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Political Ideology and Organizational Structure

Comparative analysis of the Hezbollah, the FARC and the PKK

Master's Thesis

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role that political ideologies plays in determining the target of insurgency movements. In order to understand how these groups operate, I use Janowitz's military establishment to apply it on the three main revolutionary ideologies of the 20th century, Khomeinism, Marxism/Leninism and Fanonian. Based on these analyses, I hypothesize the three main targets by ideology based on the clarity of the indoctrination and on the level of bureaucracy entailed in the revolutionary texts. I then proceed to compare these theories to three case studies, the Hezbollah, the FARC and finally the PKK. I try to offer an explanation on why religious insurgencies target most of their attacks towards rival factions or why nationalist left-wing groups are mostly focused on attacking security forces. I argue that a well-structured hierarchy, a reliance on the civil society and a clear definition of the political and military targets are quintessential to prevent civilian causalities. But contrarily to most papers on the topic, I find that a strict military discipline has the reversed result that expected. For instance, the FARC and the PKK have such a strict internal code of discipline that it led the members to desert the organizations by thousands and have civilians as their first targets. On the other side, the Hezbollah, with its proximity with the civilian sphere, shows a looser disciplinary code but is the one sticking the most to its ideological targets, rival and security targets.

Keywords

Ideology, Target Selection, Military Establishement, Khomeinism, Marxism, Fanonian, Hezbollah, FARC, PKK

Range of thesis: 36.564 words, 107 pages

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

Prague, 30 July 2019 Alexandre Cuby

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Introduction

Why do people rebel? What are the motivations behind insurgencies? What are the interactions between the main actors? What are the outcomes of a rebellion? Most of rebellion stages have already been extensively covered and keep being rewritten. Some trace the modern revolution to the French Revolution, but armed revolutions are among the oldest form of political violence in our history. The two main ideas explaining insurgency movements are greed and grievance, but behind every group, there is a narrative, an ideology. This aspect is often forgotten by academics to explain the outcome of a revolutionary movement or how they fight. What does an ideology do, who does it target, how does it work? Wagner argues that political ideology is the key factor to understand a revolution. The level of violence towards the state, civilians or dissidents can only be explained by the political theory and the effectiveness of the vanguard parties to appeal the population.[1] On his side, Goldstone argues that the outcome of a revolution cannot be predicted based in the revolutionary ideology as the main initial ideology would appeal to the other groups following a different ideology in order to bring down the government.[2] In other words, he sees ideology as a tool used by the revolutionary leaders to gather the masses and the narrative will change throughout the revolution or after the consolidation of power. Yet, Ahmed found a clear pattern between ideological movements and targets' selection, which means that ideologies are not solely a tool, they clearly have a direct impact on the outcome of a revolutionary movement.[3] Various academics that will be reviewed in the next section argue similarly to Ahmed that there is a clear pattern between ideology and the selection of targets for terrorist groups. But none offers an explanation to this correlation except for Wagner who connects successful rebellions with their bureaucratic elements.

This paper seeks to answer whether political ideologies of terrorist organizations have a direct link with the selection of their targets. In order to do so, this research paper will attempt to understand if certain revolutionary ideologies directly entail a militaristic bureaucracy for consolidating power and prevent civilian casualties.

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[1] Wagner, M. (2011). *Political Ideology and Revolutionary Theory: Case studies of Russia and Peru compared*. San Diego State University.
[2] Goldstone, J. (2001). *Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory*. SSRN Electronic Journal, 4, pp.139-187.
[3] Ahmed, R. (2018). *Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection*. Journal of Applied Security Research, 13(3), pp.376-390.

Janowitz's work on the establishment of the armed forces[4] is the most comprehensive and relevant to investigate the bureaucracy of these ideologies and of the terrorist groups embracing them. Based on his model, the general hypothesis of this thesis is that a political ideology with a clear hierarchy, a selective recruitment, a strong social cohesion (trough a common accepted objective), a strict disciplinary code and a precise definition of targets, will less likely attack civilians than an ideology not specific enough on all these aspects.

The first section will review some of the literature on ideologies and bureaucracy, it will then analyze Janowitz's military establishment in length and review the current academic literature related to each of his sections to offer a comparison. In the second section, I will systematically apply his model to the principal revolutionary ideologies of the 20th century that still have lasting effects to this day: Islamism through Khomeinism, Communism through Marxism/Leninism and Nationalism through Fanonism. I will explain the relevance for each of them in their respective analyses. At the end of these analysis, I will formulate three hypotheses, suggesting which targets are most likely to be attacked by insurgency movements as a result of these ideologies. In a third section, I will apply Janowitz's model to three case studies, one for each ideology, and analyze their targets with the Global Terrorism Database.[5] I chose Hezbollah for Khomeinism, the FARC for Marxism/Leninism and finally the PKK for Fanonian although it's direct relation is much more difficult to establish than the previous examples but I will explain his relevance. Before starting the literature review, I should briefly conceptualize the terms of political ideology, revolution and establish the relation between terrorism and revolutionaries as these terms are going to be used interchangeably throughout this paper.

Conceptualization

The term ideology can encompass thousands of definition but this thesis will use Schmid's simple and broad definition, which refers to ideology as "a systematic, elaborated

[4] Janowitz, M. (1959). *Sociology and the Military Establishment, etc*. Russell Sage Foundation: New York.

[5] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, 2018

and delimited system of thought, like political ideologies or religious doctrines".[6] This definition is the most relevant one for our study of revolutions as it encompasses the use of a religious doctrine meddling with politics, namely political Islam. In essence, political ideologies are nothing more than ideas that people decide to stick with. It is a combination of top-down socialization process and bottom-up psychological predispositions.[7] This combination is exactly the same one that Victoroff uses to explain how some persons adopt terrorist behaviors.[8] Every insurgent, revolutionary, follows a socialization process (social learning, frustration-aggression, perceived oppression, deprivation…) and inherently has a certain set of predispositions (psychoanalytical and psychological theories). The main difference for a terrorist is that they are ready to kill civilians to reach their objectives.

I will use Goldstone's definition of revolution for this paper as "an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities".[9] This definition is inclusive and exclusive enough as it can categorize revolutions such as the Iranian one in 1979 although it was not violent per se as the military did not intervened, but it does not take in account revolutions such as the Arab Spring in 2011. It will allow us to use rebellion, revolutionaries and terrorists in the same idea for their understanding of ideology and bureaucracies. This interaction is best explained by Beck's logic: radicalism, revolutionary and terrorism can be used conjointly, not interchangeably, but they follow the same process.[10]

Beck conceptualizes terrorism by considering 3 variables: the legitimacy of the perpetrator (but acknowledges Tilly's definition who does not take the legitimacy into account, thereby providing one of the first literature on state terrorism), whether the action is routine (torture or war crimes are not routine, suicide bombings and gun killings are) and who is the intended targeted (basically whether they are civilians or not). This is how Beck rules out U.S' use of torture in Iraq from terrorism or most of Taliban actions (as they use routine attacks against US militaries), but Al Qaeda's actions fit in his definition of terrorism.

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[6] Schmid, H. (1981). *On the Origin of Ideology*. Acta Sociologica, 24(1-2), pp.57-73.
[7] Jost, J., Federico, C. and Napier, J. (2009). *Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities*. Annual Review of Psychology, 60(1), pp.307-337.
[8] Victoroff, J. (2005). *The Mind of the Terrorist*. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(1), pp.3-42.
[9] Goldstone, *Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory*
[10] Beck, C. (2015). *Radicals, revolutionaries, and terrorists*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, pp.1-22.

When it comes to revolutionaries, he conceptualizes them as "an event is revolutionary when there is mass contention against an existing state, when it overthrows a regime, or creates lasting social change and establishes new political structures". It is important to note here that when he talks about revolutionary events, even a failed revolution would still count as one. The literature on power consolidation relies on the idea of successful revolutions, when the leaders and ideologies become relevant. This consolidation can also take time: less than a year for Iran in 1979 or 38 years for China from 1911 to 1949. Finally, for radicalism, he defines it as "contention that is outside the common routines of politics present within a society, oriented towards substantial change in social, cultural, economic, and/or political structures, and undertaken by any actor using extra-institutional means". Beck's definition of radicalization is similar on all aspects with Tilly's definition of terrorism as an "asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime".[11] Radicalization does not necessarily include violence while terrorism does, this is the principal difference between both, along with the fact that a state cannot be radical but it can engage in terrorism.

Beck's conclusion: "If we consider all three definitions of radicalism, revolution, and terrorism together, we might simply say that radicalism is an orientation, revolution is an event, and terrorism is a tactic. As such, they overlap (by design) substantially – many terrorists are radical, many revolutionaries use terrorism, and many radicals seek revolution". This thin line between revolutionaries and terrorists has been eloquently described by Foreign Policy last year "This owes much to how the rhetoric of counterterrorism has come to dominate foreign policy in theory and in practice. It has given license to governments to first label their armed opponents as terrorists and then treat them as such."[12] A clear overlap between all these groups is the ideology they use, which is the root of their structural foundation. To prove this point, I will quickly explore the current literature on the role of ideology in revolutions and terrorist groups (radicalization is left out of the scope as it does not necessarily entail violence, and the definition of violence for each ideology is specifically the objective of this thesis).

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[11] Ibid

[12] Malley, R. (2019). *10 Conflicts to Watch in 2018*. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/02/10-conflicts-to-watch-in-2018/

1. Literatture Review

Ideology and Revolution

Mansoor Moaddle established four connections between ideologies and revolutions[13], out of all of them, the organizational model is the one to which this thesis adheres the most as it establishes the ideology as a component of the broader institutionalization/bureaucracy of the revolutionary movement. These are the four identified connections:

- *The subjectivist model*: this takes a socio-psychological approach; individuals have various predispositions to take up arms or protest in the streets to show their discontent but they will not do it on their own. The role of the ideology in this theory is to bring words to these discontents, should it be on identity, economic situation, belonging to a group, etc. This theory is similar to Collier's pioneering work which links rebellion and greed.[14] It also gives the room to grievances and to psychological approaches such as Victoroff[15] (although he links it to terrorism) or Kalyvas[16]. For the later, everyone has a reason to fight, they just use the war and and hide behind an ideology to justify their personal feuds.

- *The Marxian model*: it sees ideology as the result of class consciousness against the state ideology, direct derivative from the class struggle ideals and related to the economics. This ideology will be developed in the second section of this thesis.

- *Episodic Discourse Model*: this is Moaddel's model, he mixes the three other models and conceptualize ideology as "a discourse consisting of a set of general principles, concepts, symbols, and rituals used by actors to address problems in a particular historical episode". He explains that ideology cannot be reduced to an organizational approach, nor to the use of grievances to gather the masses, and neither to a class

[13] Moaddel, M. (1992). *Ideology as Episodic Discourse: The Case of the Iranian Revolution*. American Sociological Review, 57(3), p.353.
[14] Collier, P. (2000). *Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity*. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6), pp.839-853.
[15] Victoroff, *The Mind of the Terrorist*
[16] Kalyvas, S. (2003). *The Ontology of "Political Violence": Action and Identity in Civil Wars*. Perspectives on Politics, 1(03), pp.475-494.

struggle. While socio-political factors have their importance, ideologies are used specifically in a certain historical context, they cannot be universal. The discursive field puts the subject (the revolutionary) as the core recipient of the action where the speaker decides what is relevant or not, identifying the problems and targets. This theory has been used by Kaufman who believes that symbolic discourses giving a precise target based on national myths explains the level of violence in which some groups fall into after clashes break out.[17] On the other side, Fearon & Laitin[18] do not believe in the episodic discourse model, explaining that the masses are not dupe and only use this argument to settle former feuds (which is exactly the main argument of Kalyvas in his pioneer work on civil wars[19]).

- *Organizational model*: in this model, he sees ideology as a mean to organize contentions for political power. He writes that this model "provide power contenders with a revolutionary agenda that justifies their presence and mission in society, outlines their responsibilities, and indicates the action necessary for seizure of power". In this theory, ideology defines the targets and tactics for any movement following a certain bureaucracy, whether it be a revolutionary movement, a professional army or a terrorist group. It is this model/theory that is accepted for this thesis as it goes in line with Janowitz's work on the military establishment and Perlmutter's work on revolutionary armies.[20] The next section will review the relation between ideology and selection of targets before addressing the literature on bureaucratic armies.

Ideology and Target selection

As it will later be described in the military establishment literature review, there are many agent factors for an individual to join an insurgency movement. But the whole role of

[17] Kaufman, S. (2006). *Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence*. International Security, 30(4), pp.45-86.
[18] Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (2000). *Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity*. International Organization, 54(4), pp.845-877.
[19] Kalyvas, *The Ontology of "Political Violence"*
[20] Perlmutter, A. (1977). *The military and politics in modern times*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp.202-277.

an ideology is to establish the enemy and therefore "legitimize" the killing of a specific target and to provide of framework/military strategy to the rebellion. It assesses the innocence or guilt of people and institutions, paving the way for "justified" killing from its members.[21] To the difference of groups in civil wars, terrorist groups carefully choose their targets even if that, by nature, means killing civilians. Their ultimate goal is to fulfil their political agendas. There are various factors that should be taken in account for groups' target selection including their capabilities, resources or external response to their actions. Asal and al. argue that civilians are targeted as rational choice for small or young terrorist groups who do not have the capabilities to carry out attacks on security forces or infrastructures.[22] They therefore argue that a group's targets are mostly defined by their organizational structure/capabilities. Quillen believes that civilians are targeted in the sole point to easily raise the number of causalities and make the terrorist group more "appealing" or serious towards the government and future recruits.[23] But I argue that the principle determinant for target selection remains the clarity of the ideology for which these groups fight. Each group has its own unique ideology, usually based from a bigger umbrella (communism, Islamism, nationalism, anarchism, fascism…). While the individuals can choose to join a certain terrorist groups on personal factors, let it be the iconic dyad of greed and grievance or other psychological factors, the group actions are always based on an ideology.[24] Asal and all agree that there is a general assertion among scholars that the selection of targets is always a calculated choice for terrorist groups.[25] But this thesis, similarly to Wagner[26], argues that a solid bureaucracy allows a group to have greater control over its individuals and force them to attack the dictated targets to avoid unwanted individual attacks.

Drake was among the first ones to establish that there is a pattern between ideologies and target selection with a similarity between target and group's overall ideology. Ahmed was the one that conducted the most comprehensive data analysis regarding the correlation

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[21] Drake, C. (1998). *The role of ideology in terrorists' target selection*. Terrorism and Political Violence, 10(2), pp.53-85.
[22] Asal, V., Rethemeyer, R., Anderson, I., Stein, A., Rizzo, J. and Rozea, M. (2009). *The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection*. Journal of Applied Security Research, 4(3), pp.258-278.
[23] Quillen, C. (2002). *A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25(5), pp.279-292.
[24] Ahmed, *Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection*
[25] Asal & All, *The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection*
[26] Wagner, *Political Ideology and Revolutionary Theory: Case studies of Russia and Peru compared*

between ideologies and target choice. Ahmed hypotheses that Left-wing groups would more likely attack political targets and that religious groups, fighting for God, would more likely indiscriminate their attacks and show a high-rate of civilian causalities.[27] Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca similarly proposed that left-wing and separatist groups would tend to attack "the state" which can be understood as political and security targets.[28] Drake hypotheses that separatist groups, based on the Basque group ETA, are more likely to attack security targets as they see them as "foreign" occupier.[29] He also argues that communist readings, which are taken very seriously by left-wing groups, provide a list of targets because in its theory, communist ideology is based on moral and on a retrospective of history. Similarly, to Ahmed, he argues that communists will more likely attack political target in order to get rid of the "ruling class". On more global propositions, Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca argue that the greater a group is concerned about control of the territory, the greater the number of attacks on security targets. Their second and as a logical followed proposition is that the less dependence a terrorist organization has with regard to its supporters, the more likely indiscriminate attacks are going to happen. It is logical as groups concerned about the territory is usually found on ethno-separatist group, which usually depend on the support of the population (ETA, PKK, even Hezbollah for instance). So a greater a group is concerned on territorial issues, the greater he will be concern on civilian approval and therefore less attacks on civilians. At least, in theory for Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca. Regarding religious groups, Asal hypothesis religious groups are most likely going to attack civilians given the dichotomy of "us versus them" with attacks legitimized by the divine duty, an argument similar to Ahmed. Piazza contradicts this argument, finding that Islamic groups are not more prone than any other ideological group to carry out high-causalities attacks and are therefore not more prone to attack civilians, if Al Qaeda is taken out of the list.[30] The reason given is that Al Qaeda, like pure Marxist groups, follow a universalistic approach towards their objectives through the idea of a "world revolution" and tend to symbolized a whole category of the population into "the other" group and would justify the killings through it.

[27] Ahmed, *Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection*
[28] de la Calle, L. and Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2007). *Killing for Something? A new Approach to the Analysis of Target Selection in Terrorist Organizations*. Juan March Institute.
[29] Drake, *The role of ideology in terrorists' target selection*
[30] Piazza, J. (2009). *Is Islamist Terrorism Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure*. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21(1), pp.62-88.

Consolidation of power

It is a hard task to consolidate power in the aftermath of a revolution. The citizens are easily divided and at the same time easily bound to each other when it comes to attack on national symbols.[31] Therefore, it relies on the leader and on the new army to stabilize the country. The leader has political solutions while the army has military ones.

Co-ethnics, cultural repression, propaganda and every other tool related to a nationalistic movement will be called that centrifugal idealization, based on Malesevic's work[32]. For him, the whole point of ideology is to provide "ontological security for a large number of individuals". Having the military suppresses rival factions and not holding electoral elections are noticeable but ordinary daily events are hard to directly criticize as they are part of our routine. Mass media, education, advertising, administrative orders and so on, the citizen take all of that for granted, and yet on the long term, those are the most powerful coercive tools that a regime can use. Malesevic details on state ideology and how the population ties their own social status to that of their national one, while at the same time turning a blind eye on the other nations, adversaries. It is easy to extrapolate this cognitive thinking to the individuals directly and imagine the citizens to deny any tie between themselves and revolutionaries. Victoroff gave some insights on this approach through social learning theory and national cultural theory.[33] For Malesevic, bureaucracy is the ultimate tool of coercion, it enforces mass obedience on a scale no one could dream to do so before. It succeeds in doing so through the centrifugal ideologicalization mentioned above. It is the same line of thought that Weber used decades before to explain military bureaucracy. For him, the army developed such complex techniques to indoctrinate the soldier that even any irrational thinking could be predicted and dealt with. The army could rationally use the irrationality of religion to control its soldiers.[34] [35]

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[31] Chowanietz, C. (2010). *Rallying around the flag or railing against the government? Political parties' reactions to terrorist acts*. Party Politics, 17(5), pp.673-698.
[32] Malešević, S. (2011). *Nationalism, war and social cohesion*. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(1), pp.142-161.
[33] Victoroff, *The Mind of the Terrorist*
[34] Miewald, R. (1970). *Weberian Bureaucracy and the Military Model*. Public Administration Review, 30(2), p.129-133
[35] Heinecken, L. (2014). *The Military, War and Society: 'The Achille Heel of Sociology" and the need for reflection*. Stellenbosch University.

For Malesevic, professional armies use the monopoly of violence to control their population and recruit it when they deem it necessary to wage war against another society, following the same line of thought as Weber.[36] As Malesevic demonstrates all over his work, he believes that bureaucracy is responsible for the spike of death tool across centuries. By increasing the efficiency of social organizations, we increase their destructive potential. His primary example is Rwanda, where months before the genocide, its army was one of the most bureaucrat and stable in the continent, therefore everything was planned and organized. I will quote him a last time and develop on that through the length of this paper "It is modern bureaucratic machines that make systematic killing possible by discouraging disobedience and by transferring responsibility to higher chain in the hierarchy".

For Weber, the army had the highest stage of bureaucratic development. For him, discipline was the quintessential of bureaucratic decision making. Everything in the army and in war was rationally thought and planned. This obsession on rationality is a recurrent point on conflicts studies, where scholars try to find a justification to everything. But Miewald collected the sayings of another group of scholars refuting his view before it was even made, with Clausewitz as leading tale.[37] For this group, as bureaucratic the army can be, the individual can act irrationally during war and it is impossible to predict the future, therefore organizing and preparing the war in advance will only lead to greater causalities. To bridge this gap between the individual and the organization, Miewald believes soldiers should be independent and professionals, in order to take their own decisions, while in compliance with the organization's goals.[38] This is obviously the clearly of the ideal type of bureaucracy Weber stated.

Bureaucratic Armies

Bureaucracy is a permanent structure indispensable to the conduct of warfare[39]. Mills and Webber represent the quintessence of the two school of thoughts on military

[36] Malešević, *Nationalism, war and social cohesion*
[37] Miewald, *Weberian Bureaucracy and the Military Model*
[38] Ibid
[39] Callaghan, J., Kernic, F. and Shields, P. (2003). *Armed forces and international security*. Münster: Lit Verlag, pp.181-183.

bureaucracy, although they do not necessarily oppose each other. Webber sees bureaucracy as the most efficient way of managing a professional army while Mills looks at the other aspect and observes that a bureaucracy wants to be self-sustainable, and therefore might manipulate the crowds to pursue the army's goals. He is one of the first to perceive that professional soldiers can become corporate soldiers due to the bureaucracy it entails. By bureaucratic process, I understand the professionalization of the army through a variety of sets common to all bureaucracies. For analyzing this bureaucracy so, this thesis will use the variables explained by Morris Janowitz in his pioneering work *Sociology and the Military Establishment*.[40] He discusses in detail the interconnection of the military and the civil society through technological advances. Then he goes through with the hierarchy and structure of the military and the rest of the chapters are related to various bureaucratic elements: selection, training, social cohesion, disciplinary code, military strategy and indoctrination.

An interesting remark from Janowitz points out that the military establishment is getting more and more interconnected with the civil society, through technology advancement for example, but as well on the political ideology.[41] The military mind, the thought that war is inevitable, has been challenge by the civil institutions because of the advancement of technology. Now that the theory of deterrence exists, military pacifism grows as military leaders are growing more concern with the political consequences of violence. While this applies to professional armies, it would be interesting to analyze if some revolutionary leaders, depending on the ideology, would be more inclined to the use of violence in the aftermath of state's seizure. One of the most prominent academic on civilian-military relationship, Samuel Huntington, wrote that "professionalism" in the military has three main characteristics: expertness, social responsibility and corporate character.[42] This last characteristic, founded in most bureaucratic/military establishment models with regards to the financial aspect of an organization will remain out of the scope for this paper as it focuses on the core ideology of each group. The two first points can be found in Janowitz's

[40] Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*

[41] Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment,* p.16-17

[42] Huntington, S. (1957). *The Soldier and the State. The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, pp.11-18.

work and they will be explored as they can directly be defined from the revolutionary ideologies that this thesis analyses.

Janowitz's Military Establishment

I will here describe generally all the chapters defined by Janowitz as the various parts of the military establishment for any army, let it be revolutionary, terrorist or a regular state army. This framework can be used for these three types of group as it is compatible with Beck[43] and Perlmutter's views on revolutionary armies.[44]

Hierarchy and authority

This one is a recurrent pillar of any bureaucracy. The principle is straightforward; every lower officer is under supervision of a higher one. It is break down under different points:

- *Skills structure*: the division of labor. It used to be feudal, the officer was born as such, the authority took root in the feudal society culture. Strict appliance of age and length of service are still a keystone of authority in modern armed forces. This aristocratic feudal authority started changing into a professional armed forces during the industrialization. For the author, we can talk about professional armies from the 19th century. The dilemma of ascriptive versus achievement is still present nowadays, Janowitz argues that the ascriptive status prevails. The hierarchy is not a pyramid but rather a diamond, as most middle jobs had to be transferred to the civilians.

- *Civil status:* This part is described best in his own words "The effectiveness of military authority is deeply conditioned by the status and prestige which civilian society accords the military profession". The military represents the civilian society; it is therefore logic than civilians put much importance to their image. He argues that

[43] Beck, *Radicals, revolutionaries, and terrorists*.
[44] Perlmutter, *The military and politics in modern times*, p.202-277.

lesser educated classes are usually the ones most attached to the military when the most educated ones' show animosity towards it.

- *Military discipline*: changing constantly depending on the situation. It's a normal behavior typical of all bureaucracies.

On the role of leadership in general, the literature is lengthy enough to observe a consensus on its role. We tend to naturally imagine rebellions as masses following a charismatic leader (Mandela, Che, Mao, Lenin to name a few successful revolutionaries whose reputation transcend boundaries due to their legacy). And while some rebellions can be explained with the symbolist approach, others are clearly more rational-thought, with sometimes a variety of leaders or thinkers. Fearon & Laitin wrote about the use of ethnic violence as a rational strategy for leaders who used the mass through an exceptional discourse[45], arguing that masses were not dupe neither and used the violence as a mean to settle former feuds (which is exactly the main argument of Kalyvas in his pioneer work on civil wars[46]). Kaufman answered this paper by arguing that rational models such as a security dilemmas fall short to explain ethnic violence and only a symbolist model with the use of myths, already under the skin of the society but used by leaders, can explain such thing.[47] To be clear, both these authors debate about leadership in ethnic conflicts and revolutions have nothing to do with this paper, but their explanations for leaders' role is interesting enough to be extracted here. Gutiérrez-Sanín also includes leadership in its 5-pillars model for measuring the army-establishment of a rebel group. Units should be standardized, every soldier should have its specialization and an recognizable hierarchy by ranks are enough to compare the hierarchy of a rebel group to the one of a professional army.[48] Kenny goes in this direction as well by establishment leadership as one of his 3 key survivable factors to any insurgency, the leadership has for objective to avoid fractionalization and splinter factions within the group.[49] For Jordan, ideological organizations are most likely to experience a cessation of activity following the removal of leader than from religious

[45] Fearon and Laitin, *Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity*
[46] Kalyvas, *The Ontology of "Political Violence"*
[47] Kaufman, *Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice*
[48] Gutiérrez-Sanín, F. (2018). *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(4), pp.629-653.
[49] Kenny, P. (2010). *Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma.* International Studies Review, 12(4), pp.533-555.

organizations are highly resistant to leadership decapitation.[50] But his conclusions are clear, leadership decapitation are pointless at best, counterproductive at worst. While he studied terrorist organizations and not revolutionary insurgencies, I can hypothesis that terrorist groups are easier to manage as they allow the killing of civilians as a mean to an end and revolutionaries have a full political agenda behind that requires them the support of the civilian population. But many studies showed us than terrorism is not a random act and is a highly political decision, so are revolutions.[51] On the same tone, for Oots, the formation of a terrorist organization, like the formation of any other political organization depends on the leadership's ability to recruit and retain a committed membership.[52] So there is a kind of consensus that leaders are necessary to create an insurgency and politicize a grievance to turn it into a revolutionary movement, but once the movement got the necessary mobilization, leaders become less important. They can even become dangerous as they will be blinded by their powers and will tempt to force their ideals upon the population, instead of achieving the proclaimed objectives of the revolution: liberty, equality and prosperity.[53] This is an open door to the creation of extremist factions.

While using the example of Hitler's SS, Perlmutter stresses the importance of a leader when it comes to controlling the revolutionary soldiers.[54] The SA – Roehm's Storm Troopers were the revolutionary soldiers of the Nazi party but after seizing power, Hitler directly purged most of his officers by fear of a pusht and created the SS, a much more professionalized and controlled army, but for his own sake, it was not the state army. The oath they took was to Hitler, not to the German Reich. This goes far before and after Hitler's regime, it is the basis of coup-proofing and consolidation of power methods. Something that, as it will be discussed in the next chapters, is necessary for every successful revolution.

Assimilation of military roles

[50] Jordan, J. (2009). *When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation*. Security Studies, 18(4), pp.719-755.
[51] Bloom, M. (2004). *Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding*. Political Science Quarterly, 119(1), pp.61-88.
[52] Oots, K. (1989). *Organizational perspectives on the formation and disintegration of terrorist groups*. Terrorism, 12(3), pp.139-152.
[53] Goldstone, *Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory*
[54] Perlmutter, *The military and politics in modern times*, 211-215

The army does not evolve purely around combatants, therefore it needs people who can multi-task and evolve throughout their career. This capacity of adaptation is necessary, so is the capacity of assimilation. A combatant one day might be an officer another day. And as every military is a civilian in the first place, the connection between both is quite straightforward.

- *Recruitment*: Janowitz discusses in details the paycheck and makes an interesting point that in today societies, where everything is based on personal achievements and materialistic gains, joining the army might look like a cheap choice, without taking much risk on economic security. The author points out a study made decades ago by Cornell University explaining that civilian reluctance to be drafted to the military forces was due to personal factors rather than the military itself or the state ideology.

- *Selection and training*: training is usually made through a shock treatment in order to make a clear cut between the civilian life and the military existence. The author makes it clear that it is impossible to select and recruit combatants who can be combat leaders at the same time. They have to undergo internal training. Shock training is an old method of discipline, based on domination. But while it stills exists, it is more and more shifting towards the process of assimilation. At the same time, Janowtiz points out throughout his work and through various studies that soldiers usually do not see the point of their training, as in peacetime, they come back to civilian traditions. Also, the best soldiers adapt themselves to combat situations, but the weakest ones simply never manage to be soldiers. The bottom line is that training is successful for the self-esteem of the recruits and to build a social solidarity among recruits (something that Marx would be against, solidarity should be universal and not confined to a certain circle). On the other hand, training has a negative effect towards the attitude of soldiers with the military institution and its leaders. So the risk of a professional military establishment is that the recruit gets the assimilation process as routine and mechanical, rather than concerned with problem-solving initiative.

- *Career Development*: According to Janowitz, “the typical professional officer spends one-quarter of his career in school or in training situations”. He explains that such a

career does not benefit much the individual and might represent a financial burden for the institution when that person does not show the expected attitude as a combatant or later as a leading officer. The shift from soldier to officer can be frustrating, so the usual adopted solution has been to recruit directly officers who are generalists in the civil society. The author concludes with some data underscoring the frustration of the career officers rather than their unified point of view on the military establishment.

Recruitment and incentives have been discussed in length by academics to understand why individuals join the risky adventure of a rebellion. The glamourous aspects of revolutions tend many to assume that grievance is the principal reason for an individual to join a rebellion. But in natural resources rich countries, it is hard to imagine that they are all politically motivated. Paul Collier explains that grievance is statistically insignificant. He argues that economic grievance can indeed occur but is indistinguishable from greed.[55] [56] Echo to that, Humphreys & Weinstein explain that there is no evidence of political grievance in their statistical study, but rather economic grievance.[57] On their side, Henriksen & Vinci explain that individuals have three reasonable reasons to join an insurgency, and those joining it for economic motivations are those who lost their way. For them, the primary reasons should be communal (typically the Cuban revolution) or existential (soldiers for whom insurgency and violence goes beyond any political or economic objective, but have a deep intrinsic motivation for it).[58] An ideologically driven rebellion can appear romantic in the way that successful ones are usually described as popular movements to topple a dictator or an oppressor. And some are, undeniably, but all have a common point: they did not occur in one day (perhaps with the exception of Iran in 1979 that remains a hard one to explain by academics). Therefore, how the rebellion sustains itself from the beginning is a crucial question, so it is important to analyze how it is funded. Collier, in its econometric model, explains that rebellion can sustain themselves through looting but only after reaching a certain threshold of financial viability. For reaching it, they (rebellions) have three ways to

[55] Collier, *Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity*
[56] Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). *Greed and grievance in civil war*. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), pp.563-595.
[57] Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. (2008). *Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War*. American Journal of Political Science, 52(2), pp.436-455.
[58] Henriksen, R. and Vinci, A. (2007). *Combat Motivation in Non-State Armed Groups*. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(1), pp.87-109.

do so: through criminal activities (FARC for instance), foreign sponsors (RENAMO) or self-financing via charitable contributions (some Islamic movements).[59] Gutiérrez-Sanín establishes the recruitment as his second out of five pillars, arguing that a quick and easy recruitment allows insurgencies to gain momentum by showing large number of troops even if they are not properly disciplined or there for the wrong reasons. Depending on the group's objective, a large but uneducated group might be more effective that a small but well socialized insurgency.[60]

Primary groups and military effectiveness

Janowitz argues that the spirit of cohesion and fraternity between soldiers is the result of military institution and not a mere inherent feeling. "The goals and standards that primary groups enforce are hardly self-generated; they arise from the larger military environment and from the surrounding civilian society."

- *Social cohesion*: For the author, four factors are responsible for the social cohesion: the technical aspect of the weapon, the type of organization of his unit and its replacement system, the nature of the military threat and the performance of his immediate leader.

- *Group behavior under stress*: Much of the explanation is pointless for this paper but it broadly explains why every unit can be responsible for a failed mission if any member starts panicking. An interesting point made by the author is that desertion is the most recurrent and extreme form of disintegration. He explains that in military operations against totalitarian regimes, maintain a group cohesion even after combat and resistance to indoctrination is of paramount importance.

For Perlmutter, revolutionary soldiers are by nature anti-corporate. They do not fight for a social status or a corporate army, they fight for membership in a group. He points out that recent history shows that for revolutionary soldiers, violence was often the primarily mean used to achieve their goals. He also argues that a political change without external

[59] Collier, *Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity*
[60] Gutiérrez-Sanín, *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*

intervention or violence is almost impossible (two years after the book published, the Iranian Revolution happened). He argues as well that as much as revolutionary these movements claim to be, once they seize power, they have to shift towards a more institutionalized movement. He uses Huntington work to establish that, compared to the usual small-elite unite of the professional soldier, "the revolutionary soldier, on the other hand, is dedicated to mass military mobilization, the professionalization and standardization of large-scale armies whose elite is not recruited primarily on the basis of "heart and character" but on merit and political loyalty."[61] Political loyalty can be reframed into: ideology's acceptance. It seems to turn out correct in most revolutions. Many academics link the lack of social cohesion within an insurgency group to a high likelihood of violence towards civilians. Cohen regrouped some of the literature and made a case to explain that widespread rape is a tool of social cohesion for insurgencies, independently of the ideological background.[62] Social cohesion is also a key factor in both Kenney's model to estimate the viability of an insurgency as it measures the willingness of members to remain in the group or not.[63] This factor would turn out particularly true for the FARC in Gutiérrez-Sanín's paper although it is not one of his main pillars.[64]

Techniques of organizational control

First, organization doctrines have various but traditional objectives: to establish direct lines of formal authority, explicit definition of missions, clear channel of official communication between staff and operating units, and limitations on the span of control. Second, military commands seek to routinize its operating procedures, essentially through a manual or internal rules for discipline. But Janowitz warns that charts and rule books are not described the way in which large-scale organizations operate. Informal practices and personal communications networks are required if coordination is to be accomplished.

- *Communication and Command Channels*: All large scale organizations have formal and informal messages coming flowing down from the top. The formal ones are the

[61] Perlmutter, *The military and politics in modern times*, p.210
[62] Cohen, D. (2013*). Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence* (1980–2009). American Political Science Review, 107(3), pp.461-477.
[63] Kenny, *Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations*
[64] Gutiérrez-Sanín, *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*

orders and informal the prior notifications of important decision. But there are also bottom-up messages, the usual formal ones are the bureaucratic reports and official inspections. The informal one's allow the authorities to be quickly informed as the hierarchical bureaucratic procedures of the official channels take time and not well adapted to the military establishment which constantly lives in emergency. The author concludes that there has not been any empirical study to understand if military organizations were the ones using the most authority to take decisions.

- *Role conflict*: Militaries are not full time soldiers, they spend time outside their regiment, in family, in the civil areas. Thus they can be attracted by a civilian career, have doubts regarding their future, they also have to cope with their familial obligations and the pressure from the civilian community which might affect their professional career. Military leaders have to make sure they can keep those identity conflicts under control. Janowitz suggests that in order to keep the armed forces together is to maintain a "small, homogenous, isolated professional group is less likely to be subjected to role conflicts. The civilianization of the military, as well as the growth in the size of the military establishment, weakens organizational control over the individual soldier and officer". This explanation is understandable and coherent, yet the bigger the armed forces, the longer the group will survive, this is a basic component for revolutionary and terrorist group alike. Of course for state armies it is different as they are supposed to have the monopoly of the violence and should not fear to be destroyed by another armed force. He also explains that the close links between military institutions and civilian society, through technology or education, are an easy grape for soldiers and officers to decide to transfer in the other side. The author implies that for keeping a professional group of soldiers, the military institution should cut its links with civilian life. For instance, shifting assignments is part of all large scale organizations, but it is even more in military life, and that affects deeply the family pressure. Garrison life was the way to cope with civilian interference but as explained earlier, the military nowadays depend on the civilian life, mainly through technology and qualified recruits. Based on a McKinsey survey, he explains that there are not more turnover in the military than in any other large scale industry. But turnover in the military, where the level of cohesion has to be high enough to trust each other's with their own lives, make it more disruptive.

- *Indoctrination*: Janowitz conceptualize indoctrination in three aspects: (1) professional code of military behavior, (2) strategic concepts of the military operations, including a description of the enemy, (3) political objectives of national security. It is through this paramount factor that I will formulate three hypotheses on the correlation between revolutionary ideologies identify and their targets. By reading the works of the various revolutionary leaders, I will get a clear biased view of the message they want to transmit to the masses and then see if the targets are well-respected in our analysis. Janowitz assumes that armed forces should not be political in a democracy, but that by definition, indoctrination is political, therefore there is always confusion on the ideological concept of the military mission. Revolutionary armed forces gather around an ideology; it is therefore impossible to imagine the army apolitical after they seize power. Janowitz proves its point with the example of the US Military which originated from the anti-colonial struggle but its professional code of values comes from the British aristocratic ideals that they combatted against: dedicated patriotism, allegiance to national identity, political conservatism, and a sense of personal fealty to the chief sovereignty.[65] For him, political indoctrination means "implanting a comprehensive dogma which supplies answers to a wide variety of issues". This is precisely what this paper seeks to answer: which ideology, through its leader's book, supplied the most comprehensive answers to a variety of possible questions. This study seeks to understand if the three ideologies provide a guideline in regards with the leadership, the social cohesion, the recruitment and the targets.

Perlmutter almost makes the apology of violence in his chapter on revolutionary soldiers "Without violence, the revolution would be doomed" referring to the necessary clash between the professional, official security forces and the revolutionary soldiers. This sentence is framed one way or another in every single revolutionary book, let it be religious, nationalist or political. He later describes more lengthily his understanding of violence "Modern revolutions are characterized by total orientation for action, a high degree of brutality, a high level of violence, a wide network of politically oriented elites, a tightly

[65] Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, p.92-93

controlled mass mobilization organization in the form of a party and a large-scale permanent military establishment, and ideological cohesion buttressed by a system of revolutionary rules that are upheld if necessary by internal police".[66] This sentences directly addresses most of Janowitz's chapters: the importance of indoctrination by explaining the need for violence and specify targets, the importance of it for the cohesion between soldiers and the role of the leadership in the control of the organization. The idea of tight control over a mass mobilization is also explained by all ideologies: Lenin's vanguard idea, Khomeini's Islamic jurisprudence led by Islamic experts and himself, Fanon's admittance for the need of a political party to educate the masses. Organizational control through discipline and avoiding role conflict are two of Gutiérrez-Sanín's five-pillars model[67] while military effectiveness through indoctrination is the last key factor of Kenny's model.[68] This last point, the role of indoctrination in order to properly establishes the target and stick to it, is the focus of this paper in order to understand how insurgencies decide their attacks.

2. Methodology

The purpose of this paper is to examine if there is a correlation between political ideologies and the selection of target. This thesis will use qualitative and quantitative research to answer its research question. Numerous articles have been written about this relationship but they do not attempt to give an explanation to the found correlations. Using Wagner's idea of explaining the successful or failed paths of insurgency movements by the lens of bureaucracy[69], I decided to adapt this idea with Janowitz's military establishment. For doing so, I systematically apply his framework to the analyzed ideologies: Khomeinism, Marxism/Leninism and Fanonian. After these analyses, I lay down three hypotheses, one for each ideology, regarding the targets that are most likely to be affected by the insurgency movements embracing them. I directly verify them with Ahmed's findings as she remains the only academic to have realized a Large-N analysis of the correlation between ideology and target. After that, I apply again Janowitz's framework, in a much simplified version, to the case studies: Hezbollah, FARC and PKK. At the end of each of the case study, I analyze

[66] Perlmutter, *The military and politics in modern times*, p.217
[67] Gutiérrez-Sanín, *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*
[68] Kenny, *Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations*
[69] Wagner, *Political Ideology and Revolutionary Theory: Case studies of Russia and Peru compared*

the targets for each of these groups with a cleaned version of the Global Terrorism Database.[70] I first deleted the non-established targets (Other), then divided the other categories into six variables as defined per Ahmed[71]:

- Government and embassies → redefined as Political targets.
- Educational institutions, NGO, Journalists, Private Citizens, Religious Institutions and Tourists → redefined as Civilian targets
- Business → remain Business targets
- Food or Water supplies, airports, maritime facilities, telecommunication, transportation and utility systems (oil, gas and electric substations) → redefined as Infrastructure targets
- Terrorist groups and non-state militias → redefined as Rival targets
- Military and police → redefined as Security target

In this process, I paid close attention to the mean used for the attacks on 'Infrastructure', which happened to be regularly wrongfully attributed. Attacks by armed assaults killing civilians in a train station or buses were categorized as transportation target in the GTD, I therefore changed them to Civilian. On the other hand, if the attack was through bombing and did not kill anybody, I categorized it as Infrastructure. I completed some data, added some and deleted some for each group. The precise methodology and final data used for each group can be found in the annexes.

Once the six targets were defined, I counted the total number of attacks per target year per year for the first table and the same process for the second table, the one of fatalities. While creating the statistical results, I realized a basic error in the methodology: I had taken in account the perpetrator's death in the total. Indeed, the number of fatalities includes the perpetrator, so if a private citizen was targeted but only one death was accounted for, that means zero civilian died and only the perpetrator did. At least this is the case when the information on the criminal is available. So I subtracted the perpetrator death (nkillter) from the total number of fatalities (nkill) in order to get a cleaner description of the actual deaths in the researched targets. I ran the numbers several times, the final result is correct.

[70] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, 2018
[71] Ahmed, *Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection*

The Chi-Test results came from another process: First I transformed each target into odd ratios based on the total amount of death from the GDP (divided once again into six targets, following the same principle as above). Once in odd ratio, I measured the Chi2 by powering by 2 the difference between the odd results and Ahmed's different models. The smaller the total Chi2 of each group is, the most likely the group falls into Ahmed's categorization. This method is far from perfect as Ahmed does not give her absolute numbers or odd numbers and specially because she measured her odd numbers based on the National/Separatist groups. Such measurement was impossible to make as I did not have a precise information of which groups were categorized as national/separatist in her analysis, so I used the overall GTD database. While the results for the Hezbollah and FARC made sense and were true given their ideological basis, the results for the PKK was much further from the theoretical truth, which will be explained below.

3. Ideology Analysis

Khomeinism

Goldstone presents classic revolutions as iconic when they are the "first" of their kind and they serve as a model for further aspirants' revolutionaries. He mentions the Iranian revolution as such, the first revolution to be designed as an Islamic Republic.[72] Shahi went in the same direction by presenting the revolution as "Indeed the Iranian revolution was the point of realization for the immense political potential of Islam in modern times."[73] Robin Wright presents the Iranian Revolution as the "last great revolution" at the same extent as the French and Russian ones.[74] Most Arab rulers were extremely skeptical about the Iranian revolution seeing it as a threat of the same level as Israel (confirmed by the fact that all Arab states with the exception of Syria, sided with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war). But the probable reason they saw the revolution with such cynicism is because Khomeini had gained the

[72] Goldstone, J. and Andrew, J. (2008). *Modern Revolutions? Yes they are*. *Harvard International Review*.
[73] Shahi, A. (2009). *Thirty years on: The Iranian revolution and its impact on the region*. [online] E-International Relations. Available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2009/01/26/iranian-nationalism-a-historical-overview/
[74] Wright, R. (2001). *The last great revolution*. New York: Random House.

support of the Arab populations, showing that overthrowing a monarchy was possible.[75] Most importantly, Khomeini wrote extensively on martyrdom, a topic that considerably influenced the strategy of movements such as Hamas, the Islamic Jihad[76], Hezbollah[77] (the infamous term of *shahid* against Israel for these three), Al Qaeda[78] and even ISIS[79]. While the world has never experienced a proper Islamic revolution since 1979, the impact of Khomeinism on the region and Islamic movements is considerable and should be studied properly. I will also quickly explain the views of an important figure of the Iranian revolution and especially a prominent figure of the ideological background of the revolution, Ali Shariati. A Marxist Islamist, he was a deep admirer of Marxism but not from the Soviet Union, he rather shared views with Che Guevara, from whom he translated books into Persian. He was also communicating with Frantz Fanon, the main political figure behind the decolonization movements that will be analyzed two sections below. The ideas of Marxism used by Shariati have also been used in Khomeini's writings when he saw the popularity of the Islamic Marxist ideologue. One of his paragraphs sounds as if it is taken straight out of the Communist Manifesto with the division of the country into two groups: oppressors and oppressed, with millions hungry and deprived of health care and education while a minority lives a lavish lifestyle.[80]

Whilst the analysis theoretical bureaucratization of the military after the revolution makes sense, another simple way to fit the ideological agenda into the armed forces is the creation of a parallel army, indoctrinated to its core based on religious soldiers, that would serve as coup-proofing for the regime. And this is exactly what happened with the creation of the Pasdaran, the Iranian Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). Thus this whole explanation of military establishment would rather go to the duties and tasks of the IRGC rather than the

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[75] Ibid
[76] Levitt, M. (2005). *Hamas and Islamic Jihad Clash over 'Media Jihad'*. [online] The Washington Institute. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-and-islamic-jihad-clash-over-media-jihad
[77] Helmer, D. (2006). *Hezbollah's Employment of Suicide Bombing during the 1980's*. Military Review, LXXXVI(4), pp.71-81.
[78] Counter Extremism, *Khomeinism*. [online] Counter Extremism Project. Available at: https://www.counterextremism.com/khomeinism
[79] Banisadr, A. (2014). *Isis is a monster created by many countries. It requires an international solution* | Abolhassan Banisadr. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/27/isis-monster-international-solution
[80] Khomeini, A. (1981). *Islam and Revolution*. Mizan Press, Berkeley, p.49-50

classic armed forces, which was already too strongly established to be fundamentally reshaped.

According to Quinlivan, it takes at least 2 police officers to control 1,000 people in stable countries at peacetime, and around 20 in countries facing internal struggles. However the parallel army does not need to be as large as the regular armed forces, but it does have to be large and loyal enough to suppress any dissident within the regular army, even though it would most likely get crushed by it in a full-scale civil war.[81] The oldest parallel army in the Middle East actually comes from Saudi Arabia which developed special forces dedicated to the protection of the Saud family and a religious police in charge of enforcing standards of public behavior according to Wahhabism. This is exactly what Iran did, with the establishment of the IRGC and the religious police in charge of enforcing religious standards following Shiism. The creation of a parallel army poses some obvious threats: they are better equipped and better trained than the regular army and they are individually more effective. Combined to their smaller number, they become a proper war machine shaped by the ideals of the new leader. But they also trample on the recruitment of the regular armed forces, decreasing the offensive and defensive capabilities of the army. While this might not be a big problem for countries living in peaceful regions, it is for unstable countries and even more so for a country like Iran that developed its ideology on the exportation of the revolution. This is how Iran came to establish proxy wars across the Middle East and engage in "dirty wars" with countries that have far better equipped militaries: Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United-States.[82]

Hierarchy and Authority

Hierarchy and Authority are the main difference between a Shia and Sunni society, on paper. Indeed, Sunnis believe that the leader of the community should be elected and his authority can be taken away if he fails to properly follow the guidance of the Quran. This idea of electing the fittest person for the leadership comes naturally from the first Caliph

[81] Quinlivan, J. (1999). *Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East*. International Security, 24(2), pp.131-165.
[82] Byman, D. (2018). *Why engage in proxy war? A state's perspective*. [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/21/why-engage-in-proxy-war-a-states-perspective/

according Sunnis, Abu Bakr, the closest adviser of the Prophet Muhammad. On the other hand, Shias believe that they should only follow the rightful religious leader, someone sinless by nature. This obviously traces back to the split between both groups when Shia decided that Ali was the rightful successor of Muhammad because he was part of his family. This successions of heirs created the 12 Imams, which is today the basis of Shia belief. But as this thesis will explain, even the Iranian Revolution, a social Shia revolution, moved into the same pattern as previous Muslim Sunni revolutions. I am going to explore theoretically, to what an Islamic State should look like according to Khomeinism.

For Shariati, the role of an Imam, so the leadership, is not to merely watch over its people or give them comfort, but to lead the Muslim community (ummah) through progress, by educating them to revolutionary ideals. He presents leadership in the West as a bureaucracy installed by the government to grant all of its people an absolute freedom of everything, where they are happy and careless. He compared this system of leadership directly to a zoo, when animals are given their basic needs, they do not seek progress. On the other hand, he presents leadership in the East, and to which a new Iran should look like (this speech was given in 1968, far before any massive sign of disagreement with the Shah), as a moral obligation. Followers of the ummah should not be free of everything, they should be militants and accept and follow their leadership. If they do not, they simply should not stay there but should leave. Shariati, although Marxist, was still a religious and proposed that the Imam should lead the people towards the "divine mission", with its mission not based on the approval of individuals but upon the "truth". As he puts it eloquently "For the individual (in the ummah), the goal in life is not to be. Rather it is to move forward".[83] These ideals were written before Khomeini's books who used them for his work. He stresses the importance of a leader as a direct obligation from God who wants his creatures to be under the guidance of an Islamic leadership to guide them through all aspects of society. Again, by extreme simplification of the difference between Sunnis and Shias, the former relies much more on Islamic books and traditional rituals while the later relies on leaders/imams to show them the rightful path.

[83] Shariati, A. (1968). *Dr. Ali Shariati on Role of Leadership in West vs Role of Leadership in Shiism*. [online] YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0evSkdzXF_4

For Khomeini, monarchy and hereditary succession are wrong and violate the laws of Islam, which is a logical flow of thoughts when the leader of a society should be the most acknowledgeable on Islamic laws. For him and many fundamental Islamic scholars and politicians, there is no needs to explain Islamic laws for a society because the Quran already explains all the laws a society should have and only 10% of the religious text is dedicated to worship.[84] So the question is how to bring an executive power to apply these laws? It is interesting to note that he tries to justify the necessity for a government even when his country was already demanding one. He gives the archaic reason that even Muhammad wanted a successor and therefore a government, but he also gives a much more Western reason: the lack of government will lead to anarchy, in other words, Hobbes' Leviathan. But there is a much more practical explanation to this need of single authority: replace the various local religious leader by only one "supreme commander" and shift from local customs and religious teaching to a full scale state ideology.[85] In other words, having a single leader with all the power is quintessential to implement this Islamic ideology. The whole idea of "supreme leadership" is based on the idea of the return of Imam Mahdi, the redeemer of Islam that will appear before Judgement Day. Therefore, while Khomeini does not present himself as him, he wants to assume his position until he arrives. A belief thoroughly shared within the Shia community and still popular among Sunnis.

Skill structure:

Khomeini does not see professional military skills as necessary to become an officer, just as he does not see good knowledge of natural sciences benefitting for any kind of leadership. For him the only thing that matters when it comes to leadership is a sound knowledge of the laws of Islam.[86] The leader of the country should naturally be the one who "surpass" everyone else in the knowledge of law and justice. For military officers, they should simply be experts on the laws of Islam when it comes to war. Their military experience is not relevant anymore, at least in theory.[87]

[84] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.29 and 37
[85] Nafisi, R. (2008). *پیدایش و پیامدهای دین بوروکراتیک در ایران*. [online] Foundation for Iranian Studies. Available at: https://fis-iran.org/fa/irannameh/volxxiv/bureaucrat-religion
[86] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.59
[87] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.60

Civil status:

Janowitz's argues that the efficiency of the armed forces depends on its status and prestige among the civilian sphere, it is therefore important to briefly explore the civilian-military relationship (CMR) in the Islamic ideology. Numerous authors explained the concept of professional soldier in Western countries, where they are controlled by the civilian society.[88] [89] On the other hand, fewer authors went after the CMR in Muslim countries, where the separation between both parties is non-existence, military and civilian power are always attached together.[90] Islam does not make much difference between the various groups of society, all the Muslims together form the *ummah*. They make a difference between the religious educated and the less educated, so between the *faqih* and the others. Historically all great Muslim leaders were military conquerors as well. From the Prophet Muhammad himself and the first Imams, including Imam Ali, Commander of the Faithful (term exclusive to him according to Shia theology), to Gamal Abdel Nasser in recent history, there is a pattern between generals and political leaders in Muslim countries. For Qureshi, this traces root to the fact that in Islam, religious, political and military institutions occurred at the same time, under the Prophet Muhammad that held all powers, at the opposite of Judaism or Christianity in which these institutions were shaped over time. Back then, there were only two categories in the society: the *muqatila* and the *qa'ada*. The former ones where the fighters, who were in the frontline, the latter simply stayed in the background. The *muqatila* were the ones seen as privileged citizens and all war treasuries were going to them. Ironically it was really similar in ancient Sparta, where the soldiers were also the politicians and the only ones with a "voice" and status within the society. War brought them money and privilege, they were therefore eager to pursue further wars. They saw the benefits of war greater than the costs of risking their lives. Qureshi argues that "the raison d'être of the Islamic state is the achievement of the universal rule of God" and therefore the adobe of war will always protect the soldiers high up in society. While Khomeini argues the same raison d'être, for him the religious scholars should be the highest ranking in society because they can properly spread their teachings. He never hid his wish for the spread of the revolution, but minimized the importance of the soldier. Quereshi finishes his paper with a short but

[88] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* p.11-18
[89] Finer, S. and Stanley, J. (1962). *The man on horseback*. London: Routledge, p.Chapter I: The Military in the Politics Today.
[90] Qureshi, S. (1981). *Military in the Polity of Islam*. International Political Science Review, 2(3), pp.271-282.

detailed analysis of modern Muslim states: all of them have the military as either the current political leader or as the ultimate leader. A simple but relevant example: British India created three countries, two of them are now Muslims: Pakistan and Bangladesh, which are under military leadership; and one that is not: India, which is still dominated by the civilian institution. This fascination for strongmen in Muslim countries has been written extensively about, and supports Janowitz's point: that the status of the soldier is extremely preserved in these countries, which reinforces the argument that the military authority should work well in these regions.

Military discipline:

According to Badawi, the main difference between International Humanitarian Law and Islamic laws of war comes from the fact that states, following the former, put much effort in securing their sovereignty and regulate warfare among them, but do not make much effort regarding wars/rebellions within their countries. It basically gives each country a "free-pass" to deal with their rebels the way they want. On the other hand, states following Islamic laws do not care too much about national boundaries (still in the spirit of internationalizing Islam), but do put emphasis on rebellions. It naturally gave more legitimacy to rebellions because of the natural mission of Islamic laws to protect all Muslims' lives.[91] Badawi defines four categories of "enemies" of an Islamic regime that will be seen at the end of this section.

Assimilation of Military Roles

Recruitment:

It appears clear that Khomeini took some ideas similar to those of Marx, but he also developed on Lenin's idea of vanguardism. On a variety of examples such as the fact that soldiers normally would not do everything they can to protect the territory or that citizens normally would not take the money from the rich to give it to the poor, he insists on the fact that the population is not naturally ready to take action and implement the pillars of Islam.[92]

[91] Badawi, N. (2009). *Islamic Jurisprudence And The Regulation Of Armed Conflict*. Program On Humanitarian Policy And Conflict Research. [online] Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8FC97823516EEEDA4925762E001ABDA8-Harvard_Feb2009.pdf

[92] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.74

Another sheer example is his quotes from Maymun al-Qaddah which are elitist in many aspects: “The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of the full moon over the stars” or “Truly the scholars are the heirs of the prophets”.[93] On another occasion, he wrote that the responsibility of religious scholars is critical as they “must take the lead over other Muslims in embarking on this sacred *jihad*”.[94] When it comes to the recruitment of the armed struggle for the Islamic revolution, he assesses that educated students are the most prone to carry out his ideals. Once again, he leaves the less educated totally on the sideline.[95] Khomeini was a fierce critic of the Soviet Union so he obviously did not quote anyone on this idea, but in political theory this is the most basic idea of Leninism. It can be predicted through these lines to what the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps would look like, or any revolutionary armed forces based on Khomeinism. An armed force in which educated people (aka devoted Muslims who know the laws of the religion and how to apply it) will lead the country until the population is ready to embrace the same ideals collectively. But this armed force obviously cannot exist solely by itself, it should be connected to the country’s economy and judicial system in order to “pave the way”. This is indeed how the IRGC came to be in Iran, the Hamas in the Gaza strip or the Hezbollah in Lebanon. On this ground, joining this Islamic armed force is not a “cheap choice” like Janowitz would describe it or based on personal reasons, it is purely ideological. Khomeini tried to divide the society into various classes: educated and less educated, religious and less religious, families with martyr and families without and so on. The whole point of these divisions was to concretely root Khomeinism as a possible ideology among the Iranian population and he managed to do so in the decade following the revolution. The civic duties that we know in Europe, present in Iran, became religious duties.[96]

Career development:

If the leader of the state dies or the regime changes, the military ranks and appointments should stay the same. Indeed, they should pursue their duties their whole life. As a general rule, every position created by the Islamic state should stay eternal and the same

[93] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.106
[94] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.116
[95] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.129
[96] Nafisi, *پیدایش و پیامدهای دین بوروکراتیک در ایران*.

people should stay in power, except if the new religious leader decides otherwise. The idea is simply to avoid the vacuum of power left and prevent foreign interference.[97]

Social cohesion

A small detail but important nonetheless, while Khomeini is a Shia and his whole concept of leadership comes out of Shia belief, he wants to unite all Muslims and all across his book he talks about a common Muslim front – Caliphate style – to spread the Islamic Revolution. He insists on the fact that both Sunni and Shia agree on the fact that the leader should be the most acknowledgeable and not necessarily the most skilled in government position. He is not fully irrational either, far from it. So while he does not call for a universal Islamic revolution, he does call upon a government that has the capacity of universal justice in the world. It should be reminded that right before the Iranian Revolution, the country had the 5th most powerful military in the world and Khomeini was probably talking about this firepower combined to an Islamic government in order to shape foreign policies the way he saw it. He presented the duty to preserve Islam by spreading the revolution, more importantly than praying or fasting, which are two of the five pillars of Islam.[98] This idea of looking more Muslim than being truly faithful was mandated by various well-known clerics before the revolution. Looking Muslim on the outside meant you showed your loyalty to the state even if you were a poor religious at home.[99] The term of describing such attitude, *taqiyya*, recently became popular in intelligence papers and TV shows to "spot" a radical Muslim trying to lie.

Techniques or Organizational Control

Communication and control channels:

Starting his third chapter on the form of an Islamic Government, he presents it as non-absolute but constitutional: laws are approved by the majority. On the other side, he wants to replace (and not destroy compared to communists) the parliament/assembly by a

[97] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.97-100
[98] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.75
[99] Nafisi, *پیدایش و پیامدهای دین بوروکراتیک در ایران*.

"planning body" that would take care of the legislative branch by following the ordinances of Islam (so from the Quran directly as sen earlier).[100]

Role conflict:

It has been previously mentioned that according to Janowitz, the military should be totally separated from the civilian to prevent role conflict for the soldiers and officers. For a revolutionary armed force, this is impossible, even more so with an Islamic armed force, which aims at spreading the revolution at all cost. The mission of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp is directly coming out from Khomeini's writings when he presents the armed forces of the Muslim community (ummah) always on the alert and ready, even in time of peace. This is an important point discussed by Janowitz in modern bureaucratic armies. But how to do so? It is a surprisingly straightforward answer that Khomeini presents: money. All the Islamic taxes (khums, zakat, jizya and kharaj) should represent such a vast budget that the sayyid (descendants of the Prophet) would not need it and the rest of the taxes should be allocated to "the preservation of Islamic order and defense of the territorial integrity"[101].

Indoctrination:

The first enemies described by Khomeini are Westerners for bringing foreign laws to the country, making the judicial system non-Islamic and installing puppet agents to exploit these Europeans laws (obviously referring to Reza Pahlavi). He even talks about "judicial machinery" clearly explaining his frustration with bureaucracy. He also criticizes America's war in Vietnam and justifies the slaughter of "a few corrupt people" by the fact that it is the religion itself that commands the religious to engage in warfare. Westerners are not only behind foreign laws but as well those responsible for the "consumption of what is forbidden", aka the exploitation of indigenous resources for their own profit. Classic reason to undergo a national revolution, this act is presented as "the most dangerous evil", or at least those accepting such exploitation. The spreading of the revolution is also tackled when he explains that Muslims do not have a choice but to "destroy the environment of corruption…this is a duty that all Muslims must fulfill, in every one of the Muslim countries, in order to achieve the triumphant political revolution of Islam"[102]. When justifying the power that the future leader of the Islamic community should have, he uses almost a humanitarian discourse

[100] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.56
[101] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.46
[102] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.48

saying a leader should "prevents cruelty, oppression and violation of the rights of others". A discourse that sharpens drastically with communist revolutionaries. Every time he mentions the enemy of Islam, he does not use words such as *killing, suppression, destruction…* but simply "prevent them to interfere". But he still uses by moment a violent language when it comes to punishment such as *whippings, stoning, perpetual imprisonment, banishment.*[103] [104] The stoning comes as a surprise here because it is the only word referring to killing an enemy found throughout the entirety of his book. To any reader of his book it is understood that he does not call for killing, but rather justifies theocracy and the importance of a permanent religious leader. So when it comes to splinter factions and other revolutionaries that disagree with him, he calls upon propaganda and rigged elections and not suppression. He presents the leader as the guardian of society and the importance of institutions of leadership. He insists on this point throughout his book and wants people to believe that theocracy is the only option for living in harmony and that the *fuqaha/faqih* should be given all powers to lead the nation, from the economy to the military. The *faqih* would naturally not be leaning right or left; he would be "just" and would not have studied anything else that the supervision of an Islamic society (as pointed above, Khomeini believed that the Quran is already giving all the answers to what this society should look like). However, it is important to note that he also looks upon the way Muhammad led the Caliphate: burning places and destruction of certain groups of people who were against Islam. For Khomeini, if Muhammed did not give such orders, he would have neglected the welfare of human society. Right after this point, he insists on the fact that the public interest is above personal interests. Thus, he adopts a utilitarian perspective, a moral ideal largely dominating in the present world, which has led so many times to the suppression of minorities. But when it comes to splinter groups, he has a clear answer: "Islam has prepared to subordinate individuals to the collective interest of society and has rooted out numerous groups that were a source of corruption and harm to human society".[105]

On the other side, an obvious fact is that his ideal army is only composed of firm believers praying regularly. In a clear sentence about the leader of an Islamic state he states that "His seat of command was the mosque: the bench of the judge was situated in one corner

[103] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.53
[104] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.75
[105] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.89 and p.127

of the mosque, while in another, the army would prepare to set out for battle"[106]. Here, he perfectly represents the power that should be given to him: the religious, judicial and military authority. The same clerics mentioned earlier, those responsible for "looking more Muslim than you are"[107] became among the first paid civil servants of the Islamic government and became the center of education for all those aspiring to make career in the government. The indoctrination quickly became institutionalized, as it could be predicted it. Regarding propaganda, Khomeini sees it as the principal enemy of the Islamic state. He considers sinful talk is more dangerous than the failure of Muslim duties.[108] It re-bounced here on the idea that the Islamic state should be unshakable from the outside, on appearance, but can have problems within. It can be read through the lines that he sees propaganda as the only answer to enemy propaganda. That gives us another idea on how he would deal with splinter factions: by discrediting them rather than suppressing them. Within the first years of the new Islamic Government, the organ of Islamic publicity came to light and became one of the five main institutions that bureaucratized religion in Iran according Nafisi.[109]

In the last lines of his fourth chapter, he said that the future generations might be able to create an Islamic Government by exchanging their views, consulting, and removing "traitors" from the government and the nation, so by exiling them. Later on he describes religious institutions as corrupted as well because corrupted minds by the former governments entered in them, so the first objective of the Islamic state would be to remove these "corrupted minds".[110] Further explanation refers to them as "pseudo-saints", they are everywhere in society and prevent a true Islamic revolution. These "pseudo-saints" are *faqih* who served in the previous regimes and do not see the West or Israel as enemies. For him, if an ordinary citizen gets corrupted, it is not a big deal, he would not be really harmful. But if a *faqih* is corrupted, then the whole Islamic society becomes sinful. Therefore, his main target within the society are the former religious leaders. Khomeini then gives a precise account of what should be done with them: First try to change their mind directly. Second, if they do not change their minds, "They must be exposed and disgraced so that they may come to lose whatever standing they enjoy among the people".[111] And he does not let any

[106] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.86
[107] Nafisi, *پیدایش و پیامدهای دین بوروکراتیک در ایران*.
[108] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.113
[109] Nafisi, *پیدایش و پیامدهای دین بوروکراتیک در ایران*.
[110] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.136
[111] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.145

confusion around the vocabulary "I am not saying they should be killed, they do not deserve to be killed. But take off their turbans!"[112]. It is one of the most peaceful sentence I read from a revolutionary for this thesis about what to do for those who do not "fit in". On the other side, he also gives a name to these "traitors": Western countries, Jews and Christians. For the establishment of a full working Islamic government, he realizes it will take time and does not want to rush anything, he wants to structurally change the whole system. Again, another point where a not-too violent revolution without mass killings can be assumed.[113] As previously mentioned, Badawi gives four categories of the enemies to Islam according various Islamic jurists:

1. Non-Muslims not following any of the holy religions and atheists
2. Scriptuaries ("people of the book": Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians)
3. Apostates, those who renounced Islam as their faith
4. Muslim rebels

The only ones that can be killed according these Islamic jurists are the apostates because they offend directly the religion. [114] But for Khomeini and Fadlallah (first ideologue of the Hezbollah), Muslim rebels were the main and most important targets for any Islamic country.[115]

Pre-revolution, according to Khomeini, the population had a duty to engage in an armed rebellious group to overthrow the government and conform it to the principles of Islam. Once a movement would start, every group of society would follow. Nothing new here, it is the definition of a revolution. The motto of Khomeini in his book calling for the Islamic revolution is "So, courageous sons of Islam, stand up!"[116]. A sentence that cannot be dissociated with Marx's *Communist Manifesto* "Working men of all countries, Unite!". Khomeini concludes his book on the simple structure on how the revolution should occur: the ordinary people should destroy the house of oppression – aka the various government's

[112] Ibid
[113] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.133
[114] Badawi, *Islamic Jurisprudence And The Regulation Of Armed Conflict*
[115] Fadlallah, S. and Soueid, M. (1995). *Islamic Unity and Political Change*. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah. Journal of Palestine Studies, 25(1), pp.61-75.
[116] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p.132

institutions – and then the *fuqaha* would implement the laws of Islam. One category is precise on who belongs to it, the second one is much broader and calls upon all Muslims.

Marxism/Leninism

The mother of the 20th century's revolutions and insurgency movements, the Communist Manifesto has been widely discussed by political, economic and sociological scholars. Given the abundance of literature, much more in-depth that this thesis can possibly explore, I will keep this section short, assuming that the reader is familiar with the main ideas behind the Manifesto. This section will simply try to look if there are any clear objectives regarding the bureaucratic elements of the future army within the Manifesto and Lenin's work, *State and Revolution*.

First it should be reminded the ideal of a revolution for Marx and its unfolding: Starting from the proletariat struggle with the bourgeoisie, the working class first attacks the production means and not those owning it. Then they start forming trade unions against the bourgeoisie to demand higher wages. Sometimes, those strikes will break out into riots, they are the first but ephemeral victories for the workers. Motivated by this short term result, the union starts growing into a class and so in a political party, without constant discontent between workers themselves. When this class becomes educated enough, thanks to the bourgeoisie whom want to revolt against the other political elements and gives them all the necessary tools, it becomes time for the revolution.[117] It is important to notice that Marx points out education as a crucial factor for the revolution, he does not see it happening without general knowledge across the working class. It is following this timeline that Marx and Engels give their first critics on the various factions within those opposed to the bourgeoisie, but this topic will be analyzed later in this section. It is also here that they mention for the first time the degree of violence of their revolution "where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat"[118]. The words violent, abolition or destroy appear dozens of time in the manifesto, making it clear

[117] Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848). *The Communist Manifesto*. P.19 1st ed. Marxists.org
[118] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.20

that the revolution was indeed planning on shaking the whole system (as the first definitions of revolutions).

Marx's view on the army can be summed up in his praise for the Paris Commune: "the first decree of the Commune, therefore, was the suppression of the standing army and the substitution for it of the armed people"[119]. This is the first sign of what would later be a really precise skill structure of the army: not hierarchy, only militias. A direct objective of the revolution for him was to destroy "the two greatest sources of expenditure: the standing army and state functionalism".[120] The tone is clear, no army, no bureaucracy, Communism will solely rely on militias according Marx, in theory. And these militias could only be composed of the members from the working class, which "cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes"[121]. Smashing the "bureaucratic-military machine" is a sentence that will come back often in Lenin's State and Revolution. He saw Britain and America, who were model of capitalistic but non militaries countries as Marx view them, becoming the biggest "bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves and suppress everything".[122]

Lenin's view on Marxism was mainly focus on the state and the army. He clearly viewed the state as the tool for class oppression, and the army as the representative of "order" which is here to moderate the class struggle. For him, the army was nothing more than a tool of the state, which is itself a tool of the bourgeoisie. Anything else that a violent destruction of the state machinery would be seen as a failure.[123] In other words, he followed Marx's views on the necessity of armed people and get rid of the standing professional army. But contrarily to Marx, he does not believe that *everyone* should be armed. The whole concept of Marxism relies on antagonist's classes, inherent to the present society, and this class struggle will exist even after the revolution. Lenin uses Engels sayings to describe the militias as "self-acting armed organization of the population"[124], which would be a highly complex and technical organization. But his organization cannot occur as a result of the irreconcilable antagonistic classes within every society. This view was accepted and

[119] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.60
[120] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.61
[121] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.4
[122] Lenin, V. (1917). *The State and Revolution*. Chapter III, p.2, 6th ed. Marxists.org.
[123] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. Chapter I, p.1
[124] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. Chapter I, p.8

profoundly documented in the acclaimed work of Kalyvas on his ontology of political violence[125], where the core idea relies on the fact that everyone in a revolution / civil war, has something to settle on their side, and they use the group movement to justify their individual actions.

Before starting the proper analysis of Janowitz's military establishment towards Marxism, the concept of "withering away" should be defined as it is largely used by Marx and Lenin. The idea of the revolution is that is must be dramatically violent in order to replace the bourgeois state by a proletarian state (or dictatorship of the proletariat). Once this revolution happened, necessarily violent for Lenin, then the state will render itself useless and therefore slowly wither away.

Hierarchy and Authority

This pillar of bureaucracy is obviously one of the biggest problem for Marx. He does not limit his critic to class oppression but rather on the distinction of class generally speaking. Engels put it clearly on the Preface to the 1888 English version of the Communist Manifesto "… the proletariat – cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class – the bourgeoisie – without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinction, and class struggles".[126] Marx mentioned hierarchical investiture directly as a pure antagonism to the spirit of communism. His definition is rather classical: a top-down system of appointing officials where the higher officials would appoint lower officials. On the same paragraph, he sheds some more confusion on labor specialty, something he repeatedly criticized. He explains that companies and individuals know how to choose the right person for the right position, and if they made a mistake, they quickly correct it and replace that person.[127] This is what he wants to apply to the armed forces, the communes being the companies, they decide along the individuals who should be armed and for how long. Lenin and Engels discredited the military rankings and explained that high officials in the army will never gain the "unrestrained respect" that

[125] Kalyvas, *The Ontology of "Political Violence"*
[126] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. Preface to the 1888 English edition
[127] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.61

a clan's leader might have on the society. So they either clearly divide the armed forces with civilian life or discredit any form of leadership within their future militias.

When it comes to the division of labor, so in other words the specialization, another key factor of the military establishment, it is also explained as a core issue for Marx. For him, the industrial revolution already started undermining the specializations of the workers so it will slowly fade away, but with the future revolution, it will put a definitive end to this separation of skills in order to have one common homogenous group. In his description of the Paris Commune, he finally mentioned the standing army and the bureaucracy as organs of the state power. While not attacking directly these institutions, he clearly states that they have been corrupted by the systematic and hierarchic division of labor, coming directly from the bourgeois as a tool for their fight against feudalism. On his call to abolish bureaucracy, he knows it cannot be destroyed at once, but on the same trajectory as the transitional proletarian state, a bureaucracy with subordination will be necessary during that time. Specifically, it will be to the armed vanguard, those who will be the "guides" of the revolution. But this vanguard won't be here for "bossing", they will be here as "foremen and accountants". So while this very much sounds like another form of hierarchy bottom-up, the long-term vision remains to get rid of this vanguard when the society will be ready, and therefore totally suppress any kind of hierarchy.

Assimilation of Military Roles

Regarding the new social order, Marx is clear on the fact that he wants to abolish competition and replace it with social association. But as explained by Janowitz, any army needs competition to be professional. It needs it for the selective recruitment and for arms purchasing. In Marx's view, only the people matter and not the state, all form of competition and selection is therefore pointless. It is only at the 56th page of the manifesto, at the Demands of the Communist Party in Germany, that Marx and Engels finally talk about the military. Their request is plain and simple: universal arming of the people. As it will later be discussed, with Lenin there should not be any army, everyone with the socialist knowledge, should be armed and able to decide for themselves. Marx makes an interesting point by stating that armies should be labor armies as well, do that they produce their needs and not

consume what the workers produced, like it was in the existing society.[128] He mentioned again the military institution later on his praise for the Commune, which abolished the standing army for replaced by a National Guard, which was mainly composed of working men.

As Janowitz pointed out, financial rewards are obviously not an option for any professional army, but they have to do their best to keep their soldiers and officers to prevent them to join the private sector. For Marx, the soldiers should get the same wage as the workmen, which is logical as they should belong to the working class as well. In addition, they should be revocable at any moment, meaning that they are not truly needed by the new society. But if they do not feel this sense of pride and are not financially rewarded neither, it is hard to imagine a reason for them to stay in the armed forces as the potential costs are far greater than the benefits. While for the urban area there was the idea of a national guard; for the rural areas Marx thought about local militias who would have a really short period of engagement. This is quite straightforward on the career development aspect, which nonexistent in Marxian theory. As mentioned before, Marx believes in a strict division of labor in the meaning that if someone is not well suited for a required position, he would be replaced immediately. This uncertainty on individuals' future prevents the armed forces to get routinized and therefore organize themselves, so they become fully reliant on the centralized state power.

Primary groups and military effectiveness

Theoretically, social cohesion and group behavior under stress should not be a problem for the communist armed forces as they already experience oppression. Indeed, Janowitz explains that one of the main factor for social cohesion is the nature of the military threat. Marx explains that the development of the proletariat in Europe has been violently suppressed. So whatever military institution that will emerge from the revolution, the new soldiers should already have a sense of brotherhood and of common experience under foreign attack, as they all come from the class.

[128] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.56

An idea specific to Lenin is the concept of vanguardism: he does not believe that the proletariat is educated enough to assume power directly and manage a socialist society. Therefore, the workers' party – the vanguard of the proletariat – should teach Marxism to the masses, educate them on socialist economy, and simply on how to live their life without the bourgeoisie. This primary group would also be responsible for organizing the violence against the bourgeoisie.[129]

Techniques or Organizational Control

For Marx, the executive power, the government, is nothing more than a committee for managing the bourgeoisie's affairs.[130] Marx and Lenin consider the military as one of their mean of production for the state, protecting the businesses. One of the first step of the communist revolution is to establish the supremacy of the proletariat through a democratic constitution.[131] Therefore, he talks about having a group of elected deciding for the rest of the society, including the eventual military. The Commune, which was the most concrete example of a communist success story according to Marx, was formed of councilors, elected by universal suffrage. They were either working men or "acknowledged representatives of the working class".[132] This is rather ambiguous as acknowledged elected representatives are the very definition of parliamentarians. So even if he called for the suppression of all bourgeoisie's tools, including the parliament, he realizes that universal suffrage remains the only realistic democratic option. His idea of the Commune was a working, executive and legislative institution at the same time, so the armed forces would not have much to discuss in intern as all the orders would be given by this centralized power. Lenin does not read this the same way, he rather adopts Engels view's on universal suffrage, presenting it as an instrument of bourgeois role. He explains that in the present-day state, the working class is not matured enough – because uneducated – to vote for what they really believe in, and therefore any elections are rigged by the bourgeoisie giving the illusion of democracy.[133] He never mentions again after that universal suffrage, leaving the concept of elections in his views relatively blurry for anyone reading him. So Lenin heavily insisted on the need of the

[129] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. Chapter II
[130] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.15
[131] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Question 16 of the Communist Confession of Faith
[132] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.60
[133] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. Chapter I

proletariat state – the proletariat organized as the ruling class – to wither away. But as long as the working people were not ready for it, he saw the extreme importance in the role of the state. He sees the state as the centralized organization of force and violence, vital to lead the masses in a socialist economy, to organize and teach them. For him, the political rule of the proletariat had to be backed by the armed force of the people. So he saw as well that an armed force, dispatched from the centralized power, could work as well. Lenin quotes few lines from Marx that are crucial to this thesis' understanding of centralized power:

"This executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, with its vast and ingenious state machinery, with a host of officials numbering half a million, besides an army of another half million, this appalling parasitic body…. sprang up in the days of the absolute monarchy, with the decay of the feudal system, which it helped to hasten" [134]

Marx, taking here lessons from the 1848-51 revolution, explained there why these two state's tools should be totally abolished. Lenin even called these two organs as parasite, designating them as the internal antagonism of the society. But Lenin's most important point from Marx comes from within "struggle against the revolution, the parliamentary republic found itself compelled to strengthen, along with repressive measures, the resources and centralization of the governmental power. All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it."[135] Lenin saw these two sentences as the fundamental point of Marxism regarding the state and as the chief difference between Marxism and other socialist factions. The math behind- is simple, the state will increase its counter-revolutionary measures, inflicting more causalities to the proletariat, which in turn has to focus all of its force on destroying the standing army. Everything comes back to the simple point that the state, with its two most advanced institutions – the bureaucracy and the standing army - should be totally destroyed. It is clear than Lenin was supportive of democratic tools for the proletariat during the transition period (the proletariat state) and supportive of a dictatorship against the bourgeoisie. In his analyze of the Commune, he explains that they replaced the state machines with much more democratic institutions: the parliament became a group of

[134] Marx, K. (1852). *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. 1st ed. New York and Moscow: Marxists.org, p.98.
[135] Ibid

officials to be elected and subject to recall at any moment; the standing army was abolished and a "National Guard" was created, where each soldiers had an extremely short period of duty. Lenin devoted a full chapter to the relation of the parliament and the army. He saw the parliament, in a monarchies or democratic republics, as a tool to fool society, to give them the illusion of choice. So he thought exactly the same as Marx regarding the parliament as the leader of the society, which therefore should not be recreated in the new state. He summed up his view on parliamentarians as a "division of labor between the legislative and the executive, as a privileged position for the deputies".[136] While against parliament, he is clear on the fact that any democracy should have representative institutions, like the elections held in the Paris Commune. His last paragraph on the parliament's chapter appeared as a pure contradiction to everything he preached beforehand:

"To organize the whole economy on the lines of the postal service so that the technicians, foremen and accountants, as well as all officials, shall receive salaries no higher than a "workman's wage", all under the control and leadership of the armed proletariat" [137]

In other words, the armed forces will control the population and will be the executive body of the society, acting like the parliament.

Role conflict:

Marx and Engels stated few times that the bourgeoisie was cutting to the working class all their connections with their families, but at the same time they were openly stating that they would not bridge that gap neither. Within the first lines of the second chapter of manifesto, where describing the difference between communists and other working-class parties, they insisted on the common interests of the entire proletariat, independent of all nationalities. As previously stated, for Lenin, Marx and Engels, there is no such thing as prestige for armed forces or military's careers, they should be mere worker like any other working category. In that sense, the division between the military and the military is nonexistent, they are the same in theory. But all these authors praised the Commune and its National Guard: they were indeed the working people, anyone physically able to carry a

[136] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. Chapter III
[137] Ibid

weapon, paid 30 cents a day, that will even be described as militaries of career by the French historian Pierre Mizla.[138]

Indoctrination:

Religion and education are probably the two most discussed elements within Marx's papers and the ideological pressure on children directly from the Manifesto can be predicted. Indeed, he presented education as a tool that "will enable young people {…} to the needs of society or their own inclinations".[139] This "or" in the middle of the sentence paved a dangerous path to the future communist leaders, clearly justifying a totalitarian state where the citizens are pure subjects to the executive. These different pages of explanations on education explained how pure indoctrination should look like with children at an early age learning a professional code of behavior and the political objectives of the society with the description of its enemy. A precise description of the enemy and the nature of the military objectives were explicitly given by Lenin: in his six chapters, he used the word *violent* or *violence* not less than 25 times, *crush* or *crushing* 16 times and the word *suppression* a flagrant 40 times, including 13 times on a single page. Lenin directly mentioned the need for indoctrinating the masses and therefore of the future armed forces by the "necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with this and precisely this view of violent revolution lies at the root of the entire theory of Marx and Engels".[140] It appears clear here that he openly views indoctrination as the only way to "educate" the masses, he even mentions the notion of propaganda in the next sentence. Everything leads to believe that they will adopt the concept of centrifugal ideologization already discussed through Malsevic's work.[141]

Targets:

Marx and Engels spend several pages to criticize the various forms of socialists, the reactionary socialists, the conservative socialists, the critical-utopian socialists and finally the democratic socialists. But contrarily to Khomeinism, they do not call to attack these communist rebels directly as they are deemed necessary for succeeding the revolution with the exception of reactionary socialists that will directly pair-up with the bourgeoisie and

[138] Mizla, P. (2010). *La Commune de Paris (1871) | 2000 ans d'histoire | France Inter*. [online] YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebz48JQh2no
[139] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.51
[140] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. Chapter III, last paragraph
[141] Malešević, *Nationalism, war and social cohesion*

should therefore be violently suppressed. So "rebels" are not the first category of target that would come to mind contrarily. The entire fourth chapter of the Manifesto deals directly with how the communists will deal with the other socialist parties. And this is where the whole confusion regarding the degree of violence preached by Marx starts. Indeed, in this page long chapter, he explains that communists from all countries should unite with any revolutionary movement aiming at challenging the existing order. The communists should therefore fight along other groups to secure the revolution as promptly as possible but they bear in mind the future interests of the movement. They can fight along the bourgeoisie as it was the case in Germany against the monarchy, along the radical bourgeois in Switzerland and along the Social-Democrats in France against the very same radical bourgeoisie they were fighting alongside in the neighboring country. In other words, Marx was an adept of the oldest and most realistic rule in international politics, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. As he simply put it when concluding the manifesto, communists "support every revolutionary movement against the existing and social and political order of things".[142] This a core problem of the manifesto, an antagonistic dyad regarding the splinter factions. On one side, he explains he wants to destroy them all because the communists have one belief and one only, that cannot be change. On the other hand, he is openly welcoming the idea of partnership with all kind of factions and even with the enemy, the bourgeoisie. This very unclear decisions on who's an ally and who's an enemy leaves a vacuum that can be dramatically bloody depending of the interpretation the next communist leader might have. The only explanation that can be found for this vacuum is in his final paragraph of the *Confession of Faith*, where he explains that the proletariat should help the bourgeoisie as a whole to gain power, as they are themselves controlled by the elites, in order to have one clear enemy to overthrow after.[143]

Lenin mentioned the other socialist's factions he faced during the Russian revolution after the first page of his work with a clear bitterness towards them. In his view, the so called socialists faction (Social-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks) were just part of the petty-bourgeoisie and in no case socialist. This could be argued that but the point is here to show that he throws these splinter factions directly into the enemy camp contrarily to Marx. He further elaborates the Bolsheviks affiliation to the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries,

[142] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. p.34
[143] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. p.53-54

comparing their common alliance as an unwanted honeymoon but they promptly joined the bourgeoisie.[144] It is in the concept of withering away that Lenin explains why Social Democrats, Mensheviks, Anarchists and every other 'false socialist' cannot follow the revolution, as they do not understand the concept of it. The first ones do not want a violent destruction of the present-day state – necessary for the supremacy of the proletariat, as the first stage of the revolution for Lenin – and the second ones want to destroy the state for the sole sake of it, without understanding the second phase of the revolution – the proletarian state withering away. Lenin even ended up calling the Social Democrats as traitor to socialism, directly throwing them in the same bucket as the bourgeoisie.

Lenin saw the proletariat and the peasants, at least the poor ones, as the sole groups entitled to be called "the people" and thus those being oppressed by the "bureaucratic-military state machine". An alliance between these two groups was possible but not a single more, which sharply differs with Marx and his view on various socialist groups. According to Lenin, one of the reason that the Commune was defeated was because they did not suppress the bourgeoisie violently enough. It is interesting that Marx and Lenin praised so much the Commune of Paris when it was a sheer example of alliance between various socialist factions, having their own internal disagreement, but still managed to pull out a (temporarily) common political agenda.[145] While Marx eventually argues for a similar approach, Lenin remains opposed to any alliance with other factions as he lived this situation directly in 1917.

Fanonian

This chapter is probably the trickiest one. Frantz Fanon appeared on the international scene at the All-African Peoples' Conference (AAPC) when he gave his first public speech at the podium as a FLN member. The AAPC took place in 1958 when only 8 African countries aside South Africa were independent, Fanon was still a unknown figure back then even in Africa. His first words gave the tone of his speech and his political thought "If Africa

[144] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. Chapter III
[145] Mizla, *La Commune de Paris*

is to be free, we cannot beg. We must tear away by force".[146] This sentence sums up his most-known chapter that will be published 3 years later "On Violence" in The Wretched of the Earth. Then came the Black Power Movement in the United-States, three years after his death. Bobby Seal, co-fouder of the Black Panther Party quoted him as their main influencer "everything that Fanon said about violence and the spontaneity of violence, how spontaneous violence educates those who are in a position with skills to lead the people to what needs to be done."[147] Another pioneer of the Black Panther Party, Eldridge Cleaver, described Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth as "the Bible" among the militants of the black liberation movement in America.[148]

For Westerners, he will either remain an absolute foreigner never heard about, either an evil advocate of violence against white people.[149] This dichotomy is best explained by Marie-Jeanne Manuellan, who was the personal assistant of Frantz Fanon at their psychatrhic hospital in Tunis during the late 50s, typing two of his books, including the last one published right before his death. She explains that Fanon is now considered a master in post-colonial studies by American universities, but he cannot be in France or Europe as they were the first targets of his works.[150] Other critics point out that Fanon did not mention the possibility of non-violence movements like Gandhi did it.[151] While his influenced has been described as pioneer for national insurgencies, it is quite hard to find a direct link between Fanon and a revolutionary group as Fanonian is not an ideology per se. The Palestinians, Tamils[152],

[146] Zeilig, L. (2016). *Revisiting Frantz Fanon: memories and moments of a militant philosopher*. [online] The Conversation. Available at: https://theconversation.com/revisiting-frantz-fanon-memories-and-moments-of-a-militant-philosopher-59914
[147] Seale, B. (1970). *Seize the time*. 1st ed. London: Arrow, pp.18-23.
[148] Cleaver, E. and Scheer, R. (1969). *Eldridge Cleaver*. New York: Random House, p.18.
[149] Shatz, A. (2001). *The Doctor Prescribed Violence*. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/02/books/the-doctor-prescribed-violence.html
[150] Aubenas, F. (2017). *Dans l'ombre de Frantz Fanon, penseur majeur du postcolonialisme*. [online] Le Monde.fr. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2017/09/12/dans-l-ombre-de-frantz-fanon_5184215_3246.html
[151] Sonnleitner, M. (1987). *Of Logic and Liberation*. Journal of Black Studies, 17(3), pp.287-304.
[152] Vaitheespara, R. (2012). *The Limits of Derivative Nationalism: Marxism, Postcolonial Theory, and the Question of Tamil Nationalism.* Rethinking Marxism, 24(1), pp.87-105.
The author does not establish a direct connection proving Tamils were influenced by Fanon but he points out Fanon's understanding of colonialism as a separatist and regionalist action. For destroying it, the natives - Tamils in this case - should therefore retake control of their lands and ask secession through a nationalistic discourse even if it is not directly Fanon's universal ideal

Tibetans, Kurds[153], Afro-Americans, Algerians, South-Africans[154] still find echo and inspiration in Fanon's work. I also found insurgency movements having shown support for Fanon's ideals, such as the Irish Republican Army[155] [156], the Zapatistas revolutionaries[157] [158] and various Spanish-written websites supporting the Zapatistas or even the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco, a Mapuche organization in Chile.[159] In the last decades, Fanon's works have also vastly influence South America and its wave of revolutions from US-backed dictators and most of decolonization insurgencies in Africa. Unfortunately for us, most of these insurgencies happened before 1970, date for which the GTD starts, and even those where connection has been established, the dataset is clearly not complete. For instance, the National Resistance Army in Uganda was known for indoctrinating all his recruits with Fanon's papers and the Ugandan Bush Wars lasted from 1980 to 1986, costing an unknown number of lives, between 100,000 and 500,000. Yet, the GTD only registered 4 attacks from the NRA.

Fanon wanted his idea of new mankind to be universal, without and particularism related to the Algerian case or even the African decolonization.[160] As explained above, this ideology apparently became so given the number of continents it crossed. The universality of Fanon for the entire Third World that so many academics sought to connect also had its opponents: Marie Perinbam in her descriptive book of Fanon's revolutionary ideology, argues that his political thought was only possible in Algeria given the context at that time, but she also admitted that some other former colonies had to use violence for acquiring their

[153] Casier, M. and Jongerden, J. (2012*). Understanding today's Kurdish movement: Leftist heritage, martyrdom, democracy and gender*. European Journal of Turkish Studies, [online] (14). Available at: https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/4656#
[154] Ahluwalia, P. and Zegeye, A. (2001*). Frantz Fanon and Steve Biko: Towards Liberation*. Social Identities, 7(3), pp.455-469.
[155] Alexander, J. (2017). *The Drama of Social Life*. 1st ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p.122.
[156] Rodriguez Via, O. *La licitud de la violencia en un acto revolucionario en el contexto de un movimiento de liberación nacional. La teoría de Frantz Fanon y el cine de Gillo Pontecorvo*. Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[157] Egan, D. (2006). *Rethinking the Zapatistas: Frantz Fanon and Resistance to Neoliberalism*. Humanity & Society, 30(1), pp.67-83.
[158] Casier and Jongerden, *Understanding today's Kurdish movement*
[159] Palacios, S. and Carrasco, L. (2017). *Terrorismo etnonacionalista en América del Sur*. [online] Msiainforma.org. Available at: https://msiainforma.org/es/terrorismo-etnonacionalista-en-america-del-sur/
[160] Cherki, A. (2016). *Fanon au temps présent. L'assignation au regard*. Politique africaine, 143(3), p.145.

freedom, but it shouldn't be held as a universal truth for all colonial situations.[161] The core idea of Frantz Fanon is simple and stated within the first page of his masterwork, when he presented decolonization as "the replacement of a "spicy" of men by another "spicy" of men. Without transition, there is total substitution, complete, absolute"[162]. This lack of transition is stating the difference between Fanon's socialist revolution and the classic Marxist-Leninist idea with the transition to the rule of the proletariat. This idea of creating a new kind of men is spread throughout the entirety of his various books. His thoughts are summarized in that the current black man is a product of colonizers, they made them, so the colonized drains his whole existence on the colonial system. [163] [164] He openly praises a socialist society[165] but not a communist state, which is likely why he openly supported Castro and the Che. Marx and Fanon both said that the proletariat is the core of the oppressed, but the twist is that in European countries like Marx explored, they have nothing to lose in a revolution and everything to win, but Fanon explained that in a colonized country, they have everything to lose. The dyad of Khomeini and Marx regarding an oppressed and oppressor is present at the very core of Fanon's work as well with the two antagonists present throughout his books, the colonizer and the colonized.

Decolonization is still a revolutionary ideology, as a matter of fact in the first page of his book, Fanon states "the proof of the success lies in a social panorama changed from scratch"[166], this social change is the fundamental nature of any revolution. He sees himself as a Marxist with a twist: while Marx was talking about the ruling class as those owning the factories, properties and banks, for Fanon the ruling class is simply the foreigner, "the other". On the other hand, while - like many revolutionaries - he holds in great esteem the 1789 Revolution, he believes that 95% of revolutions happening in under-developed countries do not bring any radical change. In the 20th century, it was mainly due to the fact that the Soviet Union and the United-States were fighting over every single struggle across the globe, so

[161] Williams-Myers, A. (2008). *Review of Holy Violence, the Revolutionary Thought of Frantz Fanon: an intellectual biography by B. Marie Perinbam Washington,*. [online] Cambridge.org. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/holy-violence-the-revolutionary-thought-of-frantz-fanon-an-intellectual-biography-by-b-marie-perinbam-washington-dc-three-continents-press-1982-pp-182-2200-1000-paperback/
[162] Fanon, F. (1961). *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.39, 4th ed. Paris: La Découverte.
[163] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.40
[164] Fanon, F. (1952). *Peau noire, masques blancs*. p.139-201, 1st ed. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
[165] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.97
[166] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.39

any revolution would naturally end up to the competition between capitalism or communism.[167] Fanon was clearly much closer to Soviet ideals than American ones and criticized the late a few times explicitly while also refusing to get treatment in the United-States when he was dying. This idea of lack of choice between the two ideologies was quoted by Shariati in his pioneering work for political Islam as a third option. Enforcing his support for socialism, Fanon encouraged national revolutions across Africa as they would be backed by socialist countries and will therefore have a chance of succeeding in this context of cold war. Fanon wrote half a decade ago that private companies and financial markets of major European cities expect their government to protect their "legitimate interests" abroad, not to mass murder populations. Today, the ideas of protecting national interests abroad is still on the motto of most secret services reminding us why Fanonian is not going to disappear anytime soon in developing countries.

Hierarchy and Authority

Regarding the role of the leader, he proves once again his principal Marxist views: he believes a leader is dangerous for the people. Indeed, he is likely to be captured by the colonial power, then the masses will ask for his liberation by losing sight of the "real struggle". So the colonial power will likely free these leaders by passing a compromise with them.[168] He explains more in detail the problem behind the leader in his first chapter. While he is necessary for the revolution, once the independence acquired, the leader will only prevent the people to consolidate the real objectives behind the revolution. He will refuse to go after the bourgeoisie by making the masses look away with ceremonies and memories of the national struggle and the success achieved so far. Fanon perceived the political party that led the revolution as a "syndicate of personal interests" once in power.[169] After various hints giving away his despise for leadership, Fanon finally explores the idea of a country without leadership, without hierarchy and without a party that would lead the masses.[170] The political party should be in the hands of the people and not vice-versa. In this sense, Fanon follows much more a Marxist than a Leninist view. Indirect criticism towards Lenin keep flowing in

[167] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.73
[168] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.71
[169] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.163
[170] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.174-177

these pages, with a prominent attack on Lenin's vanguard idea: "To arrive at this conception of the party, we should first get rid of this really western and bourgeois idea that masses are incapable of leading"[171]. The ideal political party should also be decentralized, like the economy, to displace the executive powers outside of the capital. When talking about the colonized academics, Fanon rejects the ideas of disciplines, specialties and skill structure. All of them are western tools meant to divide people and they are against any popular revolution.[172]

Linked to the civil status and directly pending on the skill structure, Fanon goes in length about the role of hierarchy in the future national army at the end of his third chapter. For him the army is necessary in order to serve as a political school, not as a war one. Soldiers should always plead allegiance and follow the country's orders and not any kind of officer. Drafting should be mandatory but not necessarily in the army, it could be in the civil service as well. Everyone should be able to join the fighting army when they want in order to "defend the national and social acquisitions". For doing so, Fanon recommends to follow a Marxist view of the army: the multiplication of militias across the country with the strict minimum number of career officers and a high rate of turnover. The idea is to prevent the army to go corporate or bureaucratic and therefore prevent it to take political decisions by itself.

Military discipline:

The violence needed to achieve the political objective according to Fanon is resumed in his first chapter, where it can be read that the activist, the rebel, is "one that work […] To work is to work at the death of the colon"[173]. Later he gives a glance of what he expects from the colonized "life can only arise from the colon's decaying corpse"[174]. Fanon also described in detail the situation in Algeria and put an emphasis on the insurgencies movements calling requiring a certain level of violence from its members. They require them to already have crossed the point of non-return so that they cannot be corrupted by the ruling class anymore and therefore make sure that they are being chased as well by the security forces. This might mean killing someone individually or collectively beating a soldier to death.[175] While Fanon

[171] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.179
[172] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.52
[173] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.83
[174] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.89
[175] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.82-83

does not praise such practice, he does not condemn them neither, which gives us a glimpse on those who might be fall into becoming rivals later on: all those who are not actively searched by the colonial police. It also and most importantly gives us a good signal regarding the level of military disciplined and internal rules required by later national insurgency movements.

Another point regarding the military discipline is the unfolding of the revolution according Fanon, who gave precise instructions. First, rebels should not take prisoners, the violence wanted for the colons should be clear and therefore only killings allowed. Then the leaders will make the masses realize that many soldiers in the colonial army are not volunteers and despise the situation as well. From there, taking prisoners of war transform the rebels into a proper army respecting international laws and it will greatly benefit later for a potential prisoners' swap. Another important point on the military discipline and echoing directly the targets that will be discussed later is the need to suppress caids and custom leaders. Fanon went to war with tribalism, everything that backs from pre-revolution should be erased in order to properly create a "New Man". And there is no mention of propaganda or structural violence in order to suppress them, purely killing.

Assimilation of Military Roles

Regarding the tactics, Fanon quickly mentions the necessity of guerilla warfare against the colons, based on the Spanish rebellion against the French army in 1810, which was far better equipped and trained or by using the American revolution strategies. He wants to swipe out the idea that material, weapons, is a prime factor for successful revolutions. But while praising for a guerilla warfare, he also made it clear that the revolutionary objectives should be precise to avoid the revolution to turn into a jacquerie. Regarding the recruitment, Fanon did not give away enough hints for this chapter but also adopted the idea that the masses should be indoctrinated in order to re-create themselves, to become this "New Man" and put behind this mind of colonized that the Europeans forced upon them. So clearly, joining the revolutionary forces should first and foremost be an intellectual work, solely based on ideology and not money.

Social cohesion:

The whole chapter "On national culture" stresses the importance of consolidating power through the creation of a "New Man". The decolonization will "unify this world" based on racial politics, it is being asked that the colonized become the colons, nothing less.[176] Most importantly, he points out the importance of being collective in the revolution. The decolonization is everyone's business as everyone will be the target of the Europeans soldiers and all will be killed. Fanon used there a strong statement regarding the philosophy of everyone minding their own business: "The "every man for himself", this atheist form of salvation, is, in this context, prohibited.".[177] While this idea is quite present in all revolutions, it is the first time that I see the interdiction of not fighting after Marx. Later in the book he explains what everyone can do if they cannot fight: feed the fighters, spy, help families in need, take the position of the husband killed. This idea of devoting time and supplies to the collective group is not only theoretical, it is not the point of this paper to make an exhaustive list of current groups practicing such methods, but the reader can think to a couple of well-known states or non-state actors practicing such methods of social cohesion in the Middle East. This chapter also remind the "ideology" per se of the revolution: pure primal nationalism. Bringing back national culture will only be a natural outcome of the rebirth of the nation in the first place.[178] While Marx praised the working class as the main force behind every country that should lead the revolution, Fanon points out that in Africa they are among the most privileged factions of the population by the regime. They "eat as they please, watching standing still" in front of the peasants' situation. This sentence sounds like an indirect threat to the working class if they stay attached to the regime without taking part of the struggle.

[176] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.48
[177] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.50
[178] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.232

Techniques of organizational control:

Communication and Control Channels:

He points out that traditionally in Northern Africa, conflicts occurring in a town were publicly discussed and a decision was taken collectively, without any kind of hierarchy. He is basically calling for a return of local justice and totally forget the institutions set up by the colonial powers. When it came to communication and control channel, Khomeini opted for an informal and quick communication between the top and the bottom. It drastically contrasts with Fanon understanding of it for who both way communications should be rigid and well respected, not by formal nor through bureaucratic obligation but because the respect of this mutual communication is the only way for salvation.[179]

Indoctrination:

The first chapter of Fanon's book, "On violence" give us a clear glimpse to the degree of violence required to succeed in the revolution. Throughout the entirety of the book, the violence of his words might come as shocking, for instance when he describes that what is good "is simply what hurts them [the colons]" or regarding the colon, who "never ceases to be the enemy, the antagonist, very precisely the man to kill."[180] The other tool for such violence are the academics, who are either white and impose the myths of white superiority through their books and classes, or local academics, forced by the Europeans to teach in such manner, or agreed to do so for money. Regarding propaganda, Fanon sees it as the main factor able to take down imperialist/capitalist powers. It is the only way to create guerrilla movements within the developed nations and therefore the main threat to colonial powers. Aside the guerrilla warfare necessary in the colonized countries and within the western world, according Fanon the dependence of the West on African resources will lead to industries closures and unemployment once the decolonization will occur. This social crisis in Europe will automatically lead to a fight from the proletariat against the capitalist regime. This sentence is obviously taken straight out of Marx's books and Fanon keeps the idea of "spreading the revolution".[181] On the other hand, he is clearly against the cold war and does not support the Soviet Union neither. Against all kind of war, he believes the faith of the world depends on their attitude towards their investments in Africa.

[179] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.187
[180] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.52
[181] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.102

Unsurprisingly, Fanon retakes the idea of Marx on religion "through fatalism, every initiative is taken away, the source of the problems, of misery, of destiny going back to God".[182] The author of this text faced precisely this situation in the West Bank where he met many citizens who did not want to take part in any political action because they believe it is God's destiny, and many Palestinians would argue with them on that, quoting precisely this sentence of Fanon. Later in the book, he described religion as tribal myths preventing any revolution, rebels should get rid of this "imaginary" and work in the "real" world. He even uses djinns (the symbols of evil in Islam) to explain what people should overcome. As explained earlier, Khomeini used djinns as well a couple of times in his book so that people keep believing in them and revolt against them. Fanon uses them to share his exasperation of religion. One might then wonder if Muslim African nations were less enthusiastic about Fanon or if national revolutions occurred less in Muslim nations than Christian ones on the continent. Another important view on violence for Fanon can be found in this sentence: "Political art transforms itself into military art. The political activist, it's the fighter. To do war and to do politics is the same thing"[183]. Fanon proved us here again that everything in the fight must be pointed towards radically changing the system (which is the point of every revolution, but there is a clear emphasis about it in this ideology). This sentence will obviously remind all International Relations academics of Clausewitz most famous quote on war, which "is nothing but a continuation of politics".

As explained earlier, Fanon criticized Lenin's idea of vanguard and despised this concept that the masses should be educated. Yet on this third chapter, he said it is impossible to educate/indoctrinate the masses without a doctrine. The only broad constantly re-used ideology was the national union against colonialism. He believed that the first and most important role of leaders is to make sure that those joining the revolutionary group fully understand the task ahead and that an intellectual indoctrination is necessary.[184]

[182] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.56
[183] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.128
[184] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.189

On splinter factions:

Like Marx and Lenin, Fanon sees the national political parties as the main problem against the ruling class. The enemy is the colon, but the first counter-revolutionaries will be these parties that do not seek violence, rather they are urban parties that simply seek to improve their living conditions. Negotiations between the colons and these parties might occur and will most likely be encouraged by the colonial powers.

On rural areas, Fanon sees these masses as "the least conscious, the least organized and the most anarchists" in industrialized countries, which show a certain greed and sympathy for violent action. So "Occidentalized" elements in developing countries tend to disregard and not consider the rural masses for the upcoming revolution as history showed that they are often a break to it. On the other side, the rural masses see the "city boys" as traitors to the nation and affiliate them with the colonizer. This idea of despise is largely explain in Fanon's book *Black skins, White masks*. From this mutual hatred, the colonizer uses the rural masses to discredit the current revolutionaries: the educated nationalist parties. Here Fanon does not explain what should be done, he merely points out historical facts on this already-seen processes. This uneducated rural masses have a name in Marxism ideology: the lumpenproletariat. Marx and Lenin agree on the importance to educated them otherwise they will turn against the revolutionary group. Fanon agrees and popularized the term a century after its first use, explaining in depth the risks coming from "uneducated" class. They will be used by the oppressor for counter-revolutionary activities if not put in check by the revolutionary group.[185] For Denning, Marx used the term lumpenproletariat broadly to talk about the white poor people living in the slums, having two connotations: they are a useless to society and they usually ally with the forces of order as they are easily manipulated[186] (promises of better living conditions). This is where Fanon stands in sharp contrast with the usual Marxist view. He used the term lumpeproletariat to describe the rural masses who moved in the coasts of the cities, in the shanty towns and slums. This is where the masses will discover the colonial oppression and can represent the principal ally for the revolutionary movement. Fanon agreed that they can be the worst enemies of the revolution (like in Angola, Algeria or Congo)[187] if they are not educated and well-integrated but they

[185] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.132
[186] Denning, M. (2010). *Wageless Life.* New Left review, 66, pp.79-97.
[187] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.132

can also play the critical role for the successful revolution as they are those who will fight in the first line. This is how he described these rural masses precisely:

"The lumpenproletariat, this cohort of starving men, divorced from tribe and clan, constitute one of the most spontaneous and radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people…. These jobless, these species of subhuman, redeem themselves in their own eyes before history… Like a horde of rats, despite the kicks and punches, keep gnawing the roots of the tree." [188]

The rural areas live with tribal traditions and do not want to merge with a common national agenda, which is why the only option left is the federalism of all these tribal areas. It can clearly be read between the lines that Fanon was advising nationalist parties to use the frustration/violence of rural masses to fit their political agendas. He sees nationalist parties/educated youth as the main thrives of the revolution but they are unwilling to use violence to radically change the system, but the rural masses would and should. This lack of communication between the urban and rural populations is the principal reason on why a full revolution cannot happen according to Fanon.[189]

Fanon gives indirect advice for the unfolding of the revolution by explaining the "natural" logic of the revolution: either the colon chose one of the few political party who led the nationalist struggle which enjoy national sympathy to pass over the power and delays the negotiations in order to get rid of the extremist factions among this party. Or not a single revolutionary party is unanimously "elected" by the people and the colon will choose the most moderate party that will condemn the other political parties as illegitimates and will use violence or propaganda to discredit them. These suppressions of the parties will lead to ethnic/tribal protests movement in the rural areas against the new ruling party, proving that the revolutionary doctrine was just laying on ethnic feuds. This theory is the core of Kalyvas's work on civil wars and it also proves the theories of Fearon & Laitin and Kaufman when it comes to the use of symbolic discourses to create ethnic violence that is justify in a broader ideology (the revolutionary struggle). So the takeaway in this indirect advice from Fanon would be to speed up any kind of revolutionary struggle in order to prevent the new

[188] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.125-132
[189] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.115

party to negotiate with the colon. The "intellectuals" that the hero of the Algerian war praises so much are also among the first targets as they will be used to spread the revolutionary ideas across the country but then, once they will ask what exactly is the ideology behind the fight, what really is nationalism and how structural problems can be deal with. The political parties that used them in the first place will now categorize them as anarchists and chase them violently, as least that's how Fanon perceives it. Then comes the turn of the political parties to be isolated and targeted once the revolution reaches the cities. There is a constant inevitable rotation of splinter factions.[190] Even with this interaction of clashes among factions, Fanon also opposes Kalyvas' logic of violence by stating that yesterday's enemies are today's brothers for the national struggle. This view does not completely dismantle Kalyvas's theory, but on tactics, it seems clear that they fight alongside and not towards each other's. Another splinter faction that Fanon predicted will emerge during the decolonization are the "minorities" that will be supported by the West. Already in 1961 he was mentioning the discourses of Western leaders regarding the situation of Jews in the Soviet Union or Muslims under communist dictatorship while chasing after black minorities taking up arms in the United States. A discourse that has not changed for a bit in these five decades. This support for minorities was spread through radio mainly (Radio-Europe Libre) and is today through state sponsored press organisms (RT, PressTV, VOA…). In short, a proxy warfare by using minorities against the majority and making sure medias cover it.

Concluding his second chapter, Fanon explained (probably the only revolutionary paper that can be credited for its honesty) that the revolution cannot be summed up to the narrative of black versus white as many splinter factions will emerge and even the revolutionary themselves will try to seek financial benefits out of the movement. The difficulty of proper indoctrination is summarized in this sentence: "The colon is not the man to bring down anymore".[191] He insists on the importance of the leaders, of the clarity of the ideology and of the centralization/bureaucratization of the revolutionary group. He reminds that anarchists will be the main splinter faction that needs to be fight during the national struggle. Finally, his last sentences of the chapter really highlight the importance of the need

[190] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.124
[191] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.139

for a vanguard movement: “Only violence carried out by the people, violence organized and led by the leadership, allows the masses to unlock the social reality, to give him the key”.[192]

Targets:

The principal targets aside that armed forces remain, like all Marxists related-ideologies, the bourgeoisie. It does not matter which form, the classic, the petty, the stupid or fancy bourgeoisie, all of them look away during the revolution. Once the national struggle achieved, the bourgeoisie takes a mask of neo-colonialist by serving as intermediate while the peasants keep producing and exporting basic agricultural products without added-value. This role of intermediate, Fanon spent few pages talking about it and pointless they are, comparing them several times the bourgeoisie to the colons in this regard. He also explained that they are not a threat at the beginning of the revolutionary war as they emerge almost naturally out of the economic circumstances in the aftermath of the independence. Throughout this third chapter, Fanon replays the repetitive outcome of national revolutions: the bourgeoisie takes the place of the colon and use the armed forces by corrupting them to maintain their economic agenda in motion. Basically nothing changes except if they cease to exist. But he precisely wrote that they should not be fought as they are not worth any effort and they will cease to exist with their own contradictions.[193] This paragraph almost raises the question of why not kill them before, as they will take advantage of the masses and fall anyway, so there is a clear defined target for potential Fanon followers. Exactly like armed forces that are repetitively described as the main tool of the oppressors. His solution, he keeps repeating it: stop the road of the “bourgeoisie” and let the intellectuals develop the political ideas for the nation. On the economic agenda, his solution is concrete as well: nationalize the tertiary sector of the economy which allows to “organize democratically cooperatives of buy and sell. So he wanted to decentralize these cooperatives by involving the masses to the management of public affairs. The idea of decentralizing the economy throughout the entirety of the nation is repeated here like discussed in the first chapter. On the political aspect, it is the necessary to get rid of the unique political party that chase the opposition by labeling them criminals.

[192] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.141
[193] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.169

Targets and rival factions are easily guessable by any reader of Fanon's work. His first chapter, *On Violence*, also calls for sheer violence towards them (security forces mostly). Yet, Frantz Fanon was a psychiatric that healed both sides during the Algerian war of liberation, his last chapter is dedicated to stories of both side fighters that het encountered during his time as a doctor. He healed French soldiers that practiced torture on Algerians, which goes against everything he stood up throughout his book. Later in the chapter, he also mentioned that the goal is to not praise fighters and that he admires those despising death and killing, making any reader confused about his true guidelines when it comes to what should be done. By finishing his book, one could think he justified violence but without crossing the point of non-return, killing.[194] For all the revolutionaries who only read his first chapter, *On Violence*, this idea will clearly be forgotten, like it has been the case for the Cuban Revolution as Castro and Guevara praised this chapter and even invited Fanon on the island, but they seemed to not have finished his book with retrospective. The similarity with Palestinians has been mentioned and why they feel so attached to Fanon's work. An example could be given during this chapter with techniques of brainwashing that Fanon's patients faced: one of them is to take the argument of the revolution one by one and deconstruct them. Forcing intellectuals to say that Algeria is not a nation and has never been one, that the Algerian people never existed, that Algerian patriotism is non-sense and that resistant are criminals, these are examples of the deconstruction mentioned by Fanon. Palestinians I encountered feel like this technique is widely used against them, so it makes sense why they still carefully read and use Fanon's work for their national ambitions. Throughout *Black Skin White Masks*, Fanon showed that the colonized look upon the colons with envy and reminds everyone of that in *The Wretched of the Earth*. The colonized constantly want to get something out of the colons, to possess the same goods, the same wealth and very often, to have a romantic relationship with a "white" in order to *feel* "white". The whole idea of Fanon is to demystify these stereotypes, restore the prestige of blackness and create a whole "New Man" in order to properly consolidate power after the revolution. To create this new man is to make sure that no colonized would turn to the Europeans given the decades of brainwashing. In order to do so, physical violence is not the main goal of the revolution, reviving black pride is. As he eloquently wrote it, the "mobilization of the masses during the national liberation introduces the common destiny through the common history.[195]

[194] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.285
[195] Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, p.90

Sonnleitner argues that Fanon justify the use of terrorism specifically in order to achieve 3 objectives: (1) promoting individual self-respect, (2) realizing political independence and (3) creating a new humanity.[196]

For the first objective, which I already mention as Fanon started developing this theory in his first masterpiece "Black Skins, White Masks", Sonnleitner explains that Fanon only sees two ways for the black people to get rid of their own slavery towards colons: the native could involve either violence or nonviolence but only violence can "destroy myths and gain control of the land". This violence is clearly targeted towards civilians, towards the colon in general as they are those maintaining the narrative of immortality over the natives.

For the second objective, he points out the necessity for Fanon to have leaders defining the targets and the number of attacks to carry out. While on an individual basis, violence can relief the natives, he will not help to grow the political agenda as the he saw the oppressed can instantly become the oppressor as well. An argument also found on Shatz's analysis of Fanonian.[197] So this objective is the most classic one when it comes to revolutionary ideals, it is about overthrowing the capitalist/colonial regime by using terrorism probably towards security targets and governments agencies.

The last objective, the creation of a new humankind that concludes Fanon's book, aims at building a national identity which cannot be done by the mere use of sheer violence. For doing so, Fanon openly argues that the colon and colonized alike should work together to create this new world identity, center around the human being. This objective is mainly shown through the last chapter "On National Culture" and showcases the universality of Fanon's ideology largely discussed by academics and activists alike. Throughout the book, Fanon reminds the reader that this new mankind can only be achieved by total and unlimited violence, on the basis of ends justifying the means.

[196] Sonnleitner, *Of Logic and Liberation*
[197] Shatz, *The Doctor Prescribed Violence*

Summary and hypotheses

Table 1: Comparison of military establishment between the studied ideologies

Khomeinism	Marxism/Leninism	Fanonian
Strong and well-defined hierarchy through religious myths. The army can stay in its current western form.	Against any kind of hierarchy. Lenin developed the idea of vanguard that will serve a provisional leader. No officers allowed.	Only few officers allowed, the overall army should regularly rotate in order to leave room for new soldiers.
Recruitment based on ideology and greed, appealing for everyone.	Recruitment based on the simple fact of belonging to the working class, no ideological, fighting or financial incentives are necessary, making the recruitment probably really poor in quality. Mandatory draft for both authors.	Recruitment based on free will, everyone should participate to the nation political actions but not necessarily through the armed forces. A modern Marxist view basically.
Natural good social cohesion, principle of the ummah. Strict punishment also explained based on Muhammed's former rule.	Dictatorship of the working class, so good social cohesion for the insurgency group between themselves. Strict sense of discipline as well, punishment well-explained.	Very solid social cohesion, based on the sense of "brotherhood" between the oppressed. Whole chapter on National Culture dedicated to this section.
Clear ideology, mixed of religious and ethnic discourses, appealing to the masses. No clear military strategy.	Clear ideology for the 20th century, poorly explained in light of the 21st century for the groups adopting it. Clear military strategy but undoable.	Clear ideology on the New Man theory and clear military strategy with an attack in two phases: violence and prisoner swaps.

I will lay down three secondary hypotheses based on the ideological analyses and the level of bureaucracy they entail, establishing the likelihood targets in order of probable attacks. The first written targets should be the one accounting the larger number of received attacks.

According to Khomeinism and various Islamic scholars, the first targets are clearly rival armed Muslim factions. His various threats towards the West leads to assert that numerous clashes with foreign militaries will necesairely happen with any Khomeinist-affiliated group, making security forces the second targets. Finally, as explained by Badawi, Khomeini also justifies the killing of innocents in certain cases, if deemed necessary for the greater good. Civilians should therefore represent the third target of this ideology.

H1. Main targets for Khomeinist groups are rival factions, security forces and finally civilians

According to Marxism/Leninism, the targets are clear. The government is the the final objective to overthrow so any governmental assets is most likely going to be attacked by communist groups in the first place. The army and police were directly mentioned by both authors as a tool of oppression and should represent the second target of these groups. Finally, Marx and Lenin give broad definitions of socialist splinter factions, so any civilian who might seem to belong to them is a potential target. Same argument goes for the bourgeoisie who's the main described target aside the government by both authors. While Marx eventually explains his will to cooperate with all those mentioned at this very end of the Manifesto, Lenin rejects any potential alliance. All these groups took dozens of pages in both works and were much more discussed that the government or police. Added to the fact that they do not believe in hierarchy, adopt a poor form of recruitment and fully rely on the social cohesion of a single group to lead the rebellion, I will formulate the following hypothesis:

H2. Main targets for Marxist groups are civilians, government and finally security forces

Fanonian is the most well-formulated work as it specifically targets security forces in a context of decolonization. As previously mentioned, he repeatedly justifies the

killing of civilians as they are the colonizers in his chapter *On Violence*. Finally, Fanon also mentions infrastructure as a symbol of the oppressive state and something imposed towards the colonized. I therefore formulate the following hypothesis:

H3. Main targets for Fanonian groups are security forces, civilians and finally infrastructure

These theoretical hypotheses are only valid for a general observation as each group, although adopting of one these ideologies, will develop their own manifesto and organizational structure. Which is why I am going to quickly explore Ahmed's[198] results who was the first academic to answer a long-needed answer: who are the terrorists' targets? Does it change depending their ideology? She agrees that all individuals of a group are not led by ideology but that the group's actions are guided by a specific ideology, and the resources allow them, there is a pattern regarding the target selection. For answering these question, she used the Global Terrorism Database and systematically categorized all the groups in six categories: Left-Wing, Right-Wing, Religious, Environment, Nationalist-Separatist Religious and finally Nationalist-Separatist Left Wing. She used a maximum likelihood model referenced on the Nationalistic/Separatist group and presented the results in odd ratios. If the number is greater 1, it means that the coefficient between the variables is considered as positive. If below 1, then no conclusion can be made. Of course we are only interested in three of these categories:

1. Religious model: The first targets for religious groups happened to be Rival factions with a coefficient value of 8.97, second comes security forces with a value of 3.25 and finally civilian targets complete the podium with a value 1.18. Ahmed herself is surprised by the result, having hypothesis that religious groups will most likely attack civilians first. This model largely fits out predictions on Khomeini's who apparently follows the same trend as general Muslim groups. This thesis will check later if it still holds true with a group having properly adopted Khomeinism, Hezbollah.
2. Left-Wing model: The first targets are surprisingly Business targets with a coefficient value of 3.36. While this finding makes sense in regard with Communist's views on

[198] Ahmed, *Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection*

private businesses, I am still surprised to find it as the first target for left-wing groups who seemed to have applied Marxism to the core of their actions. It second position come Civilian with a 1.16 value. After that, not a single other target reaches the threshold value of 1. In other words, out analysis is far from the statistical reality when it comes to communist groups.

3. NS/LW model: It is the model that applies the most to Fanonian given his nationalistic aspirations based on Marxism. The first and foremost target for this kind of groups are the Security forces with a coefficient value of 5.86, followed by Business target with a 1.69 value and Infrastructure close the podium with a 1.66 coefficient value. Aside the Business targets taking the position of the civilians, this model relatively holds true with our analysis on Fanon's prescribed targets.

Bearing in mind Ahmed's results, I will now turn to the analysis the military establishment of the Hezbollah, the FARC and the PKK and analyze their targets by using the Global Terrorism Database.[199]

4. Case Studies

Hezbollah

Hezbollah was founded in 1982 in Southern Lebanon as an answer to Israeli's invasion. In 1998 and 1999, the group was only linked (ally) with the Palestinian Hamas. From 2000, it found an extra ally, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad for 3 years and was isolated again in 2003. The following year, they allied with the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigade and the Mahdi Army. In 2006, additionally to the three previous allies, they showed mutual public support with Asa'Ib Ahl Al-Haqq group and Islamic Court Union but cut ties with the latter in 2008. They started a rivalry with the Abdullah Azzam Brigades in 2009 while keeping the same allies, these relationships stayed still ever since.

[199] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, 2018

It remained a clandestine group until 1985 when it released its manifesto clearly religious and anti-imperialism guided.[200] It openly followed Khomeini's guidance, which is why I will compare their targets based on Khomeini's work and not their manifesto directly. From 1985 to 1990, Hezbollah was directly in conflict with its Shia rival faction, Amal according to an American Congressional report.[201] Unfortunately, the Global Terrorism Dataset does not seem to have gathered sufficient data to prove it as such early stage, but I found the lacking information in Robert A.Pape's work on the subject of suicide terrorism. There are no specific information for 1985 and 1986 but 4 rivals were indeed killed in 1988 and 1989[202] and 9 attacks killing 25 Amal fighters and officials in the last year of the civil war, 1990.[203] The Congress points out that this rivalry decreased all of a sudden as Hezbollah continued to attack Israel and its newly created ally, the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). I found these attacks in our data: 50 attacks killing 41 SLA fighters and officials from 1991 to 1995. Three years later in 1998, Hezbollah would find its first non-state ally, the Palestinian Hamas, followed by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 2000.[204] The following year, the head of the Islamic Jihad will cite Hezbollah's experience to make to justify their own use of suicide terrorism in Israel/Palestine.[205]

A shifting point for Hezbollah on the international scene was their abduction of 2 Israeli soldiers in 2006 and the invasion that followed days after, causing thousands of Lebanese casualties and leaving few hundreds Israeli civilians dead. It became apparent that Hezbollah, with the backing of Iran, was able to support a direct conflict with Israel. They gained a certain popularity in the country at that time, even finding two new allies: Asa'Ib Ahl Al-Haqq group and Islamic Court Union. Two years later, Hezbollah started clashing with rival groups: it cut ties with the ISU, clashed again with the SLA and with the Internal Security Forces (Lebanon's police). While not systematically deadly, the group carried out

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[200] Masters, J. and Laub, Z. (2014). *Hezbollah*. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hezbollah

[201] Addis, C. and Blanchard, C. (2011). *Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress*. [online] Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf

[202] Pape, R. (2003). *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. American Political Science Review, 97(03).

[203] Selected data from the GTD

[204] Asal, Victor H. and R. Karl Rethemeyer. (2015). *Big Allied and Dangerous Dataset Version 2*. Available for browsing at http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database

[205] Pape, *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*

in 2008 three attacks against the government, three against rivals and one against security forces. These various events led to a decrease in popularity of the group.

Hierarchy:

Hezbollah's leadership lies in the hand of a Consultative Council composed of 7 members according to the Congressional Report[206] and Stanford[207] CISAC or 12 members according Ranstorp in its 1997 book "Hezbollah in Lebanon".[208] This council is called Majlis al Shura (Shura Council) which is a popular designation for all judicial systems in the Arab world but its literal translation in Arabic is only used for 3 actors in the Middle East: Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran's Consultative Council. The leadership (Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah since 1993) answers directly to the Iranian Grand Ayatollah according Nizar Hamzeh[209] who mapped the organizational chart of the group, putting only above in terms of leadership the "Wali-al-Faqih" (Arabic name for the Valiat-e Faqih in Persian, which is the guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, a responsibility self-taken by Khomeini in 1979 and Khamenei since 1989), the Imams (the Twelve according to Shia theology), Muhammed and finally God. The organization does not make any differences between its political and military activities but is has an assembly for each "activity", one for the political agenda, one for the "resistance activities", one for Hezbollah's activities in the Lebanese's parliament, one for the social, cultural and education activities and finally one for religious rulings and conflict mediation services. It should be taken into account that Hezbollah is a trans-national organization composed of cells across the world acting relatively independently from one another.[210] Unfortunately it is surprisingly difficult to find more details on the group's command structure and how they are divided as explained by Azani who argues that the group has to stay secret on many aspects of its structure given Israel's ability to go after its leader.[211] This Israeli policy of targeted assassination has widely acclaimed and criticized in the intelligence world and discussed in great length by Ronen Bergman in his 2018 book

[206] Addis and Blanchard, *Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress*
[207] Mapping Militant Organizations. "*Hezbollah."* Stanford University. Last modified August 2016
[208] Ranstorp, M. (1997). *Hizb'allah in Lebanon*. London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, p.45
[209] Hamzeh, A. (2004). *In the path of Hizbullah*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, pp.44-79.
[210] Romaniuk, S. (2014). *Leadership Decapitation: Israeli Counterterrorism Policy And The Palestinian Islamic Jihad*. European Scientific Journal, [online] 2(119), pp.214-223. Available at: https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/2892/2720
[211] Azani, E. (2013). *The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(11), pp.899-916.

"Rise and Kill First". In a long interview with the Times of Israel, he discussed some of the results he found: Israel started targeted killings way before 9/11 and therefore before it became mainstream in counter-terrorism practices, back then still considered as a war crime. The question of killing leaders came during the second intifada when there were too many suicide bomber volunteers for Hezbollah so Israel had to target their superiors, attacking directly the leadership. To directly extract a moment of the interview "And it became apparent that in all the organizations combined – Hamas, Fatah, the Tanzim, and so on – there was a total of something like 700 people. That's a big number, but not so big. And they reached the conclusion that you don't need to kill everyone at that level; it was enough to kill or harm 25% to paralyze the organization."[212] So from this angle, it should be concluded that these decapitations have been successful. In 1992, Israel killed Hezbollah's spiritual leader, Abbas al-Musawi, who was a vocal critic of Israel but back then the group's mission was not solely focused on its neighboring country, it also sought to expel western powers from the region and meddle in Lebanese politics.[213] Since that assassination and Nasrallah taking over, Hezbollah is 100% engaged in destroying Israel, it became its raison d'être. Moreover, a month after Al-Musawi was killed, Hezbollah bombed the Israeli embassy in Buenos-Aires, killing 29. Two years later, they carried out their deadliest attack on a civilian target: the bombing of a Jewish community center again in Buenos Aires, killing 85 civilians. It was also during this period that the organization adopted Iran as full sponsor, as Musawi was a critic of Iranian meddling in Hezbollah's affairs but Nasrallah was a serious supporter of the Iranian revolution and wanted to apply it in the Lebanase's context. So killing Hezbollah's first spiritual and beloved leader was clearly a strategic mistake but ever since, it has been an efficient strategy according to the Congress and Bergman but Jordan argued that leadership decapitation for religious groups is useless at best and counter-productive at worst[214]. This thesis tends to agree with that argument given the statistical results that will be discussed below. In the worst case scenario, it shows a failure in all aspects like for Al-Musawi, in the best-case scenario, attacks do not increase but do not fully stop neither. However, and this is important to stress, Hezbollah has not tried to attack Israel since 2016,

[212] Bergman, R. (2018). *How Israel's leaders use targeted killings to try to 'stop history'*. [online] Times of Israel. Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/how-israels-leaders-use-targeted-killings-to-try-to-stop-history/
[213] Mapping Militant Organizations. "*Hezbollah."*
[214] Jordan, *When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation*

since Mustafa Badreddine, the group's top military commander and mastermind behind their suicide terrorist attacks has been killed in May 2016.

In conclusion, there is evidence to back Jordan's argument that religious groups are not sensible to leadership decapitation as they carry an ideological package understood by all their members. On the other hand, the last targeted killing seems to have really affected the group, proving that it was relying too much on one man for its military strategy.

Recruitment:

There are various reasons for individuals to join the state armed forces or rebel groups: patriotism, basic income, greed, grievances, social group behavior (family and friends) or simply ideological motives. For Hezbollah fighters, it appears clear that the ideological factor is the most important motivation that made them join the organization. Krueger & Maleckova provided evidences that poverty is inversely related to the likelihood of joining Hezbollah and education is positively related to it, at least for high school degree holders where there is a significant statistical difference (33% of Hezbollah's deceased fighters analyzed by the authors attended high school for only 23% of the general Lebanese population aged between 18 and 38).[215]

As the Congressional report states, Hezbollah requires total allegiance to the ideology of the organization for each of its recruits and a proper understanding of Shia theology.[216] The journalist Nicholas Blanford (author of Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year struggle against Israel) gave a precise account of the group's recruitment and training process. Hezbollah recruiters are targeting specifically young people adhering to certain values, mostly pity and modesty. The recruitment process can take several years as recruiters observe potential recruits for months or years before offering them to join the group. Like any professional army, it shows that Hezbollah is not really short of fighters, it privileges their loyalty rather than absolute numbers. Once accepted, the new recruits undergo basic military training and religious education. They are free to leave during this training process

[215] Krueger, A. and Malečková, J. (2003). *Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?* Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), pp.119-144.
[216] Addis and Blanchard, *Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress*

if they do not see the group fit for them. The first stage is the religious education where each recruit is being taught about the Iranian Revolution, Islamic texts and about martyrdom for approximately a whole year. This last point is important as it was developed already in Khomeinism and helps to understand how Hezbollah democratized the use of suicide bombing. The second stage is the basic military training in which they recruit are trained for guerrilla warfare, they are dropped in the Beqaa valley and have to make their way back to their respective regiment bases with the bare minimum and rock-filled backpacks.[217] Hezbollah has been known for its tight recruitment and ideological indoctrination from a young age although they do not take any fighters before 17 years old, but since 2014 and the group's involvement in Syria, long-time fighters have openly stated that they regret the drop of standards in terms of recruitment.[218] A war had to be won for Iran and this time, quantity mattered more than quality.

Social cohesion:

According to Mohanad Hage Ali, Hezbollah developed on symbols and myths following Khomeinism in principally for recruitment, which led to a universal social cohesion. As mentioned in the ideological analysis, Khomeini described himself as the guarantor of Islamic jurisprudence in the wait of the 12th Imam who is supposed to come back and lead the Ummah (the Muslim community). Hezbollah, by perpetuating these myths and legends, "forces" any member of Southern Lebanon to "face the same tests as the faithful in the Quran... only the contexts of the conflicts have changed. This sacred legitimacy is essential to mobilization".[219] It is not the only sign of mythology used by the group, Hezbollah refers to South Lebanon as Cabal Amil, its historical name and referring to Shia's identity in the region. These identity politics were also used in Iran for consolidating the power after the revolution even though Khomeini's work never mentioned aspects of Persian identity. But this policy of using supernatural narratives and mythologies, was used by Khomeini constantly throughout *Islam and Revolution*. Finally, Hezbollah insisted on these myths and other miracles that happened in their wars through its impressive numbers of

[217] Blanford, N. (2011). *Joining Hezbollah*. [online] The Cairo Review of Global Affairs. Available at: https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/joining-hezbollah/
[218] George, S. (2015). *This Is Not Your Father's Hezbollah*. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/15/this-is-not-your-fathers-hezbollah/
[219] Hage Ali, M. (2017). *Building Sacred Legitimacy*. [online] Carnegie Middle East Center. Available at: https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/73059

publishing houses and bookstores. It is Lebanon's largest publisher, every institution related to the group publishes at least one monthly magazine for all ages and potential targets. This indoctrination through identity politics is not with random opinions, every publication is supervised by a central entity, the Central Cultural Unit based in Southern Beirut. It clearly has some parallels with what the Iranian case mentioned in the above analysis and its entire institution dedicated to propaganda.[220]

The group has also been largely credited with a strict self-discipline and strong social cohesion between its members by various academics yet there is a lack of clear explanation on why that is the case. Pollak suggested that Hezbollah maintained a strong social cohesion between its members through two tools. Firstly, through the mystical narrative as mentioned, of protecting the Shia community in Lebanon (which has been targeted across the Middle East for decades outside of Iran, before 2003) and Shia holy places in the region. Secondly, through the fact that leadership is often offered to the public with speeches and systematic visit to all the fallen fighters, perpetuating the importance of martyrdom as developed by Khomeini and Badreddine.[221] Like most revolutionary movements, Hezbollah uses the paradigm of oppressor/oppressed to justify its actions among its fighters, it also puts a strong emphasis on social justice for the poorest in Lebanon and works with its religious minorities in order to have the greatest possible social cohesion within its ranks.[222] Again, that changed with its involvement in Syria and the mass recruiting which were not done on an ideological basis anymore but solely on financial incentives. What really separates Hezbollah from any other insurgency / terrorist organization is this deep involvement in its country's politics and social affairs. The group provides better social services than the government itself, from health care to education open to even non-Muslims. This involvement has been lengthy discussed by the US Congress[223] and Early[224]. It also goes against any academic advice on the separation of military and civil society towards role conflict. Aside from heath care and education, a prominent service provided by Hezbollah was the reparation of all homes hit by

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[220] Nafisi, *پیدایش و پیامدهای دین بوروکراتیک در ایران*.
[221] Pollak, N. (2016). *The Transformation of Hezbollah by Its Involvement in Syria*. Research Notes, N.35. [online] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote35-Pollak-2.pdf
[222] Dalack, A. (2010). *Hezbollah: A localized Islamic resistance or Lebanon's premier national movement?*University of Michigan.
[223] Addis and Blanchard, *Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress*
[224] Early, B. (2006*). "Larger than a Party, yet Smaller than a State": Locating Hezbollah's Place within Lebanon's State and Society*. World Affairs, 168(3), pp.115-128.

Israel militaries, regardless of war or not. Bottom line, the single biggest social cohesion tool Hezbollah possesses is the strong sense of brotherhood and ideological attachment to the group, wheatear for the Shia community or towards animosity for Israel.[225] There are financial incentives as well, strong ones (2000$ monthly for fighters in Syria (for an average 700$ monthly income in Lebanon for the civil society), but they don't account for Hezbollah's ideological presence in the country's politics.

Ideology:

The link between Hezbollah and Khomeinism has been clearly established by researchers[226] [227]and by Lebanese and Iranian governments alike. Hezbollah has been viewed as another Islamic group that holds a universalist view of the Muslim community (ummah) and of the western world. But as it has also been argued that this universalism does not hold true for Hezbollah as it adapted itself to the particularity of Shia theology and of Lebanon's national identity.[228] Hezbollah placed Khomeini as the ruler of the community and its true successor, putting him at the center of the their "universalist" pan-Islamic view. An argument obviously rejected by the vast majority of Muslims who are Sunnis. The other argument pointed out is the national agenda of Hezbollah with the systematic use of symbols such as the historical name of Southern Lebanon. This nationalism is inarguably incompatible with Pan-Islamism. Their main sources for funding, support and recruitment is focused within Iran, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. On the other hand, they justify their support for the Palestinian cause by denouncing the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem. If the particularism of Hezbollah is not clear enough, their spiritual leader Sheik Fadlallah put it directly in an interview where he criticized all Islamic movements across the region:

"Despite this strong identity, the Islamic world is suffering from a lack of clear and objective understanding of the true situation of Islamic and Islamic thought. This is evident from the proliferation of Islamic movements, some reactionary, {...} some archaic, some

[225] Ibid
[226] Badran, T. (2013). *The Secret History of Hezbollah*. [online] Foundation Defense of Democracies. Available at: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2013/11/18/the-secret-history-of-hezbollah/
[227] Siegel, L. (1992). *Criminology: Theories, Patterns, and Typologies*. 13th ed. Boston: Cengage Learning, pp.393-430.
[228] Early, "*Larger than a Party, yet smaller than a State": Locating Hezbollah's Place within Lebanon's State and Society*.

restoring to violence in situations when peaceful means can be pursued, some with a sound grasp of reality and whose tactics, weather violent or peaceful, are guided by objective analyses. This disarray in doctrine and tactics makes it impossible to place all the Islamic movement in the same category and to pass the same judgment on them. Muslims sympathetic to Islamist goals are hard pressed to support some of their tactics which are unacceptable to Islam, such as assassinating foreigner or disrupting the school year..." [229]

It is interesting here to see that as early as 1995, this Hezbollah leader rejected any kind of Muslim universalism and was, as Khomeini, concerned about a proper bureaucracy and indoctrination, in addition to clear goals and objectives for its movement. Later in the interview, he described precisely the targets that the group should adopt. His stance against Israel and the United-States (principally these two, not much to note on Western perception in general) remains as one could think, they are the main targets. He is fiercely opposed to the killing of civilian foreigners but explain that all situations should be judged individually, sometimes a hostage taking is necessary. There is a lack of revolutionary targets like for Marxism and attacks on infrastructures, American and Israeli militaries are the first targets that come in mind, but this lengthily explanation, quoted above on rival factions goes hand in hand with some aspects of our analysis of *Islam and Revolution*, making the point that rival factions will be targeted as well. It should be pointed out that this interview was conducted in 1995, so more than 10 years into Hezbollah's creation and this decade was particularly marked by violent tensions with its rival factions. Regarding the greater good, Fadlallah explains that "When the welfare of mankind is served by a negative value, it is transformed into a positive value"[230]. This utilitarian approach clearly accepts the killing of civilian if deemed necessary for the greater good of the ummah. It is already the moral philosophy followed by all states across the world, but for a terrorist group, it means a broader acceptance towards the loss of civilian life. Nevertheless, this section on ideology and the clear wish for a well-structured-program makes us believe, as predicted with the analysis on Khomeinism, that military personnel are going to be the most affected by Hezbollah's attacks. On the other side, civilians should be relatively spared given the strong sense of hierarchy, command and dependence of the group on the civilian population and connection with it in all aspect of Lebanese's politics and social services.

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[229] Fadlallah and Soueid, *Islamic Unity and Political Change*.
[230] Ibid

Data Analysis

Like for the following case studies, it should be pointed out that the GDP data is far from perfect and complete. For instance, during the 2006 Lebanese war, our dataset identified 17 civilian and 29 militaries killed by Hezbollah. These numbers are far below all other estimates that usually ranges Israeli civilian dead toll to 40 and about 120 for soldiers killed. Nevertheless, lacking a rigorous detail on these attacks, I cannot add them to the dataset and will keep the analysis on what I gathered. In absolute terms, our selected and added data explore 401 attacks killing 1312 people from 1983 to 2017.

Our dataset found 1231 people killed by Hezbollah, from its foundation to 2007. For the same period (1983-2007), Blomberg, Gaibulloev and Sandler identified 1,070 victims but they counted the wounded as well, when this thesis only accounted those killed.[231] On their side, they highlight that religious groups like Hezbollah indiscriminate their targets much more than their counterparts. Religious groups originally accounted only for 18% of their dataset but when they studied the 10% of the deadliest organizations, religious groups represented 48% of those represented in it. For them, diversity of attack mode also means higher rate of fatalities. Hezbollah is present in the list but has among the lowest rate of mean diversity, probably because it uses systematically suicide bombing or hostage taking for targeting civilians, bombings/explosion for security targets and armed assaults for the rest, there is indeed a clear pattern between mean and target in our observation.

The biggest target per number of attacks and casualties are the security forces, with 139 attacks for 562 casualties, making a ratio of 4 killed per attack. It should be stressed that almost two thirds of the casualties were done in the first year of Hezbollah's activities in 1983 when the group carried out the deadliest attacks on US and French militaries since WWII, killing a total of 299 servicemen in the infamous 1983 Beirut barracks bombings. The following month, the group lunched the second Tyre headquarters bombing, killing 50 Israeli militaries.[232] These 3 blasts costed the lives of 349 militaries with only 3 attacks

[231] Blomberg, S., Gaibulloev, K. and Sandler, T. (2011). *Terrorist group survival: ideology, tactics, and base of operations*. Public Choice, 149(3-4), pp.441-463.
[232] For further explanations on this attack, refer to the methodology section

(although the barracks attack officially counted as one attack, the GTD divided them in 2 separates ones as there were 2 blasts). If I subtract these 3 attacks, leaving the total of killed militaries to 213 in 136 attacks, it transforms the effectiveness ratio to 1.6 fatality per attack.

The second targets in term of causalities are ex-æquo civilians and rival factions, accounting each for 22% of Hezbollah's total victims. The difference comes through the number of attacks: only 71 attacks against civilians for 120 attacks against rival factions (18% against 30% of target selection), making the effectiveness ratios at 4 and 2.3 killed per attack respectively. This difference can only be explained by 2 "grands coups" from Hezbollah with a large number of casualties with 2 attacks: the 1983 Iraqi Flight hijacked that costed the lives of 62 civilians and the 1994 bombing of a religious center in Argentina, killing 85 civilians. Until 1991, Hezbollah principally used hostage taking for dealing with civilians, it's only from this date that they started their suicidal bombings on civilians, leaving any other method aside. This method that had for objective to scare the Israeli population and coerce their governments to respect Hezbollah's demands. Pape pointed out that this method of bombing ended up being effective for American and European withdrawal from Lebanon after the barracks bombings.[233] On the other hand for rival factions, they have been targeted with suicide bombings since day one of the hostilities in 1985.

For government target: activities in 1983 with the respective bombings of the US embassy in Beirut and the US embassy in Kuwait killing a total of 70 people (while some of them were US soldiers, the primary target were civilians and are therefore accounted as such in the CTD). The last high-stake government attack was on the Israeli embassy in Buenos-Aires in 1992, killing 29 diplomat personnel and civilians.

[233] Pape, *The strategic Logic of suicide terrorism*



Table 2: Total Hezbollah attacks and causalities

Target	Attacks	Fatalities
Business	22	30
Civilian	71	290
Security	139	562
Government	42	139
Rival	120	285
Infrastructur	7	6
Total	401	1312

Table 3: Chi Square of Hezbollah targets based on Ahmed's models

Hezbollah	Political	Civil	Security	Business	Rival	Infrastructur	Total
LW	0,07309081	0,42971	0,138365	2,08755	202,2138	1,441889	206,3844
RW	0,76414702	0,456967	0,062305	0,799985	69,55852	0,007707	71,64963
Religous	0,08979538	0,452691	2,903979	0,018045	4,347474	0,044183	7,856166
Environment	0,12348234	0,742424	0,030185	6,550428		14,20121	21,64773
NS/Reli	0,00123225	1,468814	1,574844	0,097702	1,838142	0,37288	5,353614
NS/LW	0,03238326	0,09553	5,505599	0,573272	136,0735	0,104265	142,3845





FARC

Most of our research is based on Paul E. Saskiewicz's thesis who argues that the FARC is ideologically driven by Marxist/Leninist and Bolivarian principles but uses criminal activities to fund its movements and only use them as a mean to an end. He rejects the argument of those who believe that the FARC abandoned their ideological objective and simply turned into a criminal organization motivated by greed and affirms that they are still ideologically driven.[234]

[234] Saskiewicz, P. (2005). *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Entreprise?*. Navy Postgraduate School.

The FARC are the oldest and most powerful insurgency in Latin America and was composed of 18,000 fighters at its peak, controlling over 460 out of 1000 of Colombia's municipalities. It was founded in 1964 by various peasant-groups who saw in communism the only way out of the shared powers of the Conservatives and Liberals.[235] The FARC represents the quintessential group of Balcells & Kalyvas's Marxist Paradox.[236] They grew into such a well-structured and well-functioning bureaucratic army that they easily attracted recruits but also attracted the majority of the government's attention which led to an international counter-mobilization against the insurgency.

According to Rojas, there are 4 factors that stood out in the group's bureaucratic structure: mechanisms control, social composition of the organization, recruitment and source of funding.[237] With the exception of the financial aspect, the rest fits perfectly in our comparison to Janowitz's military establishment. For Gutiérrez-Sanín, the FARC were unique in their movement because of this unmatched organizational structure that he breaks down through hierarchy, recruitment, discipline, role conflict and funding.[238]

Hierarchy

As any Marxist/Leninist organization, the FARC were really fond of Lenin's ideas of vanguard and created their respective version: a centralized power through the Secretariat (like every single communist-like bureaucracy) and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC). There is also a Financial Commission in charge of every object and penny brought by fighters upon their recruitment. In a proper communist way, nothing belongs to the individuals, everything they had in their previous lives should be handed to the commission and therefore the group.

After the 1982 Seventh Guerilla Conference, widely considered as the most crucial moment for the FARC, they changed most of their military strategy and decided to centralize their organization. The following hierarchy appeared: first and foremost, there was the

[235] Congressional Research Service (2019). *Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations*. [online] Congressional Research Service. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf
[236] Balcells, L. and Kalyvas, S. (2015). *Revolutionary Rebels and the Marxist Paradox*. Duke University & Yale University.
[237] Rojas, E. (2006). *Las nuevas guerras: un enfoque desde las estructuras organizacionales*. Papel Politico, 11(1), pp.305-352.
[238] Gutiérrez-Sanín, *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*

National Conference of the Guerrillas, the highest instance of the group that defines the political-military agenda of the group. They appoint the 25 members of the Estado Mayor Central that paves the discussions of the Conference, takes the financial decisions, appoints the different commanders of the blocs and fronts and therefore the Secretariat. This last high instance is composed of 7 commanders only, each one of them is leading a bloc. They are the ones in charge of setting up the directions given by the National Conference. The information is then spread throughout the 7 blocs that divide the country's operational areas. Each bloc takes its own decision regarding the military strategy needed in the region as well as the level of propaganda required. These blocs are much more professional/roman-like army they each consists of at least 5 fronts, which are composed of at least one column, composed of two or more companies, made out of guerrillas, themselves made of squads, and each squad must have at least 12 fighters.[239] This specific and clear hierarchy did not have an equal in Colombia despite the various active rebel groups, explaining the longevity of the FARC compared to the others according Gutiérrez-Sanín.[240]

As bureaucratic and centralized as the FARC might look like, they allowed a certain division of the chain of command with a decentralization of the units, similar to what Marx and Lenin advise with their small rotational militias across the nation. At the end the group only have a central power composed of 7 principal members, thus each bloc acts relatively independently. It is not a surprise if information is not properly transmitted to the bottom and targets not properly defined, making a high rate of civilian casualties possible, exactly like it could be predicted in Marx's designation of the army.

For Rojas, Marulanda (the founder and historical leader of the FARC) created an organization independent enough to act without his presence or that of any leader because of the centralization of power through Secretariat and EMC.[241] This argument goes in line with Jordan's finding on leadership decapitation "FARC remained active after undergoing sustained decapitation efforts in 1990, 1991, 1995, 1996, and every year from 1998-2004".[242] He concludes that there is no correlation between leadership decapitation and the spike or absence of violence from the group but that the FARC, due to its size and longevity, is a case

[239] Ferro Medina, J. and Uribe Ramón, G. (2002). *El orden de la guerra*. Bogotá: CEJA, pp.50-55.
[240] Gutiérrez-Sanín, *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*
[241] Rojas, *Las nuevas guerras: un enfoque desde las estructuras organizacionales*
[242] Jordan, *When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation*

of its own. On its side, the US Congress argues that the decapitation of 3 of the 7 most important leaders of the FARC in 2008 (including Marulanda himself who died from a heart attack) was a severe blow to the group.[243] But nothing in my statistical analysis proves this point, almost contrarily, a recurrent trend of 100+ attacks each year after 2008 can be observed, something that only happened 3 times before.

Recruitment/Training

In 1982, the FARC was only composed of 1,000 combatants spread on 17 front. By the end of the millenary, they reached the size of a little army with 17,000 combatants on 60 different fronts, controlling 30% of the country's territory.[244] [245] At the 7th Guerrilla Conference in 1982, the FARC decided to implement a "new operating method" that aimed at going totally under a guerrilla warfare strategy. But four years later, the leadership realized the recruits lacked discipline and efficiency, which is why the Guerrilla Plenum took place end of 1987. From 1988, the group stepped up its recruitment and attracted middle and upper classes with educated and graduated students. While students are usually the original group behind an insurgency and with the peasants following them, the FARC was the other way around: first the peasant created the movement, then the students joined them. It is also at this moment that they decided to create the Hernando González military academy, which aimed at training field commanders to the "new method of operating" decided at the conference, meaning: train the units' leaders in guerrilla asymmetrical warfare. These commanders were trained to gather intelligence, use explosives, psychology warfare, cartography or any other skill relevant for an officer. They also received political training through explanations on the eight-years new military strategy, the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia (1990-1998 strategy). Various educational centers were opened and similarly to the Hezbollah, all recruits were trained through two stages: political indoctrination and military training. The political phase lasted for 20 days with the Marxist and Bolivarian indoctrination and classes on FARC general structure and on its penal code. Then 3 months of basic military training completed the four-months mandatory training for

[243] Congressional Research Service, *Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations*
[244] Saskiewicz, *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP)*
[245] Bargent, J. (2014). *Las FARC 1964 – 2002: De una rebelión desordenada a una máquina militar*. [online] Insight Crime. Available at: https://es.insightcrime.org/investigaciones/farc-de-rebelion-desordenada-a-maquina-militar/

all recruits. Another training assigned to all FARC members is the development of skills to carry out terrorist acts in urban areas[246], but terrorism is by definition acted towards civilians, which also helps explain why they have such a high rate of civilian casualties (24% of total attacks for 30% of total casualties)[247]. Similarly, to the PKK, the FARC decreased as much as possible the free time of its members, having a tight schedule every day and when training or indoctrination was not in the agenda, collective sport or cooking was the main occupation for social cohesion.

In 1998 the Colombian government granted a 42,000 square kilometers of demilitarized zone to the FARC as part of the peace talks.[248] The insurgency then tried to established its own government within this territory and forced the whole population aged between 13 and 60 to follow a "light" version of the FARC training: political through Marxism/Leninism indoctrination and military with a variety of weapons. More interestingly: the locals were also assigned to guerrilla militias, known as "Citizen Vigilance" in order to "spy on civic, religious and business group and inform the guerrilla organization as to the existence of potential dissidents".[249] The cease of peace talks between the organization and the government in the early 2000s showed one of FARC's biggest problems since that period: the lack of commitment from its members to the group's ideology and they were rather surfing on the benefits they could take out of it. Aside the ideology, it is specially the recruitment of children aged between 10 and 15 that made the organization weak: 7,400 of the 26,500 guerrilla fighters were minors according to Human Rights Watch in 2003.[250] These minors are usually attracted by the group for the sense of adventure/guerilla living and mostly because of the economic incentives. As any proper communist group, the FARC does not pay its recruits, but it provides them with accommodation and food, which is much more they can hope for in the civil society.[251] This lack of financial incentive is rare among insurgencies and does not necessarily oppose

[246] Rojas, *Las nuevas guerras: un enfoque desde las estructuras organizacionales*
[247] From our selected data, full results below
[248] Bargent, *Las FARC 1964 – 2002: De una rebelión desordenada a una máquina*
[249] Rohter, L. (1999). *Colombia Rebels Reign in Ceded Area*. [online] The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/16/world/colombia-rebels-reign-in-ceded-area.html
[250] Human Rights Watch (2003). *You'll Learn Not To Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia*. [online] New York, Washington, London, Brussels: Human Rights Watch, pp.19-28. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/colombia0903.pdf
[251] Rojas, *Las nuevas guerras: un enfoque desde las estructuras organizacionales*

Collier's theory on greed.[252] They were not paid but they were still benefiting compared to their civilian status. Gutiérrez-Sanín on his side contradicts Collier's argument in the case of the FARC: offering a salary to the rebels has higher (non-financial) costs than benefits: salary or rent, members would naturally start feuds between themselves to defend their gains. Another way to see financial incentives as a burden is to think about comfort. If rebels get accustomed to a certain salary, they are more likely to be disappointed when this salary would go down to a blow on the group's treasury, which naturally happens for every rebel group over time.

Ninety percent of the recruits were also peasants who did not attend primary school, meaning that some of them were illiterate and the rest not ready to fully comprehend the mixture of the organization's beliefs. Compared to most of Colombian's rebel groups, the FARC had an extremely quick recruitment process that could be achieved in a couple of days compared to in weeks/months for its ally ELN for instance.[253] It is one of the reason the group attracted almost 20,000 soldiers at its peak. So if the fighters are trained to use weapons but lack the understanding of Marxism/Leninism that is already not precise enough on the targets, it can be assume these soldiers to commit extra-juridical killings (for the FARC, not even for the government). FARC-EP commander Yesid Arteta explained in 2002 that before the attack on the Casa Verde (the historical headquarters of the group, seized in 1990), the group had the time to educate its recruits to the complexity of its belief, to the military training and strict internal rules. Since the attack from the government, the group launched offenses on regular basis, leaving very little time for recruits to get their ideological training and general classes. Another important point for the FARC recruitment is the warning given to the recruit before joining the group: joining the FARC is for a life-time, there are no possibilities to leave the organization and desertion is punished by execution. This lack of choice instead of 5-10 years' contract like in professional armies might be one of the reason why the FARC had issues controlling its members' discipline towards the ideology and targets.[254]

Social Cohesion

[252] Collier, *Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity*
[253] Gutiérrez-Sanín, *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*
[254] Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, *El orden de la guerra*

The "Reglamento de Regimen Disciplinario" dictates the daily life of every FARC member through fear of punishment. Depending on the gravity of the mistake, the fighter could either simply recognizes its wrongdoing through public self-criticism or be executed. In case of capital punishment, the sentence had to be carried out by the convict's closest friend. There is no apparent reason to use this tactic aside imposing fear upon the whole organization. Crimes that could be punished by death include "desertion, betrayal, fomenting rebellion and fractionalization, rape, theft, establishing businesses, and drug abuse".[255] [256]It is interesting to note that establishing a business is associate to the rest, in line with the communist economy approach. Saskiewicz does not give any number but precise that most of the internal-purging was towards "bourgeois" and "counterrevolutionary", and as explained in the Communist analysis, those are among the clearest targets defined by Marxism/Leninism.

There are 3 instances that serve as mechanisms of control: the cell's reunion, the relationship and the balance.[257] The cell's reunion only happens when a serious mistake was made by any FARC member or leader. If a commander, the highest possible rank, makes a mistakes, then it's the Secretariat that has to judge him. The relationship reunion happens every day during meeting of the leaders around 5:30am for half an hour[258] where they discuss "basic" mistakes committed by unit members such as burning the food or sleeping during a nightshift. These everyday meetings set the agenda of the day and discuss the previous' day mistakes, if they are basic enough, the unit's leader will judge the offending himself. Otherwise he will inform the higher instances.

An important factor for Rojas regarding the social cohesion of the group is the origin of its members: whilst Colombia underwent a quick urbanization of its population (70% of it in 2006 for 30% at the FARC's creation in the 60s), the group remained rural membered. As mentioned in the recruitment, 90% of the group is originally from the campaign, which according Rojas leads to a good homogeneity and social cohesion with the group.[259] On the

[255] Saskiewicz, *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP)*
[256] For more information on the crimes punishable by death in the FARC, see Pena, Las guerrillas marxistas y la pena de muerte a combatientes. Un examen de los delitos capitals y del "juicio revolucionario", 2013
[257] Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, *El orden de la guerra*
[258] BBC Mundo (2016). *Dentro de un campamento de las FARC en Colombia*. [online] YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ekpZ0RCrs4&t=198s
[259] Rojas, *Las nuevas guerras: un enfoque desde las estructuras organizacionales*

other hand, it prevented the group to turn into politics because the expectations from the townsfolks were not the same as the peasants. In other words: this homogeneity of the group's economical background allowed a better social cohesion that most insurgencies but also prevented the group from reaching urban populations where the conflict was supposed to be fought ideologically speaking. This argument finds support in Medina & Ramon book that describes the FARC particularly unique in its foundation: it is the only Colombian guerrilla group created and led by rural populations and farmers while all the other groups were led by students and elites in urban areas.[260] This also echoes our first comment about the FARC in the beginning of the chapter.

While the PKK is known for using women fighters at very high rate in its fight against Islamic insurgencies in the Middle East, the FARC drew less attention regarding its recruitment on women. Yet, 40 to 50% of its members were women, making the social cohesion between all members clear and easy to adapt. According Medina & Ramon, they also tend to be the best trained and most educated members of the group. A reason advanced is that they willingly choose to be separate of their children or abandon maternity, making the case for their attachment to the group's ideology.[261] The group doesn't prevent them to get pregnant, but if they do, they have to leave their babies somewhere in the civilian sphere right after birth and come back to the group, because "before being a mother, they are fighters" in the words of Ivan Rios, former commander of the FARC and member of the EMC.[262] Another reason advanced for their will to join to group is the interdiction of discrimination within the group: most of the group was coming from a rural/patriarch Colombia but in the group women have the same rights and duties as men and bear exactly the same equipment or weapons. From this point of view, the social cohesion is clear at all levels and don't seem as a potential reason for the group to spread apart of break the group's rules. The FARC are not a utopia neither, there were no women in the higher command blocks and they have never been present during the peace talks. Simply placed in Colombia's rural context in the previous decades, the FARC were in advanced when it came to equality, or at least fewer discrimination. But the massive recruitment of women also came from a strategic observation: too many men were having contact with civilians by trying to find a

[260] Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, *El orden de la guerra*
[261] Ibid
[262] Ibid

partner there. So the leadership started this campaign of recruitment although rules were drastic: hierarchical superiors could separate any couple by sending them in different fronts and if a women would get pregnant, she would have to abort or leave the child to a relative in the civilian sphere. This harsh but real culture had a name: "Cultura fariana", it meant to fully separate the group from "La Civil".[263] The first decades of the group were marked by strong social cohesion between its members but since the massive recruitment of women and the superior's abilities to separate a couple or "stealing" their partners, these were enough of a reason for a guerilla to pick fights with its comrades and desert. Love stories couldn't be the only reason but they played a role, the harsh internal rules probably played the biggest role for breaking down this social cohesion and brining the group on the edge of collapsing early 2000s. Gutiérrez-Sanín collected various data to estimate that in 2001 "339 members deserted, 1766 were captured, and 1028 were killed. This amounted to almost 15% of the whole force".[264] Unfortunately the CTD does not give any data on the killings within a group, making it impossible for us to check how many guerrillas were executed by the internal rules.

Ideology

Saskiewicz argues that the FARC never based all their objectives solely on Marxism/Leninism, rather they always maintain a liberal interpretation of the ideology: much more based on the bureaucratic and societal aspect of it rather than on the economic parts. It's equivalent support for Bolivarian principles helped to stick to its unique ideological mix and avoid the lack of funding after the fall of the USSR and of international communist groups. In contrast with all other communist groups, it is precisely at the end of the Cold War that the FARC grew exponentially in membership and territory. Before being an ideological driven group, it's first of all an armed group which identified its strategy through this identity: an armed struggle. FARC ideologue, Iván Ríos, said it himself: "For us, the fundamental postulates, general proposals, methodology of knowing and understanding society and of historic evolution, and society's contradictions that Marxism discusses are still valid concerns."[265] This mix of ideologies was also the result of the "peasant republics"

[263] Gutiérrez-Sanín, *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*
[264] Ibid
[265] Saskiewicz, *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP)*

destroyed by the Colombia Army in the 60s, most of FARC founders belonged to different liberal, socialist or communist groups and they all gathered under the FARC umbrella. The organization never stopped its indoctrination solely to its recruits, it also affected all the citizens leaving under their controlled territory and beyond: it hosted a multi-language website available for everyone and operates different radios. The point of Saskiewicz is that no criminal organization would make such effort to stay public, there was a real will from the organization to stick to its ideological belief and criminal activities were only meant to bring resources to the group.

Role Conflict:

A key characteristic of the FARC is their drastic separation from civilians. In this regard, they follow properly Janowitz's advise on the separation between the army and the civilian world. As previously discussed, a specific element to the group was their life-long membership. Before joining the group, aspirants were briefed on the hardship of war and life engagement without possibility of leaving. Couples within the group were encouraged in order to avoid as much as possible contact with civilians, sentinels were pushing back any non-FARC as far as possible from the camp without using violence neither. They also wore the same uniform and equipment between them in order to properly differentiate them from the civilians, acting like a professional army in their controlled territories.[266] It stands in sharp contrast with most insurgencies that try to blend among the civilians in order to confuse security forces. A reason advanced by Gutiérrez-Sanín regarding the importance of civilian separation for the FARC is to prevent the military to cut the group's supplies coming from the civilians. A group like the ELN who enjoys population's support also used it for getting their funding, foods or even for hiding among the civilian populations sometimes. But by using such strategy, the government could directly destroy the supply chains between civilian and rebels to weaken the ELN, which they did. The FARC wanted to avoid this problem and protect themselves through strict separation and full autonomy.[267]

Military strategy:

The most important event of the FARC history was their Seventh Guerrilla Conference that took place in 1982 where the size and strategy of the future FARC armed

[266] Ibid
[267] Ibid

forces were established, as previously discussed. The objective was to reach 28,000 combatants on 48 fronts, a new method of operating was decided: all FARC units would now be highly mobile in order to pursue their guerrilla strategy and the name of the group as also changed: FARC-EP, EP for Ejercito Popular (Popular Army), in order to embody the army-style that the group was becoming. Paradoxically, it is also at this moment of growth that the group decided to engage in an unsuccessful peace process that would last until 1988. Under the new Colombian's presidency in 1986, hundreds of the Patriotic Union's members (FARC's official political party) were assassinated by the Colombian army. In 1989, the FARC leadership gathered again and designed an eight-year military strategy that would be divided in 4 stages, called the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia. Its agenda was rather classic:

1. The first phase, 1990-1992 would be meant to acquire new weapons, aircrafts and communication equipment.
2. Second phase, 1992-1994 was supposed to considerably grow the number of guerrilla fighters.
3. Third phase, 1994-1996 was supposed to be the big scale offensive on the capitale with major attacks on military bases and civilian populations.
4. The last stage, 1996-1998 was only necessary if the 3rd one failed, it should have allowed the troops to retreat, attack national infrastructures in order to destroy the communications and supply systems and relaunch their offensive on the government.

Statistically, none of it really happened although the peak of violence directed by the FARC really happened between 1996 and 1998 with 234 attacks with indeed a high rates of attacks on governmental and infrastructural targets. It should be pointed out that the GDP lacks valuable data as the FARC did get hold of a city in 1998, Mitú, close from the Brazilian border. They controlled the city during 3 days and killed 40 security forces and 11 civilians, numbers missing from the GDP dataset.[268] It is this attack that led the Colombia President to grant the group a 42.000km2 demilitarized area discussed earlier.[269]

[268] Bedoya Lima, Y. (2008). *La toma a Mitú fue el golpe más sangriento de las Farc*. [online] El Tiempo. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-3167781
[269] Bargent, *Las FARC 1964 – 2002: De una rebelión desordenada a una máquina*

Based on Cohen's argument, the high-degree of social cohesion within the FARC should decrease and prevent the targeting of civilians.[270] On the other hand, the constant separation with civilians made them lose touch with their original ideology of peasants' defense. Completed with the combat-oriented structure of the group, the poor quality of the recruitment (uneducated members) and the lack of description regarding the target and objectives, it should not come as a surprise if civilians end up as being the first target of the group, followed by the security forces (based on the analysis of Marxism/Leninism). Finally, business should complete the podium as they are specifically targeted in the internal regulation.

Data Analysis

The first targets of the group by number of attacks remain the security forces with 831 attacks out of the 2325 ones carried out by the group's history. This represents 36% of total attacks but in term of casualties, security forces accounted for over 50% of the death toll. In second position comes the civilians, representing 24% of the group's total attacks and 30% of their causalities. I asserted in my second hypothesis that these numbers would be reversed but the main focus of the FARC remain to clash with the government and therefore its security forces. The last one on the podium in term of attacks are the infrastructure targets, accounting for 17% of the total attacks but insignificant for the death count.

I thought the rate of attacks on civilians would be much higher but the end result makes sense with our introduction on the Marxist Paradox [271]: the group became quickly well-structured and turned into a massive guerilla movement that the government could not ignore. The FARC became public enemy number one for decades in the country, often being the main narrative for presidential campaigns, before the drug war itself.

No shift of target can be observed through the years contrarily to Ahmed's analysis of civilians becoming the main targets over decades passing. As previously mentioned, the only significant event that has a direct statistical result is the loss of 3 out of the 7 most important leaders of the FARC, including Marulanda himself in 2008. The two most

[270] Cohen, *Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence*
[271] Balcells and Kalyvas, *Revolutionary Rebels and the Marxist Paradox*

important peaks of attacks from the FARC were in 1991 and 1997 with both 145 attacks each. The first one is a direct consequence of the seizure of the FARC Secretariat Headquarters, la Casa Verde, in December 1990. While for 1997, it was right between one of the most violent period of the FARC: 1996-1998, which corresponds to their plan prepared a decade before: the fourth phase, attacking a city and disrupting the infrastructure.



Table 3: Total FARC attacks and causalities

Target	Attacks	Casualities
Business	299	312
Civilian	552	1694
Government	232	567
Infrastructur	405	65
Rival	6	16
Security	831	2989
Total	2325	5643

Table 4: Chi Square of FARC targets based on Ahmed's models

FARC	Political	Civil	Security	Business	Rival	Infrastructur	Total
LW	0,000496	0,219264	1,85012	1,509988	0,782687	6,373598	10,73615
RW	0,464567	0,241342	14,43614	2,810459	2,095774	0,451899	20,50018
Religous	0,000177	0,237857	1,169875	0,089831	8,516147	1,163804	11,17769
Environment	0,00574	0,48691	11,75057	5,849824		44,32509	62,41813
NS/Reli	0,16282	1,163511	0,19708	0,006123	20,8866	2,712199	25,12833
NS/LW	0,349247	0,004965	3,544153	0,205337	1,166247	0,130597	5,400547





PKK

The use of violence by the PKK has been justified by academics because it is based on a political agenda (the 1978 Ocalan Manifesto: The Path of the Kurdistan Revolution) and because there were no other way to express their grievances as the party was banned from the Turkish's political system since its onset.[272] The Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan was founded on November 1978 based on Abullah Ocalan's work which aimed at the destruction of colonialism and the construction of a united Kurdistan that would gather workers, peasants and intellectuals.[273] The group was founded - like many national revolutionary movements - by students, in the Turkish capital, Ankara. During its early years, it was seen as the only Kurdish organization functioning like professional revolutionaries in the meaning that activists were soldiers who spent every day involved in the fight with a proper hierarchy and division of work.[274]

While Ocalan has always been in charge of the political orientations of the group, the PKK always had state sponsors that played a crucial role in defining its targets or recruitment. By chronological order, these state sponsors have been: Greece, Syria, Russia, Iraq, Iran, Armenia and the United-States. Naturally, although all states did not play the same role and were not crucial in determining the PKK policies, Syria has historically been the closest ally of the organization along Iran in their regional proxy war against Turkey while the US and Western countries supported the organization since 2011 to fight ISIS.

Finally, it should kept in mind that the PKK was founded on Marxist ideological ground but quickly adopted an ethnic separatist agenda that scholars linked to Fanon through the New Man theory and the group also adopts a particular doctrine on religion (they are mostly Muslim Sunni) that tolerates others religions in the group but also put an emphasis

[272] Jongerden, J. and Akkaya, A. (2011). *Born from the left: the making of the PKK.* In: M. Casier and J. Jongerden, *Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue* (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics) *1st Edition*, 1st ed. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, pp.123-142.
[273] Ibid
[274] Grojean, O. (2008). *La production de l'Homme nouveau au sein du PKK*. European Journal of Turkish Studies, [online] (8). Available at: https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/2753

on women's empowerment.[275] Jongerden contests this description of the group and presents the PKK as a secular movement that does not use the ethnic or nationalist discourse to justify its liberation struggle. Indeed, the PKK should be seen as a creation of the Turkish's left that quickly shifted to the liberation struggle through the creation of a new man, similar to the ideals of the African decolonization, championed by Fanon's master book, the Wretched of the Earth.[276]

Hierarchy

It is interesting to note that the organization was founded with Ocalan at its center and not its top, which contrasts drastically with vertical structures that most insurgencies adopt. The Marxist-Leninist ideas can be seen here, with a network of militias with a guide in the middle to lead the ideological foundation. Marks of Leninism on the vanguard idea can also be found with Ocalan being the supreme decision-taker, in theory, for all aspects of Kurdish life and armed forces. There was and still is a total devotion by the fighters towards Ocalan, for instance self-criticism is applied to everyone, new recruits and officers alike, but the only person that cannot be criticized is the leader himself. Many gestures and habits were forbidden as they were Ocalan's privileges, there was an almost religious cult of the personality, far from the Marxist grounds of the group.

There are two leadership within the PKK hierarchy: First, there is the "strategic leadership" guided by Ocalan that gives the general directions to the group, the main political agenda. Second there is the "tactical leadership" guided by the Central Committee that ensure all the policies taken by the leader are well set up. As Grojean points out, it allows Ocalan to avoid any blame in case of failures and put it directly on the Central Committee tactical mistakes.[277] This structure is nothing new, while communism refuses admiration of a leader on theory, most communist's revolutions turned out that way: a single leader deciding for all aspects and a political party enforcing his will. More globally than communism, it is how universalist totalitarian regimes work.

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[275] Beren, F. (2012). *The Action Profile of PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization*. Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika, 8(29), pp.87-106.
[276] Jongerden, J. (2019). *The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK): Radical Democracy and the Right to Self-Determination beyond the Nation-State*. In: G. Stansfield and M. Shareef, ed., The Kurdish Question Revisited, 1st ed. London: Hurst Publishers, pp.245-258.
[277] Grojean, *La production de l'Homme nouveau au sein du PKK*

These two leaderships composed the Central Executive Committee. The tactical leadership, officially the Central Committee, was composed of the 6 founders and most seniors military members of the PKK aside Ocalan: Cemil Bayik, Duran Kalkan, Murat Karayilan, Halil Atac, Haydar Kaytan and Mustafa Karasu.[278] They presided over different sub-committees, the two most important ones being the armed forces (the People Liberation Army, renamed ARGK) and the external center which is in charge of securing funding, mass activities, intelligence gathering and everything related to external operations (the ERNK).[279] A new structured was adopted in 2005 in order to shift from a military-ruled hierarchy to committees more focused on Kurdish daily life policies but fundamentally nothing changed as the regional committees in charge of flowing the information bottom-up were never been created. It was a necessity to restructure the system as the PKK did not have much fighting activities in the years following Ocalan's arrest in 1999, but they resumed to it in 2011.

While there is a defined hierarchy in the group exactly like any other professional army (activists, group leader, officers, commanders and so on), all have to integrate the same attitude and behavior otherwise they will be "punished" through the criticism rounds regularly organized where everyone can speak freely. This is a major difference with professional armies where officers and higher ranks usually have less disciplinary obligations than the new recruits or captains. The hierarchy of the PKK has remained the same since 1986 and even remained so after Ocalan's arrest because Turkey, which understood well the risk of collapse and anarchy from PKK members without direct orders, allowed him to send introductions to its members. A decrease of attacks from 1999 should be observed as the Turkish army started holding Ocalan and controls his guidance sent to the PKK. And that has been absolutely the case, as it can be seen from Figure 7. There has been a total drop of activities in the PKK following 1999, and the group is only properly active again since 2011 in their fight against ISIS, reaching a peak of casualties in 2016 dating back from 1992. This hypothesis echoes Jordan's finding and arguments on the role of a "charismatic leader" where he used Abdullah Ocalan as a prime case of successful

[278] Fragnito, R. (2007). *PKK Funding: Operations And Methods*. [online] Wikileaks. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/30/303557_intern-robert-fragnito-on-watch-.html
[279] Karaca, A. (2010). *Disrupting Terrorist Networks: An analysis of the PKK terrorist organization*. Naval Postgraduate School.

leadership decapitation.[280] Robert Pape sought to understand the strategy of suicide terrorism and included the Kurds in his analysis but did not find the PKK suicide attacks campaigns as successful and also attributed the fall of the group activities to leadership decapitation.[281] This cult around the charismatic leadership has also been argued by White who describes Ocalan as a symbolic leader whose role is to inspire the organization and provide general political directions.[282] It was Ocalan's mission before and after his arrest in 1999. While the group continued to operate, it drastically decreased its activities and even saw 1,500 fighters leave the group in the years following Ocalan's arrest, rather surprising given that desertion is punishable by death penalty in the group. Cemil Bayik was appointed as the new leader of the PKK although his proximity with Iran and insubordination to Ocalan's direct orders were counter-weighted by Karayılan who was the leader of the military wing.[283]

Recruitment

The third Congress of 1986 had the objective to structure in all aspects of the political and military indoctrination of the Kurds by establishing various organisms that would prevent dissent and betrayals. It was decided that all families living in Kurdish areas would send someone to the revolutionary forces. Training would take place at the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon at the Mahsum Korkmaz Academy. It then moved to Damas in 1993 and finally to Iraq's Kurdistan in 1998. The school lasted for 3 months and contrary to Hezbollah, leaving training was strictly forbidden. The first 2 months were dedicated to political indoctrination through Ocala's theories and on the concept of self-criticism while the last month was dedicated to military training. Although all PKK fighters did not attend the academy, many were trained directly in their units and they all had to take an oath of loyalty to the party, members, leaders and the cause. Nothing new here as most professional armies have the same system. A concept much less common is that upon arrival to their military units or academy, the recruits were given a new name which symbolized their acceptance to leave their former lives behind and create their new versions of themselves. In training, recruits had very little free time and when they did it was used for common sports with the leaders

[280] Jordan, *When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation*
[281] Pape, *The strategic Logic of suicide terrorism*
[282] White, P. (2000). *Primitive rebels or revolutionary modernizers? The Kurdish national movement in Turkey*. London & New York: Zed Books, pp.1-53
[283] Fragnito, *PKK Funding: Operations And Methods*

themselves, everything was designed to not leave them the option of looking back. It was not subtle either, they were often reminded that 90% of their (recruits') struggle was against themselves and their old personality and only 10% against the external threat (Turks). Everything here follows the usual sociological theories of the New Man.

Social cohesion:

As all nationalist movements, Kurds share among them a common flag, language, myths, heroes, celebrations, martyrs and so on... but probably the most staggering and unique tool for social cohesion particular to the Kurds is the self-criticism aspect obligation. Since the 3rd Congress and the shift from Leninist organization to a national liberation movement with Ocalan as its center, one of the key component of PKK social cohesion has been the motto "What hereby is analyzed is not the person but the society and not the moment but the history", where a work of self-retrospection is asked for all members.[284] This aspect has been largely studied by Grojean who explains the importance of it through regular assemblies where every member assess his own development and has to explain what he improved and what he should improve, criticism from and to other members are allowed and encouraged. The Academy has its own court but there are also several of them across military units, if the self-criticism is not deemed honest enough or if other people criticize a specific member for his "deviant" personality, he will face trial. This can lead to simple punishment if his self-critic was not honest enough or can lead to the death penalty if he had a sexual relation with another member for example.[285] A set of habits were also strictly forbidden, creating a social norm for all PKK fighters: interdiction to drink, smoke, having sexual or platonic relationships, speak with the family and get in contact with former friends or past relationships were all forbidden.

Ideology

The New Man theory has nothing particularly new, according to Grojean, however it is the Italian and Soviet models of the 20s that helped reframe the theory in order to accord

[284] Jongerden and Akkaya, *Born from the left: the making of the PKK*
[285] Grojean, *La production de l'Homme nouveau au sein du PKK*

it to each country.[286] By definition, nationalism stands in contrast with political Islam and communism because of theirs seek for universalism. Yet for mobilizing all forces within a territory, a certain level of universalism is required. This is why the first chapters of the Kurdish manifesto drew inspiration on Marxist-Leninist ideas, with social justice and class struggle. Exactly like Fanon did with his books, but the chapters that remain remembered for Ocalan and Fanon remains those dealing with the particularity of their situation (the colonization) and how to solve it (sheer violence). It is in 1983 that Ocalan introduced the concept of new personality / new man to the Kurdish ideals and the extended his work on it during the first years of the PKK armed training and fights with well-known sociological concepts that can be found in the Fanonian analysis such as "individual emancipation" or "liberated personality". In other words, everything that turned around the self and marked a shift from the Marxist grounds. This argument has clear foundations in Fanon's work, even more so when Ocalan quotes Sartre's preface of "The wretched of the earth", and spends a whole chapter explaining the concept of violence and how it was needed for the PKK. The chapter *On Violence* by Fanon has already been explored and the arguments made by Grojean towards the use of it by the Kurdish organization for creating a new man are exactly the same as mentioned above. It follows the same mystique on violence, using sheer brutality to liberate the self, recovers their identity and reverse the order in their mind in order to create a new man. Burc and Oveisy also linked the PKK ideal to Fanon's work: for the Kurd there is only one destiny: to become a non-Kurd.[287] To change this destiny, they embrace fully their identity and go after the non-Kurd, reversing their identity crisis inflicted upon them, to use Fanon's words.

Another link from Fanon to the PKK is the idea of nation-state as deeply discussed by Jongerden. The primary objective of the PKK was to separate Kurdistan from Turkey and other "colonizers" (Iran, Iraq and Syria), but also to unify the Kurds into a single state. A change from Marxist/Leninist ideas of universalism can be observed here as the PKK calls for a revolution within Turkey in order to change the political sphere and not create a separate Kurd state. Jongerden quotes Ocalan who wrote in 2015 that the initial problem of the PKK was the lack of a clear objective towards the nation-state ideology. He explains that at the

[286] Ibid
[287] Burç, R. and Oveisy, F. (2019). *Rojava Is Under Existential Threat*. [online] Jacobin. Available at: https://jacobinmag.com/2019/02/rojava-united-states-withdrawal-syria-erdogan

end, although the group was built on Marxist/Leninist ideas, it is Stalin's work and views on the importance of the nation-state that convinces them to pursue this objective as well as the wave of liberation movements in the 50s to 70s (decolonization period) which all resulted in a single model: the establishment of a new state.[288] To quote Ocalan "To be a socialist and to give support for the establishment of a state by oppressed and colonized nations were considered one and the same."[289] But this idea was the original idea of the PKK, it did not stay around for the entirety of the organization. Ocalan saw nation-states as a problematic historical construction that subjugates people and does not free them from the colonial state. It forces upon the population a single culture through a centralized assimilation machine. This idea of centrifugal ideologization is the core explanation of Malsevic regarding the relationship between nationalism and war. Criticizing this forced assimilation of language and culture, he states that this forced nationalism inevitably leads to war.[290] [291] Which is the core idea of Ocalan's works. This is why since 2005 the PKK officially changed its ultimate objective. A mere separation of Kurdish areas to form a state was not the goal anymore, now they wanted a democratic confederation which rejects centralization and follow a closer socialist ideal of bottom-up approach (organized in villages, neighborhoods, districts, cities and regions). According to Sebahat Tuncel, a Kurdish PM, this offers a new form of hierarchy than the classic Roman model that modern societies use.[292] Ocalan also explained that the PKK does not want a war of liberation for Kurds only but also for the Turks and that they should participate. This makes the connection with Fanon even more apparent as he was the first one to advocate for a radical change for humankind in its entirety.

Role conflict:

As already lengthily explain and similar to Fanon's analysis, the emphasis for the PKK truly lies on the concept of a New Man and self-criticism to achieve so. The fight "within" that intends to destroy your old-self also allows the PKK to fully embody the new role that has been assign to the recruits upon recruitment. Former academic or worker, Kurd or Turk, man or woman, all give up on their former lives in order to fully accept their new

[288] Jongerden, *The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK): Radical Democracy and the Right to Self-Determination beyond the Nation-State*
[289] Öcalan, A. (2015). *Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization*. 1st ed. New Compass Press.
[290] Malešević, *Nationalism, war and social cohesion*.
[291] Malesevic, S. (2006). Nationalism and the Power of Ideology. In: G. Delanty and K. Kumar, ed., *Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, 1st ed. SAGE Publications, pp.307-319.
[292] Jongerden, *The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK): Radical Democracy and the Right to Self-Determination beyond the Nation-State*

role, and therefore avoid any role conflict.[293] In the recruitment chapter, it has been mentioned that the PKK forbids any contact with the fighters' previous lives or families. To quote Grojean again, "it would seem that many individuals did accept the role assigned to them, and this to such an extent that they became 'agents' rather than actors, instruments at the service of a higher power rather than participants in a common cause."[294] In other words, the PKK does not seem to have any particular role conflict as it has successfully managed to indoctrinated all its 'agents' as we might confirm from the following chapter on the targets.

Military strategy:

Not many attacks should be observed in the first years of the PKK as Ocalan was against violent actions in the first phases of revolutionary movement. The PKK also made its military strategy clear during its 2nd congress when it decided the three necessary stages of the guerrilla warfare: strategic defense, strategic balance and strategic offence. The first one consisted of two steps: armed propaganda carried out from 1982 to 1984 and guerrilla actions that started on the 15 August. The third congress in October 1986 decided to move to the second stage, strategic balance, by increasing the number of armed forces.

There are some evidences to these theoretical claims, while the PKK was founded in 1979, the first attacks recorded are from 1984 and the first general waves of violence started from 1988 onwards. These 1984 attacks play a crucial role in shaping the PKK according to Jongerden and Akkay. This '15 August' marked the first attack not only on security forces but also on "Kurdish enslavement and colonial dictatorship"[295]. The GTD shows that indeed these were the first attacks but Jongerden and Akkay mentioned previous ones on civilians, not on security forces, but no data of these mentioned attacks could be found.

Data Analysis

My selected dataset identified 2221 attacks happening between 1984 and 2017, killing 4937 people, perpetuators excluded. The result is explicit enough: 54% of the attacks

[293] Dorronsoro, G., Grojean, O. and Hersant, J. (2008). *Surveiller, normaliser, réprimer*. European Journal of Turkish Studies, [online] 8. Available at: https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/3112
[294] Grojean, *La production de l'Homme nouveau au sein du PKK*
[295] Jongerden, *The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK): Radical Democracy and the Right to Self-Determination beyond the Nation-State*

done by the PKK targeted security forces, counting for 70% of the fatalities. The second target, unsurprisingly are the civilians that amounted for 24% of PKK attacks and 21% of their total fatalities. Completing the podium are business, accounting for 10% of their attacks but barely 2% of fatalities, dropping in 5th position in term of deaths.

The first attacks of the group were from the infamous and already discussed 15th of August 1984 but the "core" of the attacks came five later from 1989 to 1999 until Ocalan was arrested. This first period amounted for 48% of total attacks but surprisingly the efficacy was much higher as it accounted for 69% of total deaths. For each attack, there was an average of 3 fatalities during this period. The second stage was in the decade following Ocalan arrest who told them to stop although Bayik ignored several of his messages and led some campaigns as the 120 attacks from 2000 to 2010 can attest. It also was the period where 1500 members left the group. Facing disintegration, lack of structural hierarchy, it really came as a surprise that the group stayed alive. Third stage was the revival of the struggle with Turkey and the regional conflict with the rise of ISIS. This period, 2011-2017 also accounted for 47% of total attacks but for barely 20% of total fatalities, meaning there were less deaths than attacks themselves. A difference that can eventually explained if the targets had changed and a shift towards business or infrastructures was made, but quite the opposite, never the PKK has targeted so much security forces yet with much less efficiency.

These are the 3 stages identified but it is accurate to say that they only show a global trend with particular events easily noticed. Beren uses Bal to classify the group actions in four headings before the 2011 revival of the group[296]:

1. ‘Intensive terror’ between 1984 and 1989, 1984 marks the first attacks of group with the now already discussed August 15th, according to the statistical analysis of the GDP I found 31 attacks killing 153 people during these 5 years.
2. ‘Attempt to proceed to the guerrilla stage’ between 1989 and 1995. This is clearly the most active period of the group, easily noticed on our graphics as the peak of the insurgency: 825 attacks making 2809 fatalities for this stage.

[296] Beren, *The Action Profile of PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization*

3. ‘Intensive terror’ again encompassing large cities between 1995 and 1999. This period was much more deadly than the first wave of attacks with 350 dead but pale in comparison of the previous years.
4. ‘Terror, passive disobedience and politization’ between 1999 and 2005. This period following Ocalan's arrest was marked by desertions of the members and struggle of leadership with Bayik taking power. But for Bal, through Beren again, he believes that the inaction of the PKK at this period was due to a variety of factors: first the group was shocked by Ocalan's arrest and even more by his orders to stop fighting and leave Northern Iraq. Then came 9/11 and the world started paying attention to terrorism, forcing the PKK to stay silent for a while. Then came the Iraq invasion in 2003 which gave the PKK an opportunity to safely live in the northern Iraq again and use the region as training bases. From there, the group decided to get more into the political branches while training the recruits in Iraq. The last shift came after Beren's paper was published, since the 2011 Arab Spring appeared and in 2014 came the fight against ISIS.

Perhaps the most surprisingly result found in this data analysis was the extremely low number of fatalities in rival factions although there are many Kurdish political and armed forces. The PKK was built on the experiences and failures of previous factions and has historically tried to aligned politically with some of these factions (TKPD, KIP, KUK, KDP, TKSP, TIP, Tekosin, Sterka Sor and so on...). Ocalan concluded that the fall of Kurdish parties were due to the fact that they precipitated their violent actions in early stages of their establishment, when they were still too weak. Although the result came out as a surprise, it goes in the direction of our hypothesis based on Fanon's explanation on the solidarity required between oppressed minorities in the face of the colonizer. Perhaps the true surprise is the lack of known allies among non-state actors. When checking the START BAAD list of allies and rivals’ year per year, it appeared that the first public allied of the PKK came in 2008, the Kurdistan Free Life Party.[297] The reader should remain cautious about the dataset I used and therefore this thesis’s results as opposites evidences were found on the lack of attacks on rivals. Kacara states that there has been a wave of attacks on rivals from 2004 and 2006 when the EU and US designed the PKK on their list of terrorist

[297] Asal, Victor H. and R. Karl Rethemeyer, *Big Allied and Dangerous Dataset Version 2*

organizations and a number of rival factions came to light, Ocalan did not have a choice but to resume attacks after 5 quiet years.[298] Yet, I did not find any evidences of that on statistical analysis, there has been zero attacks on rival factions between 1997 and 2012.



Table 5: PKK total attacks and causalities

Target	Attacks	Casualities
Business	299	312
Civilian	552	1694
Government	232	567
Infrastructur	405	65
Rival	6	16
Security	831	2989
Total	2325	5643

[298] Karaca, *Disrupting Terrorist Networks: An analysis of the PKK terrorist organization*

Table 6: Chi Square of PKK targets based on Ahmed's models

FARC	Political	Civil	Security	Business	Rival	Infrastructur	Total
LW	0,000496	0,219264	1,85012	1,509988	0,782687	6,373598	10,73615
RW	0,464567	0,241342	14,43614	2,810459	2,095774	0,451899	20,50018
Religous	0,000177	0,237857	1,169875	0,089831	8,516147	1,163804	11,17769
Environment	0,00574	0,48691	11,75057	5,849824		44,32509	62,41813
NS/Reli	0,16282	1,163511	0,19708	0,006123	20,8866	2,712199	25,12833
NS/LW	0,349247	0,004965	3,544153	0,205337	1,166247	0,130597	5,400547





Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to answer whether the political ideologies of terrorist organizations have a direct link with the selection of their targets. There have been several papers directly addressing the potential correlation but they were either case studies[299,300,301] or a Large-N analysis[302] of terrorist groups' targets. For explaining the latter results, I decided to investigate the role of the establishment of the armed forces, based on the idea of Wagner who connects successful insurgencies and their bureaucratic elements.[303] The scope of this paper is limited to the three main revolutionary ideologies of the 20th century: Khomeinism, Marxism/Leninism and Fanonian. I used Janowitz's framework[304] of the military establishment to understand how these ideologies structure, in theory, the organization of their ideological armed forces.

Firstly, I broke down Janowitz's model which is divided in four main sections: hierarchy and authority; recruitment and training; social cohesion and techniques of organizational control. I reviewed the academic literature on these four topics to compare them with the author's arguments. I then applied his model to each of the ideology, breaking down the four mentioned sections to Khomeini's book, *Islamic and Revolution*; to Marx's *Communist Manifesto* and Lenin's *State and Revolution* and finally to Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*. Following this analysis, I formulated three hypotheses, suggesting which targets are most likely to be attacked by insurgency movements as a result of these ideologies. I directly applied Ahmed's findings on the statistical correlation between terrorist groups' ideologies and target selection to my hypotheses. In a third section, I applied Janowitz's model to three case studies, one for each ideology, and analyzed their targets with the Global Terrorism Database. Similarly, to Ahmed, I argue that insurgency movements do not randomly chose their targets but carefully select them based on their ideologies. Below is the summary of these statistical findings:

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[299] Drake, *The role of ideology in terrorists' target selection*

[300] Asal & All, *The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection*

[301] De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, *Killing for Something? A new Approach to the Analysis of Target Selection in Terrorist Organizations*

[302] Ahmed, *Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection*

[303] Wagner, *Political Ideology and Revolutionary Theory: Case studies of Russia and Peru compared*

[304] Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*

- According to Khomeinism, the leadership should be assumed by an Islamic council and a supreme leader taking the place of Imam Mahdi as the guide of the insurgency. Unlike International laws, Islamic laws do not care about national boundaries and focus on fighting Muslim rebels. The redundancy of this target in Khomeini's work and other Islamic scholars' papers led me to hypothesis that the biggest target of Islamic insurgencies would therefore be rival factions (according to the GDP classification). Still from his book, I established that the second target would be security forces, mostly foreign ones, as he vividly denounced the Western armed forces. Finally, civilians should complete the podium as their killing can be accepted if deemed necessary for the greater good of the Muslim community. Ahmed's results are in line with my hypothesis as she statistically shows that religious groups tend to mostly attack rivals, then security forces and finally civilians. This trinity of targets is also illustrated by the Hezbollah's case study as they are the three main targets for the group according to my analysis of the GTD.

- Communism, based on Marx and Lenin's works, is by definition against any kind of bureaucracy, hierarchy, internal rules and the armed forces should not be paid but drafted among the working class. Due to the poor nature of the recruitment and the lack of clarity for the objective of the armed forces, this paper argued that civilians would indirectly be among the first targets, seconded by government assets as they are the ultimate objective to overthrow, and finally security forces as clashes with them at early stages of the rebellion will necessarily happen. Ahmed's statistics do not support this hypothesis as businesses take up the first position of left-wing's targets followed by civilians. In my analysis of the FARC, the group does not fall in line with Ahmed's finding nor with my hypothesis, given that security forces, civilians and infrastructure are the respective order of the group's targets. The fact that security forces are the first targets over civilians has a reasonable explanation: the FARC quickly became one of the world's largest guerilla organization, attracting the Colombian government's full attention on it, even more than the drug cartels at

their peak. This attraction, called the Marxist Paradox[305], automatically brought numerous clashes between the FARC and Colombian security forces.

- Fanonian, similarly to Leninism, believes in a political party to lead the masses and explains comprehensively the required sense of brotherhood among the colonized while recruitment for armed forces should be based on free will. In addition, Fanon's theory of the New Man is properly explained throughout his works. The targets are indirectly but well described: security forces first and foremost, civilians secondly as they are the colonizer and finally infrastructure as they represent the materialist symbol of the government. This hypothesis on nationalistic objectives and targets finds some evidences into Ahmed's results who found that nationalist/separatist/left-wing groups tend to attack mostly security forces, then businesses and finally infrastructures. Unsurprisingly in the analysis of the PKK, security forces represent the large majority of the group's actual targets, followed by civilians and finally business targets.

My hypothesis on Khomeinism can find support in Ahmed's results and in my findings on Hezbollah. Ahmed's statistics do not support my second hypothesis on Marxism/Leninism and data on FARC's victims do not match the hypothesis nor her findings. Finally, Ahmed's results party agree with my hypothesis for Fanonian's ideology, the second target being different. The PKK has a closer statistical relation with Ahmed's findings than with my hypothesis. Now that this thesis gave an alternative result to whether ideology has an impact on the selection of target, I will quickly regroup and summarize the analyses of each group under the lens of Janowitz's framework.

The first one is hierarchy and leadership. Charismatic leaders have always been in the popular culture for leading a revolution but a strong hierarchy is also crucial for any insurgency group in order to stick to its ideological targets. This was proven in the case of Hezbollah with its symbolic leadership through the Ayatollahs and Imams in Shia belief. Marxism and Fanonian ideologies show bigger reticence towards hierarchy but the analyzed

[305] Balcells and Kalyvas, *Revolutionary Rebels and the Marxist Paradox*

groups, FARC and PKK, have a well-defined hierarchy, albeit one that has for objective to control the group rather than to lead it.

The second section touches upon recruitment and training. There is a fair amount of literature explaining the motives for an individual to join an insurgency movement. Between greed and grievance, the latter has been proven to be more efficient to keep a strong social cohesion in the group and is associated with a smaller likelihood of targeting civilians.[306] But this thesis explored three ideologies, so the insurgencies following them already use grievance over greed to recruit. This argument holds true for the three groups with various differences. The Hezbollah has a lengthy and selective recruitment process in order to solely hire soldiers with the best physical and ideological conditions but it pays them with an attractive salary as well. The FARC does not pay its members, which leads to conclude that its members are in the group for ideological reasons, although the poor economic conditions of Colombia made the recruitment for the FARC rather easy, especially as they did not hesitate to recruit children. Finally, the PKK, although it has the shortest recruitment and training process, is based on a common ethnic objective and common grievance on the persecution of Kurds by the various countries in the region. No easy conclusions can be drawn from this analysis as all three groups recruit based on grievance. On the other hand, the lengthy recruitment and training of the Hezbollah fighters can be linked to its smaller selection of civilian as targets as compared to the FARC and the PKK. These two finalize a recruitment without proper verification of the ideological belief nor the physical condition of its news soldiers.

The third part is the section on social cohesion and military discipline. To ensure the fighters' commitment to the group, all armed forces have a certain set of disciplinary code to show the soldier that the stick is also an option for respecting its daily tasks. Based on Janowitz's, Perlmutter[307], Kenny[308] and Gutiérrez-Sanín's[309] papers, I deduced that strict disciplinary rules would lead to a better acceptance of the targets and therefore fewer civilian causalities. The opposite turned out to better reflect reality: the PKK has by far the strictest

[306] Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. (2006). *Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War*. American Political Science Review, 100(3), pp.429-447
[307] Perlmutter, *The military and politics in modern times*
[308] Kenny, *Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations*
[309] Gutiérrez-Sanín, *The FARC's militaristic blueprint*

disciplinary code out of the tree organizations and showed the highest desertion rate, followed by the FARC who also had a strong disciplinary code. On the other hand, the Hezbollah does not have particular internal rules and its members are well-known for partying regularly in Beirut, usually coming from well-off families. A lack of discipline that has exasperated its sponsor, the Iranian government, but that also led the members to feel comfortable in the group and respect their ideological targets. While civilians represent a quarter of FARC and PKK's targets, they represent less than a fifth of Hezbollah's ones.

This thesis was limited to the scope of three selected case studies and relying on the GTD to prove its hypotheses. While the link between leadership and a group's longevity has already been established by Jordan[310], it would be interesting to further establish the relationship between the longevity of the recruitment process and the group's target selection. Independently, a qualitative research establishing the potential correlation between social cohesion (national/ethnic/religious homogeneity) and civilian causalities would be crucial to understand how insurgency movements should divide their units. With these further researches, the field would have a better statistical understanding of the relationship between the bureaucracy of insurgencies and target selection.

[310] Jordan, When Heads Roll: *Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation*

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Appendices

Appendix no. 1: Methodology for cleaning Hezbollah dataset (text)

I used the GTD and cleaned it to solely keep the necessary data. Then I added the data collected by Robert A.Pape[311] on the 3 wave of terrorist attacks from Hezbollah in the 80s: on US/France, then against Israel, finally against Israel and its allied militia, the Southern Lebanon Army (SLA). I added 23 entries, 3 of them were matching existing lines within the CTD that didn't had the number of kills filled in. The rest were inserted, respecting the date, target, type of weapon and method. Regarding the Tyre bombings, Pape didn't insert the 1982 attacks and his numbers for the 1983 attacks don't match those given by Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[312]

These are the following present in the database, mostly due to hijack so I had to decide which were the targets:

<u>The 1989 bombing of a French airline (UTA flight 772):</u>
It is considered by many academics as the direct product of Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, but the official governments responses were against Libya. It is believed that the target was Israel[313], in response to the capture Abdel Karim Obeid[314], although the victims were mostly French and Chadians. The nationality of the victims also paved the road to a theory in which the motivation of the act was against France and their growing support for Chad against the Libyan government. This is the official narrative as Qaddafi was judged responsible for this crash.
Due to the lack of literature on this incident, the last of consensus on whether it was Hezbollah or not and to the non-official international answer to it, I deleted it from the dataset, although the killing of 171 civilians shouldn't represent a simple forgotten statistic.

311 Pape, The strategic logic of suicide terrorism, 2003
312 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000
313 Caldwell and Williams, 2016
314 Starr-Deelen, 2014

1984 Hijack:

The seizure of Kuwait Airways Flight 221 dragged on for six days in 1984. Two of the passengers—officials with the U.S. Agency for International Development—were shot, their bodies dumped on the tarmac in Tehran. As the targets were officials, I classified this act as "Government Target". The dataset also shows the death of 4 people but all the records I found on this act talk about 2 killed so I changed this cell.

1985 Hijack:

The TWA Flight 847 is also listed as Airport, but the hijacked resulted in the death of one of the hostage out of 170, a US soldier.[315] I therefore classified this act as "Security Target" while the end target was obviously the US government.

1985 Attack at Madrid Airport:

Bombing at the Trans World Airlines and British Airways offices in Madrid, killing one woman and injuring 27. A follow-up submachine gun shooting and attempted grenade attacks on the Alia Royal Jordanian Airline office injured two. Linked to the Abu Nidal Organization which is another name for the Fatah Revolutionary Council, so not related directly to the Hezbollah like the dataset suggested, I therefore deleted it from the list.

1985 Bombings in Copenhagen:

Bombing at the desk of an American airline and the grand synagogue. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility through an anonymous call to the press, not even by an official statement, and no connection has been proven. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service doesn't even mention their names when it retraces the history of terrorism in the country.[316] For this reason, I deleted it from the list.

1986 Hijack:

For the Iraqi Airways Flight 163 hijacked in 1986, the Islamic Jihad (widely accepted to be the original ground of Hezbollah) took credit for the attack that costed the lives 62 civilians. I therefore categorized this attack as civilian target and not infrastructure.

[315] Sciolino, 1988
[316] Danish Security and Intelligence Service, n.d.

1988 Hijack:

Like the 1984 and 1985 hijacking, this one was later attribute to Imad Mughniyah who lunched a series of hijacks/bombings to get his brother-in-law free, Mustafa Badreddine. They were both later designed as the masterminds behind the asymmetrical strategies of the new Hezbollah's armed wing.[317] Two kuwaiti civilians were shot dead in this attack so I count the attack as civilian target.

1988 Attack on a Greek boat:

This gunman attack that killed 8 civilians was attributed to the Abu Nidal Organization. I therefore did not take it in account in our dataset.

Appendix no.2: Methodology for cleaning FARC dataset (text)

I classified the Airport as infrastructures except for the hostage taking and hijacking attack types that I categorized as civilian targets. Wishing the hostage taking I made an exception as well for the 2012 attack on a radio station, after verification it turned out that the attack was purely intended to destroy the facility but a policeman was over there during the bombings, so I maintain the target for this attack as Infrastructure. For the maritime target, I count them all civilian because of the method was hostage taking or armed assault every time, except for the 1998 attack on the port which is classified as Infrastructure attack. For the communication, all bombings were considered as infrastructure but the armed assaults and assassinations as civilians. Same goes for transport and utilities target, I classified them as infrastructure except if the method was armed assault by guns, which I therefore classified as civilian. The 2005 case where 9 farmers were killed as a result of a dynamite activate by distance was considered as civilians target.

I also deleted the 41 cases where the target was unknown.

I also cleaned the dataset from repetitions such as the bus attacks in 1994, December 22nd: the dataset shows 3 times the exact same attacks that killed 11 people, I only kept one line.

[317] Wright, 2016

Appendix no.3: Methodology for cleaning PKK dataset (text)

Again, I deleted all 20 unknown targets as there wasn't any data to understand who were the targets. I classified all the Utilities target (oil and gas) as Infrastructure although it could be argued that they were businesses and should be classified as such. I simply followed Ahmed's methodology to keep the results as close as her ones. It is on the Transportation that I had to manually pick which ones should be considered as such or not. The 3 unknown attack types were classified as Civilian attacks give the number of fatalities. The hostages taking, assassinations and armed assaults were also counted as Civilian as they were not aiming to disrupt the transport system but to kill. The hijacking that resulted in the suicide of attacker was deleted from the list as he was the only causality.

After checking all attacks, I classified all hostage taking, assassinations, armed assaults and bombings as Civilian target as they all had fatalities or used indiscriminate weapons (RPG or landmines). The only attacks I classified as Infrastructure are those on Facility/Infrastructure attack as they didn't leave any causality and had for objective to disrupt the traffic.

Appendix no.4: Data used – Hezbollah (table)

Attacks	Business	Civilian	Government	Infrastructur	Rival	Security
1983	0	1	5	2	0	6
1984	1	3	5	1	0	3
1985	9	5	7	1	14	3
1986	1	10	1	0	2	1
1987	6	3	7	1	0	1
1988	0	1	4	1	1	3
1989	0	2	0	1	1	3
1990	0	1	1	0	9	2
1991	0	2	3	0	8	11
1992	0	3	2	0	13	17
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	6	0	0	18	14
1995	1	1	0	0	11	14
1996	0	2	0	0	10	8
1997	0	1	2	0	10	6
1998	0	3	0	0	5	9
1999	0	4	0	0	8	9
2000	0	1	0	0	5	4
2001	0	1	0	0	0	0
2002	0	1	1	0	0	2
2003	0	2	0	0	0	0
2004	1	0	0	0	0	2
2005	0	0	0	0	0	1
2006	1	5	0	0	0	6
2007	0	0	0	0	0	0
2008	0	4	3	0	3	1
2009	0	0	0	0	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0	0	0
2011	0	0	0	0	0	0
2012	1	4	0	0	1	0
2013	0	4	1	0	0	2
2014	0	0	0	0	0	9
2015	0	0	0	0	0	1
2016	1	0	0	0	1	1
2017	0	1	0	0	0	0

Fatalities	Business	Civilian	Government	Infrastructur	Rival	Security
1983	0	0	71	1	0	349
1984	0	3	25	2	0	8
1985	29	3	2	1	170	39
1986	1	96	1	0	4	2
1987	0	0	0	0	0	2
1988	0	0	3	2	3	14
1989	0	0	0	0	1	1
1990	0	0	0	0	25	0
1991	0	0	0	0	8	13
1992	0	4	31	0	11	26
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	85	0	0	8	14
1995	0	1	0	0	14	13
1996	0	1	0	0	7	15
1997	0	1	1	0	4	9
1998	0	13	0	0	6	10
1999	0	3	0	0	3	12
2000	0	0	0	0	9	2
2001	0	0	0	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0	0	0	0
2003	0	1	0	0	0	0
2004	0	0	0	0	0	2
2005	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	0	17	0	0	0	29
2007	0	0	0	0	0	0
2008	0	51	4	0	1	0
2009	0	0	0	0	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0	0	0
2011	0	0	0	0	0	0
2012	0	2	0	0	7	0
2013	0	6	1	0	0	0
2014	0	0	0	0	0	0
2015	0	0	0	0	0	2
2016	0	0	0	0	4	0
2017	0	3	0	0	0	0

Appendix no.5: Data used – FARC (table)

Attacks	Business	Civilian	Government	Infrastructur	Rival	Security
1975		1				
1976	2					
1977	6	8	2	3		4
1978	4	9	4			6
1979	10	14	1			15
1980	6	7	3			8
1981	5	16	1	2		22
1982	10	18	2			17
1983	6	22	5	1	1	40
1984	5	21		1		21
1985	4	10	1	1		18
1986	5	7	3			16
1987	1	16	1			45
1988	1	18	3	1		35
1989	1	3	2		1	18
1990	1	5	1	7		15
1991	12	16	12	43		62
1992	10	14	1	5		24
1993						
1994	6	10	4	1		18
1995	8	4	6	1		27
1996	8	16	10	4		29
1997	13	46	26	27	3	30
1998	2	5	2	4		9
1999	5	18	2	1		17
2000	19	17	8	7		13
2001	2	20	12	5		9
2002	12	28	25	21		23
2003	9	9	8	22		13
2004	4	9	2	2		7
2005	2	8	4	2		14
2006	5	6	7	9		5
2007	1	6	3	3		10
2008	18	22	12	29		6
2009	21	34	19	26		4
2010	28	32	18	29		13
2011	15	24	9	24		11
2012	7	7	3	25		42
2013	3	4	2	29	1	63
2014	15	12	6	38		67
2015	7	7	1	32		28
2016		3	1			7

Fatalities	Business	Civilian	Government	Infrastructur	Rival	Security
1975		2				
1976	0					
1977	3	10	1	0		14
1978	11	13	2			16
1979	13	45	1			40
1980	11	22	3			19
1981	6	38	1	0		112
1982	6	61	0			91
1983	1	83	5	0	1	164
1984	9	67		0		70
1985	1	28	0	0		167
1986	13	38	2			59
1987	2	62	1			148
1988	0	79	4	1		228
1989	4	8	2		9	74
1990	0	19	1	0		74
1991	0	37	11	1		235
1992	4	66	0	31		155
1993						
1994	0	23	2	0		45
1995	52	48	1	0		44
1996	16	47	30	4		117
1997	5	143	13	5	5	82
1998	0	13	268	0		156
1999	3	41	12	0		103
2000	0	125	18	0		48
2001	0	99	12	0		17
2002	12	193	42	3		63
2003	45	8	27	0		49
2004	18	21	1	0		20
2005	2	46	12	0		55
2006	7	21	18	3		10
2007	0	28	3	0		24
2008	3	20	8	0		2
2009	4	69	13	4		5
2010	12	18	21	0		2
2011	2	16	7	0		13
2012	5	10	5	12		119
2013	0	2	9	0	1	92
2014	6	8	1	0		70
2015	3	1	1	0		38
2016		1	0			3

Appendix no.6: Data used – PKK (table)

Attacks	Business	Civilian	overnment	rastructure	Rivals	Security
1984						3
1985						
1986						1
1987		4				1
1988	2	10	1			9
1989	6	43	2	1		32
1990	2	30	7	1		81
1991	7	23	4			46
1992	65	81	28	14	6	165
1993						
1994	15	49	9	7	2	99
1995	69	36	7	1		12
1996	2	5	1	2	1	11
1997	3	6	2		3	2
1998	1	5	1	1		2
1999	4	12	5	3		11
2000	1	2	1			
2001			1			
2002						
2003	1	1				1
2004		2	1			6
2005	2	8	8	1		10
2006		6	1	2		7
2007		6	1			7
2008	3	11	5	2		4
2009	2	2				
2010		4	2	5		4
2011	8	17	4			5
2012	5	19	10	9	2	78
2013	3	2		3		9
2014	10	18	4	2	2	19
2015	9	58	8	10	3	234
2016	5	59	14	4	21	240
2017	9	24	8	1	9	92

Fatalities	Business	Civilian	Government	nfrastructure	Rivals	Security
1984						9
1985						
1986						1
1987		55				1
1988	3	37	1			46
1989	2	102	0	0		114
1990	10	57	29	0		351
1991	11	51	1			111
1992	15	286	21	10	8	714
1993						
1994	10	160	22	0	1	723
1995	18	59	6	4		60
1996	6	29	1	0	1	39
1997	6	17	11		65	3
1998	0	3	6	0		16
1999	9	48	4	5		24
2000	0	3	1			
2001			7			
2002						
2003	4	2				5
2004		1	3			11
2005	0	10	0	0		12
2006		8	0	0		18
2007		0	0			12
2008	0	24	0	0		10
2009	1	4				
2010		10		2		1
2011		2	4	9		4
2012	1	1	2	1	4	135
2013	0	0		0		2
2014	0	2	0	0	2	13
2015	3	20	1	1	3	188
2016	4	26	7	0	37	376
2017	11	23	4	2	10	105