

The thesis deals with the relations between Locke's theory of personal identity, its "classical" critic, performed by Butler and Reid and its critical adoption amongst some authors of analytic philosophy (Grice, Quinton, Perry, Shoemaker). In the first part of the thesis, Locke is shown as the founder of a tradition that lays stress on the fundamental relation between the identity of persons over time and its memory or consciousness. We also distinguish the identity of person and the identity of man, this means person is understood as identical so far as its consciousness reaches, independently of the identity of material and/or immaterial substance in which the identity of man consists. Serious problems with Locke's conception, such as amnesia and paramnesia are discussed in this part too. In the second part of the thesis, classical objections against Locke's theory are analyzed – Reid's "brave officer paradox" and Butler's objection of *petitio principii*; Reid's and Butler's distinction between

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the identity of persons and other things. In the third part we discuss two conceptions by contemporary authors (Grice and Quinton) who defend Locke's attitude against the classical objections and who assert, that personal identity consists in a certain sort of psychological continuity (continuity of memory or character). However, it is shown that these conceptions still come under the objection of *petitio principii*. In the fourth part therefore the conceptions of those authors (Perry, Shoemaker) are discussed, who try to point out that in the exploration of personal identity criteria we can't do without bodily continuity and that the distinction of the first-person and the third person perspective is also important.