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Mastering Space by New Means of Power

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Abstrakt

Demokratizace dominuje v mezinárodních vztazích od konce studené války. Demokratizační pomoc se navíc stala součástí zahraničních institucí států, jak je ukázáno na příkladech Spojených států a Evropské unie. Jelikož státy vnímají mezinárodní vztahy z neorealistické perspektivy, vzbuzuje to obavy ohledně jejich zdůvodnění podpory demokracie. Tato práce se pokouší najít korelaci mezi geopolitickými cíli států a demokratizací. Jejím cílem je prokázat, že demokratizované země mají sklon inklinovat k asistenční moci, a to prospívá geopolitickým cílům asistující moci.

Studiem geopolitických cílů EU a USA a jejich uplatněním na demokratizaci Ukrajiny se tato práce pokouší zjistit, jak podpora demokracie na Ukrajině prospěla USA a EU. Pro podporu tvrzení, že ideologie může být použita pro sledování geopolitických cílů, vykresluje paralelu s komunistickým převratem v Československu a analyzuje, jak SSSR těžil z podpory Československé komunistické strany.

Klíčová slova

Demokratizace, měkká síla, inteligentní moc, studená válka, komunismus, Spojené státy americké, Evropská unie, SSSR, geopolitika, podpora demokracie

Abstract

Democratization has been dominating international relations since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, democratization assistance became embedded in states' foreign institutions, as it is seen in the examples of the United States and the European Union. As states perceive international relations from a neo-realist perspective, it raises a concern about their reasoning behind democracy promotion. This thesis attempts to find a correlation between states' geopolitical objectives and democratization. Its goal is to prove that democratized countries tend to incline towards the assisting power, and this benefits the assisting power's geopolitical objectives.

By studying EU and US geopolitical goals and applying them on the democratization of Ukraine, this thesis attempts to find how democracy promotion in Ukraine benefited the USA and the EU. To support the claim that ideology can be used to pursue geopolitical goals, it draws a parallel with the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and analyzes how the USSR benefited from supporting the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Keywords

Democratization, soft power, smart power, Cold War, communism, United States, European Union, USSR, geopolitics, democracy assistance

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that she compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

In Prague on ____ May 21, 2020 _____ Ksenia Galtsova _____

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Abbreviations

ANP- Annual National Program (NATO)
CES- Common Economic Space
CIA- Central Intelligence Agency
CIS- Commonwealth of Independent States
COMECON- Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMINFORM- Communist Information Bureau
COMINTERN- Communist International
CPCS- Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
DRG- Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Strategy (USAID)
EAAU- Eurasian Economic Community
EEC- European Economic Community
EED- European Endowment for Democracy
EIDHR- European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights
ENP- European Neighborhood Policy
IMF- International Monetary Fund
IRI- International Republican Institute
MAP- Membership Action Plan (NATO)
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI- National Democratic Institute
NED- National Endowment for Democracy
NKVD- People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
UNSC- United Nations Security Council
USAID- United States Agency for International Development
WTO- Warsaw Treaty Organization
WTO- World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

If we look at international relations over the past twenty to thirty years, we will see that it has been preoccupied with both domestic and international conflicts across various regions and among various state and non-state actors. Many of these conflicts aimed at changing autocratic or semi-democratic regimes into full-fledged democracies. One could go further and call them wars for freedom. Some countries are democratized peacefully with a help of reforms. In some cases, countries are democratized with a use of force. Means of democratization vary from one case to another. Sometimes peaceful democratization can be escalated into a military conflict. There are many scenarios for delivering democracy; however, the question is why do states engage into democratization abroad?

This thesis goal is to study the reasoning behind democracy promotion. States' reasoning will be studied and analyzed through the perspective of their geopolitical goals and gains from exporting democracy. This should allow us to make a conclusion if democratization helps an external power to establish control over a democratized country's preferences.

This research hypothesis aims at examining relations between actor A and actor B, whereas A is a democratic power that assists B in building democracy, and then compare the influence of A on B's preferences before and after democratization. In other words - does A have greater influence on B's domestic and international affairs after the ideological change? Before we proceed with the research, it needs to be made clear that this work is based on the assumption that state and non-state actors perceive international order with neo-realist viewpoints. This means that they put the survival of the state and relative goals first and foremost. However, they still maintain close ties with other actors as long as such relations are beneficial.

It also needs to be stated that during the course of research, research questions that were initially submitted in the thesis proposal were narrowed to two research questions, as they were deemed irrelevant to the thesis scope. The research questions are the following: does an ideological shift help to achieve an external power's geopolitical objectives? Is democracy promotion similar to the Soviet strategy of communism promotion?

To answer the posed research questions, qualitative analysis will be conducted. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for the research, which will help to explain actors' interests and behavior through Ideological geopolitics, Nye's concept of power, Security Complex and Democratic Peace theories. In addition, democratization will be studied from a historical perspective to help proving or disproving the stated hypothesis.

Democracy can be interpreted and applied differently. This varies from one country to another and depends on its background, history, development level and many other variables. To analyze means of democratization, Chapter 3 will examine approaches to democracy promotion and instruments states use for democratization. Selection of democratization tools has a direct correlation with a type of democracy, since each case is unique and requires a different strategy based on the democracy type.

Chapter 4 aims at studying the United States and the European Union geopolitical objectives and their ways of achieving them through democratization. These two states were chosen because they are the biggest advocates of democracy on an international level. More importantly, the U.S. and EU influence on the world order is tremendous, as they are strong enough that they are capable of setting the pace for all other international actors.

To support the hypothesis, this work will draw a parallel between modern US, EU democratization policy and Soviet strategy of communism promotion, which helped it to create satellite states in Eastern Europe and spread its influence around the world. As it is claimed states pick countries of geopolitical importance for an ideological change; therefore, we will also need to cover the USSR geopolitical objectives. This will be done in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 6, the U.S. and EU democratization strategies will be studied on Ukraine's revolutions- the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Euromaidan of 2013-2014. Ukraine is an interesting case study for several reasons. First, it provides greater research scope as it experienced two revolutions in its recent history, which were supported by the EU and the USA. Both revolutions were inspired by the people's desire to align Ukraine with the West by joining the EU and reducing Russia's influence over the Ukrainian policy. The Orange Revolution ended peacefully but had little impact on Ukraine's preference shift towards the EU and the USA. While the Euromaidan got escalated into a military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, thus significantly changing Ukrainian policy. Post-Euromaidan Ukraine's preferences can be seen as beneficial to the EU and U.S. geopolitical objectives.

Since this research aims to find similarities between democracy and communism promotion, a case of communism enforcement will be studied on the example of Czechoslovakia in Chapter 6. The main reason why Czechoslovakia was picked among other Eastern European countries that also fell under communist rule is its democratic governance before the Second World War while the neighboring Eastern European countries were far from being democracies in the pre-war years. It would be fair to mention that some of them, for example Lithuania or Estonia, established democratic governance but it did not last long. The First Czechoslovak Republic was the only example of a full-fledge democracy in the region;

moreover, it had aspiration of restoring the democratic order after WW2. This is important because it helps to back up a statement that an ideological change was forced by the USSR that was pursuing its geopolitical objectives.

Before pursuing the research, it is crucial to explain the difference between two concepts being used - Eastern Europe and Central Europe when referring to Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and Ukraine. Since this work deals with European actors in different political times, it is necessary to discuss it in order to avoid misconceptions.

The end of the Second World War drew a border through European countries thus, creating two geopolitical dimensions known as Eastern Europe and Western Europe. The 45-yearlong division was fuelled by socio-political systems but not by geographical or cultural differences. However, until the present day both terms are widely used to refer to these past events and the impact that they have had on the current world political order. Czechoslovakia will be referred to as part of Eastern Europe prior to 1989. After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, Czechoslovakia and later Czech Republic will be considered Central Europe. As for Ukraine, it will be referred to as Eastern Europe since its independence in 1991.

1.1. End of the Cold War?

This thesis was inspired by the current international order and the worrying number of revolutions and civil wars happening around the world that most often lead to chaos rather than stability and prosperity. All these events had one common pattern – the struggle for freedom and a change of political system into democracy. If transitions were smooth and effective, the world would most likely be more stable. Unfortunately, most of the recent revolutions and civil unrest have led to civil war and unstable governments. Uprisings and revolutions require financial and international support, which is generally provided by interested third parties. The question here is if this is pure altruism or are there strings attached?

Until a few years ago, not many political scientists would speak about a new Cold War as this turn of events was not as obvious as it is now. However, now discussions about the revival of the Cold War no longer sound like conspiracy theories. One may say that this was publicly admitted when Antonio Guterres stated that “*the Cold War is back with a vengeance, but with a difference*” at the opening of the UN Security Council meeting in April 2018.¹ This section will briefly cover what are the New Cold War features and if there are some aspects of it inherited from the 20th century confrontation. Along with that, this sub-chapter aims at

¹ "Syria Crisis: UN Chief Says Cold War Is Back," BBC News, April 13, 2018, accessed February 12, 2019, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43759873>.

introducing an explanation as to why democratization is a mean of spreading a state's influence abroad.

The dividing line of the New Cold War remains almost identical compared to the original one. This is still a confrontation between East and West, in which some actors switched sides or were in the position to choose a side. For instance, Czech Republic is now strong enough to ally with Western democratic countries and Ukraine and Georgia gave preference to the West over their long-term alliance with Russia. Other consistent patterns such as proxy wars, economic wars, arms races and so on could be found in the current conflicts. For example, Syrian or Ukrainian conflicts are good examples of a proxy war. The US-China are engaged in a trade war, while Russia and the USA are going through another arms race.

However, the main Cold War pattern of ideological conflict has undergone changes. Before, both sides openly called out to either support democratic or communist order, nowadays promoting communism will not be beneficial and has been abandoned. There is only one widely accepted political order - democracy. This leads to various interpretations of democracy because it is very unlikely, if not impossible, to acquire international support and recognition promoting any regime where citizens do not have a voice. The various interpretations of democracy are a product of democracy adoption in countries with different backgrounds, histories and culture, as each country finds its most suitable model of democracy.

In 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War, democracy was proclaimed a universal ideology by Francis Fukuyama in his famous article *The End of History?*. In this article, he stated that the end of the Cold War is "...the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."² It is hard to object to this statement, as the end of the 20th century experienced a democratic boom as a large number of newly created states adopted democratic order. It is important to point out that the United States along with the European Union supported the transition, and, in some cases, provided financial aid as long as it benefited their political objectives.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the largest communism supporter and promoter, only five communist countries are left in the world whose politics are often criticized by the international community including China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam. The Cold War was a rivalry between two ideologies, which ended in the triumph of liberal democracy.

² Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 1989, https://www.embl.de/aboutus/science_society/discussion/discussion_2006/ref1-22june06.pdf, 1.

This resulted in a skyrocketing number of democratic countries, which continues to grow. Compared to 1989, a number of democracies increased by 100%, as per 2018.³

Undoubtedly, so far democracy is an optimum form of government but what if we look at it from a different angle? The collapse of the USSR did not guarantee supremacy and safety to the U.S. and acting from a neo-realist perspective, the U.S. should still strive to maintain her position. Thus, U.S. led active democratization can be seen as a continuation of the Cold War strategy - to convert as many states as possible into full-fledge democracies. This could guarantee alliances, support, and economic benefits. Despite the absence of a rivalry ideology, democratization remains a vital component of U.S. foreign policy, as democratized pro-West countries do not pose a threat to the U.S. and allow the White House to maintain hegemony. The European Union is also involved in democratization of its closest neighbors. It is embedded in the European enlargement and neighborhood policies that allow to maintain security and stability around the EU borders and also gain more power.

From a neo-realist perspective, this would be considered as a soft power tool to achieve a state's goal. As the USA and the EU were and remain the most active actors among others in spreading democratic values and assisting in establishing democratic governments, one may notice that this is similar to the Cold War strategy. Therefore, one of the research assumptions would be that democratization assistance is used in states' own interests as this is a source of influence over various parts of the world. This idea will be developed throughout the thesis.

To summarize, one may argue that ideology was and still is a power tool that is widely used in international politics to pursue state's goals. The Joseph Nye's work on the concept of power will assist in categorizing democratization. The following chapters will analyze the case studies of the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine that happened in the past 15 years.

1.2. The changing concept of power

*"The world is no longer as unconstrained as in nineteenth-century Europe when historians could define a great power as one capable of prevailing in war."*⁴

Joseph Nye

³ Max Roser, "Democracy," Our World in Data, March 15, 2013, <https://ourworldindata.org/democracy>).

⁴ Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 4.

It is necessary to discuss the evolving means of power as this will help to test the hypothesis, which states that great powers see democratization as an opportunity to spread their influence and change a recipient country's preferences to achieve their political objectives. In the modern world it is no longer accepted to use hard power, although the stakes remain the same, and a state's goal is to survive by pursuing power.⁵ Democracy promotion strategy allows one to gain more influence in international affairs without being punished (sanctions, economic wars, political isolation, etc.) at a relatively low cost since military intervention is not always necessary. However, it is hardly correct to say that democratization is always a soft power tool as means vary from soft to hard depending on each case. Therefore, it is better to categorize it as a smart power tool. Smart power as a concept will be introduced further in the chapter.

Throughout history, the means of power have been constantly changing and evolving. This has been strongly bound up with the Industrial Revolutions, scientific developments, the rule of international law and the close ties among countries and globalization. Centuries ago, power was a simple concept, which was defined only by means of manpower and each armies' ability to fight.⁶ Slowly, it has evolved and become more and more associated with weapons that one state could use against another. Therefore, each state's strategy was built following hard power principles.

The Second World War showed how destructive technologies and innovations could be and stressed the importance of mutual agreements and close economic ties. As a result, it made international relations more interdependent. This led to a rise of soft power use among states. The soft power concept implies that powers are more successful in pursuing their goals when they are able to influence other states through means other than coercion. This is well-demonstrated with examples like the Marshall Plan and the special relationship between the United States and United Kingdom, when financial aid paved the way to close ties and shared goals.⁷

During the same time frame, the invention of nuclear weapons introduced new means of hard power and defined power based on nuclear missiles acquisition and numbers. It is important to point out that during the Cold War financial ties and nuclear weapons were not

⁵ Jonathan Critstol, "Morgenthau vs. Morgenthau? 'The Six Principles of Political Realism' in Context," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/5712683/Morgenthau_vs._Morgenthau_The_Six_Principles_of_Political_Realism_in_Context), 240.

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Francis Raska, class on "U.S.-U.K. Special Relationship," (2017).

the only means that were widely utilized by the two blocs. In the “battle for hearts and minds”, ideology was and still remains today among soft power tools. Ideology is a great soft power tool because it is built on its attractiveness to people and can rally support among masses. As Nye said, “*if its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow*”.⁸ Another advantage of ideology as a soft power tool is its inclusivity. It includes all political aspects such as day-to-day order, values, economic model, military strategy and many more. Therefore, when using ideology, one can align with another on many levels, instead of focusing only on particular aspects such as market relations or any possible alliance benefits.

Currently, it is crucial to combine hard power, such as military strength, and soft power including, but not limited to, financial power. As it was mentioned above, military power is no longer a determining factor in inter-state relations; however, actors still accumulate and develop weapons. Armament plays a crucial role in the policy of deterrence. Nevertheless, a state’s military could be up to date, but it will not make an actor powerful or influential because financial power prevails in the modern world. North Korea, for instance, possesses nuclear weapons, while being very far from a dominating power in world politics. The United States vs Russia is another example of an imbalance between military power and financial power. Both states are well-armed, but Washington is more successful at pulling the strings of power than Moscow. At the same time, both the USA and Russia are deterred from attacking each other, due to the possession of not only nuclear weapons but also strong conventional forces. Therefore, both opt for proxy conflicts over a direct one. One of the reasons for the United States’ strength is the economic ties and institutions such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) where the USA has strong voting power. As Steven Lukes, political and social theorist said: “*a nation cannot be a great power without at least having a significant voice as the UN, IMF and World Bank.*” Therefore, the United States will continue to dominate world politics.⁹ This combination of hard and soft power makes the US stronger than Russia in the international arena. On the contrary, the European Union is more preoccupied with economic and political interdependency than armament; thus, mostly calling for soft power. Nevertheless, considering joint EU military capabilities, one must acknowledge the presence of hard power in the EU foreign policy as well.

Last, but not least, an important tool of soft power is ideology. The Cold War divided the world into two political ideologies - capitalism and communism. Often referred to as a battle

⁸ Eric X. Li, “The Rise and Fall of Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, August 20, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/>).

⁹ Nye, *The Future*, 217.

for hearts and minds between the Soviet Union and the United States, each state was able to influence segments of their population and can be considered successful as many people truly supported one side or another. The main actors used this public support for building alliances and strengthening influence on both a domestic and global level.

The two superpowers were not the first to use soft power to unite nations. All world empires relied either on religion, like the Spanish Empire, or a bureaucratic apparatus and a feeling of cultural superiority - like the Chinese Empire's Mandate of Heaven. People in the Roman Empire widely used a phrase: *Civis Romanus Sum* to emphasize one's belonging.¹⁰ Every empire that existed had a societal glue that bonded people together despite different cultures, languages or religions that helped preserve the empire from within. As we often speak of the U.S. as a modern empire, it is also necessary to have this bonding power. Soft power will be most effective only when it is promoted at different levels and aimed at everyone. Thus, the U.S. government looks at several factors - economic and military ties, culture that is strongly attractive to younger generations around the world, and freedom.¹¹ Freedom is a universal value for populations that come from different backgrounds and culture. Therefore, this is the most convenient way to rally people around democracy as democracy has become one of the defining symbols of freedom.

Regardless of soft power means, the attractive part of the deal is not offered unconditionally. Politicians receive lucrative deals such as trade contracts, embargo liftings or opportunities to join international institutions and alliances. However, this is given in return for fulfilling agreements, which in some cases may be a change of ideology between democracy or communism. When a recipient state agrees to accept the change, it often creates an unequal dependence on a donor state, whose foreign agenda is pursued in this deal. This raises a concern do states always pursue noble goals when promoting democracy or is it due to well-camouflaged relative gains that they will receive? Realists would say that every actor is concerned with achieving its own aims, regardless of the common good. Liberalists would defend an opposite position and insist on absolute gains. This research focuses on the U.S., EU and Soviet Union foreign policies and each actors' strategy will be covered in the following Chapters 4 and 5. Since the end of World War Two, the USA has stayed on the same track of maintaining unipolarity and the status quo. The EU is a unique case here because it manages to maintain a balance between relative and absolute gains in most of its foreign policy agenda.

¹⁰ Brzezinski, *The Grand*, 28.

¹¹ Ibid.

One may agree that the USSR pursued relative gains, as its agenda was state security and world affairs domination. The Soviet geopolitical aspirations will be discussed in more details in Chapter 5.

In his book *The Future of Power*, Joseph Nye discusses the smart power concept that he introduced in 2004. For him, smart power is “*an ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies...it is available to all states*”.¹² By relying on smart power strategy, actors with different resources and capabilities can reach desired outcomes.¹³ Smart power is not necessarily aimed at one actor. For example, after the annexation of Crimea which worsened relations with the West, Russia has improved its relations with China and other Asian neighbors. Annexation is a clear example of hard power, while tightening economic and military ties are part of a soft power strategy. For example, in 2014 Moscow and Beijing signed a currency swap agreement to minimize American dollar influence.¹⁴ Another big step of 2014 was concluding the 30-year Agreement between Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation to supply gas with a Power of Siberia pipeline, which was completed at the end of 2019, and now scheduled to include more gas production centres by 2022.¹⁵ Nowadays Sino-Russian relations are at their highest peak since their ideological split in the 1960s.

Current international order does not tolerate hard power and always pushes towards soft power. However, as it was claimed before, actors perceive each other with neo-realist eyes, and thus often go far beyond soft power means as we saw in the invasion of Crimea by Russia. As I will discuss later in this thesis, Russia’s reputation and international standing was negatively impacted by this as the overall perception amongst the global community is that the best way to pursue relative goals is a combined tactic of smart power.¹⁶ Democratization is a perfect example of this. It includes various soft power instruments that can target different groups and it also can call for hard power when justified. The main advantage of democratization is its perception by the public that is usually positive. Hence, democratization strategy allows great powers to pursue geopolitical goals and receive wide public approval. Conversely, while pursuing the same goals by hard power means, a state will most likely

¹² Nye, *The Future*, 23.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ James Dobbins, Howard J. Shatz, and Ali Wyne, "A Warming Trend in China-Russia Relations," RAND Corporation, April 18, 2019, accessed May 12, 2019, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/a-warming-trend-in-china-russia-relations.html>.

¹⁵ "Power of Siberia The Largest Gas Transmission System in Russia’s East," Gazprom, accessed April 26, 2020, <http://www.gazprom.com/projects/power-of-siberia/>.

¹⁶ It should be noted that there is also a limit on how far a state can go using hard power.

experience international opposition. This subchapter has shown us that the concept of power has significantly evolved from primarily relying on military strength and that currently, actors have mastered ways of domination without invasion and/or occupation.

2. Methodology

The goal of this thesis is to prove or disprove the stated hypothesis, which says powers are interested in democratizing other states as this increases their influence over newly democratized states, thus making great powers stronger internationally. If the theory is valid, then we should observe a shift in domestic and foreign policies within a recipient state that work out for the benefit of the assisting state. In other words, newly democratically elected governments will show strong incline towards a power that helped them change a form of government and brought new leaders to rule. If the theory is not valid, then we will observe a newly elected government building and developing democracy without major preference shifts towards the assisting power. Another possible outcome could be a combination of the above-mentioned scenarios, where a new leader builds a government based on democratic values and aligns state policies with the policy of the assisting country.

Research will be built on theories that allow the exploration of case studies with an aim to look for congruence or incongruence between stated expectations and observations. This will be done with a help of the following theories: ideological geopolitics, Security Complex theory, Democratic Peace theory and Nye's work on concept of power. As already mentioned, the hypothesis will be tested on the case studies. The modern democratization case of Ukraine will be compared to the past events in Czechoslovakia to draw a parallel with the widely acknowledged strategy that was used by the Soviet Union. Along with that, it aims at finding similarities with the Cold War ideological rivalry. Only in this case, full-fledge democracies are in competition with pseudo democracies.

These two case studies were chosen among other similar cases for a number of reasons. First, it was already said that the U.S. and Russia are in the state of Cold War again, thus it makes it interesting to focus on Ukraine since it is a former Soviet republic that served as a buffer zone for centuries, and it used to be the most valuable and strategic partner for Russia. So far, the democratization of Ukraine and its rapprochement with the West has been the most lucrative move towards weakening Russia's influence in the region. In addition, Ukraine's transformation into a full-fledge democracy will pose a threat to the regime in Russia.

While the reasoning behind active democratization is still a question to be answered, few would argue that the Soviet communism promotion was anything but a strategy to enlarge its influence. Therefore, my second case study is an example of the Soviet expansion into Czechoslovakia, which was camouflaged with alleged superiority of communism over democracy. Czechoslovakia falls well in the research scope as it was a democratic country

before the German invasion; thus, it was very probable that it would have become a democracy again after the Nazi occupation. The main and, likely, only reason why Czechoslovakia did not follow a democratic path was that it was liberated by the USSR. Also it should be said that the future of Czechoslovakia along with other Eastern European countries were decided at the Yalta Conference and this played an important role in Czechoslovakian communist transformation.¹⁷ Along with this argument, the country was relatively untouched by the war and had functioning industries, thus making it essential for the USSR which had lost many industries and was devastated after the war. Finally, Czechoslovakia served as a buffer zone. All the factors above made Czechoslovakia as important to the USSR as modern Ukraine is to Russia. In addition, the fact that Czechoslovakia preserved democratic values and culture despite several years of the German occupation makes it a good case study of a forced ideology.

2.1. Ideological geopolitics

John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge dedicated a chapter on researching ideological geopolitics in their book *Mastering Space Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*.¹⁸ They say that essentially geopolitics is always ideological.¹⁹ The three main aspects of ideological geopolitics are identified as: first, “*central systemic-ideological conflict over political-economic organization*; secondly, *homogenization of global space into ‘friendly’ and ‘threatening’ bloc*; thirdly, *naturalization of the ideological conflict by containment, domino effects and hegemonic stability*.”²⁰

To apply these three aspects on current international relations order, there is an ideological conflict between full-fledge democracies and semi-democratic or authoritarian countries. This clash of ideologies is split along almost the same borders as it was during the Cold War with Western, developed countries on one side and developing and underdeveloped countries on the other side. The next aspect of ideological geopolitics is homogenization of the international relations. This is represented by dividing and perceiving countries based on how liberal they are. Full-fledge democratic states are perceived as friendly actors competing for absolute gains.

¹⁷ Thomas De Waal, “The Yalta Conference Was More Than a Victors’ Feast,” Carnegie Europe, February 4, 2020, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/02/04/yalta-conference-was-more-than-victors-feast-pub-80973>).

¹⁸ John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, 2nd ed. (London & New York: ROUTLEDGE, 2003), 63.

¹⁹ Ibid., 65.

²⁰ Ibid.

Conversely, non-democratic states are often portrayed as a threat to global prosperity and stability.

Agnew and Corbridge did their ideological geopolitics analysis on the Cold War events, thus they defined a means of naturalization. However, containment, domino effect and hegemonic stability concepts are no longer widely used, since the means of power have evolved. Modern international actors shifted towards new concepts. Hence, naturalization of the ideological conflict is mostly reached via information dissemination that assists in shaping people's minds. Therefore, it helps to justify the ideological conflict.

These three characteristics will be applied while analyzing our case studies to see if modern democratization cases still bear these aspects that were common in the Cold War.

2.2. Concept of power

As it was discussed earlier, the means of power have dramatically changed over the centuries and actors currently prefer soft power over hard power. However, how can one measure power? Since the main question of the hypothesis requires us to compare external influence before and after democratization, it is crucial to clear up how it will be measured. To analyze actor's power we should think of the scope of power (who is involved) and the domain of power (over what).²¹ This is important for further research on defining what the geopolitical objectives are for the EU, the U.S., and Russia and what the USSR was trying to achieve. It will assist to study perspectives for each of the mentioned actors based on who is involved and what their relations are in the given region, thus allowing us to see if an external power pursues relative or absolute gains.

Nye defines three aspects of relational power: commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences.²² Commanding change is quite a self-explanatory term; it is an ability to change someone's decision. This could be achieved through various leverages such as international institutions, economic relationships, etc. Controlling agendas could be reached by one state establishing close relations with another and slowly projecting their own preferences onto another state, so they would believe that they want the same outcomes. Mass media and different propaganda tools would help to control state's preferences. The last aspect of relational power is establishing preferences. This is the final stage of shaping state's policies when it is no longer needed to command as it has same preferences and supports the other state

²¹ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 6.

²² *Ibid.*, 11.

at home and abroad.²³ As Dwight Eisenhower said “*you make them to do something for you not only because you tell them to do so, but because they instinctively want to do it for you.*”²⁴

However, one should not forget that the assistance in democratization by other countries is not just a soft power tool. It actually is a smart power tool as both soft and hard power means can be involved based on the particular circumstances of each case. Nye’s work on the concept of power will serve as a basis for further examination of the U.S. and EU strategy for spreading influence around the globe by democratizing countries and it will also be applied on the USSR and its communism promotion strategy.

2.3. Security complex theory

Traditionally, international relations theories tackled great powers and their interests, while not devoting enough research and time to periphery or regional powers. However, this began to change at the time of decolonization when there was an increase in regional powers and again at the end of the Cold War when the Soviet Union broke into separate states. Both events were accompanied with emerging regional powers that eventually began to rise and started to compete within relevant regions, for example Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rule.

Barry Buzan identifies several aspects of security, which are political, military, societal, environmental and economic security.²⁵ In his research, he questions what the role is of regions in those dimensions. In this work, environmental aspect will not be used, as it has no strong correlation with the research questions.

By political security Buzan means organizational stability, systems of government along with ideologies that give them legitimacy.²⁶ According to him, the end of the Cold War marked the end of ideological rivalry. Hence, great powers should no longer see lesser powers as assets. The article *New patterns of Global Security in the twenty-first century* where this idea was first discussed was published in 1991, at the time when it felt that another Cold War would not start again.²⁷ However, peace did not last long and great powers are still competing for world dominance. Active democracy promotion led by Western powers and their intervention in other

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Wayne McLean, "Regional Security Complex Theory and Insulator States: The Case of Turkey" (Master's thesis, Australia/University of Tasmania, 2011), 7, <https://eprints.utas.edu.au/15060/1/thesis-final.pdf>.

²⁶ Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century," *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991), 433.

²⁷ Ibid.

states' domestic affairs show us that small powers are still regarded as assets in great powers contest for influence.

Military security is viewed from two dimensions - offensive and defensive capabilities, and "*states' perceptions of each other's intentions.*"²⁸ Assuming that political and ideological rivalry will not develop, Buzan believed that great powers will demilitarize the periphery and will cease arms trade in such war required quantities. Indeed, demilitarization took place but later both Russia and the U.S. began moving weapons towards borders as well as arming neighboring states to increase their security. Consequently, states started to be suspicious of each other, which brings us to a security dilemma issue.

Economic security means free access to resources and markets to at least sustain the state minimum needs.²⁹ As states engage in trade wars to pursue their goals, economic well-being is frequently under a threat. Also, countries join economic unions to secure and develop their markets. This is another example of soft power tool since it can be used as a carrot and stick policy.

Societal security refers to people ability to preserve national identity, customs, language and so on.³⁰ An issue can arise, if an ideological change threaten any of the societal security components. For example, the USSR restrained religion practices in its satellite states in Eastern Europe.

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever claim "*states worry more about their neighbors than about distant states*".³¹ This explains why the EU is concerned with the policies of neighboring non-democratic countries, but why is the U.S. involved in politics across oceans and no immediate threats? The United States is a unique case as it is the only remaining superpower in the world. Buzan and Waever say that the great powers are dragged into regional conflicts and therefore, international relations should be studied from a regional level. This would explain why the USA is present across the oceans. For a great power like the US, it is necessary to do so, because this is the only way how it can prevent new regional hegemonies from uprising, which could potentially hurt the U.S. interests. In general, regional powers are also sensitive to regional power shifts, especially when they are not strong enough to deploy preventive measures. Therefore, they opt for inviting great powers to mediate conflicts.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Robert E. Kelly, "Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism'", *International Studies Review* 9, no. 2 (July/August 2007), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4621805.pdf?ab_segments=0/default-2/control.

Another reason why the U.S. became concerned with overseas politics is the invention of nuclear weapons and long-distance delivery systems, which can threaten every state regardless of their location.³² Although there are state and non-state actors that try to challenge the status quo, the U.S. is the greatest power among great powers, and this is acknowledged and comprehended by all international actors. Therefore, in order to maintain hegemony, the U.S. must project power far beyond its closest neighbors to ensure that no rising power will challenge the status quo.

Another point of Buzan's theory is that "*when great powers intervene in regions, much evidence suggests that local partners exploit external partners to pursue local opponents.*"³³ This argument can be well-demonstrated when looking at 1948 coup d'état in Czechoslovakia when Klement Gottwald was supported by the Soviets without whose assistance he may never came to power. Another example can be found in Ukraine when Viktor Yushchenko was elected Prime Minister in 1999, thanks to US and EU pressure.³⁴ John Mearsheimer also supported this view in a 2014 interview, where he said that *in promoting democracy, the USA tries to put in place pro-Western leaders to turn Ukraine into a part of the West.*³⁵ Therefore, one cannot exclude a possibility that great powers conspire with local politicians that inspire to climb to power and are willing to make deals behind closed doors. It should be noted that in the above cases both sides exploited one another while pursuing their own goals.

The security complex theory will assist to analyze the EU, US and USSR geopolitical objectives.

2.4. Democratic peace theory

A work that examines democratization and why Western powers are actively involved in promoting democratic values abroad must touch upon democratic peace theory which argues that democratic states are not likely to wage war against each other. This argument is used frequently to support democracy, but it needs to be pointed out that this applies to both domestic and interstate violence. This is important because states could maintain peaceful interstate relations, while conducting atrocities inside the state. Internal conflicts often serve as a

³² Agnew and Corbridge, "*Mastering Space...*", 67.

³³ Kelly, "Security Theory...", 200.

³⁴ Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraines Orange Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2005), <https://doi.org/10.2307/20034274>, 41.

³⁵ John J. Mearsheimer interview on "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin" to *Foreign Affairs*, 2014, <https://www.natur.cuni.cz/geografie/socialni-geografie-a-regionalni-rozvoj/studium/doktorske-studium/kolokvium/kolokvium-2013-2014-materialy/ukrajina-a-rusko-mearsheimer-souleimanov.pdf>.

justification for a military intervention. Such interventions usually aim at restoring peace first and then democratizing the country. Therefore, democratic peace theory could be seen as an internal and external peace preservation.

What are the core pillars of Democratic Peace theory? First, there is a system of checks and balances, which questions leader's decisions and requires voting as well legal restraints. In addition, public support is important as massive disapproval may lead to the loss of power. Along with that, there is a normative component to this, it is a complicated task to have a military campaign approved since liberal societies are usually against military conflicts unless severe human rights violations are involved.³⁶

One of the main benefits and at the same time constraints for democratic countries is their economic ties. Most democratic leaders will not commence trade relations with countries that have a human rights violation record, or with autocratic governments. However, there is always a room for exception. Sometimes, the leaders prefer to ignore the above-mentioned things, as they find economic relations vital for their own gains. One example of this is the infamous relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Also, there is another category of democratic states known as semi-democracies that have the possibility of deviating from the democratic peace theory. Semi-democratic countries can follow completely different reasoning and, to some extent, act unpredictably. For instance, both Russia and Ukraine are officially democratic countries. However, according to the Freedom House statistics, Russia is a consolidated authoritarian regime and Ukraine is a transitional democracy.³⁷ Nevertheless, geopolitical interests prevailed over democratic values, thus justifying non-democratic actions taken by Russia against Ukraine. Therefore, it becomes difficult to predict if semi-democracies will wage war against a democratic or semi-democratic country. It is also possible that such countries are under the democracy umbrella in order to avoid international pressure that could be executed via political isolation, sanctions and other means of soft power. This raises another issue - while most modern countries are officially democracies, many adopt a democratic system to follow the world protocol but cannot truly be considered democracies. Hence, every actor assesses democracy differently based on preferences and interests and therefore, the theory cannot always have positive correlation.

³⁶ Håvard Hegre, "Democracy and Armed Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313512852>, 161-162.

³⁷ "Democracy Scores: Countries and Territories," Freedom House, accessed May 17, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/nations-transit/scores>).

Therefore, one may say that democratic peace theory is only applicable to full-fledge democracies like Canada or New Zealand. However, sometimes democracies can act like world police with a range of actions starting from interference in another country's politics escalating to military invasion. Nevertheless, quantitative studies confirm that democracies are less likely to fight each other in interstate war or use violence inside the country.³⁸

Democratic peace theory can back up US and EU thinking that democratization increases security, as democratic states do not go into a war with each other. In Chapter 4, EU and US security concerns will be discussed.

2.5. Historical context

To prove the posed hypothesis that external powers gain influence over states that they helped to establish a democratic order, I will draw a parallel with a strategy that was widely and successfully used by the Soviet Union. Since the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks' aim was to create a world revolution, i.e. to topple down capitalist governments and replace them with communist order. The widely promoted idea was to eliminate class inequality and create a society where everyone would be equal. However, the real intention was to establish satellite governments to dominate individual states and consequently dominate the world. The peak of communism promotion was after the Second World War, when the Soviet Union established communist regimes in liberated Eastern European countries and continued an aggressive policy of delivering communism to other regions of the world. At the same time, the U.S. pursued the same goal- domination of world affairs but by spreading democracy.

This will be examined further in the example of Czechoslovakia after the coup of 1948. This case study will tackle questions such as what means were used to influence the Communist government of Czechoslovakia? Was there coercion through international institutions and agreements? What allowed the Soviet Union to control Czechoslovakia for a relatively long time and was it successful and beneficial overall? After researching on this, I will analyze and compare Soviet methods with the American and European democratization methods. Finally, I will analyze if there was a shift in Czechoslovakia's preferences after the coup d'état and if so, how big the shift was.

³⁸ Hegre, "Democracy...", 159-160.

3. Approaches to democracy

They say that there are as many points of views as there are people. The same can be said about interpretations of democracy. Each country has its own vision of democracy based on historical experience, cultural background and many other factors. Democracy itself is a contested term as its meaning can be narrowed to the rule of people by the people and can extend to complex electoral systems. More inclusive terms would include such qualities as *liberte, egalite, fraternite, openness in politics, effective citizen control over policy, equal participation* and further on.³⁹ Yet, these are simply adjectives that can describe democracy and offer a very broad definition of the term. However, these words offer guidance as to what democracy is expected to achieve. Since the definition of democracy is undoubtedly broad, various interpretations and approaches are often used to camouflage semi-democracy or autocracy as democracy in an attempt to avoid possible consequences such as popular uprising or international involvement into state's affairs.

It was already mentioned that elections are the main component of the democratic model. In order to be a full democracy, elections must be fair at each governmental level, especially of major decision-makers.⁴⁰ However, there are number of flaws with elections. Fair elections do not make a country a full-fledge democracy as elected representatives could still violate democratic procedures.⁴¹

For many countries, a form of government and stability are interdependent and dictate how effective the state apparatus is. Undoubtedly, stability is a central element in measuring country's political success. However, it does not necessarily mean that full-fledge democracies are always stable or vice versa.⁴² Governments could be equally democratic, but one could be less or more stable due to a variety of external factors. Therefore, state stability and form of government should be treated as two different variables while keeping in mind that democracies provide respectful living conditions and guarantee power change, thus giving a bigger window for a shift towards stability.⁴³ However, there could be deviations due to different interpretation and implementation of democracy.

Democracies are proven to be economically and politically successful. It needs to be pointed out that success and form of government do not necessarily depend on each other.

³⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave Democratization in the late twentieth century*, 1st ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 9.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 10.

⁴² Ibid., 11.

⁴³ Ibid., 29.

Since democracy creates an atmosphere which foster individual freedom,⁴⁴ it allows citizens to self-develop into different paths and improve both economic and political sectors in the state. There is no democracy without individual freedom.⁴⁵

3.1. Top-down vs bottom-up approach

There are two ways one can pursue democratization, which are very much dependent on a non-democratic government stance. If a recipient state is willing to liberalize and cooperate with an external agent, then it is a top-down approach. In case of hardcore totalitarian countries, chances of a government pursuing democracy are very low. Thus, this situation calls for a bottom-up approach. Tactics of the two types significantly differ but may overlap sometimes, as the ultimate goal is the same. Studying these methods in detail and then analyzing the democratization of Ukraine will assist us in answering the question if democratization is used to pursue state's geopolitical goals.

The top-down approach targets government and political elite and expects that the democratization initiative will come from them. In this case, the first step towards democracy will be political liberalization.⁴⁶ This usually starts with liberal reforms. It is also crucial to launch educational programs for the society to prepare them for executing their rights and duties in a democratic country, since liberal norms and values could be remarkably different from the country's culture. External financial aid and loans can be used as a carrot and stick policy in order to ensure that a non-democratic government stays on the path.

While a recipient state works on internal liberalization, it is also important to start changing behavior internationally to become a responsible stakeholder amongst other full-fledge democracies. This should be pursued from both sides: an external agent should engage a non-democratic counterpart into socialization process.⁴⁷ The idea is that a democratic donor will shape the behavior of a recipient state and study its interactions with other international actors. This should help to facilitate political liberalization reforms domestically. Another positive outcome is that the recipient state can adopt its new democratic counterparts' practices and know-hows, which will also facilitate liberalization processes. Along with that, an external agent has field operations aimed at education and experience-sharing with politicians and civil servants.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid., 28.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 51.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 52.

A bottom-up approach is usually led by democratic activists, opposition and sometimes dissidents. As it was mentioned earlier, this approach is pursued when a non-democratic government is not willing to start a liberalization process. The aim here is to mobilize the society, so it will become impossible to remain in a power for a current government.⁴⁹ This is usually achieved through street protests and violent uprisings, which result in either peaceful government resignation or civil war. A recent example of this would be the Arab Spring, which started in the streets of Tunisia and then spilled over the region.

However, the issue here is in the lack of political education and experience of the civil masses. When they start storming streets and state offices, their only demands are financial stability and support of human rights. Due to the lack of education leads, they do not demand political liberalization and civil rights.⁵⁰ Therefore, an external agent must provide a variety of assistance to political activists, so they can guide the populace towards long-term goals rather than immediate improvements.

Depending on the approach, a non-democratic country could either follow a slow and more peaceful path to gradually become democratic; or follow a more radical and fast democratization path, which could result in a political vacuum, instability and chaos. It would be fair to mention that in some cases a choice between the two approaches is made based on a current situation in a non-democratic country. Hence, if a government uses violence against people, this will require immediate action from international institutions and community.

There are eight tools of democratization identified.⁵¹ Some tools are typical for a bottom-up or top-down approach, but most often they are combined, when a donor state pursues democratization in a foreign country. The first tool is rhetorical commitments. It is widely used among politicians, especially highly ranking ones. They are used to present a state's official view, as well as their policy on an issue, and it is usually aligned with the state foreign policy. Second, political gestures are widely used at different political levels. Political gestures are aimed at supporting one side of a conflict; they are also a political solidarity declaration at the international level. For example, Francois Mitterrand paid an official visit to Czechoslovak dissidents in 1988. This was a symbolic event that showed French support for Vaclav Havel and also led to peaceful demonstrations demanding for greater recognition of Human Rights.⁵²

⁴⁹ Ibid., 53.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 54.

⁵¹ Jan Hornat, "Defining key terms and conceptualizing democracy promotion," class on Promoting Democracy Abroad: the US and the EU in Third Countries (Winter semester 2017).

⁵² David Vaughan, "December 1988: Mitterrand Meets Dissidents in Prague," Radio Prague International, July 14, 2012, <https://www.radio.cz/en/section/archives/december-1988-mitterrand-meets-dissidents-in-prague-1>.

Along with the above mentioned, both rhetorical commitments and political gestures could be a source of inspiration for opposition leaders and common people.

The third technique is a carrot & stick policy. This tool can relate to both democratization approaches, as it allows to be applied on different levels to reach various goals. For instance, the EU conditionality policy (which will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter) usually aims to encourage non-democratic states to conduct liberal reforms in exchange for market agreement or any other political or economic benefit. This is a pure top-down approach. The U.S. imposed an embargo on Cuba not to change the ruling party policy, but to provoke the masses to overthrow the government, since common people are usually the victims of political and economic embargos, whereas politicians are generally not influenced.⁵³

The fourth tool is another top-down approach tool is supplying technical assistance to state institutions. It includes activities such as capacity building, consultations, and experts exchange. The fifth tool is a bottom-up technique that is widely used to promote democracy in support of civil society. It aims at supporting NGOs at all levels and creating networks on the ground, since it is hard (if not impossible) to build a full fledged democracy without an educated and trained civil society.

The sixth tool is the enhancement of regional cooperation through private endeavors and programs. One example would be the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that is one of the largest independent think tanks in the world. Its goal is to promote cooperation among nations to advance international peace.⁵⁴

The seventh tool is information dissemination which is a popular and very powerful tool to raise mass awareness. Its use can vary from news to states organized crimes coverage, which could spark uprisings and lead to coup d'état. Thus, it falls under the bottom-up approach.

The eighth tool is physical intervention and/or regime change and is the last resort of dealing with non-democratic states. Regime change can be executed through intelligence operations and/or military intervention.

The above discussed tools and various combinations of them are widely used to promote democracy at present. Also, their nature allows them to be used to achieve any ideological shift and is not exclusive to democracy. In the following chapters, American and European instruments of democratization will be analyzed through the perspective of these tools. In addition, this will assist us in the case studies of modern Ukraine and Czechoslovakia.

⁵³ Hornat, "Defining ..." class on Promoting Democracy....

⁵⁴ "About Carnegie," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed April 12, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/about/>.

4. Active democracy promoters and their geopolitical objectives

The biggest world democracy contributors are the European Union and the United States. They are not the only full-fledged democracies, but for certain reasons they are involved in democracy promotion more than others. In order to prove the posed hypothesis right or wrong, one needs to analyze what are the main reasons for the United States and the EU to actively participate in democracy promotion abroad and how they correspond with their geopolitical objectives. To do that, it is necessary to define their geopolitical goals and analyze what driven forces are behind those objectives. Structural realism theory will assist in geopolitical goals analysis.

Structural realism believes that international politics is dominated by a struggle for power due to the lack of higher authority. The relative distribution of power is a key independent variable to international relations studies and understanding of outcomes such as war, peace, alliance and so on.⁵⁵ However, structural realism is split into two branches, which claim that opposite types of power will guarantee a state's survival. These are offensive and defensive realism that are supported by John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz.

According to Mearsheimer, states should follow a defensive realism approach while building foreign policy strategy because international system forces states to maximize their relative power positions.⁵⁶ For him, states will never quit searching for power, as there is no level of security that guarantees a state's survival; therefore, states should engage in constant power accumulation. Conversely Waltz believes that power maximizing will lead to international conflicts and thus jeopardize a state's survival, because states will engage in building coalitions to counterbalance each other. To Waltz, "*power is a means to the end of security.*"⁵⁷ Therefore, he advocated defensive realism, which holds that states should enhance their security. This means that they need to accumulate enough power for defense purposes but not for offense. Thus, it will allow to avoid the security dilemma, contribute to more stable international relations and, ultimately, assures state's survival.

Since it was agreed that this research is built on the assumption that states perceive international relations from a structural realism perspective, one can define states' goals as two combinations: relative goals backed by offensive realism and relative goals backed by defensive realism. Therefore, the U.S. and EU should be either seeking to maximize their

⁵⁵ John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 92.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

power or security, while building and executing their geopolitical strategy. Thus, when identifying geopolitical objectives in this chapter, it is important to see if one is a security maximizer or power maximizer, as this will allow to assess what are intentions behind democracy promotion.

Another aspect that needs to be covered is the means of delivering democracy. The two approaches to democracy promotion, which were discussed in the previous chapter, will help to analyze instruments used by the USA and EU. This is necessary for the research, as it will assist in a comparative analysis in the case of Czechoslovakia. The aim is to see if similar instruments were in use by the Soviet Union while it was attempting to spread communism throughout the world. Another point for studying bottom-up and top-down approaches is to answer if a state is a power or security maximizer and why democracy promotion is of an important foreign agenda.

4.1. The United States objectives and bottom-up approach

*“For the ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world will not be bombs and rockets but a test of wills and idea.”*⁵⁸

Ronald Reagan (1982).

The end of the Second World War opened a door to global domination for the United States. Unlike after the First World War, Washington had no intentions to walk away from this opportunity and isolate itself again. The U.S. entered WW2 to defend itself and then entered Cold War to defend itself once again, since rapidly developing technologies and weapons made every country in the world vulnerable, a remote location could no longer guarantee safety as before. Initially exporting democracy abroad was not planned, the only objective was state security. However, democratization became a tool of building a coalition against communist countries; thus, strengthening U.S. position in the international arena and guaranteeing security.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Ronald Reagan, “Text of Reagan's Address to Parliament on Promoting Democracy,” *The New York Times*, June 9, 1982, <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/09/world/text-of-reagan-s-address-to-parliament-on-promoting-democracy.html>.

⁵⁹ Muravchik, *Exporting*, 117.

It is commonly agreed that the United States acts from structural-realism perspective and this can be shown in different examples. For instance, its preference not to act upon human rights violations conducted by Israel against Palestine, or its war on Iraq waged despite the UN Security Council resolution. Democratization is also not an act of pure virtue, as the US cherry-picks countries for democracy assistance, while ignoring more brutal cases of liberal values and human rights violations. Here one may argue against this statement by saying that the mentioned events happened during different administrations. Although US administration changes, the US grand political agenda does not drastically differ, therefore it continues to act from a structural-realist perspective. In the following subchapter US geopolitical objectives will be covered in more detail.

As a sole superpower, the United States' objective is to preserve the status quo, maintain and strengthen its influence in various spheres of international relations such as political, economic, military, cultural and other. Why democratization? According to Joshua Muravchik, democracies are more appealing to the USA because "*they tend to be peaceful and pro-American*".⁶⁰ While other major international actors also aspire to gain more power, for them it is almost impossible to influence people in the same way that the US has been able to. Hence, be it China or Russia or the USA, they have the same goal, but the American approach is more successful a priori. Thus, democratization allows the US to gain support both at home and abroad.⁶¹ In addition, democratization decreases chances of a military confrontation, since democratic states do not engage in hot conflicts.

4.1.1. U.S. geopolitical objectives

As it was already mentioned, structural realism holds that every country's main objective is survival, which needs to be achieved by any means available. The next objective after survival is gaining more power, which would allow a state to dominate the international community and thus strengthen the first objective. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States the sole world super-power and it is quite logical that it would like to preserve this status. Halford Mackinder believed that a key to world domination is a control over the Heartland of Europe. Considering that two world wars started in the Heartland after the theory had been designed, one may say that states also believed in the importance of the pivot territories of East Europe.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 64.

⁶¹ Ibid.

In 1991, the U.S. grand strategy took a slightly different course than it had followed during the Cold War. Since international relations became unipolar, Washington had to change its foreign policy from two super-powers rivalry to the preservation of unipolarity.⁶² Effectively this did not change their ultimate goal to be a world hegemon. However, the dissolution of the USSR significantly affected the balance of power in Eurasia and led to the creation of new states that have been of U.S. geopolitical interest and concerns from before, for example Georgia or Uzbekistan. As Brzezinski put it: *for America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia.*⁶³ For the US to achieve this goal, it means to assure that no other power will be able to shake American position in the world affairs and change the status quo, so it could solely focus on domination of Eurasia and thus the world.

Hence, maintaining the status quo is one of the main objectives of the US. It is a multilayer policy because it includes many smaller objectives, which together make the USA the world super-power. These objectives will be to remain the dominant power in the western hemisphere that will maintain secure borders. The next objective is to ensure no other hegemony arises in the regions around the globe, as this will question the American presence and influence there. Therefore, the USA contains rising regional powers to prevent them from becoming regional hegemons. Examples of this include the U.S. involvement in Asia to contain China from gaining more power and secure U.S. alliances such as Japan or South Korea from China's influence.⁶⁴

The international order created by the Cold war was interrupted by the events of 9/11 that set the United States foreign policy on a democratic crusade in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Following the tragic events, George W. Bush said: *"I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American People...As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world."*⁶⁵ The Afghan campaign of the War on Terror was widely supported, and even brought the United States and Russia closer, as they agreed to fight terrorism together. However, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 drove the two countries apart, and since then we have witnessed a deterioration of USA-Russia relations up until 2009 when Hillary Clinton and Sergey Lavrov together hit the reset button declaring hopes to improve

⁶² Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997), <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.2307/2539283>, 60.

⁶³ Brzezinski, *The Grand*, 30.

⁶⁴ Nathan Gardels, "Aiming to Contain China Would Be a Historic Blunder," *The Washington Post*, November 16, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/11/16/us-china-4/>.

⁶⁵ "Text of George Bush's Speech," *The Guardian* (September 21, 2001), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13>.

relations between the countries.⁶⁶ However, since 2014, there has been a constant decline in relations between the two because of the events in Ukraine and Syria. The growing suspicion about each other's intentions and disagreements on almost everything has become an integral part of the US-Russia relations. In 2011, Barack Obama introduced the Pivot to Asia policy, which shifted the U.S. focus from the Middle East to Asia.⁶⁷ Despite a declaration of new geopolitical pivots, the USA remains present in the previous pivot regions as well, since its capabilities allow for that. This very brief timeline of primary U.S. focus shift from one region to another is presented here because it had an impact on international order and U.S. geopolitical strategy in regards to regions (as the grand strategy does not change).

According to the security complex theory, states should care about their closest neighbors first and only then about distant ones. The U.S. geographical location and its neighbors allow the White House not to be concerned with its security in the immediate geographical location, and thus leaves more capabilities to be involved in distant regions. In fact, the U.S. involvement across the Atlantic and the Pacific is vital to its security as well. There are several reasons for that. First, modern technologies now allow one country to attack another country from across the ocean. Hence, proximity is no longer the defining factor, when it comes to security. However, proximity plays an important role for anti-aircraft defense systems, as its deployment near potential enemy borders increases security. Therefore, the US is a strong advocate of NATO enlargement, as it allows to deploy defense systems on worrisome states' borders. Second, regional intervention usually proves to be beneficial, as this establishes strong ties and interdependence with either ruling elite or local opponents. This, in turn, leads to more security and power.

Despite its concern to maintain the current status quo, Washington tolerates regional hegemonies in cases when it is an ally. For example, Germany could be called a European hegemony, if it was not so reluctant to accept this status.^{68 69} Thanks to close relations between the US and Germany, and Germany's agreement with the European and American political

⁶⁶ Sue Fleming, "Clinton, Lavrov Push Wrong Reset Button on Ties," Reuters (Thomson Reuters, March 6, 2009), <https://www.reuters.com/article/oukoe-uk-russia-usa-reset-idAFTRE52556O20090306>.

⁶⁷ David Shambaugh, "Assessing the US 'Pivot' to Asia," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 2 (2013), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26270763>, 10.

⁶⁸ Allan Little, "Why Is Germany so Reluctant to Take a Lead in Europe?," BBC News (BBC, September 18, 2013), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24037698>.

⁶⁹ According to Joachim Bitterlich, former German Chancellor Foreign Policy Advisor, the reason for this is that after WW2 Germans were constantly told to be modest and taught not to lead. Although, Germany does not accept a hegemon status in the EU, its foreign policy based on soft power, industries, economy, international trade, whereas Germany is one of the largest exporters, social policies and many other things make the country a leading European member.

course, the U.S. does not see a potential threat to its position. If Germany ever decides to change its relations with China or Russia and make a strong alliance with either one or both, this will be regarded as a threat to American influence in Europe and Asia; thus, it will not be welcomed.

To contain regional powers, the US needs to maintain its military and economic supremacy. The Clinton Administration summarized U.S. goals and strategy in one paragraph: *“Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies...The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”*⁷⁰

Military supremacy is achieved through huge funds dedicated to research and development in the military sector while maintaining existing military bases and establishing new ones in every region of the world. For example, U.S. troops have been deployed in Japan since the Second World War. This allows Washington to contain North Korea and China to some extent. Economic supremacy is maintained via creating dependence on American market, inter-state loans and, of course, through giants such as the World Bank and IMF, which are dominated by the U.S. government.⁷¹

So how are the above-mentioned U.S. geopolitical objectives related to democracy promotion? According to Nye’s theory on the changing concept of power discussed in Chapter 2, the means of power have evolved, and states now opt for smart power. Therefore, Washington cannot simply send troops to every country that can potentially question America’s status as the sole super-power. If you call for democratization in developing countries, this takes years of work on the ground before the desired changes occur, but you receive local and international support, avoid hot conflicts and most importantly you build a loyal alliance. To build an ally that pursues same goals as you, it takes three steps in establishing relational power.

First, commanding change can be achieved by influencing a state’s agenda and decision-making. If Washington successfully democratizes a country, this changes the country’s initial preferences in favor of the donor. If a recipient country is reluctant to change, then the USA can call for a carrot and stick policy.

The second step is controlling an agenda. A fully democratic government has limited choices of strategy compared to a non-democratic actor. This is already a change of preferences

⁷⁰ James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, “Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators? The Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–99,” *Democratization* 12, no. 4 (August 2005), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340500225947>, 440.

⁷¹ Brzezinski, *The Grand*, 27.

towards America's preferences, as it sets rules of what it means to be a democracy. Part of the democratization process is becoming a responsible member of various international organizations. Along with that, the recipient state becomes involved in economic agreements and starts trade relations with Washington and other actors that could be dependent on the U.S.. It is important to highlight that the donor does not depend on the recipient state market as much as the recipient depends on it. All of these combined shapes and restricts a state's options.

The third step is where Washington shapes the recipient state's preferences without its awareness. Thus, the recipient naturally changes its preferences in favor of the U.S. without the US government commanding it. This is a long process that requires new liberal values and culture to grow their roots, so they will become an inseparable part of the governance and society.

If one was to compare the outcome of the last stage of relational power with a military conquest outcome, the results would be very similar. Historically, countries would go to war to expand territory, and develop their economies through either new geographic location, natural resources or new market access. A fallen country would have no choice but to accept newly imposed preferences and this could result in a partisan war and/or uprising against the new ruler or a confrontation with another country. However, if one comes with peace and reforms that are welcome among citizens, and opens new horizons for political and economic growth, this will be well-received and widely supported. A donor will receive the same benefits as in the scenario with a military conquest, but the recipient state will naturally believe that they have a supportive donor state as an ally.

4.1.2. Bottom- up approach and U.S. techniques

As it was discussed above, a bottom-up approach is pursued when a ruling party is not interested in cooperation and not planning to weaken their power to adopt democratic values. There are various techniques that can undermine the ruling party from the bottom and bring a new leader that is prone to cooperate with the donor. Below, U.S. covert and overt democratization strategies will be discussed. Studying them will benefit us later, when comparing the tactics used by the US to the Soviet tactics and thus answering a question if democracy and communism promotion are essentially similar.

Military invasion and/or occupation

Before the ideological confrontation between liberal and communist ideologies, Washington already had experience exporting democracy abroad. The Philippines were

occupied by U.S. forces in the end of the 19th century. Initially, the military operation was not planned as a conquest for democracy. At first, this was a matter of suppressing the separation from the American territories. However, Washington saw the establishment of democratic order as peace preservation and to some extent its security guarantee.⁷²

Years after the Second World War, the U.S. occupied and then democratized Japan, Germany and Austria. Those were outstanding cases due to the circumstances. Nevertheless, military occupation and the following political involvement helped to establish democracies in former autocratic countries. Undoubtedly, the main goal was to ensure that Nazi governments would not return to power, which would secure many other countries from military aggression. Thus, the occupation was just.

This was followed by military interventions in countries throughout the Cold War years. As communism posed a threat to U.S. security, Washington pushed hard on democracy promotion around the globe. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the idea of the great communist revolution, one would assume that Washington would have slowed down with its democracy export policy, due to the absence of a great ideological rival. Nevertheless, the USA switched to semi-democracies and authoritarian regimes, which also pose a threat to U.S. security, as it was summarized by Clinton's administration.

Another post-Cold War assumption would be that there would be fewer military conflicts and interventions around the world. However, the number of conflicts remains at roughly same level. It is fluctuating between 30 and 40 armed conflicts per year. In 1989, there were 40 armed conflicts⁷³ and in 2018, there were 34 armed conflicts.⁷⁴ In many cases, military intervention is justified due to human rights violations and it is seen as a necessity to topple down current regimes and bring democracy to impacted states. The protection of human rights is a vital responsibility of the UN that must agree on a resolution. However, the U.S., along with NATO, has launched attacks without the UNSC agreement including attacks against Serbia, Iraq and Libya.⁷⁵ These interventions are still very questionable and caused many civilian casualties. Yet, while fighting these human rights violations close to home, many EU countries and the US preferred to ignore the genocide in Rwanda for many months, while the

⁷² Karin Von Hippel, *Democracy by Force US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 8.

⁷³ Therese Pettersson and Peter Wallenstein, "Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 4 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315595927>, 538-539.

⁷⁴ Ivan Navarro Milian et al., "Alert 2019! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding," *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, June 4, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/alert-2019-report-conflicts-human-rights-and-peacebuilding>, 9.

⁷⁵ Once again, despite the fact that each operation was ordered under different administration, it still corresponds to the U.S. grand strategy, therefore different in administration does not play a role here.

situation was rapidly escalating. This conflict ultimately became one of the bloodiest massacres in the post-Cold war era.

Military intervention and occupation are necessary in some cases, but they should be driven by only one purpose, which is human rights protection. Everything else such as reforms, government willing or forced resignation and so on should be secondary. Although, realists argue that survival of the nation is nation's first responsibility and should not be compromised,⁷⁶ hardcore realists, like John Mearsheimer agrees that humanitarian intervention can be absolutely necessary.⁷⁷ Some military interventions pursue more political, military and economic power in that specific country or region. Such cases make the idea of democracy promotion abroad questionable and less attractive, as non-democratic countries are concerned with their own survival.

Central Intelligence Agency Operations

The United States started its democracy crusade during the Cold War. Measures and tactics were defined by the situation and covert operations became one of the most utilized techniques. Washington ordered the CIA to spread democratic ideas to masses via publications, trainings, conferences, Radio Liberty and many other means.⁷⁸ The CIA's goal was to ensure that the USA emerge as the only superpower and to reduce the number of Communist governments around the world.⁷⁹

The first and main concern was postwar-Europe. It was clear that the Soviet Union had plans to expand westwards as far as possible, which would make the U.S. presence on the continent almost obsolete. As the Church Committee⁸⁰ concluded later: *"The Soviets had powerful political resources in the West- the Communist parties and trade unions. ...The United States responded with overt economic aid...and covert political assistance...."*⁸¹ The overt economic aid was the famous Marshall Plan that granted funds for rebuilding postwar Europe. It aimed not only at immediate recovery, but also envisioned a long-term goal to rebuild economy.⁸² There were no criteria on who could receive the funding, as it was offered to

⁷⁶ Baylis, et al., *The Globalization*, 95.

⁷⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, "America Unhinged," *The National Interest*, no. 129 (2014), [https://nationalinterest.org/files/digital-edition/1388435556/129 Digital Edition.pdf](https://nationalinterest.org/files/digital-edition/1388435556/129%20Digital%20Edition.pdf), 20.

⁷⁸ Muravchik., 119.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ A committee elected by U.S. Senate to investigate on CIA, NSA, FBI and IRS abuses. From "Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," October 18, 2019, <https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm>).

⁸¹ Muravchik, *Exporting*, 120.

⁸² Ibid., 177.

Western as well as Eastern European countries, which were under Soviet influence. The conditionality would appear only after receiving the money, since this was planned as a hook to create dependence on U.S. subsidies. It would be naïve to assume there was no political message behind the Marshall Plan. As George Marshall said, its purpose was “*to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.*”⁸³

The covert part of operation targeted democratic parties in countries with strong Communist influence. Italy and France could have fallen under Communist rule, since they had strong Communist parties. Therefore, Washington secretly funded non-Communist parties. According to William Colby, head of the project and then director of the CIA, this money was allocated to *publications of newsletters, leaflets, posters, and other propaganda material...advice be given for training programs, research and study groups, local party offices and activities, and so on.*⁸⁴

Along with strong Communist parties, the Soviets were widely supported by labor unions. Moreover, the unions were strongly against American involvement due to U.S. underrepresentation of labor force.⁸⁵ A path to win labor unions’ support was put in place by leaders of the American Federation of Labor’s Free Trade Union Committee. They started a program to support the European labor force and their families by financial and non-material aid to non-Communist labor unions. This was covertly picked up by the CIA and executed at the highest level.⁸⁶

Both covert and overt operations had a crucial impact on the outcome of the Cold War, as it helped Democrats to win elections and reduce Communist influence in the key Western European countries such as Italy, France and Germany.

These examples of the CIA operations demonstrate insignificant portion in the variety of covert and overt operations. While on the one hand, it might look like a selfless move to improve political, social and economic conditions in foreign countries, there is also strong arguments against this type of outside influence. First of all, shaping people’s preferences by externally sponsored propaganda has its moral implications but it also withdraws a fundamental right- freedom of choice. Another argument against is the overfunding that leads to dependence and violates core democratic values. A former CIA Station Chief said: “*any aspiring politician [in one of the heavily financed countries] almost automatically would come to the CIA to see*

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 122.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 124.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

if we could help him to get elected.”⁸⁷ Covert operations also implied certain risk, as financed agents could have had completely different goals and could have turned against the U.S. In addition, this could easily undermine the U.S. government in the international community’s eyes in case of any leaks. It could have also caused protests and instability, if people of the target country would have learnt that they were being influenced by an external state, for instance a U.S. orchestrated revolution in Iran in 1953.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

One of the largest CIA projects was and still is Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which later merged into one organization. Both radios were founded by private citizens but heavily relied on covert CIA funding.⁸⁸ The radios cooperated with exiles, opposition that were pursuing democratic reforms back home; in general, their propaganda campaign was aimed at reducing the influence of the USSR. Radio Free Europe’s broadcast target region was European countries under Soviet occupation; and Radio Liberty operated within the Soviet republics. If the U.S. government funding was to be revealed, this would undermine the radios perceived credibility and unbiased approach. Therefore, the Congress created the Board for International Broadcasting.⁸⁹ Thus, the covert operation became overt in order not to compromise its programs and achievements. Until present time, the radio is fully functioning and has the same agenda of democracy promotion.

The Reagan Doctrine

While the radio operation was one of the largest covert actions, the Reagan Doctrine became the costliest operation.⁹⁰ This was a policy of supporting anti-Communist insurgents all over the world.⁹¹ Although, it called the Reagan Doctrine, the operation itself started at the end of World War Two when the U.S. launched secret massive support for resistance groups in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and Ukraine.⁹² During Reagan’s presidency, the operation started to fund mujahedins in Afghanistan and developed on a different scale.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 137.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 141.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 144.

⁹¹ “Reagan Doctrine, 1985,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed January 19, 2020, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17741.htm>.

⁹² Muravchik, *Exporting*, 144.

The Reagan Doctrine was perfectly aligned with the U.S. policy of containment; however, it did not aim at spreading democracy. It was mostly concerned with homeland security rather than with political ideologies abroad. It is hard to imagine that Afghani mujahedins would build a country based on liberal norms and values. However, the action was successful as it did eliminate Soviet influence in Afghanistan and also exhausted the Soviet resources, thus strengthening American influence in the region. According to Muravchik, as *“democracy’s fate was interwoven with America’s success in the Cold War, the Reagan Doctrine served democracy.”*⁹³

United States Agency for International Development

The success of the Marshal Plan paved the way for establishing the Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1962. According to the USAID History Book, USAID initial objectives were:

- Creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing production in developing countries.
- Diminishing the threat of communism by helping countries prosper under capitalism.

Both objectives were determined to increase U.S. influence and presence in international relations. One could disagree and say that these intentions are aimed at making the world a better place. However, as international actors operate in a realist world, they pursue their goals first and weigh their decisions to enrol in foreign aid campaign carefully. The first objective would allow the U.S. to dominate markets in recipient countries, and the second objective would eliminate the USSR from the recipient countries and create a more secure position for the U.S.

USAID now has a broader spectrum of interests, which include global health, disaster assistance, education, gender and empowerment, water and sanitation, democracy, human rights and governance.⁹⁵ As this work focuses only on politics, all non-related aspects listed above will not be reviewed. USAID political objectives are to assist partners to become self-reliant, promote American prosperity through investments that help to expand U.S. export

⁹³ Ibid., 145.

⁹⁴ “USAID History,” U.S. Agency for International Development, May 7, 2019, <https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaaid-history>).

⁹⁵ Bea Bezmalinovic, “Understanding USAID: Know Their Goals and Objectives,” Humentum, December 18, 2016, <https://www.humentum.org/blog/understanding-usaid-know-their-goals-and-objectives>).

markets, and support for democratic societies.⁹⁶ The goal of USAID democracy, human rights and governance (DRG) program includes:

- Promote participatory, representative and inclusive political processes and government institutions.
- Foster greater accountability of institutions and leaders to citizens and to the law.
- Protect and promote universally recognized human rights.
- Improve development outcomes through the integration of DRG principles and practices across USAID's development portfolio.⁹⁷

A bottom-up approach generally features organizing elections at early stage. Advocates of the bottom-up approach believe that replacing a government with a newly elected one would put a non-democratic country on the right path to a full-fledge democracy. When the USAID is to organize elections, it accounts for the current level of freedom, the existing procedures for holding elections and electorate turnout.

Political awareness among the local populace also plays a vital role in organizing fair elections.⁹⁸ Therefore, the USAID also takes responsibility to provide trainings on various matters depending on a country's level of development. This is done to create responsible stakeholders, who will be politically active, thus facilitating democratic development. Another aspect of building a healthy democratic government is independent media, as this is the main source of information. The USAID provides trainings and technical assistance to journalists to establish free media.⁹⁹

To summarize on the USAID mission, one may conclude that its scope has been evolving throughout the years in order to adopt to the current political situation. The version we see now is far more complex and concentrated on various international matters than the initial version, which was self-protection oriented. Nevertheless, one trait has survived through the years of the agency evolution. The Agency still keeps room for a carrot and stick policy, thus influencing state's preferences.

National Endowment for Democracy

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was launched in 1983 with its main goal to help democracy flourish around the world. As mentioned earlier, Washington already had

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ "Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Strategy: Democracy, Human Rights and Governance," U.S. Agency for International Development, May 7, 2019, <https://www.usaid.gov/democracy-human-rights-and-governance-strategy>).

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

CIA programs aimed at promoting democracy, and funds to support democratic opposition in non-democratic countries. However, an idea of having an NGO that would decide on recipient countries and opposition leaders to fund appears to be more politically correct.¹⁰⁰ This process does not involve the American government directly; thus, it allows the US to maintain amicable relations with current non-democratic leaders. In addition, it is less compromising for a democratic opposition to accept money from an NGO than from the U.S. administration.

Before we proceed with the NED methods, it is necessary to define its scope. Three groups are identified as its main targets. These are countries in transition, less open countries and tenuous democracies.¹⁰¹ The first group refers to states where authoritarian order has been shaken due to reasons such as internal conflicts and civil wars, economic turmoil, external isolation or invasion.¹⁰² Presently, this would also include semi-democratic countries such as former Soviet members. The less open countries division covers countries, which have not moved to a transition stage yet, and thus either have no democratic opposition at all, or it is poorly presented, or it has to operate covertly.¹⁰³ North Korea or Saudi Arabia would be great examples of such states. Strong authoritarian regimes make it impossible for any opposition to arise. Hence, the NED cannot operate in such environments as well. The only option left for the NED is to support exiles.¹⁰⁴ Recently democratized countries with no long history of democratic traditions fall under tenuous democracies group. One of the existing examples could be Tunisia after the Arab Spring.

The NED actions are framed within five broader programs, which are:

- pluralism;
- democratic governance political processes;
- education, culture and communications;
- research/international forum for democracy;
- international cooperation.¹⁰⁵

Pluralism is an essential part of democracy; thus, the NED aims at supporting various groups and organizations to facilitate a dialogue among them and establish common ground. Trade unions are one of the main NED support receivers, as they are “*an organized force for representing the interests of the common people in the political, economic, and social life of a*

¹⁰⁰ Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling Americas Destiny* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1992), 204.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ “Statement of Principles and Objectives. Strengthening Democracy Abroad: The Role of the National Endowment for Democracy,” National Endowment for Democracy, accessed January 12, 2020, <https://www.ned.org/>).

country.”¹⁰⁶ Cooperation with trade unions includes trainings, education seminars and exchange programs for unions representatives. This helps to raise people’s political awareness and stress the importance of political activism, even if some it means only to participate in elections.

Another target group is the business sector, as an open market economy is another vital component for a functioning democracy.¹⁰⁷ A truly independent private sector is able to counterbalance a government; thus, it can limit state power and help democracy to flourish. However, there is a thin line between oligarchy and democracy. For a healthy democratic state, the private sector requires all-inclusive representation to avoid corporations taking control over state decision-making.

The last group that receives NED’s support are civic and social organizations. They play a crucial role in enlightening wider society, as they work with various social groups, including minorities.¹⁰⁸ This promotes inclusiveness and acceptance, which aid the democracy cause.

The democratic governance political processes program is aimed at strengthening the rule of law, supporting political parties and promoting fair elections, and educating society.¹⁰⁹ Despite education being part of the two first programs, the NED sees it as a separate group. An educated society is an absolutely vital component of a democratic society and government, but a nation-wide democratic culture is even more crucial. This is achieved through various channels such as independent press, books and television, or open discussions.¹¹⁰

Another aspect of the Endowment is closely related to the education and culture program but aspires to target wider audience. The international forum initiative gives grants to research projects, which contribute to democracy promotion.¹¹¹ One of the most famous examples of this is the *Journal of Democracy*. This program organizes an international forum, where democratic leaders share difficulties and experiences on a path to liberal governance. International cooperation is achieved through regional cooperation of democratic activists with the main aim to build a common identity.¹¹²

4.1.3. Conclusion

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 7.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid., 9.

This chapter demonstrated a variety of democratization techniques, which were actively developed at the end of WW2, and since then have been evolving and adjusting to the international political conditions. It also shows a smooth evolution from covert to overt operations, as times have changed. However, this also does not exclude the possibility of covert operations in present times. It is too early to judge what tactics are being used currently, as this information will not be declassified in the near future. Furthermore, it would be naive to believe that the US has ceased to use the CIA for homeland security and vital state interests.

4.2. The European Union objectives and top-down approach

Geography defines foreign and domestic policy in almost every possible way. Europe has always been a central arena for international conflicts due to states' proximity to each other and the fact that many of the modern great powers intersected there and often had conflicting interests. Presently, conflicts among European Union powers are mitigated in the EU institutions, which makes the core of the European continent peaceful and prosperous. Nevertheless, its geographic location keeps the members occupied with security concerns, as its neighbors to the east and south may potentially pose a threat to the Union. Thus, the EU focuses on its close neighbors, unlike the United States.

One component of the EU's success is its complex institution system, which regulates all aspects and allow its members to enjoy the economic, political and security benefits of it. Therefore, when importing democracy, they prefer a top-down approach over the bottom-up as it focuses on state's development in all aspects through institutions building rather than ad hoc opposition.

In the following subchapter, the European Union's geopolitical goals will be discussed in order to see if democratization could help the Union to achieve its geopolitical objectives. Therefore, I will begin by stating the geopolitical goals of the EU. Then we will move towards examining democratization instruments used by the EU. Combined, these will assist us to find a correlation between democracy promotion abroad and pursue of geopolitical objectives.

4.2.1. The EU geopolitical objectives

Europe did not emerge as a global superpower after the Second World like the United States and the Soviet Union did. Major European powers were economically, politically and physically devastated and they did not have such military power. In addition to this, Germany,

Austria and Italy had to recover from Nazism and Fascism. Europe's geographic layout made it a battlefield for a superpower competition with the Soviet Union and the United States each trying to pull each European country to its side of the battle ground. Apart from the Cold War, former European colonies were another security concern because of wars for independence. In the recent past, civil wars and/or general instability in North Africa and the Middle East led to the Migrant crisis in 2015 put the EU into an insecure position. Therefore, border-security has always been on the European agenda.

The European Union is a strong democracy advocate that also believes that democratic states do not wage wars against each other. Therefore, EU democratization policy can be justified with a democratic peace theory. This benefits the border-security and regional stability, since democratic states do not use violence internally as well. All of this contributes to the regional stability.

Although the EU is far less concerned with its distant neighbours when compared to the United States, it is still involved in all major negotiations with Russia, China, Syria and other powers that could potentially disrupt the status quo. The EU is highly concerned with the great powers competition and mitigating it is one of its objectives.¹¹³ Reaching this objective will grant greater economic and territorial security to the Union. Another EU concern with distant neighbours is terrorism. Instability and wars in the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries led to the rise of terrorism in many European countries, which keeps Brussels involved in the conflict resolution there.

The European Union is a responsible stakeholder that is involved not only in military or economic conflict resolution, but it is also a leading power in fighting climate change.¹¹⁴ One reason that climate change is very important to the EU is based on the belief that climate change and the slow transition to green energy sources might destabilize leading gas and oil exporters such as Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf states. Their economy is highly dependent on oil and gas prices, so diversion from traditional sources could result in economic turmoil, which might be followed by internal and regional instability. This will also shift the balance of power, as the United States will no longer need to maintain its military presence in the Gulf.¹¹⁵ Russia refuses to admit that climate change is a serious threat to the world order. Although the

¹¹³ "Geopolitical Outlook for Europe Confrontation vs Cooperation," European Commission (European Political Strategy Centre, June 8, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc_brief_geopolitical.pdf, 2-3.

¹¹⁴ Sebastian Oberthür, "Where to Go from Paris? The European Union in Climate Geopolitics," *Global Affairs* 2, no. 2 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1166332>, 5.

¹¹⁵ Anatol Lieven, "How Climate Change Will Transform the Global Balance of Power," *Financial Times* (Financial Times, November 5, 2019), <https://www.ft.com/content/27e6c7c8-ce5c-11e9-b018-ca4456540ea6>.

United States signed the Paris Accords, its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement strengthened EU-China climate change cooperation.¹¹⁶ This puts the EU in a leading position in a climate change fight.

Access to energy resources and instability are not the only reasons why the EU is concerned with climate change. Another potential geopolitical threat to the European borders as a result of climate change is the ice melting in the North Pole. This is already shifting the geopolitical balance in the Arctic and will continue to change the power balance there, as many parties show interest in the Arctic.¹¹⁷ Therefore, abiding and observing the Paris Accords is one of the geopolitical objectives for Brussels in order to avoid a world nature catastrophe, secure its borders and maintain regional stability at least.

Geopolitics is a control over territory, which implies setting and maintaining secure borders. As it was discussed earlier, each state's goal is survival and states are relying more on smart power than on traditional military strength. Hence, establishing secure borders by building interdependent relations has become one of the key foreign policies. Nine EU members share their borders with either Russia or post-Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) which tend(ed) to be strongly pro-Russian. This eliminates a buffer zone between the European Union and Russia for the EU, as Moscow sees former Soviet republics as an extension of Russia.

The western EU members are more secure than eastern and central EU members, thanks to their distant location. Therefore, Eastern and Central European members would find themselves in safer positions if there were more pro-EU states on the border. This makes Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova strategically important to European security. Currently, territories can be controlled by other means than hard power, e.g. occupation. As a result, the EU is a strong advocate of soft power. Democratisation happens to be one of the soft power means used by the Union. Again, this can be seen as a win-win situation as assisting in the establishment of governments that share liberal democratic values, and potentially building stronger ties with them improves border security for the EU.

The EU geopolitical concerns show us that the Union's first and only geopolitical objective is its internal and territorial security. Unlike the U.S., it cannot rely on border integrity.

¹¹⁶ Ariel Cohen, "U.S. Withdraws from Paris Accord, Ceding Leadership to China," *Forbes*, November 7, 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/11/07/us-withdraws-from-paris-accord-ceding-leadership-to-china/#13f5d88573c1>).

¹¹⁷ Ekaterina Klimenko, "The Geopolitics of a Changing Arctic," *SIPRI*, December 2019, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/sipribp1912_geopolitics_in_the_arctic.pdf, 3.

Therefore, one may conclude that the EU is a security maximiser, which follows the theory of defensive realism.

4.2.2. Top-down approach and EU techniques

The top-down approach targets governments and the political elite and expects that democratization initiative will come from them.¹¹⁸ However, a precondition for that will be current government readiness to step onto a path to democratization and willingness to cooperate with an external agent; otherwise, a top-down mechanism is not possible.

Copenhagen Criteria

Initially the European Union emerged as the European Economic Community as a result of the Second World War. It started as an attempt to bound countries by trade agreements to avoid military confrontations and maintain the reconciliation between France and Germany, which started with the Treaty of Paris in 1951.¹¹⁹ Then it evolved throughout the years and resulted in the Maastricht Treaty, which paved a way for greater European enlargement; and led to agreeing on Copenhagen criteria in 1993 that stipulate if one is eligible to join the EU. Until this point, there were no clearly established enlargement conditions, and the European Economic Community was a customs union with a focus on trade and economic development rather than a political union. It is doubtful that the founding members thought of the Community as a way of democracy promotion, as at the time they were preoccupied with post-war recovery.

In light of the Cold War, security was one of the primary goals of the ECC. Thus, it was important to establish ties with more European countries to ensure that Communist parties would not take over. Despite this, the ECC did not jeopardise its democratic values. Although they were not officially stipulated, these values did not allow authoritarian countries to integrate into the Community. Thus, the community always insisted that the main components of the ECC, including freedom, respect for human rights and the rule of law, were maintained.

If one looks at early rounds of European Union enlargement, namely Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, one will see that that it was very likely these three countries could have joined the Communist Bloc as they were recovering from authoritarian regimes, which had

¹¹⁸ Hornat, "Democracy...", 51.

¹¹⁹ "Treaty of Paris", accessed October 28, 2019, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/the-parliament-and-the-treaties/treaty-of-paris>.

collapsed thanks to the help of communist parties. Therefore, communists were quite influential and had a good chance of becoming a ruling party. Undoubtedly, in the events of the Cold War neither the EU founding fathers, nor the USA would allow more European countries to join the Warsaw Pact. It also should be mentioned that Greece, Spain and Portugal were not perfect candidates for membership as authoritarianism, civil wars, decolonization of overseas territories by Spain and Portugal along with the resulting decolonization conflicts left economies devastated. In addition, all three were far from being functioning democratic countries, but they were no longer authoritarian regimes either. Overall, they were not such a big asset from an economic standpoint for the ECC at the time. However, it was more beneficial to have them integrated and thus bind them by agreements and treaties than allowing the USSR to gain control over them.

Throughout the years, the EEC evolved into the EU as we all know it. Economic or security ties are no longer the main driving force for the Union enlargement. Since the Maastricht treaty, the focus of the EU shifted towards freedom and democracy. As it is stated in the Copenhagen criteria: “*Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.*”¹²⁰ As we can see, this document places a democratic form of government and the rule of law as the first criteria. Along with the above-mentioned criteria, additional conditions could be created. This depends on each individual case of enlargement and is mainly based on the current aspiring state’s political and economic situation. For example, the EU Commission had to create new criteria for the Western Balkans (North Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) known as the *Stabilisation and Association Process*.¹²¹ Taking inter-state relations within the Western Balkans into account, the additional conditions are intended at improving regional cooperation and interstate relations.

While the length of accession negotiations always differ as this depends on each case, they are usually divided into three stages. First, a country becomes a candidate for membership; this requires unanimity voting among all current EU member states. The second stage is formal membership negotiations, which requires adaptation of EU laws and compliance with the

¹²⁰ “Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council - 21-22 June 1993,” accessed October 28, 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf.

¹²¹ “Conditions for Membership,” European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission, December 6, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en).

Copenhagen criteria. The last step is accession itself once all parties have agreed.¹²² It needs to be highlighted that sometimes enlargement negotiations may last years before all EU members reach a unanimous agreement. Also, the EU Commission does not guarantee that all candidates will be allowed to join the EU, as negotiations may be frozen at any point.

Despite quite a long and bureaucratic process that does not promise a successful outcome to a candidate, there is still a handful of states aspiring to join the EU. On the other side, this is also quite a complex process, which requires considerable EU investment. In the successful enlargement scenario, the EU will be designating its budget to help a new member state to keep up with the standards set by the EU industry, infrastructure, agriculture, economy and so on. Thus, every enlargement round costs the Union a considerable amount of funding. Undoubtedly, this is not an act of philanthropy on either side. Both parties gain from this, the only question here is who gains what?

Let us start with the European Union gains from the enlargement policy, as it is one of the key actors to be studied in this research. According to the EU geopolitical objectives discussed earlier in this chapter, the main priority of the EU is border security, which can be achieved through the democratization of its closest European neighbours. Hence, enlargement helps to enhance border security, as neighbouring newly-joined countries eliminate potential threats posed by non-democratic governments. It also serves as a filter preventing refugees and illegal migrants to settle within the existing EU borders. Also, enlargement brings stability and prosperity to the current EU members, as newcomers follow European rule of law, which makes the region more stable, and they also open new markets.¹²³

However, it needs to be mentioned that each round of enlargement was unique and served its own purpose for the European Union. During the Cold War, the expansion of the European Community was inspired by several factors. First, it was intended to preserve peace on the continent and ensure that countries would not go into war by establishing political and economic ties. Secondly, the creation of an economic union allowed its members to conduct free trade and help countries recover from the devastation of the war. Finally, this was to prevent the further spread of communism and consequently the Soviet Union.

Enlargement rounds that happened after the end of the Cold War could be described as returning to the pre-World War Two status quo. Eleven EU members that joined since the

¹²² “Steps towards Joining,” European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission, December 6, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining_en).

¹²³ Federiga M. Bindi and Irina Angelescu, *Frontiers of Europe: a Transatlantic Problem?* (Rome: Scuola superiore della pubblica amministrazione (SSPA), 2011, 37-38.

2000s are former communist countries, which were either part of the USSR or Yugoslavia, or Soviet satellite states (exception for Malta and Cyprus). However, despite the ideological divide of the Cold War, these countries have always belonged to Europe. They share history, as some of them were parts of old European empires, culture, religion and identity. Therefore, their accession to the EU was a logical finale of the Cold War and communism in Europe. In contrast, if we look at some states aspiring to join the EU, e.g. Turkey, Georgia or Ukraine one may have difficulties to find strong past or cultural connection among them. However, their accession can be viewed from a geopolitical point of view, as this will help to stabilize the neighborhood and spread influence further in distant regions.

Another benefit is the expansion of the Single Market, as the existing members get free access for their goods to the newly admitted states. During the accession period, Brussels intervenes in every aspect of domestic and foreign policy of the potential member state, as it is obliged to comply with Copenhagen and additional (if any) criteria. Thus, by the time the candidate is ready to join, it is on par with the standards set within the EU, which could be seen as the third stage of relational power. From an international politics perspective, every new member makes the EU stronger, since it is representing more territories, population and developing its economy worldwide.¹²⁴ Therefore, enlargement has proven to be one of the most successful EU foreign policies.

The European Union neighboring countries usually are far less economically prosperous. As a result, both government and populations aspire to join the EU in order to improve their economic situation. Government aim at receiving subsidies for internal development, free trade and certain prestige level, while populations aim at an increase in salary standards within the country and the opportunity to have access to the free market. In the case of geographically and politically smaller countries, being an EU member gives them political significance in the international arena. It also opens a door to Western security arrangements and this is especially important for post-communist countries, as some are still struggling with their recent histories.¹²⁵ Free trade within the EU is another attractive point, as membership guarantees the float of goods among the members.¹²⁶ This is not just access to trade without barriers. This is also about becoming a member of the one the largest world economies.

Analyzing the benefits of the EU and its candidates, one may conclude that this is not a zero-sum game, as both sides significantly benefit from the European Union membership.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 38.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 37.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

The European Union started to investigate ways of delivering democracy abroad after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The EIDHR took its roots in the Resolution to launch European Democracy Initiative and became an EU instrument in 1994.¹²⁷ As Brussels follows a top-down approach to democracy promotion, the EIDHR does too. Therefore, the instrument is restricted from direct financing any political parties to support non-coercive assistance.¹²⁸

The EIDHR targets the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms with a task of bringing financial support worldwide.¹²⁹ The instrument's primary focus is on democracy assistance and 40-45% of its budget goes to support democracy development abroad.¹³⁰ The rest is dedicated to the protection of human, economic and social rights. It is also dedicated to the support and education of civil society that is one of the first steps in creating a functioning democracy.

Unlike other EU democracy promotion instruments, the EIDHR does not only focus on its close neighbors, but it acts globally. The EU has no ambitions becoming a world superpower that dominates international order. Therefore, here the EU behaves from a position of a responsible stakeholder whose goal is to bring prosperity, development and rule of law to non-democratic countries. In case of other institutions that target EU neighbors, the Union tries to maximize its security and uses the export of democratic norms and values as a means to achieve this.

European Neighborhood Policy

Enlargement guided by the Copenhagen criteria is an effective instrument, which is beneficial for both parties. However, there is a limit of how far the European Union borders can expand due to numerous reasons. First, EU enlargement into neighboring regions could cause both internal and international destabilization, as this would change a status-quo. Secondly, current EU members are careful when offering membership to countries with large populations, since EU Parliamentary representation and votes are based on each member's

¹²⁷ Hornat, "Democracy...", 182.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ "European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Country-Based Support Scheme, Palestine," EU Neighbours, March 18, 2019, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/opportunities/european-instrument-democracy-and-human-rights-eidhr-country-0>).

¹³⁰ Hornat, "Democracy...", 183.

population. On the one hand, expanding the EU borders offers a certain level of security, but there are geographical and political limits to how far the European Union can extend. Some of the EU closest neighbors present a number of security concerns due to internal instability in North Africa and the Middle East. Due to its proximity, the EU must put an effort in stabilizing these two regions.¹³¹ Therefore, Brussels introduced European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which aims to stabilize these states as an alternative to the enlargement policy.¹³²

The ENP was launched in 2004 “*with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbors and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all concerned.*”¹³³ As part of the ENP, the EU prioritizes the development of civil institutions and the promotion of rule-based societies. It does not exclude military action, when needed, but prefers to keep this as the last resort.¹³⁴ The ENP openly supports democracy and liberal opposition in its neighboring countries. It is being executed via funds and a policy of conditionality. However, the EU does not believe that the same democratic model fits every country. Thus, democracy promotion policy is always unique and considers the history, culture and local mentality of a state. It usually starts with the rule of law, judiciary system, transparency, accountability, and strengthening of civil society. This allows to avoid negative perception of the external actor in the country, and thus integrate political elite in the reforms process.¹³⁵

In case of the enlargement policy, it is clear why countries are motivated to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, since membership is offered as a reward. With the ENP, countries are driven by conditions defined in a bilateral Action Plan.¹³⁶ It stipulates both European Union liabilities towards a recipient country and a recipient country’s responsibilities to improve in areas defined by the EU.

In the book *The Frontiers of Europe: a Transatlantic problem*, it is argued that the ENP can be studied from two perspectives. First, it is an EU obligation to spread its ideals and policies across developing countries in order to facilitate their development, enhance human rights and import democratic values. The second objective of the ENP is European Union *geopolitical entrapment*, namely to pacify abroad that poses danger to European security.¹³⁷ According to Chris Patten and Javier Solana, “*there are a number of overriding objectives for*

¹³¹ Bindi and Angelescu, *Frontiers...*, 45.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., 105.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 106.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 107.

¹³⁶ Hornat, “Democracy...”, 189.

¹³⁷ Bindi and Angelescu, *Frontiers...*, 48.

our neighborhood policy: stability, prosperity, shared values and rule of law along our borders are all fundamental for our own security. Failure in any of these areas will lead to increased risks of negative spillover on the Union.”¹³⁸ This strengthens the point that first and foremost states are driven by their selfish goals. The ENP is an instrument that gives the EU greater security, and at the same time maintains good neighborhood relations and does not give false promises on future accession, while yet keeping that leverage over the aspiring neighbors. At the same time, recipients of the ENP benefit from this multilateral agreement, as it is also aimed at domestic improvements within the near abroad and provides sufficient funding to accomplish this goal.

European Endowment for Democracy

The establishment of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) in 2013 was partly inspired by the NED, as the EU needed a faster and more flexible instrument for allocating democracy promotion funds.¹³⁹ A need for creating the EED came from pure geopolitical motives from Poland (this was a joint Polish-Swedish proposal, but Sweden had different motives which were both altruistic and geopolitical). Warsaw’s concerns came from its shared border with Ukraine and Belarus and its proximity to Russia. Thus, it is strategically important to have functioning democratic governments, which are dependent on the EU there. This would have a positive impact on the border security for foremost Poland and the Union as well. As per Sweden, it is one of the few countries that bases its foreign policy on the value of human rights, democracy, and international cooperation. The Swedish government says that its foreign policy motto is “*what is good for the world is good for Sweden.*”¹⁴⁰ Thus, Sweden actually acts as a normative power, whose goal is to facilitate stability and development, especially in the near abroad. However, behind Sweden’s support for Ukraine, there is also a concern for its security. Russia’s exclave, Kaliningrad is right across the Baltic Sea from Sweden.¹⁴¹ Since Russia has been increasing its military presence there, Sweden is trying to contain Moscow’s influence countries closed to the EU.

The idea behind the EED was to improve and decentralize the democratization mechanism represented by the ENP, so it could offer more lucrative incentives such as visa-free traveling

¹³⁸ Ibid., 55.

¹³⁹ Hornat, “Democracy...”, 191.

¹⁴⁰ Daria Gaidai and Leonid Litra, “Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Sweden” (Institute of World Policy, 2017), http://neweurope.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Aud_Ukr_Swed_eng_net.pdf), 7.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 9.

and access to the EU common market.¹⁴² It is a private foundation independent from the EU and governed by its own statute. Since the aim was to develop a capability to take action and fund initiatives quickly, the EED target group is political movements (including the ones in exile), non-registered NGOs, trade unions and other social partners such as journalists or bloggers that promote liberal values, human rights and rule of law.¹⁴³ Such mechanism allows it to efficiently deal with ad-hoc situations because of its decentralized system and non-governmental target group.

As Catherine Ashton said *“the EED sends a concrete signal to our neighbors and beyond, that we are 100% committed to supporting democracy and the values upon which the EU was founded.”*¹⁴⁴ This statement may sound as a mission declaration, similar to the U.S. Manifest Destiny, especially considering the history and nature of the EED. While other mechanisms primary focus is on neighboring countries, the EED has ambitions to expand around the globe. This makes the EU image of security maximizer less trustworthy and shifts it towards power maximizer.

4.2.3. Conclusion

The EU balance between geopolitical and civilizational discourses when it comes to its near abroad perfectly fits into ideological geopolitics ideas of Agnew and Corbridge. Political-economic organization of the closest Union neighbors jeopardizes its internal and external security. Hence, this leads to homogenization of the neighbors as a potential threat to the EU stability and security. This ideological clash is naturalized by political statements and media that tends to focus on negative side. Such media coverage boosts civilian support for the ENS and its assistance to the neighbors.

As it was stated earlier, Brussels is an advocate of security maximization, thus its primary geopolitical focus is region stability and security of borders. According to Security Complex theory, first you should deal with your nearest neighbors and then move further afield. The EU is actively involved in political, economic and social development of its near abroad via mechanisms such as enlargement and the ENS, which scope is only neighboring countries. At the same time, there are two other instruments, the EIDHR and EED that target both near and

¹⁴² Serena Giusti and Enrico Fassi, “The European Endowment for Democracy and Democracy Promotion in the EU Neighbourhood,” *The International Spectator* 49, no. 4 (February 2014), <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2014.957018>), 118.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 121.

¹⁴⁴ “The European Endowment for Democracy – Support for the Unsupported,” European Commission - European Commission, November 12, 2012, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_12_1199).

distant actors. These two sets of developmental and democratizing mechanisms allow the EU act regionally and globally. Although thus far its main target group is near abroad, its aspiration to be involved more into distant state domestic affairs by means of development and democratization policies show its ambitions of being a power maximizer to some extent.

Analyzing EU foreign policy from Nye's concept of power perspective, one may say that the scope of power involves EU neighbors, and the domain of power is EU geopolitical objectives, which aim to increase and maintain internal and border security by democratizing its closest neighbors. How does the EU establish relational power over crucially important surrounding states? First, it begins with commanding change by offering carrots via the discussed above institutions and mechanisms. The EU either offers membership or a chance to develop to be counted as a potential member, along with that it provides funds and expertise. In addition, smaller states see the Union as their way to increase their standing within global community and be welcome at international organizations. All of this comes with a policy of conditionality, which allows the EU to influence one's decision making. Next step is controlling the agenda. At this stage, a recipient state is already involved in agreements and have certain responsibilities towards its new partners. The EU aim here is to convince that the recipient state and the Union have shared goals. In the case of the EU, this is not far from the reality. Its goal is to democratize neighboring countries to ensure its own security, thus the Union is truly interested in a positive outcome. At the same time, the recipient is either interested in the same, or its aim is to get access to the European funds without changing its policy. However, those states that aspire to become an EU member do not have a choice and have to start sharing and implementing liberal values and support EU decisions. The master stage of relational power is establishing preferences, where the recipient state fully supports the EU. A newly democratized country government with high probability came to power with external help, as it needed support at various levels on the way to democracy. If it is truly democratic, then the EU succeeded in establishing one's preferences, since they would follow a liberal path. Moreover, the EU would still act as external consultant to set the right path as the more experienced partner. If a new government is still not a full-fledge democracy, then the EU has an upper hand through agreements and conditionality, which allows them to maintain a situation where the recipient state must have similar preferences.

Each state's main goal is survival, especially from military conflicts and Democratic Peace theory claims that democracies do not go in war with each other. A successful democracy conversion should prevent the EU from entering an armed conflict with its neighbors. Hence, this would maintain and increase border security and also keep the region stable.

5. The USSR objectives and its approach to communism promotion

The Soviet strategy of strategy of expansion with a help of communist ideology was never questioned and became a conventional wisdom widely accepted in the world. Two main goals for Moscow were to secure its borders and maintain world hegemon status through the domination of regions. If we look at the reasons behind democracy promotion pursued by the USA and EU, one may conclude that it is driven by very same reasons.

In this research, a comparative approach is used to answer a question if a modern democratization policy is driven by geopolitical objectives and if it is similar to the Soviet spread of communism policy. Hence, this chapter sets to identify USSR geopolitical goals and study the means of achieving them via the spread of communism. It will also analyze if the USSR was a security or power maximizer, thus if its strategy was built on offensive or defensive realism. Along with that, I will try to identify what approach was used to promote communism abroad, specifically whether it was a bottom-up, top-down or hybrid of the time? Another question for this chapter is how did communism export benefit the Soviet Union and recipient countries? Before we proceed with the research, it needs to be acknowledged that there could be a lack of information, due to Soviet archives still being classified.

5.1. USSR geopolitical objectives

Communism as an ideology strongly denounces imperialism. This sentiment was frequently repeated by the Soviet Communist Party, and these ideas were used against European powers and the United States. However, looking at the USSR foreign policy before the German invasion in 1941, one may conclude that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Winter War with Finland and other events were imperialist in their nature. It was justified with geographical insecurity, as Robert Kaplan says.¹⁴⁵ Since this sense of insecurity would cause the Kremlin to always look towards expansion, thus, it is a thin line between insecurity and expansionism. The partition of Poland could be seen as a first step towards expansion into European territories. Another step could be communism promotion across Europe. In Chapter 6, it will be discussed that Comintern was actively working Czechoslovakia and this allowed for a smooth coup d'état later in 1948. The Soviet Union had imperialist ambitions, although

¹⁴⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2013), 173.

the Bolsheviks presented it as a “*blessing of communism*”.¹⁴⁶ Another sign of imperialism was a secret Percentage Agreement between Churchill and Stalin, where they divided Europe into spheres of influence.

Although geopolitics became a taboo after the Second World War, due to its hostile nature and source of inspiration for Nazism, it did not mean that states were no longer concerned about their geopolitical objectives. For centuries, Russia and then the USSR had control over most of the Heartland defined by Mackinder in 1919. The war’s outcome and Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe allowed Moscow to spread its influence further, thus, to control the heartland. Undoubtedly, this was a source of concern for both the USSR and other powers. Kremlin had to preserve control over larger territories, when its industries and economy were in ruins. At the same time, other states had to worry about how far the Soviet Union would decide to spread its power.

The Communist world revolution was an integral part of communism. So, in its early years, the Soviet Union under Lenin leadership aimed not only to preserve communism internally but also export it abroad. Reading philosophical communist works, one may think it was a utopian idea. However, looking at actual policy and events that swallowed so many countries and lives, one may see that communist leaders were driven by nothing but greed for power and world domination. Being the first communist state in the world, the USSR believed that it was its mission to spread communism and bring the world revolution.

Based on the mentioned above factors, the Soviet Union was in the great position to continue with active communism export, as it controlled Eastern European territory at the end of the Second World War. This would strengthen its control over the Heartland. In addition, the decolonization of Africa and Asia opened new horizons for the USSR, and it launched strong support for communism there as well. Along with that, the USSR was also involved in Latin America supporting communists there, for example Cuba, Honduras or Guatemala.¹⁴⁷

It would be drastically wrong to assume that the Soviet leaders truly believed in the idea of communism and its positive impact on state development and society. The main concern that captured Stalin was of pure geopolitical nature. The WW2 showed how vulnerable the Soviet borders could be and thus, raised a question of creating a buffer zone. As part of Europe was occupied by the Soviet troops, they were the first to fall under the communist rule. Establishment of friendly regimes on the border would guarantee a certain degree of safety, if

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 172.

¹⁴⁷ <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/19820625.pdf>

Germany or any other Western power decided to invade the USSR. Hence, this was the first and foremost geopolitical objective for Kremlin right after the war.

Another agenda was the world hegemon rivalry with the U.S.. Moscow and Washington did not trust to each other and were highly concerned with each other's political agendas. The United States government was worried about the spread of communism and its hostility towards capitalism, which made them enemies. Kremlin saw the U.S. as a threat to its internal security and stability, as it remembered American intervention on behalf of the White Movement. In addition, the discovery of the atomic bomb and subsequent bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki significantly worried Stalin, as it posed a threat to the USSR. Therefore, given an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility, competing ideologies and world domination competition pushed Moscow to look for other countries that would convert to communism. In this case, it was not a border security concern, it was for the sake of strengthening the Soviet position in the race with the U.S., thus aiming at becoming a world hegemon.

5.2. USSR approach to communism promotion and Soviet techniques

The Soviet Union could be considered the first and most dedicated country to spread communism abroad. Throughout history, empires used soft power to secure their interests by influencing domestic and foreign affairs of states that were strategically important to them. In the 20th century, states used various tactics to promote their ideology. Before the establishment of the League of Nations and later United Nations, there were no institutions to supervise international relations. Realists would argue that even today international actors operate in a state of anarchy. Hence, any means available to states to preserve their sovereignty were allowed.

At the inception of the Soviet conquest on bringing the world revolution, it did not have one established approach to its promotion. Moscow tried different means such as ideological and financial assistance via Comintern, which did not prove to be successful and slowly ceased. However, the super-power rivalry put the USSR back on the conquest for world communism and it started developing other strategies. The new approach did not aim at just one integration form, it tackled it at all available levels such as political, economic, military and ideological.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Andrzej Korbonski, "Theory and Practice of Regional Integration: The Case of Comecon," *International Organization* 24, no. 4 (1970), <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300017574>, 947.

The following subchapters will discuss tactics used by the Soviets and try to frame into approach.

5.2.1. Comintern and Cominform

After overthrowing the Tsar regime in the Russian Empire, Lenin occupied himself with an idea of the world revolution to free people from capitalism. Therefore, to fulfil this goal Lenin launched Communist International (Comintern) in 1919, which later was succeeded by Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947. Both organizations intended to give guidelines on how communism should be spread and maintained. The crucial difference between Leninism and Stalinism was that the latter was preoccupied with the security and integrity of the USSR while Lenin's ultimate goal was to bring the world a communist revolution.

In the beginning, Lenin believed that all other states should follow the example of the German Social Democratic party, later he leaned towards the idea of the Russian Communist Party supremacy, since the Soviet Union was the only successful example of the communist revolution at the time as there was a number of failed attempts to convert European countries into communist governments between 1917 and 1923.

Hence, the USSR was proclaimed to be the perfect communist model, which should be followed by the rest of the world.¹⁴⁹ Leon Trotsky, another ideological leader, also supported this idea, said *we place all our hopes upon the revolution igniting the European revolution. If the rising of the peoples of Europe does not crush imperialism, we will be crushed...this is certain.*¹⁵⁰ As the Russian Civil War was still at its peak, the majority of Western governments were providing military aid to the Russian army to fight the Bolshevik Revolution. For the Bolshevik government, it became vitally important to establish friendly regimes abroad.

It should be mentioned that Comintern was not the first organization of this nature. This was a re-establishment of two previous attempts to spread communism around the world. In 1919, Comintern was founded and quite quickly Lenin was able to make Soviet Russia its leader. The organization's aim was to promote communist world revolution and it ended up being a Soviet mechanism of control over foreign communist parties.¹⁵¹ Concerned by the

¹⁴⁹ Paul E. Zinner, "The Ideological Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 4, no. 4 (July 1952): 488-511, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2008962>, 490.

¹⁵⁰ Артем Кречетников, "'Мы Новый Мир Не Построили': 100 Лет Коминтерну," BBC News Русская служба (BBC, March 17, 2019), <https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-47542931>).

¹⁵¹ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Third International," Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., April 28, 2017), <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Third-International>).

German Socialist Revolution failure in 1919, Lenin took the responsibility of leading international communist parties to uprising by providing them with guidelines, which were stipulated in Twenty-One Conditions to Admission to Comintern. The conditions can be summarized to agree and follow the Bolsheviks example and guarantee support to the Soviet republics, otherwise states would be expelled from Comintern.¹⁵²

The post-World War One period was beneficial for communists in Europe, as the consequences of war convinced many that imperialism was wrong, and communism would be a solution to the current situation. Thus, communist parties were strong even without Soviet interference in state's domestic affairs. However, Lenin's desire for control over Comintern led to lack of trust and caution from the European communist parties towards Lenin and the USSR.

In 1924, Stalin replaced Lenin as the Party General Secretary and his pre-war years became very distant from Lenin's idea of bringing the world revolution. Failed communist uprisings in Europe, especially in Germany as it was the leading communist party in Europe, made Stalin very sceptical about the world communist revolution.¹⁵³ In addition, his personality did not allow him to spread its power outside the Soviet Union, as he wanted to maintain absolute unchallenged internal power. Therefore, Stalin decided to step away from the global revolution idea and proclaim the Socialism in One Country Policy, which entirely focused on building communism in the USSR. As Comintern was of little interest to Stalin and served a source of suspicion for the Allies powers in Second World War, it was dissolved in 1943.¹⁵⁴

Despite Stalin's scepticism towards communist revolution in Europe, American involvement in the Western European continent and the Marshall Plan were straightforward enough to pose a threat to the Soviet geopolitical objectives. Hence, Comintern was resurrected as Cominform in 1947.¹⁵⁵ Its main goal was set to provide public guidelines and instruction to promoting world communism. Given the threat coming from the West, communist parties were advised to "*speed up and synchronize the process of social and political transformation,*" which should alienate them with the West and thus, roll-back capitalism.¹⁵⁶

One of the first methods of securing and strengthening the position of Communist parties in Eastern Europe was the abolishment of non-Communist parties and suppression of anti-

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¹⁵³ Кречетников, "Мы Новый ...".

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Adam B. Ulam, "The Cominform and the People's Democracies," *World Politics* 3, no. 2 (January 1951), <https://doi.org/10.2307/2008952>, 201.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

Communism supporters across the satellite states. This was driven by the growing number of anti-Soviet advocates, which could have shaken Moscow authority there. The method did not just abolish undesired opposition but also forced opposition leaders to cooperate with communists.¹⁵⁷

Another way of securing communism in Eastern Europe was via a purge.¹⁵⁸ As Cominform's goal was to ensure that all other Communist parties followed "the right" example of communism exemplified by the Soviet Union, European communist leaders were easily accused of hostility towards the USSR and then expelled and prosecuted for traitorous practice. It is important to highlight that despite Eastern European communist states being independent, it was expected that they would only act in accordance with Soviet interests, even if this meant harming their own. For example, Traicho Kostov, General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist party, was accused of anti-Soviet sentiments, as he tried to protect Bulgarian economic interests, as he refused to share costs of Bulgarian goods production.¹⁵⁹ In addition, the trial against Kostov was partially a result of an internal power struggle among Communists in Bulgaria. However, this also shows that Moscow used its Cominform leadership to make puppets out of its fellow communist states, as they were forced to follow the Soviet guidelines. This confirms that establishment and guidance of communist regimes were primarily driven by the Soviet desire for power and control.

As mentioned earlier, Moscow wanted to be a world communist leader. While establishing puppet states in Eastern Europe, it was expected that none of them would challenge Soviet authority. This was one of the reasons behind establishing Cominform, so Moscow would have a control mechanism over all the members. However, there were exceptions to this rule. Yugoslavia, which was at first a loyal Soviet alliance, openly disagreed with certain policies; moreover, Tito wished Yugoslavia to be independent from USSR decisions. Along with that, Yugoslavia was the largest and most prosperous communist state in Eastern Europe, with the potential ability to question the Soviet Communist Party gravitas. All of it together was enough to make Stalin suspicious, considering his desire to maintain absolute power. Despite this, Yugoslavia was presented as a follow example to other Eastern communist parties.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 203.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 207.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 208.

¹⁶⁰ Jeronim Perović, "The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 2 (2007): pp. 32-63, <https://doi.org/10.1162/jews.2007.9.2.32>, 41.

According to declassified archives, Tito said that the first conflict between Moscow and Belgrade occurred over Albania.¹⁶¹ Tito's policy towards the unification of Yugoslavia and Albania highly concerned Stalin due to several reasons. First, this might have worsened relations with the West and given it a reason to send troops to prevent the unification.¹⁶² Secondly, this revealed Tito's plans to *be at the center of the Balkan countries in military as well as political respects*.¹⁶³ Thus, this would have created a regional hegemon, which undoubtedly was disapproved by the Soviets.

Since Yugoslavian policy conflicted with the Soviet geopolitical goals, the Kremlin accused Tito of betrayal and asked Cominform to rule out this dispute. This was followed by Yugoslavia's refusal, as this would not be a fair trial.¹⁶⁴ This led to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform and denouncement of Titoism, which was later frequently used to accuse other communist members of disloyalty. The conflict prevailed until Stalin's death and then Khrushchev restored relations with Tito; however, Yugoslavia continued being independent from Soviet interference.

The Tito-Stalin split was among the most significant events of the Cold War, as this paved a way to Non-Aligned Movement and Yugoslavian relations with both NATO and Warsaw Pact members. It was important to have it briefly discussed because this showed another way of how Cominform was utilized for the sake the Soviet Communist Party interests. It did not just pursue individuals to be purged, but it also purged countries that expressed disagreement or viewed communism from a different angle. The main goal was not to allow anyone to challenge the Soviet power, as this would have a negative impact on the superpowers race and harm Soviet geopolitical interests.

5.2.2. Salami tactics

One of the non-institutionalized ways of promoting communism was salami tactics. In some Eastern European countries, communist parties did not enjoy strong support and thus, had extremely limited chances of winning elections. Therefore, the Soviet Union introduced a method of eliminating opposition by different means that would gradually bring communists to power.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 42.

¹⁶² Ibid., 44.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 41.

¹⁶⁴ Ulam, "The Cominform...", 202.

As this term was coined by a Hungarian communist leader, Matyas Rakosi, it will be discussed using the example of Hungary. The Hungarian Workers Party gained only 17% at the post-war elections vote compared to 54% won by the Independent Smallholders Party in 1945.¹⁶⁵ To avoid this defeat, Matyas Rakosi together with the Communist Party gradually removed opposition, which allowed the Hungarian Workers to win the majority at the next elections. This was achieved by the purge of opponents or conspiring against smaller parties to completely eliminate them.¹⁶⁶ As a result, the Social Democrat Party was forced to merge with the communist party, in order to increase party members numbers and gain more supporters. Needless to say, Soviet representatives along with the Red Army based in Hungary actively participated in the elimination of opposition. They intervened in parliamentary procedures by exercising their right to veto government bills and encourage the build-up of security forces. Also, some popular leaders of the Smallholders were arrested and sent to the USSR.¹⁶⁷ As a result, the Smallholders Party was absorbed by the Communists and the elections of 1947 were significantly less democratic than in 1945 and brought the Hungarian Workers to power.¹⁶⁸

The salami tactics proved to be efficient across all Eastern Europe, which was under the Soviet occupation, as similar methods were carried out to help communists win the majority vote. However, it did not win the hearts and minds of the populace and resulted in civil uprisings first in Hungary in 1956 and then it spilled over to neighbouring countries. Communist parties were losing support because initially it was imposed by force and after Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev loosened up the power grip, which led to civil unrest. Nevertheless, the salami tactics assisted in Sovietization of Eastern Europe and thus, facilitated the Soviet power. It also played an important role in securing the Soviet borders, as it allowed to create a desired buffer zone; and it strengthened Soviet power in the region, thus supporting its claim to be a superpower.

5.2.3. Military force and the Warsaw Pact

The Red Army represented the only significant military force in Eastern Europe for an extended period of time. The only military challenge could have been posed by Yugoslavia but despite the Tito-Stalin split, the two communist giants did not openly confront each other. The

¹⁶⁵ "The Provisional National Government (1945)," The Orange Files, April 20, 2016, <https://theorangefiles.hu/the-provisional-national-government-1945/>.

¹⁶⁶ Paul G. Lewis, *Central Europe since 1945* (New York: Longman, 1994), 56.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 56-57.

Soviet troops stationed across the region helped to gain power and establish communist governments and then it played a major role in maintaining the regime.

It is hard to say if the Soviets had a master plan to create Warsaw Pact from the early years of occupation. Nevertheless, it engaged in bilateral friendships and political treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia before the war was over.¹⁶⁹ This guaranteed non-aggression and cooperation from the side of the two governments. Another way of securing the Soviet position in Eastern Europe was appointing “right” people to high-ranking positions within the army. They were either strong communist sympathizers or non-Russian Soviet officers that were granted citizenship and then placed in allies’ armies.¹⁷⁰ East Germany was a special case as Western powers were interested in Germany as a whole, thus Moscow stationed and maintained officers and soldiers until the Fall of Berlin Wall in 1989.¹⁷¹ These measures allowed the Soviets to consolidate and keep the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Moreover, such establishment guaranteed control over decision-making, which was directed from the Kremlin. It needs to be mentioned that such extreme control was loosened up after Stalin’s death, and it also became more institutionalized through Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1955.

The WTO Charter obligated its members to “*the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; to work towards the prohibition weapons of mass destruction; to assist other members in the case of armed attack in Europe on any one of them; to establish joint militia command; to further relations of economic and cultural cooperation without interfering in other countries’ internal affairs; and to seek a more general European treaty of collective security whose establishment would replace the existing pact.*”¹⁷² It is interesting that the Charter did not require a potential member to be socialist or communist.¹⁷³ However, there were no applicants other than states, which were already heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, and thus did not have much of a choice.

For the USSR, the main benefit of the Warsaw Pact obligations was an excuse to keep its troops stationed in its member states in Eastern Europe. Keeping military forces in Hungary benefited two geopolitical objectives of the USSR. First, it enhanced its border security, as the buffer zone comprised of the Easter European puppet states and control of these areas gave Moscow a legitimate reason to maintain its military presence there, which would be of an advantage in case of a hot conflict with NATO in Europe. Second, it secured the Soviet

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 190.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 189.

¹⁷² Ibid., 192.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

authority in Hungary, since the Red Army could have always intervened to preserve its interests in the country.

Along with that, the WTO acted as a policeman that ensured that the Soviet communism ideology and interests were secured. Any deviations that seemed to distance a satellite state from the Kremlin were suppressed. This guaranteed that Soviet influence remained absolute and unquestionable. Military suppression of the Hungarian Uprising and Prague Spring showed how vital it was to preserve full control over its fellow WTO members, when they made an attempt to slightly reform existing communist system.

First, military units and then the Warsaw Pact served as guarantors of communism putting its roots down and ensuring that Moscow stood behind this to pull the strings when needed. Therefore, the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe became a key element of successful change of ideology, with the only exceptions being Yugoslavia and Albania.¹⁷⁴

5.2.4. Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance

The Marshall Plan passed in April 1948 was among the greatest threats towards Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the Soviets reacted with a similar initiative in January 1949, which is known as Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).¹⁷⁵ The immediate driving force behind the establishment of COMECON was a threat of diversion of Eastern European countries towards the USA and Western Europe. Moscow was concerned with the strong interest expressed by the Eastern Bloc in receiving funds provided under the Marshall Plan initiative, as this would strengthen relations between them and Washington, which would in turn jeopardize their relations with Moscow. Hence, Eastern Europe was strongly advised to join the COMECON and to withdraw its applications from the Marshall Plan. Although the Eastern Bloc agreed to economic cooperation with the Soviet Union through the COMECON platform, it seriously affected its relations with the Kremlin, as the U.S. aid was vital for their post-war reconstruction and economy and the Soviet program was not capable of providing such funds since its economy was heavily damaged by the war as well. Despite this obvious challenge, the main unofficial goal for the Soviet committee was to demarcate Eastern European economies from the capitalist economies of the West; everything else was of secondary importance.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Denis Healey, "The Cominform and World Communism," *International Affairs* 24, no. 3 (July 1948), <https://doi.org/10.2307/3018651>), 344.

¹⁷⁵ Lewis, *Central*, 207.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 206.

Initially, COMECON was composed of the USSR and Eastern European countries; however, throughout the years of the Cold War, it incorporated communist countries of Asia and developed associate or observer status relations with countries of Central America and Africa. Since communist ideology and alliance with the Soviet Communist Party were the main requirements for joining the association. COMECON became another strategy for strengthening and securing communist ideology around the world. With the outbreak of the Korean War, Moscow's direct control over the region led to increased military budgets imposed on Eastern Europe, in order to secure the Soviet Union in case of a direct confrontation.¹⁷⁷

During Stalin's rule, COMECON activity remained very limited, as the Committee was mostly occupied with bureaucratic surveillance and the collection of statistics.¹⁷⁸ In the first few years after its establishment, the members gathered only on three occasions. The three gatherings could be summarized as a post-war recovery plan, outline of the Committee course that basically explained and imposed the Soviet model of rapid industrialization, and the development of a collectivized model of agriculture.¹⁷⁹ Once again, this proves the fact that COMECON primary goal was to divert the Eastern Bloc from the West and to create strong economic ties and obligations between it and the Soviet Union.

The organizations started to develop with Khrushchev in power; however, its economic impact on the members were still very limited, as Moscow insisted on autarchic economic development.¹⁸⁰ Also, COMECON controlled the volume of trade and exchange between the member states. This often led to the members states being forced to import certain goods from its fellow members despite its poor quality.¹⁸¹

Probably the main benefit for the COMECON members was a secure supply of raw materials at low price coming from the USSR.¹⁸² Other than that, intra-state trade under COMECON framework was heavily controlled by Moscow, thus blocking healthy trade relations development, which was also a Soviet internal failure. The Committee was founded to prevent Eastern Europe from establishing ties and market relations with the West, and it fulfilled this goal. However, it failed to develop the economies of the affected members; moreover, such attempts were considered a crime against communist ideology and were

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 208.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 209.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 211.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., 220.

heavily suppressed like in the case of Prague Spring of 1968. While Eastern European interest was fueled by access to raw and energy resources secured via the trade with the Soviet Union, Moscow wanted to have full control over this and influenced trade negotiations to ensure Soviet interests.¹⁸³

The Sofia Principle was another source of insufficient trade relation within the organization. Under this agreement, COMECON members could claim no intellectual property rights and had to share their knowledge with its fellow members for the price of printing costs.¹⁸⁴ This slowed down development of new technologies, as R&D cost was to be covered by an initiator member. In addition, it created a fear of potential competition, while sharing the knowledge among the COMECON members.¹⁸⁵ Soviet production was mainly focused on agriculture and heavy industries in pre-war time but not on telecommunication, pharmaceuticals or medical engineering. While the Sofia Principle was a disaster for developed Eastern European states such as East Germany or Czechoslovakia, it boosted crippled technological development in the Soviet Union

5.2.5. The Brezhnev Doctrine

The Brezhnev Doctrine was a Soviet foreign policy instrument, which was introduced in the aftermath of the Prague Spring in 1968. It allowed the Soviet Union to control the interpretation and implementation of communism. Any deviations were considered a crime against all socialist countries. Moreover, the USSR reserved a right to start a military intervention, if it was deemed needed to preserve communism.¹⁸⁶

The Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko said: *“The defence of the gains and the cohesion of states belonging to the socialist commonwealth is our sacred duty...Those who hope to break even a single link in the socialist commonwealth are planning in vain. The socialist commonwealth will never permit this.”*¹⁸⁷

As Communist parties enjoyed power monopoly inside their states and Moscow declared the right to control them, it gained unchecked control over the entire socialist bloc.

¹⁸³ Jovanović Miroslav N., *International Economic Integration: Limits and Prospects*, vol. 4 (New York: Routledge, 1998), <https://books.google.cz/books?id=zax5Yn1rmy4C&pg=PA205&lpg=PA205&dq=sofia+principle&source=bl&ots=Dap-cDEllf&sig=ACfU3U2MHLrt4pc1aPBHGipqXNcpCSuhqw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjT4uPH9q7oAhWKa8AKHbzNAGoQ6AEwBXoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=sofia+principle&f=false>, 193-194.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 205.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Mark Kramer, “The Kremlin, the Prague Spring, and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in *Promises of 1968* (Central European University Press, 367).

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 365

5.3. Conclusion

As this research uses comparison analysis, the Soviet mechanism of communism promotion will be analyzed with the same methodology as used for democratization analysis. Ideological geopolitics itself is a product of the communist-capitalist rivalry, thus it is clear that during the Cold War years, the Soviet motivation and strategy fall under the theoretical approach proposed by Agnew and Corbridge. However, during the early years of the USSR, Lenin had inspiration to bring the world revolution, which was done through Comintern activity in Europe. As its target audience was established, communist parties and ruling parties showed no interest in changing the ideology. This could be considered a bottom-up approach. The October Revolution of 1917 marked the beginning of systemic-ideological conflict over political-economic organization, since it sparked a conflict between European empires, the U.S. and the newly founded USSR. Communist victory was big enough of a concern to send military forces to fight for the monarchy in the Russian Empire. Homogenization was reached at the moment when the Red Army established full control over the territory of the former Russian Empire, as most of world powers refused to recognize the USSR as a state and considered it as a threat to the world order.

Soviet strategy after 1945 called for diverse methods of delivering and securing communism primarily in Eastern Europe but other regions as well. From recently declassified information, it is known that Cominform pursued political and ideological integration by supporting communist parties. In some cases, where a communist party was in power, for instance Yugoslavia, Cominform support could be considered as a top-down approach. But in the case of Hungary, where the Communist party came to power thanks to the Soviet interference and the Red Army on the ground, this was the case of bottom-up approach. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was founded when communists already took power in Europe; thus, it was more of top-down consolidation approach. Last, but not least, COMECON was a hybrid of the two approaches, as it was founded in the early Cold War years and aimed at establishing Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and later on it was used as a tool of achieving Soviet goals.

From Nye's concept of smart power, commanding change was reached when Moscow kept the Red Army in Eastern Europe, thus consolidating power and establishing puppet states. As per controlling agendas, most of Eastern European communist leaders probably were never hard-core communists, as Stalin would expect them to be, but they shared a communist ideology and agreed with the Soviet course to a certain extent. The lack of public support and

uprisings show us that there was a strong disagreement with the Soviet planned policy on their behalf. Nevertheless, the Kremlin was able to make some European communists believe that they were looking eye to eye, as it was in the case of Rakosi, the Hungarian General Party Secretary. The main difference between the Soviet and American or European approach to ideology change is that the latter opts for carrot and stick policy, while the USSR primarily focused on the stick without offering the benefits of cooperation. Therefore, one may conclude that it failed to establish preferences, wherein Eastern Europe would voluntarily stay on the Soviet political path. The stick guaranteed that they would still do so.

Analyzing Soviet involvement into Eastern European affairs with the help of the security complex theory, one may conclude that Moscow was mostly worried about its border security, thus ensuring the need for a buffer zone. This makes it a security maximizer. However, the USSR was also occupied with becoming the only world hegemon, thus increasing influence in far regions, which defines it as a power maximizer. It is interesting to point out, that the modern United States is pursuing the same goal as the Soviet Union did.

6. Case studies

In order to come to a conclusion and prove that democracy promotion is first and foremost used for the sake of great powers, a comparison study case analysis needs to be conducted. This chapter will examine the process of democratization of Ukraine, which started in the early 2000s and then draw a parallel to the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948.

In his book *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Stephen Van Evera discusses three formats for testing a theory and the steps that need to be taken before proceeding with theory testing.¹⁸⁸ In order to conduct a case study analysis, first one needs to state a theory. This thesis research tries to prove that there is a correlation between regime change that comes with a foreign assistance and preferences shift in favor of the foreign agent that helped to bring the change. In this case our IV is ideological change, and DV is a preference shift towards a donor. Therefore, if the theory is valid, then we should observe a foreign agent gaining power over a recipient state policy by controlling an agenda and establishing preferences in order to pursue its gains. If the theory is invalid, then we will not observe a preference change. In this scenario, a recipient state preserves its overarching strategy and a foreign state will not influence the recipient state agenda and pursue absolute gains.

To conduct this theory testing, the congruence procedure type 1 will be applied on the chosen case studies. The procedure requires us to observe values on the IV and DV within a particular case and then observes the world to ascertain most typical values on the IV and DV.¹⁸⁹ Once these values have been studied, the congruence and incongruence between expectations and values need to be measured.

As this work claims that states try to create an ideological shift in order to influence another's policy and decision-making and they do so in countries of geopolitical importance to them, it is important to discuss why Ukraine and Czechoslovakia were important to the external parties involved. Their significance will be researched with the assistance of security complex theory. Then this work will move to the comparison analysis of establishing democracy and communism that was conducted by the involved actors.

Along with the above, this chapter poses a question. Did the USA and the EU establish control over Ukraine's preferences? If so, what allows them to control it? A similar matter will be investigated on the case of Czechoslovakia. What allowed Moscow to control

¹⁸⁸ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 56.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 58.

Czechoslovakia and how did it influence Czechoslovakia's preferences? The final step of the theory testing allows us to find congruence or incongruity between expectations and observations. Another question to be tackled here is how did each donor (USA, EU and USSR) benefit from an ideological change and if this contributed to each donors' geopolitical objectives.

6.1. Maidan and the democratization of Ukraine

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was frequently overlooked, and its importance was underestimated by the European Union and to some extent by the United States as well. The main priority was to reach a peaceful resolution in regard to the nuclear arsenal, as nuclear missiles were stationed on Ukrainian territory since the time it was a Soviet republic. However, now that the dust has settled after the USSR collapse, it became clear that Russia is not eager to give up its imperialist past. Therefore, it will try to gain control over the Soviet former territories by soft power means, Ukraine's geopolitical role has changed. Nowadays, Ukraine is identified to be one of the critically important geopolitical pivots in Eurasia.¹⁹⁰

In the past twenty years, Ukraine experienced the Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions, which aimed at democratizing the country and allying it with the western institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Since Ukraine is a pivot to Eurasia and presents geopolitical importance to the USA, the EU and Russia that are competing for power there, the democratization cases were potentially aimed at power consolidation over Ukraine. Therefore, studying the democratization of Ukraine will assist us in proving or disproving the research hypothesis.

6.1.1. Ukraine's geopolitical importance to Russia, the U.S. and the EU

As it is necessary to know what Russia, US and EU interests in Ukraine are to understand why these three demonstrate strong involvement in Ukraine, each actor's geopolitical objectives towards Ukraine will be covered below.

Russia

Although this research focus is on the USA and EU, Russia's geopolitical ambitions need to be covered briefly. It is necessary because Russia is among the biggest powers in Eurasia, in addition, it openly admits that current unipolar world order is not acceptable and thus needs

¹⁹⁰ Brzezinski, *The Grand*, 41.

to be altered to transform into multipolar. This was openly declared by Vladimir Putin in his famous Munich speech in 2007, “*I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world.*”¹⁹¹ For Russia, Ukraine plays a significant role in achieving this goal.

When Putin came to power at the beginning of the Millennium, he set Russia on a new political path. To be more precise, it marked a rebirth of Russian imperialism and aspirations to be a global, not just a regional power. This has been closely associated with a concept of Eurasianism, which Brzezinski called an alternative to communism.¹⁹² Eurasianism holds that Russia is neither Europe or Asia, which makes it a unique bridge between Europe and Asia. Therefore, Russia’s foreign policy should be targeting both parts of the world. To become a global power and maintain internal stability, the Kremlin should “*politically attach itself to Europe and economically attach itself to East Asia.*”¹⁹³ This would make Russia an equal European partner and boost economy, thanks to the rapidly developing Asian market, and also give access to trade in warm waters. Although Moscow does not show interest in adopting liberal values to strengthen its relations with the West, its involvement in Ukraine’s politics indicates Russia’s desire to be a part of Europe.¹⁹⁴

According to Brzezinski, Russia cannot become a European empire without Ukraine.¹⁹⁵ Therefore, independent Ukraine is a threat to Russia’s aspirations, as Ukraine’s internal division towards Russia prevents it from gaining control over Ukraine’s preferences.¹⁹⁶ In addition, Russia cannot offer much to win people’s support unlike the European Union, and this alienates the two countries even more. Establishment of a puppet government in Ukraine will allow Russia to challenge Europe, thus making Poland a geopolitical pivot between Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁹⁷ Another challenge posed by Ukrainian independence and desire to distance itself from Russia is uncertainty on Slavic leadership. Without close cooperation with Kyiv, Moscow can forget its goal of becoming a European power, and thus focus on Asia only, which is also troublesome.¹⁹⁸

Second, as it was mentioned earlier, Ukraine and Russia share both land and marine borders. Throughout history, Russia learnt that the flat lands of Ukraine and European part of

¹⁹¹ Vladimir Putin, “Munich Security Conference,” *Munich Security Conference* (February 10, 2007), <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>).

¹⁹² Kaplan, *The Revenge...*, 178.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 179.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 180.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 181.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Brzezinski, *The Grand*, 92.

Russia allow enemies to invade the country quickly. The resulting heavy spending on country militarization shows how high Kremlin's concern is with security.¹⁹⁹ In addition, friendly relations with Ukraine guaranteed that Russia could maintain its navy base in Crimea and other states would not be able to deploy their military there. In 2009, Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, said *NATO and China...are the most dangerous of our geopolitical rivals*.²⁰⁰ Along with that, Russia has been quite sensitive towards NATO enlargement, especially eastwards of Europe, as its officials frequently bring up the NATO promise. Dmitri Medvedev referred to this as *endless enlargement*.²⁰¹ These factors together stress the importance of ensuring no western power forms an alliance with states directly on Russian borders. Therefore, Ukraine needs to remain a buffer zone for Russia's border security.

Ukraine has always been important to Russia. Ukraine's warm climate and fertile soil made it the largest food supplier for Russia. In addition, some Soviet strategic industries such as defense, space innovation bureau and so on have remained operational on Ukrainian territory and Russia was actively involved in the production process of military equipment and was also one of the main buyers. Another of Russia's aspirations was that Ukraine would join the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russian initiative to form a trade union following the European Union example.²⁰² Energy relations are also of vital interest to Russia, as gas pipelines still run through Ukraine to supply Central Europe.²⁰³ Also, before the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine was one the largest of Russian gas importers, the gas trade agreement had to be completely terminated in 2016.²⁰⁴ The Ukraine's aspirations to align with the West, which were followed by the Ukraine crisis deprive Russia of its plans of building an economic community in its near-abroad dominated by Moscow. The current EEU needs Ukraine in order for Russia to challenge the EU.²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁹ In 2019, Russia was ranked fourth in the world for defense spending. "Russia Returns to Top 5 Defense Spending Countries Worldwide – Think Tank," The Moscow Times, April 27, 2020, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/04/27/russia-returns-to-top-5-defense-spending-countries-worldwide-think-tank-a70114>).

²⁰⁰ Kaplan, *The Revenge...*, 171.

²⁰¹ Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, and John J. Mearsheimer, "Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?," *Council on Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 6 (2014), 175.

²⁰² Jonathan Masters, "Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia," Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, February 5, 2020), <https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>).

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Agnieszka Konopelko, "Eurasian Economic Union: a Challenge for EU Policy towards Kazakhstan," *Asia Europe Journal* (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, April 27, 2017), <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10308-017-0480-7>).

The United States of America

The American grand strategy was discussed in Chapter 4, so the following will summarize the role that Ukraine plays in it. As domination of Eurasia is the ultimate goal for Washington, it needs to identify Eurasian pivots to accomplish this goal. The major powers are France, Germany and Russia in the European part of the continent. While China, India, Iran and Turkey are major players in the Asian part.²⁰⁶ Here we will focus only on the European actors, since Ukraine's geopolitical importance is being discussed.

France and Germany are not a big concern for the U.S., since the EU is an alliance and agrees with the USA on most issues. In this equation, Russia is a source of concern for America. As it was mentioned above, Ukraine is of strategic importance to Russia, in order to pursue its goal for altering the unipolar world order and restoring its imperial ambitions. For the USA, it is logical to counterbalance it since this threatens America's hegemony in the unipolar world. Therefore, the USA calls for democratizing Ukraine and building an alliance through institutions such as NATO and possibly the EU as well as institutions for democracy assistance, which provide financial aid. This will help to ensure Ukraine's support for the West and benefit the U.S. goal of preserving the status quo and by keeping Russia out of European affairs to some extent, so it will not become strong enough to challenge the U.S. hegemon. Another benefit of an alliance with Ukraine is that it will give access to NATO forces on both land and water. Ukraine's NATO membership is yet to be agreed on despite the fact that Ukraine and NATO have expressed interest, but the situation remains uncertain and unstable because of the military conflict in the east of Ukraine and status of Crimea.²⁰⁷ This conflict led to the termination of a military cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, which is certainly an advantage to both the USA and EU.

The European Union

The geopolitical objectives of the European Union were also discussed in Chapter 4. The EU frequently acts like a normative power that pursues absolute gains. As the examination of the EU democracy promotion institutions shows, most of the time both sides benefit from the EU offers and Brussels is able to achieve its geopolitical goals.

²⁰⁶ Brzezinski, *The Grand*, 41.

²⁰⁷ Steven Pifer, "NATO's Ukraine Challenge Ukrainians Want Membership, but Obstacles Abound," Brookings (Brookings, June 6, 2019), <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/06/natos-ukraine-challenge/>.

Why is the Ukraine so important to the EU? First and foremost, Ukraine represents border security. The Eastern European members will be the primary victims if Russia manages to establish a puppet government in Ukraine. In addition, a pro-European and stable Ukraine prevents illegal migration, and allows trade into the EU.²⁰⁸ Therefore, Poland and Lithuania pushed hard for signing the Association agreement that designed to create a framework for cooperation between the EU and Ukraine with a conditionality of liberal transformation of Ukraine.²⁰⁹

As a normative power, the EU set itself on a goal to spread liberal values, rule of law, and respect for human rights. This can be explained by the democratic peace theory. The EU promotes liberal values in the neighborhood to facilitate to further democracy spillover effect. To a certain extent, this aim is noble and mostly supported by Eastern European members that were deprived of any democratic aspirations in the past because of the Soviet communism imposition.²¹⁰ However, there are cases like Sweden that is mostly driven by normative reasons.

The older EU members that have no cultural and historical ties with Ukraine usually support liberal reforms there to promote regional security and stability since an unstable neighbor is a danger to the entire region. Thus, the EU prefers to put an effort into democratizing Ukraine, as this would be a win-win situation.

Summary

The security complex theory says that states should be concerned with their neighbors first and only then look at distant countries. Analyzing the three actors' interest in Ukraine, one may conclude that Russia and the EU act from a perspective of a concerned neighbor, whose goal is to maximize security, since Ukraine is located right between the two. However, Russia also sees Ukraine from a power maximizer perspective, since Ukraine is a linchpin to the Russia's grand strategy of challenging the unipolarity and gaining more power in Eurasia. Another source of concern, when it comes to the shared border between the two, is a spillover effect of democratization, which could potentially shake Putin's and his party United Russia's position. This concern could be backed up by former president of the NED, Carl Gershman, who said

²⁰⁸ Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, "Why Does Ukraine Matter to the EU?," Carnegie Europe, April 16, 2013, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/04/16/why-does-ukraine-matter-to-eu-pub-51522>).

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

*Ukraine's choice to join Europe would promote Russian democracy and might eventually topple Putin from power.*²¹¹

While Ukraine poses zero threat to the U.S., due to the distance, capabilities and so on, Washington is still involved into the European affairs. This could be explained with its concern over the Russia's aspirations, which could potentially threaten the American position in the current world order. Therefore, the US acts from a power maximizer position.

6.1.2. Ukraine's foreign policy and revolutions of 2004 and 2014

To confirm or reject the research hypothesis, it is necessary to measure how recipient states' preferences changed after an ideological transformation. As we already studied American, European and Russian interests in Ukraine, it is also important to discuss what the Ukrainian government's policy was towards the three interested parties. Since Ukraine experienced revolutions twice in the recent history, pre and post Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Maidan Revolution in 2014 conditions will be covered.

Similar to most post-Soviet republics, old Communist Party members took key positions in the newly founded democratic government in independent Ukraine which led to corruption, oligarchy and poverty. At the same time, during its early independent years, Ukraine set itself to truly become independent and maintain good relations with both East and West, while staying neutral. Leonid Kuchma's foreign policy was to integrate into Europe's political and economic structures, maintain friendly relations with Russia and stay neutral in regard to NATO.²¹²

Orange Revolution

Pre-Orange revolution Ukraine led by Kuchma could not be considered a democracy, but it was also far from autocracy. He tried to build a so-called managed democracy, a system with formal democratic processes, which are informally controlled by a president.²¹³ When Kuchma took the presidential office in 1994, one of his priorities was to eliminate Ukraine's dependence on Russia. This was not only the government plan, but it was also strongly supported amongst the population.²¹⁴ This was especially vital for Ukraine's stability, as re-approachment with

²¹¹ McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer, "Faulty ...", 177.

²¹² John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 3 (1996): pp. 52-62, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20047580>, 57.

²¹³ Michael McFaul, "Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution," *International Security* 32, no. 2 (2007): pp. 45-83, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.2.45>, 53.

²¹⁴ Mroz and Pavliuk, "Ukraine...", 53.

Moscow would divide the population even more, since Western Ukraine always considered Russia as its political oppressor, while the Eastern part usually supports pro-Russian policy. To reduce their dependence on Moscow, Ukraine started to look at commercializing its oil import business, taking loans from the IMF rather than from Russia or any organization dominated by it.²¹⁵ Another dependency on Russia was the fact that the Ukraine's largest volume of export and import was under the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is controlled by Moscow. Therefore, Kyiv needed to look at diversifying its trade relations, and the EU seemed like the best partner to look at.

Kuchma's policy on democratizing Ukraine and building a market economy turned out to be beneficial and received support from various EU members as well as the USA. The Western community also acknowledged Ukraine's importance in the international arena. The British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, called Ukraine *a strategic pivot in Europe*.²¹⁶ In an attempt to support the Ukrainian economy, the EU gave it most-favored-nation trading status.²¹⁷ At the same time, Washington declared that Ukraine is *a vital strategic interest of the United States*.²¹⁸

During Kuchma's two presidential terms, his strategy from becoming a liberal democracy shifted towards tight control over the opposition and population, while he still tried to maintain close relations with the West and at the same time to balance relations with Russia. With the pressure from Western democratic institutions that called for a carrot and stick policy²¹⁹, Kuchma agreed to appoint Viktor Yushchenko as Prime Minister in 1999.²²⁰ During his time in office, the country experienced stable growth and living conditions improved. As Yushchenko took severe measures to eliminate corruption, whose "victims" became oligarchs, he was soon replaced with a more "suitable" prime minister, Victor Yanukovych. This was the turning point, which transformed Yushchenko into an opposition leader.²²¹ Thanks to his service as prime minister, Yushchenko's candidacy for presidency sparked massive support amongst the population in 2004. His campaign also received support from the EU and the USA.

Yushchenko's transformation and establishment of Our Ukraine Party was presented as his desire to democratize Ukraine. Later when he won the elections, he said: "*We were*

²¹⁵ Ibid., 58.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 59.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Sticks: the USA and EU could have cut financial aid to Ukraine and affect Ukrainian integration into international organizations, specifically the World Trade Organization.

²²⁰ Karatnycky, "Ukraines...", 41.

²²¹ Ibid.

independent for 14 years but not free.”²²² Unfortunately, it is impossible to confirm if this was truly his initiative or if he was influenced by the West as such information will remain classified for many years. Nevertheless, assisting Yushchenko to lead the opposition movement was a smart move in the plan to democratize Ukraine due to several reasons. First, Yushchenko was widely supported as he showed his intentions to improve life of ordinary people by starting with eliminating oligarch influence in the government and fighting corruption. Second, as it was mentioned, during his time as Prime Minister, Ukraine experienced stable economic growth, which undoubtedly was welcome among people. Last, but not least, Yushchenko’s Prime Minister appointment came from the USA and EU, as said earlier, and that shows their support for him. When Kuchma dismissed Yushchenko, it helped him to gain even more popularity, since it proved that the current regime was neither liberal nor just. This was a great opportunity to promote a leader that is inclined towards democracy and supports the West.

Kuchma’s unwillingness to loosen the power grip and the assassination of Georgiy Gongadze, a journalist who conducted an investigation on corruption among the ruling elite, including Kuchma, were not received well in the EU and USA.²²³ The Bush administration reacted with the political isolation of Kuchma.²²⁴ Political isolation was used as a tool aimed at demonstrating the U.S. stance towards the events in Ukraine and Kuchma.

Despite the political humiliation, Kuchma still tried to improve relations with both the U.S. and EU, since he saw Ukraine as part of the Western world rather than of post-Soviet world dominated by Russia. This allowed the US to use the carrot and stick policy to establish leverage over Kuchma’s policy. In this case, “carrot” was the normalization of relations, which had severed because of the Gongadze assassination. The “stick” was the above-mentioned political isolation of Kuchma.

The U.S. was highly concerned with the upcoming 2004 elections and remained active in Ukraine. This was met with no opposition coming from the Ukraine’s ruling elite, as they were still hoping to develop stronger relations with the US and Washington kept these expectations high.²²⁵

Since the USA expressed its concern over the democratic transition in Ukraine, it opted to provide technical assistance to state institutions, information dissemination and private

²²² Gregory Feifer, “Unloved but Unbowed, Ukraine's Viktor Yushchenko Leaves Office,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 25, 2010), https://www.rferl.org/a/Unloved_But_Unbowed_Ukraines_Viktor_Yushchenko_Leaves_Office/1967436.html.

²²³ Mcfaul, “Ukraine...”), 68-69.

²²⁴ Ibid., 67, 69.

²²⁵ Ibid., 67.

endeavors and programs tools. Thus, American institutions were actively involved at different levels that targeted the population, media and government. Part of the effort was dedicated at denouncing Kuchma's policy and his reaction to Gongadze's assassination. The campaign aimed at showing how undemocratic the current government was, and it also compared Kuchma to Yushchenko to the benefit of the latter. Indiana University assisted Parliamentary Development Project to support pluralism in Ukraine.²²⁶ The USAID provided financial support to the Znayu Civic Initiative. Freedom House, which is also a US based non-governmental organization, supported civil opposition to Kuchma's regime.

At the same time, the Ukrainian ruling elite was looking for a candidate to take over the presidential office from Kuchma. This is when Victor Yanukovych, a former Donetsk governor, was appointed as Ukraine's Prime Minister and soon nominated to join the presidential campaign. During his time in office, President Kuchma repeatedly declared that Ukraine belongs to Europe and should seek closer ties and consequently become an EU member. However, when it came to presidential power transition, Kuchma chose to support the same candidate as Moscow, despite his aspirations for Ukraine to be independent from Russia. This decision questions Kuchma's rhetoric on aspirations to integrate with the EU, as Russia's backed candidate would not move Ukraine from Moscow's orbit.²²⁷

Years prior to the presidential elections, Kyiv and Moscow agreed on the provision of subsidized gas, which provided direct financial support to the Ukrainian government to strengthen its position and support the desired transition of power to Yanukovych.²²⁸ Compared to the western financial assistance to Yushchenko's campaign, Russia's share was quite modest and did not play a major role. Nevertheless, it allowed Kuchma and Yanukovych to compromise elections by committing an electoral fraud.

The reason why Kuchma was so heavily criticized and discussed in Western media came from concerns towards Yanukovych candidacy. Both the EU and USA worked with Ukrainian media to expose Kuchma's illegitimacy, thus negatively influencing Yanukovych's image.²²⁹ The message to the outside world was to expose crimes conducted by the current regime and point out that the regime backed candidate would take Ukraine away from its path to liberal democracy and create closer relations with the West.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Karatnycky, "Ukraines...", 42.

²²⁸ Ibid., 68.

²²⁹ Mcfaul, "Ukraine...", 70.

While the USA and EU invested in the media campaign against Kuchma, there is no evidence of Washington's or Brussels' financial contribution to Yushchenko's presidential campaign.²³⁰ However, his political party Our Ukraine was formed of former activists that were trained by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in the years prior to the Our Ukraine formation and during the campaign as well.²³¹ The IRI primarily worked with regional Our Ukraine offices, while the NDI focused on Kyiv.

To secure Russia's position in its relations with Ukraine, Moscow deployed quite a few media campaigns and unethical tactics to assist Yanukovych in the elections. It should be mentioned that this was organized and conducted in cooperation with the ruling elite, including Kuchma, despite his aspirations of strengthening relations with the West and becoming less dependent on Russia. Russia did not support Kuchma on media or try to improve his ruined image, as he was no longer of high importance to them since his presidential term was about to end. Instead Moscow focused on Yanukovych's image, as he was a potential ally in the Ukrainian government. According to reports, Moscow contributed around \$300 million to Yanukovych's campaign.²³²

The Russian campaign assistance had direct and indirect interaction with the population in order to increase Yanukovych's popularity. In 2004, the Russian House was opened in Kyiv, whose role was to organize public events to emphasize the importance of Russia to Ukraine's future in economy and security aspects.²³³ Along with that, Russia financed an election monitoring group, which announced that two rounds of the elections were free and fair.²³⁴ These show us that Russia also used the same tools as Washington and Brussels to achieve its goals. The only difference is that Russia did not use these tools to democratize Ukraine, but on the contrary to maintain Ukraine's hybrid democratic regime. The tools were technical assistance, civil society support and information dissemination.

When discussing the elections of 2004, it is important to consider the poisoning attack on Yushchenko a few months before the election. The investigation reached a dead-end, as all suspects cannot be questioned, since one of them holds a Russian passport and refused to cooperate.²³⁵ Nevertheless, it is confirmed that it was a planned operation organized by secret

²³⁰ Ibid., 73.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid., 69.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Robert Evans, "Ukraine President Poisoning Aids Dioxin Research," Reuters (Thomson Reuters, June 11, 2008), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-yushchenko-dioxin/ukraine-president-poisoning-aids-dioxin-research-idUSL118481020080611>).

services, which is the last stage before military intervention based on the democratization tools described earlier in this thesis, which are also used for non-democratic ideological change. Based on the existing evidence, it can be assumed that this was orchestrated by either someone from Yanukovych's supporters, Kuchma and Putin. This could have been a joint operation or an independent decision of one of the sides.

The Orange Revolution became a milestone in Ukraine's aspirations to integrate with the European Union and distance itself from Russia. This was not just a declaration discussed behind the closed doors, this was a manifest widely supported by the opposition and population. The trigger for the Orange Revolution was electoral fraud, in which it was announced that Yanukovych was to win the presidential elections, while it was quite clear that Yushchenko received more votes. After internal and international pressure, the court ruled out to hold another round of elections, which Yushchenko won.

Post-Orange Revolution

To test the proposed hypothesis, we need to see how our picked DV changed, and if it changed at all. The DV is a preference change to align with a donor state, in our case the U.S. and EU, whereas the latter also benefits from the change. This is reached in a manner, where a recipient state, in our case Ukraine, believes that they have shared goals and its preferences are to mirror the donor states' preferences. To do that, we are going to examine Ukraine's foreign policy towards Russia, as this is the state that tried to divert Ukraine from a Western alliance, and the U.S. along with the EU, as these two tried to build closer alliances with Ukraine during Yushchenko's presidency.

Since the majority of Ukrainians supported Yushchenko based on his promises to integrate with the EU, join NATO and distance the country from Russia, one could expect that this would be on his main agenda. Nevertheless, Yushchenko travelled to Moscow right after the inauguration ceremony and planned to visit European states afterwards.²³⁶ This was quite an unexpected decision for a president with a strong pro-European campaign. It was also symbolic and made the European powers question Ukraine's intentions on becoming a full-fledge democracy and joining the European Union. This also reminded the global community of Kuchma's policy of balancing between Russia and Europe, which ultimately brought Ukraine

²³⁶ Jeremy Bransten, "Ukraine: Yushchenko Making First Foreign Trip as President To Moscow," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, April 8, 2008), <https://www.rferl.org/a/1057003.html>).

closer to Russia. In his defense, President Yushchenko explained this with a need to bring internal peace and unite the divided Ukrainian population, since South and East of the state voted against Yushchenko and his western integration aspirations.²³⁷ Therefore, he chose Russia as his first official visit in order to demonstrate that Russia remains important to Ukraine and appease the Russian-leaning populace.

His political cabinet went through major changes during first months in the office. This included massive dismissals and appointments at all levels of the executive branch.²³⁸ Yushchenko appointed Julia Timoshenko as a new Prime Minister, who had strongly supported his campaign and stood next to him during the Orange Revolution. Such re-arrangements were positively received within the EU and the US, as it demonstrated Ukraine's intentions to continue with democratization. However, in September 2005, Timoshenko was fired on accusations of populism and authoritarianism, and Yanukovych was appointed to be the new prime minister in August 2006.²³⁹

In 1998, Kyiv signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, which Ukraine regarded as a first step for future membership. The Agreement aimed at strengthening democracy and developing the economy through cooperation.²⁴⁰ Therefore, after the first genuine democratic elections in 2004, Ukraine expected to be offered an EU membership. However, it was only a first step and confirmed to European ministers that *"the Orange Revolution is credible proof that Ukraine's European aspirations are based on common values shared by both European states and citizens."*²⁴¹ In February 2005, Ukraine and the EU signed the Action Plan, which laid out strategic objectives of cooperation for the following three years. The plan focused on strengthening the rule of law, democratic elections, freedom of speech, economic reforms, cooperation in common neighborhood and security and other requirements proposed by Brussels to Ukraine as a part of admission process.²⁴² Along with that, there were two clauses, which were probably the most attractive for the Ukrainian side. These were admission to the World Trade Organization and visa facilitation for Ukrainian citizens to travel

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ivan Alekseyevich Yerofeyev and Ihor Stebelsky, "The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko Presidency," Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., March 5, 2020), <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency>.

²³⁹ Feifer, "Unloved..."

²⁴⁰ "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR, September 29, 2010. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r17002>.

²⁴¹ Kataryna Wolczuk, "Ukraine after the Orange Revolution," *Centre for European Reform*, February 4, 2005, https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/policybrief_ukraine_feb2005-852.pdf, 1.

²⁴² "EU- Ukraine Action Plan," EU Neighbours, accessed April 17, 2020, <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/eu-ukraine-action-plan-0>, 3-4.

within the EU. The Action Plan was a perfect example of a carrot and stick policy in action, when parties reach a win-win agreement. The carrot for democratic election was the Action Plan agreement, WTO membership and visa facilitation. Implementation of the Action Plan will continue to be discussed further, as it was developing throughout the years of Yushchenko's presidency.

The first meeting to review Ukraine's accomplishments with the implementation was held in December 2005 as a part of the EU-Ukraine Summit. Yushchenko changed Ukraine's foreign policy course to align with European stability and crisis management. This position was strengthened with Ukraine joining the EU-led Crisis Management Operations and Exchange of Classified Information Agreements.²⁴³ In addition, European leaders approved of Yushchenko's proactive conflict settlement actions regarding Transnistria. These aligned positions and joint actions in crisis resolution between the EU and Ukraine, which is one of the largest European countries, helped to stabilize the region and potentially open a door to solving the frozen secession conflict in Transnistria. Overall, this works out to the benefit of the EU geopolitical objective of securing borders and facilitating regional stability, as the border between Transnistria and Ukraine allows arms and drug trafficking into Moldova and then further into the EU countries.²⁴⁴ However, regional stabilization is also beneficial to Ukraine for the exact same reasons.

Speaking of changing preferences after an ideological shift towards liberal democracy, one may bring up that participation in solving the secession conflict shows Ukraine's preference change from Russia's to the EU's position on Transnistria. Before Yushchenko, Ukraine adamantly ignored European conflict settlement propositions.²⁴⁵ Russia is mentioned here as another player interested in Transnistria because of its military involvement in this breakaway region. The Russian Special Forces have been stationed there since the 1990s, and when the conflict broke out, Moscow supported the separatist movements and continues to do so today. According to the European Court of Human Rights, Transnistria is a puppet state of Russia.²⁴⁶ Thus, Ukraine's proactivity in the secession conflict is in direct opposition to Russia's policy.

²⁴³ "EU-Ukraine Summit, Kiev, 1 December 2005," European Commission, December 1, 2005, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_05_337).

²⁴⁴ Vladimir Socor, "Poroshenko Drafts, Yushchenko Launches a Plan for Transnistria," Jamestown, April 27, 2005, <https://jamestown.org/program/poroshenko-drafts-yushchenko-launches-a-plan-for-transnistria/>).

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Christian Stefanescu, "Transnistria: Russia's Satellite State an Open Wound in Eastern Europe," DW.COM, May 28, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/transnistria-russias-satellite-state-an-open-wound-in-eastern-europe/a-48942598>).

As the research aims at analyzing a preference change after democratization, it is necessary to see if the Orange Revolution had an impact on Ukraine's economic relations and its preferences compared to before the revolution. A huge step forward for Ukraine was receiving a status of market economy from the EU in December 2005, as this made Ukraine's prospects for a Free Trade Agreement with the EU closer. Market economy status requires global trade regulators to compare Ukraine's export price to its domestic market, instead of comparison to the neighboring countries. The EU uses anti-dumping measures to prevent non-EU members from flooding the market with cheap goods. Since Ukraine received the market economy status, the EU countries will have to prove the case before taking anti-dumping measures.²⁴⁷

The economic side of the Cooperation and Partnership Agreement and Yushchenko's reforms paved a way to the European market with reduced tariffs for both Ukraine and the EU. As per the EU, this was also beneficial, since more independent Ukraine means a more stable region without Russia influencing Ukraine's policies by exploiting the trade relations. Already in 2005, trade between the EU and Ukraine saw stable growth and increased by 16,6% compared to 2004. The 2006 numbers showed an increase of trade volume between the two, and its commodity turnover amounted to \$18,48 billion, which reflected increase by 14,1%.²⁴⁸

The EU and Ukraine also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Energy, which was one of the Ukraine's main dependencies on Russia. This agreement aimed at progressive integration of the Ukrainian energy market to the EU and led to the enhancement of energy security.²⁴⁹

Ukraine applied for a WTO membership in 1993 and it was given with a number of compliance criteria to be met in order to join. On its journey to WTO accession, the USA provided technical assistance with reforming trade practices, liberalization of access to Ukraine's domestic market and many other.²⁵⁰ The EU also participated in the compliance process by reviewing and advising on economic reforms and officially proclaimed its strong recommendation for Ukraine's membership to the WTO in 2008.²⁵¹ Although WTO membership might seem unrelated to democratization and preference shift, there could be a correlation. WTO discretionary accession rules provide an opportunity to push one's

²⁴⁷ "EU Grants Ukraine 'Market Economy' Status," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, December 1, 2005, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1063412.html>).

²⁴⁸ Oleksandr Sushko, "Ukraine-EU Relations," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 16, no. 1 (2007), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26590576>), 90.

²⁴⁹ "EU-Ukraine...", European Commission.

²⁵⁰ "Accession of the Republic of Ukraine to the World Trade Organization," United States Trade Representative, accessed April 27, 2020, <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/wto-accessions/accession-republic-ukraine-world-trade-orga>).

²⁵¹ "EU-Ukraine...", European Commission.

geopolitical agenda to its existing members, so they can decide on the organization's future expansion.²⁵² This could be another carrot and stick tactic used by the USA and EU along with the technical assistance tool.

In September 2003, Ukraine signed the Common Economic Space (CES) agreement with Russia and other CIS members. The CES aim was to create the economic space covering the customs area of its member states, where the economy management mechanism exists, based on common principles, ensuring a free flow of goods, services, capital and labor, and where common external trade policy is pursued.²⁵³ This agreement was heavily criticized by Yushchenko at the time of the presidential elections, as it threatened integration with the EU and went against Ukraine's initial preferences to join a free trade zone agreement with Europe. The CES Agreement stipulated that a state may not be a member to two customs unions at the same time.²⁵⁴ For Russia, the CES is an instrument to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet countries that joined the space. Despite the fact that participation in the CES was in many ways against Yushchenko's plans to join the EU Customs Union, he did not withdraw from the agreement for political and economic reasons. Ukraine did not want to worsen relations with Moscow because it was still highly dependent on energy trade with Russia and did not wish to antagonize the relationship further.²⁵⁵

While Ukraine hoped for the EU to offer a membership prospective, only the newly designed ENP was proposed to Ukraine instead, which was undoubtedly disappointing for the latter. As the EU Commissioner, Janez Potochnik said *"our aim in the negotiations is to bring Ukraine as close as possible to the European Union in as many areas as possible, while not prejudging any possible future developments in European Union-Ukraine relations."*²⁵⁶

Despite the political and economic reforms made by Ukraine, the EU was not ready to move further along the enlargement path due to several reasons. First, the EU was still preoccupied with its largest accession of 2004, when ten countries joined the Union. Second, enlargement is an extremely costly policy and the EU was not convinced to offer a membership prospective to Ukraine immediately, as this would result in larger subsidies than democratic support. The EU geopolitical objectives are security and stability first and offering a

²⁵² Christina L. Davis and Meridith Wilf, "Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO," *The Journal of Politics*, May 10, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1086/691058>.

²⁵³ Andrzej Szeptycki, "Trade Relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine," *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, January 8, 2008, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/93310/2008_8.pdf, 36.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Igor Torbakov, "Stuck in Two Overlapping Neighborhoods: Dilemmas of Kyiv's European Integration and Russian-Ukrainian Relations," *Insight Turkey* 9, no. 2 (2007), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26328837>, 152.

membership status to Ukraine is more of a way reaching these objectives by stipulating conditions to the latter. However, since compliance with the conditions already assists the EU to fulfill the above aims, it is in the position of postponing Ukraine's potential enlargement. As Ukraine's motivation to become a part of the Union is quite high, it allows the EU to use a carrot and stick policy.

Since the early 1990s, Ukraine has been cooperating with NATO and discussing its future membership within the alliance and in 2002, Kuchma made NATO integration Ukraine's formal goal.²⁵⁷ The Orange Revolution brought this conversation to a new level, as the USA gave a clear signal for Ukraine's accession through the creation of Intensified Dialogue in 2005.²⁵⁸ The framework of the Dialogue meant to assist in different areas such as the strengthening of democratic institutions, enhancing political dialogue, intensifying defense and security sector and many more to prepare Ukraine for joining NATO.²⁵⁹ NATO's Secretary General, General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said "*our Commitment to the Intensified Dialogue underscores that NATO's door remains open and that Ukraine's aspirations are achievable.*"²⁶⁰ These actions are reminiscent of the rhetorical commitments and technical assistance tools described earlier in this thesis. Since it deals with state institutions, it is a top-down approach, which usually tend to be more successful than a bottom-up one. However, considering the fact that it is a military alliance right on the border with Russia, one may say that this is also quite provocative, knowing the state of affairs between Russia and NATO. It also threatens Ukraine's security and opens a door to a potential conflict and destabilization of the region.

At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO declared that it "*welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Aspirations for membership in NATO...and agrees that these countries will become members of NATO.*"²⁶¹ However, it was decided that NATO would not offer an immediate Membership Action Plan (MAP), which was strongly pushed by the USA but opposed by France and Germany, due to concerns with Russia's reaction and Ukraine inability to meet the requirements.²⁶² Therefore, NATO reached a compromise by offering Annual National Program to Ukraine. It is a part of the MAP process through which NATO

²⁵⁷ Gary D. Espinas, "Ukraine's Defence Engagement with the United States," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24384334>, 55.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 56.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 57.

²⁶² Dusica Lazarevic, "NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old Wine in New Bottles?," *The Quarterly Journal* 9, no. 1 (2009), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26326193>, 45.

can measure the progress of an applicant.²⁶³ The ANP is a framework through which the alliance can provide assistance and support for reform efforts that are part of the NATO accession criteria.²⁶⁴ Nevertheless, this still provoked Russia, which showed off its military capabilities and demonstrated its objection to NATO enlargement by invading Georgia a few months after the summit. However, it did not stop Ukraine from further cooperation with NATO and the preparation for compliance with criteria required for the accession. In 2009, Ukraine completed the first ANP. It is interesting that despite resentment about Russia and its treatment of Ukraine as if it was its vassal state, only a small minority of the Ukrainian population supported membership in NATO initiative. As per 2008, it was only 22% in favor.²⁶⁵

Events in Georgia in August 2008 and the failure to join NATO MAP, which was blocked by France and Germany due to concerns with Russia, worsened relations between Yushchenko and Putin and raised more suspicion. This resulted in Ukraine's decision not to extend a lease of harbor space in Crimea used by Russian Navy and demanded Russia to withdraw by 2017.²⁶⁶ This was probably the biggest preference shift in Ukraine's policy during Yushchenko's office, as Crimea was an outstanding issue since the collapse of the USSR and is of strategic importance to Russia for its naval access to the Mediterranean.

When Yushchenko was elected a President of Ukraine, many believed that he would be able to strengthen the rule of law, combat human rights violation and most importantly bring Ukraine to a doorstep of integration with the EU. However, Yushchenko left the country in economic crisis and Ukrainians wondering what happened to the legacy of the Orange Revolution.²⁶⁷ As his former State Secretary, Oleh Rybachuk said that Yushchenko "*failed to replace the old administration with a new model.*" This left the country even further from achieving European membership, which had been one of his major campaign's points.²⁶⁸ It would be misleading not to mention that the global economic crisis played its role in Ukraine's economy decline, but it was also Yushchenko's ineffective policy. In 2009, the country's GDP fell by 15%; import and export also experienced decline.²⁶⁹ This facilitated wide dissatisfaction and loss of trust to Yushchenko and his government. It is also believed that Yushchenko's

²⁶³ Ibid., 46.

²⁶⁴ Espinas, "Ukraine's...", 57.

²⁶⁵ Lazarevic, "NATO...", 48.

²⁶⁶ Jan Piekto et al., "Ukraine's Unrequited Passion for Europe," Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, July 14, 2016, <https://eu.boell.org/en/2016/07/14/ukraines-unrequited-passion-europe>.

²⁶⁷ Feifer, "Unloved..."

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Alexander J. Motyl, "Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovych's Rise, Democracy's Fall," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2010), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25680985>, 125.

obsession with Timoshenko that was exercised in personal rivalries, accusation and trials impeded implementation of reforms and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.²⁷⁰ Due to the above and other outcomes of his presidency, Yushchenko became extremely unpopular among Ukrainians that had supported him during the Orange Revolution, and this resulted in only 5,33% votes for him at presidential elections 2010.²⁷¹

Viktor Yanukovych presidency

Results of the 2010 elections brought Yushchenko's political enemy Viktor Yanukovych to the presidential office. Yanukovych's campaign was based on the transformation of Ukraine into *an economic tiger* by balancing between Russia and the West.²⁷² However, neither economic nor democratic reforms were conducted during Yanukovych's presidency. The new government was formed of the Donbass politicians, that were strongly pro-Russian and had little experience with democratization and market economy.²⁷³ A German political scientist called Ukraine even less democratic than it was before and noted that Ukrainians' preferences were completely disregarded by Yanukovych and his government.²⁷⁴

Although the primary focus of this subchapter is Ukraine's foreign policy, certain decisions made on intrastate level showed clear preference shift. While Yushchenko strongly supported nation building by advocating Ukrainian language, culture and history, this was met negatively among the Russian minorities with Ukrainian citizenship,²⁷⁵ Yanukovych did the opposite. As he was still backed up by oligarchs and politicians from the east of the country, his priority was to support ethnic Russians. Therefore, the Minister of Education and Science, Dmytro Tabachnyk reduced the role of Ukrainian language at schools, expressed strong support for Ukraine's Soviet past by claiming that "*western ethnic Ukrainians are too westernized to be true Ukrainians.*"²⁷⁶ Other extreme events in playing with the Ukrainian identity were Yushchenko's decision to bestow the title Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera, who cooperated

²⁷⁰ Stephen F. Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine and Central Europe: the Return of Geopolitics," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24384333>, 38.

²⁷¹ "Table-Ukraine's Presidential Election Results," Kyiv Post, January 18, 2010, <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/table-ukraines-presidential-election-results-57325.html?cn-reloaded=1>).

²⁷² Motyl, "Ukrainian...", 126.

²⁷³ Ibid., 127.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Richard Balmforth, "Where Did Ukraine's Yushchenko Go Wrong?," Reuters, January 11, 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-yushchenko/where-did-ukraines-yushchenko-go-wrong-idUSTRE60A2ZM20100111>).

²⁷⁶ Motyl, "Ukrainian...", 129.

with Nazi Germany against the Soviets.²⁷⁷ This was strongly denounced in the eastern part of Ukraine. The second event was Tabachnyk's indifference to the construction of Stalin's statue in southern Ukraine.²⁷⁸ This was regarded as unwillingness of Ukraine's ruling elite to let go the Soviet past and set the country on a new path. Such opposite policies from Ukrainization to de-Ukrainization demonstrate that Yushchenko and Yanukovych used ethnic division inside the country to their benefit to rally more support for their own policies. Also, these actions were a symbolic move to send a clear message to Moscow intended to show what side they leaned toward.

As it was mentioned earlier, one of the key interests of Russia in Ukraine was the Crimean Peninsula and maintenance of the lease agreement to keep Russia's Black Sea Fleet there. While Yushchenko ordered not to extend the lease agreement after the war in Georgia, Yanukovych extended the lease until 2047.²⁷⁹ It is interesting to point out that this decision was made during his first months in the office, so it highlights the importance of it.

Some of the biggest U.S. contributions to building democracy in Ukraine were a spread of political awareness among the population, and training courses for government press officers. From 2007 to 2012, the NED's funding on stimulation of civic activity reached \$17 million and independent media cost \$1,1 million.²⁸⁰ Also, the NED supported anti-Yanukovych groups before and during the protests.²⁸¹ This is a combination of several democratization tools, namely technical assistance, support for civil society and information dissemination, which are a mix of bottom-up and top-down approaches.

Yanukovych cancelled plans to join NATO by passing a law proclaiming Ukraine a militarily non-aligned country. As Mykola Azarov, Ukrainian Prime Minister said: "*the main element of predictability and consistency in Ukraine's foreign policy is its non-aligned status.*"²⁸² Along with that, Yanukovych confirmed that this would not cancel plans for political and economic integration with the EU.

The Euromaidan and its effect on Ukraine's policy

²⁷⁷ Feifer, "Unloved...".

²⁷⁸ Motyl, "Ukrainian...", 129.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 130.

²⁸⁰ David Korenke, "A High Stakes Gamble: U.S. Assistance for Ukraine's Pro-Democracy Movements," *Journal of International Affairs* 71 (2017), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26494374>), 190.

²⁸¹ McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer, "Faulty ...", 177.

²⁸² "Ukraine's Parliament Votes to Abandon Nato Ambitions," BBC News, June 3, 2010, <https://www.bbc.com/news/10229626>).

Since its early years of independence, Ukraine was negotiating its future integration with the European Union. When Yanukovych came to power, on multiple occasions he confirmed that this plan remained in place, as he said “*we have a European future... and Ukraine continues to work towards integrating with the European Union.*”²⁸³ Moreover, official meetings between the EU representatives and Yanukovych were held frequently. According to the French Senate, not less than 90 meetings were held during the first year of Yanukovych presidency.²⁸⁴ In 2011, Jose Barroso, then President of the European Commission, also expressed the EU’s positive position towards the future integration in his speech at Kyiv University. He said the EU has “*a clear shared determination*” to complete negotiations on an Association Agreement with Ukraine this year.²⁸⁵ Therefore, no one expected Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Agreement in November 2013 at the Eastern Partnership Summit. He offered new conditions for the EU-Ukraine future integration, where he wanted to see Russia participating in the negotiations.²⁸⁶ The outcome of the Summit was massive protests all over Ukraine, which forced Yanukovych to flee the country.

Looking retrospectively at Yanukovych’s decision, one could anticipate possible reasons behind it. One of these could be that Yanukovych and his political and oligarchic support never actually thought of integration with the EU. Continuous negotiations with the EU allowed Ukraine to negotiate better deals with Russia. At the time Ukraine was in a hard-economic situation, which was a result of Yushchenko’s legacy, and it was easy to take loans from Russia or negotiate gas prices.²⁸⁷ Right after the Summit, Russia offered an action plan to assist Ukraine’s economy by buying \$15 billion worth of Ukrainian government bonds and reducing the gas price from \$400 to \$268,5 per 1,000 cubic meters.²⁸⁸

Nevertheless, the protests sparked by declining the EU Associate Agreement resulted in a revolution, which set Ukraine on a stronger path towards democracy, EU integration and alliance with NATO. To evaluate a preference shift, we need to analyze how Ukraine’s agenda

²⁸³ “EU-Ukraine Relations: What Developments Have There Been since the Election of Viktor Yanukovych?,” La Fondation Robert Schuman - Le Centre de recherches et d’études sur l’Europe, September 26, 2011, <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0214-eu-ukraine-relations-what-developments-have-there-been-since-the-election-of-viktor-yanukovych>).

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, Speech “On the Way to Open a New Chapter in the EU-Ukraine Relationship,” (April 18, 2011), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/uk/SPEECH_11_284).

²⁸⁶ Piekło et al., “Ukraine’s...”.

²⁸⁷ Tomasz Stepiński, “The EU’s Eastern Partnership and the Way Forward after Riga,” *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 24, no. 1-2 (2015), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26591855>), 18-19.

²⁸⁸ David Stern, “Russia Offers Ukraine Major Economic Assistance,” BBC News (BBC, December 17, 2013), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25411118>).

changed after the Euromaidan that started in November 2013. Analysis will be conducted along with some key events of the Euromaidan.

It needs to be mentioned that European and American high-ranking officials personally attended the Maidan Square to support the pro-EU opposition in the late 2013, as this is quite unusual. For example, Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative, paid an official visit to Kyiv to conduct negotiations with Yanukovych and opposition, and also went to the Maidan Square accompanied by one of the opposition leaders, Arseny Yatsenyuk.²⁸⁹ The US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt also went to meet the protestors and expressed their support for them.²⁹⁰ This is a political gestures tool in the democratization playbook. This allows for more inspiration and reassurance that certain political actors agree and willing to support opposition. Overall, it aimed to empower forces from the bottom.

Speaking of Nuland and Pyatt, it is worth of bringing up a case of their leaked call, where they discuss strategies to work with the three Ukrainian opposition leaders and mention that it does not matter what the EU thinks and that the UN can handle this on its own.²⁹¹ The USA always claims that democracy is the most important thing for other nations to flourish, but such US-centric statement, which does not take the EU into the broader picture shows possible political manipulation to pursue the U.S. interests first and foremost.

On February 21st, Yanukovych and three opposition leaders signed the Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis. As all sides resorted to use of force and the peaceful protests got escalated to mass violence and casualties, the agreement was put in force with the main purpose to end the violence. However, it also restored the Constitution of 2004, which limited presidential power.²⁹² The following day, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to remove Yanukovych from office and later the same day it was confirmed that he fled the country to Russia.²⁹³

At this point, it became clear that Russia was no longer in a position to influence decision-making in Ukraine, as it lost its strongest ally Yanukovych who had been ousted. Add Russia's concerns for its Black Fleet Base in the Crimea to this equation, one could have anticipated

²⁸⁹ Andrew Rettman, "Ukraine Police Attack Protesters under Ashton's Nose," EU Observer, December 11, 2013, <https://euobserver.com/foreign/122431>).

²⁹⁰ Korenke, "A High...", 191.

²⁹¹ "F**k The EU": US Diplomat Victoria Nuland's Phonecall Leaked - Video," The Guardian, February 7, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/feb/07/eu-us-diplomat-victoria-nuland-phonecall-leaked-video>).

²⁹² "Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine - Full Text," The Guardian, February 21, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text>).

²⁹³ Alan Taylor, "Ukraine's President Voted Out, Flees Kiev," The Atlantic, February 22, 2014, <https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/02/ukraines-president-voted-out-flees-kiev/100686/>).

Kremlin was not going to take its chances with the base lease agreement. Moreover, considering the fact that the agreement got almost terminated during the Yushchenko's office, it was clear that Russia would need to act decisively in order to maintain access to the port. Therefore, to avoid losing the Navy Base and avoid a potential NATO base stationed right next to Russian border, Moscow made a bold decision to annex the Crimean Peninsula.

One may argue that the Maidan protests and the following revolution had nothing to do with the NATO enlargement. This is true. However, as John Mearsheimer called this "*the West's triple package of policies*", which refers to NATO enlargement, EU expansionism and democracy promotion. It was a matter of when Ukraine would join NATO, not if.²⁹⁴ Although there was no open discussion on Ukraine's accession to NATO prior the 2013 events, not a single Western leader publicly questioned it, and Moscow could not just rely on a possibility that it might or might not happen.²⁹⁵ Despite the fact that the annexation against Ukraine's will of Crimea was a tremendous event, which affected the current flow of the world politics, one may assume that the new Ukrainian government would alter the lease agreement not in favor of the Russian interests.

In March 2014, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen confirmed that there is still a path for Ukraine to join NATO and that the alliance would work to strengthen the partnership. As he said "*in these difficult moments, NATO stands by Ukraine. NATO stands by the right of every nation to decide its own future. NATO stands by Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and by the fundamental principles of international law.*"²⁹⁶

Petro Poroshenko became Ukraine's President in May 2014 and suggested to amend the Constitution to cancel the clause about Ukraine's non-alignment, which was previously passed by Yanukovich. The talks about NATO were started again right after the change of power in Kyiv. This resulted in Ukrainian Parliament amending the Constitution in early 2019, which now reflects the country's goal to align with NATO and become an EU member.²⁹⁷ Analyzing NATO polls among the Ukrainian population after the Euromaidan, one could see that Euro-Atlantic military alliance has gained more support and popularity compared to years before. As per polls of late 2019, 51% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should join NATO.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁴ McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer, "Faulty ...", 175.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ "Secretary General Assures Ukrainian Prime Minister That NATO Stands by Ukraine," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 6, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_107841.htm).

²⁹⁷ "Ukrainian Parliament Passes Constitutional Amendment to Reflect EU, NATO Aspirations," Radio Free Europe, February 7, 2019, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-parliament-passes-constitutional-amendment-to-reflect-eu-nato-aspirations/29756695.html>).

²⁹⁸ "Over Half of Ukrainians Stand for Ukraine's Joining NATO – Poll Read More on UNIAN: <https://www.unian.info/Society/10810508-over-Half-of-Ukrainians-Stand-for-Ukraine-s-Joining-Nato->

The Associate Agreement between Ukraine and the EU was signed in two stages: the political part was signed in March 2014 and the economic part in June 2014. The Agreement, which came into force in September 2017, defines relations between Ukraine and the EU on the basis of political association and economic integration and serves as a guideline for systematic socio-economic reforms in Ukraine.²⁹⁹ For Ukraine, this is not only a big step towards reforms and a full integration with the EU, but it is also a significant sign of its readiness to cut all ties with Russia, according to Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister, Ivanna Klymchuk-Tsymbaliuk.³⁰⁰ In its new role of an associate member, Kyiv believes that Ukraine serves as a buffer to protect the EU countries from Russia, thus contributing to EU's security; it also can offer qualified labor force to the EU and other economic benefits.³⁰¹

It is interesting to mention that Kyiv appointed foreigners to take some key positions in the newly formed government in late 2014. Natalie Jaresko (USA), Aivaras Abromavicius (Lithuania) and Aleksandre Kvitashvili (Georgia) were granted Ukrainian citizenship after taking Minister posts in Ukraine.³⁰² Poroshenko explained this with a lack of experience among Ukrainian politicians in some matters and also as a way to fight corruption. This is a legitimate practice to bring in foreign experts, while reforming a country. However, considering the conflict in the eastern Ukraine, the separatists East received more reason to believe that Ukraine is governed by the West.

Energy was the strongest Russia's tool to manipulate Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. In addition to this, Ukraine was one of the biggest trade partners for Russia. This allowed Moscow to meddle into Kyiv's business since the country's independence, and along with that, energy and trade played a major role in convincing Yanukovich not to sign the Associate Agreement back in 2013. From a Russian perspective, Ukraine was also of vital economic importance, due to its strong energy sector dependence and passage for gas export to Europe. In 2013, gas imports came only from Russia³⁰³, but since the beginning of the

Poll.html," UNIAN Information Agency, December 26, 2019, <https://www.unian.info/society/10810508-over-half-of-ukrainians-stand-for-ukraine-s-joining-nato-poll.html>).

²⁹⁹ "Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine," State sites of Ukraine, accessed May 2, 2020, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/yevropejska-integraciya/ugoda-pro-asociacyu>).

³⁰⁰ Olha Kosova, "Ukraine Reform Plans: Away from Russia and towards European Integration," Euractiv, September 4, 2017, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/interview/ukraine-reform-plans-away-from-russia-and-towards-european-integration/>).

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² "Foreign-Born Ministers in Ukraine's New Cabinet," BBC News (BBC, December 5, 2014), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30348945>).

³⁰³ Anton Antonenko et al., "Reforming Ukraine's Energy Sector: Critical Unfinished Business," Carnegie Europe, February 6, 2018, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/02/06/reforming-ukraine-s-energy-sector-critical-unfinished-business-pub-75449>).

conflict, Ukraine was decreasing its gas imports from Russia and stopped direct imports completely in 2015.³⁰⁴ To make up for this, Kyiv diversified its market and also started investing in other energy sources. As of now, Ukraine buys gas from European countries that import it from Russia, and another alternative energy supplier for the country is US liquified gas.³⁰⁵

Nevertheless, Ukraine remains a transit country for Russian gas. In December 2019, Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz signed a 5-year agreement to continue a flow of gas to Europe via Ukraine.³⁰⁶ As European countries were victims of Russia-Ukraine relations, when Russia stopped gas supply in winter 2006, thus leaving thousands of Europeans without home heating, the EU is a strong advocate of stable gas transition. Despite the military conflict in the East. Angela Merkel said *"the continuation of gas transit through Ukraine . . . is a good and important signal for ensuring the security of our gas supply in Europe."*³⁰⁷

In general, Kyiv had to diversify its market due to the conflict with Russia, as in the past, one-third of Ukraine's exports went there.³⁰⁸ Trade between Europe and Ukraine has been steadily growing since 2014, now the EU accounts for 41,5% of Ukrainian merchandise exports and 41,1% of its imports.³⁰⁹ However, Ukraine does not have a dominant market, as per 2019 figures. The numbers represent combined trade volume of all EU members that trade with Ukraine. Also, Ukraine had to look at evolving export production, which modernized some of its industries. These moves can only be seen as positive as diversification of trade and the change of gas supplier increase Ukraine's security and political stability.

The Eurasian Economic Community (EAEU) is often seen as Russia's geopolitical instrument to consolidate power over the post-Soviet countries.³¹⁰ Ukraine was one of its members, as it ratified a Treaty on a Single Economic Space in 2004 and joined the CIS Free Trade Area in 2011. However, the Orange Revolution and Ukraine's aspirations to join the EU stalled Ukraine's participation in the CIS economic union. Following the Euromaidan events, Kyiv is no longer interested in the EAEU and continues to pursue closer economic ties with

³⁰⁴ Bohdan Klid, "Time for Ukraine to Exit Russia's Energy Empire," Atlantic Council, March 28, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/time-for-ukraine-to-exit-russias-energy-empire/>.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, Guy Chazan, and Roman Olearhyk, "Russia and Ukraine Sign Deal to Secure European Gas Flows," Financial Times, December 31, 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/5c6733b2-2bc6-11ea-a126-99756bd8f45e>.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Anders Aslund, "Russia Loses Leverage as Ukrainian Exports Go Global," Atlantic Council, February 20, 2020, <https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-loses-leverage-as-ukrainian-exports-go-global/>.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ "Eurasian Economic Union The Rocky Road to Integration," *EuroParliament*, April 2017, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599432/EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599432_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599432/EPRS_BRI(2017)599432_EN.pdf).

the EU. This shows us a preference shift from Russia to the EU. It needs to be pointed out that the annexation of Crimea and military conflict in the East served as a trigger to withdraw from the EAEU. However, Ukraine has been balancing between the EAEU and the EU market since 2004, when it proclaimed that it would aim to become an EU member. Also, one could argue that Ukraine's decision to pursue economic relations with the EU over Russia was a decision purely based on economic gains, as cooperation with the EU is more beneficial than with Russia. If we took the political events and military escalation of the crisis out of this equation, Kyiv would still choose the EU economic union over the Eurasian community, especially if a power transfer was peaceful.

6.1.3. Conclusion

To summarize the first case study- democratization of Ukraine, which was executed through two revolutions- Orange Revolution of 2004 and Euromaidan of 2014, we need to answer the question if Ukraine changed its preferences (DV) in favor of the USA and the EU. If so, what was the U.S., EU contribution (IV) to this.

Although integration with the EU and NATO was frequently mentioned by high-ranking Ukrainian politicians since the early 1990s, Ukraine did not show any strong effort to fulfill this rhetoric until the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko started reforms to comply with the EU and NATO accession requirements. However, both the EU and NATO were not ready to offer membership at the time, and thus continued pushing Ukraine to work further on democratic and economic reforms. Yushchenko failed to deliver reforms upon expectations of Ukrainians and his EU and US partners. Therefore, five years of Yushchenko's presidency was not as beneficial as one could have assumed after the Orange Revolution. Another obstacle was that his power was limited by Yanukovich as then acting Prime Minister, who had strong pro-Russian sentiments and tried to balance between the West and Russia. One may conclude, there was no significant shift in Ukraine's policy, which would allow us to say that the USA and EU reached its geopolitical objectives.

On the other hand, after the Euromaidan Ukraine cut ties with Russia and showed progress on reforms to facilitate its integration with the European Union. Kyiv also approved Constitutional changes to re-open the door to integration with NATO. As it was claimed earlier, Brussels and Washington pursued democratization in Ukraine due to its geopolitical importance to them. How did Ukraine's political shift benefit the EU and US geopolitical objectives? As it was discussed in Chapter 4, the EU goal is to maintain border security and

regional stability. Regional stability is at a very low level because of the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea annexation. However, it also should be argued that no one expected the protests to escalate into a six-year long civil war with no resolution as of 2020. Speaking of border security, the EU now has a buffer zone, which enhances security of the most Eastern EU members. On maintaining a normative power status, Brussels could see Ukraine developing towards a full-fledge democracy. Once it is completed, this would make Ukraine a responsible stakeholder and facilitate to the regional development and stability. However, the ongoing conflict in Donbass makes it hard to speculate when Eastern Europe will become safe and stable.

The U.S. grand strategy is to maintain the status quo and its hegemon. Russia could have been a potential power to shift the status quo in Europe by establishing complete control over Ukraine's politics. However, the current state of relations suggests us that it would take years before Kyiv and Moscow would be able to make peace and build strong ties like in the past. Even in the event of such a scenario becoming true, it would be too late for Russia, as with high probability by this time Ukraine will complete its integration with the West.

Overall Ukraine's determination on its future with the West and aspirations to join NATO make a significant contribution to the U.S. global hegemony for several reasons. Brzezinski claimed that Russia needs Ukraine to become a Eurasian power, which was discussed into details earlier in this chapter. With a roll out of democratization policy in Ukraine, Moscow lost political and economic leverage over Ukraine's preferences and thus cannot project its power on Ukraine. Consequently, this makes Russia's aspirations to alter the status quo less plausible. This also helps the U.S. goal of maintaining the global hegemon status.

As per Western contribution to the democratization of Ukraine, the USA and EU started cooperation on matters of rule of law, liberal values, human rights, market economy and so on in the early 1990s. Until today, both have made significant investments in developing institutions and educating society to contribute to the above-mentioned matters. Based on the conducted analysis of the U.S. and EU democratization policies, one may conclude that both used a variety of tools, which represent a mix of bottom-up and top-down approaches. However, certain patterns could be identified for each donor. Washington primarily focused on supporting civil society and information dissemination tools that fall under bottom-up approach. The political gestures tool (bottom-up approach) was also utilized but not to the same extent, as the first two. Carrot and stick policy was used as well, when it came to grant the market economy status and WTO membership. It is hard to define whether carrot and stick policy is a bottom-up or top-down approach, as it is always unique and strongly depends on

concrete actions. In this specific case, it could be considered more of a top-down approach, as it was aimed at the government to improve the existing institutions and carry out reforms. It cannot be considered a bottom-up approach because market economy status and WTO membership are not among the basic needs that people would demand from a government. For example, the use of sanctions in carrot and stick policy would be considered a bottom-up because it often affects the quality of life and target population to provoke an uprising against the government.³¹¹ WTO membership was not critical to usual Ukrainians and would not motivate them to start protests.

To summarize U.S. and EU democratization efforts, I would say the biggest contribution was made years prior to the Orange Revolution. It played a crucial role in shaping politically active society and educating opposition that is capable of promoting democratic values. However, this would not be possible without technical assistance to institutions. For example, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute trained electoral offices on election organization, monitoring and fraud prevention, as it was discussed before.

To analyze the Ukrainian preference shift, we will use Nye's relational power aspects. The first level of the relational power is commanding change. In case of the democratization of Ukraine, commanding changes were presented, when the EU and Ukraine signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, as it was discussed earlier. This obliged Ukraine to comply with certain requirements in order to be considered a potential EU member. The EU also provided financial and technical assistance to the Ukrainian government to fulfill the requirements. These requirements included democratic and economic reforms, which are beneficial to the EU objectives of border security and regional stability. The USA and its rhetoric to accept Ukraine into NATO, if Ukraine complies with the accession requirements, which also aimed at strengthening liberal democracy, did not have a significant impact on Ukraine until 2014. However, Yushchenko continued discussions with NATO, as he needed a military alliance to deter Russia, which would allow Kyiv to distance itself from Moscow. Since it was not strongly supported by the Ukrainian citizens and opposed by the key EU members, there was no clear commanding change from the US side.

The next level is controlling agendas, when the EU and the USA need to assure Ukraine that they understand its cause and want to assist to achieve it. After the Orange Revolution, the EU signed the Action Plan for Ukraine to further work on liberalization to comply with the European standards. The EU did not offer a desired membership prospect to Ukraine, however,

³¹¹ Jan Hornat Class on "Promoting Democracy Abroad: the US and the EU in Third Countries (October 2017).

it assisted to receive a market economy status and WTO membership, as a reward for steps made towards democratization. The official EU rhetoric that assured that Ukraine was on the right way to achieve the desired Association agreement along with the carrots mentioned in the previous sentence demonstrate were aimed at convincing Ukraine that both countries seek the same. The Euromaidan and the West officials' political gestures such as meetings with the opposition, visiting the Maidan square to meet the protesters highlighted EU's support for the Association Agreement and Ukraine's European future. From the U.S. side, it sent a message that Washington is ready to intervene to help the democratic cause and Ukraine's aspirations to join the EU.

The final level of the relational power is to receive full support from Ukraine, as it should share same goals with the EU and the USA. Before the Euromaidan, Ukraine pursued multi-vectoral policy of balancing between the EU, USA and Russia. The Euromaidan escalation into the secession of Luhansk and Donetsk regions and loss of Crimea to Russia ended relationship with Russia. Moreover, they ended on bad terms because of Russia's military aggression. Ukraine alone does not have capabilities to continue confrontation with Russia, therefore, it has to align with the EU and NATO, which represents the US. This allows for financial aid to continue with democratic reforms in order to complete integration with the EU. The EU and NATO support for Ukraine also serves as a guarantor that Russia will not be able to engage into more direct confrontation with Ukraine and meddle into its political decision-making.

To draw a conclusion, the Euromaidan pushed Ukraine towards the West, as Russia's actions put to an end its relationship with Ukraine without an opportunity for improvement in the foreseeable future. Ukraine's present incline towards the EU and the USA makes it impossible for Russia to become a European empire. This contributes to the U.S. goal of maintaining its hegemony and status quo.

6.2. Czechoslovakia and communist coup d'état

In many ways Czechoslovakia was a unique country compared to its Warsaw Pact co-members. It did not experience the same number of open military conflicts as its neighbors; thus, the country's infrastructure and industries were preserved. This allowed for a faster recovery after World War Two than what many other countries faced. While its neighboring Eastern European countries, with the exception for East Germany, could not boast of industrialized society even before the war, all of them were devastated economically and

physically.³¹² Also, Czechoslovakia was the only country, where communists came to power by a genuine coup d'état.³¹³

Czechoslovakia was of high geopolitical importance to the Soviet Union. This case study aims at examining factors that contributed to the importance of Czechoslovakia in the super-powers' confrontation and the Soviet influence on the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a communist country.

This subchapter will cover tools used by the USSR to reach the transformation and I will attempt to classify these tools under a bottom-up or top-down approaches to find similarities with the current democratization strategy. To answer the question whether there was a shift in Czechoslovak policy towards the donor state, which in this case was the USSR, Czechoslovak objectives and policy before the coup d'état will be studied. It will also tackle the question: how did the USSR benefit from exporting and supporting communism in Czechoslovakia?

6.2.1. Czechoslovakia's geopolitical importance to the USSR

Chapter 5 discusses the Soviet geopolitical ambitions, which could be set along the lines of insecurity and imperialism. Brzezinski called this "*uniquely organic imperialism...new conflicts, new threats, and thus a further expansion drive.*"³¹⁴

It is unlikely that Moscow had had its eye on Czechoslovakia before World War Two broke out. However, it should be said that Czechoslovakia had a Communist Party since the 1920s that was cooperating with Comintern. Although Stalin's main objective was not to start a world communist revolution, he never completely eliminated communism promotion from the Soviet agenda. Therefore, Moscow could have been considering potential exploitation from communist cooperation prior the war, but probably its expectations were not set as high as the establishment a satellite state there. However, the events of WW2 made the Soviet Union change its position about the world revolution, as the results of the war gave them a great opportunity to spread its power further through the spread of communism.

The establishment of satellite states in Eastern Europe through support for communists served two aims for the USSR. First, friendly and obedient regimes abroad increased its security, as they would not attack the Soviet Union and would be more likely to provide military assistance in case of a direct confrontation with the West. Czechoslovakia's location between Germany and Austria was a security advantage to Moscow since it created a buffer

³¹² Zdenek Suda, *The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 1

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Iver B. Neumann, "Soviet Foreign Policy towards Her European Allies: Interests and Instruments," *Cooperation and Conflict* 23, no. 4 (December 1988), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45083670>, 215-216.

zone from the West. Moreover, the USSR could use the Czechoslovak territory to station the Red Army on the borders to mitigate a potential confrontation. Since there was already an atmosphere of distrust, Stalin saw it as another security advantage against the West. In addition, Czechoslovakia shared a small land border with the USSR, which could potentially be used for invasion. As per the security complex theory, one should be concerned about its neighbors first. The Soviet fear of invasion pushed it westwards as further as it was possible. Thus, it allowed to deal with its direct neighbors (Eastern European countries) since it strengthened the Soviet defensive capabilities, and indirect neighbors (Western European countries) since it strengthened the offensive capabilities.

The second advantage of a satellite in Czechoslovakia was the opportunity to please the Soviet Union's goal of imperialism. As it was said, the Soviet Union had strong imperialist ambitions. Prior to WW2 examples of expansionism included Poland and Finland, where Moscow planned to project its influence as well.³¹⁵ To the Soviet Union, the Red Army liberation of Eastern European countries on the way to Germany was a conquest by invitation, not just a liberation. The agreement between Stalin and Churchill to divide Europe into spheres of influence is another confirmation of the Soviet Union's goals of imperialism. Later, Leonid Brezhnev's words reconfirmed this way of thinking. *"Czechoslovakia lies on territory where the Soviet soldier trod in the Second World War. We bought this territory at the cost of enormous sacrifices, and we shall never leave it."*³¹⁶

As the rivalry with the United States was escalating, the Soviet Union needed to build more alliances to stand against the West. The establishment of friendly communist regimes served not only a security purpose; it also became a source of propaganda. "Success" of communist ideology in other countries assisted to prove the point of communism supremacy to non-communist countries in the Soviet conquest of bringing the world revolution.

It is hard to say if the USSR followed an offensive or defensive realism doctrine, as Stalin was always preoccupied with security and saw enemies everywhere. Therefore, his paranoia about the West's offensive intentions towards the Soviet Union could have been exaggerated or used to rally support against the West in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As Brzezinski said that the Soviet expansionism was driven by its constant feeling of external threat. Therefore, one may conclude that the USSR was both a security and power maximizer as it tried to

³¹⁵ Kaplan, 173.

³¹⁶ Neumann, "Soviet", 220.

increase its security via expansion. Alternatively, the Soviets could use threat perception to justify its expansionism.

6.2.2. Czechoslovakia and the coup d'état 1948

The below subchapters will analyze Czechoslovakia's preferential shift based on an analysis of pre-Munich Agreement policies and policies that were implemented after the coup d'état.

Czechoslovakia before the Coup d'état

Czechoslovakia was a young independent country when Nazi Germany took control over the Sudetenland and then eventually over the entire country's territory. After the war, it tried to restore democratic order and also to maintain its independence from other countries' interference to certain level. Czechoslovakia was a crippled democracy for around three years under Edvard Benes rule before Klement Gottwald became President, which marked the Czechoslovak Republic's transformation into a communist state. Since it was a short period of the post-war democratic attempt and more importantly, it was the time when the country was dealing with the war consequences, it is hard to evaluate what were Czechoslovakia's policies before 1948. Therefore, it will be fair to discuss the Czechoslovak policy prior to the Munich Agreement and Benes's plans for Czechoslovakia during and after his exile. Studying two democratic and independent periods in history of Czechoslovakia will allow us to build stronger arguments while giving an opportunity to analyze a preference shift.

To better understand the influence of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS) and its ability to overthrow the government, one needs to start from the very beginning of the country's history – the foundation of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Republic claimed its independence, when the Austria-Hungarian Empire collapsed following World War One. As Prague and other post-Habsburg newly independent capitals were preoccupied with a possible resurrection of the Habsburg monarchy, they sought military support abroad. This resulted in the Little Entente alliance, where Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia agreed on common defense.³¹⁷ Along with that, Czechoslovakia was aligned with France through Mutual Assistance Treaty. Both treaties guaranteed military support to each other in case of invasion, The Little Entente cooperation gradually developed into political and diplomatic system with

³¹⁷ Ibid., 9.

ambitions of becoming a free trade union with custom agreements, simplified border formalities and so on.³¹⁸

As the country was developing as independent state, the CPCS party was founded in 1921 during the time of communist ideas flourishing across Europe, as a result of the First World War.³¹⁹ Communists publicly blamed empires for the First World War outbreak and tried to protect workers and peasants. As the First Czechoslovak Republic was a democratic state, it allowed the CPCS uninterrupted and openly legal activity within the parliamentary system.³²⁰ The first three years of the CPCS overlap with the last years of Lenin in power and his aspirations to bring the world revolution, as it was discussed in Chapter 5. Comintern, which was a primary tool of spreading communism, and the CPCS established strong relations. As the USSR dominated Comintern, it also led to the CPCS building ties with the Soviet Union and receiving financial assistance directly from Moscow.³²¹ To guarantee control over the CPCS thinking, Comintern frequently intervened to purge communists that did not seem loyal enough to the USSR.³²² This is an example of technical assistance tool, as Comintern's goal was to guide and correct communist parties.

As the democratic Czechoslovak government led by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and then Edvard Benes did not limit freedom of speech or freedom of the press, the CPCS was able to pursue the communist propaganda via different channels. They established labor unions, cooperatives and other organizations to rally support for the CPCS.³²³ Klement Gottwald, the Secretary General was also able to develop the Communist Party press to echo the Comintern.³²⁴ The Party's goal was to enlighten the population by promoting anti-government sentiment. They referred to the Social Democrats as "*traitors of the working class*" and "*Social-Fascists*."³²⁵ To draw a parallel with the democratization instruments, this is the information dissemination and propaganda tool, which is a case of the bottom-up approach. Although communists mostly called for the bottom-up approach, as the core idea of communism was to uplift the working class, they used the top-down approach as well. This will be discussed further.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 18.

³²⁰ Ibid., 17.

³²¹ Ibid., 20.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Edward Taborsky, *Communism in Czechoslovakia* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961, 4.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 19.

Gottwald was charmed with the Bolsheviks and the Soviet model of communism. Him and his fellow party members proposed policies for Czechoslovakia to align with the directives of Comintern and the USSR.³²⁶ In 1929, he presented his plans for communist consolidation of power to the Parliament: *“we are the party of the Czechoslovak Proletariat and our supreme chief of staff is indeed Moscow. We go to Moscow to learn, do you know what? We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to wring your necks. And you know that the Russian Bolsheviks are masters in this respect... That grin will be wiped off your faces!”*³²⁷ This shows us the Czechoslovak and Soviet communists established relations years before the coup d’état, while it did not have any impact on the Czechoslovak policies.

The First Czechoslovak Republic found itself in a difficult political situation. On the one hand, Prague strived to pursue a full-fledge democratic governance, but it had stronger economic ties with Germany and Austria than with France, which was its democratic alliance.³²⁸ In addition it was surrounded by fascist or semi-fascist countries, which had claims over the Czechoslovak territory. This made Czechoslovakia more dependent on France, as the latter had security obligations towards the First Republic. British political involvement in the Central and Eastern Europe affairs was also of vital importance to Prague. *“England and France were able and willing to uphold the results of their diplomatic work, since they were the two main architects of the established order in Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War.”*³²⁹

However, in the autumn of 1938, the two main architects of the Munich Agreement, France and the United Kingdom, decided to choose a policy of appeasement, which completely disregarded France’s obligations towards Czechoslovakia, as per the Mutual Assistance Treaty. It should be mentioned that the USSR was also a guarantor of the Czechoslovak security, but the clause signed in 1935 allowed the USSR to intervene only if France intervened.³³⁰ Therefore, the Soviet Union did not take any action to save Czechoslovakia from the Nazi occupation. The CPCS managed to use the western betrayal to rally support for communists on multiple occasions.

Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia ceased to be a democracy, when Germany integrated it into the system of Greater Germany. The Munich Agreement signed by Germany, France and the

³²⁶“Klement Gottwald,” Prague Castle, accessed May 6, 2020, <https://www.hrad.cz/en/president-of-the-cr/former-presidents/klement-gottwald>).

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 10.

³²⁹ Ibid., 12.

³³⁰ Ibid., 12-13.

UK caused Czechoslovakia to begin seeking for a more trustworthy guardian.³³¹ Both Czechoslovak leaders at home and in exile agreed that Czechoslovakia needed to make an alliance with a strong actor in order to pursue national independence and liberal values.³³² A Czech historian, Vit Smetana also agrees with that: “*the recent experience with Western countries, I am talking in particular about the Munich Agreement, affected the mind-set of democratic politicians. The bulk of them had come to the conclusion that the security of Czechoslovakia could only be attained through cooperation with another country, for example the great power to the east*”.³³³ Furthermore, Prague did not have any other options in 1945 than to cooperate with the USSR as the Soviet Army occupied part of the country. Therefore, a need for a powerful alliance to be protected from potential German aggression after 1945 and the circumstances pushed Czechoslovakia closer to the Soviets.

The Czechoslovak government in exile and the USSR began to build an alliance long before the war was over. In 1943, the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed in Moscow.³³⁴ Under the Treaty, the parties agreed not to engage in any relations with Germany until World War Two was over and to provide military aid in case either party was attacked by Germany. They also agreed to mutual respect and independence, and the development of “*economic relations on the widest possible scale and to render each other every possible economic assistance*.”³³⁵ Despite the fact that the negotiations were held with the Czechoslovak democrats, Moscow also ensured to protect the Czechoslovak communists interests by adding a clause stipulating that the Communist party would be included in the postwar government along with other parties. However, it also simplified the political party system by the exclusion of the parties, which remained politically active and cooperated with the post-Munich government.³³⁶ This could be considered a mixture of ideology change tools, namely carrot and stick policy and technical assistance. The USSR exploited the Czechoslovak need for security and agreed to it under favorable conditions for Moscow. Thus, the carrot was a security guarantee to Czechoslovakia. The Soviets also secured its interests by empowering the CPCS in the future government. As this was done on the presidential level, it was a case of

³³¹ The first time was out of the concerns in regard to the Habsburgs.

³³² Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 14.

³³³ Tom McEnchroe, “The Kosice Manifesto- the 1945 Document That Sealed Czechoslovakia's Eastern Orientation,” Radio Prague International, April 5, 2019, <https://www.radio.cz/en/section/czech-history/the-kosice-manifesto-the-1945-document-that-sealed-czechoslovakias-eastern-orientation>).

³³⁴ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 15.

³³⁵ “Czechoslovakia--Soviet Union: Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Collaboration,” *The American Journal of International Law* 39, no. 2 (May 1945), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2213972>), 81-83.

³³⁶ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 22.

a top-down approach. Benes agreed to include the CPCS in the post-war government not knowing that Stalin was preparing the ground for a communist takeover if needed.

Another thing that played a major role in the bringing Czechoslovakia and the USSR closer was agreements made at the Yalta Conference in 1945 without the Czechoslovak input. The three great powers, the UK, USA and USSR agreed on the division of spheres of influence. Stalin negotiated to have Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania under the Soviet sphere of influence. However, he promised that the countries would be allowed to hold free elections. It was stipulated that *“interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population...and the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.”*³³⁷

The Munich Agreement led to the dissolution of the CPCS in 1938 with the right-wing government coming to power. This forced some of the CPCS leaders to relocate to Moscow, and Gottwald was among the exiled communists. Based on the previous Soviet support of the Czechoslovak Communists through Comintern, one would assume that relations between the two Communist Parties became stronger, as Gottwald was in Moscow. On the contrary, Gottwald-Stalin relations worsened and the future role of Communism in Czechoslovakia was questionable. The Soviet Union could not support the CPCS between 1939 and 1941 because of the Non-Aggression Pact commitments towards Germany.³³⁸ After the USSR entered the war, Stalin preferred to establish stronger ties with Benes, and thus Gottwald was left out again.

In addition, as it was said in Chapter 5, Stalin dissolved Comintern for the benefit of relations with the Western alliance. Analyzing relations between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Communist Parties from their early years, one may notice that Kremlin did not have one grand plan for the communist future of Czechoslovakia. Stalin did not ultimately aim at establishing the communist rule there and his strategy was quite agile and dependent on possible gains that could be received by changing alliances and political courses.

A similar thing could be said about Gottwald, who also changed his rhetoric to adjust to a situation and benefit from it. In the 1920s, he denounced the First Czechoslovak Republic, saying that it was a product of the Versailles Treaty and imperialism and its destruction was a primary condition toward improvements of international relations in Central Europe.³³⁹ When the Germans established a protectorate over Czechoslovakia, the CPCS shifted their rhetoric

³³⁷ “Yalta Conference,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed May 5, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Yalta-Conference>).

³³⁸ Taborsky, *Communism...*, 10-11.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

to patriotism and the denouncement of the bourgeois government for the capitulation but not offering an alternative.³⁴⁰ Before the German invasion of the USSR, the CPCS followed the Soviet rhetoric, which called the war “*imperialist and plutocratic venture*.”³⁴¹ However, once Kremlin declared the war on Germany, the CPCS ceased to criticize the Benes’s government and became a supporter of the collaboration between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon Powers.³⁴² Gottwald’s ambivalence is briefly discussed here because it shows that he blindly followed the Soviet Communist Party rhetoric. This is a proof of either his belief in supremacy of Leninism and Stalinism as the great Communist role model or this was a result of the Soviet direct influence over Gottwald and the CPCS.

During the time, Benes visited the USSR in 1943. His trip involved traveling across recently liberated lands, visits to the industries and personal meetings with Stalin. The following is based on memories of Edward Taborsky, who was his secretary and advisor, thus an invitee to high profile meetings and Benes’s company in this trip. Alexander Korneychuk, Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar, was President’s Benes companion during the trip. Therefore, he endeavored to show the most suitable side of the USSR to the visitors in order to present the Union at its best. Benes was impressed by the progress he witnessed compared to his previous trip and people’s “*avid curiosity about the outside world, a genuine desire for friendship with the West, a profound respect and admiration for Roosevelt and Churchill*.”³⁴³ A meeting with Stalin assured Benes that Prague and Moscow would be equal partners and that the Soviet Union was seeking to integrate into Western policy. They agreed on military equipment assistance, the recognition of the pre-Munich Agreement borders of Czechoslovakia and other post-war arrangements. As Benes said, “*We came to a complete agreement, absolute complete!*”³⁴⁴ He believed that the Soviet Communist Party passed its revolutionary aspirations and was ready to establish relations with the Western powers. Benes absolute trust in Stalin’s plans helped the Soviet Union not only in building a strong Communist party in Czechoslovakia. Benes also became a source of Stalin’s propaganda in the West, as he truly believed Stalin and spread this view abroad. This deluded the West and helped Stalin to convince Roosevelt and Churchill that the USSR would allow Eastern Europe to hold free democratic elections. This could be considered a political gesture and rhetorical commitments tools. It is usually used to attract masses, but it also worked with the high-level delegation.

³⁴⁰ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 18.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 19.

³⁴² Taborsky, *Communism...*, 12.

³⁴³ Taborsky, “The Triumph...”, 676.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 677.

Stalin's friendliness and promises assured Benes and won his trust, which allowed him to strengthen the Soviet involvement in the future of Czechoslovakia.

Nevertheless, the Social Democrats led by Benes who was in exile in London and the Communists led by Gottwald from Moscow exile agreed to cooperate on an anti-Hitler coalition by uniting the foreign and domestic resistance in 1943.³⁴⁵ This resulted in the Kosice Government Programme, which was signed in 1945 and intended to organize socio-political life of Czechoslovakia after the war. The Agreement was drafted by the CPCS to serve their interests, while the Social Democrats were not well-prepared for negotiations. Moreover, the Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak government in exile, Jan Sramek did not even attend the meeting and also assured Benes that this was not something to worry about.³⁴⁶ According to Vit Smetana, before Comintern was dissolved, it advised the CPCS to cooperate with progressive political parties and wait for the right moment to start the Communist revolution. This strategy became formalized in the Kosice Programme.³⁴⁷ Taborsky described this meeting being dominated by the CPCS, as it had political and psychologic advantages, thanks to the Red Army occupation of a part of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet support for the CPCS.³⁴⁸ In addition, Benes did not have any military support from the West, as per the Yalta Agreement, therefore he could not dominate the negotiations. The Kosice Programme played a significant role in the Communist consolidation of power in Czechoslovakia. There were items that limited the work of a traditional democratic parliament. First, it had no mention of eventual parliamentary opposition, but the text did not preclude its existence. Second, it banned all pre-war parties with some exceptions.³⁴⁹

The Gottwald's draft also had a list of the new Cabinet with already distributed posts. The Communists negotiated eight key positions out of twenty-five Cabinet seats to be held by the CPCS members. Control over Ministry of Information and Education allowed the CPCS to dominate media and school programs. This contributed to propaganda and the brainwashing of the population to the benefit of the Communists. The Ministry of Interior secured police and internal apparatus support for the CPCS. The Ministry of Defense was headed by a communist war hero, General Svoboda. Control over the Ministry of Agriculture was a massive contribution to the communist popularity and vote count, as it was ordered to distribute the Sudeten lands among the farmers. A Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was also a communist

³⁴⁵ "Klement...", Prague Castle.

³⁴⁶ McEnchroe, "The Kosice...".

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Taborsky, *Communism...*, 13.

³⁴⁹ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 22.

with a task to spy on Jan Masaryk, who was a popular non-communist. Gottwald even managed to win a Prime Minister seat for a communist fellow traveler, Zdenek Fierlinger and used it to rally more trust from Benes, as Fielinger was a Social Democracy Party member.³⁵⁰

It needs to be clarified that Stalin no longer needed Benes's support since he had already served his main purpose for the Soviets. Benes was their poster child of friendly relationship between communists and non-communists with a goal to gain trust and support in Czechoslovakia and in the West.³⁵¹ Therefore, the CPCS became the only Soviet support recipient in Czechoslovakia.

By the end of the Second World War, when Communists and Social Democrats returned from exile to Prague, they were around forty thousand communist supporters across the country. The CPCS was the largest party and by the end of 1945, more than a million people joined it.³⁵² This would not be the case if it was not for the Soviet Union support. The Kosice Agreement backed by Kremlin allowed for massive control over different aspects of citizens' lives to attract more members. With the abolition of pre-war parties, many decided to join the CPCS. Farmers joined the Party, as they wished to participate in the land distribution. In the territories liberated by the Red Army, people did not have much choice between political parties, since the Red Army prevented people from creating political groups different to communism.³⁵³ The USSR used the Salami tactics to gradually attract more party members for the CPCS and consequently make it the largest and most influential party.

Analyzing what Eduard Benes had planned for post-war Czechoslovakia, one may conclude that first and foremost, it was restoring the country and dealing with immediate post-war consequences. However, his main concern was to preserve democracy and maintain peace in Czechoslovakia. He told Taborsky: *"I shall make no compromise which would destroy democracy in this country. The Communists could seize power in this country only over my dead body."*³⁵⁴ The Socialist Democratic Party wished for independence and democracy and the Soviet Union as an ally.³⁵⁵ The government was still preoccupied with the mindset that they needed a strong ally to be protected from military aggression, and Prague still did not trust the

³⁵⁰ Taborsky, *Communism...*, 14.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 13.

³⁵² Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 24-25.

³⁵³ Ibid., 24.

³⁵⁴ Edward Taborsky, "The Triumph and Disaster of Eduard Benes," *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 4 (July 1958), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20029320>), 684.

³⁵⁵ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 27.

West because of the Munich Agreement. As Benes said, he sought for the Czechoslovakia to be “*a bridge between the West and the East*”.³⁵⁶

It would be wrong not to mention that Benes realized that he could not trust Stalin, but this was at the point of no return. When Benes returned from the exile, he learnt about war crimes against non-Communists, forcible communization of local authorities conducted by the Red Army and NKVD on the territory of Slovakia.³⁵⁷ Stalin also broke his promise and annexed a part of Czechoslovakia, Ruthenia. All of this pushed Benes back to the West, so when the U.S. Army entered Czechoslovakia, he hoped for them to free Prague, so he would be able to preserve democracy in the country.³⁵⁸ However, the U.S. Army could not march any further than what was agreed with Moscow.

Although Gottwald was strongly influenced and backed by Kremlin, he yet believed in the peaceful coexistence of communists and democrats at the international level. Therefore, when Marshall Plan aid was offered to Czechoslovakia in 1947, Gottwald was one of the supporters to accept aid. The Czechoslovak participation in the plan was strongly condemned by Kremlin. After his trip to Moscow, Gottwald told Masaryk “*I have never seen Stalin so furious. He reproached me bitterly for having accepted the invitation to participate in the Paris Conference...He said we acted as we were ready to turn our back on the Soviet Union.*”³⁵⁹ Thus, Czechoslovakia had to withdraw its application, despite all political parties' agreement on the need for the Marshall Plan aid. It needs to be highlighted that this happened before the Communist takeover and the Czechoslovak complete integration into the Soviet sphere of influence. The Marshall Plan aid refusal is the first example of the involuntary preference shift forced by the Soviet Union.

Gottwald's willingness to accept aid from the imperialists, as Stalin used to say, put him in a very vulnerable position in front of the Soviets. Not to lose power and Soviet support, Gottwald had to abandon his strategy of balancing with non-communists and to become more eager to strengthen communist influence in Czechoslovakia.³⁶⁰ Also, the re-established Cominform criticized the CPCS for the lack of revolutionary spirit and their cooperation with non-Communist. This led to Gottwald's change of strategy from a peaceful accumulation of power to a violent strategy that resulted in the Communist coup d'état.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., 28.

³⁵⁷ Taborsky, “The Triumph...”, 680.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Taborsky, *Communism...*, 20.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

The Coup d'état and its consequences

The coup d'état was provoked by the crisis of power in the Ministry Cabinets, when Vaclav Nosek, Communist Minister of Interior removed non-Communists from key positions in the police. This allowed the CPCS to gain even more control over the police than before. As this was against the multiparty system, non-Communists Ministers signed resignation papers, hoping that Benes would form a new government to honor all parties.³⁶¹ Meanwhile, the Communist Party started a massive propaganda campaign to attract more communist supporters. This resulted in demonstrations supporting the Communist government. More than two million citizens went on strike in solidarity with the communists.³⁶²

Gottwald proposed a new Communist government under Benes's leadership to Benes. Despite the Benes's commitment to preserving democracy, he agreed to the Gottwald's conditions.³⁶³ Since at that point, the President was concerned that the political crisis could evolve into a civil war, Edvard Benes resigned a few months later and was succeeded by Klement Gottwald.

The coup d'état and transformation of Czechoslovakia into a communist state that landed it in the Soviet orbit had a serious impact on its preferences. The shift occurred in every aspect of political, economic and social life. The first major change would be the Constitution, which was re-written by the CPCS in May 1948 and 1960. The Constitution of 1948 did not completely resemble the Stalin Constitution, but it was very similar and some clauses seemed undemocratic. Therefore, President Benes refused to sign it.³⁶⁴ The new Constitution proclaimed Czechoslovakia a people's democracy, declared dictatorship of proletariat, nationalized economy, restricted freedom of speech.³⁶⁵ The Constitution of 1960 was to mark the Czechoslovak transformation into a socialist state. Its biggest change was to proclaim: "*the vanguard of the working class*".³⁶⁶ This work does not aim to conduct a deep analysis of the Constitutional changes, as it is not in its scope. Nevertheless, it was important to mention the changes of Constitution because it allowed the Soviet Union to gain more control over Czechoslovakia by helping to draft a constitution, which was similar to the USSR's, and by becoming an advisor on its implementation, as the oldest socialist state.

³⁶¹ <https://www.upn.gov.sk/data/files/8-2016-EN-2-1948.pdf>

³⁶² Mary Heimann, *Czechoslovakia: the State that Failed* (Yale University Press, 2009), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vkvs.14>), 173.

³⁶³ David Vaughan, "1945-1948: From Liberation to Stalinism," *Radio Prague International*, January 4, 2020, <https://www.radio.cz/en/section/special/1945-1948-from-liberation-to-stalinism>).

³⁶⁴ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 38.

³⁶⁵ Taborsky, *Communism...*, 172-175.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 177-178.

Czechoslovakia was an economically developed country with a balance between heavy and light industries.³⁶⁷ Its transformation into a Soviet model forced it to adopt a planned economy system. Czechoslovakia changed its balanced industrial production to a heavy industry production, as it was requested by Moscow.³⁶⁸ This resulted in economic decline, since the Soviet economic model did not work for developed countries.

The Constitution adjustments touched on almost on every aspect of everyday life. Education went through reforms to include Marxist philosophy in program. Religion was restricted by administrative measures.³⁶⁹ Cultural life was also carefully controlled by the Communist Party. The CPCS used police and judicial systems as its instruments of power.³⁷⁰ Citizens could be arrested without warrant and held for indefinite period without a legal counselor. The presumption of innocence was also revoked. Although multipolarity was not banned, police arrested every potential opposition member. The living conditions became unbearable, and this forced citizens to flee the country to escape the Soviet control. By the 1950s, around seventy thousand Czechs crossed the border illegally to reside in the West.³⁷¹ As this posed a threat to the regime, the CPCS ordered to build the Iron Curtain along the western border. This completed the cut off of Eastern Europe from the Western Europe.³⁷²

The Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia did not just put the country into the Soviet's orbit of influence, it created a government that subordinated to Moscow.³⁷³ The USSR advised on economic and military systems and decided what alliances Czechoslovakia could join. Moreover, there were Soviet advisors at every ministry. Adaptation to the Soviet model was a sacrifice of the country's interests to the political interests of the Soviet Union.³⁷⁴ The Czechoslovak Army was trained and equipped to the Soviet model.³⁷⁵ It also had to be a member of the Warsaw Pact Treaty that guaranteed mutual assistance and defense to its members and non-interference in the internal affairs of its members.³⁷⁶ However, the Treaty also aimed at strengthening the Soviet influence in the satellite states, as they experienced civil

³⁶⁷ Suda, *The Czechoslovak...*, 40.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., 41.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., 43.

³⁷¹ Ibid., 45.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Robert Bruce Lockhart, "Report on Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs* 33, no. 3 (April 3, 1955), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20031113>, 493.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 494.

³⁷⁶ "The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955," Office of the Historian, accessed May 8, 2020, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw-treaty>).

unrest, as it allowed the Soviet Union to maintain the army on the member states' territories.

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The Czechoslovak domestic and foreign policy interests had to match those of the Soviet Union, even if they were harmful. This led to economic and social crisis within the country, because of the CPCS's iron rule discussed above. In 1968, Alexander Dubcek launched political liberalization reforms aimed at improving the socio-political and economic situation by opening trade with the West.³⁷⁸ This program became known as Socialism with a Human Face. Dubcek planned to reform the country, while preserving the Communist Party power. However, the USSR considered this as a threat to its influence in Czechoslovakia. It also feared of a potential reform spillover to the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries. Leonid Brezhnev said the events "*were moving in an anti-communist direction.*"³⁷⁹ Therefore, Moscow called the WTO members to invade Czechoslovakia to stop the liberalization reforms and establish even more authoritarian rule.

To justify the invasion, Kremlin retrospectively introduced the Brezhnev Doctrine that proclaimed that the Soviet Union had "*a sacred duty to intervene on behalf of the socialist commonwealth.*"³⁸⁰ This was also presented as if the USSR, along with the WTO defended "*Czechoslovakia's independence and sovereignty as a socialist state against the counterrevolutionary forces that would like to deprive it of this sovereignty.*"³⁸¹ The Doctrine allowed Moscow to spread its power even further over Czechoslovakia and other socialist states. Communist parties were officially told that they were "*free to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism*", but do not deviate from them.³⁸²

The Czechoslovak Republic remained a communist country strongly controlled by the Soviet Union until the Velvet Revolution in 1989.

6.2.3. Conclusion

The conducted research shows us that the ideological change (IV) led to a tremendous shift in preferences (DV), as Czechoslovakia had to disregard its own preferences to the benefit of Soviets' interests. Analyzing the pre-war and first post-war years, we can see that Czechoslovakia had aspirations of being a democracy that maintained a relationship with the

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Matt Frost and Jeremy Bransten, "Czech Republic: 1968 Viewed from The Occupiers' Perspective," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, August 9, 1998, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1089231.html>).

³⁷⁹ Kramer, "The Kremlin...", 305.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 367.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 368.

³⁸² Ibid., 366.

East and West. However, the USSR had different plans for Czechoslovakia; therefore, it was forced to become a one-party system under the Communist Party and to cut its relations with the West. One of the differences between the ideological shift in Ukraine and Czechoslovakia is the absence of any benefits to Czechoslovakia. The Soviet policy pursued relative gains only while the EU and US democracy promotion showed evidence of benefits to the both sides.

The Soviet Union used a number of tactics that are similar to the democratization tools. These were technical assistance through institutions, e.g. Comintern, propaganda and information dissemination. They represent a mix of top-down and bottom-up approaches used to prepare an institutional ground for the Communists provoke the population to rally support for the Communist Party. The Salami tactic does not fall under the democratization tools but could be considered a top-down approach since it reshuffled or dismissed the existing government for the benefit of the CPCS. To conclude, Kremlin deployed a variety of techniques from both approaches. However, its main advantage was the Red Army that occupied a significant part of Czechoslovak territory, which helped the USSR to strengthen the CPCS power in the government prior to 1945.

Nye's relational power analysis will be also applied in the Czechoslovakia case. The first level of commanding change was not initiated by Kremlin. The Munich betrayal and Nazi occupation made Czechoslovakia seek another alliance. Since Prague and Moscow had relations established before 1938, the Second World War naturally pushed them towards each other. Liberation of the eastern part of Czechoslovakia and followed Red Army occupation created an environment that influenced Czechoslovak decisions. Finally, the Red Army presence on the Slovakian territory guaranteed the CPCS success with the Kosice Programme.

While the first level of relational power was still being built up, controlling agendas was being formed at the same time. The controlling agenda is achieved when one convinces the other you pursue same goals. When Benes visited Moscow in 1943, Stalin was able to make Benes believe that post-war Czechoslovak-Soviet relations would be equal and free from interference, Czechoslovak borders would be restored to the pre-Munich agreement and surely Benes did not expect the Iron Wall to rise. This allowed Stalin to control Czechoslovak preferences on the top level. To strengthen control over Czechoslovak agenda, the CPCS with the help of the Soviet Union rallied support among the population to control the country's preferences on the bottom level as well. Therefore, when Gottwald called for support during the February coup, he received massive support. Hundreds of people went to demonstrations to support the Czechoslovak Communist Party, as the Social Democrat Party was allegedly accused of discrimination against the CPCS.

Analyzing relations development between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Communist Parties, it seems that Gottwald did not anticipate Stalin's plan to establish full control over Czechoslovakia with the help of the CPCS. Gottwald's support for the Czechoslovak participation in the Marshall Plan and his genuine surprise with the Stalin's reaction show that he was probably misguided as well as Benes. Nevertheless, the Communist coup d'état was the last step to complete subordination of power to the USSR. According to Nye, the establishing preferences phase is when one actor not only shares common goals with another, but also wants to fulfil them for another. The USSR did establish the third aspect of relational power; however, Czechoslovakia changed its policy to assist in fulfilling the Soviets goals because of security concerns for, as the Prague Spring showed Moscow expected to have full control over domestic and foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the USSR did not mind using the military force to ensure that Czechoslovak policy corresponds to the Soviet idea of communism and the grand strategy against the West, as this was stated in the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The Soviet-backed Communist takeover could be considered a smart power tool because the USSR strongly relied on its military power to gain and maintain control but various Soviet institutions (Comecon, NKVD, etc.) and diplomatic work paved the way to the ideological change in favor of communism. The Soviet military power was a factor that played an important role in influencing Benes' decisions during the Kosice negotiations and the February coup, but the change was achieved without direct military intervention. Nevertheless, the USSR called for hard power to maintain its absolute control over Czechoslovakia, when it ordered the WTO invasion in response to Dubcek's reforms.

To support the claim that great powers export ideology to benefit their goals, one needs to answer the question how did the USSR benefit from exporting communism to Czechoslovakia? Analyzing Czechoslovak geopolitical importance to the USSR, we need to see if the Soviet geopolitical goals were fulfilled by bringing communism to Czechoslovakia. The USSR acted from a position of security and power maximizer. Its objectives could be summarized to security and imperialism. First, its goal was to create a buffer zone, which was controlled by an ally that shared the Soviet policy. The Communist coup d'état allowed to control the Czechoslovak agenda and deploy forces on the western border to strengthen the Soviet security and potentially deter the West. In addition, Czechoslovakia was forced to join the Warsaw Pact that was a military alliance against the USA and the West. Therefore, it also served the Soviets in the super-power confrontation with the USA. Another Soviet objective was expansionism. A satellite government established in Czechoslovakia did not formally extend the Soviet

borders, but it brought same advantages to the USSR, since it had unconditional power over the country.

6.3. Case studies findings

This chapter aimed at either validating or invalidating the research hypothesis that claims that democratization is used to change other states' preferences to the benefit of a donor state. This theory is valid if a recipient state changes its preferences to match those of the donor state after an ideological change.

The conducted analysis on the democratization of Ukraine showed its preference shift towards the EU and the USA. However, it has to be mentioned that Ukrainian political leaders frequently changed their stance on integration with the EU and NATO, which Ukraine called the ultimate goal behind the democratization. President Kuchma pursued multi-vector policy in order to maintain close relationship with all interested parties (Russia, USA and EU). He verbally supported the integration with the western institutions, however sided with Russia at the same time. President Yushchenko won on premises of promoting Euro-integration and potential accession to NATO. His policy also showed evidence of distancing from Russia. However, he was not able to accomplish the posed goals, due to various reasons, which were discussed above. President Yanukovych pursued multi-vector policy similar to the President Kuchma's strategy. However, his refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement in 2013 showed clear evidence of siding with Russia. President Poroshenko pursued relations with the West by signing the EU Association Agreement and pursuing NATO membership. As per Russia, the military conflict and Crimea annexation did not leave many options to Kyiv other than cutting relations with Moscow.

Examining post-Orange Revolution Ukraine, one may find congruence between expectation and value. The stated expectation was to find a preference shift towards the donor, i.e. the USA and the EU. Yushchenko's policy was aimed at complying with the EU and USA requirements and strengthening ties with them. For instance, Yushchenko pushed the EU to officially recognize Ukraine as a potential EU member. He also sought a NATO membership. Although, it was declined by France and Germany, Yushchenko worked on NATO requirements stipulated in the Action Membership Plan while Ukraine's relations with Russia experienced decline. This could be due to Yushchenko ending the Crimea Lease Agreement or Ukrainization of Russian ethnic population. The military conflict between Russia and Georgia sent a message to Ukraine clarifying Russia's stance on Georgia and Ukraine accession to NATO.

However, Ukraine's policy towards the USA, the EU and Russia changed with Yanukovych coming to power. His policy opposed Yushchenko's policy in many aspects. For instance, Yanukovych focused on de-Ukrainization of the country and reminded the population of its Soviet history. He extended the Crimea Lease Agreement, thus significantly improving relations with Russia. Aspirations to join NATO became irrelevant, as Yanukovych pushed for the Constitution amendment, which proclaimed Ukraine's military non-aligned status. The last pro-Russian decision was walking away from the Association Agreement.

To summarize the post-Orange Revolution Ukraine's policy, one may conclude that during the first few years it showed an incline towards the USA and the EU. This supports the hypothesis as valid. However, this change did not last long, as Yanukovych set the country back to its alliance with Russia despite his rhetoric about Ukraine's future with the West.

Post-Euromaidan Ukraine is inclined towards the EU and the USA and has poor relations with Russia. However, as it was mentioned the Russian aggression complicated the situation and left no other choice to Ukraine. Therefore, both the Ukrainian government and population agreed to pursue the integration with the EU and greater number of people approve of joining NATO, while before this was not very popular among the population.

On the one hand, this confirms the hypothesis of a preference change towards the donor, i.e. the USA and the EU. On the other, Ukraine's aspirations to integrate into Western institutions have been present since its independence. Therefore, it becomes problematic to justify the hypothesis. However, state official rhetoric does not necessarily present its real intentions. If we look at Ukrainian policy since the early 1990s until the Euromaidan, we will see strong incline towards Russia with the exception for Yushchenko's presidency. One may also suggest that Ukraine could have considered a bridge role between the West and Russia. However, this would imply that Ukraine had a military non-alignment status.

If we analyze the Ukrainian preference shift in the framework of the EU and U.S. geopolitical objectives, we could see that the 2014 events contributed to their geopolitical goals. The EU was able to create a buffer zone, thus enhanced its security. The USA diverted Ukraine from Russia, thus reducing Russia's chances to challenge the U.S. which dominates unipolar world order. Therefore, from this angle one may conclude that democratization was exploited by the US and the EU to pursue their own geopolitical objectives.

To draw a parallel with between the two case studies, one needs to find congruence and/or incongruence between expectations and values on the Czechoslovakia case study. The theory states that the Soviet Union should have gained power over Czechoslovakian preferences after its transition to communism.

Before the Nazi occupation, Czechoslovakia was a full-fledge democracy with a developed economy and international alliances, which were created independently from outside interference. Moreover, Czechoslovakia had full control over domestic and foreign affairs. As the Czechoslovak official government in exile was strengthening its relations with the USSR, it was slowly losing control over its preferences. While at the same time, the Czechoslovak Communist Party was gaining more power within the country with the assistance coming from the Soviet Union. All of these resulted in a total Soviet control over Czechoslovakia for around 40 years. This relationship was beneficial to the Soviet Union only, as they helped to achieve its geopolitical goals of security and expansionism. Czechoslovakia served as a buffer state from the West, provided the USSR with its resources and industries and opened its market. To summarize it, this shows us a strong case of an ideological change, which shifted the country's preferences to the benefit of the donor.

To answer a question whether modern democracy promotion is similar to the Soviet communism promotion, one may conclude that there is certain resemblance. Instruments used for democracy and communism export can be categorized under top-down and bottom-up approaches. Case study analysis showed us that the USA, the EU and the USSR combined the approaches to achieve their goals. This would be true for any other ideology because a successful transformation requires functioning state institutions and supportive population. Undoubtedly, actors could try to use only one approach, however, this will be less efficient and potentially will have a negative impact on a country.

The main difference between democracy and communism promotion is that democratized states can also benefit from the change. It depends on many circumstances, such as presence of opposition, military and other factors, but democratization does not exclude a scenario where a donor country can benefit. Therefore, both relative and absolute gains can be pursued and achieved. The democratization of Ukraine showed us that all three parties (Ukraine, USA and EU) involved benefited from the change to certain levels. On the contrary, known examples of communism promotion show exploitation of a recipient country by a donor. The case of Czechoslovakia confirmed that it was a zero-sum game, where the USSR achieved its gains and Czechoslovakia had to sacrifice its interests.

7. Conclusion

This thesis starts with a discussion of the means of power evolution, as states constantly seek to accumulate more power. Each state uses the means available to it. Nevertheless, even great powers are constrained by international order and therefore, have to adopt their means of power to the new rules to avoid international condemnation and punishment. A smart power strategy that combines a use of soft and hard power when it is needed allows states to pursue their goals and avoid consequences.

Democratization can be considered a smart power strategy, as its instruments vary from information dissemination to military invasion. The main benefit of democratization is that it can be presented as a noble goal of bringing freedom to people; therefore, it is easy to justify. Another strength is the fact that freedom is a universal value, which is attractive to the majority of the global population. As it was mentioned, liberal values became a new societal glue; therefore, democratization also allows states to build a modern version of an empire, where people bound up by liberal values.

This research aim was to prove or disprove the hypothesis that a recipient state changes its preferences to the benefits of a donor state that assists with democratization. The conducted examination showed us that Ukraine inclined towards the USA and the EU after the Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions. However, implications in the face of Russian military aggression makes it hard to assume what Ukraine-Russia relations would be if Russia reacted differently. Nevertheless, Ukrainian policy after the Orange Revolution confirms the hypothesis, as there was a preference shift that also benefited to the US and EU geopolitical objectives. However, it did not last long, as the next democratically elected President Yanukovich decided to navigate Ukraine back towards Russia.

Examining the aspects of relational power identified by Joseph Nye and applied on the research case studies lead us to the following conclusion. While the research showed that the donor states (USA, EU and USSR) managed to change recipient states' preferences (Ukraine, Czechoslovakia), the third level of relational power- establishing preferences was reached through different means. The USA and the EU established Ukraine's preferences by the level of attractiveness associated with cooperation with them. Meanwhile, the USSR established Czechoslovak's preferences by force and threat to use military forces to preserve its control over preferences.

The first research question asked whether democratization helps to achieve geopolitical goals. As we saw in the example of Ukraine, its change of political course aimed at EU and

NATO accession. The European Union's benefit from just considering to grant a membership to Ukraine is quite significant. Currently, Ukraine serves as a buffer zone for the most eastern European Union states, which was of a specific concern to Poland. Secondly, diverting Ukraine from Russia significantly weakened Russia's aspirations becoming a Eurasian power. Therefore, it prevents Russia from altering the status quo in Europe. This outcome is beneficial to both the EU and the USA. Another benefit is expansion of the European trade relations, since Ukraine considers the EU its biggest trade partner now. Regional security is one of the EU geopolitical objectives, which failed with the secession of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and annexation of Crimea. Eastern Ukraine became a battlefield between Ukraine officials and Russia backed militias. This had strong impact on the European security at the beginning; however, as per 2020, these are frozen conflicts with no foreseeable resolution but also with lesser threat to the region security.

The United States' goal is to maintain hegemony by preserving unipolar world order and therefore, preventing regional hegemons rising. Russia, as one of the aspiring regional hegemons, was a potential threat to USA presence in Europe, but it is no longer, as it was said in the previous paragraph. Ukraine's interest in joining NATO strengthens the USA position, as this will bring NATO forces to Russia's front door.

The analysis of the Czechoslovak transition to communism proved that ideology can be used to change state's preferences to achieve geopolitical goals. As we are experiencing another Cold War, we should not exclude a possibility that modern democratization efforts are just a continuation of the ideological clash that began in the 20th century between the USA and the USSR. Washington still believes that non-democratic countries pose a threat to the United States, as was discussed throughout the research. Therefore, first and foremost, democracy promotion is a policy targeted at increasing U.S. security. However, it also should be said that a recipient country could benefit from the democratization as well; however, it is not usually a priority. While in case communism promotion, there were no benefits to a recipient country. Therefore, one may agree that democratization serves a means of power projection and achievement of geopolitical goals.

The EU and US approaches to democracy promotion can also demonstrate their intentions to some extent. The analysis showed that both powers use a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches; however, each inclines towards one. The USA prefers bottom-up approaches, as it mostly works with opposition and civil society to educate them about democratic procedures, so they can organize elections and thus, change the government. Therefore, it could be seen as fast way to topple non-democratic government. If an assisting

power mobilizes opposition and population, it could quickly escalate into protests and in some cases revolutions, for example, as we have witnessed in Syria. Democratization may come at a very high price, when using the bottom-up approach.

The EU usually opts for top-down approach, as it believes that democracy cannot be built without stable institutions and economy. The top-down approach paves a way to building democratic institutions and strengthening the economy to prepare the country for democratic elections. This approach could take years of work; however, it proves to be much safer. Nevertheless, both approaches serve a purpose and should be used in accordance with a situation.

Since the bottom-up approach allows for a quick democratization or change of government, one may say that such an approach achieves donor states' geopolitical objectives faster without strong consideration for the consequences it may bring. Meanwhile a top-down approach is more considerate as it does not see elections as its first objective. It takes much longer to prepare the ground for democracy to flourish and thus, it also may postpone geopolitical goals achievement.

To answer the second research question of whether democracy promotion is similar to communism promotion, I compared the strategies used by the USA and EU to that of the USSR. Chapter 6 showed us that similar instruments were used in the case of Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. Both countries were of geopolitical importance to its donor states and change of preferences was beneficial to them. One may conclude that democracy and communism promotion are very similar in regards to the means of power projection but with a difference in ideology. I would go further and say that this is the case for any ideological change. Since regardless of what ideology is promoted, a government that was assisted in significant ideological change is very likely to incline towards the donor state.

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Duma elections: prevailing number of seats won by the United Russia

