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**Change in Civil Society? Connecting Globalisation and
Sociocultural Cleavage with the Rise of Populism**

Master's thesis

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
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Title

Change in Civil Society? Connecting Globalisation and Sociocultural Cleavage with the Rise of Populism

Název práce

Změna v občanské společnosti? Souvislost globalizace a sociokulturní štěpící linie s růstem populismu

Abstract

This thesis employs the globalization and integration-demarcation cleavage theory formulated by Hutter [2014] and Kriesi [2012], conception of populism formulated by Mudde [2017] and draws on Gramscian conception of civil society and hegemony. Aim of this thesis is to build a model of causal influence of globalization on cleavage and on populism, as was suggested by Hutter [2014]. After building this model, the aim is to explore how this theoretical relationship holds over the 30 years since 90's, when the connection between globalization and new sociocultural cleavage had been theoretically suggested. For this model I am using KOF Globalization Index, European Values Survey datasets and Authoritarian Populism Index constructed and published by Timbro in years 1990, 1999, 2008 and 2017. This model is built on a dataset containing 38 countries on European continent or being a candidate country for EU. I am elaborating Hutter's theoretical suggestion and framing it in Gramscian conception of civil society. This allows me to suggest that populists are using organic crisis in a society to attract people who feel disjointed from current hegemonical elite and to create counterhegemony. The theory is, that globalization increases the tension between winners and losers of globalization sides of cleavage and through this is mediated globalization's effect on populism. Populism is theorised to be on a rise because of this mediated effect of globalization. My results have shown that it's more complex, globalization and cleavage are intersecting in their influence of populism, but globalization is actually influencing populism directly. Its mediated effect on populism through cleavage is surprisingly found negative. Moreover, I have found that globalization is actually lowering the amount of people on demarcation side of cleavage. These results have furthermore proved relatively stable over time.

Abstrakt

Tato práce využívá Hutterovu [2014] a Kriesiho [2012] teorii globalizace a integrační demarkační štěpící linie, koncepci populismu formulovanou Muddem [2017] a Gramsciho pojetí občanské společnosti a hegemonie. Cílem této práce je vytvořit model kauzálního vlivu globalizace na štěpící linii, jak formuloval Hutter [2014]. Po vytvoření tohoto modelu je cílem práce testovat, jak se model vyvíjel za posledních 30 let od roku 1990, kdy byl zhruba teoreticky formulován vztah mezi globalizací a štěpící linií. Pro vytvoření modelu v této práci využívám KOF Globalizační index, dataset Evropského výzkumu hodnot a Index autoritářského populismu publikovaného nevládní organizací Timbro. Tyto indikátory využívám v letech 1990, 1999, 2008 a 2017. Vztahy modeluji na datasetu obsahujícím 38 zemí, které se nachází na evropském kontinentu nebo kandidují na členství v Evropské unii. V práci rozpracovávám Hutterovo teoretické východisko a rámuji ho do Gramsciho pojetí občanské společnosti. Tento rámec mi umožňuje teoreticky popsat snahu populistů o využití organické krize ve společnosti k tomu, aby mobilizovali voliče, jenž se cítí odtržení od současné hegemonické elity. Takto se populisté snaží vytvořit kontrahegemonii. V teoretickém východisku této práce globalizace zintenzivňuje napětí mezi globalizací vyhrávající a prohrávající strany štěpné linie a tímto je její efekt na populismus zprostředkován. Výsledky mé práce ukazují, že tento vztah je výrazně komplexnější. Globalizace a štěpná linie spolu interagují při vlivu na populismus, ale globalizace ve skutečnosti ovlivňuje populismus přímo. Její skrze štěpnou linii zprostředkovaný efekt na populismus je překvapivě stabilně negativní. Navíc výsledky napovídají, že globalizace ve skutečnosti snižuje počet lidí na demarkační straně štěpné linie. Tyto výsledky se ukázaly jako v čase poměrně stabilní.

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1 Introduction

The centre of this thesis is to explore the assumption formulated by Hutter [2014: 7], that populist parties had been effective in mobilizing losers of globalization. For identifying this group, that is supposedly not profiting from globalizing processes and hence is against it, I am turning to integration-demarcation cleavage theory [Hutter 2014, Kriesi et al 2012], that had been formulated under different names by many authors (“new value cleavage” by Inglehart, “new politics cleavage” by Müller-Rommel or “new class cleavage” by Kriesi). The demarcation side in this cleavage are those so-called losers of globalization who are theorized to be mobilized by populist parties.

The rise of integration-demarcation cleavage had been explained by globalization, so I am using this structural force to create a complete picture. The theorized relationship is that globalization’s effect on populism is being mediated through integration-demarcation cleavage. That is, because integration-demarcation cleavage is caused by globalization, and then integration-demarcation cleavage is mobilized by populists, which should be how indirect effect of globalization on populism works. I am also controlling for the direct effect of globalization in order to capture the relationship completely.

I am framing this presupposed relationship within the Gramscian theory of civil society because his conception of this sphere and hegemonical conflict within it is providing a suitable theoretical explanation of how this relationship would happen. In Gramscian terms, populists are using organic crisis in attempt to create counterhegemony, which is threatening to the current hegemonic class and current societal structure. Organic crisis is a state of things when civil society’s demands can’t be met by political institutions, resulting in a crisis of representation, where traditional parties are no longer recognized as representatives [Gramsci 1971: 210 in Riley 2010: 17]. Simply put, populists are trying to mobilize those parts of civil society that are disjointed from the current hegemonical elite. Supporting this theoretical construct is that populist parties in European Union are vocally accusing mainstream political parties and their voters (elite) of threatening interests of lay people because they are usually pro-EU or at least don't act against it [Mudde 2017: 13].

As for the methodology, the globalization is represented by KOF Globalization Index [Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke, Sturm 2019], integration-demarcation cleavage is uncovered using latent

class analysis in European Values Survey datasets [EVS 2019, EVS 2020] and populism is represented by Authoritarian Populism Index constructed and published by Timbro [2019]. Populism using this indicator is measured as the success of populist parties in elections, therefore accounting for their actual appeal to voters and success in gaining law-making power.

This choice of variables has allowed me for longitudinal exploration of theorized relationships, starting with my analysis in 1990, following with 1999, 2008 and finishing in 2017. This enabled comparing the relationship in various years and see how time interacts with variables and how is the salience of certain effect changing over time. I am also controlling for national differences, expecting the relationship to be approximately the same in all countries, but allowing for different starting points, represented by random intercept, in each country. I am employing two methods to explore how does the relationship look like and what are changes between years. Firstly, path analysis as a simpler version of structural equation modelling, which is used in an explorative way because the model, as is theoretically formulated in this thesis, is saturated. Secondly, I am using hierarchical regression which is allowing for various interactions as well as for the aforementioned randomness of starting points for countries. Results of these two methods combined are yielding a detailed picture of how the relationship develops for different situations in different countries.

The hypothesis is, that the globalization's effect on cleavage is stable over the years but the effect of cleavage on election success of extremist and populist parties is getting stronger. This result would suggest that latent potential of demarcation side is mobilized better or that there are some other variables needed for a full explanation of this.

2 Civil Society

Civil society is a keyword present in public discourse ascribed various meanings and almost immense power. It is claimed that civil society is protecting democracy, mobilizing citizens, providing some social services that state fails to provide (if it is its duty anyway, as opinions vary on this), and many more. But what exactly is this almost magical civil society, that is supposedly a solution to so many problems of contemporary societies? According to Chandhoke [2002, 2007] and Pérez-Díaz [2014], grasping civil society in contemporary sociological discourse is not easy, therefore I am starting with highlighting common misconceptions and confusion with the concept and what civil society is not, following with recapitulating some of the classical conceptualizations of civil society, anticipating it will provide better understanding what is in the basis of this concept. Towards the end of this section I am providing definitions that I will be using for the purposes of this thesis.

“To identify the main ways it [a concept of civil society] is being used in academic and public debates” which will serve as illustration of the problem with the concept mentioned above, I am quoting Pérez-Díaz [2014: 812]: *“a broad sense (CS1: a type of society), an intermediate sense (CS2: markets and associations) and two restricted meanings (CS3: associations and social networks of any kind, and CS4: a subset of associations that convey a moral message connected with the value of civility).”* As we will see, the sociological theory, as is the one employed in this thesis is mostly concerned with CS3 and CS4 according to Pérez-Díaz’s classification, meaning with the associations and social networks of any kind and with a subset of associations that convey a moral message connected with the value of civility.

Chandhoke is on the other hand highlighting the distinction between the community and civil society, as these two might be confused mostly in urban setting because they share some features. Though, drawing on social anthropology, the important distinction between these two is, that community is characterized by personal and face-to-face interactions whereas civil society has contractual relationships [Chandhoke 2002: 35].

There is an explanation for the confusion about the civil society concept mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. According to Chandhoke [2007: 609], there’s a conflict with nowadays flattened presentation of civil society as an easy solution to the malaise of the

contemporary world, or as a sure recipe for democracy and what it can actually do [Chandhoke 2007: 608]. Moreover, it is often presented as an alternative to the state and even to the market [Chandhoke 2002: 36].

After the short summarization of what civil society is not and some important misconceptions that one has to be wary of, I am turning now to the basis of the concept. Civil society still is and always have been conceptualized as “*a metaphorical space between the household and the state*” [Chandhoke 2007: 610]. Important classics such as Hegel, Marx, de Tocqueville and Gramsci had theorised it as limits for the state (de Tocqueville), as an obligatory stage in the state formation (Hegel), as the root of the states’ power (Marx), or theorised by Gramsci the “space where the state constructs its hegemony in alliance with the dominant classes” [Chandhoke 2007: 609].

Very simply defined, “*civil society, in the modern sense, refers to an intermediate structure with many voluntary organizations, which by allowing individuals to enter and exit combine individual rights with communal solidarity*” [Riley 2010: 6].

Now, when we pinpointed parts of the contemporary discourse about civil society that are problematic for sociological exploration of this phenomenon, we can turn to the actual description of what civil society does. Civil society “*allows its inhabitants to make their own lives and their own destinies perhaps independently, perhaps in concert with others, in some degree of freedom. For the values of civil society are those of freedom, accessibility, and publicness. On this ground alone, no one is in theory barred from civil society, everyone is allowed entry into the sphere, and everyone—again in theory—is free to link with others to make their own histories*” [Chandhoke 2002: 46].

2.1 Democratizing Effect or a Space for Constructing Hegemony?

I consider it important to emphasize, that Chandhoke’s [2002: 46] definition is mentioning that some features of civil society are mostly theoretical ones and it is not certain that they are about to be found in reality, if a person is about to conduct an empirical research about features of different civil societies. I hope this next section will shed some light on this particularity of civil societies, as they are very likely sourcing from different conceptualizations of civil society that are equally influential for sociology.

There are two dominant conceptual traditions of civil society, one sourcing from Gramsci, one from Tocqueville. If we look deeper into Tocqueville's conception, we see that the common understanding of civil society as medicine for all issues are likely sourcing from his theoretical heritage. Riley's definition provided a few paragraphs above is drawing both on Tocqueville and Gramsci and he is also helping us understand, how is Tocqueville's conceptualization contributing to the 'magical medicine' misconception.

Tocqueville claims, that the existence of voluntary organizations is beneficial for democracy, because they are enhancing cooperation [Riley 2010: 6], he is emphasizing the integrating function and the ability to mobilize citizens [Riley 2010: 7] and taking it even further by insisting that „*civil society guarantees liberty by balancing the state*“. Drawing on this, „mass society theorists argue that totalitarianism derives from the absence or weakness of civic associationism that unleashes the state“ [Riley 2010: 7], therefore, if totalitarianism – a set-up of a state unleashed by weak civil society – is the opposite of democracy, strong civil society must be promoting it, right? It only seems like a logical conclusion but there are theorists claiming otherwise.

As we will see, digging deeper into Gramsci's conceptualization, it's not that easy. I tend to favour Gramsci's conceptual tradition in this thesis because it is employing more variables in the relationship, which is generally more accurate in social world. Moreover, he's leaving space for unintended consequences. And what is perhaps more important, this thesis is conceptualizing civil society as a place where opinions and values clash and where cleavages (which will be defined later) are to be found. Only with Gramsci's conflict theory embracing conceptualization I am able to view civil society in a way that is crucial for this thesis.

Gramsci's conceptualization is not reading politics of civil society but is exploring how these two are interacting with each other [Riley 2010: 12], which is something that this thesis is also aiming to explore. In Gramsci's theory, the effect of civil society depends on the establishment of hegemony, which is „*a process that requires attention to the specifically political relationship within and among decisive social classes*“ [Riley 2010: 13].

Before we dive in the exact effects of hegemony on the effect of civil society it is important to look into the meaning of that term employed by Gramsci. In general, hegemony refers to political and cultural dimension of class formation. It is, by definition, independent of the

level of economic development of a class [Riley 2010: 13, 16]. This implies, that even a class that is economically strong can be culturally weak as well as hegemonic (culturally and politically strong class) can be economically underdeveloped [Gramsci 1971 in Riley 2010: 16]. In opposition to Tocquevillian conception, strong dominant class does not imply weak subordinated class, quite the opposite actually. Hegemonically dominant class in its formation provides a framework that allows forming of strong oppositional classes, as Gramsci calls it, counterhegemony [Riley 2010: 16].

Hegemony is describing a specific kind of political relationship among social classes or their fractions. This kind of relationship is present when one „*group within a society exercises intellectual and moral leadership rather than simply naked coercive power over a set of other intraclass groupings or classes*“ [Gramsci 1971: 57 in Riley 2010: 14]. Conception like this is very much in sync with Foucault’s theory of governmentality, which can be simplified by cutting the word into two: govern – mentality [Foucault 1991, Lupton 1999]. This attempt at intellectual and moral leadership is usually recognizable, because the hegemonic body identifies and pursues broader interest of society and increases its own political power by improving moral, political and material circumstances of the group, class or society over which it exercises hegemony [Riley 2010: 14]. Of course, the term “improving” is problematic because it always depends on the perspective and values, to say what really means to improve something.

This is, nevertheless, helpful while identifying hegemonic relationships, because if class is hegemonic, it does not rule directly as a class, it rules in the name of the broader good and this broader good more or less corresponds to concrete interests of the hegemonic group [Riley 2010: 15].

Gramsci claims, that the bigger the gap between the actual national interest and the claimed national interest by hegemonic body is, the higher the chances of developing a counterhegemony are. If there is no gap, then non-elites tend to articulate their claims in the same economic-corporate terms as the dominant hegemonic class [Riley 2010: 16]. Often the case is, that ruling class is hegemonical because it also sets the means of measurement for what it means to improve something. Then there is usually little space for developing counterhegemony.

2.1.1 Connection between hegemony and civil society

Gramsci is insisting, that hegemony and civil society develop independently, meaning they may develop together, but they also don't need to. Hegemony is established through political processes, as it is essentially cultural dominance of a class, whereas civil society is caused mostly by economic factors, which is slightly confusing, because the concept does not refer to strictly economic organizations [Riley 2010: 17]. It can be even more confusing, because the dominant social conception of civil society is drawing on Tocqueville and in this tradition, there is a direct link between the development of voluntary associations which are central in civil society and the political organizations development that is described in the concept of hegemony [Riley 2010: 17].

Even though it is difficult to imagine, thanks to our socialized understanding of the way civil society works, the possibility that civil society can develop in the absence of hegemony is very important for the analysis of changes in democratic organizations. Gramsci points out so called 'organic crises', which are moments when democratic demands produced by civil society can't be met by political institutions. *'This leads to a crisis of representation in which the traditional parties in that particular organizational form, with the particular men who constitute, represent and lead them, are no longer recognized by their class (or fractions of a class) as its expression'* [Gramsci 1971: 210 in Riley 2010: 17]. This is essentially putting third variable into the relationship civil society → democracy sketched out by Tocqueville. The third variable is the hegemony of the ruling class and is intervening variable in this relationship. In the absence of hegemony, the democratic demands of civil society develop against the current regime of political parties and usually leads to general scepticism about all forms of political representations [Riley 2010: 17].

3 Theorising Change in Civil Society

In allegiance with any theory trying to describe the contemporary society, I am also claiming, that we are undergoing a time of change. The process that's often being pointed out in relation to this change and is unoriginally central also in this thesis is Globalization. I claim that globalization is the fuelling process of value-based change in civil society. The same value-base that is allowing for conflict as was explained in previous chapter.

Globalization is, according to Giddens, a process of organization of time and space [Giddens 1994: 96], and since it's influencing our conception of time and space, it is restructuring the way we perceive our world, hence changing our values and beliefs. It is also a process that is counter-traditional, and as traditions are the main point of reference for values and beliefs, it is necessarily meddling with people's world view. Giddens also writes that globalizations is the intensification of worldwide social relations which link „*distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa*” [1990: 64 in Eid 2003: 823]. Thanks to this intense connection of far-away places with immediate localities, globalization, though it is abstract and structural process, enters daily lives. Globalization has nervous end erratic character, caused by the intense interconnection of events happening all over the world, and it brings this nervousness and erraticness into daily lives of people [Eid 2003: 824].

How the world is becoming globalized is simply explained by Douglas. She claims that first, society became a problem to be dealt with at the global level. This led to a global nature of risks and triggered impulses towards establishing co-operative international institutions, which blurred boundaries of political and led to world-wide alliances, which are strengthening globalization process even further [Douglas in Lupton 1999: 66].

Globalization is multidimensional process. It is difficult to imagine how exactly is globalization happening and even though Giddens is describing its impact on everyday life quite thoroughly in a way that it's relatable, there have been narratives that Held and McGrew [2007 in: Hutter 2014: 25] called epitaphs for globalization. Towards this critique it is important to note, that globalization is empirically measurable and through this approach it has proven as much more resilient process than critiques are arguing [Hutter 2014: 25].

In order for globalization to be measurable, it is important to identify it's dimensions and acknowledge, that unlike many empirically measured concepts, where we quite usually measure only certain dimensions, in this case the measurement of globalization is product of measurement of all it's dimensions. Only this way it is possible to truly capture the process in its multidimensional wholeness and resilience. This way it is possible to confute the critique, that globalization is essentially equal to mobility [Bude, Dürrschmidt 2010: 484] and therefore easily disprovable because the estimates of people living outside of borders of their homeland are ranging between 1,7 to 3 % [Bude, Dürrschmidt 2010: 485].

There are several dimensions of globalization that are theoretically identifiable, Beck is for example identifying a few when he's demonstrating concrete self-reinforcing outcomes of globalization and these are: informational globalization, ecological globalization, economic globalization, cultural globalization, civil society globalization and globalization of labour cooperation and production [Beck 1997: 27]. Several pages later he's adding to this list technical globalization and transcultural conflicts [Beck 1997: 33].

In the forthcoming pages I am drawing a picture of changes of value-based change in civil society that globalization brought with itself and its theorized consequences. This is the theoretical background for the empirical model that I will be exploring later in the text.

3.1 Value-based Change in Civil Society

In order to capture the value dimension of civil society which had been hinted to be crucial for this thesis in previous sections, we need to introduce the term social cleavage. From the previous description of civil society, it is obvious that various inhabitants interact with each other in this metaphorical space. It would be naïve to think that all the actors always collectively agree with themselves. Here is where cleavages come to the picture. These cleavages can be distinguished by group-related lines between “us” and “them” [Schnabel, Hjerm 2014: 2].

Academics were originally interested in social cleavages because of their ability to project conflicts from the past centuries into the modern world [Franklin 2007: 1]. Current theory of cleavages draws on Lipsett and Rokkan [1967 in: Franklin 2007: 2] who proposed that cleavages were ensuring that social groups of twentieth century would withhold political antipathies from as long ago as the Protestant Reformation. These were: *“Protestant against Catholic, urban dweller against rural dweller, geographic regions in the centre of countries against regions in the periphery, and, most recently, industrial workers against their employers”* [Franklin 2007: 2].

These cleavages have diverse sources. The centre versus periphery and the Protestant versus Catholic cleavages are resulting from the national revolution or if you wish successful nation building and the rural versus urban and the owner versus worker cleavages are products of the industrial revolution. These cleavages forced people to take side in conflict over their cultural identities (the centre/periphery and Protestant/Catholic) and over their economic

interests (the rural/urban and the owner/worker), resulting into two-dimensional political space. This space – emerging from these four traditional cleavages – is constituted by cultural dimension and socio-economical dimension [Hutter 2014: 28]. These four cleavages in the two-dimensional space for a long time provided fruitful base for political parties to recruit their supporters from [Franklin 2007: 2].

The long-lasting existence of these cleavages used to be explained by socialization, which still plays a significant role in the cleavage theory [Franklin 2007: 2], but at the end of the 1960s, the cleavages started to weaken, and former explanation of their long lasting couldn't now explain these changes [Franklin 2007: 3]. In the 1992 Franklin found out, that where the social structure stayed in power to structure partisanship, new political parties couldn't be found. On the other hand where this power had declined, new parties or volatility among the old ones was generally present. He called this relationship between social structure and its power to shape partisanship the “cleavage politics” [Franklin 2007: 3-4]. Later this shift in cleavage politics was explained. When some major objectives of a political party are achieved, the party usually loses support. That is, because the conflict from which these objectives are emerging, is weakened and loses its former salience. [Franklin 2007: 4-5].

Although this shift in cleavages happened, the religion cleavage still plays an important role in the structuring of the civil society [Schnabel, Hjerm 2014: 1]. According to Hutter [2014: 23], the change in the traditional cleavages was caused by the left-libertarian and the right-populist turn in politics. But if changes are happening, how can we now know, when some issue emerging in society is still only an issue and when it's new cleavage?

To recognize cleavage, we must search for and find all of the following: “(a) an ‘empirical’ element that refers to its sociostructural foundation, (b) a set of shared values and beliefs—that is, a ‘normative’ element that provides a collective identity based on the socio-structural foundation, and (c) an ‘organizational’ element that refers to its political mobilization and organization” [Hutter 2014: 3]. Elements (a) and (b) in this definition are resulting from the Lipsetts and Rokkans conceptualization of cleavages and enables the mechanism of generational transition that is present in the socialization. This mechanism ensures durability of political ideas [Franklin 2007: 7].

But this durability isn't simply granted. As we have seen, the issues emerging from the cleavages may be solved and in that case the cleavage is very likely to weaken. For political parties this means that issue-specific conflict must be more or less constantly fought for to keep the issue salient and to keep the cleavage alive [Hutter 2014: 37].

Cleavages as structuring element of society

These symbolical value-based boundaries in civil society that are created by cleavages facilitate inclusion but also exclusion and lead to unequal chances for participation in politics and active community membership [Schnabel, Hjerm 2014: 2]. Cleavages are influenced by states' institutions, because these institutions influence individual attitudes and attitudes influence the way in which civil society is structured. One might even claim that the state also influences the possibilities of participation determined by the exclusiveness and inclusiveness of these structures [Schnabel, Hjerm 2014: 10].

Since we touched upon the way cleavages structure society, it would be helpful to use social network theory as a theoretical tool that can help us imagine these boundaries that I mentioned. Because of cleavages, the network will always be partially segregated and more or less horizontal. If this weren't the case, cleavages wouldn't exist. We can imagine two densely connected clusters of nodes with not that many connections cutting across the space in between these clusters – that is where the cleavage lies. These network connections cutting across social cleavages may exist, and they nourish wider cooperation within society [Foley, Edwards 1996: 2].

While I am describing how cleavage structure effects the features of civil society, I consider important to point out, that civil society as a whole is usually quite exclusive based on different forms of capital. Those, who don't have any usually don't find a place in civil society and are "*banished to the dark periphery of the sphere*" [Chandhoke 2007: 613]. It is primarily visible in the developing world, where most countries are dominantly rural, but nevertheless in their civil society is salient the urban middle-class agenda [Chandhoke 2007: 613]. Furthermore, recent research on Europe and religious cleavage suggests that European civil societies aren't necessarily inclusive either [Schnabel, Hjerm 2014: 10].

Integration-demarcation cleavage

As was noted in the previous section, there have been some changes in the cleavages dividing civil society in the last couple of decades. The main change has started with fulfilling some basic objectives of left parties throughout the years following the end of World War II. Mainly a certain degree of security for unemployed people, improvement in the shortages of affordable housing and improved access to health care [Franklin 2007: 4]. This has led to weakening of economical dimension cleavages and opened space for a left-liberan and right-populist turn. This turn had been spurred by the educational revolution. In different literature we can find it under these labels: “new value cleavage” (Inglehart), “new politics cleavage” (Müller-Rommel) or “new class cleavage” (Kriesi) [Hutter 2014: 4].

Hutter is calling this cleavage an integration-demarcation cleavage and is connecting it to globalization [Hutter 2014: 2]. This cleavage has introduced three new issues into the issue-specific political competition. These are (1) the economic issue concerning sectoral and international competition, (2) cultural competition which is most saliently linked to immigration of ethnically distinct groups and (3) political competition between nation states and international organizations and political actors [Hutter 2014: 6].

This brings us to the opposition sides that give name to the cleavage. The defensive and protectionist position called demarcation is opposing the economic and political integration and immigration favouring side fittingly called integration [Hutter 2014: 37]. On the demarcation side are located the ‘losers’ of globalization whereas on the integration side are positioned the ‘winners’ [Hutter 2014: 2]. These groups are often said to be created by globalization, [Kiersi et al 2012: 12], yet it is important to consider ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization as merely latent groups, consisting of latent structural potential [Kiersi et al 2012: 4], that can be awakened by political articulation of their conflicting interests [Kiersi et al 2012: 12].

Important about this new cleavage is, that it did not add a new dimension to the political space. Rather, it added novel issues into existing cultural and economic dimensions. Most of these novel issues emerged in the cultural dimension with the emergence of cultural liberalism [Hutter 2014: 29]. What is interesting, though, is not only that it adds issues to both existing dimensions, but it also connects former adversaries on the same side of this new conflict. For example, managers and social-cultural professionals are now both on the

winners' side [Hutter 2014: 32]. Globalization thus created new sectoral cleavage, which “cuts across the traditional class cleavage and tends to give rise to cross-class coalitions” [Hutter 2014: 33].

On the side of the integration are likely to be cosmopolitan citizens, entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors that allow for international competition. On the demarcation side, are likely to be entrepreneurs and qualified employees from traditionally sheltered sectors accompanied with unqualified employees and citizens that strongly identify with the national community to which they belong [Hutter 2014: 35]. As is apparent, these latent groups unite people who are different from each other in terms of sectors, social class, educational levels, and their attachment to national communities' [Hutter 2014: 32].

4 Connecting Change in Civil Society to the Rising Support of Extremist and Populist Parties

As I have already described in previous chapter, the term hegemony is central for the way that political environment in certain areas evolve. The term hegemony essentially means ‘cultural dominance of a class’ [Riley 2010: 17]. In Gramscian terms, there also exist ‘organic crisis’, which essentially describes what cleavage theory is also describing, though in more concrete terms. Organic crises are produced when civil society’s demands can’t be met by political institutions. This state, according to Gramsci, may even result in a crisis of representation, where traditional parties are no longer recognized as representatives of a class or of a fraction of a class [Gramsci 1971: 210 in Riley 2010: 17].

This is crucial theoretical base, that is providing us with insight into the success of populist and extremist parties we are seeing in Europe [Calance 2012: 31]. This rise of vote for populist parties had been often explained with globalization and cultural issues related to it [Kiersi et al 2012: 20; Swank and Betz 2003 in: Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015: 284]. This rise had been tracked to the 1990s, and it is claimed that populist parties had been effective in mobilizing losers of globalization [Hutter 2014: 7], who are emerging with the new integration-demarcation cleavage. The cleavage, as has been described in previous chapter, is notion of a latent potential, that populist parties had been mobilizing. This rise is sometimes called a ‘silent counter-revolution’ [Ignazi 1992: in Hutter 2014: 30].

This is practical example of Gramsci's theory, because populist parties are always vocally critical about the establishment [Mudde 2017: 5]. In this sense, populists are sensing the organic crisis in society and are attempting to create a counterhegemony which is threatening the current hegemonic class and through this also the current structure. In this terminology, what populist parties are trying to do is mobilize the fraction of civil society that is distanced from current hegemonical 'elite'. Example may be that many populist parties within European Union are accusing the political elite of threatening the interests of people (in this case the people are equal to national citizens) by serving the EU and putting it's interests first [Mudde 2017: 13].

Hence, if civil society is containing latent potential for populist and extremist parties to succeed, it is definitely not a sure recipe for democracy, as has been suggested by Tocqueville and contradicted in chapter 2. Chandhoke [2007: 613] writes: "*Civil societies are what their inhabitants make of them. (...) There is nothing in civil society that automatically ensures the victory of democratic projects*". Here she is referring to Smith and Hegel, who, even though they were the first to conceptualise civil society, way before the notion of cleavage and counterhegemony had been formulated, already saw the sphere as deeply troublesome and were aware of the incivilities that could arise in the civil society [Chandhoke 2007: 612].

It has become necessary now to conceptualize populism, as I have described the connection of it to changes in the structure of civil society and deemed it as uncivil. '*Populism as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people*' [Mudde 2017: 6]. It is this particular distinction of the people and the elite in favour of the people's mind, that is particularly appealing to the latent cleavage, mostly since the new cleavage is literally distinguishing between the side who is benefiting (hence the elite) and side which is being ostracized. And the appeal, that the people who are benefiting are in fact corrupt, has a potential to be pleasing for the deprived men.

It is not sufficient to state what populism is by itself, because it is mostly a term that's being used in addition to something. Far-right populism, far-left populism, extremism, fascism and so on are being used quite interchangeably in academic as well as nonfiction literature

[Albright 2018; Calance 2012; Cutts, Goodwin 2014; Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015; Hutter 2014; Riley 2010; Timbro 2019]. This is in allegiance with Mudde's [2017: 6] claim that populism by itself cannot offer complex or comprehensive answers to political questions that are generated by modern societies. Consequently, this means that it is virtually impossible for populism to be observed in a pure form and therefore in my model I am also concerned with populism as thin-centered ideology, hence always connected with other extreme ideology.

I am assuming populist and extremist parties to be mobilizing mainly the demarcation part of cleavage, because they are largely recognized by aiming their rhetoric on nationalism, and dismissive stance on integration [Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015: 281]. It had been claimed that electorate of populist and extremist parties are largely passive [Cutts, Goodwin 2014: 96], but since we are seeing rising support of this kind of rhetoric, I am assuming that there are structural changes that are aiding the success of populist and extremist parties.

5 Research Question

As I described in previous chapters, I am exploring the relationship among globalization, new integration-demarcation cleavage, and election success of extremist and populist parties (including both far-right as well as far-left). I am modelling this relationship in four time points starting in the year 1990, following with 1999, 2008 and finishing in 2017. The model of this relationship includes direct effect of globalization on integration-demarcation cleavage and this cleavage then having effect on electoral success of extremist and populist parties. Therefore, globalization has indirect effect on election success of extremist and populist parties over the cleavage divide. It is also important to control for direct effect of globalization on populism, even though that had not been theorized by authors I am using as a theoretical background for this research question [Kiersi et al 2012, Hutter 2014]. Figure 1 is visualizing theorized relationships.




Figure 1, theorized relationship among globalization, cleavage and populism

After exploring this relationship, I am then comparing the change happening in these direct effects from one time point to another, exploring how is the relationship changing over different time points and what effect does time have on these relationships. I have also added controlling for the effect that each country has in order to explore, how national differences help shaping the trend that is claimed to be seen across the world. It is important to include control for national differences, because with electoral success of populists, we are also dealing with differences of different political systems and this approach is allowing at least slight control for this national specificity.

The hypothesis is, that the globalization – cleavage effect is stable over the years but the cleavage – election success of extremist and populist parties is getting stronger. This result would suggest that latent potential of demarcation side is mobilized better or that there are some other variables needed for full explanation of this.

5.1 Operationalization of variables

In my theorized model, there are three variables: Globalization, Integration-demarcation cleavage, and Populism. These variables are all representing major structural forces and therefore careful operationalization is needed in order to be sure what exactly is the model showing.

5.1.1 Globalization

As I mentioned few pages ago, in accordance with Beck, this thesis operationalizes globalization as a multidimensional process. I am identifying three main dimensions, and

these are economic, social and political dimension of globalisation. These dimensions have several sub-topics and each of these has multiple indicators. All of them combined are creating multidimensional globalization that is a variable entering my empirical model.

In order to capture this described complexity of globalization measurement, I am using KOF Globalization Index [Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke, Sturm 2019], which is methodologically thorough and transparent freely available dataset that measures globalization in all countries over the world. Their data is available since 1970 and because they are covering all dimensions mentioned, I consider them one of the best globalization indexes out there. Their data is normalized through panel-normalization and indicators are weighted in order to employ their empirical significance to the resulting index. The weights are computed via principal component analysis over 10-year rolling window which allows for estimating the significance of each indicator for every year while considering its importance in previous years. Indicators are recognized ad two kinds: de facto and de jure and therefore also each sub-topic is divided as products of de facto and de jure indicators. These are then averaged, and the result is index for sub-topic of dimension of globalization. These sub-topics are then equally contribution into dimensions of globalization, which are conducting for the globalization as a whole.

Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke and Sturm [2019] are putting it this way: *‘Economic globalisation is composed of trade globalisation and financial globalisation, of which each gets a weight of 50 percent. Social globalisation consists of personal contact, information flows and cultural proximity where each contributes one third. Economic, social and political globalisation are aggregated to the Globalisation Index using again equal weights. The overall KOF Globalisation Index is calculated as the average of the de facto and the de jure Globalisation Index.’* Figure 2 is containing detailed insight into which indicators are adding for which dimension of globalization.

2018 KOF Globalisation Index: Variables description

Dimension	Variable Name	Variable Definitions	Source
<i>Trade Globalisation, de facto (KOFTrGldf)</i>	Trade in goods	Exports and imports of goods (% of GDP).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	Trade in services	Exports and imports of services (% of GDP).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	Trade partner diversity	Average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman market concentration index for exports and imports of goods (inverted).	IMF DOTS (2018a) and own calculations
<i>Trade Globalisation, de jure (KOFTrGldj)</i>	Trade regulations	Average of two subcomponents: Prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers and compliance costs of importing and exporting.	Gwartney et al. (2018)
	Trade taxes	Income from taxes on international trade as percentage of revenue (inverted).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	Tariffs	Unweighted mean of tariff rates.	Gwartney et al. (2018)
	Trade agreements	Number of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements.	Egger and Larch (2008)
<i>Financial Globalisation, de facto (KOFFiGldf)</i>	Foreign direct investment	Sum of stocks of assets and liabilities of foreign direct investments (% of GDP).	Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018) and IMF IIP (2018b)
	Portfolio investment	Sum of stocks of assets and liabilities of international equity portfolio investments (% of GDP).	Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018) and IMF IIP (2018b)
	International debt	Sum of inward and outward stocks of international portfolio debt securities and international bank loans and deposits (% of GDP).	Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018) and IMF IIP (2018b)
	International reserves	Includes foreign exchange (excluding gold), SDR holdings and reserve position in the IMF (% of GDP).	Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018) and IMF IIP (2018b)
	International income payments	Sum of capital and labour income to foreign nationals and from abroad (% of GDP).	World Bank WDI (2018)
<i>Financial Globalisation, de jure (KOFFiGldj)</i>	Investment restrictions	Prevalence of foreign ownership and regulations to international capital flows.	Gwartney et al. (2018)
	Capital account openness	Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness.	Chinn, Ito (2006, 2008)
	International investment agreements	Number of Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs) and Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs).	UNCTAD (2018)
<i>Interpersonal Globalisation, de facto (KOFIpGldf)</i>	International voice traffic	International incoming and outgoing fixed and mobile telephone traffic in minutes (% of population).	ITU (2018)
	Transfers	Secondary income paid and received. Gross inflows and outflows of goods, services, income or financial items without a quid pro quo (% of population).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	International tourism	Arrivals and departures of international tourists (% of population).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	International students	Inbound and outbound number of tertiary students (% of population).	World Bank WDI (2018)
<i>Interpersonal Globalisation, de jure (KOFIpGldj)</i>	Migration	Number of foreign or foreign-born residents (% of population).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	Telephone subscriptions	Fixed telephone and mobile subscriptions (% of population).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	Freedom to visit	Percentage of countries for which a country requires a visa from foreign visitors.	Czajka et al. (2018) and IATA (2018)
	International airports	Number of airports that offers at least one international flight connection (% of population).	ICAO (2018)
<i>Informational Globalisation, de facto (KOFInGldf)</i>	Used internet bandwidth	Total used capacity of international internet bandwidth in bits per second (% of population).	ITU (2018)
	International patents	Patent applications by non residents filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent office (% of population).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	High technology exports	Exports of high R&D intensity products in current US\$ (% of population).	World Bank WDI (2018)
<i>Informational Globalisation, de jure (KOFInGldj)</i>	Television access	Share of households with a television set.	ITU (2018)
	Internet access	Individuals using the internet (% of population).	World Bank WDI (2018)
	Press freedom	Quantification of the legal environment for the media, political pressure that influence reporting and economic factor that affect access to news and information.	Freedom House (2018a)
<i>Cultural Globalisation, de facto (KOFcuGldf)</i>	Trade in cultural goods	Exports and imports of cultural goods defined as in UNESCO (2009) (% of population).	UN Comtrade (2018)
	Trade in personal services	Exports and imports of personal, cultural and recreational services (% of population).	IMF BOPS (2018c)
	International trademarks	Applications to register a trademark with a national or regional Intellectual Property (IP) office by non residents in percent of all applications.	World Bank WDI (2018)
	McDonald's restaurant	Number of McDonald's restaurants (% of population).	McDonald's (various years)
	IKEA stores	Number of IKEA stores (% of population)	IKEA (various years)
<i>Cultural Globalisation, de jure (KOFcuGldj)</i>	Gender parity	Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary education level in public and private schools.	World Bank WDI (2018)
	Human capital	Human capital index based on the average years of schooling and an assumed rate of return to education.	Feenstra et al. (2015) / Penn World Table 9.0
	Civil liberties	Quantification of aspects on freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights.	Freedom House (2018b)
<i>Political Globalisation, de facto (KOFFPoGldf)</i>	Embassies	Absolute number of embassies in a country.	Europe World Yearbook (various years)
	UN peace keeping missions	Personnel contributed to U.N. Security Council Missions (% of population).	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (various years)
	International NGOs	Number of internationally oriented nongovernmental organisations (NGO) operating in that country.	Yearbook of International Organizations (various years)
	International organisations	Number of international inter-governmental organisations in which a country is member.	CIA World Factbook (various years)
<i>Political Globalisation, de jure (KOFFPoGldj)</i>	International treaties	International treaties signed between two or more states and ratified by the highest legislative body of each country since 1945.	United Nations Treaty Collection (various years)
	Treaty partner diversity	Number of distinct treaty partners of a country with bilateral investment treaties (BITs).	UNCTAD (2018)

Figure 2, globalization dimensions, indicators, and their definitions [Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke, Sturm 2019]

There had been debate about the influence of globalization on nation-states and what is the effect of it on contemporary configuration of state sovereignty. There are voices claiming, that globalization has changed everything and that we have to reconceptualize our perception of worlds system accordingly [Roudometof 2009], but this empirical index of globalization still has nation-state as its units. Lately with contemporary global development, some are arguing that with international health crisis we are seeing, that regardless of globalization – which is to be blamed for this crisis going international in the first place – the nation-states are still the main actors of no-matter how globalized the world is [Walt 2020].

5.1.2 Populism

Populism, as is stated before, is essentially a way of approaching political competition, that is fostering possibly artificial competition between the pure people and the corrupt elite [Mudde 2017: 6]. Having this main recognition enabling feature in mind, I am turning to various populism indexes and choosing the one, whose constructors had been bearing this in mind. Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index [2019] is naming the most basic populist assertion as conviction that the conflict between people and elite supersedes all other conflicts.

In their words, the term Authoritarian Populism *‘captures the common denominator for both left-wing and right-wing populists, while at the same time focusing on that which from a liberal perspective is especially problematic: the lack of respect for division of powers and minority rights; the impatience with democratic procedures; and the alarming perspective on politics as a conflict between a homogenous people and a corrupt elite’* [Timbro 2019]. Observing the political environment in European countries, they had qualitatively evaluated each political party and labelled them accordingly. Their analysis is including all European countries except Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova as they deem their political systems as semi-authoritarian.

5.1.3 Integration-Demarcation Cleavage

Integration-Demarcation Cleavage is newly emerged opinion divide in society, that had been conceptualized by Kiersi [2012], [Hutter 2014] and others. It is supposed to be dividing globalization losers and winners. The cleavage got its name from these opposing sides, demarcation favouring national closure, antiimmigration and usually against economic

integration, integration part fittingly called because it favours greater global connectivity across issues [Hutter 2014: 37].

The main argument of the works I am referencing here, is that this new integration-demarcation cleavage is on the rise across Europe [Hutter 2014: 47]. These works are mainly focusing on Western Europe, proving this trend. As Globalization is on the rise globally, and there is a basic truth in the fears as well as hopes it brings with itself [Hutter 2014: 36], I am including most European countries in my study, theorizing the trend to be present more broadly. To measure integration-demarcation cleavage, I am using European Values Survey (EVS), as rigorous, reliable, internationally and over-time comparative dataset as a source to identify the presence of latent integration and demarcation groups in European nations.

As integration-demarcation cleavage is theorized to be latent potential, I find it fitting, that the most suitable analytical method for identifying these opinion centred groups is Latent Class Analysis. This procedure was developed specifically for categorical (non-numerical) variables, which are generally very present in sociological studies. It identifies groups of respondents within which basic variables are not correlated [Jeřábek 2006: 55]. These are called the classes and in this particular research intent are allowing us to identify latent structural division within European population.

As for division creating issues, Hutter is theorizing three thematic areas that are salient for integration-demarcation cleavage. He calls them globalization issues and names global justice, Europe and immigration as issues worth investigating [Hutter 2014: 122]. I am using three variables present in all 4 waves of EVS which I am including in my research. First one is capturing the political dimension of cleavage and is measuring the trust in European Union (1), the second one is capturing the cultural dimension of cleavage and is measuring the tolerance towards immigrants (2) and the third one is measuring sense of economic justice, which is close to global justice (3).

- (1) 'Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed (European Union), how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? (1 a great deal, 2 quite a lot, 3 not very much, 4 none at all)' [EVS 2016: 15-16],
- (2) 'On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Immigrants (Code an answer for each) (mentioned/not mentioned)' [EVS 2016: 3],
- (3) 'Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? (1 Incomes should be more equal to 10 There should be greater incentives for individual effort)' [EVS 2016: 14-15].

I have created dichotomous variables from the first one and the third one, as the second already is dichotomous. Considering first variable about confidence in European Union, the recoding was straightforward: 1 and 2 I considered as ‘having confidence’ and 3 and 4 I considered as ‘not having confidence’. In the 10 points scale about economic justice the resulting dichotomy is not as clear as in the first case. I have considered 1 to 4 as ‘favourable of economic equality’ and 7 to 10 as ‘not favourable of economic equality’. This way my dichotomy is including 4 points on each side and is missing the 2 most indecisive positions.

As I am intending to explore the model in four different time eras, I have run the algorithm on four different datasets, each for one time period. Every time I let the algorithm run 100 times to ensure higher reliability of the result. Firstly, I ran the analysis on dataset containing first three waves (as integrated dataset containing even the newest data was not available when I was writing this) making it compute only one latent class and ensured that there is a relationship among these variables and therefore I have also empirical reasons to be conducting the analysis this way and not just theoretical back-up. From the figure 1 is apparent that even 2x degrees of freedom are lower value than the chi-square statistic. Therefore, I know there is a relationship among my variables, and I can now turn to discovering latent groups created by these three issues [Soukup 2020].

	statistic
DF	4
Chi-squared	569

Figure 3, chi-square, and degrees of freedom for solution with one class

In figure 4 I am sharing information criteria about results I have obtained for all four EVS waves for three dichotomous variables measuring opinions about confidence in European Union, tolerance towards immigrants and favourability of economic justice.

year	1990	1999	2008	2017
AIC	78853	215000	215000	133401
BIC	78909	215064	215064	133460

Figure 4, information criteria for solutions with two classes and three variables

As for the actual results, they are displayed in figure 5. Latent class analysis is computing probabilities of being favouring or opposing an issue for each class, this is another reason why this analysis is especially fitting for exploring latent structural potential of issue divisions. We can see that class 2 is more likely to not having confidence in European Union

across years, more likely to dislike immigrants and less likely to favour economic justice compared to the first class. Therefore, we can identify second class as demarcation and first class as integration.

class		1990		1999		2008		2017	
		pro	con	pro	con	pro	con	pro	con
EU	1	0,82	0,18	0,7	0,3	0,67	0,33	0,2	0,8
	2	0,19	0,81	0,44	0,56	0,44	0,56	0,98	0,02
Immigration	1	0,86	0,14	0,87	0,13	0,86	0,14	0,76	0,24
	2	0,8	0,2	0,78	0,22	0,77	0,23	0,84	0,16
Ec. Justice	1	0,3	0,7	0,32	0,68	0,32	0,68	0,45	0,55
	2	0,43	0,57	0,58	0,42	0,6	0,4	0,43	0,57

Figure 5, probability of each answer in all three variables for both classes per years

As is apparent from the proportions of probabilities, the opinion divide is not so clearly cut, and the results are not as clearly straightforward as the theory would suggest. Therefore, I have decided to continue this explorative analysis further and remove the economic justice variable to calculate the cleavage divide across only two issues. I have decided to remove the economic justice variable, because it is least divisive among the within class probabilities as well as among class probabilities. Another reason for removing economic justice variable is, that it has been only approximation of global justice variable, hence it's low ability to capture the cleavage divide is likely caused by this. In Hutter's paper, he is doing factor analysis and his economic and welfare indicators are aligning in different factor than those ones measuring hostility towards immigration and confidence in European Union [2014: 41]. He is calling this factor the cultural factor; therefore, I am now turning to solution measuring only cultural dimension of integration-demarcation.

In figure 6 are AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and BIC (Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion) for both three variables as well as two variables solution. As it is common in most methods for which we are obtaining information criteria, here the lower the criteria statistics, the better the model. Therefore, I am concluding, that two variables solutions are better fitting the data and therefore are creating more accurate portray of reality.

year	1990	1999	2008	2017
AIC-3	78853	215000	215000	133401
BIC-3	78909	215064	215064	133460
AIC-2	64341	75001	137403	114585
BIC-2	64382	75044	137447	114628

Figure 6, information criteria comparing three variables solution and two variables solution

In the two variable solution it is apparent that the most divisive issue has become immigration. Figure 7 shows probabilities for both classes to be confident in EU or not and to mind immigrants or don't. We can see that the main divisive issue is immigration. Confidence in European Union is not so divisive in this context, in alignment with Hutter's research on protest events where immigration and cultural issues in general have been found more salient than other issues [2014: 118]. I have decided to accept this solution and continue with these latent classes in my analysis.

class		1990		1999		2008		2017	
		pro	con	pro	con	pro	con	pro	con
EU	1	0,57	0,43	0,44	0,56	0,52	0,48	0,44	0,56
	2	0,49	0,51	0,34	0,66	0,48	0,52	0,32	0,68
Immigration	1	0,94	0,06	0,95	0,05	0,92	0,08	0,92	0,08
	2	0,14	0,86	0,21	0,79	0,28	0,72	0,06	0,94

Figure 7, probability of each answer in two variables for both classes per years

As for the actual proportions of these two latent classes in society, figure 8 shows, that the proportion don't differ too much over the years.

class	1990	1999	2008	2017
1	87 %	86 %	81 %	85 %
2	13 %	14 %	19 %	15 %

Figure 8, percentual proportions of integration-demarcation classes in Europe per years

6 Data Analysis

While approaching my research question, I had to face the challenge of having my variables on very different scales. All three variables are percentages on country level, but they have very different minimums and maximums, as shown by figure 9.

	Globalization	Demarcation	Populism
count	95	103	89
mean	76.47157895	0.172249076	14.73258427
std	11.04686018	0.113493585	12.19550751
min	43.6	0.027554535	0
25%	69.9	0.094019712	5.3
50%	79.8	0.151679307	12.8
75%	85.3	0.222066108	20.2
max	91.3	0.606139778	65.8
NA's	15	7	21

Figure 9, descriptive statistics of variables

For the first part of my analysis, SEM path model, I am entering these variables as they are, because it is not problematic and SEM is able to calculate standardized Beta coefficients by itself, which makes interpretation easy and accessible for everyone, without extensive prior knowledge about variables and the model itself. Also, the relationship being explored by this method is rather straightforward and there are no interactions.

I had decided to center my variables, as it will make interpretation of mixed effects regression easier and some authors recommend it in order to deal with multicollinearity brought into equation with adding interaction effects [Buchanan 2017], [Field 2012: 1372], although there had been claims contradicting it [Hayes 2013: 282-290]. I am choosing to center my variables using z-score scaling, mainly for the enhanced interpretability of results, as this is providing me with standardized beta regression coefficients instead of unstandardized b ones. As I am striving for standardized betas, I am standardizing both dependent as well as independent variables [Grace-Martin 2012], even though most commonly, only independent variables are being centered [Hayes 2013: 282-290]. Figure 10 is providing descriptive statistics of all three variables after z-score scaling. As my data is grouped by years, I have scaled my variables within these groups, as is recommended [Eriksson et al. 2013: 460]. More specifically, I am interested in measuring the relationship of my variables as it is on level 1, only controlling for different effect of countries and years, therefore scaling within time groups is an appropriate approach [Field 2012: 1376].

	KOFGI	dem_proportion	timbro
count	95	103	89
mean	-9.58298e-17	2.8025e-17	-4.36605e-17
std	0.98391316	0.985184366	0.982806741
min	-3.263916557	-1.554883685	-1.41339252
25%	-0.592491268	-0.658076569	-0.725547064
50%	0.169563032	-0.187870262	-0.125352711
75%	0.827764846	0.600585012	0.391360933
max	1.322061764	3.649527889	3.199587259
NA's	15	7	21

Figure 10, descriptive statistics of scaled variables

6.1 Dataset

As for my dataset, I aimed at covering whole European Union plus some additional countries within European continent or applying to become members of the EU, covered by the European Values Survey, which has been obviously growing, so that is a problematic aspect of my analysis. It becomes even more problematic because the conception of which countries to analysed differed in different datasets I am using as indicators, European Values Survey being the most allowing, whereas Timbro being the most restrictive (as they only include free democracies according to their definition into their analysis and dataset). However, hierarchical regression is capable of working with missing values [Field 2012: 1356], hence it shouldn't be too problematic. My dataset in year 1990 includes 22 countries as well as in 1999, in 2008 it contains 31 countries and in 2017 24, due to the incompleteness of EVS dataset that was pre-released. Overall, I am analysing 38 countries in 4 different timepoints. These countries are: Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. As is apparent from figures 9 and 10, not all of these countries have all indicators measured in all years but as was mentioned before hierarchical regression is capable of dealing with this inconsistency in groups and measurements.

I am approaching this group of countries that I am conducting my analysis on as a census data for European continent, therefore as Gorard [2013: 54] suggests, I am not using significance tests, for coefficients of my models, as '*significance tests are relevant only to*

making judgment about sampling variation produced by the random selection of cases for a sample'. Therefore, I am turning to other signifiers of god model fit, as are various R^2 and AIC and BIC in order to assess if my hypothesized relationships hold, as suggested by Kim, Bang [2016].

6.2 Path analysis as an explorative way to approach this relationship

Firstly, to gain insight into the relationship theorized in previous chapters among these three variables, I am conducting a path analysis. I have chosen this method because it's allowing for the complete picture of the influence of globalization both on integration-demarcation as well as populist's electoral success and at the same time of the influence of integration-demarcation on the populist's success. I am hypothesizing a saturated model, as I have only three variables and I am hypothesizing three paths among them. Because of that, I am unable to test the model fit, as saturated models perfectly copy the data [Soukup 2020].

Equations describing this model are (equation 1):

$$Demarcation = \beta_{01} + \beta_{11}Globalization + \varepsilon_1$$

And (equation 2)

$$Populism = \beta_{02} + \beta_{12}Demarcation + \beta_{22}Globalization + \varepsilon_2.$$

These two equations are describing a model where globalization has an effect on populism and demarcation and also demarcation has an effect on populism. This explorative use of path analysis is allowing for insight into what we should expect from the next stages of analysis. The results are presented in figure 11. I am not reporting goodness of fit measures, because they are meaningless in the case of the saturated model [Soukup 2020].

	1990	1999	2008	2017
Globalization's effect on demarcation	-0,38	-0,498	-0,355	-0,313
Demarcation's effect on populists	-0,243	0,029	0,043	0,158
Indirect effect of globalization on populists	0,092	-0,014	-0,015	-0,05
Globalization's effect on populists	0,12	0,262	0,319	0,425
Total effect of globalization on populists	0,212	0,248	0,304	0,375

Figure 11, standardized beta coefficients of regression analysis across years

Standardized beta coefficients of linear regression analysis across years displayed in figure 11 are showing that the effect of globalization on demarcation is negative and relatively stable over time. In the case of demarcation's effect on populist's electoral success, the effect is negative in the beginning year of this analysis and 'travels' across no effect slowly towards stronger positive effect. The expectation is that the effect would probably continue strengthening in the upcoming years. The case of globalization's effect on the success of populist parties in elections begins at weak effect and gets stronger over the years, being approximately three times stronger than the effect of demarcation proportion. It is therefore apparent, that the direct effect of globalization on the success of populist parties in elections is more important in itself than mediated through demarcation proportion. Actually, looking at the figure 11, one can see that the indirect effect of globalization on populism mediated through demarcation proportion is really close to zero and negative in most of the years. Hence, this mediated effect is lowering the total effect of globalization slightly, so in most years it's lower than the direct effect.

These results are suggesting, that for whole European Union, the findings of Hutter [2014] and Kiersi [2012] on western European protest politics are not applicable, if a person is controlling for effect of globalization on demarcation proportion of population and how this is mediating globalization's effect on populist's success as well as for direct effects of these variables on each other. To gain greater insight into how these variables interact over years, I have conducted a hierarchical model with interaction effects of time (represented as years) and with random effect for countries in order to control for the national specificities in this relationship.

6.3 Hierarchical model with random effect of slope for countries, controlling for interaction effect of each time point

As path analysis has shown us, the relationship between Globalization and Demarcation is negative and relatively stable over time. I am now exploring this stability through hierarchical regression, employing randomness allowed for each country, as a way of capturing the variability of relationship for each nation. This is important as a way to slightly control for differences caused by different political systems.

The regression hypothesized in this part of analysis is (equation 3):

$$\text{Demarcation} = (\beta_0 + U_{\text{country}}) + \beta_1 \text{Globalization} + \beta_2 \text{Years} + \beta_3 \text{Globalization} \\ * \text{Years}$$

where β is standardized regression coefficient and U is random variance of intercept, creating the random effect [Goldstein 2014: 5]. I have chosen to hypothesize the random intercept only, and not a random slope, because though different countries start at different positions, the relationship is still assumed to be the same no matter which country we are talking about [Wilde, Koopmans, Zürn 2014].

In R, I am using a `nlme` as well as `lme4` packages for estimating this model. That is, because `nlme` is providing accessible comparison options between models of lower order and so is allowing me to quickly assess if my hypothesized models are holding against tested alternatives but for `lme4`, better visualisation tools are available which are helpful with interpretation. I am using `lme4` to estimate the hypothesized model, which is hypothesized as having unstructured covariance structure. Though it might be tempting to use some structure that is hypothesizing variances to be fixed at 1, because of the centring, it is important to bear in mind that the centring has been done within groups, so actually the variances, though close to one, are not fixed at this value [Field 2012: 1371].

Firstly, it is important to explore if the random effect is necessary at all. The standardized approach to this question is to evaluate whether adding the random effect helps to explain the dependent variable [Field 2012: 1383]. The model we are testing this added random effect against is fitting just intercept as explanatory variable. In this case it means that the variable itself is explained simply by its mean [Buchanan 2017b]. So, we are testing a model with intercept only and a model with intercept and its random variance.

A simple way to compare these two models is to see the Akaike's Informational Criterion (AIC) or Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC), or ANOVA compare log-likelihoods [Field 2012: 1386], which is capturing how well the distribution proposed by the model fits the actual distribution of the data. Log-likelihood is also the basics for calculating both AIC and BIC. The ANOVA comparison of these models is resulting statistically significant, $p < 0.0001$, hence I am sure that choosing randomness on country level was appropriate in order to explain the variance of demarcation.

Therefore, I am about to test my hypothesis about equation 1. I had tested the model described in equation 1 with the model adding random slope on country level. Though the ANOVA test is significant again ($p < 0.027$), favouring the model with random slope, this level of significance is close to the 0.05 borderline and BIC is actually favouring model in equation 1. BIC for my hypothesized model being 233.9 and for model with random slope 235.6. As results of these indicators for model fit are contradicting each other, I have decided to further explore the model in equation 1. Fixed and random effects are displayed in figure 12.

	Random effect variance
Intercept	0.3430
	Fixed effect estimates
Intercept	0.02179
Globalization	-0.30721
Year 1999	-0.12568
Year 2008	-0.02351
Year 2017	-0.15296
Globalization*Year 1999	-0.05530
Globalization*Year 2008	-0.12816
Globalization*Year 2017	-0.05182

Figure 12, fixed and random effect of model from equation 3

Therefore, as can be computed from the results in figure 12, the overall effect of globalization in year 1990 is -0.30721 , in 1999 it's -0.36251 , in the year 2008 it's -0.43537 and in 2017 it's -0.35903 . Intercept is varying in these years from 0.02179 in 1990, -0.10389 in 1999, over -0.00172 in 2008 to -0.13117 in 2017. It is therefore apparent that year is intersecting with Globalization \rightarrow Demarcation relationship.

Figure 13 displays marginal and conditional R^2 as proposed by Nakagawa and Schielzeth [2013] for mixed effects models. Marginal R^2 is computed by equation 4 and is virtually

reporting on the proportion of variance explained only by fixed effects (in this case of globalization and years).

$$R_{\text{GLMM}(m)}^2 = \frac{\sigma_f^2}{\sigma_f^2 + \sum_{l=1}^u \sigma_l^2 + \sigma_e^2 + \sigma_d^2}$$

Equation 4, marginal R² for mixed effects models

In the numerator there is only fixed effects variance, in the denominator, there is total variance explained by the model, including the fixed effects variance, the random variance where l is the level at which it varies + two residual variance components, one for additive dispersion, one being distribution specific.

The second R² computed for mixed effects models was again proposed by Nakagawa and Schielzeth [2013]. It's called conditional R² and it reports the proportion of total variance explained by both fixed and random effects, as reported in equation 5.

$$R_{\text{GLMM}(c)}^2 = \frac{\sigma_f^2 + \sum_{l=1}^u \sigma_l^2}{\sigma_f^2 + \sum_{l=1}^u \sigma_l^2 + \sigma_e^2 + \sigma_d^2}$$

Equation 5, conditional R² for mixed effects models

Here, we can find the variance of fixed effects and the sum of random variance components over the l level at which it varies in the numerator. The denominator is the same as in equation 4.

Marginal R²	0.160568
Conditional R²	0.5771559

Figure 13, marginal and conditional R² of model in equation 3

The marginal R² shows that fixed effects explain only 16 % of the total variance of Demarcation, whereas allowing the intercept to vary at country level adds up to almost 60 % of total variance explained. I am therefore concluding, that for the causal relationship of Globalization -> Demarcation, country specificity is necessary predictor. I attempt to visualize this relationship including the random effect of countries in figures 14 and 15.




Figure 14, relationship in equation 3 without random intercept




Figure 15, relationship in equation 3 with random intercept

In these graphs, the blue line represents the relationship of globalization and demarcation. It is apparent that in both figures, the relationship is strictly negative, and the slope does not vary too much over the years. It is also apparent that the slope itself is not able to predict positions of concrete countries very accurately (figure 14), whereas random effect, represented by the grey area around the regression line in figure 15 is doing much better job at capturing the specific position of countries. This visualization is therefore confirming what

conditional and marginal R^2 had already told us – that the model is much better if we allow for the intercept to vary at country level and therefore control for national specificity.

I am also exploring the influence that these two variables, demarcation proportion and globalization, have on the electoral success of populism. For exploring this relationship in the same way, controlling for the effect of years and randomness of countries, I am hypothesizing equation 6:

$$\text{Populism} = (\beta_0 + U_{\text{country}}) + \beta_1 \text{Globalization} + \beta_2 \text{Demarcation} + \beta_4 \text{Years} \\ + \beta_3 \text{Globalization} * \text{Demarcation} * \text{Years}$$

Here again β is standardized regression coefficient and U is random variance of intercept [Goldstein 2014: 5]. Again, for the same reason as before, I am hypothesizing the random intercept only, because though different countries start at different positions, the relationship is still expected to be the same no matter the country, hence I am not hypothesizing random slope [Wilde, Koopmans, Zürn 2014].

In the same way as with the previous equation, I am firstly comparing model with intercept only and model with random intercept, in order to assess if adding random effect for this model is even appropriate [Field 2012: 1386]. P-value for this ANOVA comparison is $p < 0.0004$, therefore I am concluding that random intercept for this model is a suitable solution. I am then testing the model in equation 6 with model considering not only random intercept but also random slope. This ANOVA reports, that model with random slope is not significantly better than a model with random intercept only, $p < 0.116$ and BIC being 297.8 compared to 302.5 for a model with random slope. I am therefore settling for the model with random intercept but not random slope and reporting results in figure 16.

	Random effect variance
Intercept	0.4069
	Fixed effect estimates
Intercept	0.04787
Globalization	-0.12253
Demarcation	-0.51974
Year 1999	0.05664
Year 2008	-0.02369
Year 2017	0.10430
Globalization*Demarcation	0.08441
Demarcation*Year 1999	0.49182
Demarcation*Year 2008	0.67534
Demarcation*Year 2017	0.84783
Globalization*Year 1999	0.53017
Globalization*Year 2008	0.49581
Globalization*Year 2017	0.67816
Globalization*Demarcation*Year 1999	0.21122
Globalization*Demarcation*Year 2008	0.03655
Globalization*Demarcation*Year 2017	0.36574

Figure 16, random and fixed estimates of model in equation 6

The intercept changes from 0.048 in 1990, to 0.105 in 1999, 0.024 in 2008 and 0.152 in 2017. The effect of Demarcation varies from -0.52 in 1990 and -0.02765 in 1999, to 0.1556 in 2008 and 0.32809 in 2017. The effect of globalization changes from -0.12253 in 1990 and 0.40764 in 1999, to 0.37328 in 2008 and 0.55563 in 2017.

In figure 17 displays, as in the previous model, marginal and conditional R^2 proposed by Nakagawa and Schielzeth [2013] for mixed effects models. Marginal R^2 is computed by equation 4 reported above and shows the proportion of variance explained only by fixed effects. The second R^2 is called conditional and it reports the proportion of total variance explained by both fixed and random effects, as shown in equation 5 reported above.

Marginal R^2	0.1559862
Conditional R^2	0.5044956

Figure 17, marginal and conditional R^2 of model in equation 6

From these statistics in figure 17 we are confirming once more that the model with random effect is doing much better job at explaining hypothesized causal relationship than standard regression with only fixed coefficients would do. Also, we can conclude that with the random intercept and coefficients reported in figure 16, we are able to explain over 50 % of the variance of populist and extremist parties' success, which is a decent result.

To understand better how the slopes are changing with the continuous interaction of Globalization*Demarcation*Years, please see figure 18 which portrays a fan-like graph demonstrating the regression line for different levels of demarcation and globalization. This graph does not include the random intercept and illustrates only interaction effects.




Figure 18, interaction effects of equation 6

As you can see in figure 18, the regression line of globalization’s effect on Populism is changing its slope quite intensely (apart from year 2008) based on the proportion of demarcation. We can see that from the year 1999 onward, if the demarcation proportion is under average, the slope is practically flat, signifying that in case the demarcation latent class is not really present, populism success is going to be just average without a change based on globalization. On the other hand, the more the latent class of demarcation is present, the sharper the growth of populism if globalization is growing. This holds for all years, though the intensity of this growth shrinks in 2008 (and then gets as big as ever in 2017). Hence, we can conclude, that if the demarcation latent class is present, globalization has a positive effect on populists’ electoral success.




Figure 19, linear influence of demarcation proportion on populists' electoral success with globalization held at mean and random effect for countries

From figure 19 it is apparent, that the effect of demarcation on populism is indeed dependent on globalization, because if globalization held at mean, no matter what the change in demarcation, the populism remains at mean as well. Only in the year 2017, does the demarcation start to have an actual effect on populism. It is for future years to show if this was an anomaly or the start of a new development. The grey area is showing the variance of the line with random intercept, showing again, that the random intercept is doing better with predicting individual countries' positions.




Figure 20, linear influence of globalization on populists' electoral success with demarcation proportion held at mean and random effect for countries

In graphs displayed in figure 20 we see how populists' success in elections is being influenced by changing levels of globalization while demarcation proportion is held at mean. We can see that the line starts flat in 1990 and gradually becomes more slanting over the years. This signifies that the effect of globalization is strengthening as the time goes on. Here again the grey area is showing the varying positions where the regression line would be considering the random intercept for each country.

6.3.1 Assessment of assumptions about data in order for models to be applicable

There are several assumptions about data that need to be assessed in order to be sure that results interpreted above are meaningful. There are many assumptions that the data must comply with in order for the statistical linear model to be applicable. The most important ones are independence of data, multicollinearity of variables, normality of the residuals and homoskedasticity. According to Buchanan [2015], most important of these assumptions is the linearity of residuals, therefore I am reporting these in upcoming figures 21 and 22. The assumption of independence is irrelevant for hierarchical models, as they are inherently assuming cases within groups to be dependent [Field 2012: 1372]. As for multicollinearity, it can be a particular problem for models with interactions, which I have, but Field [2012: 1372] is assuring us, that centring variables is helpful in this regard.




Figure 21, Q-Q plot of standardized residuals of a model in equation 1




Figure 22, Q-Q plot of standardized residuals for a model in equation 2

As you can see, in figure 21 the residuals fit normal distribution almost perfectly, therefore the model using globalization to explain demarcation proportion in population is complying with the demand to have normally distributed residuals. The model displayed in figure 22 is performing worse, but according to Buchanan [2015], a certain level of inaccuracy at the ends of the distribution is common, because there's not that many cases there so it's more difficult for the model to fit accurately in these outlying cases. It would get better if I cut the dataset of outliers in this variable, but I consider them valuable because these are the cases potentially most interesting when it comes to populism-extremism success. I am quoting

George Box in order to support this decision: *'in nature there never was a normal distribution, there never was a straight line, yet with normal and linear assumptions, known to be false, he can often derive results which match, to a useful approximation, those found in the real world'* [Box 1976: 792]. Therefore, one must be wary that predictions of this model for outlying cases are not as accurate as for means, but they still give an approximate image of what the situation looks like.

As for homoskedasticity, I am reporting in figure 23 and 24 residuals scatter plot in order to see if the residuals are approximately equally distributed around 0. This will show if the variances of variables are approximately the same and therefore if we can fit a linear regression model.




Figure 23, residuals scatterplot for model in equation 1




Figure 24, residuals scatterplot for model in equation 2

As you can see in figure 23, the residuals are approximately equally distributed around 0. On the X axis, most cases are within the interval $\langle -1, 1 \rangle$ and for the Y axis most cases are in the interval $\langle -2, 2 \rangle$. The same stands for figure 24, where the interval containing most cases on X axis is $\langle -0,5, 0,5 \rangle$ and on the Y axis $\langle -2, 2 \rangle$. Of course, there are some outliers here, but I will turn to Buchanan [2015] and Box [1976: 792] for defence of this approximate compliance with theoretical expectations about data.

7 Discussion

In this thesis, the hypothesis was, that effect of globalization on integration-demarcation cleavage would be stable over time. Results of the path analysis displayed in figure 11 support this expectation, as the effect indeed seem to be unchanging. It holds negative value between $-0,3$ and $-0,4$, fluctuates towards $-0,5$ in only one time point and then returns to its seemingly steady level. Another hypothesized expectation was, that the effect of cleavage on populism-extremism would be getting stronger. This effect was furthermore expected to be positive as other authors have claimed [Hutter 2014; Kriesi et al 2012; Wilde, Koopmans, Zürn 2014]. My analysis has shown that it is not as simple, because the effect of integration-demarcation cleavage is negative in the beginning year of this analysis and slowly moves across no effect towards a bit stronger positive effect. It cannot be claimed stable, strong and positive effect though, but the trend in so far available data creates expectation that this effect will probably continue strengthening in upcoming years.

These theorists were using the integration-demarcation cleavage as explanatory variable for the support of populism [Hutter 2014; Kriesi et al 2012; Wilde, Koopmans, Zürn 2014] and were, mostly theoretically though, claiming that integration-demarcation cleavage is the reason why support for populism and extremism is rising. My analysis had shown that it's way more complicated than that. In fact, when looking at results in figure 11, it's apparent that the indirect effect of globalization on populism and extremism mediated through integration-demarcation cleavage is mostly negative and really close to the zero. Unlike direct effect of globalization, which starts weak and strengthens over years, being approximately three or more times stronger than the effect of integration-demarcation cleavage in itself (except for the first year). Therefore, good research question for future analysis would be which mediating variables are allowing globalization to have this strong effect on the success of populism. It is highly unlikely that this abstract structural process

would have effect on election results in itself, and therefore it would be suitable to find what other variables are mediating this direct effect observed here.

It is also pretty clear that the straightforward relationship as has been suggested by Hutter [2014] and Kriesi [2012] is actually changing over time and the intensity of effects is fluctuating within years. Also, though path analysis has shown that the effect of integration-demarcation cleave on populism-extremism is not that big, it is strongly affecting how will the relationship between globalization and populism-extremism look like. In case the integration-demarcation cleavage is not really present (or better there's rather small proportion of demarcation and most of the population is therefor on the integration side), the effect of globalization is (over the years) negative to none. The more demarcation is emerging in population, the more swiftly is populism-extremism rising with the rise in globalization. The only year not following this trend is 2008, in which populism-extremism is slowly on the rise with rising globalization no matter the proportion of demarcation in population.

Hence, I am concluding, that if the demarcation latent class is present, globalization has positive effect on populists' electoral success. But this does not mean that globalization's effect on populism-extremism is mediated though integration-demarcation cleavage, as path analysis has shown that indirect effect of globalization through this cleavage is actually making the overall effect of globalization smaller. This is again slightly at odds with what had been expected based on Hutter's [2014] and Kriesie's [2012] findings. Possible reasons for this are, that my analysis was conducted in longitudinal setup and is exploring how the relationship develops over the last thirty years.

Both of the analysis that I am using as my main theoretical base had been conducted on cross sectional data in time close to 2008, which is most similar to what was originally expected, as figure 18 is showing. Another important thing to note is, that I am using bigger sample of countries than these theorists, which is very likely to be contributing to this discrepancy in results. It probably would be fruitful to group countries based on their region and conduct this analysis while using region as a grouping variable for which random intercept as well as slope would be allowed. This would yield an answer weather the relationship is truly different in different European regions and therefore Kriesie's theory does not apply for other European countries. Lastly, neither Hutter [2014] nor Kriesie [2012] assessed their

theory as causal model of populism support. They had formulated the theory in a causal way, but never actually tested for causal model. They had found many indicators suggesting that their theorised relationship is applicable, mostly in the field of protest politics. They have found the cleavage present and vivid, but they did not test if the variance of populism-extremism electoral success is truly explained by the variance in globalization and integration-demarcation cleavage.

Another plausible reason for this incoherence with expectations based on literature is perhaps, that I have used only intolerance towards immigrants and trust in European Union as indicators for integration-demarcation cleavage. I have decided to drop an economical justice indicator, though it was present in Hutter [2014: 255] analysis as well, because it didn't prove salient cleaving issue in comparison with the other two. Moreover, solution with three issues proved less fitting than solution with only immigration and European Union as indicators (figure 5 and figure 6). Hutter [2014: 255] used two more indicators, one for environmental friendliness and one for homophobia, which I didn't include because they weren't yielding coherent results in Hutter's analysis [2014: 41]. He used explorative factor analysis (although his variables were far from cardinal [Hutter 2014: 255]) and he discovered two factors in each western country analysed – some countries had cultural factor and mixed factor, some countries had cultural factor and economical factor. Cultural factor always included immigration and European Union as correlated indicators, economical justice and environment were holding the other factor and homophobia was fluctuating between these two. This suggests why economical justice doesn't hold as cleaving issue when used in analysis that doesn't identify factors. Also, this is another possible explanation why my results are not perfectly in line with theoretical expectations, as I am basically capturing cultural dimension of integration-demarcation cleavage in this analysis.

The theoretical assumption that is underlying my thesis is, that populist parties are mobilizing those groups of society that are disjointed from current hegemonical 'elite', as Gramsci theorized [Riley 2010]. Practical exhibition of this can be considered the narrative developed by many populist parties within European Union which is accusing the political elite of ignoring the interest of people (national citizens) and putting interests of elitist European Union above their electorate [Mudde 2017: 13]. It's this distinction between people and elite that should be theoretically most appealing to the demarcation side of cleavage, as this cleavage is quite literally [Hutter 2014: 2] dividing winners and losers of

globalization – or the elite, which is benefiting from globalization, and the people who are being ostracized. The claim that the people who are benefiting from something that is perceived as harmful to others are in fact corrupt, is potentially very appealing.

This causality is not so straightforward in terms of my results. It is apparent, that part of this is empirically confirmable, as the amount of demarcation in population is intersecting with the influence of globalization on populist's success in a way that it's enhancing it – the more the merrier, one might say. But it's also not as clear because the average proportion of demarcation in population is making globalization's effect on populism-extremism milder and globalization in itself is lowering the proportion of demarcation in population as it rises.

Therefore, the assumption based on nationalism focused rhetoric of populist parties [Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015: 281] is that they are appealing to anti-globalization-oriented people, but this theorized appeal to demarcation side is failing in terms of my results. It is clear that certain part of populist's success is explainable by globalization making demarcation side anxious and therefore nationalistic rhetoric appealing, but it's clearly not fully explaining this contemporary trend. In fact, there is likely another intervening variable that's mediating the significant effect of globalization on populism, because globalization in itself as an abstract process is unlikely to influence citizens to vote for a certain party.

The results of my thesis therefore are showing that it is indeed globalization, that is fuelling force behind the rise of populism-extremis, as various authors claim [Kiersi et al 2012: 20; Swank and Betz 2003 in: Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015: 284] but unlike Hutter [2014: 7] is assuming, it is not integration-demarcation cleavage that's mediating this. It is definitely interacting with this relationship, effecting its saliency, but in itself demarcation is actually shrinking with rising globalization. Therefore, it is likely, that so called 'silent-revolution' [Ignazi 1992: in Hutter 2014: 30] is caused by other factors and that explaining it with just globalization mediated through integration-demarcation cleavage, would be overly simplified.

8 Description of Used Analytical Methods

8.1 Latent Class Analysis

Latent class analysis (LCA) was developed specifically for categorical (non-numerical) variables, which are generally often present in sociological studies. The aim was to develop a fitting statistical modelling method that would be useful for analysis in social sciences, as most of the statistics is considering continuous variables, which are scarce in these sciences. It identifies groups of respondents within which variables are not correlated [Jeřábek 2006: 55]. These are called the classes and in this particular research intent are allowing us to identify latent structural division of Integration-demarcation cleavage within European population. Latent class analysis requires big amount of respondents, which is a weakness of this method, but since European Values Survey has tens of thousands of respondents in each wave, I could safely use LCA without worrying about this [Soukup 2020].

The key assumption in latent class analysis is the local independence, which means that certain attitudes depend only on belonging to a class and not on other variables. Therefore, variables used to model these classes should not be correlated [Soukup 2020]. This method is yielding results that allow us to estimate probability based proportions of classes in population as well as interpret what are these classes standing for, based on conditional probability of each answer for each variable for people in latent classes [Soukup 2020]. LCA also allows for further exploration of typology it creates with actually assessing the class into which each respondent belongs. It does this by assessing the probability of each answer pattern to belong in each class and then sorts all respondents with this answer pattern into the class with highest probability [Soukup 2020]. This leads to an inherent problem with this method which is that cases who have any missing answers will not be classified.

8.2 Structural Equation Modelling

I have chosen Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) because it allows for deeper understanding of what are causal relationship among multiple, interlinked variables. This method allows for testing theoretical relationships that are more complex and contain more variables than standard linear regression models, because they allow controlling for mediation and they capture indirect effects as well as direct effect (unlike standard OLS methods, which capture only direct effects).

As I am using only manifest variables, performed in this thesis is subsection of SEM called path analysis. This method is fitting for series of following regression models, in which dependent variable from one model, is independent variable in another model. This approach started to be developed in 1930's by Sewel and it's main advantage is, that it estimates all of the regressions within it at the same time and provides a goodness of fit measures so you know, if your theoretical model is representing the observed data [Soukup 2020].

Important advantage of SEM modelling is that it automatically incorporates error terms into the model and therefore the researcher bears in mind that he is assuming not only the relationship between variables but he is also estimating how much of a variance of a variable is explained by her theorized model. One can think of SEM as a parallel of classical test theory [Newson 2015: 2] if we consider the formula for variance of variable X $\text{Var}(X)$, where $\text{Var}(X) = \text{Var}(T) + \text{Var}(e)$, where $\text{Var}(T)$ stands for true variance and $\text{Var}(e)$ for error of variance [Novick 1966], because SEM is trying to explain variance of a variable by and estimate the error [Newson 2015: 2]. Important difference between SEM measurement and classical test formula is that we can't consider the error term to contain only measurement error, as here the measurement error is containing any variance that is unaccounted for by our explanatory variables [Newson 2015: 2].

I have used lavaan package for R, which is one of the most reliable tools for SEM these days. Lavaan uses Maximum Likelihood objective function [Rosseel 2012: 39], which is allowing us to always gain a the same estimations, as there is only one maximum likelihood value on the likelihood curve of the model on a concrete data [Soukup 2020]. There is a requirement to have cardinal measures. In the case of variables used in this analysis, the percentage scales are cardinal by themselves.

Regarding the goodness of fit for this model, my model is saturated, which means I have specified all possible paths among these variables. That is, the model is precisely copying the data and therefore it works only as a descriptive tool, and we are unable to test hypothesis if this model is good for explaining variances of our endogenous variables [Soukup 2020].

8.3 Hierarchical regression

In this study, I have collected data on European countries in 4 time points and I am interested how is the hypothesized relationship changing over time. This is a perfect example of data

fitted for the use of hierarchical regression, multilevel regression, or mixed effect models, if you wish. This method is approaching data as segregated into subgroups – in this case countries – and controls the effect of the subgroup. This is, in fact, very realistic approach, because in reality, very little cases are actually perfectly independent – in the real world, things have a tendency to create natural clusters.

Though these models are demanding in several ways – they demand a quite a lot of data if you wish to measure effects of more natural clusters [Field 2012: 1373], and the math allowing us for using this method is also rather complex, these models are allowing to ‘cast aside’ some standard requirements we usually have on our data [Field 2012: 1357]. There is no need to assume homogeneity of regression slopes, because multilevel models are allowing us to explicitly model variability of regression slopes within groups, furthermore as hierarchical regression is inherently designed for handling clustered data, the assumption of independence falls. Which is also opening the door to model longitudinal data this way, as there is also no way we can talk about independency for this kind of data [Field 2012: 1357]. Another powerful asset of hierarchical regression is the ability to manage missing data and estimate parameters with just the data that is available [Field 2012: 1358]. That is particularly appreciated in the case of my data, as there are more and more countries in Europe (and covered by the datasets I am using) as the years go by.

This randomness of regression slopes I’ve mentioned is modelled by fixed and random coefficients. Randomness of coefficient means, that we are not conceptualizing this particular regression parameter to be always on a constant value, rather we are expecting its value may possibly vary for different groups of cases [Field 2012: 1362]. There are two ways in which a regression may vary and those are intercept and a slope. Intercepts are signifying where the model is at y if x is 0 (and all other letters are held at zero), so accordingly random intercept allows the y to be different for different groups for the same x (and all other letters held at zero) [Field 2012: 1362]. Slopes, as they are the number we multiply the x non-zero value by to get the y value for this particular x (while all other variables are held at zero), are signifying the steepness of regression line, a therefore, when allowed to be random, introducing variability into the y change for one value change in x (while all other variables are held at zero) [Field 2012: 1364]. Considering this, for predicting a score for a particular research unit, we need to not only consider the unit, but also the group it falls into [Field 2012: 1368].

There are several assumptions that need to be considered in regards with this randomness of regression coefficients and clustering of cases. Firstly, random coefficients are assumed to be normally distributed around overall model [Field 2012: 1372] and multicollinearity can be a particular problem in case of multilevel model with interactions that are crossing levels in the data hierarchy. In the case of my model, this would be a case of interaction between country and a year of data collection, for example. But according to Field [2012: 1372], centring predictor (which I've done) is helpful in this issue.

Conclusion

A few years ago, Hutter [2014: 7] formulated assumption, that populist parties are effective in mobilizing losers of globalization. In this thesis, I turned to integration-demarcation cleavage theory [Hutter 2014, Kriesi et al 2012] as a mean of distinguishing between winners and losers of globalization and explored how effective populists are in mobilizing losers of globalization, demarcation side of the cleavage.

I used Gramsci's theory of civil society and hegemonical conflict within it because it provided a suitable theoretical explanation of how this mobilization would happen. Looking at it through a Gramscian perspective, populists are using organic crisis and aiming at creating counterhegemony, threatening current hegemonic class and structure of society. Basically, populists want to mobilize disjointed parts of civil society that are not identifying with hegemonical elite [Mudde 2017].

It has been claimed that integration-demarcation cleavage is rising because of globalization [Hutter 2014, Kriesi et al 2012], so I employed it to the model in order to have a complete picture. The theory is, that globalization has an indirect effect on populism through this cleavage. I also controlled for the direct effect of globalization to further explored this theorized relationship.

Therefore, I explored this hypothesized model, that has a direct effect of globalization on populism, a direct effect of globalization on integration-demarcation cleavage and direct effect of cleavage on populism, resulting in an indirect effect of globalization on populism mediated through the cleavage. For globalization, I used KOF Globalization Index [Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke, Sturm 2019] to represent this variable, integration-demarcation cleavage

was computed using latent class analysis from European Values Survey datasets [EVS 2019, EVS 2020] and to represent populism I used Authoritarian Populism Index by Timbro [2019]. Because of the nature of Timbro's index, populism is represented by the success of populist parties in elections, which means this thesis has analysed their actual appeal to voters and success in gaining law-making power.

Thanks to using these variables, I was able to model the relationship in four different time points and therefore approximate longitudinal analysis. The starting point of my analysis is the year 1990, following with 1999, 2008 and lastly 2017. I compared the model in these years, and I measured how time interacts with relationships among these variables and affects their salience.

I used path analysis (a simple version of SEM) in an explorative way to see how this saturated model changes over years and then I used hierarchical regression, controlled for interactions of time with theorized relationships and also allowed me to control for national differences. I expected the relationship to be approximately the same in all countries but because all countries have different starting points due to different historical circumstances, I reflected this in the model and allowed for random intercept. Results yielded by these two methods combined provided us with a detailed picture of the relationship over time.

The results have shown that the effect of globalization on integration-demarcation cleavage is relatively stable over time, holds negative value and most of the years is within an interval of $-0,3$ and $-0,4$. The effect of cleavage on populism has been found negative in 1990 and steadily moving across zero effect towards a bit stronger positive effect. It has not been found strong and positive as had been expected based on theoretical expectations [Hutter 2014; Kriesi et al 2012; Wilde, Koopmans, Zürn 2014], though the trend seems to be prevailing and therefore this effect will probably be strengthening in upcoming years. What had come as a surprising result though, was the fact that for the lack of strength in this relationship is subsidising the overwhelmingly positive and over the years strengthening causality between globalization and populist's success in elections.

Moreover, theorised causality of cleavage – populism relationship is not so straightforward in the light of my longitudinal analysis. Partially, there is surely a relationship between cleavage and populism because the amount of demarcation in the society is intersecting with

the influence of globalization on the populism. It' changing this relationship in a way that the more salient is a demarcation in a society, the steeper the regression line of globalization's influence on populism. But it is even more complicated because globalization is making the amount of demarcation side of cleavage in a society smaller.

To sum up, results of this analysis have shown that indeed, globalization is a fuelling force of the success of populists, as has been claimed by many [Kiersi et al 2012: 20; Swank and Betz 2003 in: Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015: 284], but unlike expected, it is not integration-demarcation cleavage that serves as a mediator of this relationship as Hutter [2014: 7] suggested in his protest politics centred analysis. Integration-demarcation cleavage is influencing the saliency of globalization's relationship, but in order to truly understand what exactly is mediating globalization's effect on the rise of populism, more research is necessary.

Závěry

Před několika lety Hutter [2014: 7] formuloval předpoklad, že populistické politické strany efektivně mobilizují prohrávající globalizace. V této práci se obracím k jeho teorii integrační demarkační štěpící linie [Hutter 2014, Kriesi et al 2012] jako k nástroji rozlišení mezi výherci a prohrávajícími a k exploraci toho, jak efektivně populisté mobilizují prohrávající – demarkační stranu štěpící linie.

Využívám Gramsciho teorii občanské společnosti a v ní přítomného hegemonického konfliktu, jelikož mi poskytuje přiléhavé teoretické vysvětlení této mobilizace. Vysvětleno z Gramsciho perspektivy, populisté využívají organickou krizi a cílí na vytvoření kontrahegemonie, čímž ohrožují současnou hegemonickou třídu a strukturu společnosti. Zjednodušeně řečeno, populisté se snaží mobilizovat odtržené části občanské společnosti, které se neidentifikují se současnou hegemonickou elitou [Mudde 2017].

Tvrdí se, že díky globalizaci je integrační demarkační štěpící linie na vzestupu [Hutter 2014, Kriesi et al 2012]. Proto v modelu v této práci využívám globalizaci, abych vytvořila co nejkompletnější vyobrazení výše popsaného vztahu. Z teoretického hlediska je očekáván nepřímý efekt globalizace na populismus skrze štěpící linii. V práci navíc kontroluji přímý efekt globalizace na populismus pro lepší pochopení tohoto modelu.

Tato práce testuje hypotézu o modelu, ve kterém má globalizace přímý efekt na populismus a na integrační demarkační štěpící linii a tato má vliv na populismus. Spojením posledních dvou přímých efektů vzniká nepřímý efekt globalizace na populismus zprostředkovaný štěpící linií. Jako indikátor globalizace je v práci použitý KOF Globalizační index [Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke, Sturm 2019], integrační demarkační štěpící linie byla spočítána pomocí analýzy latentních tříd z datasetů Evropského výzkumu hodnot [EVS 2019, EVS 2020] a populismus reprezentuje Index autoritářského populismu publikovaného nevládní organizací Timbro [2019]. Vzhledem k povaze indexu autoritářského populismu je úspěch populismu reprezentován úspěchem populistických stran ve volbách, což znamená že v této práci analyzuje reálnou oblíbenost u voličů a jejich úspěch při získávání zákonodárné pozice.

Díky volbě těchto indikátorů mi bylo umožněno modelovat teoretizovaný vztah ve čtyřech různých časových bodech a tím aproximovat longitudinální exploraci. Počáteční bod mé analýzy je v roce 1990, následuje rok 1999, 2008 a končí v roce 2017. Teoretizovaný model byl porovnán mezi těmito lety a bylo změřila jsem také jak čas interaguje s vztahy formulovanými v tomto modelu a ovlivňuje jejich význačnost. V práci jsem použila cestičkovou analýzu (jednodušší verzi strukturního modelování) jako explorativní přístup k odhalení, jak se tento saturovaný model mění mezi analyzovanými roky. Poté jsem použila hierarchickou regresi, ve které jsem kontrolovala navíc interakci času s jednotlivými proměnnými a se zapojením náhodného interceptu, díky kterému jsem do modelu inkorporovala národnostní rozdíly. Očekávala jsem, že modelovaný vztah bude zhruba totožný ve všech zemích, nicméně kvůli odlišnému historickému vývoji jsem očekávala různé počáteční body, což reflektuje náhodný intercept. Kombinované výsledky těchto dvou analytických metod nám ukazují detailní pohled na teoretizovaný vztah v čase.

Výsledky analýzy ukázaly, že efekt globalizace na integrační demarkační štěpící linii je v čase relativně stabilní. Drží se v negativních hodnotách a ve většině let se pohybuje v intervalu $-0,3$ a $-0,4$. Efekt štěpící linie na populismus je v roce 1990 negativní a postupně se posouvající přes nulu na mírný pozitivní efekt v roce 2017. Neprokázal se jako silný a pozitivní, jak bylo očekáváno na základě teoretických předpokladů [Hutter 2014; Kriesi et al 2012; Wilde, Koopmans, Zürn 2014], nicméně posilující tendence se z dat zdá přetrvávající, a tudíž tento efekt bude pravděpodobně posilovat v nadcházejících letech. Překvapivým výsledkem je, že ne příliš silný vztah mezi štěpící linií a populismem může být

plně zastoupen pozitivním a v letech se zintenzivňujícím vlivem globalizace na volební úspěch populistů.

Teoretizovaný kauzální vztah štěpící linie a populismu se ve světle těchto výsledků nejeví jednoduše přímočarý. Částečně je určitě možné potvrdit vztah štěpící linie a populismu, jelikož procentuální zastoupení demarkační strany štěpící linie ve společnosti interaguje s vlivem globalizace na populismus. Ovlivňuje intenzitu tohoto vztahu tak, že s rostoucí proporcí demarkace v populaci se regresní linka mezi globalizací a populismem stává více a více strmou. I toto je však komplikované, jelikož globalizace má na druhou stranu tendenci zmenšovat proporce demarkační strany štěpící linie.

Sečteno a podtrženo, výsledky této práce ukázaly, že je skutečně pravda, že globalizace je vlivnou silou podporující úspěch populistů, jak tvrdí teoretikové [Kiersi et al 2012: 20; Swank and Betz 2003 in: Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015: 284], ale na rozdíl od očekávání není tento vliv zprostředkován integrační demarkační štěpící linií, jak předpokládá Hutter [2014: 7] na základě své analýzy protestní politiky. Integrační demarkační štěpící linie ovlivňuje intenzitu vlivu globalizace na populismus, ale abychom byli schopni porozumět, jak přesně globalizace působí na úspěch populistů ve volbách, je nutné tento vztah dále zkoumat.

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Project of Master Thesis

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Expected Year of Defence of the Thesis: 2020

The Title: Change in Civil Society. Connecting Globalisation with the Rise of NGOs and Far-right.

The Aim of the Thesis:

The aim of this work is to frame the contemporary social theory about globalization and its impact on civil society employing both the social cleavage theory and switch in the civil society organizations structure caused by the rising importance of non-governmental organizations. The connection of these two theories about the impact of globalization on the civil society is creating possibility of explaining the rise of support for far-right parties. After developing the theoretical framework of the relationship between the globalization, shift in the civil society and the support for far-right parties, the aim is to create data model testing the theorized relationship. The model will be mainly based on the data from the European Values Survey, using several national indexes as variables measuring the social forces. In order to be able to employ national indexes but also because of the nature of the country-clustered European Values Survey, the data model will be created using multilevel logistic regression.

Introduction of the Topic:

The recent years have seen an up-rise of far-right and populist parties across the globe. Trump winning American election, Fidezs party holding secure majority in Hungary, the Law and Justice party in Poland serve as prominent examples but almost every democracy on Earth is now experiencing strengthening of the far-right. There is a lot of issues when applying the term far-right, because different authors are describing the contemporary far-

right wave using various terms ranging from far-right and populism (Cutts, Goodwin 2014; Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015; and others) to fascism (Albright 2018). I am going to be using the term far-right in alignment with several researchers as an umbrella category labelling both the extreme as well as the populist parties because all of them are using similar rhetoric focusing on nationalism and immigration (Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2015: 281).

The rise of far-right is not easy to explain, and recent research is disproving the former assumptions about triggers for far-right party support sourcing mainly from the state of economics, hence I connect the recent rise of far-right with more complex changes in society. The main focus of this thesis is on the globalization and how this process created changes in civil society which are possibly resulting into mentioned up-rise of far-right. In this thesis I'll employ the theory of cleavages to describe these changes and use a work of several scholars (Inglehart 1977, Kriesi 1989a, Hutter 2014) to explain the evolution of the new social cleavage and how the globalization contributed to it.

Hutter is calling this new cleavage Integration-demarcation cleavage and connects it to the globalization (Hutter 2014: 2). This cleavage introduced three new issues into the issue-specific political competition. These are (1) the economic issue concerning sectoral and international competition, (2) cultural competition which is most saliently linked to immigration of ethnically distinct groups and (3) political competition between nation states and international organizations and political actors (ibid: 6). This cleavage is dividing the population on so called winners and losers of globalization (ibid: 37). Manifestation of the aforementioned globalization issues crystalizing in this new cleavage is expected to result in another profound transformation of political conflict (ibid: 2). I am connecting this transformation of political conflict with the rise of NGOs as I describe in the next paragraphs.

The theory of civil society used in this thesis will be drawing mainly on Chandhoke as a prominent civil society theorist and researcher. She uses globalization as the influential factor escalating the change in civil society (Chandhoke 2002: 41). According to Chandhoke, one of the main changes in civil society is the rising number and importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In her work, she accuses them of overtaking the civil society and disempowering citizens. She claims that civil society associations (which NGOs are) are in the end aggregated reflection of wishes and desires of members of civil society,

but NGOs are often lacking the member base or means by which it would aggregate wishes and desires of its member base, considering it has one (Chandhoke 2002: 46).

In this way, NGOs might be contributing to deepening of the new cleavage because the way they advocate their claims and disempower members of civil society can be perceived as a factor contributing to the transformation of political conflict. Also, NGOs are mostly advocating positions that are in line with the integration part of the new cleavage, which is creating discrepancy in the representation of the public opinion within the public space and media. This might be another factor contributing to the deepening of the integration-demarcation cleavage, creating frustration on the demarcation side.

Methodology:

In this thesis I will create a data model connecting the globalization with the integration-demarcation cleavage, the number of NGOs and the support for far-right parties. I will be using multilevel logistic regression, where the countries of the citizens will be the clustering variable. Since the European Values Survey (EVS) is clustered based on countries, it's violating one of the most important assumptions in the linear model, which is the assumption of independence of residuals, it is more suitable to use multilevel model. When observations are interdependent, it results in the participants from the same cluster being more likely to be similar than participants nested in other clusters“ (Sommet and Morselli 2017). This is clearly to be expected in the case of European countries. The multilevel logistic model is also bringing a possibility to employ variables on the cluster level, which is highly useful when exploring the connection between the state of civil society (represented by individual members) and social forces represented by national indicators.

By social forces I mean globalization represented in this model by KOF Globalisation Index, the number of NGOs in each country as the Yearbook of International Organizations. For far-right parties support I have either option of using national indicator or treating this as individual level variable as the European Values Survey is also asking about the local party support.

I am expecting the aforementioned disempowerment of citizens by NGOs theorized by Chnadhoke to be interconnected with the integration-demarcation cleavage in a way that the presence of NGOs is about to deepen the integration-demarcation cleavage divide, yet at the same time causing stronger feeling of disconnectedness of citizens from the public affairs and deepening the feeling that citizens don't have a power over the politics (both of these variables are measured by EVS).

When operationalizing the integration-demarcation cleavage, Hutter (2014: 15) claim, that three issues are salient for this cleavage. Namely immigration, European Union and economic liberalism (or global justice). Since this thesis is theorizing the integration-demarcation cleavage and the influences shaping it as the most important factors explaining the social changes briefly described above, I consider important to cover all three recognized indicators of this cleavage. In the datasets of EVS is available indicator for the European union issue ("how much do you trust European Union"), and indicator for the immigration ("could you identify which social groups you would be uncomfortable with as your neighbours? Immigrants") as well as global justice issues ("society should prevent significant income inequality"). This should allow precise measurement of the integration-demarcation cleavage.

I also consider two other indicators for the integration-demarcation cleavage. One is measuring how much a person considers themselves a global citizen which should be distinguishing the winners and losers of globalization ("what is your place in the world?") and one is measuring the trust in United Nations, which is also indicating the trust in the integration of the world ("how much do you trust United Nations?").

All of these indicators have been measured in the latest three waves of European Values Survey in the 1999, 2008 and 2017. This should be sufficient to create a model of the integration-demarcation cleavage development in Europe.

Expected Structure of the Thesis:

1. Introduction
2. Theorizing Change in Civil Society
 - 2.1. Social Cleavages
 - 2.1.1. Integration-demarcation Cleavage
 - 2.2. Civil Society Organizations (The Rise of NGOs)
3. Connecting the Change in Civil Society to the Rising Support of Far-right
4. Testing the Theoretical Relationship
 - 4.1. Operationalization
 - 4.2. Data Model
 - 4.3. Interpreting Results
5. Discussion
6. Conclusion

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