changed. Institutionalized principles that kept women by the kitchenet slowly turned into a language of oppression. What else could this be than Hegel's figure of Spirit that he exemplifies in the particular moments of Spirit as the Greek ethical life in Antigone's case, through the meaninglessness of individual life in the figure of terror, to the transmutation of the human into the God in religious community or spirit.

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

## III.2 The Journey There and Back Again

As I recalled in the beginning of this work, there always comes the moment, at least in *Hobbit* and the *Phenomenology*, that we have to turn back and march to the beginning in order to understand the ending in full. With these last chapters I am going to focus on the concluding passages from the *Phenomenology* once again, and make some final remarks on the subject of this work as such.

### III.2.1 Porticula mundi

Recollection is the taming of representations; language is to think that we have them on a leash. These are our diminutive struggles taking place every second of our diminutive lives. However, how come that these become sound within the entire Spirit's historical narrative? It is only then when we count them from within the choir of intersubjective relations. One of the examples of individual meaning broadly communicated within a community is the work of art. A work of art can be counted as means of historicization; means of displaying the individual's life on the great screen of absolute Spirit.<sup>133</sup> In Nuzzo's interpretation, what sustains within world history are not individuals but individual narratives in which the personal is suppressed in order to gain the universal meaning from them. This is why Churchill's memoirs are conceptualized as stories of world history as such. In other words, personal history only makes sense for Hegel once integrated into the great histories of the Spirit.<sup>134</sup> Therefore, the great stories of history are always already dialectical stories of personal and collective memory (and forgetting); not only the rigorous historiographical ones, but also the works of literature or fine arts.

Work of art is more than the ethical life and actuality of that people, for it is the *inwardizing-recollecting* of the spirit within them that was still *alienated* – it is the spirit of the tragic fate that collects all those individual gods and attributes of the substance into the *one* pantheon, into the self-conscious spirit conscious of itself as spirit. (PS: 2010, §753/667)

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<sup>133</sup> Ricci: 2013, pp. 151-152.

<sup>134</sup> Nuzzo: 2012, p. 159.

Hegel, step by step, builds the great edifice of recollection as the central space in which the Spirit acknowledges Itself. This edifice is partly the great gallery of artworks which never give us that which actually modelled the emerging work of art. Rather it shows (as language shows its rules rather than denominates them) “the veiled remembrance of this actuality” [die eingehüllte Erinnerung dieser Wirklichkeit] (PS: 2010, §753/666) out of which we can recognize the formerly living elements as dead, either as languages, history, etc.; and as dead we only approach them externally, from the great distance of subject experiencing object, “merely to represent them as they were within themselves” (PS: 2010, §753/666). In other words, the artwork is a great tool of historicization because it already approaches any kind of subject (as *Gegenstand*) from within this outer space, from the externality that only appertains to the relation of subject and object. The artwork is a work of ultimate distancing, of deadening what has been alive and lived so far. At the same time, the artwork is always a higher stage of modelling actuality; it is more than nature, more than reality as given by natural forces (PS: 2010, §753/667).

In my reading, the work of art is not just a metaphor of the very final section of the *Phenomenology*. It is fundamentally connected to the overall *inwardizing* movement of the Spirit that recollects Its historical figures. Nuzzo, through the words of Toni Morrison giving account of her literary praxis, claims that recollection is insufficient when it comes to the work of art. There is always already imagination needed – an idea not entirely unfamiliar to Hegel’s understanding of recollection and artwork, particularly regarding the recollection of the absolute Spirit.<sup>135</sup>

The cycle of the production of an artwork consists of the self-emptying of the absolute Substance. Now the substance exists as individuality, an individual thing, or, as Hegel puts it, “as the pure language” (PS: 2010, §754/667), i.e. an object of the perceptive mind always-already vanishing. At the same time, the artwork is embodiment – though even at the level of the absolute, not quite absolute, for as we have discussed, memory is a leaky business; and finally, it is “a *representational thought* and the unfurling of this existence into a world which, in the end, pulls itself together into the universality which is likewise the *pure certainty of itself*” (PS: 2010, §754/667). The final pulling itself together into the universality of pure certainty is already the act of *Entäußerung* of the absolute Spirit, or Its first steps into a new era, new figure,

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<sup>135</sup> Nuzzo: 2012, p. 160.

after recollecting the previous ones, as I understand it.<sup>136</sup> I am connecting this passage with the final passage of the *Phenomenology*, in which the individual works of art are the spirits and the figures of the Spirit, i.e. each spirit as specific community of certain character and size, and the particular eras of the Spirit's history. At the end of the recollection, or the *porticula*, the Spirit, in this Night of Itself, remains conscious of Itself, and as such enters another great hall of Its always-already unfolding history (PS: 2010, §808/719). Entering the next great hall, and thus the creation of *another* history as such, the absolute Spirit coming to be, is accompanied by the imaginative act, or the act of recollection itself. For recollection, after all, is an act of positing representations, and this positing is the act of imagination. The production of the individual work of art only differs in the addressee of the unfolding – the work of art unfolds itself for the others, while the absolute Spirit does for Itself as both Itself and the Other.

Overall, the idea of the production of the work of art is itself a movement of the freeing of the spirit, and then binding itself again to the matter in its immediacy of pure sense-certainty. This is the process of creating and apprehending the work of art. And that is the way the Spirit unfolds Itself in front of Itself – as a Gallery of fine art products. The products of fine arts, and especially the products of literary narratives, or perhaps any kind of individualized narratives, are, thus, the creative element of recollection, the imaginative element, that together with apprehending Itself (the world Spirit) in its pure spatio-temporal Being *is* the truth of the absolute Spirit.<sup>137</sup> History is a product *of* and *for* the Spirit, the history imagined. The absolute Spirit *in-Itself* is the sequence of events, or figures of the Spirit, and this imaginative act of recollection.

### III.2.2 Showing Instead of Saying; The Chief Function of Absolute Memory

“In fact, only the absolute Memory that (animated by the imagination) gives life to the literary work can say what is otherwise utterly inexpressible; only the artwork can find the words to

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<sup>136</sup> The quoted passage continues: “These forms, and, on the other side of the coin, the world of the legal person and legal right, the devastating savagery of the content's elements cast out into free-standing status, as well as both the legal person of stoicism as it has been thought and the untenable disquiet of scepticism: All of these forms constitute the periphery of those shapes, which, expectantly and with urgency, stand around the birthplace of spirit becoming self-consciousness, and they have as their focal point the all-permeating pain and yearning of the unhappy self-consciousness and the communal birth pangs of its emergence, – the simplicity of the pure concept, which contains those shapes as its moments” (PS: 2010, §754/667-668).

<sup>137</sup> Nuzzo discusses this principle in the example of a literary work of art; Nuzzo: 2012, p. 160.

say what no human language can say, namely, ‘la demolizione di un uomo,’” says Nuzzo about the literary testimony of *Se questo è un uomo* by Primo Levi. The ultimate value of the work of art is in its capability of *showing* things rather than saying things. Language, as has been argued, is limited by that what cannot be said, namely its logical and dialectical structure. Whenever we say something, we always already apply these dialectics, and thus, we can rather successfully show them than speak them. The unspeakable is the truth of the spirit, that which is shown rather than said, for truth is a leaky business too, as I have explained. There, the work of art and the business of memory falls into a special kind of communication, or language, that silently speaks the unspeakable.

Finally, we shall take to account the fact that absolute Memory is a multidirectional memory.<sup>138</sup> It concerns both the diachronic and the synchronic moment of the historical figures of the Spirit, and all the particular spirits as communities or cultures therein. As Nuzzo formulates it:

...the systematic sequence of moments and the diachronic sequence of figures – become a net of correspondences, which constitutes the totality of spirit (finally, in the last chapter of the *Phenomenology*, the net becomes a circle). History is no longer a line proceeding in a temporal succession, but an interwoven net of multiple memories. On the other hand, history brings to light the duplicity of dialectic memory: memory is retroactive and prospective, is the movement into the depths of spirit (*Er-Innerung*) and is radical exteriorization or alienation (*Entäußerung*); memory is the intertwining of time and the concept, repetition and erasure of time in the concept, realization, and alienation of the concept in time.<sup>139</sup>

Memory is, thus, a center around which the Spirit shapes itself in its particular forms and moments, futures, and pasts. In the peristaltic movement of *Erinnerung* and *Entäußerung*, the absolute Spirit is complementing and simultaneously emerging again and again. The *Entäußerung* is the newly emerging discourse, the joint holding together the past and the future dimensions of absolute Memory.

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<sup>138</sup> A term inspired by Michael Rothberg in “From Gaza to Warsaw: Mapping Multidirectional Memory,” in *Criticism*, Vol. 53, No. 4, Issue “Transcultural Negotiations of Holocaust Memory”: 2011, pp. 523-548.

<sup>139</sup> Nuzzo: 2012, p. 40.

## Some Concluding Remarks

To end this attempt to point out Hegel's incredible contemporary impact, for which, it is, also at present, worth genuinely celebrating – though, such zeal at times stemmed from other feelings than simple admiration –<sup>140</sup> the Birthday of someone who is nearly a hundred and ninety years dead and gone (and yet so annoyingly present). And, still, one who has something to say about the world environmental crisis?<sup>141</sup> I have tried to show how broadly discussed Hegel is today, not only by the analytic tradition, Žižek, new materialists, new cultural historians – not to mention contemporary presidents of France...<sup>142</sup> but also indirectly by literati, artists, scientists, and common people. Hegel is capable of very spontaneously raising the feeling that one is an important part of something bigger. It is not perhaps the absolute Spirit Itself, but each particular spirit as community or society, under which each and every one fights their own petite struggles, nevertheless, as Hegel shows, of such unsuspected relevance. This relevance, I have tried to argue, is especially sound when it comes to language and memory.

Throughout this entire work, the relationship between *Wirklichkeit* and language was broadly discussed and examined with regard to the notion that Hegel's language is on the level of spirit similar to the modern concept of discourse, i.e. a web of interrelated meaningful contents. Language was first interrogated in its relation to the real as actual [*Wirklichkeit*], and it was said that they share in a fundamental way the logical structure that rather shows itself dialectically than expressing themselves directly. As the dog or granny examples have performed, materiality in its objective truthfulness, or its logical structure, corresponds to the logic of thinking, and thus the existence of language is possible. In these terms, language is a kind of objective thinking that also integrates the subjective side of reality, and thus *speaks for* the real in the most truthful way. Though language uses universals (words or signs) as its means

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<sup>140</sup> See the video that became viral: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vS2i\\_bRDOR0&feature=emb\\_title](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vS2i_bRDOR0&feature=emb_title).

<sup>141</sup> Philip Oltermann, "Germany finds it hard to love Hegel 250 years after his birth," in *The Guardian*, August 27, 2020. Accessed from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/27/germany-finds-it-hard-to-love-hegel-250-years-after-his-birth>.

<sup>142</sup> Emmanuel Macron, "We Need to Develop Political Heroism," by Klaus Brinkbäumer, Julia Amalia Heyer and Britta Sandberg, in *Der Spiegel*, October 13, 2017. Accessed from <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-french-president-emmanuel-macron-a-1172745.html>.

of operation, it is capable of expressing both subjectivity itself (hence my free will), and objectively true matters of facts – thus tightly connected to matter as such.

Next, we moved on to the topic of language as the meaning-bearer which brings the content of the yet-empty names in memory [Gedächtnis]; as *names* [Namen] dwell in memory as its empty content – or the night of the self. The bridge between language and memory is thinking; and it is one of the most complex edifices to comprehend even for Hegel.

Language is the externalization of the spirit itself; memory is the interiorization of it. Moreover, language is a free operator which *actually does* something, creates something, changes the real when being used. It is a free actor, or we are free actors performing the actual [Wirklich], i.e. co-creating it in this strong sense.

What I have only touched upon is the entire beginning of the *Phenomenology*, in which it is argued that without language we would not be able to posit a thing as a particular object consisting of a manifold of universal qualities we are able to ascribe to it. And much more: we would not have been able to evolve without it. Language is an ultimate necessity to begin the entire *Bildung* of the Spirit, and hence its development to freedom, which in the *Phenomenology* marks the very beginning of the history of the Spirit, and each individual spirit, too. It is in language that we modify reality, we co-create it. It is in language that things become truly meaningful for us – as we learn in the last part of the *Encyclopaedia*, where a direct path is laid out from language and thinking, through right and morality, to the civil society and state. If Spirit is a bone, as we have said, then language is the joints enabling the Spirit to bend its limbs, which means nothing less than the Spirit's ability to self-develop. Without joints we would not have been able to live – not alone and not together. Imagine the harsh – and, to a great extent, peculiar! – consequences of taking this metaphor literally. We would have ended like scarecrows in the fields; this is exactly the apocalypse Žižek has in mind – though his zombies are computers, or computers with limbs at least; the important point is that we would not be able to think. Anyway, as we have said – the Turing test would not suffice in this case.

This is also one of the reasons why Hegel's speculative method is as much concerned with whole(s) as with particulars; and by particulars, I mean reality grasped in particular reflections of the subject:

Reflection placed at the service of reason is the basis of speculation. Hegel must take up reflection and absorb it into speculation, thus passing beyond it. The fundamental

point on which the *Phenomenology* turns is Hegel's claim that *substance* becomes *subject*. He says: "everything turns on grasping and expressing the true, not only as *substance*, but equally as *subject*" (§7).<sup>143</sup>

Language is birthed from the speculative empiricism of the *Phenomenology*. But at the same time, we might say, speculative empiricism is founded on language, on the principle of language, on the fact that language is the beginning of life itself. In Part I, I argue that as the actual [das Wirklich] is co-created by the spirit's free will, language shall count as a direct participant in what this actual is and how it is shaped. Language is the *acteur* of the world historical plot as discourse.

In "The Logic of Speaking" and "The Rolling Signs" sections of Part I, I have discussed the issue of the interconnection between language and materiality. On this account I tried to argue that the sign [das Zeichen] is the principle that entangles the word uttered with the material thing, while the possibility of such an entanglement is only possible thanks to their shared structure disclosed in thinking or intelligence. The structure is at the same time something that cannot be disclosed openly within the self-expression of the subject, or thinking. Signs rule. And we know already, their origin lies in memory as *Gedächtnis* which, as if to the passengers of a flight to some remote destination (as I remember them from the early millennium), provides them with handy little vanity bags, i.e. with necessary contents, or meanings (of their humanity). We only can test these contents when we actually use them; we only test the true objectivity of thoughts by transforming them into utterances.

With the brotherhood of language and thought, the motherhood of memory and language, and finally with the result of marriage of being and thought called language, we enter the field of dangerous and fragile relationships that actually turns out partly circular, but not enough to fall into one. So much for Hegel's dialectics, where a little bit of little incest never hurt anybody.

Language and memory are vital for the spirit to acknowledge its world, and to acknowledge itself, and they are more interconnected than we might think at first sight. Memory is like a language recollection, as we have put forward. At the same time, it cannot operate without the names that it encloses being exteriorized [entäußert] in language, i.e. having its

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<sup>143</sup> Donald Phillip Verene, *Hegel's Absolute: An Introduction to Reading the Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. by William Desmond, Suny Series in Hegelian Studies, State University of New York Press: Albany 2007, p. 6.

meaning revealed. This is what the *Gedächtnis* of the *Philosophy of Mind* (memory, or mechanical memory) and the *Phenomenology's Erinnerung* (recollection, or productive memory) have in common, and what I take as the basis of Hegel's consistent account of memory. *Without memory, language would not have been possible – without memory, language would have remained in the blind ostension of pointing at things, or real material objects [Dinge].* Thanks to memory, we are able to perceive and to denominate actual objects, as well as ourselves in their unities. Whereof I remember, thereof I am, and thereof the object is real in the strong sense. Moreover, to remember means to name things.

Hegel balances the mainstream of his times to give primacy to the subject. To act freely we need bones. Hence, only when grasping the material reality as our own, as *heimlich*, which we do through memory and language, are we able to respond to this reality. This also shows how deeply discourse is embedded in materiality, or reality, and how much we too are constituted by this discourse. For we are always already becoming ourselves in language, or the predominant discourse.

In Part III, I have attempted to tackle the problem of history in Hegel from the discourse and memory viewpoint, based primarily on the last paragraphs of the *Phenomenology*. I have suggested understanding history as a history of discourses overruling each other. But history in itself is nothing of the Spirit's creation until memory takes its part. It is memory that reterritorializes the moments of the Spirit, or any kind of spirit, and which, thus, gives it its meaning as content [Bedeutung]. Like memory, truth is neither absolute, as we have observed, but it is actually a leaky business that is dependent on the leakiness of memory as such. This obviously does not go against the thesis that truth is the whole. The whole is just a bit of a shabby stocking. The substance of the whole is – on either the personal, social, or absolute level – spirit's memory. And as history becomes meaningful thanks to the activity of memory, or recollection, it is also – as a work of art, as the product of the Spirit – history imagined.

# List of abbreviations

Works of G. W. F. Hegel:

The works of Hegel in original published within *Werke* in 20 Bänden in Suhrkamp 1969-1986 are marked /B after the abbreviation of the work of Hegel's with the number of the particular Band, e.g. AHW/B5, 558.

Each abbreviation of an English translation is accompanied with the year of publication after a colon, e.g. PS: 2010, §788/700.

- AHW/B2            G.W.F. Hegel, *Aphorismen aus Hegels Wastebook*. *Werke* in 20 Bänden. Ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M. 1969–1986. Band 2.
- EI                 *The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusätze): Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*. Trans. by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.: Indianapolis, Cambridge 1991.
- EI/B8             *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse: Erster Teil, Die Wissenschaft der Logik*. *Werke* in 20 Bänden. Band 8. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M. 1830.
- EIII               *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*. Trans. by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2007.
- EIII/B10         *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse: Dritter Teil, Die Philosophie des Geistes*. *Werke* in 20 Bänden. Band 10. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M. 1830.
- IPH               *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*. Trans. by Leo Rauch. Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis 1988.
- JL                 *Hegel and the Human Spirit: Translation of Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-06) with Commentary*. Trans. by Leo Rauch. Wayne State University Press: Detroit 1983.
- JS                 *Jenaer Systementwürfe I*. Felix Meiner: Hamburg 1986.

- LHPHIII: *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Vol. III. Trans. by E. S. Haldane & Frances H. Simons, M.A. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.: London 1955. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/58169/58169-h/58169-h.htm>.
- LPHIII: *Lectures on the History of Philosophy: The Lectures of 1825-1826*. Vol. III. Edited by Robert F. Brown. Trans. by R. F. Brown, J. M. Stewart, and H. S. Harris. University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford 1990.
- LPS *Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-8*. Trans. by Robert. R. Williams. Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York 2007.
- PG/B3 *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Werke in 20 Bänden. Band 3. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M. 1832-1845.
- PR *Philosophy of Right*. Trans. by S.W Dyde. Batoche Books: Kitchener 2001.
- PS *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. by Terry Pinkard. 2010.
- Rede zum Schuljahrsabschluss*. Secura GmbH: Cologne 2008. <https://books.google.cz/books?id=qXSrBA00hPoC&printsec=frontcover&hl=cs#v=onepage&q&f=false>.
- SL *Science of Logic*. Blackmask Online: 2001. <http://www.blackmask.com>. *The Science of Logic*. Ed. and transl. by George di Giovanni. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2010.
- WL *Wissenschaft der Logik I: Erster Teil, Die objektive Logik Erstes Buch*. Werke in 20 Bänden. Band 5. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M. 1832-1845.

Works of L. Wittgenstein:

- PI *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Eds. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Blackwell Publishing Ltd: Chichester, UK 2009.
- TLP *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. Routledge: London, New York, 2001.

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