

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE
Fakulta sociálních věd
Institut mezinárodních studií

PROTOKOL O HODNOCENÍ BAKALÁŘSKÉ PRÁCE
(Posudek oponenta)

Práci předložil(a) student(ka): **Jindřich Přívratský**

Název práce: **Americká mírová iniciativa v izraelsko-palestinském konfliktu za vlády G.W. Bushe**

Oponoval (u externích oponentů uveďte též adresu a funkci v rámci instituce):

doc. PhDr. Francis D. Raška, PhD.

1. OBSAH A CÍL PRÁCE (stručná informace o práci, formulace cíle): **This work analyzes the role of the administration of George W. Bush in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The author discusses how the events of 9/11 influenced President Bush's approach to the issue. The so-called "roadmap" to peace and its genesis is scrutinized as are the reasons for the ultimate failure of the negotiations.**

2. VĚCNÉ ZPRACOVÁNÍ (náročnost, tvůrčí přístup, argumentace, logická struktura, teoretické a metodologické ukotvení, práce s prameny a literaturou, vhodnost příloh apod.): **The dissertation is organized and conceived well and I have no problem with the theoretical framework. A plethora of sources has been consulted and the bibliography is impressive.**

3. FORMÁLNÍ A JAZYKOVÉ ZPRACOVÁNÍ (jazykový projev, správnost citace a odkazů na literaturu, grafická úprava, formální náležitosti práce apod.): **I think that the written presentation and referencing are fine.**

4. STRUČNÝ KOMENTÁŘ HODNOTITELE (celkový dojem z bakalářské práce, silné a slabé stránky, originalita myšlenek, naplnění cíle apod.):

Jindřich Přívratský has chosen the Israeli-Palestinian peace process during the presidency of George W. Bush as the topic of his Bachelor's dissertation. The work is divided into an Introduction (Chapter 1), five main chapters (Chapters 2-6), and a Conclusion (Chapter 7). Overall, the treatise is rich in content and the argumentation is sound. In the ensuing paragraphs, I will offer my comments on each individual chapter.

In the Introduction (Chapter 1), Přívratský clearly spells out the aim of the dissertation and he familiarizes the reader with the structure and content of the individual chapters. The literature review explains which sources the student considers to be most important and why. My impression of the Introduction is positive and it certainly encourages the reader to continue reading. I must say that the supervisor, Dr. Jana Sehnálková, generally does an excellent job guiding student dissertations. Chapter 2 represents a discussion of the state of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In the first subsection, the efforts of the Clinton presidential administration to achieve peace between the Israelis and Palestinians are analyzed. Clinton played an instrumental role in the genesis of the Oslo accords and this convinced both sides that the United States was truly interested in achieving peace in the Middle East. The differences between the Israeli and Palestinian sides proved too great and could not be bridged. Thus, the Camp David summit organized by President Clinton ended in failure. The so-called "second intifada" forms the subject of the second (and final) subsection of Chapter 2. The failure of the aforementioned Camp David talks was followed by the "second intifada", which was directly provoked by Ariel Sharon's campaign stop at the Temple Mount, which, in turn, caused fury among Palestinians. Many Israelis and Palestinians died as a result of the "second intifada." Nearing the end of his presidency, Clinton tried to salvage the peace process with a gathering at Sharm El Sheikh. The "second intifada" roared on nonetheless, but Clinton commissioned a report from Senator George Mitchell, which was released after George W. Bush assumed the presidency. It is interesting that Israeli Leader, Ehud Barak, had offered very generous terms both at Sharm El Sheikh and at a later summit in Taba. Arafat refused the deal. Of course, once Barak was replaced by General Ariel Sharon as prime minister, the situation drastically changed. Sharon conditioned any peace talks on a cessation of Palestinian violence and when this did not happen, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations did not resume. This

chapter is both informative and persuasively argued.

In Chapter 3, Přivratský addresses President George W. Bush's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue before and after 9/11. The first of three subsections deals with Bush's stance prior to the events of 11 September 2001. It is pointed out that Bush's only pre-9/11 attempt to restart peace talks by sending CIA director George Tenet to the Middle East failed and Bush, at this stage, gave up on the idea of moderating between both groups. How the events of 9/11 changed Bush's approach to foreign affairs forms the subject of the second subsection. The author delves into the Bush Doctrine of 2002, which refocused United States policy towards the Middle East away from the Israeli-Palestinian issue with a new emphasis on fighting terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unilateralism and American military force would replace international law and multilateralism. A new emphasis was also placed on combatting "rogue states" and preemption. In the final subsection, Přivratský scrutinizes the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Bush's later Middle Eastern policy. In order to gain the support of Arab states for his war on terror, Bush called for the peace process to continue and even expressed support for the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state. Bush even expressed the desire for a democratization of the Palestinian Authority, which, if it occurred, would suit Bush's aims based upon the premise that freedom was the key to solving problems in the Middle East in general. I like this chapter, which logically leads to the next.

President George W. Bush's relationship with the individual actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon, is the subject of Chapter 4. Bush never did trust Arafat and he had good reason not to as the Israelis intercepted a weapons shipment from Iran to Gaza, which was a direct violation of the Oslo Accords. Bush's relationship with Sharon, on the other hand, was very good. After the interception of the arms shipment to Gaza mentioned above, Bush became convinced that, like the United States, Israel was fighting a war on terror. Bush agreed with Sharon that any progress towards peace was based on the condition that the Palestinians stop any violence. Later, Bush's relations with Palestinian and Israeli leaders, Abbas and Olmert, also brought no progress. This brief chapter demonstrates how difficult the art of diplomacy can be.

In Chapter 5, Přivratský explains Bush's so-called "Roadmap." In the first of three subsections, Přivratský explains the background to the conception of the "Roadmap." The second subsection deals with the three main phases of the "Roadmap." The first involved the cessation of violence and the development of democratic institutions on the Palestinian side. The second would be the creation of a Palestinian state within provisional borders. In order for the second phase to be realized, the first would have to be implemented. The third (and final) phase of the roadmap called for the establishment of a Palestinian state with final borders and a permanent end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Shortcomings of the "Roadmap" are discussed in the third subsection. Basically, the author points out that neither the Israelis, nor the Palestinians conceived the plan, but were merely consulted. Otherwise, there were problems regarding precise definitions of aims to be achieved, as well as with the time scale. While the expectations for the Palestinian side were defined more specifically, the same could not be said of expectations to be fulfilled by the Israelis. The author rightly states that the peace plan was imbalanced and looked out more for Israeli than for Palestinian interests. This chapter is both informative and well argued.

Chapter 6 assesses the implementation of the "Roadmap" and offers an explanation as to why even this peace plan proved unsuccessful. The first of three subsections goes into detail about the first attempt at implementing the stipulations of the "Roadmap." Both the Palestinians and Israelis were not very eager to implement the "Roadmap" or to take the steps needed to conclude the peace process successfully. Thanks to uncontrolled violence by Hamas and the failure of the Palestinian Authority to stop it, as well as Israeli retaliation (which resulted in Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Abbas's resignation), the peace process was once again frozen in September 2003 with little prospect for renewal. In the second subsection, Přivratský traces what transpired between September 2003 and the Annapolis Peace Conference. One major occurrence was the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the dismantling of several West Bank settlements. Sharon's aim here was to delay the peace process and prevent the formation of a Palestinian state. Arafat's death paved the way for presidential elections, which resulted in Abbas's victory and a vindication of sorts for the peace process. A summit between Sharon and Abbas in Sharm El Sheikh in February 2005 where it was agreed that the "second intifada" would end. After Sharon's incapacitation due to a stroke suffered in January 2006, he was succeeded as Israeli prime minister by Ehud Olmert. A plan involving major Israeli territorial concessions was agreed, but never implemented due to a brief war with Lebanon and the victory of Hamas in Palestinian parliamentary elections. Undemocratic methods on the part of Hamas resulted in Abbas declaring a state of emergency and appointing a Fatah (the major pro-peace Palestinian party) government. This move rekindled hopes for the peace process. The final subsection of Chapter 6 discusses the Annapolis Peace Conference in November 2007 and its aftermath. In the end, the negotiations were doomed by seemingly

Irreconcilable disagreements between the Israelis and Palestinians and a corruption scandal that resulted in Olmert's resignation and a subsequent election that brought Binyamin Netanyahu to power. Chapter 6 is well written.

In the Conclusion, Přívratský recapitulates the main points presented in the work and ends by stating that the "Roadmap" was more reflective of President Bush's ideological stance in favor of Israel than of the reality on the ground. This ultimately resulted in failure because both the Israelis and Palestinians found the conditions imposed by the "Roadmap" difficult to satisfy.

My overall impression of this B.A. dissertation is positive. I recommend a mark of A or B depending on the student's performance in the oral defense.

**5. OTÁZKY A PŘIPOMÍNKY DOPORUČENÉ K BLIŽŠÍMU VYSVĚTLENÍ PŘI OBHAJOBĚ (jedna až tři):
What are the prospects for the peace process today?**

**6. DOPORUČENÍ / NEDOPORUČENÍ K OBHAJOBĚ A NAVRHOVANÁ ZNÁMKA
(A-F): A or B depending on the student's performance in the oral defense.**

Datum: **7.6.2020**

Podpis:

Pozn.: Hodnocení píše k jednotlivým bodům, pokud nepíšete v textovém editoru, použijte při nedostatku místa zadní stranu nebo příložený list. V hodnocení práce se pokuste oddělit ty její nedostatky, které jsou, podle vašeho mínění, obhajobou neodstranitelné (např. chybí kritické zhodnocení pramenů a literatury), od těch věcí, které student může dobrou obhajobou napravit; poměr těchto dvou položek berte prosím v úvahu při stanovení konečné známky.