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Attitudes of Border Dwellers as Indicators of the Evolution of Geopolitical Reality in States – the Case of the Czech Republic

Master's thesis

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague/London on Greg Aldridge

References

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Abstract

This thesis aims to understand, in the case of the Czech people living along the borders, the extent to which they are, and have become, more “internationally minded” in recent decades. Three theoretical approaches to understand the attitudes of those living along the boundaries are identified as the Realist Securitisation, Liberal Openness and Bordering as a Process paradigms. Descriptions are presented of the historical and demographic nature of the Czech borderlands as well as developments in Czech politics and attitudes to foreigners in the last two decades. Detailed regression analysis at the level of 6,300 individual municipalities is undertaken to empirically test the theoretical paradigms and to control for other factors so as to understand the specific impact of the boundary on the attitudes of those living alongside it. The formation of attitudes is a complex process in which history still seems important and not all interactions with foreigners are seen as improving attitudes towards them. However, against a backdrop of lower support for EU integration and greater concern over immigration in the Czech Republic as a whole, open borders since accession to the EU have coincided with border dwellers becoming in many, but not all, cases less Eurosceptic and less opposed to migrants than is the case for the rest of the country.

Keywords

Czech Republic, boundary, border-dwellers, bordering, transnationalism, Euroscepticism, immigration.

Title

Attitudes of Border Dwellers as Indicators of the Evolution of Geopolitical Reality in States – the Case of the Czech Republic.

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[1] Jakub Černý, "Population Characteristics of Voters: Evidence from the Czech Parliamentary Election" (Bachelor thesis, Charles University, Prague, 2019), is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/detail/202750/.

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Introduction

Border areas, as the point where nation states meet in a hard geographic sense are among the most tangible features in geopolitics. They are simultaneously the front-line between the power and sovereignty of different entities and the point of contact for the exchange of goods, people and ideas – they can be both walls and bridges. The attitudes of those living there are indicators of geopolitical reality including the state of relations with neighbours and views on outsiders and foreigners in general. The analysis in this thesis aims to understand, in the case of the Czech population living along the boundary, the extent to which it is, and over recent decades has become, more "internationally minded" compared to the country as a whole.

Depending on theoretical approach, borders can be considered a place where fear of outsiders is acute as this legitimises the sovereignty of ruling powers within their own state; or they can be places where increasingly open movement, in Europe at least, facilitates interactions that reduce fear of those same outsiders; or they can be the construct of a complex and highly contextual mix of history, politics, economics and sociology. Each of these paradigms would be expected to result in differing attitudes among those living by the boundary – either negative attitudes to outsiders, increasingly positive attitudes to outsiders or differing attitudes depending on time and place.

The Czech Republic is an attractive case for analysing these paradigms. The Czech borders are rich in historical experience as well as a related demographic composition in which many areas of the border are economically and educationally relatively disadvantaged. In the last century alone the border regions have been created, annexed, returned and cleared of ethnic Germans. Two border regions formed part of the Iron Curtain and were, for four decades, closed militarised boundaries. A further two were international boundaries but within the Eastern Bloc. The final boundary was, until 1993, an intra-regional boundary within Czechoslovakia.

In the last two decades the Czech population has become more Eurosceptic and more concerned by immigration. The same period has also seen several new entrants to the political scene representing anti-establishment and populist movements and employing strongly anti-EU and anti-migrant messages. Moreover, the former incumbent parties have also adopted increasingly Eurosceptic and anti-immigration stances. These developments are

indicative of a more securitised narrative in the country – providing a backdrop against which to understand how attitudes have developed along the boundary.

Using a bespoke database for over 6,300 municipalities including demographic as well as spatial variables, it is possible to use regression models to test the empirical applicability of the different theoretical approaches and to determine the effect of the boundary itself in forming attitudes towards outsiders and foreigners. This allows the assembly of a detailed picture of the patterns of attitudes in different places and at different times and to determine what are the factors that have the greatest influence on their formation.

Chapter 1 explains the theoretical background to what drives attitudes among those living along the border. Chapter 2 describes the nature of the Czech borderlands including the historical and demographic differences compared to the country as a whole. Developments over the last two decades in Czech politics and attitudes towards the EU and foreigners are detailed in Chapter 3. The details of the methodological approach are set out in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 analyses the results to determine the extent to which those living along the border have become more "internationally minded" and provides some insights into the implications of the findings.

1. Theoretical Background to the Attitudes of Those Living on the Border

The impact that boundaries might be expected to have on those who live alongside them is rooted in different academic and analytical approaches to borders which have seen significant evolution in the last fifty years. Then, the principal considerations were tangible, geographical and political - focusing on lines on maps, where the boundary[2] is, how it is set and demarcated, and what are the territorial limits to sovereignty and power. In the intervening years, there have been two broadly competing narratives about the nature of borders in the modern world.

The first builds on this traditional view, arguing that borders are securitised locations because states assert sovereignty within their demarcated territory either with physical symbols such as walls and fences or through creating fear of outsiders to justify the state's power within its boundaries. The second claims that the world is becoming increasingly open in many respects (economic, trade and technology) with greater co-operation and movement of people across borders driving transnational behaviour which in turn reduces fear of the unknown or the outsider. Building on Kolossov's distinction between the 'realistic' and the 'liberal' political approaches to border studies,[3] these two narratives might be identified as the realist securitisation paradigm as opposed to the neoliberal openness paradigm.

Over recent decades the approach to analysing borders has become increasingly ideational and constructivist, considering bordering as a process rather than analysing the location of the boundary itself. The focus has been on how borders are created and reproduced by notions of "here" and "there" and the importance of context, yet still recognising this process as a way to assert power over territory. Bordering as a process can be applied to many areas of society, but in the context of international borders can be seen as a way to understand how

[2] The terms *frontier*, *boundary* and *border* are used in the sense set out in J.R.V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987 – reprinted by Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). *Frontier* refers to the zone either side of the *boundary* between two territories where the *boundary* is the distinct line separating one territory from another (p.1). *Border* is the area immediately fringing the boundary (p.12).

[3] "In the 'realistic' paradigm, the states are perceived as the most important actors on the international scene, and boundaries between them are interpreted as strict dividing lines protecting state sovereignty and national security. According to 'liberal' views, states are not the only and sometimes not even the major political actors, and the principal function of state boundaries is to connect neighbours and to enable various international interactions." Vladimir Kolossov, "Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches," *Geopolitics* 10, no. 4 (2005): 612, DOI: 10.1080/14650040500318415.

connotations of "us" and "them" (both positive and negative) can change how the border itself is conceived between the securitised and borderless paradigms.

Analysing the attitudes of those who live alongside the border and how they have changed over time can provide insights into which of the approaches – realist securitisation, neoliberal openness or constructivist bordering as a process – has greatest validity. The realist securitisation approach would suggest that those who live alongside the border are on the front line with outsiders and therefore more acutely aware of differences and as a result should be more nationalist, more Eurosceptic and less favourable to foreigners. In the case of the neoliberal openness approach, the removal of borders and freedom of movement post-EU accession should increase transnationalism in particular for those living along the border and therefore result in increasingly positive attitudes to foreigners and lower Euroscepticism. The constructivist bordering as a process approach would see attitudes, towards foreigners and the EU, of those along the borders as more variable, changing depending on context both in terms of location (for example, the identity of those beyond the border) and time (depending on the importance of national attitudes on these topics at any given time).

The traditional political geography approach

The traditional political geography approach is arguably best summed up in the 1960s works of J.R.V. Prescott and J.V. Minghi.[4] The main interest was the development of boundaries – how and where they were set with reference to geographical features and the limits of political authority, with some consideration of legal and economic issues. Within this, there was a focus on the practicalities of determining location and demarcation of boundaries and the creation of typologies of boundaries to reflect their inherent characteristics. This approach also highlighted the variety of different border types that exist, such that all borders might be considered unique.

There was also recognition of the geopolitical significance of boundaries with discussion of the theories and laws on boundary-setting sought by Ratzel, Ancel, Haushofer and Spykman.[5] However, the complexity of the differing nature of each boundary was seen as a barrier to the development of these theories – "It is probably this fact which has prevented those devoted to

[4] J. R. V. Prescott, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries* (London: Hutchinson, 1965), of which Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* is an updated version, and Julian V. Minghi, "Boundary Studies in Political Geography," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 53, no. 3 (1963): 407-428, jstor.org/stable/2561272.
[5] Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 8-10.

the quantification of political and social data from identifying the laws or consistencies which eluded Ratzel and others".[6] Moreover, the focus on the hardening from frontiers to boundaries was also a reflection of the move from thinking of borders as organic and dynamic in Ratzel's thinking to more concrete limits at the edge of sovereign states in line with realist approaches where demarcated states are considered the key entities operating in the international system.

The approach also highlighted the analyses that had been undertaken to understand the impact of the location of boundaries and the effects of moving them. However, the focus was very much on the difference in geographical and economic features either side of the boundary caused by the limitation to totally free movement across an otherwise identical landscape. This showed that some boundaries could be to varying degrees "permeable" to enable economic activity to continue or, for varying reasons, closed creating economically disadvantaged "peripheral" areas.

Largely missing from Minghi and Prescott's analyses of the effect of boundaries was the attitudes of those who live in these areas. As highlighted by van Houtum,[7] only in the final paragraph of his paper did Minghi call on researchers to "undertake investigations in the sociological field, as well as in the cultural and economic areas, for the spatial patterns of social behavior can be even more important than other patterns in determining the impact of a boundary and its viability as a national separator".[8] Prescott also recognised that attitudes may vary and in the idea of the "frontiersman" there is a notion that those who live along the border are different, shaped by the opportunities and threats provided by their location, but this was not developed beyond suggesting voting patterns may reflect the economic interests of those who live there.[9]

Although the attitudes of borderlanders was not a major concern of the traditional approach, the traditional identification of the potential for borderlands to be "peripheral" is important for understanding and controlling for the impact of this when understanding the effect of living on the boundary *per se*. Given that political (and in some cases military) issues are greater priorities in border regions, there is potential for economic issues to be relatively ignored and border regions can therefore suffer disproportionately economically from limits

[6] Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 12.
[7] Henk van Houtum, "The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries," *Geopolitics* 10, no.4 (2005): 673, DOI: 10.1080/14650040500318522.
[8] Minghi, "Boundary Studies in Political Geography," 428.
[9] Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 170-172.

to catchment areas, tariffs, linguistic differences and even instability or military action[10] – in addition, border areas are not the location of choice for strategically important economic investment, especially if boundaries are at risk militarily. Moreover, there is a pressure for marginalisation to become endemic as those able to leave will migrate to regions with better prospects, leaving behind an increasing concentration of those who are unable to move.[11]

The realist securitisation paradigm

Linked to the traditional approach and its concern with states setting boundaries to demarcate their territory, the realist securitisation paradigm recognises the necessity of having clear boundaries as central to the state's ability to claim sovereignty and exert authority over its population. This approach has its roots in understanding the creation of the state system in the first place with the need to create outsiders and fear of anarchy to provide legitimacy to the state itself. However, it can also be seen as a response from states and their elites to reassert sovereignty in the face of developments which have led to the claim that borders have become less important. With the state as the key entity in a realist international system, it should be expected to behave in a way which ensures its own survival, not just in this system, but also in relation to its own population and this involves securitising the border as a place of distinction in need of protection from outside threats – hence the realist securitisation paradigm.

The development of the state system is interwoven with the creation in the first instance of clear borders. One of the characteristics of a state as an entity is the legitimate use of force within its boundaries and, in the view of Tilly, this was originally achieved by rulers offering protection against internal and external threats of violence.[12] Moreover, in explaining why war was central to the development of states, Tilly highlights how it was important for rulers to deal with threats to their authority and that "establishment of large perimeters of control within which great lords had checked their rivals sharpened the line between internal and external,"[13] reinforcing the legitimacy of the monopoly on violence locally.

[10] James Anderson & Liam O'Dowd, "Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance," *Regional Studies* 33, no. 7 (1999): 597, DOI: 10.1080/00343409950078648.
[11] Doris Wastl-Walter, Mónika M. Váradi and Friedrich Veider, "Coping with marginality: to stay or to go," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 29, no. 5 (2003): 799-800, DOI: 10.1080/1369183032000149578.
[12] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Bac In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-187.
[13] Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," 185.

From a more critical perspective, the constitutive nature of boundaries was recognised by Campbell who highlighted their importance in separating the inside from the outside, the "rational, ordered polity" of "civilized 'man'" from the "dangerous, chaotic and anarchical realm in which… savage people are found."[14] This distinction results in war happening with outsider groups, not within the insider group, and "foreign policy" is used to establish the boundaries between these two such that "'man', the 'state', and 'international relations' are mutually constitutive."[15] Sovereignty therefore "operates on the basis of a simple dichotomy: sovereignty versus anarchy."[16] Moreover, boundaries in this logic are seen, necessarily, as areas of danger since "were there no borders, there would be no danger, but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity."[17]

Boundaries and national security are closely linked as highlighted by Kolossov – "border areas are considered the natural location for border guards and customs services, of a high concentration of military units, especially facing directions from which danger threatens in the eyes of public opinion."[18] Moreover, "the concept of the border as security fence is based on securitisation of the state in general, which is supposed to be a major task of the state."[19] These conceptions of the boundary also appeal to the idea of securitisation involving physical barriers – walls and fences – to limit flows of people and goods, what has been termed teichopolitics,[20] used to describe recent moves to rebuild barriers and physical manifestations of boundaries as states' response to the threat to their sovereignty from globalisation.

However, recognising the idea of borders as social constructs and the concept of bordering as a process, securitisation of borders does not need to involve physical barriers on the boundary. It can also involve the messages given by "symbols, signs, narratives"[21] or, for example, the stringency of border management as set out by power élites, including which documents – passports and/or visas – are required in order to enter countries.[22] Paasi highlights that the modern state can also deploy its education and communication systems to

[14] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 60.
[15] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 60-61.
[16] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 65.
[17] Campbell, *Writing Security*, 81.
[18] Kolossov, "Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches," 621.
[19] Kolossov, "Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches," 622.
[20] Stéphane Rosière and Reece Jones, "Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences," *Geopolitics* 17, no. 1 (2012): 217-234, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2011.574653.
[21] Vladimir Kolossov and James Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," *Belgeo* 1 (2013): 9, DOI: 10.4000/belgeo.10532.
[22] Kolossov and Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," 5.

create perceptions about outsiders – highlighting Finland's representation of Russia as the national Other through school textbooks – which reinforce the importance of boundaries.[23]

While some of these actions by the state to (re-)securitise the border may happen some distance from the boundary itself, and affect the whole population, as Kolossov and Scott note, "public opinion has an intrinsic tendency to irrationally perceive political boundaries as the major barrier to any undesirable influence from the outside world."[24] However built, Newman says, "strong fences and walls do create, for the ruling élites, a manageable situation where the 'us here' and 'them there' line of binary separation is easier to control."[25] This securitised boundary to the realist state may be expected to impact on the attitudes of those living on the front line with the outsiders, those who live in the borderland itself, raising their awareness of the Other beyond the boundary, heightening nationalist feeling and increasing, for example, Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment.

The neoliberal openness paradigm

At the other end of the spectrum, the neoliberal openness paradigm identifies a number of factors driving the world to become increasingly borderless. This is driven in part by economic factors, including trade and the activities of multinational companies, as well as technological advances, which are overcoming physical geographical distance by migration to a virtual cyber world. At the same time, borders have become less obtrusive – the militarised borders of the Cold War in Europe have largely gone – or even non-existent with the EU's Schengen zone, cross-border co-operation has been encouraged and there has been a rise in "social transnationalism" as people increasingly study, work, travel and socialise beyond their own state's borders. These factors are driven in large part by neoliberal approaches to economics and international co-operation as well as a drive to break down barriers, build bridges and open up borders – hence the neoliberal openness paradigm.

The strongest notions of a borderless world were driven by the rise of multinational companies operating globally, across state boundaries, such that they became transnational with their "home" country increasingly irrelevant and loyalty instead being to the corporation – as Ohmae predicted in 1990, "for a growing population of firms that serve global markets

[23] Anssi Paasi, "Boundaries in a Globalizing World," in *Handbook of Cultural Geography*, ed. Kay Anderson, Mona Domosh, Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift (London: Sage, 2003), 465, DOI: 10.4135/9781848608252.n33.
[24] Kolossov and Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," 11.
[25] David Newman, "The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our 'borderless' world," *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 2 (2006): 150, DOI: 10.1191/0309132506ph599xx.

or face global competition, nationality will disappear."[26] This was accompanied by economic globalisation involving increasingly free movement of capital and rapid growth in world trade starting in the early 1970s[27] driven by several rounds of negotiations to reduce tariffs. Moreover, there was a general convergence of economic thinking driven by the neoliberal Washington Consensus and the sense that culture and tastes would homogenise around the Western ideal. Borders which had been militarised and relatively closed during the Cold War were increasingly open. Finally, technology was also seen as a contributor to the development of a borderless world both as a tool for financial transactions becoming virtual and global but also as activity more generally could move from the physical to the virtual world. While these, occasionally, extreme notions of "borderlessness" and the end of the nation state may have captured the *zeitgeist* in the 1990s, there were early responses highlighting the challenges in these projections[28] and more recently borderless world discourses have been dismissed as "naïve"[29] and, indeed, the basis for the renaissance of border studies.[30]

However, the trend of globalisation has continued, transnational behaviour at the level of individuals has increased and efforts to foster co-operation across borders have continued, particularly in Europe. Cross-border efforts, including the Regio Basiliensis in the Upper Rhine Valley borderlands of Switzerland, France and Germany and the EU's INTERREG projects have fostered collaboration and transnationalism in spite of national borders.[31] In some cases, borders have, in effect, been removed – in the Schengen countries of Europe, for example. While not creating a "borderless" world, this has created an "openness" which is potentially in opposition to the concept of securitised borders.

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[26] Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World* (London: Collins, 1990), 10.
[27] World trade grew from US$2.4 trillion in 1970 to US$6.8 trillion in 1990 and US$12.5 trillion in 2000 (Constant 2010 US$), outpacing global economic growth such that it represented 13.6%, 19.3% and 26.0% of World GDP respectively in these three years – World Bank Database: data.worldbank.org.
[28] See, for example, Masao Miyoshi, "A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State," *Critical Inquiry* 19, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 726-751, jstor.org/stable/1343904; Henry Wai-chung Yeung, "Capital, State and Space: Contesting the Borderless World," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 23, no. 3 (1998): 291-309, jstor.org/stable/623203; and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Borderless Worlds? Problematising discourses of deterritorialisation," *Geopolitics* 4, no. 2 (1999): 139-154, DOI: 10.1080/14650049908407644.
[29] Corey Johnson, Reece Jones, Anssi Paasi, Louise Amoore, Alison Mountz, Mark Salter and Chris Rumford, "Interventions on rethinking 'the border' in border studies," *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 61, DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.01.002.
[30] Kolossov and Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," 2.
[31] Joachim Blatter and Norris Clement, "II Introduction to the Volume," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 15, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 14-53, DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2000.9695541.

Deutsch outlined the potential for integration through increased interaction between citizens (including travel, migration, educational and cultural exchanges and inter-marriage) to contribute to building a sense of community across borders and ultimately the creation of a supranational "security-community."[32] In this way, Others from beyond the internal boundaries of the community should come to be seen in a less threatening way than when borders remain securitised and contact is limited, replaced instead by a sense of "mutual sympathy" and ""we-feeling," trust, and mutual consideration."[33] Kuhn developed this into the concept of "individual transnationalism" – the "extent to which individuals are involved in cross-border interaction and mobility"[34] – and demonstrated that greater levels of individual transnationalism are linked to lower levels of Euroscepticism. Mau and Mewes also developed the theme, investigating the extent of "horizontal Europeanisation" or "social transnationalism" – in which people are mobile across borders, interacting and creating networks through visiting other countries and socialising with other Europeans – and finding that it happens, albeit unevenly depending on country and demography. [35]

Growth in students studying abroad (from 28,000 students on the Erasmus programme in 1990-91 to over 270,000 students in 2013-14[36]), workers commuting across national boundaries (rising in the EU from under 1 million in 2002 to over 2.1 million in 2018[37]), people travelling to other countries in the EU (43% of Czechs do so at least once a year[38]) and socialising with other EU citizens has made the EU more transnational and open. To the extent that those who live along the open borders are best placed to act in a transnational way, this openness may be expected to impact strongly on their attitudes, reducing fear of the Other, lowering nationalist feelings and reducing Euroscepticism.

[32] Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North American Area* (Princeton , New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957).
[33] Deutsch, *Political Community and the North American Area, 36.*
[34] Theresa Kuhn, "Individual transnationalism, globalisation and Euroscepticism: An empirical test of Deutsch's transactionalist theory," *European Journal of Political Research* 50 (2011): 814, DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01987.x.
[35] Steffen Mau and Jan Mewes, "Horizontal Europeanisation in Contextual Perspective," *European Societies* 14, no. 1 (2012): 7-34, DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2011.638083.
[36] European Union, *Erasmus – Facts Figure and Trends. The European Union support for student and staff exchanges and university cooperation in 2013-14* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015), 30, ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/education/library/statistics/erasmus-plus-facts-figures_en.pdf.
[37] Eurostat database: Employment and Commuting by NUTS2 regions, appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfst_r_lfe2ecomm&lang=en.
[38] European Union, *Special Eurobarometer 474: Europeans' perceptions of the Schengen Area*, data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2218_89_3_474_ENG.

Bordering as a process

The constructivist approach to bordering as a process by definition distinguishes itself from the simple concept of the boundary as a line on a map. Borders are constructed by social practices, processes and institutions and exist to maintain some order between "here" and "there", "us" and "them", "our" and "their" territory.[39] These practices take many forms and are described by Paasi as "diverging sets of contextual performances in which institutional – that is political, cultural, economic and governmental – practices come together, and in which emotions such as pride, hatred or competition and social and cultural distinctions based on social memory and future structures of expectations also dwell intensively."[40]

Bordering processes are all about power – the full range of social and institutional practices have the political effect of distinguishing and demarcating between different groups and sorting "insiders" from "outsiders", that is to say creating boundaries. As Kolossov and Scott note, "No study of borders, at the local or state level, or of the visible or the invisible type, is without a power component."[41]

As a process, bordering has much wider relevance in society than simply creating state boundaries – so much so that, in the view of Kolossov and Scott, the "disciplinary wealth of borders studies has rendered exclusive fixations with geographical, physical and tangible borders obsolete; equally important are cultural, social, economic and religious borders."[42] This does not, however, mean that state boundaries are no longer important. On the contrary, they remain in many ways the most important boundaries, in part because of the resilience of national states as a construct and in part due to the historical processes and efforts that have gone into building and sustaining them over a long period. O'Dowd highlights the importance of history and "inherited structures" in preventing states and boundaries dissolving altogether in the face of ubiquitous "bordering" and the construction of social boundaries[43] and Kolossov and Scott also recognise the importance of the "geopolitics of

[39] David Newman, "On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 18, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 14-15, DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2003.9695598.
[40] Anssi Paasi, "Generations and the 'Development' of Border Studies," *Geopolitics* 10, no. 4 (2005): 669, DOI: 10.1080/14650040500318563.
[41] Kolossov and Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," 5.
[42] Kolossov and Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," 1.
[43] Liam O'Dowd, "From a 'borderless world' to a 'world of borders': 'bringing history back in'," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28, no. 6 (2010): 1031-1050, DOI: 10.1068/d2009.

memory" which has an impact on the process of creating identities for what lies beyond the boundary.[44]

Reflecting the uniqueness of boundaries identified in traditional approaches, context is key. According to Paasi, it is not necessarily the uniqueness of the 300 or so current land boundaries that prevents creation of a general theory of borders, but rather the way in which each boundary interacts with other pertinent socio-cultural factors.[45] For this reason, he called for greater fieldwork, as he himself has undertaken, among border people. The impact from bordering practices on even "obsolete" tangible boundaries and those who live near them remains worthy of investigation.

It would be easy to see bordering processes as purely a tool for the strengthening of boundaries by creating negative connotations of Others and fear of outsiders thus requiring protection and securitised boundaries. However, bordering processes can also be used to achieve the opposite effect – a focus on positive interpretations of shared history along the boundary can be used to forge "feelings of solidarity or reconciliation with the neighbour."[46] If boundaries are indeed social constructs driven by ideas then it should also be possible to imagine a different construct also – "when imagination has the potential to divide people, it also has the potential to unite people".[47]

Bordering as a process thus highlights the importance of context and history on the attitudes of those living along the border as well as the potential for change. Rather than supporting either the realist securitisation or the neoliberal openness paradigm, it can be seen as the underpinning process which constructs either of them and allows the nature of boundaries to change between the two. Considering boundaries as constructs of a bordering process may therefore be expected to result in the attitudes of those living on the border varying in an explainable manner depending on context, the identity of those on the other side and time.

Studies of the attitudes of those living on the border

While there has been substantial theorising on the nature of boundaries and borders, the processes that generate and reproduce them and even their relevance and validity, there has been relatively little analysis of the attitudes of those who live alongside them, the

[44] Kolossov and Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," 10.
[45] Paasi, "Generations and the 'Development' of Border Studies," 668-669.
[46] Kolossov and Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," 10.
[47] Henk van Houtum and Anke Strüver, "Borders, Strangers, Doors and Bridges," *Space and Polity* 6, no. 2 (2002): 142, DOI: 10.1080/1356257022000003590.

borderlanders themselves. Studies of attitudes have been in the form of detailed case studies of specific locations such as the Finnish-Russian border,[48] German-Polish border[49] or various communities along the boundary between the EU and accession countries in 2003.[50] There have also been analyses of polling and election data such as the analysis of Canadian attitudes to closer integration with the US depending on distance from the US-Canadian border[51] and support for the AfD in Bavaria depending on distance from the Austrian and Czech boundaries.[52] Most relevant is Theresa Kuhn's analysis of Eurobarometer data to show that those living close to the French-German border were more pro-European in attitude (in the case of Germans) and this seems to be mediated by individual transnational behaviour rather than just distance from the boundary.[53]

Empirical tests of the relative validity of the paradigms of realist securitisation, neoliberal openness and bordering as a process are limited. Bürkner, researcher of the German-Polish border, highlighted this: "Such conflicting hypotheses – i.e. about border regions as breeding grounds of Euroscepticism on the one hand and as facilitators of its reduction on the other hand – call for more empirical evidence. However, border scholars and scholars of EU integration have hardly ever heard this call."[54] Paasi, who investigated the Finnish-Russian border notes: "Much of the content of recent boundary studies seems to be based more on reviews of general international discussions than on contextual theorising, field observation and inquiry among borderland inhabitants."[55]

The analysis in this thesis of the attitudes of those living along the Czech boundary seeks to redress some of this empirical imbalance.

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[48] Anssi Paasi, "Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish-Russian Border," *Regional Studies* 33, no. 7 (1999): 669-680, DOI: 10.1080/00343409950078701.
[49] Hans-Joachim Bürkner, "Border milieux, transboundary communication and local conflict dynamics in German-Polish border towns: The case of Guben and Gubin," *Die Erde* 133 (2002): 69-81, researchgate.net/publication/290317426.
[50] Ulrike H. Meinhof, "Migrating borders: an introduction to European identity construction in process," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 29, no. 5 (2003): 781-796, DOI: 10.1080/1369183032000149569.
[51] Timothy B. Gravelle, "Partisanship, Border Proximity, and Canadian Attitudes toward North American Integration," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 26, no. 4 (2014): 453-474, DOI: 10.1093/ijpor/edu006.
[52] Sebastian Jäckle, Uwe Wagschal and Andreas Kattler, "Distanz zur Grenze als Indikator für den Erfolg der AfD bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 in Bayern?" *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 12 (2018): 539-566, DOI: 10.1007/s12286-018-0395-8.
[53] Theresa Kuhn, "Europa ante portas: Border residence, transnational interaction and Euroscepticism in Germany and France," *European Union Politics* 13, no. 1 (2011): 94-117, DOI: 10.1177/1465116511418016.
[54] Hans-Joachim Bürkner, "Europeanisation versus Euroscepticism: Do Borders Matter?" *Geopolitics* (forthcoming issue - published online February 2020): 8, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2020.1723964.
[55] Paasi, "Generations and the 'Development' of Border Studies," 668.

2. The Nature of the Czech Borderlands

The boundaries of the Czech Republic have been influenced by a number of factors – historical, demographic and political – which are relevant to understanding the attitudes of those living along the borders. From a historical perspective, the presence of ethnic Germans in much of the borderlands was central to one of the most traumatic events in Czech history – the Sudeten crisis in 1938. The subsequent expulsion of ethnic Germans and resettlement of these areas post 1945 gave rise to a particular demographic mix in some of the borderlands. In political terms, there are four neighbouring states with different identities beyond the boundary – however, these can also be considered in the historical context as one formerly internal boundary (Slovakia), two formerly intra-Eastern bloc boundaries (Poland and "East" Germany) and two formerly militarised "Iron Curtain" boundaries (Austria and "West" Germany). The borderlands are therefore rich in "context" for analysing and understanding the attitudes of those who live there.

Historical context of the Czech Borderlands

At its foundation in 1918, Czechoslovakia had a significant minority of ethnic Germans living within its boundaries. This group had grown through a series of waves of "colonisation" in the previous centuries, starting with the first colonisation in the 13th and 14th centuries and, as these Germans were migrating from neighbouring Germanic territories, they settled in particular in less attractive, less populated border areas at a higher elevation on the periphery of the historic Czech lands.[56] Therefore, by the 1930s, ethnic Germans were in the majority in almost all the areas that currently make up the modern boundary with Germany and large parts of the modern boundary with Poland to the west of the city of Opava. Along the Polish boundary east of Opava and along the modern Slovak boundary ethnic Germans were generally in a minority – however, this region had its own historical experience. A conflict with Poland in 1919 over the newly created boundary in Silesia had to be resolved at the Spa Conference in 1920 leading, for example, to the city of Těšin/Cieszyn being split with the river in its centre forming the boundary. Along the current Austrian boundary, the proportion of Germans was more mixed from area to area.[57] The 1938 Munich agreement and

[56] Petr Daněk, "Towards Cultural Regionalization of the Czech Lands: Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," *Scripta Fac. Brun.* 25 (1995): 45, sci.muni.cz/geobib/scripta/1995/Scripta_1995_25_Danek.pdf.
[57] Daněk, "Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," 47.

subsequent annexation of the Sudetenland by Nazi Germany was directly related to these majority ethnic German areas along the border and often substantial distances beyond the boundary line. Moreover, at the same time, Poland used the Munich agreement to justify annexing the previously disputed area of Silesia around the city of Česky Těšin.

Following the end of the Second World War, ethnic Germans were forcibly expelled from the newly re-established Czechoslovakia. Approximately three million Germans were expelled in 1945 and 1946 with tens of thousands reported to have died in the process.[58] The Sudeten region was then rapidly resettled through a state-sponsored plan with 1.2 million inhabitants moving into the region by May 1947[59] and migration continued into subsequent decades. The region of Silesia along the border with Poland was also returned and the boundaries with Austria and "West" Germany were largely militarised and closed with electric fencing for the next four decades – lower cross-border circulation in that time might be expected to have had effects on the borderland which may still be evident in attitudes today.

The characteristics of those who moved to the Sudeten region had a significant impact on the demography of these regions with some places (more industrialised and urban areas along the northern border) easier to repopulate than others. There were insufficient migrants from within the Czech lands so a significant proportion (about 10%) of the new inhabitants came from Slovakia and there was further resettlement by Slovak Gypsies and immigrants from the Balkans.[60] Alongside the migration, the area also suffered from Government policy to move factories to less industrialised areas in Slovakia, contributing further to the Sudeten regions becoming economically peripheral. While not all of the new migrants stayed, their arrival and the deindustrialising effect of state policy had an enduring impact such that many of these regions required special Government support for much of the post-war period, especially along the German and Polish boundaries.[61]

[58] Estimates for the number of ethnic Germans that died vary. In 1995, Daněk quoted a figure of 240,00 according to Sudeten German sources (Daněk, "Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," 49) while more recent estimates suggest a figure of 19,000-30,000 based on a report from a Czech-German "Joint Commission of Historians" – see Eagle Glassheim, "National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945," *Central European History* 33, no. 4 (December 2000): 463, DOI: 10.1163/156916100746428.

[59] Daněk, "Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," 50.

[60] Daněk, "Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," 50.

[61] Daněk, "Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," 49-51.

In analysing the differences between those living in the Czech "borderland" and those living "inland,"[62] Daněk found that the Sudeten areas in 1991 were characterised by a younger, less retired, population with lower levels of education, a higher proportion of Slovaks and Gypsies, and lower levels of religious affiliation.[63] Politically, he identified that those in the Sudeten regions were less likely to vote in the 1991 elections, and when they did it was more likely to be in favour of left wing parties such as the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) or the Communist Party (KSČM) – in part linked to the tradition in these areas of supporting the Communist Party following the migration in the 1940s and because these areas were less negatively affected by the Communist regime.[64] It is important to note that Daněk's "borderlands" do not map specifically to what are considered the borders in the context of this thesis, but to the extent that there is significant overlap between the Sudeten regions and some of the borders of the Czech Republic today it is important to consider the extent to which the historical context remains relevant today.

It is not just history that is involved – Maškarinec highlights the interaction with economics noting that in the Czech Republic "support for the left is similarly typical of rural municipalities located in peripheral borderland areas where access is difficult… or in contiguous areas of structurally disadvantaged regions."[65] A more recent analysis of the Sudeten areas by Šimon highlights that it is still possible to identify "phantom" borders, reflecting the boundary of the Sudeten region, in more recent voting behaviour – this is recognisable in lower turnout rates in Sudeten regions and a mirroring of support for the Czechoslovak People's Party (ČSL/KDU-ČSL) between the pre-war period and the post-communist elections.[66]

[62] "Borderland" here refers to those areas that saw large exchanges of population after the Second World War, i.e. the Sudeten region. "Inland" areas saw low population exchanges as the concentration of Germans was below 20% according to the 1930 census. Daněk, "Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," 52-53.
[63] Daněk, "Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," 53-55.
[64] Daněk, "Sudeten Half a Century after the Transfer," 56-57.
[65] Pavel Maškarinec, "The rise of new populist political parties in Czech parliamentary elections between 2010 and 2017: the geography of party replacement," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 60, no. 5 (2019): 518, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2019.1691928.
[66] Martin Šimon, "Measuring Phantom Borders: The Case of Czech/Czechoslovakian Electoral Geography," *Erdkunde* 69, no. 2 (2015): 139-150, DOI: 10.3112/erdkunde.2015.02.04.

Demographic and political nature of the Czech Borderlands

Of the 6,302 municipalities[67] in the Czech Republic, 285 (4.5% of the total) lie directly on the boundary. The aggregate characteristics of each of the five border areas based on the identity of the neighbour are set out in Table 1.

Table 1: Aggregate characteristics of municipalities in the Czech Republic and directly on state boundary, by neighbour

	Czech Republic	Austria	"West" Germany	"East" Germany	Poland	Slovakia
Total municipalities	6,302	52	32	56	109	44
Sudeten municipalities[68]	1,435	51	32	56	101	5
Boundary length – km	2,160	460	---	819 ---	796	252
Population (2017)	10,610,055	86,852	64,377	184,119	403,392	92,484
Area (2017) – km^2	78,870	1,826	1,663	1,710	2,793	1,222
Population density (people/km^2)	135	48	39	108	144	76
Towns with population > 15,000	106	1	1	2	8	1
Average age (2003) – years	39.5	38.1	37.6	38.4	38.8	38.9
Average age (2017) – years	42.2	42.4	41.6	42.0	42.9	42.8

Source: Bespoke Database (see Appendix 1). Border lengths from CZSO.[69] The sum of boundary municipalities by neighbour is greater than 285 since eight municipalities have more than one neighbour.

Municipalities directly on the boundary account for about 8% of Czech population and 12% of territorial area, thus population density is lower than the country as a whole at 90 people per km^2, compared to 135 nationally. Population density varies widely along the border, with lower densities in the rural and mountainous municipalities along the Slovak, Austrian and "West" German borders. Population densities are higher along the northern borders with "East" Germany and Poland which also have more larger cities and towns next to the boundary. The overlap with Sudeten municipalities is very high, except along the Slovakian boundary. However, while most boundary municipalities were in Sudeten regions, most Sudeten municipalities were not on the boundary – highlighting the need to recognise the difference.

[67] The 6,302 municipalities are those in the bespoke database created for this research – see Appendix 1.
[68] Data from Martin Šimon supplemented to cover all modern Czech municipalities (see Appendix 2) including municipalities annexed by Poland around Česky Těšin. There are an additional five municipalities categorised as Sudeten but, due to lack of data, not in the database and a further 25 municipalities in the Czech Republic identified as both Sudeten and non-Sudeten as they lie between the two.
[69] Czech Statistical Office, *Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic 2019* (Prague: Czech Statistical Office, 2019), 66, czso.cz/csu/czso/statistical-yearbook-of-the-czech-republic-2019.

The relative youth of the population in the Sudeten area identified by Daněk was reflected, to some extent, in 2003 in lower average ages, especially along the German and Austrian sections. However, by 2017, this had all but disappeared as the border regions have seen greater ageing than the country as a whole, with average age rising between 2003 and 2017 by about four years in all five border regions compared to a national increase of 2.7 years.

Table 2: Employment, education, ethnicity and religion in municipalities in the Czech Republic and directly on state boundary, by neighbour (2011 Census data unless otherwise noted)

	Czech Republic	Austria	"West" Germany	"East" Germany	Poland	Slovakia
Share of population employed	43.9%	42.0%	40.8%	39.0%	41.2%	40.8%
Employees share of total employed	77.9%	78.7%	75.4%	77.7%	80.5%	78.6%
Unemployment rate (2001)	6.8%	9.0%	6.7%	9.5%	9.4%	8.9%
Unemployment rate (2017)	3.7%	3.8%	2.2%	4.6%	5.4%	4.4%
Share of employed commuting abroad (2001)	0.5%	1.9%	1.7%	0.8%	0.5%	1.0%
Share of employed commuting abroad (2011)	0.8%	3.4%	3.0%	1.9%	0.9%	1.5%
Share of adult population with secondary education or less	51.0%	60.5%	57.2%	60.3%	57.2%	59.7%
Share of adult population with tertiary education	12.5%	7.9%	6.0%	5.9%	9.2%	8.2%
Share of population ethnically Czech or Moravian[70]	92.8%	91.2%	86.4%	91.7%	85.7%	89.7%
Share of population ethnically Slovak	1.9%	3.0%	3.7%	2.4%	3.0%	2.4%
Share of population Roman Catholic	18.5%	19.6%	6.7%	5.8%	20.7%	46.8%

Source: Bespoke Database.
Note: Unemployment rates may use different definitions – 2001 from Census data, 2017 data from CZSO monthly unemployment statistics.

Table 2 shows data on employment, education, religion and ethnicity for the boundary regions while Figure 1 displays selected demographic data by district which is clearly less specific in reflecting proximity to the boundary than the municipality data, however it shows some of the broad patterns. Overall levels of employment have tended to be lower in border areas compared to the country as a whole. Lower proportions of the population were employed in 2011 and unemployment was also generally higher in border areas than nationally, although this gap has narrowed more recently. Although unemployment remains higher in the border areas, the border with "West" Germany has lower unemployment than

[70] Excluding those declaring joint Czech-Moravian ethnicity as data is unavailable at municipality level. At national level this accounts for c. 1.3% of the population that declared their ethnicity in the 2011 Census.

for the country as a whole and Austria is in line, suggesting better economic opportunities along these boundaries. Figure 1 shows that most of the districts with the highest unemployment rates are alongside the boundary, but so too are some with the lowest.

Figure 1: Unemployment, commuting, education and religion by District (Okres), 2011 and 2017

Unemployment rate, 2017, %



Share of employed commuting abroad, 2011, %



Share of adult population with secondary education or less, 2011, %



Share of population declaring their religion stating Roman Catholic, 2011, %



Source: Bespoke Database.

These differences in economic opportunity may also be visible in data about cross-border commuting for work. Those in the border areas, with the exception of Poland, were more likely to commute for work across the boundary than was the case for the country as a whole. This was particularly the case along the Austrian and "West" German borders – as can be seen clearly in Figure 1. Full freedom of movement for Czechs to work in Austria and Germany only came into force in 2011 so this number is likely to now be even higher. Eurostat data shows that between 2011 and 2017 the number of Czechs commuting across the boundary for work doubled from 31,000 to 63,000 with the greatest increases in the Severozápad (North-West), Jihozápad (South-West) and Jihovýchod (South-East) regions – regions bordering Germany and Austria – where cross-border commuter numbers increased

nearly fourfold in the period.[71] By contrast, cross-border commuters from Prague and Central Moravia have fallen over this period. To fully understand the impact of this factor will require new municipality level data from the 2021 census.

The educational attainment of those living along the border continues to reflect the observations of Daněk with the proportion of the population not attaining their General Certificate of Education significantly higher than for the country as a whole and also a significantly lower proportion of people with tertiary education. In terms of ethnicity, there is a greater proportion of Slovaks, especially along the "West" German border. The presence of ethnic Poles and Silesians (along the Polish and Slovak borders), Germans (along the German border) and Vietnamese (around the city of Cheb on the "West" German border) account for much of the difference compared to the presence of ethnic Czechs and Moravians in the country as a whole. There is also a notable difference in religion – while the Slovak border has proportionately more Roman Catholics than the country as a whole, reflecting the higher proportion of Roman Catholics in the south east of the country in general (see Figure 1), the German border has a substantially lower share.

Table 3: Voting characteristics of municipalities in the Czech Republic and directly on state boundary, by neighbour

	Czech Republic	Austria	"West" Germany	"East" Germany	Poland	Slovakia
Turnout (2002 Election)	57.7%	53.3%	50.4%	50.2%	53.6%	55.3%
Turnout (2003 EU Referendum)	54.0%	50.1%	49.0%	49.1%	48.6%	50.0%
Turnout (2017 Election)	60.4%	55.1%	49.8%	50.8%	54.9%	56.3%
KSČM share (2002 Election)	18.5%	26.1%	26.8%	23.4%	20.0%	18.4%
ČSSD share (2002 Election)	30.2%	29.4%	28.9%	29.6%	33.9%	28.7%
"Yes" share (2003 EU Referendum)	77.3%	74.1%	71.4%	73.5%	77.7%	79.7%
KSČM share (2017 Election)	7.8%	11.8%	9.9%	8.5%	8.3%	8.3%
ČSSD share (2017 Election)	7.3%	8.4%	6.7%	6.9%	8.8%	8.5%
SPD share (2017 Election)	10.7%	12.8%	12.2%	12.9%	13.0%	12.5%

Source: Bespoke Database

Table 3 shows how voting patterns in boundary regions differ from the country as a whole. In terms of political behaviour, the pattern of lower turnout noted by Daněk and Šimon for Sudeten regions can be seen in the border areas in several elections in the last twenty years, the 2002 and 2017 Elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the 2003 Referendum on accession to the EU. This lower turnout can be seen in all border areas, not just those that

[71] Eurostat: Employment and Commuting by NUTS2 Regions.

were part of the Sudeten area. In addition, Daněk's observations on the preference of those living in Sudeten regions to support the Communists is reflected in the higher level of support for the KSČM in 2002 and 2017, in particular along the Austrian and German borders – support for the Communists fell in these areas alongside falls elsewhere but in 2017 remained at a higher level than in the country as a whole. Higher levels of support for the ČSSD are less clear in border regions, either in 2002 or 2017.

Most interesting in the context of this analysis is support for EU accession in 2003 and support for the strongly nationalist and anti-EU party of Tomio Okamura, the SPD, in 2017. In the EU referendum, support for EU accession was lower along the borders with Austria, "East" Germany and especially "West" Germany compared to the country as a whole. Polish border areas were more in line with the country. Notably, along the boundary with Slovakia support for EU accession was more positive, in line with the higher support seen in big cities such as Prague, Brno and Plzeň. By contrast, in the 2017 election support for the anti-EU rhetoric of the SPD was higher in all border areas, including Poland and Slovakia. On the surface, the borders seem to have been, and are increasingly, more Eurosceptic than the country as a whole.

Figure 2: Vote shares by District (Okres), 2003 and 2017

Share of vote in favour of EU accession, 2003



Vote share for SPD, 2017



Source: Bespoke Database.

This pattern can be partially discerned from maps of voting behaviour by District (Figure 2). Strong support for EU accession can be seen along the Slovakian border (as well as in Prague, Brno and Plzeň) and opposition to it can be seen on the Austrian and German boundaries. While strong support for the SPD is clear on the "East" German and Slovakian boundaries, the situation in the Austrian, "West" German and Polish border areas is not quite so clear. While District level data is useful for displaying high level patterns, detailed

municipality level data is particularly valuable in understanding the specific effects of border proximity.

A recent Eurobarometer survey[72] focused on attitudes to the Schengen zone provides further evidence of the impact on attitudes to the EU from proximity to the border as well as frequency of travel to other Schengen countries. Supporting the notion that those living near the border are more likely to be transnational and travel to other countries, 80% of those who reported visiting another Schengen country at least monthly lived within 50km of the boundary with just 4% living over 100km from the boundary. Equally, 12% of those living within 50km of the border travel to another Schengen state at least monthly and, in total, 56% do so at least annually, compared to less than 1% and 35% respectively for those over 100km from the boundary.

Chart 1: Attitudes to the EU and the Schengen Area by distance to the boundary



Source: Special Eurobarometer 474.

As seen in Chart 1, the image of the EU appears to be less positive for those living nearer the boundary, although this group sees the Schengen area as being advantageous to the country. At the same time, those living further from the boundary, who are less likely to cross it on a regular basis, are more inclined to see Schengen as disadvantageous and also have a less positive image of the EU overall.

[72] European Union, *Special Eurobarometer 474: Europeans' perceptions of the Schengen Area*, data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2218_89_3_474_ENG.

Chart 2: Attitudes to the EU and the Schengen Area by frequency of visits to other Schengen countries



Source: Special Eurobarometer 474.

By contrast, as shown in Chart 2, those who travel regularly to other Schengen countries have a more positive image of the EU and see the Schengen Area as advantageous, whereas those who rarely or never visit other Schengen countries both have a more negative image of the EU and see Schengen as being less advantageous. There is an issue of causality, in that those with a less favourable image of the EU may choose to travel less to other Schengen countries, but it is less clear why having a more negative view of the advantages of Schengen would lead to less visits to other Schengen states. On the contrary, this appears to be an example of transnationalism where experiencing the benefits from using open borders gives rise to an understanding of their advantages regardless of distance to the boundary.

It is clear that the Czech border areas have a challenged and complex history which differs depending on the neighbouring country. It is also clear that the post-war experience, as well as other factors have contributed to the borders showing some signs of the peripherality predicted by theory with lower educational attainment, higher levels of unemployment and a more rapidly ageing population. However, they are also more, and increasingly, connected to neighbours in terms of commuting for work. Some historical patterns of support for the Communists remain, if diminished, and involvement in politics, measured by turnout, is also lower. On the surface, the borders appear to have a more Eurosceptic attitude than the country as a whole. Whether this is the effect of the boundary or underlying historical, demographic and political influences is unclear – separating these causal factors to identify the impact of the boundary itself is the aim of this thesis.

3. Developments in Czech Politics

In the last two decades Czech politics has changed radically. Following an overwhelming 77% vote in favour of joining the EU in 2003, there is some evidence of increasing scepticism and apathy in relation to the EU, even in the face of strong recognition that the EU has been beneficial to the country. In part linked to the migrant crisis in 2015 there has also been an increase in concern over immigration and a rise in anti-migrant sentiment. Meanwhile, the four parties that had emerged as the key participants in the Chamber of Deputies by the 2002 and 2006 elections, gaining 85-90% of all votes in each of those elections, saw their support evaporate over subsequent years to a combined 32% share of the vote in 2017. A range of new parties entered the political scene with agendas promoting, depending on party, anti-corruption, pro-business, strong liberalism, anti-EU and anti-migrant sentiments. During this time, the parties themselves became less supportive of EU integration and tougher in their attitudes to immigration so the Czech electorate, in aggregate, showed greater support for more Eurosceptic and anti-immigration attitudes – this can be tracked by creating indices of Euroscepticism and anti-migration sentiment for the Czech Republic.

Development of attitudes in the Czech Republic towards the European Union

In June 2003 the Czech Republic voted to join the EU with 77.3% of votes in favour of accession. In the years following accession in 2004, Eurobarometer data initially showed the proportion of Czechs who thought that the country's membership of the EU was a "Good thing" increasing to between 45 and 50% (see Chart 3).[73] However, from 2008 the share of Czechs feeling this way declined, while the share who saw it as a "Bad thing" rose from 10% to 20%. Thus, the net favourability (those who think it is a Good thing minus those who think it is a Bad thing) fell from over 40% in 2006 to below 10% in 2017 before returning to approximately 20% more recently.

[73] The data for this series is constructed from the Eurobarometer Interactive website (2004-2011), ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index, and data in the annual Parlemeter reports produced by the European Parliament (2013-2019): Parlemeter 2014 Analytical Synthesis, page 48, www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/parlemeter-2014; Parlemeter 2016 Analytical Overview, page 16, europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/parlemeter-2016; Parlemeter 2017 Results Annex, page 22, europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/parlemeter-2017-a-stronger-voice; Parlemeter 2018 Results Annex, question A15, www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/parlemeter-2018-taking-up-the-challenge; Parlemeter 2019 Results Annex, question B12, europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/parlemeter-2019-heeding-the-call-beyond-the-vote.

Chart 3: Proportion of respondents who think that Czech membership of the EU is a Good thing, a Bad thing and Net Good-Bad, 2004-2019

Source: Constructed from Eurobarometer Interactive website and Parlemeter reports.

The Czechs have long been among the least positive countries towards their EU membership – only Latvia and the UK had a lower proportion seeing the EU as a Good thing in the 2004.[74] In terms of net favourability, the most recent report shows only Italy and the UK with lower scores – 18% for the UK and 20% for Italy compared to 23% for the Czech Republic.[75] Also notable is the relatively high level of apathy – the proportion of respondents who see the EU as neither a Good thing nor a Bad thing – in the same report, 48% of Czechs fall into this category, the joint highest level with Slovakia.

Moreover, the fact that Czechs are less inclined to see the EU as a Good thing is at odds with their belief that membership has benefited the country. In 2004, 42% of respondents saw the country having benefited rising to 64% who saw this as the case by 2019 – meanwhile those who believed it had not benefited fell from 41% to 28%.[76] Over the fifteen years, perceptions of benefiting from EU membership have gone from evenly balanced to there being twice as many who see EU membership benefiting the country compared to those who don't.

In a recent survey, Czechs were evenly split as to whether the British people had made the right choice in voting to leave the EU with 46% saying it was the right choice and 41% saying it was not .[77] Only three countries had a higher share of respondents thinking that it was the right choice – Greece (48%) Italy (47%) and Romania (47%) – and even the British survey showed only 38% agreeing it was the right decision. Reflecting this, the same survey

[74] Eurobarometer Interactive website.
[75] Parlemeter 2019 Results Annex, question B12.
[76] 2004 data from Eurobarometer Interactive website. 2018 data from Parlemeter 2018 Results Annex, question A16.
[77] Parlemeter 2018 Results Annex, question A4.

showed the Czech Republic has among the highest share of respondents who say they would vote to leave the EU if there was a referendum with 23% saying they would vote to leave and 45% saying they would vote to remain.[78] In this regard, the Czech Republic is once again among the more Eurosceptic member states – Greece, Italy and Cyprus have slightly higher shares in favour of leaving but, other than Italy, also higher shares in favour of remaining.

Development of sentiment in the Czech Republic towards immigration

Alongside increasing Euroscepticism, there has been increasing opposition to immigration, especially in the last five years following the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe when large numbers of, largely, Syrian migrants entered Europe via Turkey and moved across the open Schengen borders within the EU. Anti-migrant sentiment also interacted with anti-EU sentiment as some Czech political parties' rejected EU-led quotas for accepting refugees.

Chart 4: Proportion of respondents citing "Immigration" as one of the two most important issues in their country, by country (and total for the EU), 2004-2019.



Source: Constructed from data on the Eurobarometer Interactive website.

Chart 4 shows how Eurobarometer surveys demonstrate that before 2014 immigration was rarely considered one of the two most important issues facing the Czech Republic (being cited by 5% of respondents or fewer compared to 10-20% in the EU as a whole) – concern was more focused on economic challenges (unemployment, inflation and Government debt)

[78] Parlemeter 2018 Results Annex, question A3.

or social issues (health, social security and crime). However, the proportion of respondents citing immigration as one of the two most important issues rose in 2014 and 2015, reaching just under 50% of all those interviewed, before falling back to 15-20% in surveys from the end of 2017. While concern over immigration has subsided since its peak, it remains at a higher level than it was in the past. It is also notable that sentiment in neighbouring countries was also different with Austria and Germany showing, and continuing to show, greater levels of concern, while relatively few in Poland and Slovakia ranked immigration in the two most important issues.

Development in party support since 2002

In both the 2002 and 2006 elections to the Chamber of Deputies four parties – the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Communist Party (KSČM) and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) – accounted for 88% of total votes cast. By 2017 these four parties accounted for just 32% of all votes, with three new parties – ANO 2011, the Piráti and the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD) – taking over 50% of votes between them and two others each taking over 5%.

Chart 5: Share of vote by party in Chamber of Deputies elections, 1990-2017, %.



Source: NSD European Election Database[79] (1990-1998); CZSO (2002-2017).

Reflecting increasing Euroscepticism among the population, the issue of European integration was central to the cleavage which appeared in the ODS-led centre-right coalition from 2006 to 2010 with ODS adopting a more Eurosceptic position while its coalition partner

[79] NSD European Election Database: eed.nsd.uib.no.

KDU-ČSL remained more Europhile.[80] This split over Europe created an opportunity for a new party at the next election in 2010 – the conservative TOP 09, taking a strongly pro-EU stance, took 17% of votes. Meanwhile, Public Affairs (VV), set up on an anti-corruption platform and sitting in the middle of the spectrum in terms of Europe, gained 11% of votes, while ODS and ČSSD saw their share of votes fall 15% and 10% from their 2006 level. Both TOP 09 and VV entered government in coalition with ODS until the next election in 2013.

In 2013, early elections were held following the collapse of the previous government in the wake of corruption allegations and VV did not stand any candidates of its own (although its members did stand for other parties including Úsvit).[81] Three new parties gained, between them, 28% of votes. ANO 2011, with "notionally a liberal", anti-establishment, "'centrist populist' anti-corruption", even "anti-politics", approach,[82] took 18.7% of the vote. Úsvit (Dawn of Direct Democracy), set up by Tomio Okamura, focusing on socially excluded areas and anti-Roma, anti-globalisation and anti-EU messages,[83] gained 6.9% of the vote. The Piráti, with a liberal and libertarian stance, took 2.7% of votes in 2013. Based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey,[84] while Úsvit was clearly anti-EU, ANO 2011 and the Piráti were positioned as pro-European, if not strong advocates of further integration. ČSSD were the most successful of the traditional parties with 20.5% of votes and formed a coalition government with ANO 2011 as the junior partner.

In the 2017 election ANO 2011, the Piráti and the SPD, created by Tomio Okamura after the disintegration of Úsvít, took respectively 29.6%, 10.8% and 10.6% of all votes with further declines in the share of the vote for all the traditional parties except ODS (which saw its share increase to 11.3% from 7.7%). These three populist and anti-establishment parties polled over 50% of total votes, while the KSČM, ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and ODS had a combined 32% share.

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[80] Michal Vít, "Central Europe and the Rise of Nationalism: The Case of The Czech Republic," *Colección Monografías CIDOB* (2017): 70, cidob.org/en/content/download/65938/2018920/version/6/file/67-74_MICHAL%20VÍT.pdf.

[81] In spite of its anti-corruption positioning, VV was itself accused of being corrupt and split, see Seán Hanley and Milada Anna Vachudova, "Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic," *East European Politics* 34, no. 3 (2018): 286, DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2018.1493457.

[82] Hanley and Vachudova, "Understanding the illiberal turn," 280-281, 286.

[83] Vít, "Central Europe and the Rise of Nationalism," 71-72.

[84] Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1999-2014 trend file and 2017 FLASH survey ("CHES Database") available at chesdata.eu – Jonathan Polk et al, "Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data," *Research & Politics* 4, no. 1 (January-March 2017): 1-9, DOI: 10.1177/2053168016686915 and Ryan Bakker et al, "Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999-2010," *Party Politics* 21, no. 1 (January 2015): 143-152, DOI: 10.1177/1354068812462931.

Analysis by Maškarinec showed that the SPD, similar to Úsvit in 2013, drew support principally from left-leaning supporters of the KSČM and ČSSD, as well as large parts of Moravia not traditionally associated with the left.[85] By contrast, while ANO 2011 took votes principally from right-leaning ODS supporters in central, north and eastern Bohemia in 2013, in 2017 its strength was across the north of Moravia and with left-leaning voters in north-western Bohemia where it had already had some success in 2013.

While there were many factors behind the 2017 election result, the positioning of the new parties in relation to Europe and immigration, along with moves by the traditional parties, reflected increased Euroscepticism and reduced tolerance towards immigration in the Czech Republic. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey showed that ANO 2011 had become less positive on Europe, the SPD were even more Eurosceptic than Úsvit had been, the Piráti were less enthusiastic than either ČSSD and KDU-ČSL and KSČM had become more opposed to EU integration (see Chart 6). Moreover, votes were migrating towards those parties that were more Eurosceptic.

Chart 6: Position of Czech political parties towards EU integration (7 = Strongly pro-integration, 1 = Strongly anti-integration), 2002-2017.



Source: CHES Database, "Position" variable.

Using the same surveys, it is possible to see a similar development in attitudes towards immigration (Chart 7). Since 2006, all the major parties, except TOP 09, have increasingly favoured a tough policy on immigration with the KSČM now strongly opposed to immigration. Among the largest three new parties, the Piráti are relatively neutral while SPD

[85] Maškarinec, "The rise of new populist political parties in Czech," 524-537.

are strongly in favour of tough immigration policies and ANO 2011 are moving in that direction from a more neutral level.

Chart 7: Position of Czech political parties towards immigration (10 = Strongly favour tough policy, 0 = Strongly oppose tough policy), 2006-2017.



Source: CHES Database, "Immigrate_Policy" variable.

The position of ANO 2011 in relation to the EU is relatively neutral, with its leader Andrej Babiš, "no hard ideological Eurosceptic", favouring some elements of EU integration (such as market infrastructure and security) while questioning others.[86] However, he has been willing, alongside President Zeman, to use fear of migrants and refugees as outsiders while stopping short of the ideological "narrative of Czech nationalism" equivalent to that seen in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe.[87] The SPD, by contrast, is unashamedly anti-EU and anti-migrant – its "migration policy could be summarized as pure scaremongering"[88] and connected to this was a message of resisting directives, even diktats ("Diktát"), from the EU.[89] Okamura also suggested a referendum on Czech membership of the EU.[90] Euroscepticism in Czech politics has grown and been linked to fear of migrants and outsiders, especially in light of the Syria-related migrant crisis starting in 2015 in what seems to fit the concept of bordering as a process throughout the country, not just along the boundary itself.

[86] Hanley and Vachudova, "Understanding the illiberal turn," 282.
[87] Hanley and Vachudova, "Understanding the illiberal turn," 278, 282.
[88] Tereza Chmelíková and David Březina, "Political Relevance of the Migration Issue at Czech Elections 2017 and 2018," in *The political relevance of the migration issue at the 2017 Czech, Dutch and German elections,* ed. Dániel Mikecz (Budapest: Republikon Institute, 2018), 10, euagenda.eu/upload/publications/the-political-relevance-of-the-migration-issue-at-the-2017-czech-dutch-and-german-elections.pdf.
[89] Chmelíková and Březina, "The Migration Issue at Czech Elections 2017," 15.
[90] Chmelíková and Březina, "The Migration Issue at Czech Elections 2017," 16.

Indices of Euroscepticism and Anti-Migration Sentiment

Using the data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and the results of elections for the Chamber of Deputies it is possible to construct indices of Czech attitudes to the EU and immigration[91]. To calculate the indices, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey score for the relevant measure for each political party is weighted by its share of the vote in the Chamber of Deputies election. Using this approach, it can be seen that the implied overall degree of Euroscepticism amongst voters in the Czech Republic was a relatively favourable score of 4.9 on the Chapel Hill scale in the 2002 election (the year before voting 77.3% in favour of joining the EU), falling to a more neutral 4.1 in the 2017 election (the year before a Eurobarometer survey showed a 66% to 34% Remain to Leave split among those respondents who expressed a view). Likewise, on immigration, Czech voters have moved from a neutral 5.1 on the Chapel Hill scale in 2006 to a more anti-immigration 7.3 in 2017. In aggregate, over the last 15 years the Czech Republic has moved from being favourable to a neutral stance on EU integration and from being neutral to being opposed to immigration.

It is possible to calculate the Euroscepticism and Anti-migration Sentiment indices for each municipality and ORP for the 2002 election (Euroscepticism) and 2017 election (both). This allows the analysis of aggregate attitudes for individual administrative units rather than simply considering support for one party in isolation and will allow analysis of how this is affected by being on the borders.

Drivers of voting patterns in Czech Republic

In isolating the impact on voting patterns from being located on the border, it is essential to understand and control for other drivers of voting behaviour. Voting patterns differ regionally as well as in line with other cleavages based on demographic factors such as age, employment, education and religion. Recognising how these affect support for specific parties and the EU is valuable in the context of developing a full picture of the impact of boundaries.

As noted above, there are clear differences in support for individual parties in different parts of the country. The KSČM were traditionally strong in north-west Bohemia and north-east Moravia, the ČSSD in the Moravskoslezský region in north-east Moravia, the ODS in Prague and across Bohemia from south-west to north-east and the KDU-ČSL in southern Moravia.

[91] These indices are calculated as part of the bespoke database.

Among the newer parties, in 2017, ANO 2011 had relatively higher support in north-west Bohemia and north-east Moravia, the SPD in north-west Bohemia and eastern Moravia and the Piráti in Prague. Given these variations it is important to include regional vote shares among the independent variables to be controlled in the analysis.

Before 2010, Czech voting was according to Maškarinec "dominated by a socio-economic cleavage"[92] and in Bertoa's view characterised by "a one-dimensional structure of competition revolving around a unique cleavage: economy."[93] Voting patterns were therefore dependent on traditional right-left positioning with splits between owners and workers, economic winners and losers from social transformation and college graduates and the less well educated. The ODS attracted owners, graduates and white collar workers while the ČSSD and KSČM were more successful in areas with higher unemployment, more blue collar workers and fewer graduates. Maškarinec identified three additional factors of relevance – voter age, religion and an urban-rural split. The KSČM were more successful with the generation born before 1954. The KDU-ČSL, as might be expected, were more successful in largely Catholic areas thereby explaining their strength in southern Moravia.[94] Úsvit was relatively more successful in small towns and rural areas than in the larger cities and the SPD continued this while also attracting voters in urban areas of Moravskoslezský.[95] Recognising and controlling for these variables will be necessary to ensure that the analysis of attitudes in the borderlands reflects solely the location of municipalities rather than their underlying demography. Therefore, variables reflecting regional differences, urban/rural splits, age, male:female ratios, employment status, education, ethnicity and religion are all potentially relevant control factors to introduce into the analysis.

[92] Maškarinec, "The rise of new populist political parties in Czech," 516.
[93] Fernando Casal Bértoa, "Party systems and cleavage structures revisited: A sociological explanation of party system institutionalization in East Central Europe," *Party Politics* 20, no. 1 (2014): 24, DOI: 10.1177/1354068811436042.
[94] Maškarinec, "The rise of new populist political parties in Czech," 517-518.
[95] Maškarinec, "The rise of new populist political parties in Czech," 535.

4. Methodology

Each of the three theoretical approaches detailed in chapter 1 drives different hypotheses and relationships to be tested – the results of each test can then be used to judge the relative validity of each approach and to deliver insights about the attitudes of those living near the boundary. Regression models are used to test the hypotheses – with each hypothesis driving a different specification of which variables should be included. The tests are performed at two levels, Municipalities with Extended Powers (Obce s Rozšířenou Působností – ORP) and Municipalities (Obce) – the first identifies the impact on the dependent variables from having a share of the ORP's population in municipalities near the boundary compared to those that do not, while the second identifies the impact of being directly on the boundary relative to the rest of the country and the ORP itself. Taking this multiple level approach allows the true impact of the border to be understood as it is, necessarily given that only 4.5% of all municipalities lie directly on a border, a relatively small effect compared to some of the other independent variables. A range of dependent and independent variables are defined to test the relationships in a series of regressions (further details of definitions and sources are contained in Appendix 1). The underlying structure of each regression test is similar – analysing the effect on the same dependent variables (measures of Eurosceptic and anti-migrant attitudes in the Czech Republic between 2002 and 2017) of a range of independent variables split between "target" variables (those related to populations living near the border or crossing it for work) and "control" variables (those that may affect the dependent variable and are included to ensure the target variables are not simply reflecting an underlying factor). The use of multiple dependent variables allows greater understanding of how sentiment towards outsiders is expressed and how it has changed over time.

Hypotheses to be tested

Three hypotheses are tested based on the predictions of each of the theoretical approaches outlined in chapter 1.

The realist securitisation paradigm implies that those living along borders have a heightened sense of threats from "others" living beyond the boundary and would therefore be expected to be more Eurosceptic and anti-migrant. This gives rise to the first hypothesis:

H1: Those living along the boundary consistently demonstrate higher levels of Euroscepticism and/or anti-migrant sentiment compared to the population in general

By contrast, the neoliberal openness paradigm suggests that those living in border areas are increasingly transnational, especially as borders open up, and through mixing with Others beyond the boundary are increasingly Europhile and less supportive of anti-migrant sentiment. This gives rise to the next hypothesis:

H2: Those living along the boundary and exhibiting transnational behaviour demonstrate lower levels of Euroscepticism and/or anti-migrant sentiment

Finally, the bordering as a process approach highlights the importance of context and the interactions of social, historical and political factors in constructing boundaries and therefore the attitudes of those living alongside them. The third hypothesis is therefore:

H3: Those living along the boundary are impacted by the complex and highly contextual influences which construct the border resulting in changing patterns of Euroscepticism and/or anti-migrant sentiment over time and in different places

Regression models for each hypothesis are specified below after definition of the variables and data sets to be analysed.

Data sets analysed

Two data sets are used representing different levels of the hierarchy of Czech administration – ORPs and municipalities. The ORP dataset has 206 cases (205 ORPs plus Prague) while the municipality dataset has 6,302 (see Appendix 1 for details of construction of the municipality database). The variables used for each are identical except for those relating to boundary and Sudeten municipalities which are dummy variables for municipalities but proportions of the population for ORPs.

Using ORPs as one data set is beneficial since each case is sufficiently large to be considered representative (the smallest, Králíky, had a population of approximately 8,600 in 2017) and the results are able to identify the impact on attitudes from being close to the boundary. However, there is a challenge that some of the granularity of data available in the more detailed municipality level data is forfeited and therefore insights about the impact of the boundary may be lost or blurred.

The use of municipality level data has the benefit of maintaining the richness of the detail of each case and ensuring that it is explicitly the position on the boundary that is affecting the attitudes, not merely broad proximity, especially as the attitudes of those in the ORP itself are included as an independent variable in the analysis. However, the challenge with this level of

data is the range of municipality size – from some with a population of just 15 in 2017 (and even fewer votes cast) to Brno with 380,000 in the same year. There is a question of whether such small municipalities can be considered representative and whether they should also be given the same weight as other cases which are 25,000 times larger. Moving to a weighted least squares regression, by contrast, risks overemphasising the very large cities in the results. For this reason, the municipality level data is split into four groups based on the population of the municipality – over 15,000; 750-15,000; 100-749; and less than 100 – and regressions are performed for the middle two groups, considered as Small/Medium-sized towns and Villages respectively. The characteristics of these four groups are detailed in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Aggregate characteristics of groups of municipalities in the Czech Republic by size,[96] 2017

	Czech Republic	Cities/Large Towns	Small/Medium Towns	Villages	Hamlets
Number of municipalities	6,302	106	1,909	3,850	437
Total population	10,610,055	4,820,332	4,422,189	1,330,990	31,262
Direct boundary municipalities	285	13	134	133	5
Austrian boundary municipalities	52	1	27	22	2
West German boundary municipalities	32	1	10	20	1
East German boundary municipalities	56	2	27	25	2
Polish boundary municipalities	109	8	49	52	0
Slovakian boundary municipalities	44	1	27	16	0

Source: Bespoke Database. Note: Number of municipalities for the Czech Republic column reflects only those in the database (see Appendix 1). The sum of individual country figures differs from the total number of boundary municipalities as some municipalities share a boundary with two countries.

Taking this approach has the benefit of reducing the need to consider weighting the regression and creates two subsets each representative of a strata of the Czech population. Moreover, the two groups include the vast majority of boundary municipalities by number and, combined, represent the majority of the population of the Czech Republic.

Performing the analysis for the larger towns and cities is challenging as their dependent variables are highly correlated to regional and ORP variables because they are such a large part of those spatial entities and any results for the impact of boundaries will be skewed by, for some boundaries, an unrepresentative single case of one municipality on that boundary. Moreover, the effect of the boundary for these larger entities is arguably already captured in the ORP level approach.

[96] Cities/Large Towns have population over 15,000; Small/Medium Towns have populations of 750-15,000; Villages have population of 100-749; and Hamlets have population below 100.

Combining the insights from ORP and municipality level analyses will allow the detail of the impact of boundaries to be identified. The broad impact of proximity to the boundary relative to the country as a whole can be seen from the ORP level analysis, while the detail of how boundaries directly impact attitudes, relative to the country, but also the locality, can be seen from the municipality level analysis at the level of towns and villages.

Dependent variables

Five dependent variables ("DV") are used, representing different measures of Euroscepticism and Anti-migration sentiment at two points in time – 2002/2003 and 2017. While they are not precisely comparable, having a range of measures allows the identification of consistency and change in attitudes over time.

The first dependent variable is the level of support for EU accession in the referendum in 2003 ("Yes 2003"). This is arguably the purest expression of attitudes to the EU among the variables tested, showing support for joining the EU in a straightforward choice between joining or not. However, there is an argument that support for joining could be a reflection of economic self-interest or following the lead given by a favoured political party – for example, the exit poll showed similar shares for "Yes" regardless of political party supported with the exception of the KSČM[97] so this will be considered in analysing the results.

The second dependent variable is support for the SPD in the 2017 Chamber of Deputies election ("SPD 2017"). This is also a relatively pure measure of sentiment towards the EU and migrants as the party had little heritage as anything other than a populist party focused on anti-migrant and anti-EU messages – choosing to vote SPD appears to be a strong endorsement of these views. However, it also seems possible that some with these attitudes may not support the SPD because of its overall rhetoric and the changing stance of other parties has resulted in other ways to express these sentiments without voting for the SPD.

The third and fourth dependent variables are the Index of Euroscepticism for 2002 and 2017 ("IES 2002" and "IES 2017"). As detailed earlier, this is constructed, for each ORP and municipality, by calculating the weighted average score on attitude to EU integration in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey using the individual scores for each party in 2002 and 2017 and

[97] The 2003 exit poll showed that 86%, 84% and 82%, respectively, of ODS, KDU-ČSL and ČSSD supporters voted "Yes" in the referendum compared to just 37% of KSČM supporters. Figures from the SC&C exit poll for Czech Televsion as reproduced in Seán Hanley, "A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13-14 June 2003," *West European Politics* 27, no. 4 (2004): 708, DOI: 10.1080/0140238042000249867.

weighting them by the share of the vote received by that party in the Chamber of Deputies elections in 2002 and 2017. This is not a pure measure, clearly, since other factors contribute to the decision of which party to support, however it provides an additional indicator that is comparable over time. Some of the other factors that impact voters' choice of party may be addressed by the control variables described below which are aimed at reflecting cleavages based on demographic factors. The 2003 referendum result should be expected to reflect the 2002 Index of Euroscepticism since supporters of KSČM, KDU-ČSL and ČSSD voted "Yes" in proportions reflecting the scores of their party on the Chapel Hill scale – only ODS supporters voted "Yes" in a proportion notably different to what their party's score would imply.[98] As shown in Chart 8, there is evidence of strong correlation between IES 2002 and Yes 2003 at the level of ORPs and for subsets of the municipality data set based on similar sized municipalities. By the time of the 2017 index, most voters were supporting a party that did not exist in 2002 and the issues of the EU and migration had taken on increased salience, therefore the index measures some of the attitudes inherent in choosing which of the new parties to support.

Chart 8: Scatter charts of Yes 2003 (y-axis) against IES 2002 (x-axis) for different data sets

[98] KSČM scored 2.7 on the Chapel Hill scale and 37% of its supporters voted "Yes." ČSSD and KDU-ČSL scored 6.4 and 82-84% of their supporters voted "Yes." ODS scored 3.8 but 86% of their supporters voted "Yes."

The final dependent variable is the Index of Anti-Migration Sentiment for 2017 ("AMS 2017"). Similar to the Index of Euroscepticism, this is constructed by calculating a weighted average score for the Chapel Hill Experts Survey on attitudes to immigration policy using the score for each party and the share of the votes received by the party in the 2017 Chamber of Deputies election. Like the Index of Euroscepticism, this is not a pure measure of anti-migrant sentiment – however, again, with so many votes going to "new" parties in the 2017 election the index reflects, to some degree, which of a relatively broad spread of attitudes voters chose to support on this issue. The breadth of attitudes of the parties was broader in 2017 compared to earlier years – there are no data on this measure for 2002 and an equivalent index in 2006 is of limited value given that all the major parties were clustered around a similar position (see Chart 7 in Chapter 3).

"Target" independent variables

The "target" independent variables are those whose effect this analysis is aiming to understand – the impacts of living near the boundary and of behaving in a transnational fashion.

Living near the boundary is measured in a purely topological sense, deeming those municipalities that share a boundary with another country as "Direct" boundary municipalities. To fully understand the context of the boundary, this variable is further refined to identify the country on the other side – thus boundary municipalities are separated between those bordering on Austria, "East" Germany, "West" Germany, Poland and Slovakia. A small number of municipalities share a boundary with two countries and are therefore assigned the relevant dummy variables for both. For a fuller description of the construction of this variable, see Appendix 2.

At the ORP level, the dummy variables for individual municipalities are combined with populations for each municipality to measure the proportion of each ORP's population that lives in each type of boundary municipality – whether these variables are dummies or a proportion of the population is dependent on the data set being analysed.

Transnational behaviour is measured using the share of employees that commute for work to another country as a proxy ("Commuters"). This is attractive as a variable since it captures regular interaction with foreigners and was recorded as part of the census in 2001 and 2011 for each municipality. Unfortunately, other indicators of transnational behaviour, such as

marriages to foreigners, shopping across the boundary or socialising with other nationalities are not available in such a comprehensive fashion by municipality.

"Control" independent variables

The "control" independent variables reflect the underlying drivers of voter behaviour described in chapter 3. Including them in the regression ensures that, to the extent that border municipalities have certain characteristics not related to the boundary, these are reflected explicitly in the analysis and their impact excluded from the specific effect of the boundary itself. Failure to include them risks creating confounders in the analysis, potentially invalidating the conclusions to be drawn.

The first control variables relate to the demographic nature of each municipality – population density, average age and the proportion of men in the population. Population density ("Pop. Density"), measured as residents per hectare, gives an indication of the degree to which the municipality is rural or urban – voting patterns in each type of municipality can differ and need to be captured explicitly in the analysis. Average age ("Mean Age"), in years, reflects the mix of different age groups and controls for the potential of different behaviour of older voters compared to younger voters. The share of men in the population ("Male Share"), as a percentage, captures the potential for differing voting behaviour based on sex. All three variables are collected at municipality level annually, so the most recent data (2003 or 2017) is used in the models.

The second set of control variables reflects the nature of employment and unemployment as measures of socio-economic conditions in the municipality. The proportion of the population that is employed ("Employed") gives a measure of economic well-being, with higher numbers implying a lower dependency ratio, fewer retirees and less unemployment. The proportion of those employed that are classified as employees ("Employees"), rather than for example self-employed or employers, can be seen as an indicator of the share of "workers" as opposed to entrepreneurs or business owners, or alternatively blue-collar as opposed to white collar workers which drives certain voting patterns as described earlier. The level of unemployment ("Unemployed"), as a proportion of the population aged 15-64, is a measure of economic stress in the municipality. These variables are particularly important as they control for factors that could be linked to the economic peripherality expected in border areas. The proportion of the population employed and the share of them that are employees is captured in the census and the most recent data (2001 or 2011) is therefore used.

Unemployment data is from the census for 2001 and from monthly CZSO statistics for September 2017 – the two measures are not precisely consistent but should be considered directionally similar.

Two further control variables relate to educational attainment of the population in the municipality, identifying those with either relatively low or relatively high levels of education. The two variables are the proportion of the population over 15 in the municipality that undertook tertiary education ("Graduates") and those that have either no formal education, primary education or finished secondary education without gaining their General Certificate of Education ("Below Secondary"). Figures are collected as part of the census at the level of the municipality so data for 2001 or 2011 is used.

The next pair of variables control for ethnicity and religion. The first is the proportion of the population that declares either Czech or Moravian ethnicity ("Czech-Moravian") in the census – low levels for this variable and, therefore, a high proportion of "foreign" ethnicity in the municipality could be seen to either raise concerns among the population about "foreigners" or allow interaction with other ethnicities that reduces the outsider effect. The second is the share of Catholics in the population ("Catholics") – the link between Catholics and support for the KDU described earlier makes controlling for the impact of faith on voting patterns potentially important. In both cases there is a large proportion of "undeclared" responses, especially in 2011, so the proportions calculated are the share of those declaring their religion or ethnicity, not the share of the total population. Both of these variables are collected as part of the census and the most recent (2001 or 2011) data are used.

Variables to control for spatial trends in the dependent variables are also included. The existence of regional and ORP-level variations in attitudes, as measured by the dependent variables, could potentially result in invalid observations of patterns ("Region" and "ORP" indicate, respectively, regional and ORP metrics for the relevant dependent variable). All regressions therefore include the regional metric for the dependent variable to control for such regional variations and ensuring that the impact of the boundary is isolated from other spatial factors. At the municipality level, the dependent variable metric for the ORP is also included in order to further isolate the effect of the boundary from very localised differences. Thus, the analysis at the level of ORPs identifies the impact of the boundary relative to the country as a whole, adjusting for the region, while the analysis at municipality level identifies the impact of the boundary relative to the country as a whole but also relative to the region

and ORP. Including both variables at the municipality level effectively includes an adjustment for localised "contagion" in attitudes unrelated to the boundary itself.

The final control variable distinguishes between the country as a whole and municipalities that were part of the Sudeten region ("Sudeten") that experienced significant population turnover immediately after the Second World War. Given that many boundary municipalities lie in the Sudeten region, the goal is to ensure that the analysis is not simply identifying longstanding historical effects from "phantom" borders, as described by Šimon,[99] but rather the effect of current, actual boundaries with other states. As is the case for the identification of boundary municipalities, a dummy variable is used to identify Sudeten from non-Sudeten municipalities[100] and for the analysis at ORP level this is then converted into the proportion of the population of the ORP living in Sudeten municipalities – which of these measures is meant by the Sudeten variable is dependent on the data set being used.

Regression models tested

Regression models are specified to, firstly, set a baseline using just control variables and, subsequently, to specifically test the three hypotheses set out above. The goal of setting a baseline is to validate the underlying model and understand the explanatory power (R^2) of these control variables. This allows a controlled addition of the target variables in subsequent models which can identify both their significance as variables and the impact on explanatory value (the increase in R^2). The spatial variable for whether or not municipalities are in the Sudeten region is excluded from these control variables as this is specifically border-related – however, regional and ORP measures for the dependent variable are included. The first relationship to be tested therefore is between the dependent variable and the control independent variables, denoted as:

DV = f (Region, ORP, Pop. Density, Mean Age, Male Share, Employed, Employees, Unemployed, Graduates, Below Secondary, Czech-Moravian, Catholics)...(i)

This group of independent variables is used repeatedly in subsequent regression specifications and is referred to, for simplicity of presentation, as "CIV". Clearly, when using this specification with the ORP level dataset, the ORP measure is omitted from the list of independent variables as this is the dependent variable in that particular model.

[99] Šimon, "Measuring Phantom Borders: The Case of Czech," 139-150.
[100] For a fuller description of the nature of this variable, see Appendix 2.

The first hypothesis, H1, asserts that the effect of living on the boundary is consistently higher levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment across time and space. Given the potential relevance of the Sudeten region as a variable in spatially driven differences, it too is added as the final control variable. Therefore the proposed relationship for this hypothesis is:

DV = f (CIV, Sudeten, Direct)...(ii)

The second hypothesis, H2, suggests that transnational behaviour, proxied by commuting for work, is a moderating effect on Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment. Given the link between proximity to the border and commuting overseas for work, a second relationship is tested just for border municipalities to see the impact of commuting on attitudes in the subset of cases where proximity to the boundary is a given. Therefore, the relationships proposed to test this hypothesis are:

DV = f (CIV, Sudeten, Direct, Commuters)...(iii) – for all cases

DV = f (CIV, Sudeten, Commuters)...(iv) – for the subset of Direct boundary municipalities with three groups – all boundary municipalities; Small-Medium sized towns; and Villages

The final hypothesis, H3, suggests a complex and highly contextual set of influences on the attitudes of those living along the boundary. Therefore, rather than simply including presence on a boundary, the identity of the neighbour across the boundary is also included in the relationship to introduce the historical nature of the interaction with that neighbour and to capture the changing nature of attitudes along each contextual border. The relationship is therefore:

DV = f (CIV, Sudeten, Austria Direct, West Germany Direct, East Germany Direct, Poland Direct, Slovakia Direct, Commuters)...(v)

These five relationships result in 75 separate regressions – 15 (five dependent variables times three data sets) for each of the five relationships (i) to (v). The combined results of these regressions will allow an understanding of the factors that influence the attitudes towards Europe and migrants of those living along the boundary and those acting transnationally relative to the rest of the country and to areas not on the boundary – measuring the empirical validity of each theoretical approach and identifying the individual contextual factors in more detail.

5. Results and Insights

The results of the regression analyses for each relationship outlined in Chapter 4 identify the key factors which drive Euroscepticism and attitudes in relation to migrants in the Czech Republic. The control variables are, unsurprisingly, important – especially those relating to religion, education and the views in neighbouring municipalities and ORPs. Moreover, the presence of a "phantom" border around the Sudeten region can, in some cases, be detected. The effect of the boundary considered as a single block is mixed and commuting is a significant variable, albeit in the opposite direction to that expected. Analyses including the identity of the neighbour across the boundary provide greater richness to understand the pattern and drivers of attitudes to the EU and migrants.

Variability and correlation of variables used in the analysis

In order to interpret the regression results, it is helpful to understand the range of each of the variables. Table 5 details the minimum, maximum and range for each variable used in the later period regressions (ranges for both time periods are included in Appendix 3).

Table 5: Range of observed values for each variable by dataset

	ORP			Small/Medium Towns			Villages		
	Min	Max	Range	Min	Max	Range	Min	Max	Range
YES 2003	69.8	83.7	14.0	53.2	88.5	35.3	26.4	94.8	68.4
IES 2002	4.5	5.5	1.0	3.9	5.9	2.0	3.3	6.4	3.2
IES 2017	3.6	4.6	1.0	3.3	5.2	1.9	2.8	5.4	2.5
SPD 2017	5.7	20.0	14.3	2.4	26.7	24.3	0.0	41.1	41.1
AMS 2017	6.7	7.8	1.1	6.2	8.1	1.9	6.3	8.5	2.2
2011/2017									
Pop. Density	0.3	26.1	25.8	0.1	33.9	33.7	0.0	7.0	7.0
Mean Age	37.3	44.7	7.5	31.7	47.8	16.1	32.7	59.8	27.1
Male Share	48.3	54.4	6.2	43.4	59.8	16.4	33.2	68.2	35.0
Employed	35.8	47.9	12.0	27.7	55.0	27.3	18.2	58.0	39.8
Employees	69.0	85.6	16.6	56.7	92.5	35.8	33.3	96.7	63.3
Unemployed	1.1	10.4	9.3	0.2	15.6	15.4	0.0	19.6	19.6
Graduates	3.9	23.6	19.7	1.4	35.0	33.6	0.0	32.4	32.4
Below Secondary	30.7	67.1	36.4	19.5	77.1	57.6	29.0	88.1	59.0
Czech-Moravian	70.1	98.7	28.5	55.8	99.6	43.8	58.7	100.0	41.3
Catholics	3.6	76.0	72.3	1.5	91.1	89.6	0.0	89.9	89.9
Commuters	0.2	4.2	4.0	0.0	13.0	13.0	0.0	14.8	14.8

Source: Bespoke Database.

As would be expected the range of variables is higher for Villages (except in the case of population density given that, by their nature, Villages are more rural). The size of some ranges means that even small co-efficients in the regression could reflect a large potential impact on the dependent variables, as will be highlighted in some cases below.

Correlation matrices for the three data sets and both time periods are included in Appendix 3. In general, correlations are relatively low between the variables. However, in a few cases there is evidence of autocorrelation between the independent variables, for example between the share of Graduates and the share of those with Below Secondary education and between the share Employed and the level of Unemployed. For each regression a variance inflation factor (VIF) test was performed resulting in the exclusion of the share of Graduates from all regressions using the ORP data sets as this metric was significantly above 10. VIF is above 5 but below 10 in some other cases for Graduates and Below Secondary as well as for Employed and Unemployed – in these cases the variables are retained in the regression as there is no evidence of autocorrelation involving the most important elements of the results, the target independent variables.

Explanatory power of the control independent variables

The results for relationship (i) are shown in Table 6. In this and all subsequent results tables, the regressions use the negative value of the dependent variable for SPD 2017 and AMS 2017 to ease comparability of the direction of attitudes.[101] Overall, the control independent variables have reasonably strong explanatory power for all dependent variables and across all three data sets – R^2 is above 0.4 for all but two of the fifteen regressions tested. The lower R^2 are for the most specific variables (support for Yes and the SPD) in the data set for Villages which has the greatest variability in metrics given the relatively small size of each case so maybe this should not be unexpected. There is clear spatial clustering in voting behaviour and attitudes – either the regional or the ORP metrics for the dependent variable, and often both, are highly significant variables in the regression. The region is a very strong influence on the ORPs as is the ORP, in turn, on municipalities.

[101] High values of SPD 2017 and AMS 2017 are associated with more negative attitudes towards outsiders whereas the opposite is the case for other dependent variables. Using the negative value for these two makes the resulting co-efficients in the regression directionally the same in terms of attitude and therefore more easily comparable.

Table 6: Regression results for Relationship (i): "Control" independent variables

	ORP					Small/Medium Towns					Villages				
	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017
Intercept	74.175 **	6.448 ***	3.557 ***	-2.936	-0.224	18.979 *	3.459 ***	1.509 ***	-5.689 .	-0.650 *	20.268 *	2.651 ***	1.163 ***	-11.410 ***	-1.212 ***
	(25.601)	(1.501)	(0.971)	(12.357)	(1.017)	(7.741)	(0.385)	(0.279)	(3.414)	(0.263)	(9.501)	(0.352)	(0.229)	(3.062)	(0.289)
Region	0.446 ***	0.276 **	0.604 ***	-0.838 ***	-0.661 ***	0.116	-0.151 **	0.134 ***	-0.180 ***	-0.183 ***	0.105	-0.215 ***	0.042	-0.168 *	-0.143 ***
	(0.118)	(0.094)	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.104)	(0.063)	(0.048)	(0.069)	(0.040)
ORP						0.674 ***	0.699 ***	0.651 ***	-0.759 ***	-0.663 ***	0.848 ***	0.735 ***	0.668 ***	-0.788 ***	-0.671 ***
						(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.031)
Pop. Density	-0.034	-0.001	-0.006	-0.110 *	-0.005	0.089	0.003	-0.003	-0.068 *	-0.004 *	0.690 *	0.013	-0.008	-0.281 .	-0.015 .
	(0.074)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.053)	(0.004)	(0.057)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.303)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.165)	(0.009)
Mean Age	0.226	-0.000	-0.004	0.103	-0.004	0.175 **	-0.003	-0.004 .	0.134 ***	-0.002	0.006	-0.002	-0.003 .	0.187 ***	-0.004 *
	(0.181)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.111)	(0.008)	(0.056)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.043)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.001)
Male Share	-0.691 .	-0.006	0.010	0.333 .	0.001	-0.226 ***	-0.005 .	-0.002	0.006	-0.001	-0.075 .	-0.001	0.001	-0.006	0.002
	(0.413)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.195)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.040)	(0.002)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.001)
Employed	0.235 *	-0.023 ***	-0.008	-0.095	-0.005	0.132 ***	0.001	-0.001	-0.011	0.001	-0.030	-0.002 .	-0.001	-0.004	-0.000
	(0.116)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.073)	(0.005)	(0.036)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)
Employees	-0.008	0.001	-0.012 ***	-0.069	-0.015 ***	-0.015	-0.000	-0.003 **	0.011	-0.003 ***	-0.034 .	-0.001	-0.002 *	0.014	-0.003 ***
	(0.066)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.042)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
Unemployed	0.375 **	-0.030 ***	-0.022 **	-0.155 .	-0.017 **	0.145 **	-0.008 ***	-0.011 ***	-0.082 *	-0.007 **	-0.047	-0.013 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.005	-0.006 **
	(0.113)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.084)	(0.006)	(0.045)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.036)	(0.002)
Graduates						0.108	-0.013 ***	0.001	0.044	0.003 .	0.006	-0.001	0.008 ***	0.122 ***	0.009 ***
						(0.068)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.071)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.002)
Below Secondary	-0.203 ***	-0.013 ***	-0.015 ***	-0.176 ***	-0.015 ***	-0.094 ***	-0.011 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.071 ***	-0.007 ***	-0.181 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.070 ***	-0.007 ***
	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.025)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)
Czech-Moravian	-0.095 *	-0.008 **	-0.002	-0.004	0.000	-0.014	-0.003 **	0.002 **	0.025 .	0.002 **	0.006	0.005 ***	0.006 ***	0.055 **	0.005 ***
	(0.040)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.033)	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.035)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.001)
Catholics	0.089 ***	0.006 ***	0.005 ***	0.028 ***	0.003 ***	0.052 ***	0.007 ***	0.004 ***	0.019 ***	0.002 ***	0.037 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.024 ***	0.003 ***
	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)
n	206	206	206	206	206	1,904	1,904	1,909	1,909	1,909	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850
R^2	0.567	0.718	0.682	0.665	0.749	0.401	0.634	0.652	0.541	0.737	0.139	0.445	0.409	0.230	0.408
Adjusted R^2	0.545	0.704	0.666	0.647	0.737	0.397	0.631	0.650	0.538	0.735	0.137	0.443	0.408	0.228	0.406

Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence denoted by symbols: *** 99.9%; ** 99%,; * 95%; . 90%. Negative values of the dependent variables SPD 2017 and AMS 2017 are used to make comparison of direction of attitudes easier.

Reflecting the lower variation in demographic measures between ORPs as they are combinations of different types of underlying municipality, population density, average age and the share of men in the population are rarely significant variables in the regression at this level. One of the exceptions is significantly higher support for the SPD in more densely populated ORPs and this relationship is also significant at the level of municipalities where higher density populations were more favourable to the SPD and anti-migrant attitudes even though they had been more favourable to EU accession (for Villages).

Municipalities with a higher average age were favourable to joining the EU and less likely to support the SPD – however, older populations were also more Eurosceptic and anti-migrant by 2017 but, it seems, they found other ways to express these views while choosing not to support the SPD. The proportion of men in the population is rarely a significant influence, except to be related to lower support for EU accession. Demographically, EU accession was, in general, supported by older, more female groups, especially in denser villages, while SPD support was more prevalent among younger populations, again in more densely populated municipalities, but sex was not a major differentiator.

The share of those employed who are classified as employees is a significant factor – there was a significant link between a high share of "workers" and Eurosceptic and anti-migrant attitudes in 2017 at the level of ORPs and municipalities. This relationship was not seen in earlier periods, except in the case of Villages, and in the same way as for older populations it was expressed without strong support for the SPD itself.

High levels of unemployment are also generally associated with more Eurosceptic and anti-migrant attitudes – with the exception of the result of the referendum in 2003. This is slightly surprising given that one of the demographic groups to have significantly lower support for joining the EU according to the exit poll was the unemployed at 65% compared to 77% overall.[102] One possible explanation, given that the vote had specific policy implications, is the consideration of economic self-interest, with areas suffering from unemployment (and not necessarily the unemployed themselves) voting in favour of accession as a way to secure economic benefits for the whole community from EU membership.

Educational attainment is a significant factor in voting patterns and attitudes. There is a consistent, significant and strong link between lower educational attainment and Eurosceptic

[102] Figures from the SC&C exit poll for Czech Television as reproduced in Seán Hanley, "A Nation of Sceptics?" 708.

and anti-migrant attitudes, with a significant relationship regardless of dependent variable and data set. As described above, the share of graduates in the population is excluded at the ORP level, as there is very high autocorrelation with the share of the population not achieving their General Certificate of Education. At municipality level, high shares of graduates are significantly linked to higher Euroscepticism in 2002 at the level of Small/Medium Towns, possibly the result of support for the ODS among those with a degree which would result in a slightly higher score on the IES metric in that year, but lower levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment, and lower support for the SPD, in 2017.

The share of Czechs and Moravians in the population has the distinction of being the only control variable that also links to the underlying hypotheses as a high share of "foreign" ethnicities in the population drives direct experience of interactions with outsiders. Higher shares of ethnic Czechs and Moravians was linked, for ORPs, to more Eurosceptic views in 2002 and 2003 before becoming insignificant in 2017. At municipality level, a higher proportion of Czechs and Moravians is linked to lower levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment in 2017 – a reversal from the 2002 relationship for Small/Medium towns but a continuation of the relationship seen for Villages. In 2002 it seems that places with few "foreigners" were more negative whereas in recent years this relationship has reversed – thus it seems there has been a move from fear of the unknown to actual experience of outsiders becoming more salient in shaping attitudes. Areas with more "foreigners" are seeing rising Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment. This implies that experience of foreigners is not resulting in less concern over outsiders – a potentially important challenge to transnationalist suggestions that interaction overcomes fear. The presence of outsiders is either causing resentment, failing to allay fear or acting as an experiential rallying point for populist messages – and possibly all three.

The strongest relationship across all the regressions, with the exception of the regional or local metrics for the dependent variable, is the share of the Catholics in the population. A high share of Catholics is universally, significantly and strongly linked to lower levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment. While this could be linked historically to support for the views of the KDU, the fall in support for that particular party has not broken the link between Catholics and those views in the 2017 results.

Table 7: Regression results for Relationship (ii): Impact of location directly on the boundary

	ORP					Small/Medium Towns					Villages				
	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017
Intercept	90.741 ***	6.885 ***	2.946 **	-8.117	-0.556	19.334 *	3.684 ***	1.150 ***	-7.122 *	-0.479 .	17.687 .	3.227 ***	0.895 ***	-12.062 ***	-1.089 ***
	(25.378)	(1.518)	(1.113)	(13.612)	(1.073)	(7.813)	(0.393)	(0.291)	(3.435)	(0.266)	(9.553)	(0.368)	(0.254)	(3.114)	(0.298)
Region	0.461 ***	0.263 **	0.627 ***	-0.871 ***	-0.707 ***	0.118	-0.154 **	0.190 ***	-0.236 ***	-0.225 ***	0.072	-0.228 ***	0.070	-0.194 **	-0.172 ***
	(0.115)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.054)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.032)	(0.105)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.041)
ORP						0.672 ***	0.689 ***	0.654 ***	-0.763 ***	-0.662 ***	0.862 ***	0.704 ***	0.674 ***	-0.798 ***	-0.682 ***
						(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.031)
Pop. Density	-0.048	-0.001	-0.006	-0.120 *	-0.006	0.088	0.003	-0.003	-0.070 *	-0.005 *	0.793 **	0.006	-0.004	-0.229	-0.010
	(0.072)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.054)	(0.004)	(0.058)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.306)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.168)	(0.009)
Mean Age	0.188	-0.006	-0.003	0.138	-0.001	0.175 **	-0.004	-0.004 .	0.142 ***	-0.002	0.022	-0.004 *	-0.002	0.193 ***	-0.003 *
	(0.182)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.113)	(0.008)	(0.056)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.044)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)
Male Share	-0.849 *	-0.010	0.014	0.378 .	0.007	-0.227 ***	-0.005 .	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	-0.082 *	-0.000	0.001	-0.010	0.001
	(0.404)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.198)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.040)	(0.002)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.001)
Employed	0.233 *	-0.020 **	-0.007	-0.080	-0.003	0.132 ***	0.001	-0.001	-0.003	0.001	-0.031	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.000
	(0.117)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.077)	(0.006)	(0.036)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)
Employees	-0.013	0.001	-0.011 **	-0.065	-0.014 ***	-0.015	0.000	-0.002 *	0.014	-0.003 ***	-0.034 .	-0.001	-0.001 .	0.016	-0.002 ***
	(0.065)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.042)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
Unemployed	0.377 **	-0.026 ***	-0.021 **	-0.151 .	-0.016 **	0.147 **	-0.007 **	-0.011 ***	-0.085 *	-0.008 **	-0.061	-0.011 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.007	-0.006 **
	(0.116)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.085)	(0.006)	(0.047)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.036)	(0.002)
Graduates						0.106	-0.013 ***	0.000	0.038	0.002	0.013	-0.001	0.008 ***	0.124 ***	0.009 ***
						(0.068)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.071)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.002)
Below Secondary	-0.179 ***	-0.011 ***	-0.016 ***	-0.198 ***	-0.017 ***	-0.094 ***	-0.011 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.086 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.182 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.072 ***	-0.007 ***
	(0.044)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)
Czech-Moravian	-0.192 ***	-0.011 ***	0.000	0.016	0.002	-0.017	-0.004 ***	0.004 ***	0.046 **	0.004 ***	0.045	0.001	0.007 ***	0.062 **	0.006 ***
	(0.049)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.038)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.001)
Catholics	0.088 ***	0.006 ***	0.005 ***	0.036 ***	0.003 ***	0.052 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.026 ***	0.003 ***	0.039 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.026 ***	0.003 ***
	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)
Sudeten	-0.250	-0.060 *	0.026	0.552	0.056 *	-0.005	-0.022 .	0.047 ***	0.692 ***	0.045 ***	0.591	-0.075 ***	0.019	0.332	0.030 *
	(0.496)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.357)	(0.026)	(0.249)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.149)	(0.009)	(0.361)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.216)	(0.012)
Direct	-2.440 ***	-0.013	0.031	-0.001	0.002	-0.142	-0.037 *	-0.010	0.080	-0.004	1.065	-0.051 .	0.053 *	0.217	0.058 **
	(0.710)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.576)	(0.041)	(0.355)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.212)	(0.013)	(0.663)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.405)	(0.022)
n	206	206	206	206	206	1,904	1,904	1,909	1,909	1,909	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850
R^2	0.594	0.725	0.684	0.669	0.755	0.401	0.635	0.656	0.546	0.740	0.141	0.449	0.411	0.231	0.411
Adjusted R^2	0.569	0.708	0.665	0.648	0.740	0.397	0.633	0.653	0.543	0.738	0.137	0.447	0.409	0.228	0.409

Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence denoted by symbols: *** 99.9%; ** 99%,; * 95%; . 90%. Negative values of the dependent variables SPD 2017 and AMS 2017 are used to make comparison of direction of attitudes easier.

Additional observations from introducing Sudeten and boundary variables

Table 7 sets out the results of the regression for relationship (ii). The introduction of the variables relating to the validity of the realist securitisation paradigm – presence in the Sudeten region and presence directly on an international boundary – adds limited explanatory value to the regression model except in the case of the 2003 referendum result at the level of ORPs. In this case, the R^2 increases by approximately 0.03 whereas for all the other regressions the increase is only at the third decimal place. However, although the additional explanatory value is low, the Sudeten region and the boundary are significant influences in some of the regression models.

At the level of ORPs, the regression highlights the significant effect of direct boundaries on support for EU accession – identifying that having a high share of the population in an ORP living on the boundary was significantly linked to lower support for EU accession than the country as a whole. Based on the coefficient for the Direct variable, an ORP with 100% of its population in boundary municipalities would be expected to have a 2.4% lower vote in favour of accession than the country as a whole – in line with the lower level of support seen among boundary municipalities in general. This implies that the lower support for EU accession identified in chapter 2 is indeed the result of being on the boundary rather than demographic factors. By contrast there is no such significant relationship identified between being on the boundary and support for the SPD in 2017, even though chapter 2 highlighted similar apparently strong support for the party among municipalities along the boundary. This suggests that support observed for the SPD among boundary communities is the result of other demographic factors rather than the boundary *per se*.

At the level of municipalities, there are some additional significant relationships implying that, relative to their ORPs, boundary municipalities moved from being Eurosceptic in 2002 (even if there was no significant difference in support for EU accession) to being, in the case of Villages, less Eurosceptic and less anti-migrant than their ORP in 2017 (although again they were not significantly different in support for the SPD).

The Sudeten region can also be seen as a significant variable in the regression models. At the level of ORPs, this can be seen in significantly higher Euroscepticism in 2002 but also lower anti-migrant sentiment in 2017. For municipalities, there is a similar effect as seen with the boundary with a move from significant Euroscepticism to, for Small/Medium Towns, lower support for the SPD and lower Euroscepticism and, for all municipalities, lower anti-migrant

sentiment. This suggests that the "phantom" border of the Sudeten region can still be observed, especially at the level of individual municipalities, and as with boundary municipalities it too has moved to a relatively more open attitude to the EU and migrants.

The effect of adding variables for Sudeten and boundary municipalities provides some insights but does not demonstrate relationships that are either universal or consistent in direction. It does not therefore support the first hypothesis that boundary municipalities are consistently associated with anti-EU and anti-migrant sentiment. It does, however, provide some initial indications about the effect of boundaries – phantom and real – and the changing nature of the attitudes of those living along them.

Additional observations from introducing cross-border commuting as a variable

Regression results for relationship (iii) are set out in Table 8. Introducing cross-border commuting as a variable further improves the explanatory power of the regression for ORPs – R^2 increases by up to 0.03 in the case of the Index of Euroscepticism – but again has limited effect on this metric for municipality level data sets.

For the ORP data set, this increased explanatory power is manifested as a significant effect from cross-border commuting for all dependent variables, except EU accession. However, contrary to the direction of the effect predicted by liberal openness, transnationalist theories, high levels of commuting are significantly related to high levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment as well as, albeit at a lower level of confidence, support for the SPD. Living on a boundary does not explain higher support for the SPD, but crossing the boundary for work does. A four percentage point increase in the share of employees cross-border commuting (the difference between the highest and lowest levels across all ORPs) is equivalent to a 1.2% increase in support for the SPD.

Including the commuter variable also changes the relationship observed with Sudeten areas such that there is no longer a significant effect on Euroscepticism in 2002 but there is significantly lower support for the SPD. There are no major changes in other coefficients of correlation resulting in the implication that ORPs with presence on the boundary (in the case of the 2003 referendum) or with a higher proportion of cross-border commuters (for all dependent variables) are linked to higher levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant attitudes.

Table 8: Regression results for Relationship (iii): Impact of being directly on the boundary and of cross-border commuting

	ORP					Small/Medium Towns					Villages				
	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017
Intercept	84.760 **	6.666 ***	2.832 *	-10.125	-1.009	19.480 *	3.866 ***	1.170 ***	-7.037 *	-0.474 .	17.517 .	3.337 ***	0.892 ***	-12.285 ***	-1.082 ***
	(25.538)	(1.448)	(1.089)	(13.573)	(1.062)	(7.814)	(0.393)	(0.291)	(3.437)	(0.266)	(9.554)	(0.370)	(0.256)	(3.120)	(0.298)
Region	0.483 ***	0.197 *	0.582 ***	-0.874 ***	-0.681 ***	0.107	-0.147 **	0.198 ***	-0.243 ***	-0.230 ***	0.063	-0.237 ***	0.070	-0.189 **	-0.172 ***
	(0.115)	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.105)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.041)
ORP						0.678 ***	0.660 ***	0.645 ***	-0.759 ***	-0.657 ***	0.866 ***	0.699 ***	0.674 ***	-0.803 ***	-0.685 ***
						(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.031)
Pop. Density	-0.055	-0.001	-0.005	-0.120 *	-0.006	0.091	0.002	-0.003	-0.071 *	-0.005 *	0.805 **	0.006	-0.004	-0.225	-0.009
	(0.072)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.054)	(0.004)	(0.058)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.306)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.168)	(0.009)
Mean Age	0.192	-0.006	-0.001	0.153	0.001	0.175 **	-0.005 .	-0.003	0.143 ***	-0.001	0.022	-0.004 *	-0.002	0.194 ***	-0.003 *
	(0.181)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.113)	(0.008)	(0.056)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.044)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)
Male Share	-0.747 .	0.002	0.019	0.415 *	0.012	-0.226 ***	-0.005 .	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	-0.083 *	-0.000	0.001	-0.010	0.001
	(0.407)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.198)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.040)	(0.002)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.001)
Employed	0.271 *	-0.014 *	-0.003	-0.060	-0.000	0.128 ***	0.002	-0.001	-0.003	0.001	-0.032	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.000
	(0.119)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.077)	(0.006)	(0.036)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)
Employees	-0.030	-0.000	-0.014 ***	-0.077 .	-0.016 ***	-0.013	-0.000	-0.002 *	0.014	-0.003 ***	-0.033 .	-0.001	-0.001 .	0.016	-0.002 ***
	(0.065)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.042)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
Unemployed	0.386 **	-0.025 ***	-0.022 **	-0.156 .	-0.017 **	0.147 **	-0.007 ***	-0.011 ***	-0.085 *	-0.008 **	-0.060	-0.011 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.005	-0.006 **
	(0.116)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.085)	(0.006)	(0.047)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.037)	(0.002)
Graduates						0.106	-0.013 ***	0.000	0.038	0.002	0.011	-0.001	0.008 ***	0.124 ***	0.009 ***
						(0.068)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.071)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.002)
Below Secondary	-0.183 ***	-0.012 ***	-0.015 ***	-0.196 ***	-0.017 ***	-0.093 ***	-0.011 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.086 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.182 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.072 ***	-0.007 ***
	(0.044)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)
Czech-Moravian	-0.202 ***	-0.012 ***	0.000	0.012	0.002	-0.015	-0.005 ***	0.004 ***	0.045 **	0.004 ***	0.049	0.001	0.007 ***	0.063 **	0.006 ***
	(0.049)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.038)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.001)
Catholics	0.093 ***	0.008 ***	0.006 ***	0.038 ***	0.004 ***	0.051 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.027 ***	0.003 ***	0.038 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.026 ***	0.003 ***
	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)
Sudeten	-0.078	-0.036	0.043	0.719 .	0.072 **	-0.044	-0.015	0.051 ***	0.717 ***	0.047 ***	0.566	-0.073 ***	0.019	0.296	0.028 *
	(0.505)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.366)	(0.026)	(0.252)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.152)	(0.009)	(0.362)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.218)	(0.012)
Direct	-2.318 **	0.008	0.064	0.215	0.030	-0.221	-0.022	-0.001	0.130	0.000	1.017	-0.045	0.052 *	0.178	0.056 **
	(0.711)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.584)	(0.041)	(0.362)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.220)	(0.014)	(0.664)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.406)	(0.022)
Commuters	-0.482	-0.076 ***	-0.041 **	-0.291 .	-0.035 **	0.157	-0.030 ***	-0.009 *	-0.050	-0.004	0.133	-0.013 *	0.000	0.070	0.004
	(0.297)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.158)	(0.011)	(0.142)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.058)	(0.004)	(0.125)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.058)	(0.003)
n	206	206	206	206	206	1,904	1,904	1,909	1,909	1,909	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850
R^2	0.600	0.751	0.700	0.675	0.766	0.402	0.639	0.657	0.546	0.740	0.141	0.450	0.411	0.231	0.411
Adjusted R^2	0.573	0.734	0.680	0.652	0.751	0.397	0.636	0.654	0.543	0.738	0.138	0.448	0.409	0.228	0.409

Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence denoted by symbols: *** 99.9%; ** 99%,; * 95%; . 90%. Negative values of the dependent variables SPD 2017 and AMS 2017 are used to make comparison of direction of attitudes easier.

For municipalities, cross-border commuting is also significantly associated with higher levels of Euroscepticism (even if only for Small/Medium Towns in 2017) but there is no evidence for greater support for the SPD or anti-migrant sentiment. Introducing this variable also affects the relationship between presence on the boundary and Euroscepticism – for both sizes of municipalities, the relationship between boundary presence and Euroscepticism in 2002 is no longer significant, suggesting that it is the presence of cross-border commuters, not the boundary, that was at the root of the Euroscepticism. Given there is a higher proportion of cross-border commuters along the boundary, there is likely to be a link between these two variables and it is the commuter variable that appears to have the stronger link.

Overall, the data do not support the second hypothesis either and in fact suggest the opposite effect. To the extent that cross-border commuting is a good proxy for transnational links and interactions, it suggests that rather than improving attitudes towards outsiders these experiences harden Eurosceptic and anti-migrant, feelings. Combined with the observation that areas with higher proportions of "foreign" ethnicities have over time become less positively inclined to outsiders, this presents a significant challenge to the liberal openness paradigm. To fully test the second hypothesis, it is also necessary to see whether the effect of high proportions of cross-border commuters is the same when considering just the subset of municipalities that lie on the boundary.

Additional observations from considering the sub-set of municipalities lying on the boundary

Table 9 sets out the results of the regression for relationship (iv). Considering just the sub-set of municipalities that lie directly along the boundary, there is also a significant link between those with higher shares of cross-border commuting and higher levels of Euroscepticism, anti-migrant sentiment and support for the SPD. From this, it is possible to infer that it is not a matter of more cross-border commuters living along the boundary in general that drives the relationship but that within the group of boundary municipalities themselves a greater share of cross-border commuters is linked to less favourable attitudes to outsiders. Given that the regression also includes the dependent variable for the ORP it measures attitudes relative to an already more Eurosceptic and anti-migrant baseline of the ORPs along the boundary as seen from the previous regressions.

However, separating the boundary municipalities between towns and villages shows that this negative sentiment among cross-border commuters is significant in boundary Villages in

Table 9: Regression results for Relationship (iv): Impact of commuting for those municipalities directly on the boundary

	All direct boundary municipalities					Small/Medium Towns					Villages				
	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017
Intercept	15.961	5.350 ***	0.682	-21.734 *	0.825	5.216	0.400	2.010 .	-11.472	0.113	65.326	5.004 *	0.016	-14.577	1.288
	(32.037)	(1.149)	(0.757)	(8.583)	(0.992)	(40.952)	(1.389)	(1.114)	(15.409)	(1.178)	(51.161)	(2.160)	(1.137)	(12.831)	(1.694)
Region	0.216	-0.180	0.191	-0.214	-0.329 *	0.641 .	-0.092	-0.063	0.147	0.033	-0.145	-0.021	0.557 *	-0.478	-0.682 **
	(0.359)	(0.165)	(0.146)	(0.234)	(0.130)	(0.356)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.255)	(0.132)	(0.602)	(0.328)	(0.248)	(0.407)	(0.233)
ORP	0.518 **	0.612 ***	0.746 ***	-0.820 ***	-0.760 ***	0.379 *	0.917 ***	0.921 ***	-0.917 ***	-0.974 ***	0.624 *	0.309	0.507 **	-0.807 *	-0.473 *
	(0.175)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.171)	(0.112)	(0.177)	(0.112)	(0.109)	(0.178)	(0.105)	(0.279)	(0.214)	(0.192)	(0.318)	(0.215)
Pop. Density	0.024	0.019	-0.019	-0.172	-0.014	0.814 .	0.063 ***	0.006	-0.047	0.002	-0.389	0.128	-0.049	-0.910	-0.093
	(0.317)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.210)	(0.011)	(0.462)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.293)	(0.016)	(3.373)	(0.160)	(0.123)	(2.116)	(0.113)
Mean Age	-0.136	-0.023 **	0.009	0.344 ***	0.005	0.559 .	0.004	-0.001	0.243 .	0.002	-0.426 .	-0.019	0.005	0.302 .	0.003
	(0.167)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.099)	(0.005)	(0.293)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.143)	(0.007)	(0.231)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.162)	(0.009)
Male Share	0.413 **	-0.017 *	-0.008	0.074	0.002	-0.503 .	-0.005	-0.010	0.104	0.003	0.006	-0.015	-0.008	0.013	0.000
	(0.156)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.091)	(0.005)	(0.298)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.189)	(0.010)	(0.224)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.132)	(0.007)
Employed	-0.164	-0.005	0.004	0.052	0.004	0.129	0.018 *	0.011 .	0.124	0.011 *	-0.223	0.001	0.000	-0.003	0.001
	(0.101)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.055)	(0.003)	(0.176)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.090)	(0.005)	(0.140)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.081)	(0.004)
Employees	0.093	-0.000	-0.004 .	0.005	-0.006 **	-0.110	-0.002	-0.005	-0.047	-0.005 .	0.068	-0.002	-0.001	0.011	-0.004
	(0.058)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.092)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.052)	(0.003)	(0.084)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.051)	(0.003)
Unemployed	-0.094	-0.013 *	0.002	-0.046	0.004	0.129	0.013 .	0.000	-0.070	0.002	-0.063	-0.012	-0.006	-0.049	-0.000
	(0.130)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.104)	(0.006)	(0.181)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.159)	(0.008)	(0.188)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.185)	(0.010)
Graduates	0.494	0.016	0.013 .	0.209 .	0.014 *	0.069	0.017	-0.017	-0.158	-0.012	0.887 .	0.030	0.026 *	0.374 *	0.023 *
	(0.338)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.115)	(0.006)	(0.446)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.173)	(0.009)	(0.506)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.174)	(0.009)
Below Secondary	-0.264 **	-0.011 **	-0.011 ***	-0.064	-0.011 ***	-0.099	-0.003	-0.012 *	-0.138 .	-0.013 ***	-0.209	-0.008	-0.011 **	-0.043	-0.011 **
	(0.100)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.045)	(0.002)	(0.143)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.071)	(0.004)	(0.137)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.066)	(0.004)
Czech-Moravian	0.015	-0.001	0.002	0.040	0.002	-0.015	-0.004	-0.001	0.020	-0.000	0.022	0.003	0.004	0.042	0.004
	(0.061)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.039)	(0.002)	(0.061)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.103)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.071)	(0.004)
Catholics	0.082 **	0.008 ***	0.004 ***	0.020	0.002 **	0.090 **	0.006 ***	0.002 .	-0.003	0.001	0.104 *	0.009 ***	0.007 ***	0.043	0.004 *
	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.048)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.029)	(0.002)
Sudeten	1.334	-0.010	0.080	0.693	0.101 *	1.968	0.007	-0.013	-0.078	0.013	1.814	-0.082	0.094	0.844	0.114
	(1.372)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.794)	(0.043)	(1.272)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.757)	(0.040)	(2.552)	(0.119)	(0.095)	(1.605)	(0.087)
Commuters	-0.352	-0.024 *	-0.020 **	-0.264 *	-0.016 **	-0.183	-0.029 *	-0.010	-0.052	-0.006	-0.404	-0.026	-0.041 **	-0.591 **	-0.032 **
	(0.283)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.109)	(0.006)	(0.341)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.104)	(0.005)	(0.408)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.212)	(0.012)
n	285	285	285	285	285	134	134	134	134	134	133	133	133	133	133
R^2	0.364	0.654	0.548	0.336	0.560	0.566	0.847	0.714	0.438	0.724	0.326	0.530	0.565	0.373	0.550
Adjusted R^2	0.331	0.636	0.525	0.301	0.538	0.515	0.829	0.680	0.372	0.691	0.246	0.474	0.514	0.298	0.496

Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence denoted by symbols: *** 99.9%; ** 99%,; * 95%; . 90%. Negative values of the dependent variables SPD 2017 and AMS 2017 are used to make comparison of direction of attitudes easier.

recent years, whereas it was not a significant influence in Small/Medium towns on the boundary in 2017. The reverse is true of attitudes in earlier years. This implies that the relationship between cross-border commuters and attitudes to the EU and migrants is not universal in all boundary municipalities. The negative effect on attitudes from high levels of cross-border commuting can be observed at the level of ORPs relative to the country and within the group of municipalities that lie on the boundary, especially villages. This confirms the unexpected result that this form of transnationalism seems to be a significant effect but in the opposite direction to that expected.

Additional observations from including the identity of the neighbour across the boundary

Regression results for relationship (v) are shown in Table 10. Including the identity of the neighbour across the border adds additional explanatory power to the regression results. At the level of ORPs, identifying neighbours raises R^2 by up to 0.03 compared to considering all borders as one while having a more muted, but still positive, impact on R^2 at the level of municipalities.

At the ORP level, the relationships are very similar to previous regressions with cross-border commuting still significantly related to higher levels of Euroscepticism, anti-migrant sentiment and support for the SPD, but not lower support for EU accession. The co-efficient for the relationship has also increased, especially in the case of SPD support such that a four percentage point increase in cross-border commuters in this case translates to a 1.6% increase in SPD support.

Lower support for EU accession related to presence directly on the boundary is more specifically identified as being linked to the Austrian and West German boundaries (with implied support lower by five percentage points or more) as well as, with lower confidence and lower impact, East Germany (two percentage points lower). These are very large effects equivalent to almost sixty percentage points difference in the share of Catholics or thirty percentage points difference in the share of low educational attainment – both of these required differences represent almost the full range for those variables. ORPs exposed to the West German boundary were also significantly more Eurosceptic in 2002, a boundary effect not identified for boundaries as a whole. Meanwhile, ORPs along the East German and, with lower confidence, Slovakian boundary were less Eurosceptic than the country as a whole by 2017 and the East German boundary was also less anti-migrant in 2017 – none of these

Table 10: Regression results for Relationship (v): Impact of commuting and of being directly on the boundary by neighbour

	ORP					Small/Medium Towns					Villages				
	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017
Intercept	83.440 **	6.673 ***	2.495 *	-14.007	-1.074	16.971 *	3.860 ***	0.967 **	-7.686 *	-0.486 .	17.558 .	3.369 ***	0.891 ***	-12.000 ***	-1.075 ***
	(25.048)	(1.455)	(1.104)	(13.616)	(1.059)	(7.862)	(0.402)	(0.294)	(3.450)	(0.265)	(9.649)	(0.377)	(0.259)	(3.123)	(0.299)
Region	0.484 ***	0.185 .	0.617 ***	-0.898 ***	-0.703 ***	0.122	-0.146 **	0.230 ***	-0.257 ***	-0.247 ***	0.059	-0.241 ***	0.071	-0.183 *	-0.174 ***
	(0.113)	(0.096)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.105)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.042)
ORP						0.669 ***	0.653 ***	0.638 ***	-0.752 ***	-0.650 ***	0.869 ***	0.700 ***	0.673 ***	-0.808 ***	-0.684 ***
						(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.031)
Pop. Density	-0.049	-0.001	-0.006	-0.130 *	-0.006	0.087	0.002	-0.004 .	-0.074 *	-0.005 **	0.806 **	0.006	-0.005	-0.243	-0.010
	(0.071)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.054)	(0.004)	(0.058)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.306)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.168)	(0.009)
Mean Age	0.167	-0.008	0.003	0.216 .	0.005	0.172 **	-0.005 .	-0.003	0.146 ***	-0.001	0.026	-0.004 *	-0.003	0.194 ***	-0.003 *
	(0.178)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.117)	(0.008)	(0.056)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.044)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)
Male Share	-0.792 *	0.000	0.015	0.418 *	0.009	-0.219 ***	-0.005	-0.002	0.003	-0.001	-0.083 *	0.000	0.001	-0.009	0.001
	(0.400)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.200)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.040)	(0.002)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.001)
Employed	0.312 **	-0.012 .	0.000	-0.022	0.003	0.132 ***	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.033	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003	0.000
	(0.118)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.080)	(0.006)	(0.036)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)
Employees	-0.031	-0.000	-0.013 ***	-0.072 .	-0.015 ***	-0.012	-0.000	-0.002 *	0.014	-0.003 ***	-0.034 .	-0.001	-0.001 .	0.016	-0.002 ***
	(0.064)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
Unemployed	0.384 **	-0.025 ***	-0.021 **	-0.119	-0.016 *	0.153 **	-0.008 ***	-0.010 ***	-0.075 .	-0.007 **	-0.059	-0.011 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.009	-0.006 **
	(0.116)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.087)	(0.006)	(0.047)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.037)	(0.002)
Graduates						0.121 .	-0.013 ***	0.001	0.043	0.003 .	0.010	-0.001	0.008 ***	0.123 ***	0.010 ***
						(0.069)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.071)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.002)
Below Secondary	-0.171 ***	-0.011 ***	-0.015 ***	-0.200 ***	-0.016 ***	-0.087 **	-0.011 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.085 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.184 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.073 ***	-0.007 ***
	(0.044)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)
Czech-Moravian	-0.182 ***	-0.011 ***	0.000	0.005	0.002	-0.005	-0.005 ***	0.004 ***	0.047 ***	0.004 ***	0.051	0.001	0.007 ***	0.061 **	0.006 ***
	(0.050)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.039)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.001)
Catholics	0.087 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.041 ***	0.003 ***	0.050 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.028 ***	0.003 ***	0.038 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.026 ***	0.003 ***
	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)
Sudeten	-0.038	-0.035	0.053 .	0.901 *	0.081 **	-0.089	-0.018	0.051 ***	0.726 ***	0.047 ***	0.583	-0.074 ***	0.018	0.288	0.027 *
	(0.508)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.378)	(0.027)	(0.255)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.153)	(0.009)	(0.365)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.220)	(0.012)
Austria - Direct	-4.950 *	-0.139	-0.198	0.332	-0.141	-1.825 *	-0.037	-0.089 **	-0.557	-0.077 *	0.183	-0.015	-0.074	-0.634	-0.059
	(2.084)	(0.120)	(0.138)	(1.736)	(0.124)	(0.760)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.483)	(0.030)	(1.507)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.918)	(0.049)
West Germany - Direct	-5.324 **	-0.210 *	-0.103	0.998	-0.083	-1.505	-0.162 **	0.005	0.663	0.025	2.671 .	-0.048	0.013	-0.909	0.024
	(1.705)	(0.097)	(0.106)	(1.341)	(0.096)	(1.212)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.734)	(0.046)	(1.612)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.972)	(0.052)
East Germany - Direct	-1.961 .	0.020	0.150 *	1.076	0.129 .	0.480	-0.003	0.101 **	0.803 .	0.075 **	-0.641	-0.067	0.044	-0.409	0.088 .
	(1.146)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.939)	(0.067)	(0.737)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.439)	(0.027)	(1.454)	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.882)	(0.047)
Poland - Direct	-1.457	0.046	0.038	-0.502	-0.001	0.674	0.022	0.008	-0.024	0.006	1.616	-0.047	0.126 ***	1.210 *	0.116 ***
	(0.919)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.708)	(0.050)	(0.552)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.328)	(0.020)	(1.003)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.609)	(0.033)
Slovakia - Direct	2.508	0.186	0.286 .	1.498	0.155	-0.444	-0.047	-0.023	0.018	-0.013	1.223	-0.057	0.012	-0.519	0.004
	(2.303)	(0.131)	(0.146)	(1.841)	(0.132)	(0.727)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.435)	(0.027)	(1.784)	(0.078)	(0.064)	(1.080)	(0.058)
Commuters	-0.240	-0.063 ***	-0.031 *	-0.418 *	-0.031 *	0.291 .	-0.025 ***	-0.004	-0.029	-0.001	0.120	-0.014 *	0.002	0.089	0.005
	(0.310)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.184)	(0.013)	(0.149)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.065)	(0.004)	(0.126)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.059)	(0.003)
n	206	206	206	206	206	1,904	1,904	1,909	1,909	1,909	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850
R^2	0.628	0.763	0.712	0.682	0.774	0.404	0.641	0.660	0.548	0.743	0.142	0.450	0.412	0.232	0.413
Adjusted R^2	0.594	0.741	0.686	0.653	0.753	0.398	0.637	0.657	0.543	0.740	0.137	0.447	0.410	0.228	0.410

Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence denoted by symbols: *** 99.9%; ** 99%,; * 95%; . 90%. Negative values of the dependent variables SPD 2017 and AMS 2017 are used to make comparison of direction of attitudes easier.

effects were identified when considering all boundary ORPs as one. By contrast, there is no discernible relationship between boundaries and support for the SPD at the level of ORPs.

For Small/Medium Towns the effect of cross-border commuters is still seen in higher Euroscepticism in 2002, but no longer in 2017. The identity of the neighbour is also insightful. Municipalities directly on the Austrian boundary were significantly more Eurosceptic and anti-migrant, but not in favour of the SPD, compared to their ORP and the country both in the EU referendum and in the 2017 election – these municipalities were even less in favour of EU accession than their already Eurosceptic ORPs. Along the West German boundary, a significantly higher level of Euroscepticism in 2002 has become neutral in recent years. Moreover, municipalities along the East German boundary have moved from being in line with the country in 2002 and 2003 to being significantly less Eurosceptic and less anti-migrant than even their ORPs by 2017 and also, with lower confidence, less in favour of the SPD. Along the Slovak and Polish boundaries, municipalities of this size were not significantly different from the country or their ORPs in their attitudes to the EU or migrants.

At the level of Villages, a similar picture with slightly changed actors can be seen. Once again, a higher share of cross-border commuters was significantly linked to higher Euroscepticism in 2002, but not in other cases. Village sized municipalities along the East German boundary were not significantly different in attitudes, except for being less anti-migrant in 2017. However, Polish village sized municipalities went from being not significantly different in 2002/2003 to being significantly less Eurosceptic, less anti-migrant and less in favour of the SPD compared to the country and their ORP by 2017. Villages along the Austrian, West German and Slovak boundaries were not significantly different in their attitudes based on these results, although West German villages were more pro-EU accession.

Given the preponderance of cross-border commuting, especially along the Austrian and West German boundaries, a clear link between the variables for identity of the neighbour and commuting raises questions of causality. Removing the Commuters variable from this regression (see Table 19 in Appendix 4) results in consistently negative sentiment towards the EU and migrants along the Austrian (for ORPs and Small/Medium Towns) boundary. However, evidence of improving sentiment along the East German and Polish boundaries can also be seen. This raises a question of causality as to whether this sentiment is the result of economic disparities that are made evident by commuting or the historical nature of these boundaries (rooted in the Cold War or the identity of the former imperial rulers) – both of

these are discussed in more detail later – or whether it is truly the experience of commuting that drives different attitudes along the borders. The regressions including both variables suggest that cross-border commuting is the more powerful factor, but it may be that the direction of causality is irrelevant as the implications are the same. If commuting causes the negative sentiment, the implication is clear. However, even if the identity of the neighbour causes the sentiment that appears related to commuting, then it seems that high levels of commuting have not been able to change that sentiment over time, at least in the case of the Austrian boundary, implying that cross-border interactions are not the panacea transnational solution some would suggest to improving sentiment towards outsiders.

Insights from the results

Taken together the regression results provide conclusions both on the hypotheses presented and also on the changing attitudes of Czechs living along the boundaries of the country.

The first two hypotheses, reflecting the realist securitisation and liberal openness paradigms and their theoretical expectations of attitudes among border-dwellers are not supported by the regression results. The third hypothesis, based on considering bordering as a process, is supported by the results – those living along the boundary are indeed impacted by complex and highly contextual influences which construct the border. Clearly, the very nature of this theoretical approach makes the hypothesis harder to disprove since it is necessarily broader and less specific in its predictions of what to expect in terms of the attitudes of border dwellers. However, allowing such a rich and contextual approach also allows a more nuanced understanding of what forms attitudes along the boundary and a fuller interpretation of the insights from the models above.

The key insights, in general, are that in areas with a higher share of Catholics levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment are lower. The reverse is true of areas with high proportions of the population either unemployed or with relatively low educational attainment. These are important control variables because of concentrations of Catholics along some boundaries in the south east and the potential for boundary areas to be economically peripheral with both lower educational attainment and higher unemployment – all factors that need to be understood to identify the effect of the boundary itself.

The impact of the boundary is complex, changing and highly contextual. In general, ORPs with exposure to the boundary, either in spatial terms but in particular through a higher share of cross-border commuting associated with it, are associated with higher levels of

Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment including lower support for EU accession and higher support for the SPD. This broad conclusion, however, disguises some more detailed insights about the dynamics of the relationship depending on the identity of the different neighbours. These do not simply reflect each country in turn, but also highlight that over time, with the exception of Austria, most boundaries have experienced reduced levels of Euroscepticism and falling negative sentiment towards outsiders compared to the country as a whole. Equally, low levels of support for EU accession in 2003 along the boundary have not translated into high support for the anti-EU and anti-migrant messages of the SPD in 2017. At the margin, therefore, there is evidence that, in spite of being on the front line of the migrant crisis, the boundaries are becoming, relatively, more open to outsiders rather than more fearful of them – the "boundary effect" identified by Kuhn is present in the Czech Republic too.[103]

The exception to this is Austria. Along this border negative attitudes towards outsiders in the guise of migrants or the EU is identifiable in a consistent way in both the earlier and more recent periods considered, even if at times this relationship is mediated through the variable of higher levels of cross-border commuting. This relationship is clear at two levels – first, ORPs along the Austrian boundary are more negatively disposed to outsiders and, second, towns within those ORPs that are on the boundary are more negative than the ORPs themselves. A number of theories could be advanced as to the reason for this relationship based on historical context – the Austrian border was one of the two highly fortified Cold War boundaries and is also inextricably linked with the identity of the former Habsburg rulers. Moreover, those beyond the boundary are ethnically German, raising a question of whether that element of history remains important. In multiple ways, therefore, it is on the front line of historical divides, exaggerating differences between the two sides of the line through securitisation or historical memory.

The West German border was also a closed Cold War boundary and the other side is also populated by ethnic Germans. It too was associated with higher levels of Euroscepticism at the time of the EU referendum. However, in recent years, attitudes have become more neutral suggesting that, in spite of the troubled history in this regard, having German speakers beyond the border is no longer necessarily linked to greater concern about outsiders, if this even were the case previously.

[103] Kuhn, "Europa ante portas," 94-117.

Along the East German boundary, the population were opposed to EU accession in 2003, albeit less strongly than for other boundaries with German speaking neighbours. Since then they have become less Eurosceptic and less anti-migrant both at ORP and municipality level compared to the country as a whole. Unlike the other boundaries with German speakers on the other side, this boundary was, in the Cold War, shared with another Eastern Bloc country rather than being a securitised military boundary. This reinforces the observations about having German speaking neighbours becoming less important and highlights a potential pattern that the non-Cold war boundaries had weaker negative sentiment in 2003 towards outsiders than that seen along formerly Cold War boundaries. In this context it is valuable to recall that the starting point of 2002/2003 was less than fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

This latter insight is supported by the pattern observed along the Polish boundary. While it is seen at the level of Villages rather than Small/Medium towns, Polish boundary municipalities have mirrored what is seen along the East German boundary – although starting from relative neutrality in the earlier period they now have lower levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment than elsewhere in the country, including significantly lower support for the SPD.

The development of attitudes to outsiders in municipalities along the Slovakian boundary is the least dynamic. There is no significant impact from the boundary on any, except one, measure of Euroscepticism or anti-migrant sentiment, regardless of time period or underlying geographical unit used. The border's history, until recently, as an intra-regional boundary within Czechoslovakia may oversimplify the context, but it is perhaps interesting that the newest international boundary in the Czech Republic is also the least influenced by boundary dynamics. This conclusion should not be confused with the suggestion that those living along the Slovakian border are no different to the country as a whole, after all Slovakian boundary municipalities voted more strongly for EU accession than almost anywhere else in the country. Rather the clear difference in attitudes is explainable in terms of demographic factors – this boundary has a very high share of Catholics, one of the strongest "control" variables in the analysis and linked to lower levels of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment – as opposed to the existence of a boundary.

It is important to extend this insight about the Slovakian border to all the preceding discussion. When describing those living along certain boundaries as, say, neutral in terms of Euroscepticism and anti-migrant sentiment, that is not to say they are not more or less negative towards outsiders, but rather that to the extent that this is the case, it is a reflection

of other demographic factors, for example religion, unemployment or low educational attainment, not the boundary itself. These demographic factors may in turn be related to the boundary in terms of economic peripherality, but in this analysis these accumulated consequences of the boundary are being excluded in favour of isolating and understanding the specific impact of proximity to outsiders that comes with living on the boundary.

Finally, the analysis also shows up another historical and boundary-related observation – while not on the boundary with other countries, there is evidence of a phantom boundary between the country as a whole and the Sudeten region. This region, like other boundary areas, shows signs of moving from being more Eurosceptic than the country as a whole to being less so and also less anti-migrant and less in favour of the SPD.

Analytical challenges and areas for additional research

At this point, it is worth highlighting some of the challenges faced by the analysis, the extent to which they might contest the conclusions and areas for further investigation.

The first relates to the measure for cross-border commuting. This is challenged as it relies for the later period on census data from 2011 and, as highlighted earlier, there have been very large regional changes in this metric since the borders opened for Czechs to work in Austria and Germany from 2011. Integrating 2021 census data for this variable will be very valuable, especially as it will help to validate or refute the unexpected relationship between cross-border commuting and Euroscepticism and anti-migration attitudes identified in these results.

Linked to this is the potential to identify other measures for transnational behaviour beyond just cross-border commuting. By its very nature, cross-border commuting is highly linked to proximity to the boundary and while it may distinguish internationally well-connected municipalities from more isolated ones it is also potentially linked to unequal cross-boundary economic relationships. If cross-border work reflects and highlights differentials in earnings or economic success across the boundary, it could demonstrate and reinforce differences in a way that more discretionary interactions such as socialising would not. The potential for this sort of effect was identified by Newman who notes the possibility that interaction with groups with a higher socio-economic status, in some cases, "strengthens the notion of border as barrier" and gives rise to the "feeling of constituting the inferior other" which reinforces difference rather than promoting assimilation.[104] Since the boundary areas most negatively

[104] Newman, "The lines that continue to separate us," 151.

disposed to outsiders are also those with relatively wealthy neighbours, attitudes may reflect underlying resentment or even jealousy that an arbitrary line can make such a difference in terms of economic wellbeing. Additional metrics on transnational behaviour would be helpful to add to the more circumstantial evidence highlighted in chapter 2 about positive attitudes to the EU among those who regularly cross the border, for example, to go shopping.

The dependent variables used include three constructed indices that are not pure measures of the underlying metric they aim to represent. As such, over-reliance on these three metrics may raise questions over the validity of the conclusions to be drawn. While the results for these variables are important in building a fuller picture of changes in attitudes, they do not obviously conflict with the conclusions that could be drawn from using just the purer measures of support for EU accession in 2003 and the SPD in 2017. To reinforce the fact that the conclusions do not over-rely on these indices it is possible to narrowly summarise the findings as border regions were broadly less inclined than the country as a whole to support EU accession in 2003, yet by 2017 they were not more likely to support the SPD and if anything inclined to be less supportive of the anti-EU, anti-migrant messages they were offered. While support for the SPD was identifiable through the effect of cross-border commuting, it is notable that removing this variable did not result in neighbour identities becoming significant variables as was the case for all other measures of sentiment. This is to grossly simplify, however it is broadly in line with the more detailed insights drawn above. The results also conflict with the headline measures, as shown in chapter 2, which suggest a simple message that border areas were both less inclined to EU accession (except Slovakia) and more inclined to the SPD. This apparent contradiction between headline observations and the conclusions drawn only serves to highlight the value of this more detailed and nuanced approach.

The final challenge is linked to the relatively small increase in explanatory value from including the boundary and commuter-related variables. However, with few exceptions, all the individual independent variables have limited impact on R^2 when added or excluded. To put this into context, including all the boundary and commuting variables is almost equivalent to including the highly significant variable for the share of Catholics. While these independent variables do not, individually, radically change the overall explanatory power, in combination they are significant and add to the overall understanding of the relationship between the boundary and attitudes to outsiders.

Conclusions

In the forming of attitudes of the Czech population towards outsiders, boundaries matter. However, the way they matter is neither as the location of consistent fear of what lies beyond nor as a place where all interactions generate positive feelings. Their impact is more complicated than either of these approaches and this complexity is unravelled only through detailed analysis. The analysis demonstrates that an initial observation that almost all boundary areas were less favourable to EU accession and all were more in favour of the SPD is too simplistic since, in many cases, this is the result of other demographic factors such as education, religion or employment status and not the presence of the boundary. The analysis also demonstrates that transnational behaviour, in this case cross-border commuting, far from being a powerful force to reduce negative attitudes towards outsiders actually serves to reinforce negative views towards the EU and migrants. Moreover, areas with a higher share of "foreign" ethnicities have become relatively more Eurosceptic and anti-migrant implying that experience of outsiders has not improved attitudes towards them. However, at the same time, proximity to the boundary is seen as a driver of increasingly favourable attitudes to outsiders, compared to the rest of the country, in all border regions except those neighbouring Austria, suggesting that, with open borders, proximity alone is enough to improve attitudes, almost by osmosis.

That this has happened in the face of the 2015 migrant crisis and intense securitisation rhetoric from political parties highlights the challenge in turning border dwellers into a front-line of "frontiersmen" with negative attitudes towards outsiders, even if that happened to be a goal. It may be that along the boundary daily experience of outsiders is more real and therefore attitudes are less volatile than national opinion as a whole. This seems to be good news for proponents of liberal openness and those who seek to promote more positive attitudes towards outsiders. However, the attitudes of border dwellers are measured relative to the country in general. Therefore, while border dwellers have become more positively disposed to outsiders relative to the country, the size of this difference (0.1-0.2 index points less negative than the country) is small relative to the scale of the shift in sentiment of the country as a whole (0.8-2.2 index points over the fifteen years depending on Index). Even boundary areas are still more negatively disposed to outsiders than was the case in 2002, just less so than their compatriots.

The most powerful observation is that attitudes towards outsiders are the result of a complex array of historical, economic and demographic factors – attitudes differ at different times and in different places for understandable reasons. The "geopolitics of memory" identified by Kolossov and Scott[105] weighs heavily on boundary areas with history still seeming to be important. Previously Cold War boundaries (and those with German speaking neighbours) were more Eurosceptic than the country as a whole in 2003 and this remained the case for the Austrian boundary in 2017. Even if having German speaking neighbours did affect attitudes, however, it seems no longer to be the case. The former Eastern Bloc boundaries had become, at different levels, less Eurosceptic and less anti-migrant than the rest of the country by 2017 having been more Eurosceptic in 2003 in the case of East Germany and neutral in the case of Poland. It is not only current boundaries that have seen attitudes change – those living beyond the "phantom" Sudeten boundary have also become less negative than the country as a whole. The boundary region with the least "international" history, bordering Slovakia, experienced the least impact on attitudes from the presence of the boundary.

Economic factors also have a part to play – cross-border commuting is, at least partially, related to economic opportunity and the boundaries where there is the greatest economic disparity between the two sides of the line, with Austria and "West" Germany, are also those with greatest cross-border commuting. It is conceivable that the link between cross-border commuting and negative attitudes to outsiders could be reflecting resentment at economic disparities, created by an arbitrary line of sovereignty which appears to favour those beyond the boundary, as much as it results from the experience of interacting with those who live there. Demographic factors, in part linked to economics, are also important – especially relating to religion, education and unemployment. To the extent that many border areas are economically and socially peripheral, with higher unemployment and lower educational attainment, they may be more Eurosceptic and anti-migrant than the country as a whole but this is the result of decades of accumulated peripheralization rather than the fact they lie on a boundary right now. Attitudes seen in these more peripheral places are no different to similarly challenged places that are distant from the boundary.

The geopolitical implications of these results, if the Czech Republic is a representative case, are that, with open borders, the attitudes of border dwellers towards outsiders generally improve over time. This echoes the Eurobarometer data in Chapter 2, which seems to show

[105] Kolossov and Scott, "Selected conceptual issues in border studies," 10.

that experiencing the benefits of open Schengen borders is a strong driver of recognition of their advantages. If the goal is to promote positive attitudes towards outsiders, encouraging cross-border commuting alone seems to be counter-productive. If the economic resentment thesis is the case, aiming to even up economic differences across the line may be a more pertinent approach, even if this reduces the need for cross-border commuting. Patience also seems to be important since historical memories remain important drivers of attitudes – the particular history along the Austrian boundary remains relevant. However, even the most traumatic memories can be overcome as seen in the case of those living beyond the phantom Sudeten border who have moved from being neutral or Eurosceptic in 2003 to being relatively positive towards the EU and migrants by 2017.

Boundaries do influence the attitudes of those living next to them, but in a complex way reflecting history, economics and experience of the neighbour. Over time, against the backdrop of increasingly negative attitudes in the country as a whole, those living along the open Czech borders have become less negative in comparison to their compatriots. In the case of the Czech Republic the history of its borders is particularly challenging – yet time, it seems, does indeed have a healing effect even in relation to the most troubling experiences along the boundaries, both phantom and real.

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List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Definition and Sources of Data Used

The regression analyses are performed using a bespoke database constructed from multiple sources. The database encompasses 6,388 municipalities for which electoral data was available at the 2017 election. Due to lack of data for the municipalities that were constituent parts of the larger cities, 85 of these municipalities were amalgamated into seven city level units for Brno, Liberec, Opava, Ostrava, Pardubice, Plzeň and Ústí nad Labem. Data was largely available for Prague municipalities so they were used individually – the two exceptions were cross-border commuter data for 2001 and unemployment data for 2017 which were only available at the level of the city so these aggregate figures were used for all Prague municipalities. Eight municipalities that had electoral data for 2017 had no Census data for 2011 so were excluded from all the regression analyses and a further five lacked electoral data for 2002 and 2003 so were excluded from regressions for the earlier period. As a result of using municipalities as they existed in 2017 as the base, a small number of municipalities that existed at the time of the 2002 and 2003 elections were excluded from the analysis but they represented in aggregate less than 10,000 people, 0.1% of the total population. Data for ORPs was constructed by calculating the sum (or in some cases weighted average) of the metric for the constituent municipalities in each ORP.

The principal source of data was the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO - czso.cz) from which municipality level data was downloaded directly for variables marked "Annual data" and "2011 Census" as well as for regional election results. Data for the 2001 census as well as municipality level election result were provided directly in the form of spreadsheets by CZSO. The 2017 unemployment data was extracted from the monthly data series available at czso.cz/csu/czso/uchazeci-o-zamestnani-dosazitelni-a-podil-nezamestnanych-osob-podle-obci_090417.

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey databases were used to evaluate attitudes of Czech political parties in relation to the EU and immigration policy and to construct indices of Euroscepticism and Anti-Migrant Sentiment – they are available at chesdata.eu.

Eurobarometer data was not used in the regression model database but was used extensively in describing attitudes of Czechs towards the EU, Schengen and immigration in Chapters 2 and 3 – this is available from a number of websites including: https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/home;

https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index; and europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/Eurobarometer.

The definitions of data series used in the regressions and their source are detailed in Table 11 below.

Table 11: Data definitions and sources

Name	Definition	Period	Source
YES 2003	Proportion of votes cast in the 2003 EU Referendum in favour of "Yes" to join the EU	2003	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
IES 2002	Index of Euroscepticism 2002 – average of Chapel Hill Expert Survey scores on party attitudes towards EU integration for 2002 weighted by share of votes received in the 2002 Election for the Chamber of Deputies	2002	Chapel Hill Expert Survey; Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
IES 2017	Index of Euroscepticism 2017 – average of Chapel Hill Expert Survey scores on party attitudes towards EU integration for 2017 weighted by share of votes received in the 2017 Election for the Chamber of Deputies	2017	Chapel Hill Expert Survey; Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
SPD 2017	Proportion of votes cast in the 2017 Election for the Chamber of Deputies in favour of the SPD party	2017	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
AMS 2017	Index of Anti-Migrant Sentiment 2017 – average of Chapel Hill Expert Survey scores on party attitudes towards immigration policy for 2017 weighted by share of votes received in the 2017 Election for the Chamber of Deputies	2017	Chapel Hill Expert Survey; Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Pop. Density 2003	Population per hectare in 2003 – calculated using population and geographic area data for each municipality	Annual data	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Pop. Density 2017	Population per hectare in 2017 – calculated using population and geographic area data for each municipality	Annual data	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Mean Age 2003	Average age of the population in 2003	Annual data	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Mean Age 2017	Average age of the population in 2017	Annual data	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Male Share 2003	Proportion of the population that was male in 2003	Annual data	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Male Share 2017	Proportion of the population that was male in 2017	Annual data	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Employed 2001	Proportion of the total population that was employed in 2001	2001 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Employed 2011	Proportion of the total population that was employed in 2011	2011 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Employees 2001	Proportion of total people employed that were employees in 2001	2001 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Employees 2011	Proportion of total people employed that were employees in 2011	2011 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)

Unemployed 2001	Number of people declaring themselves unemployed as a proportion of 15-64 year olds in 2001	2001 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Unemployed 2017	Unemployment rate for September 2017	Monthly data	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Graduates 2001	Proportion of the population 15 years old or over in 2001 with tertiary education	2001 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Graduates 2011	Proportion of the population 15 years old or over in 2011 with tertiary education	2011 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Below Secondary 2001	Proportion of the population 15 years old or over in 2001 with no formal education, primary or incomplete education or secondary education without general certificate of education	2001 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Below Secondary 2011	Proportion of the population 15 years old or over in 2011 with no formal education, primary or incomplete education or secondary education without general certificate of education	2011 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Czech-Moravian 2001	Proportion of the population declaring their ethnicity declaring either Czech or Moravian in 2001	2001 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Czech-Moravian 2011	Proportion of the population declaring their ethnicity declaring either Czech or Moravian in 2011, excluding joint ethnicity as this is not available at municipality level	2011 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Catholics 2001	Proportion of the population declaring their religion declaring Roman Catholic in 2001	2001 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Catholics 2011	Proportion of the population declaring their religion declaring Roman Catholic in 2011	2011 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Commuters 2001	Proportion of those employed that commuted to work abroad in 2001	2001 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Commuters 2011	Proportion of those employed that commuted to work abroad in 2011	2011 Census	Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)
Sudeten	Dummy variable (for municipalities) where 1 denotes presence in the Sudeten region Proportion of population (for ORPs) that live in the Sudeten region	-	Martin Šimon plus amendments - see Appendix 2.
Direct	Dummy variable (for municipalities) where 1 denotes presence directly on an international boundary Proportion of population (for ORPs) that live in a municipality directly on the boundary	-	Constructed – see Appendix 2.

Appendix 2: Construction of Sudeten and Direct Boundary Municipality Dummy Variables

The dummy variable series for presence in the Sudeten region is based largely on the data series provided by Martin Šimon as used in his analysis of phantom borders.[106] 255 of the 6,310 municipalities for which voting data is available in 2017 are not covered by Šimon's data series so these were individually inspected using maps and classified depending on the status of surrounding municipalities. Most were classified as either Sudeten (1) or non-Sudeten (0) but a small number of municipalities were given a score of 0.5 to reflect that they were on the boundary between Sudeten and non-Sudeten municipalities and in the absence of further information about their status this was the most logical approach to take.

Creation of the dummy variable series for presence on the boundary also involved inspection of maps to identify the municipalities that lie directly on the international boundary as well as the identity of the neighbouring country or, in some cases, countries.

In both cases, the Geoviewer function on geoportal.cuzk.cz, specifically the INSPIRE administrative units map, along with Google Maps, were used to identify and categorise municipalities based on their six digit identification number.

[106] Šimon, "Measuring Phantom Borders: The Case of Czech."

Appendix 3: Data Variability and Correlation Matrices

Table 12: Range of observed values for each variable by dataset

	ORP			Small/Medium Towns			Villages		
	Min	Max	Range	Min	Max	Range	Min	Max	Range
YES 2003	69.8	83.7	14.0	53.2	88.5	35.3	26.4	94.8	68.4
IES 2002	4.5	5.5	1.0	3.9	5.9	2.0	3.3	6.4	3.2
IES 2017	3.6	4.6	1.0	3.3	5.2	1.9	2.8	5.4	2.5
SPD 2017	5.7	20.0	14.3	2.4	26.7	24.3	0.0	41.1	41.1
AMS 2017	6.7	7.8	1.1	6.2	8.1	1.9	6.3	8.5	2.2
2001/2003									
Pop. Density	0.3	23.5	23.2	0.1	34.1	34.0	0.0	6.9	6.9
Mean Age	36.6	41.6	5.0	28.9	50.1	21.2	28.3	61.8	33.5
Male Share	47.4	50.1	2.7	39.6	58.9	19.2	28.5	68.6	40.1
Employed	39.0	52.1	13.2	31.8	58.7	26.9	18.2	74.5	56.3
Employees	74.1	88.7	14.6	60.3	93.1	32.8	28.9	97.9*	68.9
Unemployed	2.6	14.5	12.0	0.9	24.8	23.8	0.0	39.4	39.4
Graduates	2.5	18.8	16.3	0.5	28.6	28.1	0.0	36.2	36.2
Below Secondary	43.5	76.6	33.1	33.8	86.8	53.0	29.8	95.1	65.3
Czech-Moravian	71.4	99.3	27.9	54.6	100.0	45.4	53.7	100.0	46.3
Catholics	10.3	86.5	76.2	5.7	98.2	92.4	2.3	98.7	96.5
Commuters	0.1	3.1	3.0	0.0	8.2	8.2	0.0	15.6	15.6
2011/2017									
Pop. Density	0.3	26.1	25.8	0.1	33.9	33.7	0.0	7.0	7.0
Mean Age	37.3	44.7	7.5	31.7	47.8	16.1	32.7	59.8	27.1
Male Share	48.3	54.4	6.2	43.4	59.8	16.4	33.2	68.2	35.0
Employed	35.8	47.9	12.0	27.7	55.0	27.3	18.2	58.0	39.8
Employees	69.0	85.6	16.6	56.7	92.5	35.8	33.3	96.7	63.3
Unemployed	1.1	10.4	9.3	0.2	15.6	15.4	0.0	19.6	19.6
Graduates	3.9	23.6	19.7	1.4	35.0	33.6	0.0	32.4	32.4
Below Secondary	30.7	67.1	36.4	19.5	77.1	57.6	29.0	88.1	59.0
Czech-Moravian	70.1	98.7	28.5	55.8	99.6	43.8	58.7	100.0	41.3
Catholics	3.6	76.0	72.3	1.5	91.1	89.6	0.0	89.9	89.9
Commuters	0.2	4.2	4.0	0.0	13.0	13.0	0.0	14.8	14.8

Source: Bespoke Database. * Employee share for 2001 excludes one figure greater than 100 relating to a small municipality.

Table 13: Correlation matrix for ORP Data Set, 2001 and 2003 data

	Austria - Direct	Below Secondary	Catholics	Commuters	Czech-Moravian	East Germany - Direct	Employed	Employees	Graduates	Male Share	Mean Age	Poland-Direct	Pop. Density	Slovakia - Direct	Sudeten	Unemployed	West Germany - Direct
Austria- Direct	1.000	0.097	0.040	0.325	0.013	-0.033	0.012	0.003	-0.067	0.027	-0.109	-0.049	-0.062	0.088	0.102	0.055	-0.021
Below Secondary	0.097	1.000	0.140	0.089	-0.124	0.147	-0.360	0.333	-0.933	0.624	-0.415	0.073	-0.517	0.079	0.369	0.252	0.049
Catholics	0.040	0.140	1.000	0.168	0.176	-0.211	-0.359	0.137	-0.007	0.213	-0.043	-0.008	-0.115	0.307	-0.307	-0.111	-0.104
Commuters	0.325	0.089	0.168	1.000	-0.224	0.113	0.087	-0.058	-0.068	0.121	-0.186	0.019	-0.063	0.117	0.231	-0.038	0.258
Czech-Moravian	0.013	-0.124	0.176	-0.224	1.000	-0.271	0.291	-0.291	0.113	0.066	0.376	-0.551	-0.240	-0.111	-0.624	-0.464	-0.227
E. Germany - Direct	-0.033	0.147	-0.211	0.113	-0.271	1.000	0.002	-0.026	-0.195	-0.024	-0.163	-0.048	-0.005	-0.032	0.278	0.148	0.457
Employed	0.012	-0.360	-0.359	0.087	0.291	0.002	1.000	-0.509	0.248	-0.159	0.288	-0.273	-0.073	-0.210	-0.262	-0.759	0.146
Employees	0.003	0.333	0.137	-0.058	-0.291	-0.026	-0.509	1.000	-0.314	0.306	-0.359	0.269	0.004	0.055	0.323	0.415	-0.078
Graduates	-0.067	-0.933	-0.007	-0.068	0.113	-0.195	0.248	-0.314	1.000	-0.615	0.379	-0.057	0.626	-0.054	-0.337	-0.176	-0.093
Male Share	0.027	0.624	0.213	0.121	0.066	-0.024	-0.159	0.306	-0.615	1.000	-0.334	-0.051	-0.454	0.006	0.095	-0.017	-0.016
Mean Age	-0.109	-0.415	-0.043	-0.186	0.376	-0.163	0.288	-0.359	0.379	-0.334	1.000	-0.126	0.164	-0.121	-0.549	-0.439	-0.122
Poland - Direct	-0.049	0.073	-0.008	0.019	-0.551	-0.048	-0.273	0.269	-0.057	-0.051	-0.126	1.000	0.121	0.022	0.363	0.231	-0.032
Pop. Density	-0.062	-0.517	-0.115	-0.063	-0.240	-0.005	-0.073	0.004	0.626	-0.454	0.164	0.121	1.000	-0.011	0.035	0.203	-0.028
Slovakia - Direct	0.088	0.079	0.307	0.117	-0.111	-0.032	-0.210	0.055	-0.054	0.006	-0.121	0.022	-0.011	1.000	-0.062	0.114	-0.021
Sudeten	0.102	0.369	-0.307	0.231	-0.624	0.278	-0.262	0.323	-0.337	0.095	-0.549	0.363	0.035	-0.062	1.000	0.573	0.161
Unemployed	0.055	0.252	-0.111	-0.038	-0.464	0.148	-0.759	0.415	-0.176	-0.017	-0.439	0.231	0.203	0.114	0.573	1.000	-0.040
W. Germany - Direct	-0.021	0.049	-0.104	0.258	-0.227	0.457	0.146	-0.078	-0.093	-0.016	-0.122	-0.032	-0.028	-0.021	0.161	-0.040	1.000

Table 14: Correlation matrix for ORP Data Set, 2011 and 2017 data

	Austria - Direct	Below Secondary	Catholics	Commuters	Czech-Moravian	East Germany - Direct	Employed	Employees	Graduates	Male Share	Mean Age	Poland-Direct	Pop. Density	Slovakia - Direct	Sudeten	Unemployed	West Germany - Direct
Austria- Direct	1.000	0.116	0.028	0.394	-0.041	-0.033	0.028	-0.004	-0.061	-0.033	0.002	-0.049	-0.061	0.090	0.099	-0.030	-0.021
Below Secondary	0.116	1.000	0.157	0.203	-0.005	0.159	-0.586	0.272	-0.914	0.528	0.245	0.099	-0.539	0.075	0.408	0.189	0.060
Catholics	0.028	0.157	1.000	0.104	-0.148	-0.195	0.036	0.121	0.097	-0.028	0.179	-0.002	-0.099	0.352	-0.286	-0.128	-0.104
Commuters	0.394	0.203	0.104	1.000	-0.268	0.290	-0.117	-0.036	-0.184	0.087	0.005	-0.001	-0.056	0.100	0.326	0.009	0.349
Czech-Moravian	-0.041	-0.005	-0.148	-0.268	1.000	-0.163	0.221	-0.269	-0.090	0.166	0.135	-0.508	-0.335	-0.242	-0.470	-0.385	-0.189
E. Germany - Direct	-0.033	0.159	-0.195	0.290	-0.163	1.000	-0.345	-0.051	-0.236	0.077	-0.064	-0.048	-0.010	-0.032	0.279	0.089	0.453
Employed	0.028	-0.586	0.036	-0.117	0.221	-0.345	1.000	-0.154	0.556	-0.222	-0.365	-0.243	0.121	-0.087	-0.508	-0.554	-0.083
Employees	-0.004	0.272	0.121	-0.036	-0.269	-0.051	-0.154	1.000	-0.229	0.133	0.055	0.179	0.028	0.011	0.198	0.309	-0.085
Graduates	-0.061	-0.914	0.097	-0.184	-0.090	-0.236	0.556	-0.229	1.000	-0.552	-0.231	-0.055	0.583	-0.025	-0.400	-0.129	-0.143
Male Share	-0.033	0.528	-0.028	0.087	0.166	0.077	-0.222	0.133	-0.552	1.000	-0.037	-0.107	-0.336	-0.002	0.082	-0.035	0.037
Mean Age	0.002	0.245	0.179	0.005	0.135	-0.064	-0.365	0.055	-0.231	-0.037	1.000	0.093	-0.060	0.008	-0.075	0.039	-0.066
Poland - Direct	-0.049	0.099	-0.002	-0.001	-0.508	-0.048	-0.243	0.179	-0.055	-0.107	0.093	1.000	0.097	0.023	0.363	0.262	-0.032
Pop. Density	-0.061	-0.539	-0.099	-0.056	-0.335	-0.010	0.121	0.028	0.583	-0.336	-0.060	0.097	1.000	-0.015	0.006	0.252	-0.028
Slovakia - Direct	0.090	0.075	0.352	0.100	-0.242	-0.032	-0.087	0.011	-0.025	-0.002	0.008	0.023	-0.015	1.000	-0.062	0.039	-0.021
Sudeten	0.099	0.408	-0.286	0.326	-0.470	0.279	-0.508	0.198	-0.400	0.082	-0.075	0.363	0.006	-0.062	1.000	0.426	0.162
Unemployed	-0.030	0.189	-0.128	0.009	-0.385	0.089	-0.554	0.309	-0.129	-0.035	0.039	0.262	0.252	0.039	0.426	1.000	-0.114
W. Germany - Direct	-0.021	0.060	-0.104	0.349	-0.189	0.453	-0.083	-0.085	-0.143	0.037	-0.066	-0.032	-0.028	-0.021	0.162	-0.114	1.000

Table 15: Correlation matrix for Small/Medium Sized Towns Data Set, 2001 and 2003 data

	Austria - Direct	Below Secondary	Catholics	Commuters	Czech-Moravian	East Germany - Direct	Employed	Employees	Graduates	Male Share	Mean Age	Poland-Direct	Pop. Density	Slovakia - Direct	Sudeten	Unemployed	West Germany - Direct
Austria- Direct	1.000	0.093	-0.027	0.321	-0.082	-0.014	-0.052	0.053	-0.064	0.045	-0.094	-0.019	-0.059	0.023	0.180	0.157	-0.009
Below Secondary	0.093	1.000	0.169	0.021	-0.085	0.086	-0.442	0.351	-0.890	0.216	-0.171	0.063	-0.444	0.056	0.314	0.407	0.044
Catholics	-0.027	0.169	1.000	0.094	0.161	-0.119	-0.353	0.201	-0.115	-0.045	-0.022	0.014	-0.148	0.211	-0.206	-0.013	-0.063
Commuters	0.321	0.021	0.094	1.000	-0.188	0.032	0.013	0.004	-0.008	0.020	-0.110	0.028	-0.040	0.106	0.209	0.056	0.214
Czech-Moravian	-0.082	-0.085	0.161	-0.188	1.000	-0.206	0.154	-0.088	0.039	-0.069	0.205	-0.276	-0.065	-0.065	-0.500	-0.309	-0.126
E. Germany - Direct	-0.014	0.086	-0.119	0.032	-0.206	1.000	-0.019	0.020	-0.096	-0.007	-0.074	0.009	-0.003	-0.014	0.190	0.116	0.176
Employed	-0.052	-0.442	-0.353	0.013	0.154	-0.019	1.000	-0.318	0.379	-0.008	-0.010	-0.113	0.167	-0.127	-0.205	-0.651	0.051
Employees	0.053	0.351	0.201	0.004	-0.088	0.020	-0.318	1.000	-0.407	0.036	-0.106	0.065	-0.064	0.047	0.220	0.250	-0.009
Graduates	-0.064	-0.890	-0.115	-0.008	0.039	-0.096	0.379	-0.407	1.000	-0.192	0.122	-0.070	0.444	-0.057	-0.274	-0.342	-0.045
Male Share	0.045	0.216	-0.045	0.020	-0.069	-0.007	-0.008	0.036	-0.192	1.000	-0.214	0.007	-0.165	0.008	0.150	0.138	0.058
Mean Age	-0.094	-0.171	-0.022	-0.110	0.205	-0.074	-0.010	-0.106	0.122	-0.214	1.000	-0.064	0.018	-0.013	-0.321	-0.265	-0.079
Poland - Direct	-0.019	0.063	0.014	0.028	-0.276	0.009	-0.113	0.065	-0.070	0.007	-0.064	1.000	-0.035	0.009	0.227	0.118	-0.012
Pop. Density	-0.059	-0.444	-0.148	-0.040	-0.065	-0.003	0.167	-0.064	0.444	-0.165	0.018	-0.035	1.000	-0.043	-0.057	-0.063	-0.042
Slovakia - Direct	0.023	0.056	0.211	0.106	-0.065	-0.014	-0.127	0.047	-0.057	0.008	-0.013	0.009	-0.043	1.000	-0.046	0.084	-0.009
Sudeten	0.180	0.314	-0.206	0.209	-0.500	0.190	-0.205	0.220	-0.274	0.150	-0.321	0.227	-0.057	-0.046	1.000	0.478	0.115
Unemployed	0.157	0.407	-0.013	0.056	-0.309	0.116	-0.651	0.250	-0.342	0.138	-0.265	0.118	-0.063	0.084	0.478	1.000	-0.024
W. Germany - Direct	-0.009	0.044	-0.063	0.214	-0.126	0.176	0.051	-0.009	-0.045	0.058	-0.079	-0.012	-0.042	-0.009	0.115	-0.024	1.000

Table 16: Correlation matrix for Small/Medium Sized Towns Data Set, 2011 and 2017 data

	Austria - Direct	Below Secondary	Catholics	Commuters	Czech-Moravian	East Germany - Direct	Employed	Employees	Graduates	Male Share	Mean Age	Poland-Direct	Pop. Density	Slovakia - Direct	Sudeten	Unemployed	West Germany - Direct
Austria- Direct	1.000	0.107	-0.036	0.460	-0.073	-0.014	-0.112	0.013	-0.087	0.063	0.028	-0.019	-0.066	0.023	0.179	0.107	-0.009
Below Secondary	0.107	1.000	0.220	0.132	0.045	0.100	-0.531	0.430	-0.911	0.242	0.372	0.081	-0.511	0.060	0.352	0.345	0.044
Catholics	-0.036	0.220	1.000	0.077	-0.165	-0.106	-0.050	0.222	-0.075	-0.042	0.156	0.026	-0.157	0.223	-0.189	-0.023	-0.063
Commuters	0.460	0.132	0.077	1.000	-0.199	0.081	-0.130	0.030	-0.111	0.047	0.062	0.018	-0.077	0.078	0.270	0.115	0.263
Czech-Moravian	-0.073	0.045	-0.165	-0.199	1.000	-0.130	0.138	-0.023	-0.095	0.006	0.127	-0.220	-0.157	-0.147	-0.324	-0.180	-0.094
E. Germany - Direct	-0.014	0.100	-0.106	0.081	-0.130	1.000	-0.164	0.005	-0.116	0.022	0.019	0.009	-0.019	-0.014	0.189	0.061	0.176
Employed	-0.112	-0.531	-0.050	-0.130	0.138	-0.164	1.000	-0.156	0.508	-0.186	-0.374	-0.118	0.228	-0.100	-0.352	-0.495	-0.036
Employees	0.013	0.430	0.222	0.030	-0.023	0.005	-0.156	1.000	-0.434	0.023	0.213	0.012	-0.135	0.023	0.116	0.123	-0.001
Graduates	-0.087	-0.911	-0.075	-0.111	-0.095	-0.116	0.508	-0.434	1.000	-0.266	-0.390	-0.069	0.508	-0.048	-0.317	-0.300	-0.070
Male Share	0.063	0.242	-0.042	0.047	0.006	0.022	-0.186	0.023	-0.266	1.000	-0.048	0.012	-0.242	0.027	0.144	0.100	0.045
Mean Age	0.028	0.372	0.156	0.062	0.127	0.019	-0.374	0.213	-0.390	-0.048	1.000	0.059	-0.168	0.045	0.048	0.106	-0.012
Poland - Direct	-0.019	0.081	0.026	0.018	-0.220	0.009	-0.118	0.012	-0.069	0.012	0.059	1.000	-0.049	0.009	0.227	0.106	-0.012
Pop. Density	-0.066	-0.511	-0.157	-0.077	-0.157	-0.019	0.228	-0.135	0.508	-0.242	-0.168	-0.049	1.000	-0.051	-0.110	-0.057	-0.045
Slovakia - Direct	0.023	0.060	0.223	0.078	-0.147	-0.014	-0.100	0.023	-0.048	0.027	0.045	0.009	-0.051	1.000	-0.047	0.040	-0.009
Sudeten	0.179	0.352	-0.189	0.270	-0.324	0.189	-0.352	0.116	-0.317	0.144	0.048	0.227	-0.110	-0.047	1.000	0.310	0.115
Unemployed	0.107	0.345	-0.023	0.115	-0.180	0.061	-0.495	0.123	-0.300	0.100	0.106	0.106	-0.057	0.040	0.310	1.000	-0.054
W. Germany - Direct	-0.009	0.044	-0.063	0.263	-0.094	0.176	-0.036	-0.001	-0.070	0.045	-0.012	-0.012	-0.045	-0.009	0.115	-0.054	1.000

Table 17: Correlation matrix for Villages Data Set, 2001 and 2003 data

	Austria - Direct	Below Secondary	Catholics	Commuters	Czech-Moravian	East Germany - Direct	Employed	Employees	Graduates	Male Share	Mean Age	Poland-Direct	Pop. Density	Slovakia - Direct	Sudeten	Unemployed	West Germany - Direct
Austria- Direct	1.000	0.068	-0.031	0.052	-0.035	-0.006	-0.036	0.015	-0.045	0.013	-0.068	-0.009	-0.052	-0.005	0.146	0.099	0.042
Below Secondary	0.068	1.000	0.047	0.002	-0.103	-0.075	-0.375	0.191	-0.676	0.048	0.025	0.035	-0.250	0.064	0.244	0.333	-0.009
Catholics	-0.031	0.047	1.000	0.032	0.269	-0.096	-0.242	0.125	-0.037	-0.022	0.076	-0.045	-0.046	0.114	-0.303	-0.123	-0.070
Commuters	0.052	0.002	0.032	1.000	-0.163	0.042	0.018	-0.045	0.009	0.040	-0.049	0.022	-0.054	0.049	0.136	0.022	0.167
Czech-Moravian	-0.035	-0.103	0.269	-0.163	1.000	-0.209	0.055	0.089	0.071	-0.084	0.185	-0.200	0.072	-0.069	-0.518	-0.319	-0.169
E. Germany - Direct	-0.006	-0.075	-0.096	0.042	-0.209	1.000	-0.003	-0.122	0.019	0.056	0.004	-0.009	-0.065	-0.005	0.155	0.053	-0.006
Employed	-0.036	-0.375	-0.242	0.018	0.055	-0.003	1.000	-0.053	0.239	0.077	-0.153	-0.060	0.149	-0.099	-0.083	-0.511	0.049
Employees	0.015	0.191	0.125	-0.045	0.089	-0.122	-0.053	1.000	-0.177	-0.015	-0.016	-0.015	0.078	0.014	0.015	0.002	-0.066
Graduates	-0.045	-0.676	-0.037	0.009	0.071	0.019	0.239	-0.177	1.000	-0.008	0.024	-0.057	0.168	-0.032	-0.176	-0.234	-0.002
Male Share	0.013	0.048	-0.022	0.040	-0.084	0.056	0.077	-0.015	-0.008	1.000	-0.114	0.041	-0.059	0.012	0.127	0.074	0.056
Mean Age	-0.068	0.025	0.076	-0.049	0.185	0.004	-0.153	-0.016	0.024	-0.114	1.000	-0.076	-0.146	-0.011	-0.255	-0.153	-0.075
Poland - Direct	-0.009	0.035	-0.045	0.022	-0.200	-0.009	-0.060	-0.015	-0.057	0.041	-0.076	1.000	-0.049	0.027	0.209	0.107	-0.008
Pop. Density	-0.052	-0.250	-0.046	-0.054	0.072	-0.065	0.149	0.078	0.168	-0.059	-0.146	-0.049	1.000	-0.017	-0.112	-0.073	-0.074
Slovakia - Direct	-0.005	0.064	0.114	0.049	-0.069	-0.005	-0.099	0.014	-0.032	0.012	-0.011	0.027	-0.017	1.000	-0.014	0.101	-0.005
Sudeten	0.146	0.244	-0.303	0.136	-0.518	0.155	-0.083	0.015	-0.176	0.127	-0.255	0.209	-0.112	-0.014	1.000	0.400	0.139
Unemployed	0.099	0.333	-0.123	0.022	-0.319	0.053	-0.511	0.002	-0.234	0.074	-0.153	0.107	-0.073	0.101	0.400	1.000	0.033
W. Germany - Direct	0.042	-0.009	-0.070	0.167	-0.169	-0.006	0.049	-0.066	-0.002	0.056	-0.075	-0.008	-0.074	-0.005	0.139	0.033	1.000

Table 18: Correlation matrix for Villages Data Set, 2011 and 2017 data

	Austria - Direct	Below Secondary	Catholics	Commuters	Czech-Moravian	East Germany - Direct	Employed	Employees	Graduates	Male Share	Mean Age	Poland-Direct	Pop. Density	Slovakia - Direct	Sudeten	Unemployed	West Germany - Direct
Austria- Direct	1.000	0.067	-0.024	0.126	-0.059	-0.006	-0.060	-0.025	-0.049	0.010	-0.002	-0.009	-0.052	-0.005	0.146	0.033	0.042
Below Secondary	0.067	1.000	0.122	0.028	-0.036	-0.084	-0.396	0.220	-0.747	0.037	0.214	0.074	-0.332	0.054	0.229	0.258	-0.028
Catholics	-0.024	0.122	1.000	0.013	-0.072	-0.084	-0.100	0.170	0.009	-0.055	0.111	-0.030	-0.065	0.129	-0.279	0.006	-0.052
Commuters	0.126	0.028	0.013	1.000	-0.143	0.057	-0.020	-0.036	-0.024	0.027	-0.038	0.011	-0.043	0.056	0.199	0.007	0.142
Czech-Moravian	-0.059	-0.036	-0.072	-0.143	1.000	-0.130	0.168	0.065	0.020	-0.078	0.073	-0.146	-0.049	-0.146	-0.294	-0.204	-0.117
E. Germany - Direct	-0.006	-0.084	-0.084	0.057	-0.130	1.000	-0.083	-0.118	0.005	0.083	0.039	-0.009	-0.063	-0.005	0.155	0.025	-0.006
Employed	-0.060	-0.396	-0.100	-0.020	0.168	-0.083	1.000	0.009	0.347	-0.046	-0.241	-0.093	0.234	-0.069	-0.199	-0.329	0.002
Employees	-0.025	0.220	0.170	-0.036	0.065	-0.118	0.009	1.000	-0.180	-0.035	0.048	-0.077	0.036	-0.032	-0.059	0.018	-0.079
Graduates	-0.049	-0.747	0.009	-0.024	0.020	0.005	0.347	-0.180	1.000	-0.082	-0.160	-0.075	0.312	-0.031	-0.222	-0.205	-0.010
Male Share	0.010	0.037	-0.055	0.027	-0.078	0.083	-0.046	-0.035	-0.082	1.000	0.052	0.030	-0.101	0.019	0.129	0.013	0.037
Mean Age	-0.002	0.214	0.111	-0.038	0.073	0.039	-0.241	0.048	-0.160	0.052	1.000	0.004	-0.213	0.017	-0.079	0.030	-0.024
Poland - Direct	-0.009	0.074	-0.030	0.011	-0.146	-0.009	-0.093	-0.077	-0.075	0.030	0.004	1.000	-0.060	0.027	0.209	0.104	-0.008
Pop. Density	-0.052	-0.332	-0.065	-0.043	-0.049	-0.063	0.234	0.036	0.312	-0.101	-0.213	-0.060	1.000	-0.026	-0.133	-0.088	-0.072
Slovakia - Direct	-0.005	0.054	0.129	0.056	-0.146	-0.005	-0.069	-0.032	-0.031	0.019	0.017	0.027	-0.026	1.000	-0.014	0.056	-0.005
Sudeten	0.146	0.229	-0.279	0.199	-0.294	0.155	-0.199	-0.059	-0.222	0.129	-0.079	0.209	-0.133	-0.014	1.000	0.206	0.139
Unemployed	0.033	0.258	0.006	0.007	-0.204	0.025	-0.329	0.018	-0.205	0.013	0.030	0.104	-0.088	0.056	0.206	1.000	-0.029
W. Germany - Direct	0.042	-0.028	-0.052	0.142	-0.117	-0.006	0.002	-0.079	-0.010	0.037	-0.024	-0.008	-0.072	-0.005	0.139	-0.029	1.000

Appendix 4: Additional Regression Results

Table 19: Regression results for Relationship (v) excluding the Commuters variable

	ORP					Small/Medium Towns					Villages				
	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017	Yes 2003	IES 2002	IES 2017	SPD 2017	AMS 2017
Intercept	85.871 ***	6.712 ***	2.678 *	-10.819	-0.714	17.197 *	3.664 ***	0.949 **	-7.759 *	-0.487 .	17.745 .	3.259 ***	0.905 ***	-11.735 ***	-1.085 ***
	(24.824)	(1.498)	(1.111)	(13.693)	(1.061)	(7.867)	(0.399)	(0.293)	(3.446)	(0.265)	(9.647)	(0.374)	(0.257)	(3.118)	(0.299)
Region	0.474 ***	0.243 *	0.640 ***	-0.885 ***	-0.714 ***	0.138 .	-0.142 *	0.228 ***	-0.254 ***	-0.246 ***	0.066	-0.232 ***	0.071	-0.189 **	-0.175 ***
	(0.112)	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.105)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.042)
ORP						0.661 ***	0.672 ***	0.640 ***	-0.754 ***	-0.651 ***	0.865 ***	0.705 ***	0.671 ***	-0.801 ***	-0.680 ***
						(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.031)
Pop. Density	-0.046	-0.001	-0.006	-0.123 *	-0.006	0.083	0.002	-0.004 .	-0.073 *	-0.005 **	0.797 **	0.006	-0.005	-0.248	-0.010
	(0.070)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.054)	(0.004)	(0.058)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.306)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.168)	(0.009)
Mean Age	0.161	-0.009	-0.000	0.175	0.002	0.172 **	-0.005 .	-0.003	0.145 ***	-0.001	0.026	-0.004 *	-0.003	0.194 ***	-0.003 *
	(0.178)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.117)	(0.008)	(0.056)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.044)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)
Male Share	-0.843 *	-0.010	0.010	0.357 .	0.004	-0.222 ***	-0.005	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	-0.082 *	-0.000	0.001	-0.009	0.001
	(0.394)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.200)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.040)	(0.002)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.001)
Employed	0.301 *	-0.015 *	-0.002	-0.046	0.001	0.138 ***	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.032	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.000
	(0.117)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.080)	(0.006)	(0.036)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)
Employees	-0.024	0.001	-0.012 **	-0.059	-0.014 ***	-0.015	0.000	-0.002 *	0.014	-0.003 ***	-0.034 .	-0.001	-0.001 .	0.015	-0.002 ***
	(0.063)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
Unemployed	0.386 **	-0.024 ***	-0.022 **	-0.129	-0.017 **	0.153 **	-0.007 ***	-0.010 ***	-0.076 .	-0.007 **	-0.060	-0.011 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.011	-0.006 **
	(0.116)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.088)	(0.006)	(0.047)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.037)	(0.002)
Graduates						0.117 .	-0.013 ***	0.001	0.044	0.003 .	0.011	-0.001	0.008 ***	0.123 ***	0.010 ***
						(0.069)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.071)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.002)
Below Secondary	-0.168 ***	-0.010 ***	-0.015 ***	-0.197 ***	-0.016 ***	-0.089 **	-0.011 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.084 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.184 ***	-0.009 ***	-0.008 ***	-0.073 ***	-0.007 ***
	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)
Czech-Moravian	-0.174 ***	-0.009 **	0.001	0.018	0.003	-0.011	-0.004 ***	0.004 ***	0.047 ***	0.004 ***	0.047	0.001	0.007 ***	0.060 **	0.006 ***
	(0.049)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.039)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.001)
Catholics	0.085 ***	0.006 ***	0.005 ***	0.036 ***	0.003 ***	0.052 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.027 ***	0.003 ***	0.039 ***	0.007 ***	0.005 ***	0.026 ***	0.003 ***
	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)
Sudeten	-0.130	-0.057 .	0.039	0.648 .	0.065 *	-0.017	-0.023 .	0.050 ***	0.714 ***	0.047 ***	0.607 .	-0.076 ***	0.019	0.333	0.029 *
	(0.494)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.365)	(0.027)	(0.252)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.150)	(0.009)	(0.364)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.218)	(0.012)
Austria - Direct	-5.469 **	-0.283 *	-0.321 *	-1.257	-0.262 *	-1.385 .	-0.076 *	-0.104 ***	-0.651	-0.079 **	0.227	-0.021	-0.071	-0.506	-0.053
	(1.971)	(0.116)	(0.126)	(1.608)	(0.114)	(0.726)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.433)	(0.027)	(1.507)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.914)	(0.049)
West Germany - Direct	-5.534 **	-0.271 **	-0.160	0.249	-0.139	-1.044	-0.203 ***	-0.009	0.571	0.023	2.865 .	-0.071	0.016	-0.754	0.032
	(1.681)	(0.098)	(0.104)	(1.315)	(0.094)	(1.189)	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.705)	(0.044)	(1.599)	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.967)	(0.052)
East Germany - Direct	-1.957 .	0.031	0.122	0.681	0.100	0.438	0.002	0.100 **	0.797 .	0.075 **	-0.630	-0.067	0.045	-0.372	0.089 .
	(1.145)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.933)	(0.067)	(0.737)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.439)	(0.027)	(1.454)	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.882)	(0.047)
Poland - Direct	-1.388	0.055	0.048	-0.305	0.010	0.649	0.023	0.008	-0.017	0.006	1.602	-0.047	0.126 ***	1.179 .	0.114 ***
	(0.914)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.710)	(0.050)	(0.553)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.327)	(0.020)	(1.002)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.609)	(0.033)
Slovakia - Direct	2.432	0.164	0.281 .	1.473	0.150	-0.326	-0.058 .	-0.025	0.009	-0.013	1.292	-0.066	0.014	-0.436	0.009
	(2.298)	(0.135)	(0.147)	(1.861)	(0.133)	(0.725)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.435)	(0.027)	(1.783)	(0.078)	(0.064)	(1.079)	(0.058)
n	206	206	206	206	206	1,904	1,904	1,909	1,909	1,909	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850	3,850
R^2	0.626	0.747	0.705	0.673	0.767	0.403	0.639	0.660	0.548	0.743	0.142	0.449	0.412	0.232	0.412
Adjusted R^2	0.595	0.726	0.681	0.645	0.747	0.398	0.635	0.657	0.544	0.740	0.137	0.446	0.410	0.228	0.410

Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence denoted by symbols: *** 99.9%; ** 99%,; * 95%; . 90%. Negative values of the dependent variables SPD 2017 and AMS 2017 are used to make comparison of direction of attitudes easier.