

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Political Studies
Department of Political Science

Dissertation Thesis

2020

Abderahman Salaheldin

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Political Studies
Department of Political Science

Abderahman Salaheldin

**Egyptian foreign policy and the Arab Spring:
A Case study of Egyptian policy before and after Arab
Spring towards Turkey and Palestine**

PhD Dissertation Thesis

Prague 2020

Author: **Abderahman Salaheldin**

Supervisor: **Mgr. Martin Riegl, Ph.D.**

Year of the defense: 2020

References

SALAHELDIN, Abderahman. *Egyptian foreign policy and the "Arab spring": A Case study of Egyptian policy before and after Arab Spring toward Turkey and Palestine*. Praha, 2019. 127 pages. Dissertation thesis (PhD.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies, Department of Political Science. Supervisor Mgr. Martin Riegl, Ph.D.

Abstract

The main focus of the dissertation is to examine the interactions between Egyptian foreign policy and the domestic, regional and international dramatic changes that shaped the environment in which that foreign policy was made and operated during the Arab Spring in Egypt from January 2011 to June 2013. The goal is to explore whether domestic, regional and international changes during the Arab Spring had resulted in a substantial change of Egyptian foreign policy in those three years regarding most foreign policy issues especially toward Turkey and Palestine.

The dissertation's analysis, while rather qualitative and inductive in nature, employed the neoclassical realism as its theoretical framework. It allowed the researcher to identify major domestic players and issues such as ideology, strategic culture, political religion and the ability to mobilize national resources and study their impact on the foreign policy decision makers. The researcher concluded that the Egyptian foreign policy made several major changes during the Arab Spring especially toward Turkey and Palestine/Israel. These changes were due to domestic and regional variables more than to international systemic order's signals. Neoclassical realism proved to be ideal for the researcher's analysis. It helped him easily identify key actors on different levels of analysis, examine their interaction and determine their impact on the Egyptian foreign policy's decision making. The dissertation contains many suggestions to further develop the theory to deal with some of its shortcomings and to account for other levels of analysis.

Keywords

Egypt–Turkey–Palestine–Israel–Arab Spring–Foreign Policy–Neoclassical Realism

Abstrakt

Hlavním cílem disertační práce je analyzovat interakce mezi egyptskou zahraniční politikou a dramatickými změnami na domácí, regionální a mezinárodní úrovni, které utvářely prostředí, ve kterém byla tato zahraniční politika formulována a implementována v období během arabského jara od ledna 2011 do června 2013.

Autor se v této práci snaží prozkoumat, zda domácí, regionální a mezinárodní změny v průběhu arabského jara vedly v těchto třech letech k podstatné změně jednotlivých aspektů egyptské zahraniční politiky, a to zejména vůči Turecku a Palestině.

Provedená analýza v předložené disertační práci, ač spíše kvalitativního a induktivního charakteru, je teoreticky ukotvena v neoklasickém realismu. To autorovi umožnilo identifikovat hlavní domácí hráče aktéry a problémy, jako je ideologie, strategická kultura, politické náboženství či schopnost mobilizovat národní zdroje a studovat jejich dopad na tvůrce rozhodnutí v oblasti zahraniční politiky.

Autor dospěl k závěru, že egyptská zahraniční politika prošla během arabského jara několika významnými změnami, zejména vůči Turecku a Palestině / Izraeli. Tyto změny byly způsobeny hlavně signály domácích a regionálních elementů; více než mezinárodním systémovým řádem.

Neoklasický realismus se autorovi jevil jako ideální teoretický rámec pro předložený výzkum. Umožnil snadno identifikovat klíčové aktéry na různých úrovních analýzy, prozkoumat jejich interakci a určit jejich dopad na proces rozhodování o egyptské zahraniční politice. Disertační práce obsahuje řadu návrhů, jak dále rozvíjet teorii, která by se vypořádala s některými jejími nedostatky a zohlednila další úrovně analýzy.

Klíčová slova

Egypt–Turecko–Palestina–Izrael–Arabské jaro–zahraniční politika–neoklasický realismus

Length of the work: 300,000 is the number of characters with spaces (127 pages), without abstract and appendices

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 7 May 2020

Abderahman Salaheldin

Acknowledgement

I would like first to express my special gratitude for my supervisor Mgr. Martin Riegl, Ph.D. and for PhDr. Petr Jüptner, Ph.D. the Director of Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. Without their invaluable support and guidance, I would have not been able to progress in my PhD study or finish this dissertation.

I am also grateful to prof. PhDr. Blanka Řířhová, CSc., RNDr., Jan Kofroň Ph.D. and all the staff members of the Centre for Doctoral Studies. Their valuable advice and help facilitated my study and assisted in overcoming many obstacles.

I would also like to thank my dear friends Dr. Tereza Němečková of the Metropolitan University and Dr. Bohumil Doboř of the Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University for their valuable contribution to improving the text of this dissertation by proofreading it and suggesting very constructive changes.

I am personally indebted to my former secretary at the Egyptian embassy in Prague Ms. Michaela Zeissova for her assistance with typing the initial parts of the manuscript and translating the abstract to Czech.

My wife Dr. Thoraya Elkhadrawy MD provided me with the utmost support and encouragement that enabled me to finish my 40-years-unfulfilled dream of going back to school for a PhD degree in political science. My twin sons Khalid and Waleed, their wives Shireen and Basma, my nephew Mohamed Halawa and my “goddaughter” Dr. Heba Ismail kept cheering me on with every step of progress toward finishing this very challenging project.

This acknowledgment would not be complete without thanking Prof. MUDr. Tomáš Zima, DrSc., MBA, the rector of Charles University in Prague. He was the first to encourage me to study at this great university when I first met him in 2015 to introduce myself as the Egyptian ambassador to the Czech Republic.

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	3
INTRODUCTION	4
1. CHAPTER ONE.....	6
DISSERTATION GOAL, HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS	6
1.1. <i>Dissertation Goal.....</i>	<i>6</i>
1.2. <i>Methodology</i>	<i>8</i>
1.3. <i>Primary Sources.....</i>	<i>10</i>
1.4. <i>Theoretical Framework.....</i>	<i>10</i>
1.5. <i>Hypothesis and Research Questions</i>	<i>12</i>
1.6. <i>Dissertation Structure</i>	<i>13</i>
2. CHAPTER TWO.....	15
NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY AS THE BEST TOOL TO ANALYZE THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE ARAB SPRING.....	15
2.1. <i>The Limits of Structural Realism.....</i>	<i>15</i>
2.2. <i>Elements of An Updated Version of Neoclassical Realism</i>	<i>18</i>
2.3. <i>Why Choosing Neoclassical Realism to Analyze Egyptian Foreign Policy During the Arab Spring</i>	<i>24</i>
3. CHAPTER THREE	32
NARRATIVE AND ANALYSIS.....	32
3.1. <i>The Concept of the Arab Spring.....</i>	<i>32</i>
3.2. <i>The Egyptian Arab Spring.....</i>	<i>36</i>
3.3. <i>Major Egyptian Foreign Policy Issues and Decisions (2011-2013)</i>	<i>39</i>
3.3.1. <i>Relations with Israel.....</i>	<i>40</i>
3.3.2. <i>Relations with the US.....</i>	<i>42</i>
3.3.3. <i>Position on the Arab Spring's Developments in Other Arab Countries</i>	<i>45</i>
3.3.4. <i>Relations with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</i>	<i>47</i>
4. CHAPTER FOUR	51
EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY DURING THE ARAB SPRING	51
4.1. <i>Background.....</i>	<i>51</i>
4.2. <i>Domestic Attitudes in Egypt and Turkey Towards Each Other.....</i>	<i>52</i>
4.3. <i>Regional Powers' Policies Towards Turkey's Approach to the Arab Spring</i>	<i>60</i>
4.4. <i>International Players' Encouragement of the Turkish Model for Arab Spring Countries... ..</i>	<i>67</i>
4.5. <i>Change and Continuity in Egyptian Policy Toward Turkey.....</i>	<i>75</i>
5. CHAPTER FIVE.....	78
EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE ARAB SPRING TOWARD PALESTINE AND ISRAEL	78
5.1. <i>Background.....</i>	<i>78</i>
5.2. <i>Domestic Attitudes in Egypt During the Arab Spring Towards Palestine and Israel</i>	<i>84</i>
5.3. <i>Regional Powers' Policies Towards Egypt's Relations With the Palestinians and Israel... ..</i>	<i>88</i>
5.4. <i>International Players' Encouragement of the Egyptian Role</i>	<i>91</i>
5.5. <i>Change and Continuity in Egyptian Policy towards Palestine</i>	<i>97</i>
6. CHAPTER SIX.....	102
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	102
6.1. <i>The Results of Applying Neoclassical Realism.....</i>	<i>103</i>

6.2.	<i>Proving the Hypothesis and Answering the Research Questions.....</i>	<i>114</i>
6.3.	<i>Recommendations for Future Research to Further Develop the Theory</i>	<i>118</i>
LIST OF REFERENCES.....		123

List of Abbreviations

Central Treaty Organization	(CENTO)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	(COMESA)
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum	(EMGF)
Egyptian Foreign Policy Executives	(EFPE)
European Union	(EU)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	(EBRD)
Freedom and Justice Party	(FJP)
Gulf Cooperation Council	(GCC)
Islamic Resistance Movement (in Arabic Harakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya) (Hamās)	
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	(ISIL)
Justice and Construction Party	(JCP)
Justice and Development Party (in Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)	(AKP)
Maritime Roll-On-Roll-Off	(RORO)
Mediterranean Dialogue	(MD)
Middle East and North Africa region	(MENA)
Middle East Treaty Organization	(METO)
Multinational Force and Observers	(MFO)
Muslim Brotherhood	(MB)
Neoclassical Realism	(NCR)
North Atlantic Organization	(NATO)
Palestine Liberation Organization	(PLO)
Palestine News Agency	(WAFA)
Qualified Industrialized Zones	(QIZ)
Supreme Council of Armed Forces	(SCAF)
Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency	(TIKA)
United Arab Emirates	(UAE)
United Nations' Security Council	(UNSC)
United States of America	(US)

Introduction

The aim of this dissertation is to identify a group of factors with the strongest impact on the Egyptian foreign policy making and implementation during the study period (2011-2013). At the outset, I argue that domestic factors were more dominant than the global environment in influencing the Egyptian Foreign Policy Executives (EFPE) and their policy responses and initiatives. Throughout my research I try to test this hypothesis.

I examine the Egyptian foreign policy during a transitional and turbulent period globally, regionally in the Middle East and domestically in Egypt. The global unipolar dominance of the United States (US) since the dismantling of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s was about to be challenged by the re-emergence of Russia's Putin daring foreign policy and his aggressive foreign interventions. The traditional Middle East was also boiling with ethnic, religious and political conflicts that were exacerbated by domestic political, social and economic discontent. Because of their geographic proximity, common history and cultural affinity, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and to a lesser extent Kuwait were able to influence many Egyptian domestic institutions, media outlets, political parties and groups. They also helped reshaping global reactions to Egyptian policies.

Developments in Egypt were directly impacted by actions and events that had taken place in other parts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. For almost three years people in Tahrir Square were spontaneously responding to news, statements and developments broadcasted to them live through modern technologies including social networks. EFPE were also very eager to satisfy what they perceived as rising popular demands. Sensing, initially, that Islamists would politically prevail, EFPE promised radical changes in foreign policy. These changes, however, needed to wait until the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) came to power in 2012. When starting to inch toward implementing these changes, they provoked regional and international responses that helped bringing MB's reign to an early end as the Brotherhood's government also lost domestic support and legitimacy.

Neoclassical realism provides me with the proper theoretical tool for analyzing the impact of international, regional and domestic variables on the perceptions of Egyptian leaders, their foreign policy decision making process and its policy-implementation. Throughout my dissertation, I test the accuracy of my hypothesis that the government leaders in Egypt

under three different political regimes from 2011 to 2013 were responding to their regional allies, domestic public demands, limited resources and national strategic culture more than they did to international systemic pressures.

Beyond testing my hypothesis, I also try to answer few initial research questions:

- Did the Arab Spring's domestic, regional and international changes have resulted in a substantial change of the Egyptian foreign policy regarding most issues especially toward Turkey and Palestine?
- Did political Islamists tried to force their own foreign policy's agenda during the Arab Spring? Like their policies failure on the domestic level, have they achieved very little regionally and internationally?
- How important was public opinion – for the formulation of the Egyptian foreign policy – during the Arab Spring? How did powerful domestic institutions such as the military respond to public opinion's expressed preferences?
- To what extent did the regional and international „anarchic“ variables during the Arab Spring impact the EFPE perceptions and ability to extract national resources to implement their intended foreign policy?

This dissertation is mainly descriptive and qualitative. In light of the above-mentioned research results, the dissertation could be used by future neoclassical realism researchers to further develop the theory to fit dealing with small states, regional influence and policy feedback.

The dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter describes its goal, methodology, hypothesis, research questions and structure. The second chapter deals with neoclassical realist theory as the best tool to analyze the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring. After making the case for my choice of theoretical approach, the third chapter develops a detailed new narrative of developments during my study's time period. It also applies the neoclassical realism's tools to analyze that narrative. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with my two case studies of analyzing the Egyptian foreign policy toward Turkey and Palestine during the Arab Spring. The sixth and last chapter will test my hypothesis, draw research conclusions and suggest areas for future research.

1. Chapter One

Dissertation Goal, Hypothesis and Research Questions

1.1. Dissertation Goal

The main goal of the dissertation is to examine the interactions between the Egyptian foreign policy and the domestic, regional and international dramatic changes that shaped the environment in which that foreign policy was made and operated during the Arab Spring in Egypt (January 2011 – June 2013). I aspire to find out whether domestic, regional and international changes have resulted in a substantial change of the Egyptian foreign policy in those three years regarding most foreign policy issues especially toward Turkey and Palestine. There are many indications that lead us to answer in the affirmative. However, more rigorous research is still needed to find out which of these three levels of change was more influential and also explore the constancy and strategic aspects of the Egyptian foreign policy during the study period. I am also going to briefly review earlier periods only for the sake of tracking down the main institutional and political elements that impacted foreign policy in the Egyptian society and international geopolitical changes that led to create the Egyptian foreign policy's immediate environment.

More than any country in the world, Egyptians cannot afford to live in isolation. They cannot also be left alone to mind their own business. They are in the middle of the three old continents and in control of major international waterways and crossings adjacent to a very valuable strategic region. Egypt is also totally dependent on sources of life that emanates outside of its borders (The Nile River) (Goldschmidt, 2008). The Egyptian regional pivotal role has also been a tradition of the Egyptian foreign policy throughout history especially since medieval times. Even under Ottoman rule, the Egyptian governor Mohamed Ali and his offspring were given special independent status and the title of Khedive, which comes only next in precedence to the Ottoman Sultan. When the Ottomans needed to discipline the Saudi ruling family and their Wahhabi allies in the Arab Peninsula, they turned to Egypt for help (Winter, 1992). Before getting its full political independence from British colonization, the Egyptian king Farouk hosted the first meeting of the Arab League that chose Cairo to be its headquarters. Major efforts of war and peace in the Middle East witnessed Egyptian vital contributions.

The regional and international environment of the Egyptian foreign policy since the establishment of the first republic in 1953 was not a constant, however. Very few countries in that region were independent in the 1950s. Oil was not yet openly valued as a strategic commodity. The two superpowers were engaged in a heated Cold War competition over this strategically vital and conflict-torn turbulent region. The United States was stretching muscles to replace traditional colonial powers' areas of domination in the Middle East and other adjacent regions (Satloff, 2017). Using Arab nationalism and playing on the superpower rivalry, the former Egyptian President Gamal Abd El Nasser was able to reinforce and maintain that traditional central Egyptian regional role in the 1950s and 1960s. His successor, former president Anwar Sadat made a strategic shift in the 1970s when he allied his country with the USA, privatized the economy, made peace with Israel and tried to exploit the "Political Islam" card domestically and overseas. This last tool backfired and got him killed by the same Jihadist militants he sent to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union occupation with the United States backing and Saudi funding (Lewis, 1992).

In the 1980s, 1990s and early twenty first century, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak tried to avoid both Nasser's and Sadat's mistakes by simply not introducing any major changes in the Egyptian foreign and domestic policies. This has sustained him in power for 30 years. The last decade of Mubarak's era witnessed a decay in the regional and international influence of Egypt and a domestic dispute over the president's son plans to succeed his aging father (Adly, 2014).

The popular revolt that was supported by the military in early 2011 did not stop at preempting Mubarak's plans for his son to succeed him but also forced President Mubarak to step down. It empowered both the military and popular movements which were, except for the political Islamists, not organized. The Arab Spring's turmoil in Egypt created a vacuum of political power, chaotic security situation and unlimited high expectations of moving to a better, more equitable and more democratic political and social system. The titanic changes extended its impact beyond the Egyptian borders and influenced the whole Middle East (King , 2020). Global and regional powers tried to steer the changes to serve their interests. Fluidity and unpredictability were the name of the game both within Egypt and region wide. The Arab Spring upheaval also coincided with the transition in the global

order from a unipolar, the United States dominated world order to a multipolar one (Bellin, 2012).

My dissertation focuses on what has changed inside and outside Egypt during early 21st century that made change inevitable and to what extent did the change impacted its foreign policy specially toward my two case studies: Turkey and Palestine / Israel.

I try to briefly cover the following aspects of the Egyptian foreign policy before going into a deeper analysis of how they interacted to produce changes (or continuity) in that policy during the three years under study (2011-2013):

- Decision making mechanism
- Regional and international environment affecting the Egyptian foreign policy
- Geopolitical impact of the Egyptian foreign policy on its regional and global environment.

1.2. Methodology

This dissertation is based on qualitative research methods – specifically on careful and detailed case studies. As the title indicates I also use a comparative method in order to analyze how Egypt approached two different countries - Turkey and Palestine/Israel during the period 2011-2013. Thus, the dissertation also compares the situation before the Arab Spring and after that upheaval.

The employment of case studies research methodology is warranted for two reasons. Firstly, given the fact that the thesis focuses on a novel event, it is vital to provide a thorough description not only of the key events, but especially of motives of key agents, and of broader structures limiting choices of these agents (the word structures here refers to those within society and at the regional and international level). In similar cases it is logical to focus closely on a given case and selected analytical levels. Secondly, this dissertation aims at providing a case-oriented explanation, not at providing a general theory. Thus, internal validity (strength of qualitative studies) is of greater concern than external validity. Qualitative methods are naturally enhanced when sufficient data and case specific knowledge is accessible (APSA, 2013).

To be able to provide a profound analysis of foreign policy denominators, it is necessary to build a descriptive base. While descriptive argument has been undervalued in some schools of political science, it is in fact the cornerstone of any further analysis, especially if the required information is not already available in structured forms (Gerring, 2012 p. 35). Thus, descriptive method will also be applied in order to draw a detailed picture of key decision-making elements. Nevertheless, this description will try to prepare the ground for the following theoretical analysis using Neoclassical Realism's tools.

A logical question remains why Egypt has been selected as a country for detailed analysis. There are two key reasons for this choice: (I) Egypt is among major powers in the region. Egyptian relations with Turkey and Palestine represent intrinsically significant issues to most Egyptians, Middle Easterners and the rest of the world (Davutoglu, 2010) (II) given that the author of this study speaks Arabic as his mother tongue and that he has been a close witness to, and participant in, political events in Middle East, he hopes that he will be able to better gather and analyze needed information than any researcher who is not familiar with the subject-matter.

It should be mentioned here that the author also served during the period 2010 to 2013 as the Ambassador of Egypt to Turkey. He recently published, in Arabic, his memoirs about this very interesting time for the relations between the two countries (Salaheldin, 2019). For two years before and after that period, he occupied the post of Egyptian Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs. He conducted most of his research for this study at Charles University while serving as the Egyptian Ambassador to the Czech Republic in Prague. Since July 2018, he retired his diplomatic career and devoted all his time to academic research, writing and lecturing.

The researcher tried his best, in this dissertation, to make the best use of his deep and wide knowledge of the study subject and time period without being influenced by the bias of his country's official position. Needless to say, that all views and conclusions he reached in this study are his own and do not reflect the official policy of the Egyptian Government.

1.3. Primary Sources

For official Egyptian statements and documents, the researcher mainly consulted the Egyptian daily newspapers: Al Masry Al Youm (Almasry-Alyoum) and Al Ahram (Al-Ahram). The English websites of the Turkish Anadolu News Agency (Anadolu-News, 2011-2013) and Hürriyet Daily News: (Hurriyet) were used for documenting Turkish positions on the Arab Spring developments specially in Egypt. For official Palestinian perspective, the English website of the Palestinian News Agency Wafa (Wafa) is used. Aljazeera.net is the main source for the Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (in Arabic Harakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya) or Hamas and other political Islamists views as that Qatari TV broadcast channel has always been known for supporting all such factions of Political Islam.

The researcher refers to the chronicle of domestic events of the revolution created by M. Cherif Bassiouni and posted on his website under Egypt Updates and later compiled in a book (Bassiouni, 2016). The web site “Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide” (Cornell, 2015) by Cornell University’s Library proved to be very useful in referring the researcher to many websites which thoroughly documented the Arab Spring’s developments and international reactions to it.

All the dissertation sources are going to be public and published sources with heavy reliance on primary sources for the most recent period under examination. Occasionally, the researcher needed some clarification through citing personal interviews with decision makers or his own personal observations. All the views that author would express throughout this research are his and do not represent the Egyptian Government’s official policy.

1.4. Theoretical Framework

This dissertation while rather inductive in nature, employs neoclassical realism as outlined in Ripsman et al. as its theoretical framework (Ripsman, et al., 2016). Selection of this particular theory was made for three reasons. Firstly, unlike its structural predecessor (structural realism), this theory is explicitly focused on the formation of

foreign policy. Further, the theory tries to combine into its framework both internal and external structures.

Finally, the theory is based on the assumption that while there is objective reality (in the form of a set of threats and opportunities), politicians however (i) might misread this reality because of their ideological mindset or lack of rationality, or (ii) might be unable to react appropriately to these threats and opportunities because of domestic structures and limitations (Lobell , et al., 2009). In sum it seems that neoclassical realism is able to provide adequate theoretical base for structuring the narrative of the thesis and for analyzing the scope of this research and its different dimensions.

I am also going to look into interactions between the immediate regional and international environment and the domestic social and political elements that impact the foreign policy elite decisions. I chose the neoclassical realism approach because it also allows me to identify major domestic issues such as ideology, nationalism, political religion and cultural affinity and study their impact on the foreign policy decision makers. These are all elements that could not be analyzed or even accounted for using some realist approaches or Marxist tools (Dalacoura, 2012).

As the founders of the neoclassical realism explain, it recognizes the importance of competitive domestic pressures in shaping the foreign policy of any specific country. The Arab Spring years of upheaval witnessed a proliferation of those domestic processes of interaction that produced the Egyptian foreign policy during the 3 years under study (2011-2013).

I will not try to identify which domestic factor played the most dominant role in shaping any foreign policy decisions. However, I will do my best to try to outline those combinations of factors or elements that influenced major trends of the Egyptian foreign policy at that time, especially where there was a departure from traditional Egyptian foreign policy positions before 2011. I would also try to examine the limits and restrictions imposed by the Arab Spring developments within Egypt, and the region at large, on the ability of the Egyptian foreign policy elite to extract and mobilize national and regional resources to implement its preferred (intended) foreign policy goals and options.

Because of the strategic importance of Egypt and its enormous regional influence, I would also need to examine the influence of other important regional players such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey on the formation of the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring. Due attention will be given to the fact that the popular revolt resulted in diminishing the ability of the Egyptian state to contain such foreign influence especially when it came from regional (brothers) who have affiliates within the Egyptian society itself. Countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar had very high stakes in the political struggle that was inflamed in Egypt during the study period. Each of these countries tried in its own way to influence the outcome of that struggle within Egypt (Steinberg, 2014).

The Obama's United States was also starting to develop a non-interventionist approach toward Middle East problems while Russia under Putin saw in the Arab Spring a direct threat to its own national security which required a more active engagement (Simon, et al., 2015). Globally, we were witnessing another transition from a unipolar order that lasted since 1990s back to a bipolar or a multipolar system. Fluidity and uncertainty blurred the borders between what was domestic in Egypt, regional in the Middle East and global at that time of transition on all the three levels of interaction.

1.5. Hypothesis and Research Questions

Throughout my dissertation, I will be testing the accuracy of my hypothesis that the government leaders in Egypt under three different political regimes from 2011 to 2013 were responding to their regional allies, domestic public demands, limited resources and strategic culture more than they did to international systemic pressures.

Beyond testing my hypothesis, I will also aim at answering few initial research questions:

- Is it possible to claim that the Arab Spring's domestic, regional and international changes have resulted in a substantial change of Egyptian foreign policy regarding most issues especially toward Turkey and Palestine?
- How much evidence can be found for arguing that political Islamists forced their own foreign policy's agenda during the Arab Spring? Like their policies failure on the domestic level, have they achieved very little regionally and internationally?

- How important was public opinion for the formulation of Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring? How did powerful domestic institutions such as the military respond to public opinion expressed preferences?
- To what extent did the regional and international „anarchic“ variables during the Arab Spring impact the EFPE perceptions and ability to extract national resources to implement their intended foreign policy?

1.6. Dissertation Structure

The first chapter focuses on elaborating the dissertation topic, goal, hypothesis, research questions and structure. It also includes a brief description of theory, methodology, and the primary research sources.

The second chapter shows limits of the most popular theory of international relations of structural realism that made the development of neoclassical realist theory much needed and almost inevitable. Then it presents the most updated version of the neoclassical realist theory as outlined by Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell in their most recent book *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Ripsman, et al., 2016) Finally, it concludes with explaining how can neoclassical realism be applied to analyzing the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring (2011-2013) and why do I believe that it is the optimum tool to deal with the interaction between international, regional and domestic players.

After making the case for my choice of theoretical approach, I develop then in the third chapter a detailed new narrative of developments during my study's time period. It includes domestic developments in Egypt, major regional reactions and global interactions. They will all be chronically organized in the same narrative for analytical purposes. I also include in the same narrative major public pronouncements on the three levels (global, regional and domestic) that influenced the culture and perceptions of the foreign policy elite in Egypt.

I hope that creating this narrative would make it easier for me and for the reader to follow the interaction between the three levels (systemic, dependent and intervening) of analysis as prescribed by the neoclassical realist theory. I aim to identify the main actors in forming Egyptian foreign policy during that period, i.e. who was playing a more dominant role

among institutions such as the Foreign Ministry, the Military, Intelligence Services or the Parliament? What impact does some domestic factors such as public opinion, the Media or the political culture and beliefs of key personalities (President – Foreign Minister – Intelligence Chief)?

Naturally, this narrative is going to be influenced by my own views of recent history that I personally lived as an Egyptian, diplomatic practitioner and a member of the foreign policy decision-making elite. However, I will try as best as I can to make my narrative inclusive of others' views, balanced and objective. This third chapter will also deal with applying the neoclassical realism tools to analyze that narrative. It should elaborate on all three levels of variables and their interaction. It conclude with some assessment of the different weight of influence of each category of variables.

The fourth and fifth chapters deal with my two case studies and apply my conclusions to the Egyptian foreign policy toward Turkey and Palestine during the Arab Spring. I try to track down aspects of continuity or change of the Egyptian policy toward these two important countries in the Middle East. In both chapters, four and five, I examine the leaders' perceptions, public opinion attitudes, Turkish, Israeli and Palestinian actions and policies and major regional and international actors' influence. I also try to apply neoclassical realism parameters on these variables.

The last (sixth) chapter deals with testing my hypothesis, answering my initial research questions, drawing my research conclusions and suggesting areas for future research. I try to cover the following points:

- Determining dominant players
- Identifying strategic constants
- Domestic and foreign variables impact
- Comparing results gained from the case with broader theoretical arguments
- Identifying trends or future models

2. Chapter Two

Neoclassical Realist Theory as The Best Tool To Analyze The Egyptian Foreign Policy During The Arab Spring

This chapter shows the limits of the most popular theory of international relations of structural realism that made the development of neoclassical realist theory much needed and almost inevitable. It presents then the most updated version of the neoclassical realist theory as outlined by Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell in their most recent book *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Ripsman, et al., 2016). Finally, it concludes with explaining how can neoclassical realism be applied to analyzing the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring (2011-2013) and why it can be considered as the optimum tool to deal with the interaction between international, regional and domestic players.

2.1. The Limits of Structural Realism

Realist theories take only into account systematic (anarchic) international actions. While government, decision making and foreign policy theories research only the domestic processes and deal mainly with intervening perceptions and culture (Mearsheimer, 2006). On the other hand, neoclassical realist theory deals with the interaction between all those three levels to produce foreign policy executive policy responses, initiatives and feedback (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among themselves for power. It is based on five assumptions. „The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics, and they operate in an anarchic system. The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. The fourth assumption is that the main goal of states is survival. The fifth assumption is that

states are rational actors.“ (Mearsheimer, 2006). John J. Mearsheimer, a strong and authoritative advocate of structural realism, admits that at least defensive realism is not adequate, by itself, to explain states' behavior when they try sometimes in an irrational way to secure more power. Therefore, he believes that analysts need to complement it with some foreign policy theories (Mearsheimer, 2006).

I would like to develop this critique further by arguing that especially in medium size states' case and when they are operating in a volatile domestic and international environment, chances are, they would often act in an irrational way. Their decision makers are sometimes more concerned with preserving the state's existence, territorial integrity or national unity. This is also sometimes true in the case of superpowers. How can we explain the US President's Kennedy management of the Cuban Missiles Crisis if we would ignore the US domestic variables at the time?

I would dare to argue that both defensive and offensive realism by themselves can only serve for advocating a specific foreign policy or ideology rather than analyzing, explaining or predicting states behavior in the realm of international relations. This is especially true when we deal with medium size states such as Egypt, Turkey or Israel. This opinion was also agreed to by some of the forefathers of neoclassical realism (Steven, et al., 2009). Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell believe that there are four more analytical problems with the external determinism of the structural realist theory.

The first problem deals with perception and misperception. They argue that „if leaders' perceptions of systematic constraints diverge from reality, international politics would be, at best, incomplete, as the sources of a state's behavior may lie less in the external environment than its leaders' psychological makeup“ (Ripsman, et al., 2016 p. 22).

The second problem in their minds deals with the clarity of systematic signals. They claim that „if the international system only rarely provides clear enough information to states to guide their policy responses, then a broad range of foreign policy choices and international political outcomes must lie outside the preview of a structural theory of international politics.“ (Ripsman, et al., 2016 p. 20).

The third set of problems relates to rationality of decision makers. The authors assert that “neoclassical realists note that leaders do not always respond rationally to systematic stimuli even if they correctly perceive the threats and incentives of the international system.“ They conclude that this irrationality is „problematic for purely structural theories which require states to respond to international imperatives in a rather automatic fashion, selecting the most appropriate policy response to meet external conditions.” (Ripsman, et al., 2016 p. 23).

The fourth and last problem deals with the need to mobilize state resources. Structural realism assumes that states are rational, responsive to accurate perceptions and functionally similar. The authors believe however that „not all states have the ability to direct policy on their own when faced with opposition from powerful domestic interest groups and societal veto players in the legislature and elsewhere.“ (Ripsman, et al., 2016 p. 24).

Kitchen adds another shortage of structural realism related to its lack of interest in the role of ideas at the unit (domestic) level. He suggests that a grand strategy formation explains why states choose to act in ways which structural realism would not expect. Neoclassical realism, Kitchen believes, has the potential to defuse a number of key areas of conflict in the study of international relations (Kitchen, 2010).

Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell tried to summarize the relationship between neorealism and neoclassical realism. „Both schools begin with assumptions about the conflictual nature of politics, the centrality of conflict groups, and the importance of relative power distributions. Both research programs assign causal primacy to systemic independent variables. Specific neorealist and neoclassical realist theories, in turn, generate testable and probabilistic hypotheses.

It is clear, however, that neorealism and neoclassical realism differ from each other based on the range of phenomena each seeks to explain, or the dependent variable. The former seeks to explain recurring patterns of international outcomes, defined as the range of likely outcomes resulting from the interaction of two or more units in an anarchic environment. Examples would be the likelihood of major war across different types of international systems, the prevalence of hegemonic orders versus balances of power (defined in terms

of state capabilities), and patterns of alliance behavior among states.” (Steven, et al., 2009 p. 19). Table 1 illustrates the areas of convergence and divergence among classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism.

Table 1 – Classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism

Research program	Epistemology and methodology	View of the international system	View of the units	Dependent variable	Underlying causal logic
CLASSICAL REALISM	Inductive theories; philosophical reflection on nature of politics or detailed historical analysis (generally drawn from W. European history)	Somewhat important	Differentiated	Foreign policies of states	Power distributions or distribution of interests (revisionist vs. status quo) → foreign policy
NEOREALISM	Deductive theories; competitive hypothesis testing using qualitative and sometimes quantitative methods	Very important; inherently competitive and uncertain	Undifferentiated	International political outcomes	Relative power distributions (independent variable) → international outcomes (dependent variable)
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM	Deductive theorizing; competitive hypothesis testing using qualitative methods	Important; implications of anarchy are variable and sometimes opaque to decision-makers	Differentiated	Foreign policies of states	Relative power distributions (independent variable) → domestic constraints and elite perceptions (intervening variables) → foreign policy (dependent variable)

Source: Steven et al, 2009, p. 20


2.2. Elements of An Updated Version of Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism shares classical realism’s concern for the state and its relation to domestic society. It also defines its mission largely in terms of building theories of foreign policy, rather than theories of the international system within which states interact. Nonetheless, neoclassical realists aspire to greater methodological sophistication than their classical realist predecessors (Lobell , et al., 2009). Moreover, they begin with the fundamental assumption of neorealists that the international system structures and constrains the policy choices of states. On the other hand, neoclassical realism also identifies elite calculations and perceptions of relative power and domestic constraints as intervening variables between international pressures and the states' foreign policies. Relative power sets parameters for how states (or rather, those who act on their behalf) define their interests and pursue particular ends (Lobell , et al., 2009).

Neoclassical realists attempt to understand foreign policy of any specific country as a product of a process integrating unit-level (state and its society) variables into their analysis rather than relying predominantly upon the systemic incentives of the struggle for power and security between States as neorealists do (Ripsman, et al., 2016). Neoclassical realists conceptualize these „intervening variables“, falling between the independent variable of the international system and its systemic incentives and the dependent variable of foreign policy outcomes, as „transmission belts“ that shape and condition the response of states and their elites to the international system (Lobell , et al., 2009).

Neoclassical realist theory allows us to give different relative weight to three categories of variables depending on their impact on the executives’ perceptions. It takes account of three levels of analysis: the independent systemic anarchic global stimuli, the intervening domestic variables and the dependent products of foreign policy decisions and their implementation. These three levels of analysis are shown in the following Figure 1.

Figure 1 – The Neoclassical Realist Model of Foreign Policy



Source: Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 59

The authors believe that neoclassical realism can serve three analytical purposes for researches of international relations at foreign policy (Ripsman, et al., 2016 p. 28):

- To explain foreign policy choices and grand strategic adjustments when the international environment does not present a clear and imminent threat or opportunity.
- To explain anomalies of states' external behavior when flawed perceptions or domestic political realities interfere with rational security responses.
- To explain phenomenon ranging from the short-term crisis behavior of states, to foreign and defense policies, to near to medium term patterns of grand strategic adjustment up to and including long-term patterns of international (systematic) outcomes.

This theory, they argue, can uniquely do all of the above "by incorporating systematic-level independent variables and intervening unit-level variables in a deductively consistent manner". I agree with Taliaferro and Ripsman that states do not necessarily respond mechanically to changing international circumstances as structural realist imply. This was more obvious in the chaos caused by the Arab Spring upheaval.

While former President Mubarak complied with the United States demands to step down, he did so more in response to domestic pressures from Egyptians' mass demonstrations supported by the military rather than to US president Obama's call in a press conference (Anderson, 2016). I would also argue that domestic players such as the military have had more impact on the foreign policy executives than any foreign power including the US, the single unipolar power at that time.

My research and real-life experience also show that global balance of power system is not always clear to decision makers especially in small and medium size states. Even in a unipolar world such as the one that existed during the early days of the Arab Spring, the US as the sole super power did not send clear cut signals to decision makers in the Middle East during that upheaval and when it did, it sent completely contradictory signals (Hoover, 2011).

One researcher found out that "the only consistent aspect of the US administration's policy toward Egypt has been outreach to and engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood. At no time before or after the Brotherhood's ascent to prominence in Egyptian politics and society did the administration make support of the Brotherhood conditional. At no

time did it use US leverage - given the massive amount of financial and military aid Egypt was depending on, and given the new Egyptian government's desire for prestige in the world community—to pressure the Morsi government to respect human rights, religious liberty and the impartial rule of law.”(Pierce, 2013).

In Libya, the US allowed and assisted military intervention compared to Egypt where the US was in favor of a smooth and peaceful transfer of power from Mubarak to the military. In Syria, a war of proxies was remotely managed to remove Assad from power until the Russians decided to step in (Mearsheimer, 2014).

There has also been a consensus among scholars about the geopolitical mutual impact between internal political changes in the Arab world, especially in Egypt, and shifts in the balance of power across the region, which would affect Iran, Turkey, Israel and the West (Dalacoura, 2012 p. 77).

Foreign policy executives are also influenced by major regional players who might not always comply with signals coming from the global system. Actually, in the Egyptian case the Saudis and the Emiratis, acting against the American wishes, supported the popular revolt against the Egyptian elected president Morsi and the military's later action to remove him from power to avoid a civil war (Goodenough, 2013). Both countries and other Gulf leaders felt that the Muslim Brotherhood's next move will be to challenge their legitimacy after the very successful strides in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen.

The Gulf States were determined to reverse the MB's rise to power region-wide and to make sure that it will not reach their shores. They were especially troubled when they uncovered a MB's conspiracy to overthrow the government in the UAE and arrested many involved MB's activists including some Egyptians (Ansamed, 2013). The failure of the MB in Egypt in its turn produced waves of changes that reversed that earlier surge of political Islam as we can see today in the same countries that we have just mentioned (Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Syria.), (Anderson, 2016).

In dealing with the impact of regional players on the Egyptian foreign policy making and the implementation, I found out that they are much more important and influential than other global factors. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and to a lesser extent Kuwait were able to

influence many Egyptian domestic institutions, political parties and groups. Their influence included funding, sponsoring and acquiring powerful media outlet and playing a detrimental proactive role to reshape global unipolar reactions to Egyptian policies. (Baabood, 2014). Therefore, Saudi Arabia, UAE were trying to influence Egyptian domestic politics in order to reverse the regional trend of empowering political Islam. They were also fighting back what they perceived as a strong drive by the US governments and the West in general to replace Middle Eastern autocratic rulers with political Islamists. This is exactly what neoclassical realists describe as the tendency of foreign policy elites to assess not only threats at the systemic level, but also at the sub-systemic and domestic levels. Specifically, threats can emanate from other great powers and extra-regional actors, regional powers in the locale, or domestic opponents. The implication is that state leaders can act on one level, but the objective is to influence the outcome on another level(s) (Steven, et al., 2009 p. 51).

I can cite as a clear example of that unique regional influence the Saudi and Emirati role in supporting the Egyptian second popular uprising this time against the brotherhood and the military move on July 3, 2013 to replace the brotherhood president with the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court as a transition toward holding new presidential and parliamentary elections and adopting a new constitution. The two Gulf countries were also successful in helping the Egyptian effort to reverse the initial reaction of the US and some other western countries against these developments in Egypt.

I provided below a citation in Arabic and English of the Saudi Foreign Minister statement very strong statement in Paris in the fall of 2013 to support the new government in Egypt at that time against any threat of Western sanctions. He also declared that his country will compensate Egypt for any lost assistance from Western countries because of overthrowing the MB's government (Aswatmasriya, 2013).

Because of the geographic proximity common history and cultural affinity, I would recommend other analysts and students of this subject to deal with major regional players as another category of the intervening variables cited above such as domestic institutions, State-society relations, political culture and public opinion. I might also be able to contribute to further developing the neoclassical realist theory by suggesting a feedback

cycle of intervening variables and examining the impact of regional powers using examples during the very short period covered in my dissertation.

On the domestic level, the executives are not always able to extract the needed national resources for the conduct of their favored foreign policy. They might also encounter insurmountable opposition by a powerful institution such as the military. A clear example in the Egyptian case was the former MB President Morsi's call for Egyptian Jihad in Syria only two weeks before his removal from power. On 13 June 2013, the military responded to this call with an inflammatory statement denying any intention on its part to fight in Syria. In a clear signal of Morsi's lack of authority as a commander in chief and the degradation of his legitimacy because of the popular opposition that took to the streets millions of people to call for his removal few days after that call (Saleh, et al., 2013).

Taliaferro and Ripsman attributed misperceptions of foreign policy executives to the absence of clarity of the systematic signals or problems of rationality of these elites (Ripsman, et al., 2016 p. 23). An Egyptian American scholar captured this fluidity in the systemic signals at the time of the Arab Spring (Gerges, 2013 p. 300). "The short-lived unipolar system in which the United States dominated international relations has come to an end. A global redistribution of power has curtailed America's freedom of maneuver and exposed its relative decline. The Iraq debacle has undermined not only America's moral standing and credibility but also its deterrence strategy. More than at any time since the end of the Second World War, the US faced an insurmountable challenge in maintaining its preponderant influence in the region in the face of sweeping historical and sociological changes after the largescale popular Arab uprisings in 2011 and the evaporation of traditional alliances that had underpinned America's position since 1973" (Gerges, 2013 p. 301).

I would like to also add a third category of reasons for the misperceptions of foreign policy executives. That category would relate to the strategic culture and beliefs of the foreign policy elites which makes them sometimes misunderstand very clear and obvious international and regional developments.

A clear example again was the MB President Mohamed Morsi's misreading of international signals coming from the US and Gulf countries about the conflict in Syria

and his misunderstanding of the Egyptian military's strategic culture. Morsi went out to declare that Egyptians would fight in support of the Syrian opposition and called for Jihad in Syria (Kirkpatrick, 2018 p. 229). He was misled to believe that this could save him his presidency against a very strong popular opposition and mass demonstrations that took to the streets a call on him to step down. He also overlooked a deep-rooted reluctance against interventions in civil wars on the part of the Egyptian armed forces since the war in Yemen in the 1960s (Thorn, 2015). To everybody's surprise, The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) did not wait more than few hours to issue a rebuttal to the misguided president that clearly explained to him the prevailing strategic culture that he and his Muslim Brothers were not aware of (Anderson, 2016).

My research also shows that the prevailing strategic culture during Sadat/Mubarak time continued for obvious reasons to be dominant during the time of SCAF. It included a strong commitment to honor the obligations of the peace treaty with Israel, to actively participate in all international efforts to achieve peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors specially the Palestinians (Aran, et al., 2014).

Defending the security of the Gulf Arab countries as part of defending Egypt's own national security and securing the flow of Egypt's historic share of the Nile water is also some of the basic concepts of that prevailing strategic culture (Vaitikiotis, et al., 2014). Accordingly, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in 2011 was surprised when the president of SCAF, Field Marshal Tantawi, turned down his very generous offer to establish a presidential strategic partnership council with Egypt simply because it would have been a departure from the existing strategic culture of the country of not going in any formal alliance with non-Arab nations. However, the MB's government did agree to the establishment of such a council against the advice of its military establishment (Zuhur, 2007).

2.3. Why Choosing Neoclassical Realism to Analyze Egyptian Foreign Policy During the Arab Spring

Neoclassical realist theory allowed me to give different relative weight to three categories of variables depending on their impact on the executives' perceptions. It takes account of

three levels of analysis: the independent systemic anarchic global stimuli (the international and regional variables), the intervening domestic variables (strong institutions, public opinion, strategic culture and the ability to mobilize resources) and the dependent products of foreign policy decisions and their implementation.

First, neoclassical realism was very helpful for me to explain foreign policy choices and grand strategic adjustments when the international environment does not present a clear and imminent threat or opportunity. The time period of 2011-2013, in my opinion, was part of a transitional phase of the international order from a unipolar global system that lasted since 1990 to a bipolar or multi polar one (Kissinger, 2014). This transition was not yet clear to all the principal players. Actually, it was helped and expedited by the Arab Spring which made the Russians feel the heat of political Islam spreading their way (Trenin, 2012).

After the fall of Gaddafi (with the Russian silent acquiescence) the trend of empowering political Islamists has started to be crystal clear in Tunis, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and finally Syria (Simon, et al., 2015). The European and NATO powers were called upon to fill the gap of Obama's administration inability to lead the West in reacting, directing and making use of Arab Spring developments (Osman, 2016). Many of the main actors were non-governmental and cross-national entities such as the MB. Others were dominant domestic institutions such as the military in Egypt, Yemen and Libya and the tribes in Libya and Yemen (Worth, 2016). Regional players had much more influence than superpowers on Arab Spring developments at the foreign policy decisions of the impacted countries in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran and Turkey had a greater impact than the US, Russia or the great powers of Europe had on developments in Tunis, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria (Gerges, 2013). When the Russians tried to scale up their intervention in Syria, they found themselves forced to coordinate with Turkey and Iran to produce a cease fire and to fight ISIS (Tabler, 2015).

Secondly, neoclassical realism also enabled me to explain anomalies of states' external behavior when flawed perceptions or domestic political realities interfere with rational security responses. The domestic variables such as strong institutions, public opinion and the prevailing strategic culture had a detrimental impact on EFPE ability to mobilize resources. The popular revolt against Mubarak government in Egypt did not only force

him to step down but also created a security, economic and political instability that lasted for the whole period covered by the present study. Accordingly, the foreign policy executives (both SCAF and MB) were not always able to extract national resources to implement their preferred external policy. In the last few years and maybe for some time to come, Egypt has become more dependent on regional partners' assistance, international loans or foreign direct investments (Trager, 2015).

The Egyptian military played a decisive role in supporting the popular demand for Mubarak to step down. It has played a similar role in siding with the second popular revolt asking MB president to do the same thing two years later. In between the two popular uprisings, SCAF dominated the political scene in Egypt. It has officially and legally ruled the country from February 2011 to June 2012 when MB's President Morsi was elected. It continued, however, to have the legislative powers during most of Morsi's one-year long presidency. The elected parliament was dissolved upon the Supreme Court decision to nullify the constitutionality of the elections law that was in force for the parliament election. As demonstrations were taking place almost daily and street fights were routine scenery in the streets of Cairo, the role of the military to keep public security and safety was essential (Gaub, 2014).

MB's supporters claim that other state institutions also conspired to restrain Morsi's government freedom of action both domestically and externally (Kirkpatrick, 2018 p. 222). I do not agree with that claim. I believe they are influenced by the Turkish model of (Deep State) scenario where the secular cadres of the public service would resist the political Islamist government. I do not believe Egypt had a parallel secular civil service. I also think that the top rank Egyptian civil servants, especially at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were willing to cooperate with the MB government (Trager, et al., 2016). However, this professional civil service somehow lost its traditional political neutrality because of the Arab Spring. Government offices witnessed probably in the first time in decades heated political debates between its employees and repeated demonstrations and strikes to ask for social benefits and wage increases (Kirkpatrick, 2018 p. 140).

I also agree with the conclusion drawn by some researchers about the reasons for the state-institutional resistance to major changes under the rule of the brotherhood (Hamad, 2019). The young activists who led the (2011) uprising coveted a complete restructuring of the

state's institutions, redefining the government's social responsibility, and repositioning the Egyptian foreign policy. On the other end of the spectrum, leaders of the state institutions (military, security, and judiciary) sought to limit change to amputating the head of the regime (Mubarak) and preempting his son's succession. This second group wanted to maintain the power structure of the First Republic or (the-status-quo-ante) (Hamad, 2019 p. 205).

There is no doubt that public opinion has also turned into a major element of influence over the foreign policy executives in making their external choices. For example, the MB's prior rhetoric, while in the opposition, against peace with Israel made its president lose a great deal of his credibility and popularity simply because of his signature on the regular cordial letter of credentials of the new Egyptian Ambassador to Israel (Porat, 2014).

The uprising also dramatically increased the role of some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the „6th of April“ and later „Tamarod“, which started as only protest movements (Mulderig, 2013). These NGOs initially lacked any formal organizational structure or durable sources of funding that would match the unlimited influence they acquired on decision making elites since January 2011 (Halaseh, 2012). They were consulted on vital domestic and external issues such as choosing a new prime minister. They successfully challenged the choice of some Egyptian Ambassadors overseas through pressuring the government or letting the receiving foreign government know about their objections to the nominated Ambassador.

Existing international treaties and obligations were reviewed, discussed publicly and vehemently criticized. SCAF declared, on assuming power in February 2011, that it would respect all such treaties and obligations, including the peace treaty with Israel (Egypt, 2011). However, the gas pipeline from Egypt to Israel was blown up repeatedly since the revolution until it ceased to operate.

MB's President Morsi visited Turkey in September 2012 to attend a Turkish political ruling party meeting in support of Erdogan. This unprecedented overt cross-country mix of domestic and foreign policy business was not done only to appeal to the Turkish Islamists supporters of Erdogan but also to please Morsi's own Islamists political

supporters in Egypt. The fine lines that separated what used to be considered domestic, regional and international had almost disappeared (Sheira, 2014).

The global information's revolution highly increased this blurring of borders and highlighted the role of the public both domestically and region wide. It did not always contribute to relaying accurate and clear messages to make that public well informed. (Storck, 2011) Many key players, domestic and foreign, tried to manipulate the relayed information to influence the public opinion to their benefit (Worth, 2016).

All of the above impacted the rationality of the foreign policy executives during my study period. The message was not always clear from the global system. The regional players exercised heavy hand interventions that did not go along with global interventions but contradicted each other in most cases. Public opinion and nongovernmental organizations played, in many cases, a counterproductive role for the policy and the purposes of the ruling elite.

David Kirkpatrick, the former correspondent for the New York Times during the Arab Spring, cited a very good example of the impact of an ambiguous US position, public opinion pressures and the regional intervention (Kirkpatrick, 2018 p. 62). He referred to the Egyptian protesters' storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo in the suburb of Giza on 10 September 2011. Kirkpatrick blamed the failure of the Egyptian SCAF's generals to stop the mobs' attack on the embassy mainly on their incompetence and their submission to public opinion's pressures. However, he added that the US administration did not make it clear to SCAF how important this issue was to America. Israel also waited until the lives of the embassy staff were threatened to deliver a threat of military intervention (Kirkpatrick, 2018 p. 63).

Both the inexperienced MB's executives and the young revolutionaries also made some fatal mistakes that did not serve their own policy's purposes. A striking example was a live TV broadcast of a national security meeting headed by President Morsi on how to deal with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile which would substantially reduce the Egyptian share of the river's water. The Egyptians were puzzled to watch a live coverage of this highly sensitive and classified meeting on their TVs. The Ethiopians, for sure, were not happy also to listen to a discussion about available Egyptian options

that included military strikes, sabotage operations and economic pressures. To everyone's surprise, this was done by a sheer unintended mistake (Tekle, 2013).

A second related example took place in Addis Ababa. A visiting Egyptian delegation was meeting with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in 2011. The delegation comprised of nongovernmental political leaders representing the so-called people-to-people diplomacy. After congratulating them on getting rid of former president Mubarak, the Ethiopian Prime Minister announced to them and the whole world the launch of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. For his pleasant surprise, the inexperienced visiting Egyptians applauded him warmly.

Many of the developments that took place during the January 2011 revolution and enabled it to succeed, had later put great restrictions on the ruling elite's ability to extract national resources necessary for the implementation of their domestic and foreign policies. The defeat of the police forces and their later absence from the streets of Egypt allowed for the smuggling of hundreds of terrorist foreign fighters and tons of weapons and explosives into Sinai, the western desert and the southern borders. Police stations were attacked and burned down, prisons were opened up for both political and criminal prisoners to set free. The lack of public security lasted in varying degrees for more than two years, or most of my study's time period. Terrorist organizations made good use of those two years to build their infrastructures and strong hold outs in Sinai. They also established their extended networks of political, social and financial connections throughout the country (Anderson, 2016).

Some research even claims that MB while in power protected and supported those terrorist organizations. They cite the infamous statement of MB president Morsi when terrorists kidnapped dozens of Egyptian security soldiers, Morsi declared that he cared about the safety of the soldiers as much as he did about the safety of their kidnappers! (Fatheya, 2013). However, this manipulation did not prevent those terrorists from killing other soldiers while travelling in their civilian clothes back to their hometowns on vacation.

Several scholars believe that MB sacrificed the limitation of the lack of security for having some proxy organization that could serve the MB's purposes without having formal links

with them. They cite what happened after June 30, 2013 as a good example of this scenario. Since MB was forced out of power by popular demonstrations supported by the military, terrorist attacks have not stopped in Sinai up to the time of writing these lines (Osman, 2016).

To sum up, my research proved that the Arab Spring turmoil impacted the rationality of the foreign policy executives during my study period. Because of the transitional nature of the international order during the Arab Spring, the message was not always clear from the global system to the Egyptian leaders. Regional players exercised a more influential interventions than the weak and confusing global interventions. These global and regional interventions contradicted each other in most cases with the regional powers will prevailing. The political instability during the Arab Spring gave weight to public opinion and nongovernmental organizations. They played, in most cases, a restraining role on the ruling elite's ability to mobilize needed resources for the implementation of its foreign policy.

All of above-mentioned factors explain why I chose neoclassical realism to analyze Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring. The theory enabled me to look into the independent systemic global and regional signals and their interaction with the intervening domestic factors such as the influence of public opinion, non-governmental organizations, powerful institutions and prevailing political and military culture.

After making the case for my choice of theoretical approach, in the next chapter I will need to develop a detailed new narrative of developments during my study's time period. It should include domestic developments in Egypt, major regional reactions and global interactions. They all should be chronically organized in the same narrative for analytical purposes. I will also include in the same narrative major public pronouncements on the three levels (global, regional and domestic) that influenced the culture and perceptions of the foreign policy elite in Egypt.

I hope that creating this narrative would make it easier for me and for the reader to follow the interaction between the three levels of analysis (systemic, intervening and dependent) as prescribed by the neoclassical realist theory. I will depend on the chronicle of domestic events of the revolution created by M. Cherif Bassiouni and posted on his website under

Egypt Updates and later compiled in a book (Bassiouni, 2016). I also found the web site “Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide” (Cornell, 2014) very useful in referring me to many websites documenting Arab Spring’s developments and international reactions.

I will also consult the Egyptian daily newspapers Al Masry Al Youm and Al Ahram for official Egyptian statements and documents. The English websites of the Turkish Anadolu News Agency and Hürriyet Daily News will be used for documenting Turkish positions on Arab Spring developments specially in Egypt. For official Palestinian perspective, I will use the English website of the Palestinian News Agency. Aljazeera.net will be my main source for MB, Palestinian Hamas and other political Islamists views as the Qatari TV broadcast has been known for supporting them.

Naturally, this narrative would also reflect my own views of history that I personally lived as an Egyptian, diplomatic practitioner and a member of the foreign policy decision-making elite. However, I will try as best as I can to make my narrative inclusive, balanced and objective.

3. Chapter Three

Narrative and Analysis

I will try in this chapter to produce the narrative and analysis of major events of the Arab Spring in Egypt from 2011 to 2013. In doing so, I will be highlighting only those developments that had direct impact on foreign policy decision making in Egypt. I will also focus more attention on those policies and actions which could help explain the two-case studies (Turkey and Palestine). I will include domestic developments in Egypt, major regional reactions and global interaction. They will all be chronically organized in the narrative in order to facilitate the analysis.

I will first explore different concepts of the Arab Spring and try to reach an acceptable definition and timeframe for the study. I will then move to identify what differentiates the Egyptian Arab Spring and why. I will conclude the chapter with outlining and analyzing Egyptian relations with four main parties: the US, Israel, other Arab Spring countries and Ethiopia. Along with the Gulf countries, these parties enjoy strategic importance to different Egyptian decision makers during, at least, the last two decades. This chapter's narrative and analysis will be tailored to best describe the domestic, regional and international setting for the Egyptian policies toward Turkey and Palestine from 2011 to 2013 which will be analyzed in the following two chapters.

3.1. The Concept of the Arab Spring

The aim of this dissertation's research is to identify a group of factors with the strongest impact on the Egyptian foreign policy making and implementation during the study period (the Arab Spring). It hypothesizes that domestic and regional factors were more dominant than the global international environment in influencing EFPE and its policy responses and initiatives during 2011-2013. I will try here to define the concept of the Arab Spring which constitutes the time period and domain of analysis for this research.

John Gerring argues that instead of using the layman's definition of concepts, we would rather need to formulate entirely new concepts, appropriate to the requirements of science and expressed in an appropriate terminology (Gerring, 2012 p. 60).

The origin of the expression "The Arab Spring" is coincidentally driven from Western media repeated references to its parallels to the Prague Spring. It was initially used by optimists who saw in the uprisings of different Arab countries something similar to the Czechoslovaks' aspirations in 1968 of liberating themselves of the Soviet communist control (Fawn, et al., 2018).

However, the opponents of such uprisings have focused more on the similarities between the outcome of both Prague Spring and the Arab Spring in 2011. They always refer to the fact that the Arab Spring ended with a deep disappointment of the high expectations of Arabs and international observers alike. They point out to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to remove the reform government and to bring back the communists to power. They conclude that both Springs ended up with the status quo ante. Some of them would even go further to suggest that the human, economic and social cost and destruction of the Arab Spring could not be repaired without disintegrating countries and redrawing the political map of the whole Middle East (Puspitasari, 2017).

The Arab Spring took a completely different course of action in each of its countries. Civil wars erupted and are still going on in Syria, Libya and Yemen. Islamists won the elections in Tunisia and Egypt but proved to be lacking experience. MB in Egypt used the same old autocratic tactics of the previous regime of Mubarak and tried to have a monopoly of political power (King , 2020 p. 307). The military needed to intervene twice in Egypt, to back the popular uprising, once to get rid of Mubarak and again to topple the MB's president Mohamed Morsi. In Tunisia, the Islamists (Ennahda party) were smart enough to allow other parties to share power and to take control. They did not mind moving to the opposition seats (Anderson, 2016).

The layman usage of the word Arab Spring did not stop at describing the situation in countries with major popular uprisings. It also referred to the suppressed demonstrations in Bahrain and the popular demand for reform in the three monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan. Only the Encyclopedia Britannica's article on the concept includes

a big variance of meanings: Some defines it as follows: „The Arab Spring, also referred to as Arab revolutions, was a revolutionary wave of both violent and non-violent demonstrations, protests, riots, coups and civil wars in North Africa and the Middle East that began on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia with the Tunisian Revolution.“ (Britannica, 2019).

The Britannica more narrowly defines the Arab Spring as the “wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging some of the region’s entrenched authoritarian regimes. Demonstrators expressing political and economic grievances faced violent crackdowns by their countries’ security forces such as the Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia), Egypt Uprising of 2011, Bahrain demonstrations (2011), Yemen Uprising of 2011–12, Libya Revolt of 2011, and Syria Uprising of 2011–12”. These sets of protests are often described together as encompassing the “Arab Spring”, the “Arab Uprisings”, the “Middle East Uprisings”, the “Arab Revolts” or the “Arab Revolutions” (Britannica, 2019).

Some analysts would also include in the Arab Spring domain of definition demonstrations and protests that erupted in Morocco and Jordan in 2011 but were smartly contained by the monarch in each of these countries conceding some of his royal constitutional powers. The Saudi king pre-empted any such protests in his country by a lavish distribution of social benefits and salary increases for the lower classes (Anderson, 2016).

Others would go as far as suggesting that the Iraqi Sunnis had their own Arab Spring in 2011 which was oppressed by the Shiite-controlled government and later led to the creation of terrorist groups such as ISIS. An in depth analysis of this argument could be found in Scott Anderson’s *Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apart* (Anderson, 2016). Robert F. Worth in his study “A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS” supported this opinion as the title clearly suggests (Worth, 2016). Ironically, many neoconservative researchers even tried to credit the 2003 US invasion of Iraq with laying the seeds for the Arab Spring (Husain, 2013).

Many western analysts were disappointed in the outcome of the Arab Spring in most of its countries. They therefore claim that the Spring lasted only during the peaceful mass demonstrations and abruptly ended when the ruling regimes started to use violence or

when civil wars erupted as was the case in Libya, Syria or Yemen. According to that definition, the Arab Spring in each of its countries was on for few weeks only (Worth, 2016).

Optimists would like to think that the Arab Spring has never ended in any of its countries. They believe that these uprisings are still going on, with varying degrees. Despite some setbacks, revolutionaries are hopeful the ruling regimes will ultimately listen to their people's demands. Some of the parties that was formed in 2011 and 2012 in Egypt are still called „The Revolution is still on“. The Arab Spring at Five was the title of a special issue of Foreign Affairs which was published in March 2016 by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Some scholars claim that the Arab Spring did not end in 2013 with the shift from the initial revolutionary wave into a counter-revolutionary backlash with old regime's men on the offensive in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen old regime's men on the offensive in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya. Those “revolutionary” scholars point out to social eruptions which have kept occurring in one country after the other since 2013: Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, Sudan were the most affected. And then, starting from December 2018 — eight years exactly after the start of the first wave of uprisings back in 2010 — the Sudanese protest movement shifted into uprising mode, followed by Algeria in February, with now, since October 2019, Iraq reaching the boiling point followed by Lebanon. The global media started speaking of a “New Arab Spring” (Achcar, 2019).

Many believe the Arab Spring that began with the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor in 2010 ended in failure. Since 2013, except for Tunisia, autocrats have kept or regained control across the Arab world. The resurgent antidemocratic regimes then tarnished the protesters by claiming that it was a Western conspiracy that led people to the streets in Tripoli, Manama, Tahrir Square in Cairo, and across the region. But the continued absence of political and economic opportunity in the Middle East did not abate. Now, national protests happening in Algeria, Lebanon, and Sudan herald a new season of civil unrest and calls for democracy in the Middle East or “Arab Spring 2.0” (Muasher, 2019).

3.2. The Egyptian Arab Spring

The above section illustrated that the expression “The Arab Spring” does not necessarily carry the same meaning in different political and social contexts. Fortunately for my research purposes, the Egyptian concept of the Arab Spring is much better defined. Both the laymen and academicians’ usage of the word in Egypt refer only to the nationwide cross-party demonstrations and protests which lasted from January 2011 to July 2013 (Bassiouni, 2013). All other demonstrations and protests were either limited to certain regions or professions or staged by certain groups of specific political affiliation. Before 2011, it was the leftist and liberal youth groups who led popular demonstrations. Political Islamists were the only one who took the street after July 2013. Of course, we will always find people who would strongly believe that the Arab Spring is still going on today. Muslim Brotherhood’s activists are still calling for a new revolution on the 25th of January every year (Bassiouni, 2016).

When we look back on what came to be known as the Arab Spring in Egypt, we would be probably disappointed by the failed expectations not only of the Egyptians but of all those who worldwide followed with admiration the peaceful demonstrations of Al Tahrir Square. In contrast to what happened in Libya, Syria and Yemen, urban and cosmopolitan young Egyptians in major cities organized peaceful demonstrations with remarkable discipline. When the police forces were defeated and broken down, they disappeared from the streets of Egypt. Some of those civilian youngster demonstrators tried to police the streets themselves with no central leadership (Bassiouni, 2016).

The country did not end up in a civil war in 2011 due to this sense of civic responsibility and also thanks to Mubarak’s compliance with the people’s and military’s wishes for him to step down. Had he acted like Libya’s Gadhafi or Yemen’s Saleh, Egypt could have seen a bloodier and longer revolution. To illustrate this point, it is enough to compare Mubarak’s behavior with what happened in Egypt two years later. MB’s President Mohamed Morsi adamantly refused in 2013 to accept the Egyptian people’s demand for early elections. His file and rank brothers occupied some of the major squares in Cairo and insisted on fighting back the military which sided with people’s position (Trager, 2017).

Some analysts concluded that the Arab Spring did not develop in a Civil War in Egypt because, unlike other countries in the Middle East, it has a culture of deep and stable communal bonds. The country has maintained its present borders for hundreds (if not thousands) of years. The only major religious minority consists of Orthodox Christian Copts who inhabited Egypt before Muslims conquered the country 1400 years ago. They kept their religion and adopted Arabic as their language and culture. Egyptians are also very homogeneous ethnically. Egypt is always cited by sociologists as a good example of a stable and well-developed hydraulic civilization (Goldschmidt, 2008 p. 1).

As far as Egypt is concerned and for the purpose of my research, the Arab Spring expression refers only to the popular demonstrations, protests and uprisings that started to escalate in Egypt from the labor protests in the city of Mahalla in May 2010 and went nationwide starting from 25 January 2011 until toppling the MB government in July 2013. One study outlined how did the MB expedited the end of their short time in power by their premature and naïve thrust to the same autocratic tactics that Mubarak developed over 30 years (Trager, 2017).

MB's attempted to combat, rather than co-opt or cooperate with, these (different) power centres after Morsi won the 2012 presidential elections. Morsi sought to undercut the judiciary through his November 2012 edict that placed his own decrees above judicial scrutiny. MB's dominated upper parliamentary house tried to retire over 3,000 judges through new legislation. The Brotherhood additionally used its influence over the constitution-writing process in late 2012 to ban all parliamentarians affiliated with former President Hosni Mubarak's ruling party from participating in elections for ten years, which effectively excluded the rural clans and tribes that make up the major power centres of the countryside, whose leaders often served in the Mubarak-era parliament (El-Sherif, 2014).

The Brotherhood similarly tried to side-line the business community by creating its own business organization, whose leaders accompanied Morsi on his foreign trips. Meanwhile, as media criticism of Morsi's increasingly autocratic and incompetent rule mounted in early 2013, Muslim Brothers carried posters of TV anchors' heads in nooses at their rallies, vowing to „cleanse“ the media (Hamad, 2019). By the same token, Brotherhood leaders' calls for “restructuring and reforming” the Interior Ministry put Egypt's police

on notice, driving many officers to participate in the anti-Morsi uprising in their uniforms (Trager, 2017).

Although Morsi tried to court the military by respecting its autonomy over national security matters and its own internal affairs, he undermined the arrangement through aggressive foreign policy pronouncements during his final month in office. Indeed, from the generals' standpoint, Morsi usurped the military's national security responsibilities when he declared that all options are open against Ethiopia's construction of a Nile dam and then endorsed the Syrian jihad at a Cairo Stadium rally alongside a group of radical Salafist clerics in mid-June 2013 (Bassiouni, 2016).

Some researchers argue that the Egyptian military's leadership decided early on in January 2011 (if not before) to let popular anger bring down two sitting presidents (Mubarak in 2011 and Morsi in 2013), (El-Sherif, 2014). A very conducive and welcoming Western response should also be part of the analysis. While most of the Middle East governments were worried about the spread of that Spring to their populations, Arab masses were watching the developments in Egypt with great admiration. Key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE and Qatar played a major role in influencing the Arab Spring especially in Egypt. The global and regional support for the popular uprisings in Egypt was unanimous in 2011. However, in 2013, regional as well as international powers were divided on whether to support the change of regime in Egypt or to oppose it (Bassiouni, 2016).

For my research purposes, I decided that toppling the MB's president in mid-2013 could serve as the end date of the Arab Spring time period for this study. After that date, demonstrations and protests continued to be staged by the Brotherhood and other political Islamists for another year or more. However, they were no longer representative of all political and social groups in Egypt. The Military stood firmly with those who opposed the Brotherhood rule. Despite some Western and regional reluctance, Saudi Arabia and UAE lavishly assisted the new provisional government and the subsequent elected one headed by former Defense Minister Field Marshal El Sisi (Brown, et al., 2016).

Fortunately, the Arab Spring is used in this research only to define the time limit of my chosen case studies. Therefore, I opted for using a flexible definition of the Arab Spring which was developed by Dr. Bassiouni of Chicago University that makes the start of the Arab Spring in the Egyptian case coincides with the eruption of protests and labor demonstrations in many of the factories in May 2010 and dates the end of that Spring in Egypt with the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in June 30, 2013 (Bassiouni, 2013). However, I am aware that many social sciences studies consider the Arab Spring and its consequences and impact still happening today (Muasher, 2019). On the other extreme, there are other social scientists who claim that there were no such unified coherent similar phenomena that took place in all of these Arab countries at the same time and, therefore, they advise researchers to look on each individual case separately (Bellin, 2012).

Other groups of scientists and observers focus more on the different responses of the international communities to those Arab uprisings. They claim that bombing Gadhafi's troops in Libya, helping the insurgents in Syria, the Saudi suppression of the demonstrations in Bahrain and helping the military intervention twice in politics in Egypt were all key factors in determining the different outcomes of Arab Spring in all of those countries (Steinberg, 2014). Without believing in any of the so-called conspiracy theories, my dissertation is going to examine the impact of the foreign (global and regional) actors and their effort to influence developments in Egypt including the Egyptian foreign policy decision making.

3.3. Major Egyptian Foreign Policy Issues and Decisions (2011-2013)

I chose four major foreign policy issues to examine in my analytical narrative. They were selected because of their importance to the Egyptian decision-makers as indicated by their inclusion in almost every public speech by any senior official about foreign policy. These selected issues are: Peace with Israel, Relations with the US, Arab Spring's turmoil in other Arab countries and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

3.3.1. Relations with Israel

SCAF started its reign of government by making a constitutional declaration which stipulated for a continuous respect of all prior international treaty obligations which included the peace treaty with Israel (Egypt, 2011). Mubarak used to hint that his departure would mean domestic chaos, regional instability and some security threats to Israel. Both SCAF and MB's President Morsi made it very clear publicly that they were committed to the peace treaty with Israel as much as they would not be trying to destabilize other countries in the region (Aran, et al., 2014).

We can detect here some resemblance of views between the military establishment (SCAF), the Egyptian public opinion and the regional and international environment in favor of maintaining the Egyptian – Israeli peace. Accordingly, reneging from the peace treaty obligations were never discussed or asked for by any party during the Arab Spring. The same applies to the Egyptian role in trying to resume the peace process between Israel and Palestinians and to mediate a reconciliation among Palestinians themselves (Fateh and Hamas factions). There too all domestic, regional and international parties have continued to agree on the importance of such Egyptian role (Aran, et al., 2014). However, there was less agreement on other aspects of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship.

Since the very early days of the Egyptian Arab Spring in January 2011, the pipeline that was carrying Egyptian gas to Israel was bombed almost weekly. Many of Hamas operatives who fled into Egypt to help their Egyptian Islamic allies have also colluded to destroy this important artery of normal relations between Egypt and Israel (Ishaq, 2012). Other calls to end many trade projects with Israel were heard in demonstrations that were staged in front of the Israeli embassy in Cairo during the Arab Spring reaching sometimes the stage of storming the embassy itself after it was evacuated of its staff (ICG, 2012). These anti-Israel popular feelings were expressed in response to Israeli air bombardment of Gaza. However, they did not stop neither SCAF (2011) nor the MB's President Morsi (2012) from mediating ceasefire agreements in Gaza between Hamas and Israel (Ishaq, 2012).

This traditional Egyptian role has always been welcomed and encouraged by regional and international partners. Turkey and Qatar who were always envious of that Egyptian role

during Mubarak time have come around to support that same role under SCAF and more enthusiastically under MB's President Morsi. Turkish PM Erdogan who happened to be in Cairo during Gaza war in November 2012 summoned his (younger brother) the Emir of Qatar to Cairo along with his asylum's guest Khaled Meshaal, the leader of Hamas at that time to all gather in Cairo. They joined the MB's President Morsi and his Egyptian intelligence services who mediated with the Israelis a major ceasefire agreement. Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State and her team were given an office space in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry to supervise the mediation and to make sure that the Egyptian effort would be successful. Clinton was the first to praise the Egyptian effort in this regard (Morey, et al., 2012).

MB rhetoric during its time in the opposition haunted its leaders when they assumed power (Frontier, 2019). MB's President Morsi was publicly criticized for addressing his Israeli counterpart as "my dear" in a standard letter of credentials and introduction of the new Egyptian ambassador to Israel. Very soon afterward, Egypt needed to withdraw that ambassador for consultations in protest of the Israeli bombing of Gaza. However, MB's protests did not take the streets threatening Jews that the army of Mohamed will come back to drive them out of Jerusalem as they used to do before Morsi was elected president (Porat, 2014). Israel must have not felt at ease with the special relations between the Egyptian MB's President Morsi and Palestinian Hamas which is considered one of the arms of the brotherhood in Palestine. However, Morsi kept all contacts with the Palestinian factions in the hands of his intelligence services which were in close touch with its Israeli counterparts (Ishaq, 2012).

Some Israeli analysts expressed concerns about the Egyptian MB's President Morsi direct contacts with Iran. The Iranian president visited Cairo for the first time since the Iranian revolution to attend the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit on 6 and 7 February 2013. Egypt welcomed the visit of thousands of Iranian tourists. Israel and Saudi Arabia were not happy with such Egyptian – Iranian rapprochement. Egyptian Salafists, who are proxies of the Saudis, obstructed any further steps of reconciliations. The US and most of the Egyptian public were in favor of closer Egyptian relations with Iran. However, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and to a lesser extent Israel opposed such rapprochement (Byman, et al., 2016).

3.3.2. Relations with the US

I came across hundreds of accusations of different versions of conspiracy theories behind the Arab Spring developments. These theories have been very popular in the Arab Spring countries and elsewhere such as in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the Arab monarchies. The most prevalent theory simply accuses the US and the West of conspiring to destabilize and change the regimes in the whole Middle East except for Israel. Academicians and intellectuals who supported this theory cited the neoconservatives' Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and its recommendations that served as a blueprint of the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy towards the Middle East. It was used to justify the war in Iraq as liberating the Iraqi people of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship (Arbutnot, 2012). The New American Century group also recommended funding and training non-governmental organizations in the Arab world that would use civil disobedience to destabilize their countries' autocratic regimes. Apart from pulling out of Iraq, the Obama administration did not stop any of the programs of the new Middle East initiative that was initiated by George W. Bush's administration.

Many scholars credit the US with training the young Egyptians who led the initial call for the Arab uprisings. The US did attempt to provide some funding and organizational support to various pro-democracy groups (Gerges, 2013). The April 6 movement in Egypt, which was pivotal in organizing the January 25 protests in Cairo that led to the overthrow of Mubarak on February 11, was one group that received some US support. Other groups in Bahrain and Yemen also received US funding and training. Egyptian youth leaders attended a "technology meeting" in New York sponsored by the State Department, Facebook, Google, MTV and Columbia Law School, where they received training „to use social networking and mobile technologies to promote democracy“ (Cornwell, 2012).

The US government also provided assistance to many activists in the Arab world – including Egypt – in gaining access to technology which allows dissidents „to get online without being tracked or to visit news or social media sites that governments have blocked“. Many of the tech firms and non-profit organizations that received funding saw huge increases in the use of their technology across the Arab world during the start of the Arab Spring, much to their surprise (Nixon, 2011). However, US officials still thought

that these revolutionary youths are daydreamers. Immediately before the Arab Spring, US ambassador to Egypt Margret Scobey reported to her headquarters in Washington: „April 6's stated goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections is highly unrealistic, and is not supported by the mainstream opposition“ (Nixon, 2011). American Military and economic assistance continued to back up the strategically important Mubarak's Egypt. Initial reactions from the US administration to the January 2011 demonstrations in Egypt was to assure everyone that Egypt had a stable order (Pierce, 2013).

Some of the Egyptian Arab Spring leaders such as Mohamed El Baradei called publicly on the US in early February of 2011 to pressure Mubarak to step down. He repeated the same call twice; in 2012 to make SCAF hold the presidential election on the promised date and again in 2013 to have the MB's President Morsi agree to early elections or to step down as demanded by the mass protests all over the country. In all of these cases most parties including the protesters' leaders were convinced that the US was playing a very influential behind the scenes role at manipulating the government's actions (Pierce, 2013).

The US Government started an early unofficial dialogue with the MB since they acquired 20% of the Parliament's seats in 2005 elections. In June 2011, Hillary Clinton the US Secretary of State announced the launching of an official dialogue with the Brotherhood at all organizational levels. One year later, she called Field Marshal Tantawi, the head of SCAF and acting president to encourage him to declare the MB's candidate Mohamed Morsi as the winning President in the 2012 elections (Pierce, 2013). However, MB's leaders continued to hold deep suspicion towards the US who was trying to mend fences with the new regime in Egypt (Kirkpatrick, 2018 p. 236).

Shortly after the uprising, Obama announced his decision to forgive one third of Egypt's economic debt to the US or about one billion US dollar. He also supported Egypt in its negotiations with IMF and other International donors to get more loans to make up for the increasing deficit of the balance of payment after the uprising (Gerges, 2013). Ironically, all Egyptian governments from 2011 to 2014, including the Brotherhood's, were not able to conclude such a deal with the IMF because of its required austerity measures. MB's members of Parliament from 2005 to 2010, including Mohamed Morsi

himself, used to give lengthy speeches criticizing Mubarak for giving in to IMF and accepting such measures (AlmasyAlyoum, 2012).

The Brotherhood's leaders, instead, promised Egyptians that they would raise 100 billion US dollars from friendly donors (assumed to be Qatar and Turkey). These promises did not materialize because those donors could not come up with these sums of money. Other major donors such as Saudi Arabia and UAE did not respond positively to signals coming out from Washington to financially salvage the Brotherhood's regime in Egypt. UAE security services uncovered a coup attempt by Brotherhood operatives against the royal family in Abu Dhabi. Saudis shared the same concern about the Brotherhood's hidden agenda of replicating the Arab Spring experience in all the Gulf rich Sheikdoms (Trager, 2017).

In retrospect, we can now determine with great confidence that the government leaders in Egypt under three different political regimes from 2011 to 2014 were responding more to their public demands, limited resources and strategic culture. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into details of the different conspiracy theories about the US role in starting and trying to manage the Arab Spring. Dozens of studies have already researched these theories and tested their accuracy. Interested readers can find a good compilation of these studies at Cornell University Library's website (Cornell, 2014). We can only here refer to the use and development of the same conspiracy theory by different factions to suit their political interests and objectives.

For MB, the US was initially an important partner who can put pressure on Mubarak and SCAF. Later, MB's President Morsi was very keen to prove to the US that he is as effective as Mubarak was in mediating between the different Palestinian factions and Israel. When applying the same autocratic methods of Mubarak, Morsi was expecting to get the same treatment and support that Mubarak got from the US during his 30-year reign of power. Morsi did not understand that he lived in a different Egypt and a different Middle East (Pierce, 2013). He was also dealing with a different US and a quite different international order.

3.3.3. Position on the Arab Spring's Developments in Other Arab Countries

Initially, each Arab political regime including Mubarak's in Egypt was in self-denial that it could be faced with the same protests that destabilized the other regimes. However, when Mubarak stepped down and SCAF took over, the political authority in the country did not try to help the uprisings in other Arab States. SCAF was complying with Mubarak's long maintained tradition of no interference in other Arab countries' internal affairs. It was also following the public wishes to leave each Arab Spring countries' population on its own to decide the fate of their regime (Gaub, 2014).

Foreign observers in Cairo were surprised to see demonstrations in April of 2011 against the visiting Secretary general of the UN because of the UN support of NATO intervention in Libya. Responding to requests of support from Qatar and Saudi Arabia to supply the Syrian opposition factions with arms, Egypt under three different regimes (SCAF, Morsi and Mansour) abstained from giving any support to the Syrian armed opposition. MB continued to channel medical and humanitarian assistance via the Egyptian and Arab doctors' syndicates that were controlled by the Brotherhood at that time (Trager, 2017).

MB's President Morsi continued the same policy for his first 11 months in power. Only at the 12th hour and immediately before he was removed by the military and the popular demand did he call for an Egyptian jihad (struggle) against the regime in Syria. It was obvious to everyone that he made this change to appeal to the Gulf and the western countries not to the Egyptian masses who were protesting against him. However, it did not work. In few hours, SCAF responded with a public statement rebuffing the President of the Republic and declaring that the Egyptian Armed Forces will not fight outside of its territory unless in defense of the Egyptian people who do not support the president's call for jihad (Gaub, 2014).

Once again, the decision makers in Egypt responded more favorably to domestic variables (the public opinion and the military) rather than to accommodate important regional partners or powerful international actors. Accordingly, the Egyptian embassy in Damascus was kept open throughout all the developments in the Arab Spring against the wishes of the Gulf countries and the recommendations of the Arab League.

When the political Islamists surrounded the Syrian embassy in Cairo asking for its closure in June 2011, MB's President Morsi announced he would sever diplomatic relations with Syria and close down the embassy. However, both the Syrian and the Egyptian embassies remained open and the Syrians kept an Ambassador heading their diplomatic mission in Cairo but gave him the title of "Head of an Interests' Section" (Saleh, et al., 2013) .

When the uprisings threat extended to Yemen, both the Egyptian public and the government were very supportive diplomatically. SCAF endorsed the Gulf Cooperation Council's initiative to solve the Yemeni crisis peacefully. Egypt received many delegations from the Yemeni president's party to brief them about the Egyptian experience in dealing with public protests. MB's branch in Yemen made a public outreach to the Brotherhood leadership in Egypt (Ferris, 2015).

Initially, the Egyptian government did not take sides in Yemen. It declared that the Yemenis should be left on their own to decide the identity of their future government. Naturally, Egypt was busy with its own domestic political struggles. It did not play an active role in mediating a solution for the crisis in Yemen. However, Yemenis were allowed to continue to enter Egypt without a visa until 2014 when the civil war became much bloodier and hundreds of thousands of Yemenis fled their country.

It is worth mentioning that the most influential factor that SCAF and MB's President Morsi paid attention to was the public opinion and to a lesser extent the Saudi position. Because of its neutrality at the early stages of the conflict, Egypt was able to keep its embassy in Sanaa until the Houthis invaded the city in late 2014 (Ferris, 2015). The Egyptian leaders' political and military culture has played a significant role in determining the Egyptian policy towards the crisis in Yemen.

Egypt had a terrible experience of military intervention in Yemen in the early 1960s. Both SCAF and influential intellectuals in Egypt have, since, agreed that their country should not repeat this mistake ever. The Egyptian government was mainly concerned with the three objectives to be achieved in Yemen; restoring order, not to empower radicals and terrorists and (after 2013) to weaken the Muslim Brotherhood's Yemeni party (Filkins,

2018). Not all of these objectives were shared by the Saudis at all times, but they were continuously supported by the Egyptian public and military.

When the Arab Spring's demonstrations extended to Bahrain, it was a whole new ball game for the Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia would not allow predominantly Shiite's mass demonstrations to topple the Sunni royal family in that close neighboring country. Saudi led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) military force went into Bahrain and helped putting down the unrest. Egypt was not invited to participate in that force. However, all Egyptian governments from 2011 onwards strongly supported the ruling family in Bahrain (Steinberg , 2014). MB might have had a different hidden agenda toward the Shiite- Sunni (Iranian-Saudi) proxy conflict during their one-year presidency in Egypt. However, they have never made that agenda public because of their concern not to antagonize their own Sunni fundamentalists (Salafists) and their Saudi financiers (Gause, 2014).

In all the Arab Spring cases that were explored above, there was a strong impact of public opinion, the military, regional powers and the strategic culture of leadership. The Egyptian government had rarely supported or followed messages coming from the international community on these different cases when they contradicted domestic or regional preferences.

3.3.4. Relations with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

In the late 1950s and early 60s of the twentieth century, the US Bureau of Reclamation conducted a Blue Nile survey in Ethiopia to identify projects that would enable the Ethiopian government to control and make better use of the main artery of the Nile river. The US hidden agenda was to develop some kind of leverage on the revolutionary leader of Egypt at that time; Gamal Abdel Nasr. The survey identified the present site of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in the southern part of Ethiopia as the perfect location for the dam. All Egyptian governments under Nasr, Sadat and Mubarak made it a high strategic priority of their foreign policy to prevent any foreign endorsement, funding or assistance for the Ethiopians to build that dam (Morsy, et al., 2019).

The Ethiopian government made use of the decay of the Egyptian regional influence under Mubarak during the last few years of his reign of power. Fifty years after the US study was conducted, the Ethiopian government started to survey the site secretly in October 2009 and August 2010. The Arab Spring provided Ethiopia with an added opportunity because of the political instability and chaos that prevailed in Egypt in 2011. The Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi wasted no time to announce, one month after Mubarak's departure that the GERD project (which was called the Millennium) will be open for competitive international bidding. On the 31st March 2011, a 4.8 billion US dollar contract was awarded publicly to an Italian construction company without any bidding procedure.

The GERD's foundation was laid by the Ethiopian prime minister on April 2, 2011 (Morsy, et al., 2019). One day later, Zenawi received a delegation of Egyptian revolutionary youth. In his public speech to greet them, he criticized their former president Mubarak and accused him of neglecting Africa and obstructing the Ethiopian project to generate electricity using the Nile water's hydraulic power. He received a loud enthusiastic applause from the uninformed Egyptian youngsters who knew nothing of the dangers that this project would cause their country (Morsy, et al., 2019).

Some of the above-mentioned criticism of neglecting relations with Africa against Mubarak was widely supported by those who asked him to step down. No public pronouncement of opposition was made public by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces SCAF government at that time. There was an Egyptian keen interest to avoid aggravating Ethiopia and other Nile basin countries while SCAF needed their support within the African Union (AU) discussions. AU was having a heated debate about developments in Egypt and whether it should be considered a punishable military coup or peaceful transfer of power (Bassiouni, 2013). The leaders of the uprisings did not also want to highlight the fact that Mubarak, like his predecessors (Nasser and Sadat), was able to prevent Ethiopia from building that dam. No one wanted to admit that Mubarak's departure and the uprising's instability had allowed Ethiopia with Western endorsement to go ahead with launching that project (Bassiouni, 2013).

One year later and in the middle of demonstrations against SCAF in the streets all over Cairo, Egypt lost its last ally in this dispute over the distribution of the Nile water. In

March 2012 Sudan's president Omar Al Bashir declared that he supported the building of the dam. SCAF was not able to take a strong position against Sudan while it needed Sudanese help to prevent smuggling weapons and foreign terrorists inside Egypt from the south. The Israeli Air Force needed to bombard an automobile convoy in Sudan that was trying to smuggle weapons and explosives via Egypt to Hamas in Gaza. The Israeli analysts pointed out to Bashir's strong connections with MB and the earlier Sudanese involvement in the assassination attempt on the life of former Egyptian president Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995 (Dentice, 2018).

MB's President Mohamed Morsi tried to appeal to the worried Egyptian public when he faced a strong challenge of his legitimacy during his last month as president. He made two fatal mistakes. On the 3rd of June 2013, Morsi summoned a panel of Egyptian experts to discuss what to do with this Ethiopian dam. He did not inform them that their discussions were carried live on Egyptian TV and broadcasted via satellites to the whole world. Some of the panelists suggested destroying or sabotaging the dam, others supported destabilizing the Ethiopian government through assisting opposition rebels (Tekl, 2013).

Instead of gaining public opinion's support to reinforce Morsi's political position, this episode turned into an international scandal and a local unpleasant joke about the incompetence of the Brotherhood and its president. Ethiopia requested the Egyptian Ambassador in Addis Ababa to explain what exactly happened and said in that meeting (Tekl, 2013). The MB's president needed to issue a statement of apology for the unintended embarrassment caused by the broadcast and to stress the good neighborly relations and mutual respect with Ethiopia.

Only one week later, the desperate MB's President Morsi made another uncalculated mistake trying to lure the public demonstrations against him. He publicly announced that Egypt's water security can never be violated. Without calling openly for war, he declared that all options are open to deal with that urgent matter (GERD). Understandably it was the same speech in which he made his infamous public call for jihad (struggle) in Syria. On both fronts he mistakenly thought that he was appealing to the public and the military to save his presidency. It did not work. He immediately received a public rebuttal from his military confirming that it will not fight outside Egypt's borders. Many slogans

condemning Morsi's incompetence in dealing with this issue were raised by the demonstrations that ultimately, with the military intervention, brought an end to Morsi's rule (El-Beairy, 2013).

4. Chapter Four

Egyptian Foreign Policy Towards Turkey During the Arab Spring

I apply in this chapter my preferred tools of neoclassical realism's theory to the following three levels of interaction that impacted the Egyptian foreign policy towards Turkey during the Arab Spring. The first level is the domestic attitudes in Egypt and Turkey towards each other. The second deals with regional powers' policies towards Turkey's approach to the Arab Spring. The third examines to what extent did the international players' encourage the adoption of the Turkish model by Arab Spring countries.

4.1. Background

Initially at the early days of the Arab Spring in 2011, Turkey was believed to be the biggest winner of the Arab Spring. Most Egyptians and Arabs thought that Turkey had played the 'most constructive' role in the Arab events. Its PM at the time, Recep Erdoğan, was the most admired among world leaders, and those who envision a new president for Egypt wanted the new president to look most like Erdoğan. Egyptians wanted their country to look more like Turkey than any of the other Muslim, Arab, and other choices provided (Telhami, 2011). All regional powers, the US and Europe supported the Turkish role to help the Arab Spring's countries hoping that they would adopt Turkey's choices of a secular government and a free-market economy (Gerges, 2013).

By mid-2013 Erdogan's strongest ally, the Egyptian MB, failed to govern their country. People took the streets asking MB's President Morsi to step down or conduct early elections. MB adamantly refused to accept the Egyptian people's demand for early elections. Its file and rank brothers occupied some of the major squares in Cairo and insisted on fighting back the military which sided with people's position and removed Morsi (Trager, 2017),

The new Egyptian government eventually banned MB and jailed many of its members, including Morsi himself. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan were the main backers of

that change and, after a brief reluctance, the US and the EU acquiesced. This was a serious blow to Turkey's power projection and the new alliance it was forging with a Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt. Afterward, we witnessed a deep regional and international division of positions toward those developments in Egypt and parallel setbacks in the rest of the Arab Spring countries. However, Erdoğan did not alter his policies in response to these radical regional changes and the international concurrence. He was more focused on his own domestic political considerations.

4.2. Domestic Attitudes in Egypt and Turkey Towards Each Other

Turkey was considered a role model for many political factions in Egypt (Kalin, 2011). Secular political parties and groups felt even more inclined to admire the Turkish model than MB's leaders did (Faaruki, et al., 2017). Erdoğan was already a folkloric hero in Egypt and the Arab world with his theatrical behavior during the debate with an Israeli official in Davos or his public calls to lift the siege on Gaza Strip.

Many of the Egyptian MB's activists and leaders were arrested by the Israeli authorities on board the „Mavi Marmara“, a Turkish ship which was seized by Israel while trying to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians in Gaza. Nine Turks lost their lives in clashes with the Israeli military on board of that ship. The incident added to the popularity of Erdoğan and his model in Egypt. To Egyptian secular liberals, the attraction of the Turkish model was multifaceted (Khalil, 2012).

The Justice and Development Party (in Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP) was mainly supported by Islamists who chose to run for political power in a secular western democratic system. Their political campaigning was not about enforcing Sharia law (Islamic religious law) but rather advocating a liberal open-door economic policy with a strong role of the government to promote social welfare. Foreign policy was a very successful tool in the hands of the AKP to further the appeal to its domestic constituency. Pursuing an active, independent and effective foreign policy complemented the AKP's government's domestic performance and raised its leaders' political popularity and public support (Ghanim, 2008).

By 2011, The AKP government continued Turkey's active participation in NATO and was still energetically pursuing EU membership. It exerted enormous effort to adopt structural changes in the Turkish political, economic and social systems to adapt to the EU Copenhagen criteria required to join the Union. One of the most important targets of this process was to increase the competitive ability of Turkish products to penetrate EU markets. Applying the same European industrial and infrastructure standards enabled Turkey to sell its machines and buses to Germany, France and some of the Nordic countries (Ülgen, 2017).

At the same time, Egyptians were also admiring the performance of Turkish economy despite the global economic crisis of 2008. In eight years, the Turkish economy tripled its size and literally implemented a very conservative economic reform program tailored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). „AKP's economic and political achievements in domestic politics, considerably raised Turkey's prestige in the region, and as a result, Ankara began to be considered a center of soft power and an attractive model in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East.“ (Kalin, 2011).

Using Western and European democratic parameters, Erdogan was able to limit the political powers of the Turkish military and judiciary. He was also able to cite the public opinion and parliament's opposition as good reasons to turn down an American request to use the Turkish territory for invading Iraq in 2003. To balance this reluctance towards the US, Erdogan reached out to Israel and improved his economic and military ties with the Zionist State (as he used to call Israel later on).

The AKP government was able to maintain a very active and independent regional policy. The Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu designed and implemented a strategy that is targeting the Middle East and Balkans as Turkey's strategic depth. He was actively engaged in mediating between the Israelis and Syrians in 2006 and between the West and Iran in 2010 and declared a Zero-Problems-Policy towards all Turkey's neighbors (Davutoğlu, 2020 p. 89). With its domestic and regional successes, Turkey was considered a custodian, model and God father for many of the political factions that led the Arab uprisings in 2011 (Yilmaz , et al., 2011).

Applying neoclassical realism to Turkish foreign policy during the Arab Spring led a Turkish researcher to reach the following conclusions which I agree with:

“In the 2011 general elections, the AKP secured a single-party rule for the third consecutive time since 2002 by gaining 49 per cent of the votes. For the AKP, it was a landslide victory that fortified its hegemony in Turkish politics and proved that opposition parties were still too weak to offer alternatives. This victory fed into the AKP’s self-aggrandizement and convinced its officials that they were ideologically and politically on the right path. In the following years, for instance, some senior AKP officials went so far as to propose that Turkey’s successes under the AKP rule inspired the revolution and reform processes in the Arab world.

Turkey vigorously promoted the Turkish and the AKP model to Arab countries experiencing a period of regime change and political transition. These activities included political intervention in these countries’ internal affairs, and in some cases military intervention as well. The AKP’s 2011 electoral victory provided the party with enough self-confidence and public support to implement an ambitious and interventionist foreign policy in the region” (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

The domestic situation in Egypt was also very ripe for closer relations with Turkey. Mubarak was reserved toward Erdogan because of the latter’s MB background and his populist foreign policy against the siege on Gaza. However, Mubarak was more congenial to the then Turkish President Abdullah Gul. In July 2010, Mubarak received Gul as his guest of honor at the graduation of the Egyptian military academy’s cadets (Gul, 2010). The old Egyptian leader, with his military background, wanted to show Erdogan’s partner a different kind of relations with the military other than the one of rivalry and tutelage that dominated Turkey for half a century. Mubarak must have also wanted to strengthen Gul’s hands in Turkish politics.

Gul was pictured in Turkish newspapers surrounded by Egyptian Generals who saluted the Turkish flag when it landed together with the Egyptian flag from a military helicopter at the end of the parade. Probably that was why Gul was the first head of State to visit Egypt in March 2011 only three weeks after Mubarak stepped down and conceded power to his military generals (Yilmaz , et al., 2011).

In Cairo, all the Egyptian political leaders who supported the uprising were very eager to meet with Gul particularly the “Young Revolutionaries”. Gul impressed them as an intellectual with western higher education who also has millions of followers on his twitter account. They impressed him by reporting on their meeting with him on the Facebook while talking to him. He invited all of them to come to Turkey to see first-hand how its political model worked especially while AKP was preparing to win its landslide victory one month later (PALDF, 2011).

A group of about fifty of the Egyptian “Youth of the Revolution” visited Turkey at Gul’s fully- paid-for invitation. They spent about a week meeting with various AKP officials and shadowing Ahmet Davutoglu in his own elections campaign for a parliament seat at his original hometown of Konia. It is worth noticing that these youngsters were observing for the first time in their life a western style democracy in action in a predominantly Muslim country. In my own personal conversations with them during their visit to Turkey, they all spoke very highly of the Turkish political elections model with the exception, strangely, of the Muslim Brotherhood youth. These disciplined young men were more interested in learning how AKP ran the country successfully for nine years and what did the civil-military relations look like (Salaheldin, 2019).

Turkish and Egyptian newspapers alike printed photos of the youngsters’ meetings with Gul, Erdogan and Davutoglu on their front pages. Both sides played the Arab Spring cards to maximize their domestic political gains (PALDF, 2011).

With MB’s Mohamed Morsi’s election as a president in June 2012, relations between Egypt and Turkey reached a historical peak. Morsi visited Ankara to attend an AKP political conference to support Erdogan. He was treated as a hero and a guest of honor. Again, both Morsi and Erdogan were addressing their domestic constituencies and buttressing each other’s political career at home. Erdogan provided two billion USD in soft loans to Cairo, which was experiencing serious economic problems and could not reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for loans to fund its huge balance of payment’s deficit. During Erdoğan’s second visit to post-revolution Egypt in November 2012, twenty-seven agreements of cooperation in many fields were signed between the two parties including the establishment of a high Strategic Council (Kuru, 2013).

During 2010, there were only three senior (ministerial) visits exchanged between Egypt and Turkey. In comparison, the following two years witnessed 17 official visits between top officials in the two countries as shown in the following list (Salaheldin, 2019).

Exchanged visits of senior officials between Turkey and Egypt (2011-2013):

- Turkish President Gul visited Egypt on 3 March 2011. He was the first foreign Head of State to visit Cairo after former president Mubarak stepped down.
- Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr visited Ankara and Istanbul on 10 and 11 August 2011. He met with his Turkish counterpart, the Turkish President and Prime Minister.
- Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visited Egypt from 12 to 14 September 2011 with a very large governmental and business delegation.
- The Egyptian Minister of Transportation, Galal El Saieed, visited Ankara on the 22nd and the 23rd of April 2012 to sign with his Turkish counterpart the agreement of launching a Roll-on-Roll-off Maritime transportation Line (RORO) between Turkish and Egyptian ports on the Mediterranean.
- The Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Egypt in July 2012 to be the first foreign official to meet with the, then, newly elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.
- The Assistant of the Egyptian President for Foreign Affairs, Essam El Haddad, and the ministers of Finance and International Cooperation visited Istanbul on 6 September 2012 to negotiate the terms of a Turkish two-billion-dollars-loan to Egypt.
- Egyptian Senator Reda Fahmy of MB and the chairman of the Egyptian Senate (Shura Council) visited Turkey on the 17th and the 18th of September 2012 and met with the Turkish speaker of the parliament and the foreign minister.
- Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi visited Ankara on 30 September 2012 to address the national convention of the Turkish AKP ruling party and to have extensive discussions with the Turkish president, prime minister, opposition leaders and business entrepreneurs.
- Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visited Cairo on the 17th and the 18th of November 2012. He had extended meetings with all senior government and opposition officials and religious leaders. He also addressed a big gathering of Egyptian politicians and intellectuals at Cairo University.

- The Egyptian Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Khaled Al Azhary visited Turkey on the 23rd and the 24th of January 2013 to meet with his counterparts and seek Turkish help with reinvigorating Egyptian bankrupted public sector's enterprises.
- Turkish President Gul visited Cairo from 6 to 8 February 2013. He attended the summit meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). He also met with his Egyptian counterpart and with Egyptian and Turkish businessmen.
- Dr. Ashraf El Araby, the Egyptian Minister of International cooperation visited Ankara from 14 to 16 March 201. He met with Turkish ministers of Industry, Planning, Environment and construction. They discussed ways and means to use the Turkish 2 billion dollars loans to Egypt.
- The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) sent a delegation of its senior officials to Cairo in early April 2013 to offer the Egyptian officials assistance with vocational training.
- The Egyptian Minister of Investment visited Istanbul on the 5th and the 6th of April 2013. He attended the Turkish-Arab Economic forum, met with his Turkish counterpart and had several meetings with business people.
- The Egyptian Minister of Sports visited Turkey from 11 to 13 April 2013 and met his Turkish counterpart. He proposed several projects for Turkish investment in Egyptian sports.
- The Egyptian Adviser to the President led a delegation of senior Egyptian officials of the presidency different ministries. They visited Turkey from 15 to 21 April 2013. TIKA hosted them and paid for all their visit's expenses. They explored how can Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood's rule benefit.
- The Egyptian Minister of Defense Military Production (the current president of Egypt), Abd El Fattah El Sisi visited Istanbul to attend an arms exhibition. He met with his Turkish counterpart and Prime Minister Erdogan.
- Egyptian Prime Minister Kandeel visited Istanbul from the 9th to the 11th of May 2013. He attended a summit meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). He also met with his Turkish counterpart, Erdogan, and with President Gul.

In about two years, the number of the exchanged visits between Egypt and Turkey skyrocketed. It included officials of all levels, politicians, businessmen and intellectuals.

Turks were happily providing their expertise to their Egyptian counterparts in all spheres of public life and government; from running an open market economy to dealing with transportation problems and recycling garbage (Salaheldin, 2019).

Gradually the two sides had started to recognize differences between their domestic settings. The Egyptian MB came only to power with the protest vote of many groups who did not want a return to Mubarak's era. These groups included a wide range of political spectrum ranging from the religiously conservative Salafists to the liberal revolutionaries. MB itself did not have the wide political support nor the economic and social achievement record that AKP had enjoyed after successfully ruling Turkey for about ten years (Balcer, 2012).

AKP officials were also closely following domestic developments in Egypt. They looked with admiration to MB's Morsi's decision, only few weeks after his inauguration as the president, to retire the minister of defense Tantawi and the military chief of staff Anan, the two generals who ruled the country since Mubarak stepped down and who handed power over to Morsi on his election. AKP officials and their Turkish media did not hide their euphoric celebration of their Egyptian affiliates success in an achievement that took them 10 years of trying in Turkey and could not fully attain (Anadolu-News, 2011-2013).

The Egyptian MB's officials refuted any claims that it was Erdogan who advised them to sack the highest top brass generals. They publicly bragged that Egypt under the Brotherhood's rule will soon present a new model for the whole Arab and Muslim world to look up to and a high example to follow (Kuru, 2013). Ironically, the MB's President, Mohamed Morsi, picked General Abdel Fattah El Sisi to become the new defense minister. In less than a year later El Sisi sided with another popular uprising against Morsi and forcibly removed him from the presidency and jailed most MB's leaders who tried to organize violent resistance to the new interim regime. In one more year, El Sisi overwhelmingly won a presidential election and became the internationally recognized president of Egypt (Lynch, 2018).

After spending almost 80 years in the opposition (mostly underground), MB also lacked a coherent political, economic and social program to implement after it controlled both the executive and the legislative branches of the government in Egypt.

For more than four decades, MB's leaders built their popularity on disgracing Mubarak's and Sadat's open-door policy, submission to the IMF requirements and their peace with Israel. When in power, MB's leaders woke up to the fact that they needed to negotiate an economic austerity agreement with the IMF to get only 4.8 billion dollars in loans and a certificate of good health for the troubled Egyptian economy. Even their closest allies such as Turkey and Qatar were expecting and encouraging them to continue to preserve peace with Israel which was also vital for them to secure an opening with the US and other western powers (Trager, 2017).

In addition to the crippling economic domestic problems that tied down the foreign policy decision making of the Muslim Brotherhood's government, its own political ideology and beliefs provided an added restraint. Morsi was cursed by foes and allies for addressing the Israeli president as my dear friend in a letter transmitting the credentials of the new Egyptian ambassador in Tel Aviv. MB's long maintained rhetoric against peace with Israel discredited his argument that it was a standard diplomatic formula used in most ambassadorial letters of credence. He was also reminded by leftist members of the parliament of his fierce opposition, when he himself was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentarian group, against all agreements with IMF and their attached reform strings. His government was therefore forced to pull out of negotiations for an agreement that it badly needed (AlmasyAlyoum, 2012).

I referred earlier to many domestic political mistakes committed by the inexperienced MB's government. They included keeping Mubarak's old guards in key decision-making positions such as the Foreign minister, Former ambassador Mohamed Kamel Amr, the defense minister, General El Sisi, and the chief of intelligence, General Raafat Shehata who was the deputy intelligence chief for about ten years under Mubarak. The only key foreign policy official from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood was Essam El Haddad, the president's adviser for foreign affairs. He was President Morsi's confidant and close adviser despite his lack of foreign policy's knowledge or experience (Salaheldin, 2019). Many of those mistakes committed by the MB leaders had a direct impact on limiting their freedom of action in handling domestic and foreign problems. These fatal blunders included, among many others: attempting to combat, rather than cooperate with those political groups who started the uprising and supported Morsi in the elections, trying to undercut the judiciary, banning all parliamentarians affiliated with Mubarak's ruling party

including influential rural clans and tribes from participating in elections for ten years, side-lining the business community by creating its own business organization, vowing to „cleanse“ the media of opposition and calling for „restructuring and reforming“ the Interior Ministry (The Police), (El-Sherif, 2014).

In less than one year in power, MB created numerous political opponents and scared off many other bystanders. That was exactly the opposite of what Erdogan’s party AKP had done in its first eight years in power in Turkey where it was keen on gaining supporters, building alliances and avoiding needless confrontations (Benhaïm , et al., 2016).

From a neoclassical realist’s perspective, both AKP and MB were focused on domestic considerations while drawing their foreign policy towards each other and the Arab Spring. They also both made many miscalculations because of this limitation. MB paid dearly and expeditiously for these errors and limitations when it was driven out of power by another popular uprising that was even bigger than the one brought it to the throne and was also supported by the military. The AKP government’s foreign policy also suffered many losses regionally and internationally because of its unproportioned focus on domestic affairs while making its foreign policy decisions on how to deal with the Arab Spring in order to maximize its national security and international influence.

4.3. Regional Powers’ Policies Towards Turkey’s Approach to the Arab Spring

Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister during the Arab Spring wrote a book titled „The Strategic Depth“ in 2001 when he was teaching political science and Middle Eastern politics at the University in Turkey (Davutoglu, 2010). This book turned to be the blueprint of the AKP’s government foreign policy since it came to power in 2002. It’s quite interesting to note that the first translation of this important book was to Arabic language and was published 10 years after the Turkish version was first published and only when the author moved from his position as PM Erdogan’s foreign affairs advisor to become the Turkish foreign minister on the eve of the Arab Spring.

Ahmet Davutoglu advocated the return of Turkey to its regional strategic depth in the Balkan and Middle East without giving up on its existing strong ties with the West,

exemplified in its membership in NATO, and its continued aspiration to join the EU. He cited historic, strategic, cultural and religious reasons for his strategy. The AKP's government constituency of Islamists were natural fans and supporters of such a strategy. Most of them was yearning to restore the glory days of the Ottoman Empire. They wanted to revive their Islamic cultural tradition and their historic ties with the Middle East that Ataturk had unsuccessfully tried to eradicate (Davutoglu, 2010).

Since 2002, the AKP government tried to open to its immediate neighbors via trade, investment and tourism. The Turkish Anatolian small and medium size businesses primarily owned by conservative Islamists (Green Money) wanted access to nearby markets for their fair quality products. AKP government offered each of its neighboring countries a three-folded proposal of fraternity; a free trade agreement, a free visa entry and a strategic joint high-level council. Before the Arab Spring, Turkey had at least one of these three forms of agreement with most of the Middle East and Balkan countries. On the eve of the Arab Spring and at the peak of Erdogan's popularity in the Arab world after the Mavi Marmara's incident, Turkey moved a step further in 2010 when it formed a sub-regional collective free trade and free visa zone with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan (Tocci , et al., 2011).

Davutoglu described his country's regional vision as promoting full regional integration, maximizing political dialogue, establishing high-level strategic cooperation councils with each country on a bilateral basis, finalizing visa exemption and free trade agreements to ensure economic integration, building energy and trade networks, establishing the most comprehensive transportation system, protecting cultural diversity, and respecting ethnic and sectarian pluralism (Davutoglu, 2013).

On the eve of the Arab Spring and in the last Arab summit held in Sirte, Libya, in 2010 Amr Moussa, the Secretary General of the Arab league called on Turkey to join the Arab regional system in a strategic dialogue as one of the friendly neighboring major power with strong historic, cultural and economic ties to the Arab world. In September 2011, Erdogan was invited to address Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo at the start of his Middle Eastern tour to cheer the results of the Arab Spring. While winning over ordinary Arabs, particularly with his Turkey's tough line toward Israel, Erdogan's growing

popularity and clout was a headache for more cautious Arab leaders who could see their own influence overshadowed (Karadeniz, et al., 2011).

There were also some other reasons for concern on the part of big Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia that made them reluctant to wholeheartedly accept this Turkish rapprochement with the Arab world. The first reason of concern was the AKP's strong affiliation with political Islamic movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey was also portrayed for half a century as the fingernail of NATO in the Middle East. Erdogan himself was warmly welcomed by many Western capitals who thought of Turkey before 2012 as a possible model of a Middle Eastern secular democracy which happened to be also predominantly Muslim (Benhaïm , et al., 2016).

Egypt's free trade agreement with Turkey was signed in Cairo on 27 December 2005 after 6 rounds of negotiations and entered into force on 1 March 2007. In 3 years-time and on the eve of the Arab Spring, the trade volume between the two countries tripled and reached 3 billion dollars, two thirds of which was Turkish exports to Egypt. Meanwhile Turkish investments in Egypt also tripled to reach one billion dollars in 2011 (Tumiad, 2019).

Before the Arab Spring, about 80 Anatolian small and medium size businessmen moved their small factories to new industrial zones in Egypt, where they would enjoy cheap energy and labor at one fifth of their cost in their hometowns back in Turkey. Turkish textile and clothing products which were produced in Egypt also enjoy a free tariff tax access in the whole of the Arab world, most of the African countries such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the US Qualified Industrialized Zones (QIZ). In 2011, the two countries had a combined market of 160 million in population, 1.7 million square kilometers in land size, and a combined GDP of almost one trillion USD (Davutoglu, 2013).

Mubarak's government, however, was reluctant to conclude with Turkey neither the free visa nor the high strategic council agreements. For the reasons cited above, political relations between the two countries were not very intimate. Erdogan also aggravated the Egyptian leadership when he sided with the Palestinian Hamas faction (an affiliate of the

Muslim Brotherhood) in its struggle to lift the siege on Gaza (Anadolu-News, 2011-2013).

AKP loyalists were on board of a convoy of assistance in January 2010 that carried food, medicine and construction materials to Gaza. When turned away by Israel, Egypt agreed to receive the ship at the Egyptian port of Al Arish and to have the supplies checked and delivered to Gaza across the Egyptian borders. The Turkish Islamists stormed the Egyptian borders' check point with Gaza trying to deliver truckloads of assistance without inspection. Egypt has a Peace Treaty obligation with Israel which is acting as the occupying power in Gaza. Egyptian police arrested the angry Turkish activists and did not allow the delivery of the assistance until the required inspection and coordination was completed. The incident bruised the Turkish-Egyptian relationship for some time (Taflioglu, 2013).

Many observers were expecting a bigger crisis between the two countries in May 2010 if the Turkish ship „Mavi Marmara“ were to be turned away by the Israelis and would end up again at Al Arish port (Hurriyet). This is probably why some Egyptian MB leaders were on board of that ship. The Israelis had unintentionally, however, saved the Egyptian-Turkish relationship another blow when they stormed the ship and captured all its passengers after killing 9 Turkmen and one of whom was also an American citizen (Anadolu-News, 2011-2013).

As soon as the first Arab uprising took place in Tunisia, the AKP government followed the same pattern of reaction by asking the sitting Arab leaders to make political concessions and open up to the oppositions' demands and make substantial reforms of their political systems. In Tunisia and Egypt, the developments were quick, and their two leaders stepped down in few days. In Syria, Libya and Yemen, the sitting presidents did not give up their power peacefully and used military force against their opposition. The Turkish response was quite different in these three cases (Yilmaz , et al., 2011).

In Syria with its adjacent borders, Turkey had turned its former ally Bashar Al Assad into an evil enemy. AKP government hosted the military Syrian opposition and provided them with weapons and free access to the very long unguarded Turkish Syrian borders. Turkey acted also as a hub for Western and Arab Intelligence services who wanted to get

rid of the Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. In the first four years of the war in Syria, Erdogan welcomed more than one million Syrian refugees and offered Turkish citizenship to the well-educated among them. Later, Turkey asked the EU for 10 billion dollars to establish a demilitarized zone in the north of Syria and build new cities and villages to resettle the refugees whose numbers exceeded 3 million in Turkey in 2019 (UNHCR, 2019). Accordingly, Istanbul was the Mecca for US, NATO, EU and Arab countries when they wanted to discuss Syria's future (Danforth, 2018).

In Libya, AKP loyalists had major investment projects. They were worried to lose them if Kaddafi would remain in power after the uprisings. Therefore, Turkey was less enthusiastic about joining NATO in bombarding Kaddafi's troops. The same reluctance was also shown in Yemen because of the involvement of a Saudi-Iranian rivalry there, in which Turkey did not want to take sides (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

In the Egyptian case things were much clearer and more decisive. From day one of the uprising, Turkey was against Mubarak and for an immediate change of the regime there. AKP reached out to all political parties and groups in Egypt after Mubarak stepped down. It is well known now that they gave special attention and trainings to the Muslim Brotherhood's cadets in political campaigning and running the government functions (Elreeny, 2018).

On the regional level, the Turkish role in Egypt and the rest of the Arab Spring countries was initially encouraged by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The two countries consulted and coordinated with Turkish officials on every regional step towards the Arab Spring countries and Egypt was no exception. Iran has welcomed this special relationship between Egypt and Turkey. They were reminded of Ahmed Davutoglu's prediction in his „Strategic Depth“ book about the trio, Egypt, Turkey and Iran, which would dominate the strategic space of the Middle East and constitute its three main pillars (Davutoglu, 2010). The trio's presidents met in early 2013 in Cairo at an OIC summit that witnessed the first visit of an Iranian president to Egypt since the Iranian revolution. Egyptian president Morsi, announced that a solution to most crisis in the region especially the one in Syria could only be solved through the joint effort of the major four powers in the region Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia (Kuru, 2013).

Assuming that political Islam would ultimately prevail in all Arab Spring countries as it did in 2012 in Tunis and Egypt, all the regional powers encouraged Turkish moderating role to domesticate this new wild political power. Most important players in the region and internationally were content with this growing special relationship between Turkey and the Arab Spring countries especially with Egypt. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu underlined the emergence of a new axis between Turkey and Egypt since Morsi's election and deemed this axis extremely important in order to maintain order and stability in the Middle East.

“Egypt is an important country connecting this area (north Africa) to other regions. Turkey considers the successful democratic experience of Egypt as the single biggest strategic asset in the region. Egypt and Turkey are rapidly heading towards creating the most important bilateral axis in the region. Each and every success of Egypt is as precious as Turkey's own success. Therefore, we support all the economic and diplomatic moves that Egypt will make. The Turkish-Egyptian axis is extremely important in order to maintain order and stability in the Middle East. For example, Turkey and Egypt worked side by side in achieving a ceasefire in Gaza in November 2012. Turkey believed that Egypt should be the main actor of this process. Also, Turkey does not want to be part of any plan that would mean the almost re-implementation of the Cold War parameters that could see Turkey and Egypt form two separate blocs. Turkey also does not want to see a new Cold War structure in the region built upon either religious or ethnic fragmentation. Therefore, Turkey is pursuing a foreign policy to limit the scope of such a culture of confrontation” (Davutoglu, 2013).

Many reasons account for the regional dramatic reversal that happened in 2013. The failure of the Brotherhood to govern in Egypt, the Syrian military stalemate because of the Russian and Iranian intervention and the unravelling of MB's conspiracy to stage a coup d'état in United Arab Emirates, were some of the most important reasons for the dramatic change of the strategic landscape in the Middle East in 2013 and onward (Lynch, 2018).

There were also important regional developments after 2013 that shifted the regional balance away from Turkey. Firstly, in July 2013, the military answered the call of another

uprising in Egypt and toppled President Morsi. The new government eventually banned the Muslim Brotherhood and jailed many of its members, including Morsi himself. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan were the main backers of that change, and the US and the EU acquiesced. This was a serious blow to Turkey's power projection and the new alliance it was forging with a Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt. Secondly, Ennahda's government was unable to provide security and stability in post-revolution Tunisia and was forced out in 2014. It lost the ensuing parliamentary and presidential elections to its secularist rival, Nidaa Tunis (Mansouri, 2016). These two developments completely went against the AKP's predictions of high performance of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties in free elections all over north Africa (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

Finally, the growing chaos in Syria ran also counter to the AKP's policy projection and started to destabilize and isolate Turkey at the same time. The resilience of the Syrian regime and the weakness of the opposition foiled Turkey's designs. It was soon evident that Bashar al Assad still enjoyed considerable support nationally by the Syrian minorities, regionally by Iran and Hezbollah, and globally by Russia. Moreover, the US disappointed the rebels in 2013 by reaching a deal with Russia on the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal rather than hitting Syria militarily (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

The US gradually understood that, under these circumstances, the removal of Assad without a viable alternative could only produce devastating consequences for the security and stability of the region. As ISIS consolidated its power in Syria's north and east with a new offensive in 2014, the fight against jihadist groups became Washington's new priority, which benefited the Assad regime. Meanwhile, the Syrian Islamic opposition remained weak and fragmented. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party PYD emerged as the most effective force fighting against ISIS in the eyes of Western nations (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

With the weakening of the moderate Sunni opposition and the collapse of the Free Syrian Army, Turkey committed itself to the support of Salafist groups, who cooperated with Jihadist groups. Turkey supported in particular Ahrar al-Sham (Islamic Movement of Free Men of the Levant), a Salafist organization that fights shoulder to shoulder with the Al-Nusra Front, an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. By the end of 2013, Turkey's

surrogates in Syria started to be a cause of worry for the western countries and later to Saudi Arabia and UAE (Danforth, 2018).

4.4. International Players' Encouragement of the Turkish Model for Arab Spring Countries

The idea of promoting Turkey as a model for Muslims and Arabs was not born with the Arab Spring. It had been proposed at least twice before 2011. The first was in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's model of turning the Ottoman state to a European style republic, salient features of which were westernizing and secularizing the nation state. Atatürk's model was imitated by Iran, under Reza Shah Pahlavi, and later by Tunisia and (partly) Algeria. Turkey was assigned a leadership role in creating a pro-western Middle Eastern military alliance against the Soviet Union in the mid 1950's (Balcer, 2012). The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), originally known as the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), was formed in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The then young Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser opted for a rather non-aligned neutral approach toward the cold war and successfully campaigned against such alliance (Dell'Aguzzo, et al., 2016).

Looking up to Turkish democracy as a model emerged for the second time after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Turkey's westernizing and secularizing nation-state aspects were presented as model to the newly emerging independent Turkish states in Central Asia by Western advisors. Turkey was a successful example of a self-imposed westernized democracy, secular society, and open-market economy. To most western powers and strategists, the so called „Turkish Model“ was a safeguard against the possibilities of rising extremism and anti-Western feelings in the Arab and Muslim worlds (Kireçci, 2012).

Since early 2000's and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US tried again to promote the Turkish model to the troubled Middle East countries. Both Bush and Obama called the Turkish American relations a special „Model Partnership“ without specifying for whom. In the 2004 G8 summit's Greater Middle East Initiative, Turkey was given a key role in training young Arabs on liberal political rights and political participation as an effective tool to combat the appeal of Islamist extremism (Bagci, et al., 2007).

NATO also gave Turkey the same key role in its own initiative to modernize and moderate the wild Middle East. Turkey played a behind the scene influential role in many of the NATO reach out to the Greater Middle East such as: The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) to develop its political and military relations with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) to facilitate political dialogue with Middle Eastern countries including Egypt; the wider political discussions in the North Atlantic Council to include briefings on a range of Middle Eastern and Mediterranean issues (Bagci, et al., 2007).

Most western scholars favorably greeted the Turkish support of the Arab Spring and rushed to suggest the Turkish model for all the transforming Arab Spring countries to adopt. They cited several reasons. Some argued that „Turkey has become viewed as a model for emerging democracies of the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) due to three main factors: the balancing of Islam and democracy through a bottom-up approach to Islam, sustainable economic growth and development, and the ability to exercise soft power in the region.“ Others thought that „Turkey would be appealing to the people of the MENA region not only because of a cultural affinity based on Islam, but more importantly the AKP’s ability to detach the military from domestic politics.“ (Rane, 2012).

Many praised Turkey’s „free-market economy and expanding economic partners; a culture of tolerance and inter-civilizational dialogue; constructive relations with neighboring countries; and engaging with Europe and the West based on a Western identity while engaging with the Muslims world based on an Islamic identity“ (Rane, 2012). Davutoglu pointed to the pro-active approach displayed by Turkey as providing a „demonstration effect“ in terms of Turkey’s appeal to the Muslim world based on „its deepening democracy, booming economy and increasingly independent foreign policy“ (Davutoglu, 2013).

According to a 2011 Arab public opinion poll conducted by the Brookings Institution and Zogby International „Turkey was found to be the biggest winner of the Arab Spring. In the five countries polled, Turkey is seen to have played the „most constructive” role in the Arab events. Its prime minister, Recep Erdoğan, is the most admired among world

leaders, and those who envision a new president for Egypt want the new president to look most like Erdoğan. Egyptians wanted their country to look more like Turkey than any of the other Muslim, Arab and other choices provided.“ (Telhami, 2011).

Tunisian politicians and leading officials made it no secret that they looked up to Turkey as an example and model for the reformed political regime they aspire to establish. Egyptian politicians did not have the same agreement about the Turkish model even among the MB's leaders.

In the aftermath of Mubarak's overthrow and the establishment of Egypt's MB political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), representatives of the party suggested that Turkey would provide a model for the party and the country. While this position was maintained by some Muslim Brotherhood's leaders such as Momhammad Badie, the spiritual leader of MB, FJP deputy leader Essam El-Erian had been a vocal critic of Erdoğan's remarks that Muslims should not be wary of secularism, which the Turkish prime minister made on Egyptian television at Cairo Opera during a visit in September 2011 (El-Sherif, 2014).

Many Egyptian MB's leaders believed that they should learn from the Turkish experience and use AKP assistance to revive the Egyptian economy and to reach out to western partners. They also privately thought, however, that Egypt should and could never be secular or otherwise they would lose their legitimacy and popular support. They also believed that they cannot wait for more than ten more years to get rid of the military tutelage as the AKP did. However, Egyptian MB's leaders were aware of the Turkish Model's favorable image in the US, Europe and the rest of the western world and tried their best to pretend that they were following Erdoğan's footsteps (El-Sherif, 2014).

Nuri Yeşilyurt of Ankara University made a very good neoclassical realist's analysis of the international systemic environment of the Arab spring. He argued that „from a structural realist point of view, it can be argued that the main systemic factor was the gradual disengagement of the US from the Middle East under the Obama administration, a result of the new “pivot to Asia” strategy. With the US military pullback from Afghanistan and Iraq, regional powers such as Turkey and Iran found opportunities to manifest themselves in the region. Meanwhile, the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011 substantially changed the regional balance of power. When combined with the US

disengagement from the region starting in 2009, the sudden collapse of once-stable Arab regimes beginning in 2011 created an enormous power vacuum in the Middle East. This situation gave Turkey a considerable structural incentive to engage more actively in regional affairs and fill the gap that was created with the unfolding revolutions.“ (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

I wholeheartedly agree with the above analysis. I would however disagree with Yeşilyurt's claim that the international systemic signals were not clear toward Turkey during the Arab Spring. Obama's administration made it very clear that it was encouraging a Turkish leading role in managing the fluid situation of the Arab Spring. Obama was calling Erdogan on the phone regularly to consult him on important developments (Gerges, 2013 p. 312). The signals from the US were vague, undetermined and confusing to the Egyptian leadership throughout the Arab spring and probably until today. Obama, on the other hand, was very clear in his support of the Turkish activism favoring the change in the Arab Spring countries and trying to influence it to be “A'la Turk”.

Yeşilyurt's misreading of the systemic signals led him to mistakenly conclude that „It was during the Libyan Crisis (2011) that Turkish policymakers learned more clearly about the structural constraints and opportunities created by the Arab Uprisings. After the quick and (relatively) bloodless revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, it was Turkey's first serious encounter with the Arab Spring. As the uprising in Libya quickly evolved into an armed conflict between the regime forces and the rebels, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's initial policy was strictly against any kind of military intervention; instead, he encouraged a dialogue between the two sides. However, there was not much support for this approach in either the Arab World or the West, and eventually it alienated the rebels. Unable to prevent the Arab League's and the UN Security Council's resolutions to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, Turkey was forced in March 2011 to change its position and join the noncombatant components of NATO operations under United Nations' Security Council (UNSC) Resolution No. 1973.“ (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

I would argue that Erdogan himself was quite aware of the systemic limits and opportunities from the very beginning of the Arab Spring. He was ready to switch from Turkish soft power to aggressive tools of intervention since day one of the Arab Spring.

On February 4, 2011 when Mubarak was still trying to hold on to power and signs of a civil war in Egypt were on the horizon, Erdogan announced his country's willingness to join an international intervention in Egypt. He offered Turkish ships carrying humanitarian assistance supplies (Anadolu-News, 2011-2013). Two weeks after Mubarak's departure, Turkey sent its ships to evacuate the Egyptians who were stranded by the Libyan civil war (Bassiouni, 2016).

Erdogan was also well informed of the western plans against Libya's Kaddafi and in support of the rebels. However, Turkey had more than 15 billion dollars of investment in Libya and thousands of Turks were working in these projects. Erdogan was responding to domestic pressures when he showed reluctance to go along the French-led campaign to have NATO enforce the no-fly-zone and bomb Kaddafi's troops. He made a compromise by agreeing to join the non-combatant NATO units enforcing the no-fly-zone that was authorized by the Arab League and the United Nations (Anadolu-News, 2011-2013). Kaddafi allowed the Turkish ships to go into Libyan ports that were still under his troops control to evacuate the Turks and the Egyptians. Both levels of the neoclassical realism theory were working then in harmony; the systemic (international and regional), and the unit-level intervening variables (domestic), (Sheira, 2014).

An Egyptian American scholar suggested the following explanation for Obama's bidding on Turkey's role vis-à-vis the Arab Spring's countries. "Having decided to reduce America's military footprint in the region and lower its profile, Obama looked to Turkey, with its liberal, successful economic model, to fill any power vacuum there and serve as an example to neighboring Muslim countries. Indeed, Turkey has provided the US with cultural and strategic depth in its engagement with the region. As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey has played a supporting role in Afghanistan and northern Iraq, and until recently served as a strategic mediator between Iran and the West and between Israel and Syria" (Gerges, 2013 p. 371).

I think Erdogan major oversight, however, was to believe that these international systemic signals would continue to coincide with his ambitious plan to empower MB's affiliate parties to rule all the Arab spring countries. Because of his domestic political consideration or stubbornness, he did not pay attention to the changing international

signals that should have been alarming to him to change his policy by mid-2013 (Bekdil, 2017).

The military sided with the popular demand and overthrew the MB's regime in Egypt and rounded up all its leaders including President Morsi. Both Saudi Arabia and UAE wholeheartedly supported the change. The US recognized the military stalemate in Syria because of the Russian intervention and made a deal with Putin to destroy some Syrian chemical stockpiles rather than have an American-Russian military showdown in Syria (Anderson, 2016).

Islamists fared poorly in Libyan elections, but they did not want to concede power. Egypt and the UAE emerged as the main backers of the Tobruk-based, secularist Chamber of Deputies against the Tripoli-based General Nationalist Congress, which contained Islamist factions such as the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), and which was backed by Turkey and Qatar. Ultimately, Qatar turned out to be the only Arab Gulf country that sided with Turkey in its Muslim Brotherhood-focused regional policy (Steinberg, 2014). The US and the rest of the west adapted to the above developments and did not stick to the original script of letting the ballots empower the Islamists in the Arab Spring countries. Erdogan did not redirect his policies to respond to those radical regional developments and the international concurrence. Here I might agree with the contention that “the extensive utilization of foreign policy for domestic purposes by the ruling party hindered Turkey's adaptation to shifting balances in the regional power structure between 2013 and 2016” (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

Yeşilyurt cited several domestic reasons for the shift in Turkish foreign policy toward the Arab Spring countries after 2013. Certain prominent domestic developments began to erode the AKP's hegemony in Turkish politics. Firstly, the Gezi Protests of June 2013 revealed the growing discontent among liberal and secular segments of Turkish society against the AKP's authoritarian tendencies. Secondly, with Turkey's sensational corruption investigations of December 2013, a serious power struggle between the AKP and the Gülen movement (formerly allies) came to light within the ruling coalition, which climaxed during the failed coup attempt of Gülenist military officers in July 2016. Thirdly, in October 2014, deadly protests erupted around the country against Ankara's reluctance to help the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobane, which was facing heavy assault

from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Finally, the results of the June 2015 general elections were disappointing for the AKP, as it lost its majority and the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) passed the 10 per cent national threshold, a historical first for a pro-Kurdish party. As a result, the AKP's single-party rule was endangered for the first time since 2002 (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

These domestic developments indicated growing challenges to AKP rule and revealed the rising polarization among different social and political communities in Turkey. Accordingly, it became increasingly difficult for the AKP to govern with smooth and soft measures as before, and authoritarian tendencies prevailed. Since the AKP's Arab Spring policy was mainly legitimized by the AKP's democratic achievements in Turkey and its desire to export its „success story“ to the Arab world, these developments and challenges curtailed Turkey's quest to be a model democracy for the Arab Middle East in the post-Arab Spring era (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

When we combine those domestic factors with the above-mentioned regional development and changing systemic signals coming from the US, Russia and Europe, we can fully understand the redirection of some Turkish foreign policy actions. Erdogan began to recognize that the US had shifted its priority from helping Islamists come to power by the ballots to fighting terrorist ISIL. Russia was determined to back Bashar El Assad and their joint forces along with the Iranians were able to make strides of progress against the fractioned opposition forces (Trenin, 2012). Europe was fed up with Erdogan's blackmail and embezzlement using the threat to unleash the Syrian refugees to the European borders and shores to create migration problems (Seeberg, 2016).

The only change on the ground that Erdogan found it difficult to swallow, grasp and react to was the defeat of his MB's surrogates in Egypt, Tunis, Libya and Syria. Gradually he has been making some fine-tuning to adjust for these failures but not to the extent of making Turkey relevant and influential again. He was waiting for the elections that made him continue as president until 2023 to celebrate 100 years of Ataturk's republic (Salaheldin, 2019).

The new Egyptian leadership after removing MB was quite responsive to the domestic, regional and international signals after 2013. Domestically, there was still political

division that would not allow for dramatic changes in foreign policy or pay for its costs. Therefore, Egypt decided only to downgrade its diplomatic relations with Turkey in reaction to Erdogan's continued support of the MB by hosting its leaders and TV broadcasts in Istanbul. Trade and investment relations remained untouched (Tumiad, 2019). Only the Maritime Roll-On-Roll-Off (RORO) transportation line was stopped for security reasons as it was delivering goods on Turkish trucks driven in Egypt from the Mediterranean ports to the Red Sea to be reshipped to the Gulf's markets. Naturally, the joint naval exercises were also cancelled by Egypt. Also, for domestic reasons, Erdogan claimed that he cancelled it first. Security checks and negative political propaganda resulted in reducing the number of tourists and business travelers between Turkey and Egypt. Most of these changes are in my opinion reversible once Erdogan changes his mind (Salaheldin, 2019).

On the regional level, the new Egyptian government was aware of the importance of the Turkish role in Syria, Iraq and Libya and recognized that this role was still of some value to important regional and international players. Egyptian new leaders after 2013 also took into account the declining reliance of the US, Europe, and Saudi Arabia on Turkey in Syria. Egyptian advocacy for a political peaceful solution for the civil war in Syria gained support and momentum. Egypt was not ready to intervene militarily in Syria to counter the Turkish intervention there and could count on the US and Saudi change of mind in this regard (Steinberg , 2014).

In neighboring Libya, the situation was quite different as Turkish-backed Islamist militias threatened the Egyptian national security. Caches of Turkish weapons which continued to be smuggled from Libya, including rockets and anti-aircraft weaponry, have flooded Egypt's black markets through the extended borders both countries share, often reaching extremist militants in the western desert and Sinai regions of Egypt. Militant jihadists heavily rely on these weapons to wage their terrorist attacks against the Egyptian military and police (Strazzari, et al., 2018).

Egyptian airstrikes in Libya against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) positions in Libya on February 16, 2015 were triggered by a video released by ISIL in Libya a day earlier, depicting the beheading of 21 Coptic Christians from Egypt. Within hours, the Egyptian Air Force responded with airstrikes against ISIL training camps and weapons

stockpiles in retaliation for the killings. Warplanes acting under orders from the Libyan government also struck targets in Derna, reportedly in coordination with Egypt. Egyptian news media alluded to Turkey and Qatar as the source of backing of these terrorist organizations and their associates in Libya (SkyNews, 2017).

Turkish-Qatari alliance to promote political Islamists' right to govern the Arab spring countries has not ended. The two countries are still struggling to help the militant Sunni Islamic factions in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Sudan. Saudis have been unsuccessfully trying, since 2013, to break this alliance by using the GCC to pressure Qatar to end its support of the MB in Egypt. When three of the GCC countries and Egypt imposed sanctions on Qatar for non-compliance with its commitments in this regard, Turkish troops moved to protect the Qatari Emir (Filkins, 2018).

4.5. Change and Continuity in Egyptian Policy Toward Turkey

Egypt and Turkey have many commonalities, foremost regarding their geopolitical location, history, and cultural affinity. Throughout their history both nations have served as bridges between neighboring continents and civilizations, and both have made positive contributions to global culture and heritage. It is also noteworthy that they are both geographically bi-continental in nature, i.e. their territories span over two continents, a fact that has allowed them to enjoy multiple identities — Arab, Islamic, African, Asian, and Mediterranean in the Egyptian case and European, Islamic, Asian, and Mediterranean in the Turkish case. Moreover, both countries are home to strategic international waterways: Egypt has the Suez Canal and Turkey has the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

As the two most powerful countries in the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt and Turkey undoubtedly have great influence in the region. Together, their population of 180 million people accounts for more than one-third of the Middle East's total. Combined, they have 1.7 million square kilometers of territory. In 2011, the two countries had a combined gross national product (GNP) of almost one trillion USD (Davutoglu, 2013). Today, their total GNP at purchasing power parity (PPP) exceeds 3 trillion USD (CIA, 2019). Official Turkish trade statistics with Egypt over the last five years show that trade between the two countries has not been substantially negatively impacted by their deteriorating political relations. See Table 2.

Table 2: Egyptian-Turkish bilateral trade statistics (million USD)

Year	Exports	Imports	Volume	Balance
2014	3,301	1,437	4,738	1,864
2015	3,129	1,216	4,345	1,913
2016	2,733	1,443	4,177	1,290
2017	2,360	1,997	4,357	363
2018	3,055	2,190	5,245	865

Source: (TUIK, 2019)

Mubarak, SCAF and the MB's President Morsi all recognized Turkey's regional weight and importance. The head of State in the three Egyptian regimes handled relations with Turkey with important inputs from the main foreign policy institutions: the ministries of foreign affairs and defense and the intelligence (Salaheldin, 2019).

Morsi abandoned Mubarak's and SCAF's cautious rapprochement with Turkey for obvious reasons. He needed Turkish economic and technical assistance in the absence of Saudi enthusiasm to help his regime. Morsi also used the Turkish-Qatari connections with Hamas to successfully broker a cease-fire agreement between the Palestinian faction and Israel in 2012.

Morsi believed that he should learn from the Turkish experience and use Erdogan's assistance to revive the Egyptian economy and to help build ties with some Western partners. Egyptian MB leaders were aware of the Turkish model's favorable image in the U.S., Europe, and the rest of the Western world. They also thought, however, that Egypt could never be a secular state or else they would lose their legitimacy and popular support. In addition, they believed that they could not wait for a decade to get rid of military tutelage as the Erdogan's AKP party did in Turkey (Salaheldin, 2019).

Throughout my study period and after 2013, Egyptian decision makers were more responsive to signals of the international and regional levels more than their Turkish counterparts who were still hostage to many domestic challenges. That is not to say that Egypt does not have even more domestic hurdles but it now counts more on regional and international assistance to overcome it (Bekdil, 2017).

5. Chapter Five

Egyptian Foreign Policy During the Arab Spring Toward Palestine and Israel

This chapter starts by giving a brief background of the Egyptian policy toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict before the Arab Spring. It moves then to analyse the domestic attitudes in Egypt during the Arab Spring towards Palestine and Israel. Afterward, it examines the regional powers’ policies towards Egypt’s relations with the Palestinians and Israel and the international players’ encouragement of the Egyptian role to help revive the peace talks and to reconcile Palestinian differences. At the end, the chapter tracks down change and continuity in Egyptian policy toward Palestine.

5.1. Background

Developments in the broader Middle East and across the Arab world in the last decade have further complicated the intertwined nature of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The conflict was pushed down on the priority list of the Arab regimes especially in the Arab Spring countries. The popular uprisings have displayed trends that are concerning to decision makers in the region and beyond.

The Palestinian Islamist faction Hamas had strong ties and a historic affiliation with the Egyptian MB who was a leading power broker in Egypt after 2011. In addition, within the Egyptian, Israeli and the Palestinian political systems there were other domestic inhibitors towards the other neighbours (Ishaq, 2012).

Since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 and until 2011, Israel described its relations with Egypt as „Cold Peace“. However, for more than three decades Egypt had honoured all its security, economic and political commitments in the peace accords. The two countries maintained their embassies in each other capital headed by ambassadors. Egypt provided Israel initially with oil and later with gas to make up for the oilfields in Sinai after Israel’s withdrawal (Aran, et al., 2014).

The US-led the effort to establish the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peace keeping mission in Sinai to monitor the two parties' compliance with the security provisions of the peace treaty. With the exception of smuggling some weapons into Sinai through the tunnels built or allowed by Hamas in Gaza, MFO reported on Egypt's record of doing its best to prevent any threat to the security of Israel to emanate from its territory to be in good standing. The US military tried to help Egypt to build an underground barrier along the borders between Sinai and Gaza and to electronically detect the tunnels in order to be able to destroy them (Siboni, et al., 2014).

In 2006, Hamas won the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council over Fatah, capturing the majority of seats. Clashes between Hamas and Fatah forces in the Gaza Strip intensified, however, in June 2007. Victorious Hamas was left in control of the Gaza Strip, while a Fatah-led emergency cabinet had control of the West Bank. Hamas has not accepted the 1993 Oslo peace accords between the Palestinian authority or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel (Gold, 2013).

The International Quartet (the US, Russia, United Nations, and EU) made future foreign assistance to the Palestinian Authority conditional upon the future government's commitment to non-violence, recognition of the state of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements. Hamas rejected those conditions, which led the Quartet to suspend its foreign assistance program to Gaza. Israel also imposed economic sanctions on the Hamas-led administration in Gaza while continuing its cooperation program with the PLO-controlled Palestinian authority in the West Bank (Gold, 2013).

Egypt has always been active in mediating reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and several cease-fire agreements between Hamas and Israel. Turkey and Qatar have tried to compete with that Egyptian mediating role. However, their close relations with Hamas and its mother organization or the MB made them a less credible mediator than Egypt in the eyes of PLO and Israel (Dentice, 2018). Egypt was trying to prevent the use of its common borders with Gaza to smuggle weapons that could be ultimately used against Israel. This task was further complicated by the collapse of the Egyptian security forces because of the Arab Spring's uprisings in early 2011 (Gold, 2013).

Since the first Palestinian uprising in the 1980's, Israel and the US have been trying to convince Egypt to take control of Gaza as was the case in the 1950's and 1960's (Gold, 2013). Egypt had not accepted such responsibility of managing an overpopulated small strip of land that is controlled by a surrogate of the MB. Splitting Gaza from the West Bank would also have marked the end of the Palestinian national aspirations in Statehood (Aran, et al., 2014).

Many Israeli peace plans and proposals included parts of Egypt's Sinai desert as a possible geographic extension of Gaza to accommodate the overflow of the increasing Palestinian population. Egypt had also turned down all these Israeli proposals. However, Egypt agreed to use its port of Al Arish in East-northern Sinai to receive some of the medical and food humanitarian assistance to Gaza during military hostilities between Hamas and Israel (Gold, 2013).

Until 2008, Sinai was generally quiet and free of serious security threats to Israel. Egypt was also cooperating with the 2007 EU mechanism to monitor all the borders crossings into Gaza to prevent any weapons smuggling to Hamas. The Egyptian controlled „Rafah“ crossing in northern Sinai was dedicated to the two-way passage of Palestinians in and out of Gaza into Egypt or third countries with proper travel documentations and visas. All goods should be transferred into Gaza via the Israeli controlled crossings (Porat, 2014). Within Cairo's decision-making system, the Egyptian Intelligence Service was in charge of dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli issues under the direct orders of the president and with some occasional coordination with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gold, 2013).

The Israeli attacks against Hamas in Gaza on the eve of 2009 introduced a radical change of attitude on the Egyptian domestic scene and its regional and international environment. The Muslim Brotherhood's activists and their members of the parliament used the public sympathy with the Palestinian civilian casualties of Israeli heavy and sometimes indiscriminate air bombardment to accuse the Egyptian government of conspiring with Israel against the Palestinians in Gaza (Gold, 2013).

In late 2009 and early 2010, MB's members of the Egyptian parliament led popular street marches to deliver food and medicine to civilian victims in Gaza and to challenge the

rules that allowed only passengers and not goods to cross the borders from Rafah. Some of the MB's parliamentarians went as far as Istanbul to board Turkish ships delivering humanitarian supplies to Gaza. Some of these ships were diverted to the Egyptian port of AL Arish to have its loads of assistance's goods delivered to Gaza via the Rafah crossing after being thoroughly examined by the Egyptian authorities (Bekdil, 2017).

Other ships trying to get to Gaza were seized by the Israeli armed forces. One of those ships was the Turkish ship „Mavi Marmara“ which was captured and boarded by the Israeli military in May 2010. Israeli soldiers killed some of its Turkish activist's passengers and arrested the rest including the Egyptian MB's parliamentarians (Salaheldin, 2019). Israel released the Egyptian detainees first as a gesture of good will toward its Egyptian peace partner and to highlight the different status of its deteriorating relations with Erdogan's Turkey (Samaan, 2013).

On the eve of the Arab Spring, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a hot issue of contention between Egypt on one hand and Turkey and Qatar on the other. Turkish and Qatari officials were hinting that Egypt was helping the Israeli blockade against Hamas in Gaza and siding with Fatah in the reconciliation negotiations. The other regional parties were also divided. Iran was backing Hamas, Turkey and Qatar while Egypt was supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE (Steinberg, 2014).

Most of the Western countries, led by the US, considered Hamas a terrorist organization, imposed sanctions against its leaders and supported Israel's right to retaliate against any attack from Gaza. Most of these Israeli retaliations, however, were disproportionate and resulted in massive destruction of civilian buildings and human casualties. International public outrage against Israel was never translated into a UN action because of US objection (Porat, 2014).

The Egyptian public was very sympathetic to the suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza. The Egyptian parliament from 2005 to 2010 had an active 20 % minority of MB's members. They led a vigorous campaign criticizing the government's policy toward Gaza, Hamas and Israel. The Egyptian government was sometimes forced to look the other way while Hamas operatives were supervising a massive transportation of all kinds of goods via the tunnels from and to Sinai (Dentice, 2018).

The Egyptian Intelligence Service was in control of the Egyptian Rafah crossing to Gaza from Sinai and the reconciliation process between the Palestinian factions. The Egyptian foreign ministry continued to handle the Israeli-Palestinian dispute's discussions in the Arab League, the United Nations and other international organizations. Egypt did not have adequate economic resources to give the Palestinian in Gaza or the West Bank similar assistance given by Qatar, Turkey or Iran. However, the Egyptian government used its regional and international weight, its special relations with the US and Israel and its control of Gaza's borders with Sinai to leverage the position of both the PLO and Hamas towards reconciliation (Taflioglu, 2013).

The Israeli-Hamas war in 2009 put a heavy pressure on the Egyptian decision makers from its dependant environment's factors such as the domestic Egyptian public opinion and the parliament, the independent environment from regional players such as Turkey, Qatar and Iran or international NGOs. These pressures resulted in relaxing the Egyptian restriction on the illegal goods' trafficking in the Gaza's tunnels under the borders line and allowing some of the humanitarian assistance to pass through the Egyptian Rafah crossing from Sinai into Gaza (Taflioglu, 2013).

Since 2009, Egypt also allowed some of the humanitarian assistance coming from Turkey, Qatar and other countries to go into Hamas-controlled-Gaza via Rafah. Israel and the US raised concerns about those transfers of goods to Gaza with the Egyptian government which was squeezed between its domestic and regional public opinion pressures and its Peace Treaty obligations. There is also a strong indication that even before January 2011 and the eruption of the Arab Spring, a substantial number of Jihadist terrorists with their armaments were smuggled into Sinai from Gaza (Dentice, 2018).

Since January 2011, the security vacuum in Sinai has worsened even further, leading to an increase in Islamist militant activity, particularly in the north. The Egyptian gas pipeline to Israel and Jordan was repeatedly blown up. Many of armed Hamas operatives crossed into Sinai and attacked Egyptian police stations and prisons to help the Egyptian popular uprising and to free Muslim Brotherhood's prisoners. There are some reports that those Hamas operatives even played a mysterious role in supporting the uprising in El Tahrir square in downtown Cairo. As an offshoot of the Brotherhood, Hamas was looked at by the Egyptian public as a partner of the revolution against Mubarak (Taflioglu, 2013).

The MB's demonstrators at El Tahrir square chanted many slogans against Israel and its oppressive policies toward the Palestinians. However, since Mubarak stepped down no Egyptian government, including the Muslim Brotherhood's government, had ever given up on its Peace Treaty commitments toward Israel. The security cooperation between the two countries continued, despite the serious problems and challenges that were caused by the chaotic security situation after the Arab Spring's uprising (Aran, et al., 2014).

Both the Egyptian SCAF and the MB's government after Mubarak continued to predominantly rely on the Egyptian intelligence services to deal with Israel, Hamas and the PLO (Taflioglu, 2013). Naturally, the MB government was more lenient toward Hamas as one of its offspring organizations. Therefore, MB's government in Egypt had closer relations with Turkey and Qatar and less friendly relations with the PLO, the Saudis and UAE (Anderson, 2016).

In August 2011, some Jihadist militants crossed into Israel from Sinai and killed eight Israelis. In response, five Egyptian policemen were unintentionally killed in an Israeli air strike targeting Palestinian militants along the Egyptian border, causing the most serious diplomatic crisis since the 1979 peace treaty between the two countries (Gold, 2013).

The MB instigated the angry crowds to surround and storm the Israeli embassy in downtown Cairo. The US senior officials appealed to SCAF chairman and the acting Egyptian president to make his military intervene to rescue the Israeli employees who were trapped in a secured room inside the embassy before the mob could break in and capture them. Otherwise, the Israeli Armed Forces might have tried to intervene to rescue their nationals. The incident could have jeopardized the peace treaty which had stood firm for four decades between the two countries (Siboni, et al., 2014).

During the presidency of Mohammed Morsi (August 2012-July 2013), there was little violence in Sinai and the government attempted to change some policy drivers in the "Sinai Question", ranging from a de-militarized approach to one that engaged in dialogue with tribal leaders. The MB government therefore used soft tactics towards terrorism and the radical Bedouin threat in Sinai, allocating additional resources (270 million USD) to promote development and infrastructure projects, as well as promising economic reforms, including landownership (Dentice, 2018).

The worst downside of that policy was using the Brotherhood's allies, the Salafists, as mediators with the Jihadist Salafist terrorists in Sinai. Morsi was forced to declare that he was as keen to preserve the safety of his kidnapped security soldiers as much as preserving the safety of their terrorist kidnappers. This statement did not generate international negative reactions. However, it had very strong worrisome ripple effects domestically in Egypt and throughout the Arab World. People wondered which side the MB's Egyptian president would choose in the next crisis (Dentice, 2018).

Morsi's leniency toward Jihadist Salafist terrorists in Sinai contributed to the worsening of the security situation in the peninsula which exasperated the Israeli security officials. Although this period was characterized by an apparent calm, at the end of 2012 Israel's Shin Bet (the internal security service) released in its annual report on terrorism a statement that emphasized an increase of Salafist-Jihadists present in the Sinai Peninsula (Fatheya, 2013).

In accordance to the security provisions of the Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty, Morsi needed the Israeli consent to increase the number of the Egyptian soldiers and their armaments in Sinai to fight the terrorists. Israel denied him this favour which was voluntarily granted to his successor one year later. Today, Israel and Egypt have a very strong security cooperation in Sinai to fight terrorist threats to both countries (Dentice, 2018).

5.2. Domestic Attitudes in Egypt During the Arab Spring Towards Palestine and Israel

The Arab uprisings caused a stark reversal of Hamas's fortunes in the eyes of the Arab public opinion, especially in Egypt. In the stagnant years preceding 2011, Hamas had been at an impasse: isolated diplomatically; surrounded by borders' restrictions by Egypt and Israel; pursued by Israeli and Palestinian Authority security forces in the West Bank; warily managing an unstable ceasefire with a far more powerful adversary; incapable of fulfilling popular demands for reconciliation with Fatah; and more or less treading water in Gaza, where some supporters saw it as having sullied itself with the contradictions of

being an Islamist movement constricted by secular governance and a resistance movement actively opposing Gaza-based attacks against Israel (ICG, 2012).

Hamas faced diminishing popularity since the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections that brought it to power. It had to contend with criticism from others and from within its own file and rank. It had suffered of many defections by an important group of militants who left to join other groups more committed to upholding Islamic law and to engaging in violent attacks against Israel. All in all, the movement could take comfort in little other than the fact that Fatah was doing no better (ICG, 2012).

The Arab Spring's revolts seemed to change all of the above. Positive developments came from across the region: the toppling of Fatah's strong Arab ally, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak; the rise in Egypt of Hamas's closest supporter and mother movement, the Muslim Brotherhood and the opening of the Gaza-Sinai crossing at Rafah. The new Egyptian government appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces SCAF stopped using the control of Rafah crossing to pressure, constrict and impoverish what the former Egyptian regime had used to perceive as Gaza's illegitimate rulers (Bassiouni, 2016).

There was an emerging new political power on the rise in the Middle East. The signs were very clear: the empowerment of Islamist parties in the Arab Spring's countries; growing instability in states with large Islamist oppositions; and the promise of a new, more democratic regional order reflecting widespread revulsion towards Israel and its allies and popular affinity with Hamas. Ironically, this upheaval and the resulting empowerment of Political Islam was supported by NATO members such as Turkey and was encouraged by the United States and its Western allies (Brooke, 2013).

Hamas operatives helped the popular uprising in Egypt by smuggling trained fighters into Sinai to attack Egyptian police stations and forcibly open prisons doors to free the MB's activists who were detained to keep them from igniting the uprising. As Hamas saw it, the popular revolt in Egypt and other countries promised to profoundly affect the advancement of each of its primary goals: governing Gaza; weakening Fatah's grip over the West Bank; spreading Islamic values through the Arab world; ending its diplomatic isolation; and strengthening its regional alliances against Israel (Ishaq, 2012).

When the SCAF took overpower in Egypt, many of the Hamas operatives were released from Egyptian prisons. Executive orders granted the Egyptian citizenship to thousands of Gazans and other Palestinians, including many leaders of Hamas (AL-Ahram-Online, 2012). Restrictions on the passage of goods and passengers to and from Gaza to Sinai were relaxed (Ishaq, 2012). More of this rapprochement between Egypt and Hamas was further developed during the one-year-rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Gold, 2013).

The election of the MB's Mohammed Morsi as president of Egypt raised serious concerns about Cairo's future commitment to peace with Israel. When Morsi was a member of the parliament, he co-founded the Egyptian Commission for Resisting the Zionist Project and questioned the value of keeping the Egypt's commitment to the obligations of its 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel (Frontier, 2019). Muslim Brotherhood's political leaders led popular demonstrations during the 2012 presidential elections chanting the (Muslim's prophet) Mohamed's army will come back to fight the Jews (Porat, 2014).

In the face of this rising public opinion's antagonism against Israel, many Western and Israeli analysts were doubting the Egyptian military's inability—or unwillingness—to stem terrorist attacks from Sinai against Israel was also a worrisome trend. The storming of the Israeli embassy by the mobs in 2012 also contributed to this sense of apprehension. The Egyptian secular opposition of the Brotherhood was also reminding everyone of its record in criticizing presidents Sadat and Mubarak for keeping the peace with Israel and giving up on the Palestinian national right for Statehood (Ashour, 2015).

While Morsi—in his first speech after being declared the new president—pledged to preserve international accords and obligations, he had in the past called the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty “unfair” to Egypt's interests and accused Israel of repeated violations of the treaty. Morsi had also a history of making extremist statements. He proclaimed during a May 13 campaign rally that “Jihad is our path and death for the sake of Allah is our most lofty aspiration. Above all Allah is our goal” (Trager, 2017). Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh congratulated Morsi on his elections' victory, saying, „This is a victory for all Arabs and Muslims, and this is God's promise to his believers. “ (Ishaq, 2012).

Morsi and other Brotherhood's leaders privately tried to assure the US and Israel of Egypt's continued commitment to the security provisions of the Peace Treaty with Israel. They had their opportunity to prove it when another war erupted between Israel and Hamas in September 2012 (Brooke, 2013). The Israeli bombardment of Hamas headquarters and power stations generated public opinion pressures on the Brotherhood's new government to intervene and try its hand to stop the war (Bassiouni, 2016).

While the MB, like other political forces, certainly had the intention to reduce the role of the army in politics, it also wanted to avoid confrontation. The Islamists who led the drafting process of the 2012 constitution were careful not to jeopardise the armed forces' status, privileges and financial autonomy. However, the more Morsi and his Brothers tried to assert their power and independence, the more they antagonised the security forces and other political adversaries (Ashour, 2015).

Controversial MB's projects included new development policies for the Sinai and the Suez Canal, normalising Egypt's relations with the Hamas-led government in Gaza by reopening the Rafah border crossing, and engaging in dialogue with certain tribes in Sinai and Upper Egypt who had long been in conflict with the Egyptian security forces. Fears that all these moves would undermine national security, and thus the army's interests, did not help to build confidence (Ashour, 2015).

By the end of Morsi's first year as president, it was very clear to all observers that he is not in full control of his military or police forces. Many of the president's policies and decisions were publicly contradicted by actions and statements from the military. When he announced investment incentives to Sinai Bedouins to solicit their help against the Jihadists, the military issued a statement not allowing private ownership of land in Sinai for unspecified security reasons (Siboni, et al., 2013).

In the field of foreign policy, Morsi did not have better support from the Military. Trying to counter popular protests against him in June 2013, he called Egyptians to Jihad (fight) in support of Syrian opposition against the rule of Bashar Al Assad. The military did not waste any time before issuing its own statement denying any willingness to fight outside

Egypt's national borders unless the country's national security was threatened (Trager, 2017).

The Egyptian military had also rebuffed Morsi's decision to allow Sinai Bedouins and Gulf investors to own land in the planned industrialized zones along the Suez Canal. Morsi was hopeful to use these incentives to entice the cooperation of Hamas to stop the jihadist terrorist attacks in Sinai. Qatar, Hamas's main backer, was promised a big chunk of that investment incentive which did not materialize because of the Egyptian military's opposition (El-Sherif, 2014).

Similar reluctance was shown by the professional foreign and intelligence services of Egypt when Morsi decided to sever diplomatic relations with Syrian government. Ultimately, El Assad ambassador was allowed to stay in Cairo and freely function in his own embassy building. His diplomatic title was only reduced to be the head of a diplomatic interests' section (Ashour, 2015). Again, Morsi was counting on this move to bring him closer to the US, the rest of the West and Israel. Strong opposition of powerful domestic institutions prevented him of reaping the benefits of these daring steps (El-Sherif, 2014).

Obviously, Morsi was not able to mobilize his nation's resources to implement his major foreign policy decisions. More importantly, key institutions of his foreign policy establishment were not hesitant to publicly declare their disobedience to his policies and decisions regardless of how much they were serious or feasible. Neoclassical realist analysts should, in my opinion, look at these examples as perfect application of the concept of „limitations on mobilizing the national resources to implement foreign policy decisions and policies“.

5.3. Regional Powers' Policies Towards Egypt's Relations With the Palestinians and Israel

Readily available also to President Morsi was the systemic regional and international support to keep Egypt's peace with Israel and to mediate a new cease-fire to save his organization's surrogate, Hamas. Coincidentally, Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan was visiting Cairo. He called Hamas's bank-roller, the Emir of Qatar to come to Cairo in a

harry accompanying Hamas leader in exile, Khaled Mashaal (Salaheldin, 2019). Obama also sent his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to join the mediation effort in Cairo. The Egyptian Intelligence Service conducted the indirect negotiations which ended successfully in a ceasefire guaranteed by Egypt and the US (Brooke, 2013).

Other influential regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser degree, the UAE – were not very enthusiastic about that deal that empowered the MB in Egypt and its affiliate, Hamas in Palestine. However, the signals were very clear and strong from the US in support of this new deal and the Egyptian role to reach it (Brooke, 2013). The Saudi and Emirati officials joined the Iranians in congratulating Morsi of his government's early achievement. They also promised different packages of financial and in-kind assistance to help Gaza to recover and its government to keep the loyalty of its overpopulated people (Bassiouni, 2016).

Getting rid of the MB was a dream come true for the Saudis and the Emirati governments. Both were threatened by similar uprisings that forced Mubarak to step down in Egypt. The whole gulf region was full of volatile undercurrents resulting from political Islam, Shiite minorities and the massive, poor, and unintegrated foreign workers. Saudi Arabia had, and still has, a keen interest to help stabilizing El Sisi's regime who toppled the Brotherhood from power in Egypt (Steinberg, 2014).

Before the Arab Spring, the old regional order was protected, to a large extent, by the military and general power of the strongest Arab state, Egypt, a Sunni power never far from the Saudis' side in recent decades. Behind Egypt was the global clout of the US. By the end of 2013, the Sunni bloc – the existence and strength of which was a vital Saudi interest – lacked a natural leader (Gause, 2014).

The Egyptian regime was having difficulty putting its own house in order, which prevented it from playing its traditional regional and inter-Arab role. As for American backing, the Obama administration appeared hopeless to Saudi eyes (Steinberg, 2014). Hence, the Saudis did everything in their power to bolster the El Sisi regime in Cairo, hoping against hope for its return to centre stage. Without it, there is no Sunni Arab equivalent to Iranian leadership of the Shiite bloc. The Saudis were also hoping that the

new American administration will be more assertive and supportive of regional order and stability, with less reliance on the role of Iran in the area (Steinberg, 2014).

In a way, we can talk about one of the outcomes of the Arab Spring as the undeclared Saudi-Egypt-Israel axis against political Islam which is supported by Iran, Turkey and Qatar. Many people try to cite religious sectarian reasons to explain the basis and rationale of forming those two axes. However, Turkey and Qatar have predominantly Sunnis population and do not support the Iranian Shiite call for all Muslims to submit to the authority of the religious preachers. However, the rulers of the three countries vehemently support some kind and form of political Islam.

The new discrete Saudi-Egypt-Israel has also been trying to counter the political Islam influence in Palestine. Egypt continued to be encouraged to act as the sole mediator between Hamas and Israel and the only broker of reconciliation between Hamas and the PLO. The three countries did their utmost to weaken the influence of Iran, Turkey and Qatar in Palestine (Steinberg, 2014).

Another regional coalition also merged in the eastern Mediterranean between Egypt, Israel and Greece to counter Turkey. The basis of forming this coalition was mainly economic and focused on splitting the gas resources off the three countries shores and cooperating to transport the gas to points of demand. However, the cooperation between the three countries had military and political implications. When Turkey tried to militarily challenge Cyprus over its right to explore and produce gas off its shores, Greece pulled its NATO and European strings to warn Turkey against implementing its threats. Egypt made a similar public warning and threatened Turkey that its aggression would have dire consequences (Kotb, 2019).

When Egypt hosted the first meeting of the energy ministers in Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was not invited. Only Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian territories met in Cairo in July 2019. Parallel cooperation with Lebanon and possibly with Syria would enable the two countries to later join the newly formed Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), (Kotb, 2019).

With sprawling gas processing facilities, Egypt wants to be a hub for gas wells in the region, process it and send it to the international market. Israeli natural gas was expected to flow to Egyptian liquefaction facilities in late 2019. The flow of Israeli gas to Egypt stems from a \$15 billion agreement Israel's Delek Drilling and Texas-based partner Noble Energy and an Egyptian company signed in February 2018 (Kotb, 2019).

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi said Egypt, by signing that deal, had scored a "big goal as gas would have either got [to the international market] through us or through another country (he meant Turkey)", EL-Sisi said. "If it had got out through another country, you [the Egyptian people] would have blamed us for not taking action" (Kotb, 2019).

5.4. International Players' Encouragement of the Egyptian Role

The Obama Doctrine

From World War II through the latter part of the last decade, the active foreign policy engagement and leadership of the US was widely seen as essential for its own security, the security of allies, and the maintenance of a stable and relatively liberal world order. In recent years, however, this long-time logic of foreign policy has been called into question. America has gradually but unmistakably been pulling back from its customary international role (Brooke, 2013).

Advocates of a foreign policy strategy of retrenchment and selective disengagement have argued that such a change was consistent with America's own national interests and that regional stability and local power balances would largely be maintained by local actors. Foreign policy retrenchment had long been promoted by certain foreign policy practitioners and by realist scholars who favour policies of disengagement and offshore balancing. To a significant extent, the Obama administration's conduct in this realm represented not only the president's own convictions but also a test of realist ideas (Brands, et al., 2016).

However, the Obama administration used force few times selectively. It took part in air attacks against the Libyan regime of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011. It undertook drone strikes throughout the region. It slowed the drawdown of forces from Afghanistan,

returned military advisers to Iraq, and undertook airstrikes and Special Forces operations against al Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Nonetheless, Obama's inclination was, more often than not, one of disengagement, conciliation of adversaries, and aversion to the use of American power (Brands, et al., 2016).

Realists believe that this retrenchment was more of an adaptation to a new global order and balance of power than a personal choice of President Obama. It had actually started with George W. Bush's second administration after its policy failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (Barry, 2006). When we examine the US foreign policy under Obama, we can understand why did Donald Trump come out to declare that the US is no more going to play the role of a single super power, the defender of the Western civilization or the saviour of democracy and human rights. He offered to continue to protect Japan, his European allies and Gulf monarchs only if they would pay the US military for doing this job. He cited the relative deterioration of the US infrastructure, standards of living, health and education as the main reasons for giving up on the traditional global role played by the US for about a century (Kazin, 2016).

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US administrations concluded that its support of dictatorships in the Middle East made America a legitimate target of Jihadist militants who were fighting those dictators. George W. Bush and Obama did not mind if political Islamists came to power through free elections in the Arab Spring countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. They went the extra mile of militarily helping this change to come true in the last two cases. This new US policy assumed that freely elected political Islamist leaders would use their public support to fight the Jihadist terrorists (Pierce, 2013). It turned out, in the Egyptian case and all the other cases, that political Islamists united their ranks with the Jihadist militants rather than fighting and discrediting them (Dentice, 2018).

A clue to Obama's policies of retrenchment in the Middle East can be found in his blunt dismissal of the region's relationship to US vital interests. Jeffrey Goldberg, in his Atlantic magazine interview, paraphrased Obama's view with the words, „[T]he Middle East is no longer terribly important to America's interests.“ (Obama, 2016). It was a wishful thinking to dismiss the importance of the Middle East. Large parts of the region have become increasingly violent and unstable, and events there could adversely affect

the longstanding core national interests of the US: security of oil supplies, prevention of territorial control by hostile powers, support for regional friends and allies, regional stability, counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human rights.

On the global level, the new US approach was adopted in the belief that it would reduce conflict, motivate local actors to counterbalance against regional threats, encourage the international community to „step up“ in assuming the burdens of regional stability, protect America’s own national interests, and promote global order. Yet most realist researchers suggest that the opposite was more often the case. They believe that America now faces a more dangerous world with the rise of hostile powers, fanatical terrorist movements, and worsening regional conflicts in the Middle East, as well as increasing security risks in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Meanwhile, US allies have become uneasy and have sought to hedge their own security commitments. In turn, senior US military and intelligence leaders warn of increasing threats to America itself (Thrall, et al., 2017).

In the Middle East, this new policy materialized when Obama called on the Egyptian president (Mubarak) to listen to his people’s demands and step down (Brooke, 2013). This message must have scared off the Gulf monarchs and made them feel insecure and wondering if they would be next-in-line. It also pushed the Saudi rulers to take things into their hands when Arab Spring’s demonstrations erupted in Bahrain. A Saudi led GCC military force helped Bahrain’s king, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, to quell the popular uprising. Saudi and Emirati rulers also supported the Egyptian military intervention to remove the MB from power and warned the Obama administration against sanctioning the new regime in Cairo. The US acquiesced (Baabood, 2014).

Ironically, Obama’s conflict-ridden relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu and his distancing from Israel also affected Egyptian and other Arab government assessments of American policy. Just as the Syria’s red line controversy caused widespread misgivings about US credibility, so too did the tensions that developed between Washington and Jerusalem trigger questions about the worth of American security guarantees. After all, if such a long and close relationship could be called into question, how could US commitments to Arab states in the region be taken at face value? (Byman, et al., 2016).

As a result, new regional networks and some forms of alliances discreetly started to take shape. The Gulf monarchs and counterrevolutionaries in Egypt, Libya, Tunis and Syria against political Islamists. The Gulf, Egypt and Israel against Iranian expansion of influence in the Middle East (Malley, 2019).

On July 2, 2013, the U.S. warned the Egyptian Armed Forces against a coup, threatening to suspend military aid while at the same time encouraging President Morsi to hold early elections (whether for the presidency or the People's Assembly is unclear), (Pierce, 2013). But soon thereafter the administration changed its position. This change was due to the strategic Egyptian importance to the Middle East stability and Israel and the Gulf security. Both Israel and the Gulf rulers lobbied actively the US administrations from 2013 onward in favour of preventing any deterioration in the US-Egyptian relationship because of the military intervention to remove the Muslim Brotherhood from the helm of political power in Egypt (Baabood, 2014).

On 21 August 2013, The EU Council conclusions on Egypt recommended to its members to suspend export licenses to Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licenses of other military equipment until the Council made further assessment (Bassiouni, 2016). The Obama administration had an internal debate on whether to call the change of government in Egypt a military coup which would have required suspending all kinds of US assistance to Egypt (Morey, et al., 2012).

In a public statement during his visit to Paris in August 2013 The Saudi Foreign Minister warned all the Western countries that Saudi Arabia would stand by the new government in Egypt and would compensate any cut of Western economic or military assistance to Egypt. Furthermore, the Saudi and Emirati governments funded Western arms sales to the new government in Egypt (Gause, 2014). The Israeli government made every effort to show its endorsement of the new Egyptian government and its no objection to new arms sales to the Egyptian military and police forces (Satloff, 2017).

Few months after removing the Brotherhood from power in Egypt, Russia sent its defence and foreign ministers to meet with their Egyptian new counterparts in Cairo. The visit to Cairo by Russia's defence and foreign ministers was billed by both sides as historic. Egypt and the Soviet Union were close allies until the 1970s, when Cairo moved closer to the

United States, which brokered its 1979 peace deal with Israel. General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who was Egypt's army chief and defence minister, told his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, the visit indicated the continuation of "historic strategic relations via starting a new era of constructive, fruitful cooperation on the military level", the state news agency reported (Perry, et al., 2013).

The message from the Gulf, Israel and Russia was very clear to the US and the rest of Western nations. Political Islam had failed in Governing Egypt and some other Arab Spring's countries. The new political regime in Egypt has gained control of the political situation in this strategically important country. The whole world has high stakes in preserving Egypt's stability and helping its new government in its fight against the Jihadist terrorists.

The Obama administration decided not to call the 2013 change of government in Egypt a coup. It rescinded its earlier decision to suspend delivery of some US weapons to Egypt. The US-Egyptian military and security cooperation was not interrupted specially in the area of counterterrorism. One-by-one, EU countries followed the US example and resumed its arms sales and security cooperation with the new government in Egypt. Russia also made lucrative arms sales to Egypt. Some of it was funded by Saudi Arabia or UAE (Morey, et al., 2012).

The international support uninterruptedly continued for the Egyptian role in preventing arms supplies to Hamas, mediating between its leader and Israel and trying to reconcile its differences with the PLO. Egypt remains an important player for Israel (Trager, 2015). Egypt's security services helped several times to moderate unofficial, indirect talks between Israeli and Hamas delegates. For example, Egyptian mediation under leadership of the SCAF helped secure the exchange of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier long held in Gaza, for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in late 2011 (Gold, 2013).

Since El Sisi's rise to power in 2013, some analysts believe, Egyptian policy has clearly favoured Israel over Hamas. For instance, in 2014, Cairo sided with Israel and waved off American, and pro-Hamas Turkish, and Qatari initiatives to end Israel's fighting against Hamas. In fact, El Sisi's proposed ceasefire was designed such that Hamas would not emerge from the conflict with gains that will depict it as victorious (Dentice, 2018).

During Israel's 2014 „Operation Projective Edge“ in Gaza, Sisi gained the perfect opportunity to adopt the image of peace mediator in the international community. Sisi benefitted from Israel's refusal of international mediation for a ceasefire, which led Israel to resort to calling on Cairo to host negotiations with Palestinian factions and sign the ceasefire agreement. The image of Sisi as a peacemaker helped in some part distract the international community from the government's own challenges with domestic unrest (Dentice, 2018).

The improving relations with Israel helped Sisi in his fight against the terrorists in Sinai. Israel allowed the Egyptian military and its heavy weaponry to areas B and C in Sinai. Egyptian and Israeli security agencies have maintained closer coordination and cooperation against the Jihadists in Sinai and their supporters in Gaza. Israel leaked information that its air force bombed some terrorist camps in Egyptian Sinai with prior coordination between the two countries (Dentice, 2018).

The special relationship between the new Egyptian government and Israel also helped facilitating the establishment of covert cooperation between the Gulf leaders and Israel against Iran. There is no indication that Egypt acted as a broker of this new undeclared partnership that emerged after the Arab Spring. However, Egypt negotiated on behalf of Saudi Arabia with Israel in 2015 to transfer the sovereignty of Tiran and Sanafir in the gulf of Aqaba from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia needed to commit itself to the security obligations of Egypt in accordance to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. In the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The two countries needed Egypt to act as a match-maker and a guarantor of the new relationship (Filkins, 2018).

The new Egyptian government received a wide support of the West, Russia and the Gulf for its role in managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its implications on Arab politics in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. This support took the form of enormous amounts of financial and in-kind-assistance, arms supplies and political backing in international financial institutions such as the IMF. Egypt started to play a more active role in regional organizations like the Arab League and the AU (Bassiouni, 2016).

As the newly elected Egyptian president in 2014, former General El Sisi was welcomed at the United Nations, many western, Arab and African capitals, only one year after his country was on the verge of facing regional and international sanctions and isolation. El Sisi continued to present his country's credentials to the world as the one who is fighting terrorism and religious radicalism on behalf of the whole human race, the moderate peace maker of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the protector of the Middle East's oil resources and its routes of transportation to dependent Europe. Egypt gained an added strategic importance when its new government was able since 2015 to stop most illegal waves of immigration from its shores to Europe (Wahid, et al., 2018).

5.5. Change and Continuity in Egyptian Policy towards Palestine

Throughout the above review, it is obvious that the Egyptian foreign policy towards Palestine and Israel had continued almost unchanged during my period of study (the Arab Spring). Egypt kept doing its best to respect its peace treaty obligations, to cooperate with Israel against Jihadist terrorism and to promote resuming the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Egypt also continued its efforts to try to reconcile the differences between the PLO and Hamas. The Egyptian policy of operating the Rafah crossing from Sinai to Gaza continued unchanged during the time period of my research (2010-2013). Egypt continued to clear all the goods' lists with Israel before allowing it to cross into Gaza from Rafah.

Because of the terrorist attacks against the Egyptian gas pipeline to Israel, it stopped functioning for many years. As gas imports from Egypt stopped in 2011, the total value of Israeli imports from Egypt fell from \$350 million to around \$50 million a year in 2011–2016 (GAL, et al., 2018).

Because the Egyptian Israeli Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) agreement demanded that Egyptian goods exported to the US contain at least 11.7 per cent of Israeli added value (reduced to 10.5 per cent in October 2007), Israeli exports of textile-related categories to Egypt grew in line with the growth of Egyptian exports to the US. Israeli exports of textile-related products more than tripled in the first years after the application of the QIZ

agreement in 2005, to \$68 million in 2010. Since 2011, the level has registered a steady decline—to \$55 million in 2011 and \$35 million in 2014 (GAL, et al., 2018).

The Egyptian Intelligence Services continued to be in charge of leading the conduct of Egyptian relations with Israel and Palestine. The president of Egypt was always directly involved in the formulation and the execution of that policy all the time. The intelligence services had to report directly to the president on these two issues. Other foreign policy's institutions such as the foreign ministry and the armed forces marginally contributed to the making process of Egyptian policy toward Israel and Palestine. These two institutions played a more important role in the execution of that same policy (Siboni, et al., 2013).

The public opinion attitudes and the security chaos in Egypt during the Arab Spring forced the hands of all three Egyptian governments of that period and limited their choices in domestic and foreign policies formulation and implementation. However, all the three political regimes declared their unequivocal respect of all Egypt's prior treaty obligations, in clear reference to the peace treaty with Israel. The US made it very clear to the Muslim Brotherhood leaders that American cooperation with their government would be contingent on this government's commitment to respect the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Similar strong messages were also signalled by other Western Capitals (Pierce, 2013).

We should, therefore, be able to understand that continuing the Egyptian policy unchanged toward Israel and Palestine during the Arab Spring can be more attributed to independent systemic variables emanating from the international environment more than the dependent variables of the Egyptian domestic setting.

In many cases, however, the security vacuum in Egypt did not enable the different Egyptian governments to implement the desired policy toward Israel. The repeated demolition of parts of the gas pipeline in Sinai by Jihadists and the mobs' storming of the Israeli embassy in downtown Cairo are but two examples in this regard. The latter witnessed a strong intervention by the US to force the Supreme Council of Armed Forces SCAF to rescue the Israeli personnel of the embassy before the mobs would capture them (Anderson, 2016). That was another indication to the prominence of the independent systemic factors over the domestic dependent variables.

Both the SCAF's and the MB's governments were not able to mobilize the Egyptian national resources to implement their desired policy toward Israel because of the security chaos. The two above-mentioned examples can also illustrate that fact. The Muslim Brotherhood's government was even less fortunate in this regard as it did not have full control over the armed and police forces. Both the SCAF and El Sisi- led government in 2013 had the complete allegiance of their uniformed military and police. It gave them more ability to conduct their foreign policy toward Israel specially in the area of security cooperation (Wahid, et al., 2018).

In dealing with Hamas, the different Egyptian governments during the Arab Spring were more responsive to domestic and regional dependent factors such as public opinion and lack of security. Because of Hamas affiliation and strong ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, its leaders were able to influence the Egyptian government decisions on many Palestinian issues such as granting Egyptian citizenship to many Gazans Palestinians. Former Muslim Brotherhood's Egyptian president allegedly was freed from his prison in 2011 by Hamas operatives who crossed the borders in Sinai making use of the security vacuum created by the popular demonstrations (Dentice, 2018). President Morsi must have felt indebted to Hamas and was influenced by this bias in his decisions on issues such as the Palestinian reconciliation and the Egyptian mediation for a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel.

The world order was in a state of transition during the Arab Spring. The US had ceased to act as the only superpower in a unipolar world order (Kissinger, 2014). Therefore, the systemic independent signals from Washington were delayed, blurred and sometimes contradicted each other. As a clear example, it took Washington the whole day to intervene with SCAF leaders to free the Israeli embassy's personnel from the hands of the mobs in Cairo. Unfortunately, the US was slower and less effective a year later when the US ambassador to Libya was killed by a Jihadist group in Benghazi (Morey, et al., 2012). It also took Russia about two years after the eruption of the Arab Spring to come back and play an assertive role in the emerging international order and in the Middle East.

The Greater Middle East region witnessed several failures of the US policies that led America to abandon its previous effort to enforce change in that troubled region. The earlier US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and their marred consequences were turning

points for the later US international retrenchment (Satloff, 2017). This was reinforced by the failure of NATO military intervention in Libya to achieve an orderly transfer of power. To the contrary, the US paid the price of that intervention dearly by losing the life of its ambassador to that country at the hands of the same rebels that NATO strikes were meant to help against Qaddafi's forces.

The creation of ISIS terrorist group and its control of vast territories in northern Iraq and Syria was the last nail of the US old interventionist policy's coffin in the Middle East. The US was then more interested in building international coalitions to fight ISIS rather than acting unilaterally (Morey, et al., 2012).

The transitional fluidity of the international order also allowed Russia, Turkey and the Gulf countries to act as influential international players in impacting foreign policy decision making in Egypt and other Arab Spring's countries. Examples of these developments include the role of Turkey and Qatar in helping the Egyptian ceasefire mediation between Israel and Hamas in 2012 and the Saudi/Emirati support of the Egyptian military removal of the Brotherhood from power in 2013 and the Russian intervention to save Bashar El Assad's rule in Syria (Trenin, 2012).

Opposing or supporting political Islam has become the key factor in determining the membership of the newly formed camps in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. Turkey, Iran and Qatar lined up together against a coalition of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE. The fight by proxy between those two camps is still going on in Libya and Yemen. The polarization is not as clear in the case of Syria. Russia also used the US decline to act in order to renew its old relationship with Egypt. It has provided the new Egyptian Government led by El Sisi with lucrative arms sales funded by the Gulf's monarchs and contracted to build four nuclear power reactors on the north Egyptian shores (Lynch, 2018).

The emerging new world order also features an end of the US active interventionist neoconservative liberalism in the Middle East which started by George W. Bush, continued to a lesser degree by Obama and laid to rest by Trump. Major regional powers and some external ones such as Russia felt the urgent need to take things in their hand. The strategic importance of the Arab Spring's countries, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen

expedited the transformation process of regional politics to reflect the new world order and influence its features.

6. Chapter Six

Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research

The main focus of this dissertation was to examine the interactions between domestic, regional and international dramatic changes that shaped the environment in which the Egyptian foreign policy was made and operated during (the Arab Spring in Egypt) January 2011 – June 2013. I tried to find out whether domestic, regional and international changes have resulted in a substantial change of Egyptian foreign policy in those three years regarding most foreign policy issues especially toward Turkey and Palestine. I wanted to determine which of these three levels of interactions was more influential and also explore the constancy and strategic aspects of the Egyptian foreign policy during the study period. I hypothesized that domestic and regional factors were more dominant than the global international environment in influencing the Egyptian Foreign Policy Executive elite and its policy responses and initiatives during 2011-2013.

I also tried to answer the following research questions:

- Did the Arab Spring's domestic, regional and international changes have resulted in a substantial change of Egyptian foreign policy regarding most issues especially toward Turkey and Palestine?
- Did political Islamists force their own foreign policy's agenda during the Arab Spring? Like their policies failure on the domestic level, have they achieved very little regionally and internationally?
- How important was public opinion – for the formulation of Egyptian foreign policy – during the Arab Spring? How did powerful domestic institutions such as the military respond to public opinion expressed preferences?
- To what extent did the regional and international „anarchic“ variables during the Arab Spring impact the EFPE perceptions and ability to extract national resources to implement their intended foreign policy?

My dissertation while rather inductive in nature, employed neoclassical realism as its theoretical framework because its focus on foreign policy formation as an outcome of continuous interaction between international systemic anarchic independent pressures

and competitive domestic intervening pressures. This interaction between two levels of actors produces the leaders' perception which leads to their choices of making specific foreign policy decisions and their implementation.

I chose the neoclassical realism approach because it also allowed me to identify major domestic issues such as ideology, nationalism, political religion and cultural affinity and study their impact on the foreign policy decision makers. These are all elements that could not have been analyzed or even accounted for had I opted to select some other realist approaches.

I will start this concluding chapter by summing up the results of my research to test the neoclassical realism assumptions against the findings of my case studies. I will then move to review my findings about the role of the neoclassical realism's two levels of analysis (independent and intervening) in shaping the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring. I will then try to determine which of these two levels of change was more influential and also explore the constancy and strategic aspects of the Egyptian foreign policy during the analyzed period of time. I will then move to proving the thesis-hypothesis and answering my main research questions. Finally, I will demonstrate the relevance and usefulness of applying the neoclassical realism's theory to answering my research questions and testing my hypothesis and I will conclude with proposing recommendations for future research to further develop the theory.

6.1. The Results of Applying Neoclassical Realism

Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell believe that there are four basic analytical assumptions which justify using neoclassical realism (Ripsman, et al., 2016). I will start by examining the validity of these four assumptions for the formation of the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring.

- I. *„If leaders' perceptions of systematic constraints diverge from reality, international politics would be, at best, incomplete, as the sources of a state's behavior may lie less in the external environment than its leaders' psychological makeup.“* (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

I found one example proving the accuracy of this assumption early on during my research. While former president Mubarak complied with US demands to step down, he did so more in response to domestic pressures from Egyptians' mass demonstrations supported by the military rather than US president Obama's call in a press conference. I would also argue that domestic players such as the military have had more impact on the foreign policy executives than any foreign power including the US, the single unipolar power at that time.

The same could be said about Saudi Arabia and UAE intervening against political Islam's control of government in Egypt. The two countries were obviously acting for pure domestic purposes to save their ruling monarchies. Their actions however were in direct contradictions with the US and European policies that supported the elected government of the Muslim Brotherhood and opposed any military intervention against it.

Another clear example was from Turkey. In 2015, in desperate need of local proxies to fight ISIS, the United States settled on the Kurdish dominated People's Protection Units, or YPG, which it armed, along with other militias, under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF. The success of these forces triggered Turkish fears of Kurdish separatism, which in turn led Turkey to undertake its own escalating military interventions in several key areas in northern Syria (Lynch, 2018). The Turkish president was responding more to domestic political pressures and aspirations than to international systemic signals.

II. *„If the international system only rarely provides clear enough information to states to guide their policy responses, then a broad range of foreign policy choices and international political outcomes must lie outside the preview of a structural theory of international politics.“* (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

The time period of 2010-2013 was part of a transitional period of gradual transformation of the distribution of power in the world's stage from a unipolar global system that lasted since 1990 to a multi-polar one. Initially, this transition was not yet clear to all the principal players in Egypt, the Middle East. Actually, its manifestation was helped and expedited by the Arab Spring which made the Russians feel the heat of political Islam

spreading their way. After the fall of Gaddafi (with the Russian silent acquiescence), the trend of empowering the Islamists has started to become crystal clear in Tunis, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and finally Syria. The European and NATO powers were called upon to fill the gap of Obama's administration's inability to lead the West in reacting, directing and making use of Arab Spring developments in Libya and Syria.

Even in a unipolar world such as the one that existed before the Arab Spring, the sole superpower (USA) did not send clear cut signals to decision makers in the Middle East. After the Arab Spring and before departing office, US president Obama publicly discounted the importance of the region (Obama, 2016). During that upheaval, he abstained most of the time from intervening in the affected countries. When he did, he sent completely contradictory signals. In Libya, the US only allowed and assisted NATO's military intervention without the direct participation of American troops. In Egypt, the US was in favor of a smooth and peaceful transfer of power from Mubarak to the military. In Syria, the United States remotely managed a war of proxies to remove Assad from power until the Russians decided to step in (Trenin, 2012).

There has also been a consensus among scholars about the geopolitical mutual impact between internal political changes in the Arab world, especially in Egypt, and shifts in the balance of power across the region, which would affect Iran, Turkey, Israel and the West. Some states collapsed under the pressure and devolved into civil war; others found ways to muddle through and regain control over their societies. Eight years later, those early hopes for a fundamental, positive shift in Middle Eastern politics appear to have been profoundly misplaced (Lynch, 2018).

EFPE were also influenced by major regional players who might not always comply with signals coming from the global system. Actually, in the Egyptian case the Saudis and the Emiratis, acting against the American wishes, supported the popular revolt against the Egyptian elected president Morsi and the military's later action to remove him from power to avoid a civil war. Both countries and other Gulf leaders felt that the Muslim Brotherhood's next move will be to challenge their legitimacy after the very successful strides in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen (Baabood, 2014).

III. *„Leaders do not always respond rationally to systematic stimuli even if they correctly perceive the threats and incentives of the international system.“* (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

A clear example again was the MB President Mohamed Morsi's misreading of international signals coming from the US and Gulf countries about the conflict in Syria. Therefore, he went out to declare that Egyptians would fight in support of the Syrian opposition and called for Jihad in Syria. He was misled to believe that this could save him his presidency against a very strong popular opposition and mass demonstrations that took to the streets a call on him to step down (Trager, 2017).

President Morsi also overlooked a deep-rooted reluctance against interventions in civil wars on the part of the Egyptian armed forces since the war in Yemen in the 1960s. To everybody's surprise, SCAF did not wait more than few hours to issue a rebuttal to the misguided president that clearly explained to him the prevailing strategic culture that he and his Muslim Brothers were not aware of (Ferris, 2015).

IV. *„Not all states have the ability to direct policy or mobilize national resources on their own when faced with opposition from powerful domestic interest groups and societal veto players in the legislature and elsewhere.“* (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

By the end of Morsi's first year as president, it was very clear to all observers that he is not in full control of his military or police forces. Many of the president's policies and decisions were publicly contradicted by actions and statements from the military and the judiciary (Hamad, 2019 p. 240). When he announced investment incentives to Sinai Bedouins to solicit their help against the Jihadists, the military issued a statement not allowing private ownership of land in Sinai for unspecified security reasons (Almasry-Alyoum).

The administrative courts even ventured into national security and foreign policy ordering the government to demolish the tunnels between Sinai and Gaza. This initiative was an indirect rebuke to Mursi's government that maintained close ties with Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip. The administrative court likewise provided protection for anti-

Mursi officials. On one occasion, the court reversed a decision to suspend a government official who harshly criticized the president (Hamad, 2019 p. 241).

Only two weeks before his removal from power, the former Muslim Brotherhood president Morsi called for Egyptian Jihad in Syria. On 13 June 2013, the military responded to this call with an inflammatory statement denying any intention on its part to fight in Syria. In a clear signal of Morsi's lack of authority as a commander in chief and the degradation of his legitimacy because of the popular opposition that took to the streets millions of people to call for his removal few days after that Call (Trager, 2017).

Similar reluctance by the professional foreign and intelligence services of Egypt when Morsi decided to sever diplomatic relations with Syrian government. Ultimately, El Assad ambassador was allowed to stay in Cairo and freely function in his own embassy building. His diplomatic title was only reduced to be the head of a diplomatic interests' section (Salaheldin, 2019).

Obviously, Morsi was not able to mobilize his nation's resources to implement his major foreign policy decisions. More importantly, key institutions of his foreign policy establishment were not hesitant to publicly declare their disobedience to his policies and decisions regardless of how much they were serious or feasible. Neoclassical realist analysts should look at these examples as a perfect application of the concept of limitations on mobilizing the national resources to implement foreign policy decisions and policies (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

From the World War II through the latter part of the last decade, the active foreign policy engagement and leadership of the US was widely seen as essential for its own security, the security of allies, and the maintenance of a stable and relatively liberal world order (Kissinger, 2014). During the Arab Spring, however, the US was gradually but unmistakably pulling back from its customary international role in the Middle East. Realists argue that this retrenchment was more of an adaptation to a new global order and balance of power than a personal choice of President Obama. I believe it had actually started with George W. Bush's second administration after its policy failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (Kissinger, 2014).

At the time of the Arab Spring, the transition of the international order from a unipolar to a multipolar system, economically and to a lesser extent militarily, made the domestic actors in Egypt and the regional players in the Middle East less responsive to US signals. Russia also started to play an active balancing role to the US in the Middle East. My research showed how the new government in Egypt in July 2013 indifferently reacted to US threats of sanctions and how did the Saudi and Emirati counter those American threats.

Realists were called upon to analyze and guide the US policy after the World War II and throughout the Cold War. Concepts such as the balance of power, nuclear deterrence and the mutually assured destruction (MAD) were very popular both in governmental decision-making circles and the academic ones. By the 1980's, the neorealists in the US were the driving force behind the Reagan administration's effort to use the Cold War arms race and regional wars by proxy to bleed and exhaust the Soviet economy. They declared their victory when the Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989 (Kissinger, 2014).

From 1990 till the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Liberal Idealist were briefly back in control. Starting with Francis Fukuyama's assertion that history had ended which led the neoconservative in the White House to try to draw the agenda for a new American century (Barry, 2006).

The focus of political scientists and international relations scholars moved from the realists' balance of power concept to new ideas such as the „Clash of Civilizations“ (Huntington, 1993). The new trend focused more on the role of religion, culture and history in shaping the foreign policy elites' images, decisions and policies. This new development necessitated further development of the neorealist theory to add the domestic intervening level of analysis which resulted in the creation of the neoclassical realism theory (Ripsman, et al., 2016). Neoclassical realism begins with a traditionally realist assessment of the strategic context of the state, that considers the geopolitical structure of the international system and identifies the material balance of power that defines and prioritizes national interests and the threats to those interests (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

I will try here to sum up the findings of my research as it relates to the international systemic pressures and the strategic international environment of the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring.

Many scholars, credit the US with training the young Egyptians who led the initial call for the Arab uprisings. (Storck , 2011) The United States did attempt to provide some funding and organizational support to various pro-democracy groups (Cornwell, 2012). Groups such as Freedom House, National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) are known as “non-governmental organizations, NGOs” but get most of their funding from the U.S. government - largely from the State Department and the US Agency for International Development. The US government funding of these NGOs has sometimes fueled the charge that they are an arm of the US government, or stooges of its intelligence agencies. Both Mubarak and SCAF governments in Egypt acted against the members and the premises of these organizations (Cornwell, 2012). However, American Military and economic assistance to Egypt, about 1.5 billion USD annually, continued to back up the strategically important Egypt.

Initial reactions from the US administration to the January 2011 demonstrations in Egypt was to assure everyone that Egypt had a stable order. Some of the Egyptian Arab Spring leaders such as Mohamed El Baradei called publicly on the US in early February of 2011 to pressure Mubarak to step down (Bassiouni, 2016). He repeated the same call twice; in 2012 to make the SCAF hold the presidential election on the promised date and again in 2013 to have the MB’s President Morsi agree to early elections or to step down as demanded by the mass protests all over the country (Faaruki, et al., 2017). In all of these cases most parties including the protesters’ leaders were convinced that the US was playing a very influential behind the scenes role at manipulating the government’s actions. They were proven wrong by actual developments on the ground (Pierce, 2013). For MB, the US was initially an important partner who can put pressure on Mubarak and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces SCAF. Later, MB’s President Morsi was very keen to prove to the US that he is as effective as Mubarak was in mediating between the different Palestinian factions and Israel (El-Sherif, 2014).

When applying the same autocratic methods of Mubarak, Morsi was expecting to get the same treatment and support that Mubarak got from the US during his 30-year reign of

power (Kirkpatrick, 2018). Morsi did not understand that he lived in a different Egypt and a different Middle East. He was also dealing with a different US and a quite different international order (Ashour, 2015).

The time period of 2010-2013 was part of a transitional phase of the international order from a unipolar global system that lasted since 1990 to a multi polar one. This transition was not yet clear to all the principal players. Actually, it was helped and expedited by the Arab Spring. It made the Russians feel the heat of political Islam spreading their way. I do argue that applying the neoclassical realism theory in my research and analysis of the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring brings new findings which could not have been possible had I only resorted to structural realism or neorealism tools (BEQA , 2017).

Using a plural definition of the state, neoclassical realism recognizes that processes within states are influenced not only by exogenous systemic factors and considerations of power and security, but also by cultural and ideological bias, domestic political considerations and prevailing ideas (Kitchen, 2010). The popular revolt against Mubarak government in Egypt did not only force him to step down but also created a security, economic and political instability that lasted for the whole period covered by the present study. Accordingly, the foreign policy executives (both SCAF and MB) were not always able to extract national resources to implement their preferred external policy. In the last few years and maybe for some time to come, Egypt has become more dependent on regional partners' assistance, international loans or foreign direct investments (Farouk, 2014). One report claimed that Gulf countries supported Egypt with 92 billion USD since 2011 (Monitor, 2019).

The Egyptian military played a decisive role in supporting the popular demand for Mubarak to step down. It has played a similar role in siding with the second popular revolt asking Muslim Brotherhood's president to do the same thing two years later. In between the two popular uprisings, SCAF dominated the political scene in Egypt. It has officially and legally ruled the country from February 2011 to June 2012 when MB's President Morsi was elected. It continued, however, to have the legislative powers during most of Morsi's one-year long presidency. The elected parliament was dissolved in 2012 upon the Supreme Court's decision to nullify the constitutionality of the election's law that was in force for the parliament election (Hamad, 2019 p. 250). As demonstrations were taking

place almost daily and street fights were routine scenery in the streets of Cairo, the role of the military to keep public security and safety was essential (Bassiouni, 2016).

The MB's supporters claimed that other state institutions also limited Morsi's government freedom of action both domestically and externally. During my research work and my professional experience, I could not find enough evidence to support their claim except as it applies to the military and the judiciary (Hamad, 2019 p. 222). I believe those pro Islamists analysts were influenced by the Turkish model of (Deep State) scenario where the secular cadres of the public service would resist the political Islamist government. Except for the military and the judiciary, Egypt did not have, in my opinion, a similar parallel secular civil service.

The top rank Egyptian civil servants, especially at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were willing to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood's government. However, my research showed that Egyptian civil service somehow lost its traditional political neutrality because of the Arab Spring. Government buildings witnessed probably in the first time in decades heated political debates between its employees and repeated demonstrations and strikes to ask for social benefits and wage increases (Bassiouni, 2013).

There is no doubt that public opinion has turned into a major element of influence over the foreign policy executives in making their external choices. For example, MB's prior rhetoric, while in the opposition, against peace with Israel made its president lose a great deal of his credibility and popularity simply because of his signature on the regular cordial letter of credentials of the new Egyptian Ambassador to Israel. Under public opinion pressures, some leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood, had resigned from both the group and its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), to protest the letter sent by Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi to his Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres. The letter, which was sent on 17 October 2012 to introduce the newly-appointed Egyptian ambassador to Israel, provoked controversy due to its friendly wording. "This message is a national and religious treason, which disregards the blood that has been shed since 1948 at the hands of Zionists", reads the resignation letter (AL-Ahram-Online, 2012).

From a neoclassical realist's perspective, my research proved that both AKP in Turkey and MB in Egypt were more focused on domestic considerations while drawing their

foreign policy towards each other and the Arab Spring. They also both made many miscalculations because of this limitation. The MB paid dearly and expeditiously for these errors and limitations when it was driven out of power by another popular uprising that was even bigger than the one brought it to the throne and was also supported by the military. The Turkish AKP government's foreign policy also suffered many losses regionally and internationally because of its unproportioned focus on domestic affairs while making its foreign policy decisions on how to deal with the Arab Spring in order to maximize its national security and international influence (Yeşilyurt, 2017).

During the Arab Spring, youth movements, opposition parties, labor unions, and human rights organizations, in Egypt and other Arab Spring countries, have banded together to oppose repressive authoritarian regimes. These diverse coalitions have channeled local grievances about unemployment, inflation, and police abuse into clear calls for democratization and political reform. The Arab Spring uprising also dramatically increased the role of some Egyptian non-governmental youth organizations such as the 6th of April or later Tamarod, which started as only protest movements (Seeberg, 2016).

These Egyptian NGOs initially lacked any formal organizational structure or durable sources of funding that would match the unlimited influence they acquired on decision making elites since January 2011. They were consulted on vital domestic and external issues such as choosing a new prime minister. They successfully challenged the choice of some Egyptian Ambassadors overseas through pressuring the government or letting the receiving foreign government know about their objections to the nominated Ambassador (Seeberg, 2016).

Existing prevailing legal, political and military culture has always been observed and respected. International treaties and obligations were reviewed, discussed publicly and vehemently criticized. Both the SCAF and Morsi declared, on assuming power, that they would respect all such treaties and obligations, including the peace treaty with Israel. My research also shows that the prevailing strategic culture during Sadat/Mubarak time continued for obvious reasons to be dominant during the time of SCAF and MB's President Morsi (Ashour, 2015).

Morsi had misread the international signals coming from the US and Gulf countries about the conflict in Syria. Therefore, he went out to declare that Egyptians would fight in support of the Syrian opposition and called for Jihad in Syria. He was misled to believe that this could save him his presidency against a very strong popular opposition and mass demonstrations that took to the streets a call on him to step down. He also overlooked a deep-rooted reluctance against interventions in civil wars on the part of the Egyptian armed forces since the war in Yemen in the 1960s. To everybody's surprise, The Supreme Council of Armed Forces SCAF did not wait more than few hours to issue a rebuttal to the misguided president that clearly explained to him the prevailing strategic culture that he and his Muslim Brothers were not aware of (Trager, 2017).

During the Arab Spring, the fine lines that separated what used to be considered domestic, regional and international had almost disappeared. For example, MB's President Morsi visited Turkey in September 2012 to attend an AKP political ruling party meeting in support of Erdogan. This unprecedented overt cross-country mix of domestic and foreign policy act was not done only to appeal to the Turkish Islamists supporters of Erdogan but also to please Morsi's own Islamists political supporters in Egypt (Trager, 2017).

The Global Information's Revolution highly increased this blurring of borders and highlighted the role of the public both domestically and region-wide. It did not always contribute to relaying accurate and clear messages to make that public well informed. Many key players, domestic and foreign, tried to manipulate the relayed information to influence the public opinion to their benefit (Storck , 2011).

My research proved that all of the above-mentioned factors impacted the rationality of the Egyptian foreign policy executives during my study period. The message was not always clear from the global system. The regional players exercised heavy hand interventions that did not go along with global interventions but contradicted each other in most cases. Public opinion and NGOs played, in many cases, a counterproductive role for the policy and the purposes of the ruling elite.

6.2. Proving the Hypothesis and Answering the Research Questions

Based on the above-mentioned observations and analysis, I concluded that next to domestic variables, regional politics played the second most important role in influencing the Egyptian FPE' decisions. I also proved that using type III neoclassical realism can explain how did the regional policies were able to influence and change the policies of the major international powers such as America, Russia and the EU toward Egypt and not the other way around as the structural realism theory would have assumed (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

In neoclassical realists words, I was able to prove with great confidence my hypothesis that „the government leaders in Egypt under three different political regimes from 2011 to 2014 were responding to their regional allies, domestic public demands, limited resources and strategic culture more than they did to international systemic pressures“. Their perception of, and reaction to, international systemic pressures, were heavily influenced by their regional coalitions, strong domestic institutions, public opinion and prevailing culture. When the international anarchic systemic signals contradicted regional and domestic intervening variables, the latter prevailed. The international strategic environment was quite permissive and not restrictive.

I also reached the following answers to my research questions:

- It is correct to claim that the Arab Spring's domestic, regional and international changes have resulted in a substantial change of Egyptian foreign policy regarding most issues especially toward Turkey and Palestine. The only two exception were maintaining peace with Israel and keeping the economic relation with Turkey. The three different Egyptian regimes' leaders during the Arab Spring considered these two issues to be of vital strategic importance. The systemic international and regional signals did not contradict this conviction.
- Political Islamists' leaders unsuccessfully tried to introduce some limited change of the Egyptian foreign policy's agenda during the Arab Spring. However, like their policies failure on the domestic level, they had also achieved very little regionally and internationally. Their removal by the military was called for by

domestic popular demand and was not met with strong regional or international resentment.

- Public opinion was a key factor for the formulation of Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab spring. Powerful domestic institutions such as the military positively respond to public opinion expressed preferences in most cases. Only when very strong systemic international pressures were applied, did SCAF act against the demonstrators.
- Regional powers had a great impact during the Arab Spring on the Egyptian FPE's perceptions and its ability to extract national resources to implement its foreign policy.

Neoclassical realism was ideal for my analysis. It helped me easily identify key actors on both levels of analysis. On the domestic intervening level, I was able to determine who is participating in the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE), the main foreign policy's domestic institutions, the prevailing culture and the FPE's ability to mobilize resources to implement foreign policy decisions and strategies.

For the purpose of identifying key domestic actors, I distinguished FPE from the rest of the government and from society. The FPE consists of the individuals who are responsible for making the foreign policy choices, which often include the head of government, secretaries, or ministers — such as the minister of foreign affairs and the secretary of defense — charged with foreign policy issue areas (Ripsman, et al., 2016). In addition, the FPE may also include other individuals that are members of ministerial, sub-committee, or sub-cabinet sessions on foreign security policy, and therefore have some influence over foreign policy choices. Many individuals inside and outside of the government have an interest in foreign policy, however, not all of these actors have meaningful input into the policymaking process (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

The FPE are separate from and supported by an extensive bureaucracy and institutions including defense, economic, intelligence, and regional experts. Although these foreign policy experts might be present at meetings with the FPE, they do not weigh in on the final decision. Instead they provide expertise on political, economic, military, or

intelligence matters to the FPE, often writing background and support papers, and making policy recommendations (Kitchen, 2010).

In the Egyptian case, my research enabled me to identify the FPE during the Arab Spring as composed of the president, his foreign policy advisers, the foreign and defense ministers, the chief of intelligence, and the SCAF (Trager, 2015).

It was also easy for me to research public opinion attitudes despite the fact that Egypt did not have any organized research of public opinion polling and measurement. I counted more on the outcome of four elections and referenda that were conducted during my research's time-period and the public opinion campaigns which accompanied them (Martini, et al., 2013). I was naturally aware of possible manipulation and misinformation of those campaigns at the time of chaos and uprising. I dealt with those deviations as, in neoclassical realists' terms, structural modifiers (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

I concluded that public opinion had a primary influence on the FPE's perceptions, decisions and its ability to mobilize resources to implement those decisions. The SCAF and the intelligence services played the dominant role among the foreign policy domestic institutions in making foreign policy decisions. Naturally, the foreign ministry had a more active role in implementing them. My research on the two case studies of the Egyptian foreign policy toward Turkey and Palestine/Israel confirmed the above-mentioned conclusions.

Neoclassical realism's third level of analysis of international relations order deals with the outcome of interaction between different influential countries' such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, UAE and Qatar. Analyzing these countries' foreign policies toward Egypt during the Arab Spring was the perfect tool for my analysis of regional politics in the Middle East (Wahid, et al., 2018).

During the Arab Spring, regional interactions acted as the intervening variables between the weak, unclear and contradicting international systemic signals on one hand and the vibrant chaotic domestic variables on the other (Lynch, 2018).

Neoclassical realism maintains that the international system is an imperfect transmission belt; systemic influence on outcomes pass through intervening domestic-level process variables that can amplify, obstruct, or distort it. Neoclassical realists are in agreement with structural realists that states construct their foreign security policies primarily in response to the threats and opportunities that arise in the international system and which shape each state's range of policy options. While neoclassical realism is an extension of the core assumptions of structural realism and the broader Realpolitik tradition, neoclassical realist scholars maintain that a purely structural theory, one that is not augmented by unit-level intervening variables, can explain very little about the behavior of states in the international system (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

Type III neoclassical realism is a theory that can explain international politics. Lobell argues that neoclassical realist theory can explain political phenomena ranging from short term crisis decision-making, foreign policy behavior, and patterns of grand strategic adjustment of individual states, to long-term systemic outcomes, and ultimately to the evolution of the structure of the international system itself (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

In my present research, reflecting a type III approach, I tried to modify the understanding of balance-of-power theory to focus more on regional politics. I still maintained the neoclassical realist assumption that states act against shifts in elements or components of power rather than shifts in aggregate power alone. The combination of regional structural modifiers and intervening variables combine to encourage the FPE to disaggregate the power of emerging states into its components or elements (Kitchen, 2010). In other words, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, UAE and Qatar played intervening roles in modifying the international systemic signals as they are transmitted to and perceived by the Egyptian FPE.

Moreover, developments inside Egypt and changes in the Egyptian foreign policy, on their own, influenced the foreign policies of the main Middle Eastern regional powers toward not only Egypt but also the rest of the region and the international actors. It suffices to cite here the removal of both Mubarak and Morsi from power in Egypt which caused a geopolitical earthquake that shook the Middle East. Many of the regional powers readjusted their domestic, regional and international policies to adapt to these colossal

changes, to make the best use of them and to try influence future changes in Egypt (Lynch, 2018).

6.3. Recommendations for Future Research to Further Develop the Theory

In evaluating the limitations of using neoclassical realism as shown by my research, I find myself in full agreement with the critique of Tang (Tang, 2009). The most glaring omission of neoclassical realism has been dealing with international cooperation. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro stated very clearly that their theory's main goal is to focus on how states assess and cope with threat and opportunity for expansions (Ripsman, et al., 2016). The theory thus has a strong „competition bias“ (BEQA , 2017).

Earlier, Taliaferro himself admitted that neoclassical realism is in danger of falling into the offensive realism camp rather than becoming a theory of foreign policy that is consistent with both offensive and defensive realism (Lobell , et al., 2009). In my present research this loophole in the theory was quite obvious when dealing with the short periods of time when there was harmony among the international players during the very early times of the Arab Spring.

Neoclassical realism did not help me analyze, for example, the Egyptian government attitude toward the international united action to topple Qaddafi in Libya. The Egyptian FPE did not have any better alternative but to comply with the united international action especially as its own public opinion was very supportive of the international intervention against the Libyan dictator.

According to Tang, a second problem involves a lack of synthesis (Tang, 2009). I wholeheartedly agree. „Although all neoclassical realists submit to the assumption that domestic politics is a key for understanding state behavior, they do not share an integrative framework for analyzing the actual process through which states formulate and implement policies. More often than not, each author develops his/her own explanatory framework without attempting to build upon each other's work, although there has been some apparent and substantial overlapping among different authors'

frameworks“ (Tang, 2009). I exactly did that because I could not find a ready-to-use framework to analyze the Egyptian domestic processes.

Tang also lists methodological issues as a third category of problems. He pointed out that neoclassical realists tend to believe that structure and domestic politics are neatly separable than additive. Yet, apparently, structure and domestic politics interact with each other and thus constitute a system. As a result, Tang suggested, an interactive or systemic approach, rather than an additive or linear approach, should be the preferred approach (Tang, 2009). I exactly did that in my research and came up with idea of adding the regional politics variables to the intervening level of analysis to stress the interactive nature of relaying the systemic international signals even before reaching the domestic environment of the FPE.

Although neoclassical realists unanimously emphasize the role of policymaking executives, Tang believes that the role of leaders has been mostly missing from their discussion (Tang, 2009). My research proved exactly his point. There is no doubt that individual decision-maker traits, especially their personality and worldview, have all impacted their decisions. I referred to numerous cases which confirm this assertion in my present study. After all, it is leaders who construct threat, debate and decide strategies, and order mobilizations. Tang stresses that we also need to understand elite identities and how their identities shape their perceptions to understand state behavior (Tang, 2009).

I tried in my present study to examine both the political and strategic culture of the Egyptian FPE especially among SCAF’s members. I highlighted the impact of the 1960s failed Egyptian military intervention in Yemen. I also referred to the anti-Israel culture among Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders and its limitations on their foreign policy choices when they assumed political power.

Logically, I would like to start by recommending to neoclassical realists to try to deal with the above-mentioned shortcomings of applying the theory to my present study. I would also like to recommend them to look into my suggestion of adding the regional politics variables to the intervening level of analysis to stress the interactive nature of relaying the systemic international signals even before reaching the domestic

environment of the FPE. This improvement could be applied on research that covers longer time period.

Type III neoclassical realism was developed by Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro, and Steven Lobell in *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Ripsman, et al., 2016). They argued that neoclassical realist theory can explain political phenomena ranging from short term crisis decision-making, foreign policy behavior, and patterns of grand strategic adjustment of individual states, to long-term systemic outcomes, and ultimately to the evolution of the structure of the international system itself. What they termed Type III neoclassical realism is a theory that can explain international politics (Ripsman, et al., 2016).

Applying Type III of neoclassical realism could provide this theory with a closer relation with international history and better understanding of its interactive processes. My research showed that changes in the Egyptian foreign policy during the Arab Spring played a major role in shaping the regional politics and brought changes to the foreign policies of major powers in the Middle East. Therefore, I believe that future research can focus on longer periods of the Egyptian foreign policy and its interactions with those of other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and Iran.

I also recommend using Neoclassical Realism to do comparative studies on those major regional powers other than Egypt during the same time period during the Arab Spring. Using neoclassical realism for comparative research can help the researchers identify key actors on both levels of analysis, the International systemic and intervening domestic, and their impact on each country's foreign policy.

Researchers should be able to investigate and compare the role of intervening variables such as state institutions, leader images, state-society relations, and/or national culture on policy choices through comparative, qualitative and historical case studies. They can examine the decision-making processes in each country to determine why they did what they did and whether the researcher's variables of interest were the cause.

As for the Middle Eastern studies, I have an extended list of suggestions for my colleagues who are conducting political science and international relations research. My research on

the Arab Spring tried only to provide few answers on a whole list of questions about the Arab Spring that remain unanswered. Some of them relates to the domestic conditions in each of the Arab Spring countries. Others relate to the different regional and international reactions to each uprising in different Arab Spring countries.

We still need more rigorous and extensive studies to first document what actually happened and the real reasons behind those developments. We need these studies for obvious academic purposes. We can also use them to dispel or confirm some of the conspiracy theories which are very popular in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

I would also like to recommend elaborate studies on the failure of political Islam to govern in Egypt, Tunis and Libya. The MB group and its affiliates were the most organized opposition's factions in these countries before the Arab Spring. Initially, they faired very well in the early elections after the 2011 popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunis. We need to examine the domestic, regional and international reasons behind their subsequent failure while in power.

A separate category of studies is needed on the relationship between political Islam and terrorism. These studies can help us answer the following important questions. Why did some Jihadist groups turned to terrorism to achieve their political goals? What are the domestic reasons for forming politically motivated Jihadist terrorist groups? How much support did these terrorist groups, especially in Syria, receive from regional powers such as Turkey, Iran Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar or western powers such as the US and Europe?

In the near future, I aspire to contribute to filling the research vacuum about the Arab Spring in Middle Eastern, political science and international relations studies. I recognize the need for a concerted effort by many researchers from different academic fields equipped with multidimensional and interdisciplinary research tools. I hope that many more scholars at Charles University in Prague, the Czech Republic would find encouragement in my present dissertation to do further research on some of my suggested topics.

I especially see a great potential of encouraging the University's graduates of Arabic literature program to use their linguistic knowledge to do graduate studies on some of the above-mentioned topics. I also hope that Charles University's Czech Institute of Egyptology (CIE) would contribute to the study of modern Egypt and its more recent history as much it contributes now to the study the ancient Egyptian culture.

List of References

- Achcar, Gilbert. 2019.** More Than Just A “Spring”: The Arab Region’s Long-Term Revolution. [interv.] Joris Leverink . s.l. : ROAR Magazine, November 8, 2019.
- Adly, Amr. 2014.** The Economics Of Egypt’s Rising Authoritarian Order. Washington, D.C : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014.
- Al-Ahram.** Al Ahram Newspaper. [Online]
<http://english.ahram.org.eg/Portal/1/Egypt.aspx>.
- AL-Ahram-Online. 2012.** Leading FJP Member Resigns In Protest At Morsi's Letter To Israel. Cairo : Al Ahram Newspaper, 2012. News.
- Almasry-Alyoum.** Al Masry Al Youmdaily newspaper. [Online] Al Masry Al Youm. (<https://www.almasryalyoum.com/>).
- Almasry-Alyoum. 2012.** Brotherhood Asks Al-Azhar To Issue Fatwa On IMF Loan. Cairo : Al-Masry Al-Youm Newspaper, 2012. News Report.
- Anadolu-News.** Anadolu News. Anadolu News Agency English. [Online] Anadolu News Agency. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en>.
- Anderson, Steve. 2016.** Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apartt: . New York : New York Times, 2016. News report in five parts and an Epilogue.
- ANSAMED. 2013.** UAE: Inquiry Into 'Women's Branch' Of Islamic Group Linked To July Arrests, Other More Recent Ones Against MB, (09 January 2013). La Redazione ANSAMED è situata presso la sede centrale dell’Agenzia ANSA,. Rome : ANSAMED News, 2013. News report.
- APSA. 2013.** A New Wave Of Qualitative Methodology. Washington DC : American Political Sciences Association APSA, 2013.
- Aran, Amnon and Ginat, Rami. 2014.** Revisiting Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Israel under Mubarak: From Cold Peace to Strategic Peace. Journal of Strategic Studies. 2014, Vol. 37, 4, pp. 556-583.
- Arbuthnot, Felicity. 2012.** The Neocons’ Project for the New American Century: “American World Leadership” – Syria next to Pay the Price? Washington DC : Global Research Centre, 2012.
- Ashour, Omar. 2015.** Collusion to CraCkdown: Islamist-Military Relations In Egypt. Washington DC : Brookings Institution, 2015.
- Aswatmasriya. 2013.** Saudi Foreign Minister’s Statement In Support Of Egypt. Cairo : Aswatmasriya news, 2013.

Baabood, Abdullah. 2014. Gulf Countries and Arab Transitions: Role, Support and Effects, Transitional Processes and Political Change in Arab Countries. IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook. Barcelona : European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), 2014, pp. 42-48.

Bagci, Huseyin and Sinkaya, Bayram. 2007. The Greater Middle East Initiative And Turkey: The AKP'S Perspective. [book auth.] Nimrod Goren and Amikam Nachmani. The Importance of Being European: Turkey, the EU and The Middle East. Jerusalem : The Hebrew University, 2007, pp. 165-177.

Balcer, Adam. 2012. Turkey as a Source of Inspiration for the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges. [ed.] Stephen Calleya and Monika Wohlfeld. Change and Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean. s.l. : Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, 2012, pp. 370-386.

Barry, Tom. 2006. Rise and Demise of the New American Century. Washington DC : International Relations Center IRC, 2006.

Bassiouni, Cherif M. 2016. Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath: 2011-2016. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press;, 2016. p. 450.

Bassiouni, Cherif M. 2013. Egypt in Transition: The Third Republic, : Vol. 4, No. 4, December 2013, p6. Prism, a Journal of the Center for Complex Operations. December 4, 2013, pp. 6-20.

Bekdil, Burak. 2017. Turkey's Failed Grand Design for the Middle East. Ramat Gan : The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies BESA, 2017.

Bellin, Eva. 2012. Arab Uprisings: New Opportunities for Political Science. Washington DC : Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University,, 2012.

Benhaïm , Yohanan and Öktem, Kerem. 2016. The Rise And Fall Of Turkey's Soft Power Discourse. European Journal of Turkish Studies. March 2, 2016, Vol. 21.

Beqa , Mentor . 2017. Neoclassical Realism: Its Promises and Limits as a Theory of Foreign Policy. European Academic Research. 2017, Vol. V, 1.

Brands, Hal, Feaver, Peter and Mearsheime, John. 2016. Should America Retrench? The Battle Over Offshore Balancing. Foreign Affairs. November-December 2016, Vol. 95, 6.

Britannica. 2019. Arab Spring. The Encyclopaedia Britannica. New York : Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc, 2019.

Brooke, Steven. 2013. U.S. Policy and the Muslim Brotherhood. [book auth.] Lorenz (ed.) Vidino. The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the. Dubai : Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2013, 1, pp. 6-31.

- Brown, Nathan and El-Shimy, Yasser. 2016.** Did Sisi Save Egypt? Foreign Affairs. Special issue "The Arab Spring at Five", 2016, pp. 191-198.
- Byman, Daniel and Moller, Sara B. 2016.** The United States and the Middle East: Interests, Risks, and Costs. [book auth.] Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino. . Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy. Cambridge, MA : The Tobin Project, 2016.
- CIA, US Central Intelligence Agency. 2019.** The World Factbook. Washington DC : CIA, 2019.
- Cornell. 2015.** Arab Spring Research Guide. [Online] 2015. <https://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=31688&p=200755>.
- Cornell, University. 2014.** Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide. Cornell University Library. [Online] 2014. https://guides.library.cornell.edu/arab_spring.
- Cornwell, Susan. 2012.** U.S. Pro-Democracy Groups Find Shrinking Global Welcome . Washington DC : Reuters, 2012. News Analysis.
- Dalacoura, Katerina. 2012.** The 2011 Uprisings In The Arab Middle East: Political Change And Geopolitical Implications. International Affairs. 2012, Vol. 88, 1, pp. 63-79.
- Danforth, Nick. 2018.** Instead of Turning East, Turkey is Going It Alone. Austin, TX : The Texas National Security Network, 2018. Commentary.
- Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2020.** Systemic Earthquake and the Struggle for World Order; Exclusive Populism versus Inclusive Democracy. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- Davutoglu, Ahmet. 2010.** The Strategic Depth (in Arabic). Doha, Cairo : Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2010.
- Davutoglu, Ahmet. 2013.** The Three Major Earthquakes in the International System and Turkey. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs. 2013, Vol. 82, 2, pp. 1-11.
- Dell'Aguzzo, Loretta and Diodato, Emidio. 2016.** The 'State' Of Pivot States In South-Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Egypt, Israel, And Tunisia After The Arab Spring. Perugia : Perugia Stranieri University Press, 2016.
- Dentice, Giuseppe. 2018.** The Geopolitics of Violent Extremism: The Case of Sinai. Barcelona : European Institute of the Mediterranean IEMed, 2018.
- Egypt, The Government of. 2011.** Constitutional Declaration 2011. Egypt's Government Services Portal. [Online] 2011. [/www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/default.aspx](http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/default.aspx).

- El-Behairy, Nouran. 2013.** Ethiopia Frustrated By Egyptian Statements On GERD . Cairo : Daily New Egypt, 2013. News Analysis.
- Elreeny, Manal. 2018.** The problem of political Islam and the State before and after the Arab Spring (in Arabic). [ed.] Aisha Abash. Berlin : Democratic German Center, 2018.
- El-Sherif, Ashraf. 2014.** The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Failures. Carnegie Democracy and Rule of Law Program. Washington DC : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014. Paper.
- El-Sherif, Sherif. 2014.** Egypt's Post-Mubarak Predicament. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, DC : s.n., 2014.
- Faaruki, Daanish and Fahmy, Dalia. 2017.** Egyptian Liberals, From Revolution To Counterrevolution. Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism : Illiberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy. London : One World, 2017, pp. 1-23.
- Farouk, Yasmine. 2014.** More than Money: Post-Mubarak Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf. Dubai : The Gulf Research Center, 2014. GRC GULF PAPER .
- Fatheya, Eldakhakhny. 2013.** Morsi Is Keen On The Safety Of The Kidnapped And The Kidnappers (in Arabic). Cairo : Almasryalyoum Newspaper, 2013. News Analysis.
- Fawn, Rick, et al. 2018.** The Prague Spring and the 1968 Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in an International Context,. EUROPEUM. December 27, 2018.
- Ferris, JESSE. 2015.** Egypt's Vietnam Lessons From The Last Time Cairo Waded Into War In Yemen. Foreign Policy. April 3, 2015.
- Filkins, Dexter. 2018.** A Saudi Prince's Quest to Remake the Middle East. s.l. : The New Yorker, 2018. News Analysis.
- Frontier. 2019.** Morsi: Man of Courage. Peshawar, Pakistan : The Frontier Post, 2019.
- Gal, Yitzhak And Rock, Bader. 2018.** Israeli-Egyptian Trade: In-Depth Analysis. London, UK : Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2018.
- Gaub, Florence. 2014.** Arab Armies: Agents of Change? Before And After 2011. Paris : EU Institute for Security Studies, 2014.
- Gause, Gregory F., III . 2014.** Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. Doha : BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER, 2014.
- Gerges, Fawaz. 2013.** The Obama Approach To The Middle East: The End Of America's Moment? International Affairs. 2013, Vol. 89: 2, 2, pp. 299–323 .
- Gerring, John. 2012.** Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework. Boston : Boston University, 2012.

- Ghanim, David. 2008.** Turkish Democracy and Political Islam. The Middle East Policy. Spring 2008, Vol. XVI, 1.
- Gold, Zack. 2013.** SINAI SECURITY: Opportunities for Unlikely Cooperation Among Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. Washington DC : the Saban Center at BrOOkINgS, 2013.
- Goldschmidt, Arthur. 2008.** A Brief History Of Egypt. New York : Facts on File, Inc., 2008. p. 305.
- Goodenough, Patrick. 2013.** Saudis Warn the West: We Won't Forget Your Stance on Egypt. Washington DC : CNSNews.com, 2013. News report.
- Gul, Abdullah. 2010.** Gül Attends Egyptian Military Academy Graduation Ceremony. Ankara : s.n., 2010. The personal website of Mr. Abdullah Gül .
- Halaseh, Rama. 2012.** Civil Society, Youth and the Arab Spring. [ed.] Stephen Calleya and Monika Wohlfeld. Change and Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean,. Malta : Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, 2012, 13, pp. 254-273.
- Hamad, Mahmoud. 2019.** Judges and Generals in the Making of Modern Egypt; how institutions sustain and undermine authoritarian regimes. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Hoover, Joe. 2011.** Egypt and the Failure of Realism. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies. 2011, Vol. 1, 4, pp. 177-188.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993.** The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. 1993, Vol. 72, 3.
- Hurriyet.** Hurriyet Daily News. Hurriyet Daily. [Online] www.hurriyetdailynews.com.
- Husain, Ed. 2013.** Did the Iraq War Give Birth to the Arab Spring? Council on Foreign Relations. New York : CNN, 2013. News analysis.
- ICG, International Crisis Group. 2012.** Light At The End Of Their Tunnels? Hamas & The Arab Uprisings. New York : International Crisis Group ICG, 2012.
- Ishaq, N. G. 2012.** Hamas, Palestinian Political Power and the Arab Uprisings. Nijmegen, the Netherlands : Radboud University Nijmegen, 2012.
- Kalin, Ibrahim. 2011.** Turkey and the Arab Spring. Project Syndicate online. May 23, 2011.
- Karadeniz, Tulay and Saleh, Yasmine. 2011.** Turkish PM Throws Weight Behind Arab Cause. Cairo : Reuters, 2011. News Article.
- Kazin, Michael. 2016.** Trump and American Populism. Foreign Affairs. November-December 2016, Vol. 95, 6, pp. 17-25.

- Khalil, Mohamed Abdelkader. 2012.** Turkey and the Arab Spring Revolutions (in Arabic). Cairo : AlAhram online, 2012.
- King , Stephen J. 2020.** The Arab Winter; Democratic Consolidation, Civil War, and Radical Islamists. New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2020. pp. 301-302.
- Kireçci, Akif. 2012.** Relating Turkey to the Middle East and North Africa: Arab Spring and the Turkish Experience. 2012, Vol. 63, 63, pp. 111-134.
- Kirkpatrick, David D. . 2018.** Into the Hands of the Soldiers: Freedom and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East. New York : Penguin Books, 2018.
- Kissinger, Henry. 2014.** World Order. New York : Penguin Press, 2014.
- Kitchen, Nicholas. 2010.** Systemic Pressures And Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model Of Grand Strategy Formation,. Review of international studies. 2010, Vol. 36, 1, pp. 117-143.
- Kotb, Ahmad. 2019.** The EMGF: More Than Gas. Cairo : AlAhram online, 2019. News analysis.
- Kuru, Ahmet. 2013.** Egypt's Transition Two Years Later: A Turkish Perspective. Brookings. 2013. Foreign Policy Trip Reports .
- Kuru, Ahmet. 2013.** Islam and Secularism in the Arab World: Lessons from Turkey. Brookings Doha Center (BDC). 2013. KURUPOLICY BRIEFING.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1992.** Rethinking the Middle East. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 1992, Vol. 71, 4, pp. 3-22.
- Lobell , Steven E., Ripsman , Norrin M. and Taliaferro , Jeffrey W. 2009.** The Statesman, the State, and the Balance of Power: Neoclassical Realism and the Politics of Grand Strategic Adjustment. [book auth.] ed. W. Taliaferro. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Lynch, Marc. 2018.** The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today's Middle East. Foreign Affairs. 2018, Vol. 97, 5.
- Malley, Robert. 2019.** The Unwanted Wars: Why the Middle East Is More Combustible Than Ever. Foreign Affairs. November-December 2019, Vol. 98, 6, pp. 38-47.
- Mansouri, Fethi and Armillei, Riccardo. 2016.** The Democratic 'Transition' In Post-Revolution Tunisia:. 2016, Vol. 4, 1, pp. 156-181.
- Martini, Jeffrey and Worman, Stephen M. 2013.** Voting Patterns in Post-Mubarak Egypt. Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation, 2013. RAND Corporation research report series.

- Mearsheimer, John. 2014.** America Unhinged. The National Interest. January/February 2014, 129, pp. 9-30.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2006.** Structural Realism. [book auth.] Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity . Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 71-88.
- Monitor. 2019.** Gulf Countries Supported Egypt With \$92bn Since 2011. s.l. : Middle East Monitor , 2019.
- Morey, Daniel, et al. 2012.** Leader, Follower, or Spectator? The Role of President Obama in the Arab Spring Uprisings. Social Science Quarterly. 2012, Vol. 93, 5.
- Morsy, Ahmed and Ahmed Morsy, Menna Alaa El-Din, Ahmed. 2019.** Egypt's Sisi Says 'Dams On The Nile Would Have Never Been Built Was It Not For The Impact Of 2011. Cairo : ALAham online, 2019.
- Muasher, Marwan. 2019.** Is This the Arab Spring 2.0? . Washington DC : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019.
- Mulderig, Chloe M. 2013.** An Uncertain Future: Youth Frustration and the Arab Spring. The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. Boston : Boston University, 2013. The Pardee Papers.
- Nixon, Ron. 2011.** U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings. New York : New York Times, 2011. News Analysis.
- Obama, President Barak. 2016.** The Obama Doctrine. Washington DC : The Atlantic, April 2016.
- Osman, Tarek. 2016.** Islamism: What it Means for the Middle East and the World. New York : Yale University Press, 2016.
- PALDF. 2011.** Erdogan Meets With Egyptian Young Revolutionaries In A Campaigning Conference Attended By Million Turks (Arabic). 2011. News report.
- Perry, Tom and Fick, Maggie. 2013.** Egypt's Sisi Sees New Defense Cooperation With Russia. Cairo : Reuter, 2013.
- Pierce, Anne R. 2013.** US “Partnership” with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Effect on Civil Society and Human Rights. Society. December 18, 2013, Vol. 51, 1, pp. 68-86.
- Porat, Liad. 2014.** The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt-Israel Peace. Bar-Ilan University,. Ramat Gan : Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2014. Mideast Security and Policy Studies.
- Puspitasari, Shinta. 2017.** Arab Spring: A Case Study of Egyptian Revolution 2011. 2017, Vol. 6, 2, pp. 160-178.

- Rane, Halim. 2012.** An Alternative to the “Turkish Model” for the Emerging Arab. *Insight Turkey*. 2012, pp. 47-56.
- Ripsman, N M, Taliaferro, J W and Lobell, S E. 2016.** *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. New York : Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Salaheldin, Ambassador Abderahman. 2019.** Interview: Ambassador Abdel-Rahman Salah on tumultuous Egyptian-Turkish relations. Cairo : AL Ahram Online, March 9, 2019.
- Saleh, Yasmine and Perry, Tom. 2013.** Mursi Role At Syria Rally Seen As Tipping Point For Egypt Army. Cairo : Reuter, 2013. News Report.
- Samaan, Jean-Loup. 2013.** The Rise And Fall Of The “Turkish Model” In The Arab World. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*. 2013, Vol. 12, 3.
- Satloff, Robert. In “”, Caravan issue no. 1613 (2017), Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stan. 2017.** U.S.-Egypt Strategic Relations, From Obama To Trump: What Went Wrong And What Might Be Possible. [book auth.] Hoover Institution. *Egypt: Past and Present Keystone of the Arab-Islamic World*. Palo Alto : Stanford University, 2017, pp. 1-24.
- Seeberg, Peter. 2016.** *Analysing Security Subcomplexes In A Changing Middle East—The Role Of Non-Arab State Actors And Non-State Actors*. Palgrave Communications. November 29, 2016.
- Sheira, OMAR. 2014.** *Turkey-Egypt Relations: Incentives To Normalize*. Istanbul : Istanbul Culture University, 2014. GPOT PB No. 40.
- Siboni, Gabi and Ben-Barak, Ram . 2013.** *The Sinai Peninsula Threat Development And Response Concept*. Washington DC : The Saban Center at BBrookINgS and the Military and Strategic Affairs Program at INSS , 2013.
- Siboni, Gabi and Ben-Barak, ram. 2014.** *The Sinai Peninsula Threat Development And Response Concept*. Washington DC : The Saban Center at BBrookINgS and the Military and Strategic Affairs Program at INSS, 2014.
- Simon, Steven and Stevenson, Jonathan. 2015.** The End of Pax Americana Why Washington’s Middle East Pullback Makes Sense. *Foreign Affairs*. 2015, Vol. 94, 6, pp. 2-10.
- SkyNews. 2017.** Turkey and Qatar; The Dual Sponsors Of Extrimism In Africa (in Arabic). Abu Dhabi : Sky News TV, 2017. News report.
- Steinberg , Guido. 2014.** *Leading the Counter-Revolution Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring* . Berlin : Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2014. SWP Research Paper .
- Steinberg, Guido. 2014.** *Leading the Counter-Revolution Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring*. Berlin : German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2014.

Steven, Lobell, Ripsman, Norin and Taliaferro, Jeerey. 2009. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge : Cambridge: University Press, 2009.

Storck, Madeline. 2011. The Role of Social Media in Political Mobilization: a Case Study of the January 2011 Egyptian Uprising. University of St Andrews. Scotland : s.n., 2011. A dissertation submitted in part requirement for the Degree of M.A.,.

Strazzari, Francesco and Zampagni, Francesca. 2018. Illicit Firearms Circulation And The Politics Of Upheaval In North Africa. [book auth.] Nils Duquet (ed.). Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe. s.l. : Flimish Peace Institute, 2018, pp. 435-460.

Tabler, Andrew. 2015. The New Great Game:How Regional Powers are Carving Up Syria. Foreign Affairs. August 11, 2015.

Taflioglu, Serkan. 2013. From Burden To Strategic Asset; The Relationship Between The Government Of Hamas And Mubarak's Egypt. Niğde Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi. 2013, Vol. 4, 1.

Tang, Shiping. 2009. Taking Stock of Neoclassical Realism. International Studies Review. 2009, Vol. 11, 1.

Tecl, Tesfa-Alem. 2013. Egypt TV Airs Live Discussion Of Ethiopia Dam Sabotage Plans. Khartoum : Sudan Tribune, 2013. News Analysis.

Telhami, Shibley. 2011. The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll. [Online] Brookings, 2011. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-2011-arab-public-opinion-poll/>.

Thorn, Craig Alex. 2015. Egypt's Vietnam: Lessons from the last time Cairo waded into war in Yemen. Foreign Policy. April 3, 2015.

Thrall, Trevor A. and Goepner, Erik. 2017. Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror. Washington DC : CATO Institute, 2017.

Tocci , Nathalie, et al. 2011. Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy From a Transatlantic Perspective. Washington, DC : The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved., 2011. MEDITERRANEAN PAPER SERIES.

Trager, Eric and Shalabi, Marina. 2016. The Brotherhood Breaks Down: Will the Group Survive the Latest Blow?., Foreign Affairs. January 17, 2016.

Trager, Eric. 2015. Egypt's Durable Misery: Why Sisi's Regime Is Stable, Foreign Affairs, Jul 21, 2015. Foreign Affairs. July 21, 2015.

Trager, Eric. 2017. The Muslim Brotherhood Fatal Mistake. Foreign Affairs. August 21, 2017.

- Trenin, Dmitri. 2012.** Russia's Line in the Sand on Syria: Why Moscow Wants To Halt the Arab Spring,, , 2012. Foreign Affairs. February 5, 2012.
- TUIK. 2019.** Trade Data by Country. Turkish Statistical Institute. [Online] 2019. http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046.
- Tumiad. 2019.** Turkish-Egyptian Businessmen Association. Tumiad. [Online] Tumiad, MAY 5, 2019. <http://tumiad.com/turkish-businessmen-are-ready-to-pump-5-billion-investments-in-egypt/?lang=en>.
- Ülgen, Sinan. 2017.** Trade As Turkey's EU Anchor. Brussels : Carnegie Europe, 2017. Paper.
- UNHCR. 2019.** Registered Syrian Refugees. UNHCR Response Syrian Refugee. [Online] 2019. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>.
- Vaitikiotis, Michael and Grandjean, Romain. 2014.** Managing Military Intervention In Democratic Transitions. [book auth.] Oslo Forum. The Oslo Forum Network of Mediators. Oslo : s.n., 2014.
- Wafa.** Palestinian News Agency. Palestinian News. [Online] www.english.wafa.ps).
- Wahid, Michael and Benaim, Daniel. 2018.** Egypt First: Under Sisi, Cairo Is Going Its Own Way. Foreign Affairs. January 2018.
- Winter, Michael,, London. 1992.** Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule 1517–1798. London : Routledge, 1992. p. 340.
- Worth, Robert F. 2016.** A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS, . 2016. New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016.
- Yeşilyurt, Nuri. 2017.** Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective. All Azimuth. July 2017, Vol. 6, 2, pp. 65-83.
- Yilmaz , Nuh and Ustun, Kadir. 2011.** The Erdoğan Effect; Turkey, Egypt and the Future of the Middle East. The Cairo Riview. Fall 2011, 3.
- Zuhur, Sherifa. 2007.** Egypt: Security, Political, And Islamist Challenges. Washington DC : Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2007.