

Abstract

This title reveals a lot about its intentions and objectives. Its research target is to explain the behavior and strategy of Greece in negotiations prior to agreement on the third economic adjustment program. Thesis asks what the key characteristic of the Greek bargaining strategy was. Negotiation analysis approach is employed as the theoretical/methodological framework. It leads us to examination of following factors. Actors' interests and preferences have to be understood and distinguished from positions. Next, alternatives to negotiated agreement, creating and claiming value techniques, and actions to change the game constitute the remaining basis of negotiation analysis. Moreover, the element of bargaining power is added as a relevant concept to research bargaining strategy. That leads us also to commitment tactic, use of threats, and commitment through domestic audiences and audience costs. Last but not least, two-level games factor is considered as well.

Hypothesis and further explanation of analytical technique is followed by three chapters that provide historical context of the negotiations. Then finally empirical analysis is done based on theoretical framework mentioned above. My research shows mixed results. Greek strategy was significantly inconsistent and therefore I cannot consider my hypothesis confirmed. The effort to enhance credibility of the commitment to end austerity was most successfully represented by the tactic of public commitment to domestic audiences. The use of threatening tactic reveals some potential; the rest of the factors do not indicate any credibility enhancement effect.