

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

Institute of Political Science

**Master thesis**

**2019**

**Cailler Natacha**

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**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

Institute of Political Science

**Natacha Cailler**

**United we stand? European strategic culture  
in the fight against terrorism**

*Master thesis*

Prague 2019

**Author:** Natacha Cailer

**Supervisor:** prof. JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D.

**Academic Year:** 2018/2019

## **Bibliographic note**

CAILLER, Natacha. *United we stand? European strategic culture in the fight against terrorism*. 97 p. Mater thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science. Supervisor prof. JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D

## **Abstract**

As Europe has become a major target of terrorist attacks, especially since 2015, there has been a growing demand for action from the governments. France and Germany have been among those countries affected by the current terrorist threat. Calls for increased European integration and cooperation have been heard and highlight the need for the building of an integrated and comprehensive counterterrorist framework within the European Union. The idea that a common European strategic culture regarding the fight against terrorism might be a significant tool to achieve such a goal is burgeoning in the minds of many. This research project analyses the French and German response to terrorism through the popular discourse towards terrorism, the threat perception of terrorism and immigration, the modalities of the use of force and the institutional structure of counterterrorism. It features the building of a common European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism.

## **Keywords**

**Strategic culture, terrorism, Europe, France, Germany**

**Range of thesis: 165 128 characters**

## **Declaration of Authorship**

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 10/05/2019

**Natacha Cailler**

Institute of Political Science

Master thesis proposal

# United we stand? European strategic culture in the fight against terrorism



**Author:** Natacha Cailler

**Supervisor:** Tomáš Karásek

**Study programme:** International Security Studies

**Year of proposal submission:** 2018

## Topic, Conceptualization and Methodology

The concept of strategic culture has been in the center of a theoretical debate among the international relation scholars in recent years. Used to explain or understand the decisions taken by states and political leaders, and ranking their strategic preferences based on their country's history, culture and behavior, there is however no consensus on a definition of strategic culture and the debate is still ongoing as to the role of the concept within research, as well as its characteristics. As a consequence, strategic culture is a difficult concept to apply consistently due to the variety of possible interpretations. Moreover, there is no definitive answer on whether a European strategic culture exists, and if it does, what are its

characteristics and the scope of its influence over the decisions of political leaders and states. The aim of this project is to look at the European Union and the possibility that EU member states are sharing a set of similar strategic decisions which could, as a result, lead to the building of a European strategic culture. The study will focus on the angle of terrorism in Europe, and the states' response to this new threat. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated on European soil, which in turn, renewed the debate over European defense strategies. "There is a growing demand for the European Union to become more capable, more coherent and more strategic as a global actor."<sup>1</sup> Many are advocating for a deepening and enhancing of European cooperation on defense strategies and policies. This process might be the first step of rapprochement of the EU member states towards the building of a European strategic culture, which would become a tool in the fight against terrorism.

Following the debate outlined above about the existence of similarities within the EU member states' response to the terrorist attacks and the possible link towards the building of a European strategic culture, the research will be focused on two main research questions:

- How have the EU member states responded to the recent terrorist attacks on European soil?
- On what grounds could it suggest the rapprochement of EU members states' decisions towards the formation of a European strategic culture?

By answering to the first question, the study will look at the way states have responded to terrorist attacks on their territory, and how it has affected its actions, views, and the public opinion towards the idea of a European strategic culture. The hypothesis is that, despite the apparent diverging responses by EU member states, there are, in some instances, similarities in the way European states reacted to this new threat. The second question will focus on the possible link between the responses to the terrorist attacks and the existence of a European strategic culture, within the field of defense and the fight against terrorism.

Regarding the case selection, I chose EU member states considering the focus of this project on the European Union. "The United Kingdom, France and Germany stand somewhat apart from the other EU members in terms of their economic resources and political influence as well as their military capabilities, including their troop numbers, their training and military hardware."<sup>2</sup> The United Kingdom will be left aside considering its decision and ongoing process of departing from the European Union. However, the influence of France and Germany over other member states is, in my opinion, what makes them primary targets of this study because of the possible common grounds they could share on the response to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, France and Germany are good starting points concerning the terrorist attacks perpetrated on their territory, as well as their economic importance within the Union. Sweden will be my third case study. Being a Northern European country means that it has a different traditional view on European Union, and its goals and concerns are quite different than the ones of France and Germany in economic terms. Moreover, it has also been the target of recent terrorist attacks. Using these three countries in the study is interesting because of their diverging opinions on cooperation in defense strategy, even though they can all relate to the terrorist threat. "As it is well known, there are

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<sup>1</sup> European Union External Action, [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5393/csdp-capabilities\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5393/csdp-capabilities_en)

<sup>2</sup> Christophe O. Meyer. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union. Pp 7

countries where support for European defence cooperation is historically strong (Benelux, Italy, France) and others where it is stubbornly low (United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ireland).”<sup>3</sup> France, Germany and Sweden are encompassing a range of EU member states seen as diverging in their traditional views on the use of force, and could be described as belligerent, pacifist and neutral. The diversity among the case studies is important for this project because the variety will improve the validity of the study, should the research find similar responses to the terrorist attacks within these countries. Finally, taking into account the importance of using primary sources for research, one of the reason for choosing these cases is possibility to conduct my research in French and Swedish, which I speak, and to a lesser extent in Germany, which I have some basis of the language.

The number of case studies would need to be larger in order to have a better and more complete picture of the questions at hands. However, this is impossible considering the reduced scope and length of this study, as well as the limited time period given for the research project. For these reasons in particular, the timeline which the study will focus on is also reduced. The analysis will span from 2015 to the present day. The decision to work on this particular timeline is also linked to the wave of recent terrorist attacks, which have been growing in number since 2015 in Europe. Moreover, they have been perpetrated in all the three case studies.

To find similarities in the response to terrorist attacks in France, Germany and Sweden that could suggest the existence of a European strategic culture within the field of counterterrorism, components of strategic culture need to be found in the response to the terrorist attacks. The research is going to focus on some of these components: the threat perception towards terrorism and immigration, the authorization mechanisms of the use of force and its degree, the degree and mode of cooperation of the countries in counterterrorism, and the political discourse. In order to categorize and measure these responses, I will use different sources of data. First, the data will be collected through the study of policies and cooperation agreements related to terrorism and what policies have been put forward after the terrorist attacks and what are their purpose. Second, I will use survey to determine the view of the public opinion on key notions related to the fight against terrorism like immigration or the need to build defensive partnerships. Finally, a press analysis will be conducted in each of the case studies to establish a comprehensive review of the political discourse on counterterrorism and the need for cooperation in order to succeed. The analyzed press material will be taken from newspapers representing the political spectrum of each nation. In France, the articles will be taken from *Le Monde*, as center-left newspaper and *Le Figaro*, a center-right newspaper. The German newspapers are the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagsbladet* are the right-center pick for Sweden, which doesn't have a left-wing newspaper of national scope.

### **Literature Review**

Meyer (2006) studied the norms on security and defense policies in the European Union using the case studies of the UK, France, Germany and Poland. He states that national strategic cultures in Europe are distinct from one another, but they still converge towards the creation of a European strategic culture.

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<sup>3</sup> Bastien Irondelle, Frédéric Mérand, Martial Foucault. Public Support for European defence: does strategic culture matter? Pp 366



Four norms are analyzed for each case study, which are used to prove the convergence towards a European strategic culture: what are the legitimate goals to the use of force, what is the risk tolerance, what are the authorization requirements of the use of force, and what are the norms related to cooperation with other states.

Gray (January 1999) addresses the debate between first and third generation of theories on strategic culture, and revisits what he wrote more than a decade ago on the subject. Moreover, he responds to the critics of Alastair I. Johnston as a representative of the third-generation theorists. The author is aware of some shortcomings of the first-generation theory but disagree with Johnston's work, especially his separation of ideas and behaviors in order to explain strategic culture. Colin insists on the concept of strategic culture as a context, which can possibly change over time, but slowly. Context is understood as "that which weaves together". In this sense, strategic culture is a context that helps us to understand the behavior of actors, and not to explain their behavior. It means that the context provides a set of preferences concerning strategic choices to actors. The actors cannot escape this context, but they can however contradict these preferences once they make their strategic decision.

#### French strategic culture

Ruffa (2014) compares the case studies of Israel, Italy and France concerning the societal belief on casualty sensitivity and aversion. Traditionally, French is not averse to casualties in war which should be understood within the larger scope of the military-civilian relationship. Ruffa mentions the armed forces as the first tool used in order to keep the country safe, and the sacrifice of soldiers for the nation which is an important tradition. French strategic culture has two distinct traditions: the legacy of human rights and the importance of promoting them in the world for the political influence of France, but also the Gaullist legacy which emphasizes independent defensive capabilities and an autonomous decision-making process. France's willingness to participate in multinational operations, as well as its capacity to act unilaterally when its interest or citizens abroad are at risk are also important components of the country's societal beliefs. Finally, armed forces play a crucial role in the society but they don't weight a lot in the decision-making process which is left to the executive power.

Tardy (2014) explains that the French position on peacekeeping operations has been stretched over the years between the military culture, and multidimensional operations which require a larger scope of activities. There is an opposition between the tradition of swift and reactive operations and long-term operations which are often required in order to bring peace to fragile countries. France is traditionally a military power that employs the use of force as a foreign policy tool. This led, according to the author, to an identity crisis of the armed forces that oscillate between their traditional role of warriors and their new task during peacekeeping missions. There is a clear paradox between the traditional military prestige the loss to the Nazis during the Second World War. The peacekeeping operations seem to be a way of regaining this prestige. French crisis management policy tends to work through frameworks like the UN or NATO.

#### German strategic culture

Noetzel and Schreer (2008) examine the concept of the use of force in German strategic culture. Germany traditionally has a "culture of restraint" towards the use of force and reserves it for defensive purposes. The legal barriers to the use of force have been dismantled over the years but military force is

still not seen as a policy instrument in the eyes of Germans. The authors mention the transformation of the Bundeswehr (national Army) to allow it to participate in counterinsurgency missions. Unfortunately, Germany is not able to provide a comprehensive strategy in its counterinsurgency missions, leading to a loss of political influence. Noetzel and Schreer describe Germany as an influential power in the international community but emphasize its unwillingness to use force a weakness it needs to overcome in order to meet the expectations of the international community, and to keep its position as an influential power.

Duffield (1999) posits that neorealism failed to predict the security policy in Germany after the reunification because it didn't take into account the cultural variable. The German strategic culture is characterized by feelings of multilateralism and antimilitarism. There is a string distrust of a professional army, and the conscription is supposed to maintain the link between the Bundeswehr and the German population. Stability, continuity and calculability are primary goals in security policy considering the need to have reliable partners and be a reliable partner itself. German strategic culture emphasizes peaceful solutions and reserves the military option as a last resort solution.

#### Swedish strategic culture

Doeser (2016) focuses on the decision of Sweden to participate in the intervention in Libya, in contrary to the Finnish decision to stay out of the intervention, and the impact of each country's strategic culture on their decision. He finds that Sweden is a traditionally non-aligned country, member of the European Union and non-member of NATO. The country is however collaborating with NATO as long as their intervention is authorized by international law. Doeser insists on the promotion of international peace as an important part of Swedish strategic culture, and the fact that their intervention should only happened for defensive as well as humanitarian purposes. Although Swedes are open to peace enforcement, they will likely prefer to intervene for peacekeeping, with the insurance of a UN mandate and a clear leadership to ensure the efficiency of the mission.

Christiansson (2010) challenges the assumption that an evolution in the long-term approach of security is caused by an evolution in identity. He uses conceptual stretching to explain the two-dimensional game of solidarity and sovereignty in the Swedish strategic culture. Domestic and foreign policies can influence each other, pushing towards a larger understanding of the values underlined within the strategic culture. Sweden is traditionally neutral, and this idea has to be maintained as the image for the domestic audience. However, solidarity is also important in order to promote international peace, and to secure sovereignty for the country through cooperation. Christiansson emphasize the widening of the concept of security through the dichotomy between solidarity and sovereignty, as well as the continuing priority of neutrality for the domestic audience. This is achieved by a political discursive and the stretching of the concepts of solidarity, sovereignty and neutrality.

### **Outline**

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- Strategic culture theory

- Methodology

### Section 2: States response to terrorist attacks (France, Germany, Sweden)

- Study of policies related to terrorism
- Study of cooperation agreements related to terrorism
- Surveys
- Press analysis

### Section 3: Grounds for the formation of a European strategic culture

- Threat perception
- Use of force
- Cooperation and partnerships
- Political elite

Conclusion & Discussion

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## Introduction

On January 7<sup>th</sup>, 2015, the French satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo was the target of a terrorist attack, which claimed the lives of 12 people working for the redaction. The slogan “Je suis Charlie” was adopted after the attack as a representation of the freedom of speech and of the freedom of the press. From then on, it has been used as a tribute to the victims of terrorist attacks, with variations such as “Je suis Paris” or “Je suis Orlando”. It highlights the tightening of the international community over the terrorist threat and the increased compassion within its ranks for the victims of terrorist attacks. Moreover, it illustrates the wish of the population to see something happening to reduce the threat and the increased willingness of the governments to cooperate in the fight against transnational terrorism. The recognition of the fight against terrorism as being a part of the strategic culture of a nation is one way of improving the tools available for such purpose.

The concept of strategic culture has been in the center of a theoretical debate among international relation scholars in recent years. Used to explain or understand the decisions taken by states and political leaders, and ranking their strategic preferences based on their country’s history, culture and behavior, there is however no consensus on a definition of strategic culture and the debate is still ongoing as to the role of the concept within research, as well as its characteristics. As a consequence, strategic culture is a difficult concept to apply consistently due to the variety of possible interpretations. Furthermore, there is no definitive answer on whether a European strategic culture exists, and if it does, what are its characteristics and the scope of its influence over the decisions of political leaders and states. The aim of this project is to look at the European Union and the possibility that EU member states have similar strategic behaviors and policies which could, as a result, lead to the building of a European strategic culture. The study will focus on the angle of terrorism, and the states’ response to this threat. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated on European soil, which in turn, renewed the debate over European defense strategies. “There is a growing demand for the European Union to become more capable, more coherent and more strategic as a global actor.”<sup>4</sup> Many are advocating for a deepening and enhancing of European cooperation on defense strategies and policies. This process might be the first step of

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<sup>4</sup> European Union External Action Service, *CSDP capabilities*, [website], 2016, [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5393/csdp-capabilities\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5393/csdp-capabilities_en), (accessed 31 October 2018)

rapprochement of the EU member states towards a common European strategic culture, which could become a tool in the fight against terrorism.

For this reason, the goal of this investigation will be to show the existing overlaps between the response of EU member states to terrorism and their link with the building of a common European strategic culture regarding the fight against terrorism. Therefore, the research question is as follows: Does the European Union have a common strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism?

In order to find overlaps in the EU member states' response to terrorism, I will be focusing on the two main drivers of the European Union: France and Germany. "The United Kingdom, France and Germany stand somewhat apart from the other EU members in terms of their economic resources and political influence as well as their military capabilities, including their troop numbers, their training and military hardware."<sup>5</sup> The United Kingdom will be left aside considering its decision and ongoing process of departing from the European Union. However, the influence of France and Germany over other member states is, in my opinion, what makes them primary targets of this study. Furthermore, France and Germany are good starting points concerning the terrorist attacks perpetrated on their territory, as well as their economic importance within the Union. France and Germany are encompassing a wide range of EU member states in terms of their traditional views on the use of force, which are diverging, despite their common interests in the pursuing and increasing of the integration process within the European Union. The diversity among the case studies is important for this project because the variety will improve the validity of the findings, should the research find similar responses to the terrorist attacks within these countries. Finally, taking into account the importance of using primary sources for research, one of the reasons for choosing these cases is the possibility to conduct my research in French, which I speak, and to a lesser extent in German, which I have some basis of the language.

The number of case studies would need to be larger in order to have a better and more complete picture of the questions at hand. However, it is impossible considering the reduced scope and length of this study. For these reasons, the timeline which the study will focus on is also reduced. The analysis will span from 2015 to the present day, because of the wave of recent terrorist attacks, which have been growing in number since 2015 and have affected the two countries selected as case studies.

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<sup>5</sup> C. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 7.



To find similarities in the response to terrorist attacks in France and Germany that could suggest the existence of a common European strategic culture within the field of counterterrorism, it is necessary to divide the concept of strategic culture into components that can be studied. Those components are: the popular discourse regarding terrorism, the threat perception of terrorism and immigration, the modalities of the use of force regarding terrorism and the institutional structure of counterterrorism. In order to categorize and measure these responses, different sources of data will be used. First, it will be collected through the content coding of newspaper articles to establish a comprehensive review of the popular discourse on terrorism. The analyzed press material will be taken from newspapers representing the political spectrum of each nation. Secondly, I will use surveys to determine the view of the public opinion on terrorism and immigration, as well as strategic documents that are assessing the threats existing for the nations mentioned above. Those strategic documents will also be used to assess what is the strategic orientation of France and Germany regarding the fight against terrorism. Finally, the data will be collected through the study of policies, laws and cooperation agreements related to terrorism that have been put forward after the terrorist attacks and what are their purpose.

The analysis that follows is structured around four main chapters. The first chapter focuses on the theoretical framework, as well as the methodology used and is divided into four sections. The first one zooms in on the concept of strategic culture, the existing debate about its use and definition among scholars, together with the conceptualization of the theory so that it fits into the frame of this research project. The second section clarifies the choice of the case studies, as well as the current status of their national strategic culture. An explanation of the focus on Jihadi terrorism is the subject of the third section. The fourth one deals with the methodology used for this study. The second and third chapters will respectively explore the state of the response to terrorism in France and Germany. Each chapter is divided into five sections linked to the components of strategic culture: the popular discourse, the threat perception, the strategic orientation, the legislative framework and the counterterrorist institutions and bodies. The fourth chapter accounts for the analysis of the empirical data presented above. Its first section focuses on the popular discourse regarding terrorism. The second one deals with the threat perception of terrorism and immigration. The modalities of the use of force is the subject of the third section and the last one focuses on the institutional structure of counterterrorism. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the main findings.

## Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The first chapter of this research project concentrates on the theoretical framework and methodology used to gather the empirical data necessary to assess the hypothesis that there is a common European strategic culture regarding the fight against Jihadi terrorism. This chapter will be divided among sections dealing with strategic culture as a concept, the reason behind the choice of France and Germany as case studies, the relevance of the use of the terminology of Jihadi terrorism and the methodology adopted for the gathering of the empirical data.

### Section 1: The concept of strategic culture

This section will focus on the concept of strategic culture and what the theory entails, as well as the debate surrounding its definition and purpose among international relations scholars. Finally, it will be conceptualized and adapted to fit into the frame of this research project.

#### *A. Strategic culture as a concept*

The traditional and neorealists models of strategic decision-making face growing contestations from political science theorists in the 1970s, because of their lack of inclusion of culture and cultural differences as an influencing factor in the decision-making process. Snyder is the first author to mention the concept of strategic culture as an alternative to traditional models of strategic decision-making process. It challenges the a-historical and noncultural neorealist framework for analyzing strategic behavior. The extensive body of literature on the concept of strategic culture is based on the importance of culture as a factor in strategic decision-making process. “Unfortunately, while strategic culture scholars are united in opposition to the dominance of rationalist-materialist-universalist theorizing in international relations circles, this is about where agreement ends.”<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the concept is still controversial in the sense that there is no consensus on what strategic culture is and, how exactly it influences the decision-making process. Scholars of strategic culture are internally divided among three generations of theories, with the same emphasizes on the influence of cultural factors on the

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<sup>6</sup> A. Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 33, no. 3, 2012, p. 3.

decision-making process, but with a different vision of the articulation between culture and behavior, as well as with the disagreement on the definition of culture itself, which means a different definition of strategic culture. The first generation of strategic culture, with Colin Gray as the main figure sees culture and strategic culture as a context, the second generation, with the leading figure of Bradley Klein, emphasizes the difference between officially declared policy and ‘real’ aims and motives of the political elite, whereas the third generation, led by Alastair Johnston, sees strategic culture as an independent variable affecting the behavior of security actors.<sup>7</sup>

The first generation of strategic culture theorists appears in the early 1980s, in response to the opposing vision of the Americans and the Soviets on nuclear strategy. The concept was then, a new way to understand and explain why these two states had a diverging decision-making process when they were faced with the same environment. The first generation of theories on strategic culture hypothesized that “different security communities and sub communities (1) tend to exhibit in their strategic thought and behavior patterns that could be collectively termed cultural, and that (2) strategic culture finds expression in distinctively patterned styles of strategic behavior.”<sup>8</sup> Colin Gray, the leading theorist of the first generation, emphasizes the importance of context in the formation of strategic culture. “Culture or cultures comprises the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience.”<sup>9</sup> Context is a component of behavior and, at the same time, is a shaping context for behavior. Strategic culture in his understanding is then the existence of culture as a context or environment which is influencing strategic decision-making process. “In this discussion strategic culture can be conceived as a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behavior, as the total wrap and woof of matters strategic that are thoroughly woven together, or as both.”<sup>10</sup> Moreover, “culture is behavior, because those responsible for the behavior necessarily are encultured”<sup>11</sup> as members of this culture. It is in this sense that strategic culture provides context in which the strategic decision-making process is happening. However,

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<sup>7</sup> H. Biehl, et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, *Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr*, vol. 13, 2013.

<sup>8</sup> C. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’ *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1999, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

occasionally, strategic choices can be counter-cultural and contradict the dominant culture, because it only offers context, and not reliable causality.

The second generation of theories on strategic culture appears in the mid-1980s. It postulates that there is a difference between the deep motives behind what leaders do and what they think or say they are doing. This legitimizes the existence of a declaratory strategy and of the authority of the leaders that are in charge of the decision-making process. It emphasizes political hegemony, which establishes “widely available orientations to violence and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative enemies.”<sup>12</sup> The political elites are influencing strategic culture. However, strategic culture is still an outcome of historical experience and has an influence over strategic behavior. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether or not strategic discourse influences behavior. “Instrumentality implies that decision-making elites can rise above strategic cultural constraints which they manipulate.”<sup>13</sup> The main issue for the detractors of the second generation of strategic culture theories is that these elites have been socialized and encultured in the strategic culture they are living in and producing. They are also influenced by it, which undermines the role that political elites can play in changing the strategic culture of their state, because they act accordingly to predefined and ranked strategic behaviors.

The third generation of strategic culture theories appeared in the 1990s. Its understanding of strategic culture lies in the continuity of culture instead of in the change in culture. These theorists recognize the existence of exceptional events or defining moments that could affect the culture in some ways, but due to the fact that such events are sporadic, they consider that the value of studying these exceptional events is not primary. The third generation leaves out behavior from the independent variables, which allows it to avoid the determinism of the first generation of theories on strategic culture. This literature is a bit more eclectic than the two first generations, but its authors agree on the fact that culture is not as much rooted into history as it is on recent experience, which explains why Elizabeth Kier describes strategic culture as the produce of changing domestic political contexts.<sup>14</sup> Alastair Johnston emphasizes the fact that the third generation focuses on competitive theory testing, and that organizational culture is the key independent variable in strategic choice. He is one of the leading theorists of the third generation of strategic culture and defines strategic culture as “an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role

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<sup>12</sup> A. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995, p. 39.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p. 40.

<sup>14</sup> A. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995.

and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”<sup>15</sup> Behavior is omitted from his definition of strategic culture because it is the latter that is causing behavior, or at least influencing it and not the other way around. This omission allowed him to account for small changes in “normal” behavior (as following the strategic culture), since the strategic preferences of a state can be overridden by other variables. The ranked preferences render strategic culture falsifiable. The other important issue of strategic culture for Johnston is the possibility to test it and find empirical data to prove its existence, which is why he recommends the use of cognitive mapping and symbol analysis to study the strategic culture of a specific actor.

### *B. Strategic culture debate*

As an evolving body of literature, the different conceptions of strategic culture have to face criticism in their applicability and correspondence with the reality. In his 2012 article, Bloomfield emphasizes the presence of two issues within the current strategic culture debate. First, the theories are too coherent, which is a good point in itself, but also poses the threat of not being able to explain small and occasional changes in a strategic culture. This can, in turn, lead to incoherence and the possibility of negating the existence of strategic culture. The second issue with strategic culture theories according to Bloomfield is the fact that they are characterized by too much continuity, which doesn’t allow theorists to explain why and how strategic culture can evolve in the medium to long-term, as it was experienced by Germany after the Second World War. As an alternative to these shortcomings, Bloomfield offers a new vision of strategic culture, in which a number of sub-cultures are competing over the decision-making process. “Specifically, if we accept that a state’s strategic culture contains a number of ‘strategic cognitive schemas’ – subcultures – which coexist and compete for influence over the making of strategic decisions, we can begin to solve the excessive-continuity problem by noting that these subcultures exist in changeable relations of dominance, subordination and latency relative to each other.”<sup>16</sup> Piero Pirani mentions that these sub-cultures represent different facets of the same strategic culture and the only thing keeping these diverging cultural traits together

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 46.

<sup>16</sup> A. Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 33, no. 3, 2012, p. 17.

is the common understanding of the friend/enemy nexus: whom to trust or not to trust.<sup>17</sup> This vision of strategic culture, englobing a range of sub-cultures, is able to solve the problem of too much coherence of the strategic behavior. In case of unordinary circumstances, the decision-makers can “rummage around in the cultural toolbox”<sup>18</sup> to find a better fitted solution to the unexpected circumstances. But the question remains: are the decision-makers going to go back to the previous dominant sub-culture once this unexpected problem is solved, or is the strategic culture going to be irremediably distorted?

Bloomfield is one of many authors criticizing the concept of strategic culture. However, the major debate in strategic culture theories is between Colin Gray of the first generation and Alastair Johnston from the third generation of theories. Johnston focuses on three sets of critics of the work of the first generation in general, and more precisely of Colin Gray. The first issue lies in the definition of strategic culture itself. Johnston finds it too large in terms of variables encompassing strategic culture, meaning that there is little space left to explain non-cultural analysis of strategic choices. It makes it difficult to have valid tests. Similarly, the “mechanically deterministic argument”<sup>19</sup> of the first generation of theories allows strategic thought to only lead to more one type of behavior, which can’t explain the gap between thoughts and actions within a strategic culture. The second shortcoming of authors such as Gray, according to Johnston, concerns the rejection of instrumentality. By not recognizing the possibility of some kind of separation between strategic culture and behavior, there is a risk of negating the existence of strategic culture if the link between the two cannot be found. Finally, he emphasizes the fact that the first generation of theories doesn’t interest itself in the “process of deriving an observable strategic culture.”<sup>20</sup> They don’t specify how and by what means someone can observe and analyze a state’s strategic culture. On the contrary, for Colin Gray, Johnston is wrong to separate ideas from behavior: since we are part of our context, we are culture. The main issue for him is the confusion between causes and effects of culture. “The scholastically effective solution to these dilemmas simply is to command that strategic culture is the realm of ideas and attitudes, which leaves the zone of strategic behavior amenable to

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<sup>17</sup> P. Pirani, ‘Elites in Action: Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture’, *Political Studies Review*, vol. 14, no. 4, 2016, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> A. Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 33, no. 3, 2012, p. 19.

<sup>19</sup> A. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995, p. 37.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, p. 39.

essay for strategic-cultural influence.”<sup>21</sup> Gray continues by postulating that the best way to go would be to move toward a creative accommodation of both Johnston and his understandings of the concept of strategic culture. “From Gray we take the notion that culture provides context; that it guides and shapes interpretation: we just have to accept that culture is a disaggregated thing with contradictory elements rather than a monolithic whole. From Johnston we take the goal of building falsifiable theory. It becomes possible to test whether, when a state’s external strategic environment shifts or its culture/identity changes, a subordinate subculture may displace a dominant one because it fits the new external circumstances or that state’s ‘view of itself’ better.”<sup>22</sup>

There is a recent and increasing interest toward strategic culture as an explanation for the behavior of states, as opposed to the trend in international relations, characterized by American ethnocentrism and neglecting national preferences. This trend can be observed in the new and growing strand of literature on transnational strategic culture studies, especially on the idea of a European strategic culture. However, there is an empirical debate over the existence of a European strategic culture, and even among scholars who promote and believe in this idea, there is no consensus on the scope of this strategic community: should it englobe the geographical Europe or only the members of the European Union? This research project will focus on this strand of literature of transnational strategic culture and move forward with the hypothesis of the existence of a European strategic culture, at least in the field of counterterrorism.

### *C. Strategic culture conceptualized*

Christophe Meyer defines strategic culture as “comprising the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defense goals.”<sup>23</sup> This is the definition of strategic culture that will be used for the purpose of this study. Strategic culture is

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<sup>21</sup> C. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’ *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1999, p. 22.

<sup>22</sup> A. Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 33, no. 3, 2012, p. 22.

<sup>23</sup> C. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 20

seen as a persistent environment which allows decision-makers to learn from and to adapt to past experiences encountered within their specific political community. The fact that norms, which can explain human behavior, and in turn, strategic behavior, can be both visible and invisible, justifies the existence of a ranked set of options forming the larger frame of strategic culture. It allows strategic culture to account for subtle changes within the dominant strategic behavior linked to the necessity of adapting to the environment and more specifically to unexpected and external or internal shocks. Going back to this definition, the key issue when one wants to speak of a European strategic culture is whether there is an identifiable set of norms, ideas and patterns of behavior regarding the response to terrorist attacks shared by the European political community, and whether it can be interpreted as the building of a European strategic culture in the field of terrorism.

To ascertain if there is ground to invoke the building of a European strategic culture in the field of terrorism, this study is mainly inspired by two publications related to the literature on transnational strategic culture studies: “Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent” edited by Heiko Biehl, Bastien Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas; and Christophe O. Meyer’s book, “The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union”. The comparative research design is based on case studies, similarly to the works mentioned above. However, Meyer’s research is more closely related to this research project than the collective work of Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas, because of the limited number of case studies.

## **Section 2: Case selection**

This section highlights the characteristics of France and Germany’s national strategic cultures, as well as the similarities and dissimilarities between the two. Moreover, it clarifies the reasons behind the choice of France and Germany as case studies.

The main purpose of the case selection was to represent the strongest and most influential members of the European Union in terms of economic, as well as political weight, but also to represent the diversity among the strategic culture of the member states, which will improve the validity of the study, should the research find similar responses to the terrorist attacks within these countries. “The United Kingdom, France and Germany stand somewhat apart from the other EU members in terms of their economic resources and political influence, as well as their military capabilities, including their troop numbers, their training and military



hardware.”<sup>24</sup> The UK has been left aside because of its decision of withdrawing from the European Union. This is based on the hypothesis made for the purpose of this study and implying that the building of a European strategic culture in the field of terrorism, is ongoing within the European Union framework. France and Germany are sensible choices as case studies because of their political and economic weight within the Union and the fact that they have been the targets of recent terrorist attacks. However, they rely on diverging strategic cultures, especially concerning the use of force.

France’s strategic culture is based on the protection of territorial integrity, the responsibility to ensure international security and the promotion of the “republican values”, linked to the human rights’ history of the country and its “missionary self-understanding”.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, it needs to conciliate the conflicting traditions of multilateral ambition and Gaullist legacy of independence, making its behavior in terms of strategic policies seem inconsistent by its partners. On the other hand, Germany’s strategic culture is based on the “nie wieder-norm”<sup>26</sup> or never again-norm resulting from its history, as well as a culture of military restraint<sup>27</sup> in foreign affairs, its main purpose being the protection and security of German citizens. The country is seen as a “reluctant hegemon”<sup>28</sup> since it has the capacity to play a crucial and leading role in European strategic policy but is reluctant to. Both nations are privileging the presence of a UN mandate or resolution to intervene but their respective relations to the use of force are more or less antagonistic. Whereas “France considers its armed forces a primary tool to achieve security objectives”<sup>29</sup> and could be characterized as averse to the (non)-use of force and as a “reluctant peacekeeper”<sup>30</sup>, Germans reject the use of military intervention as a legitimate tool for Germany’s involvement in external crisis and conflict management and the

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>25</sup> B. Irondelle and O. Schmitt, ‘France’, in H. Biehl et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, vol. 13, 2013.

<sup>26</sup> S. Becker, *Germany and War : Understanding Strategic Culture under the Merkel Government*, Paris Paper, Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, 2013.

<sup>27</sup> J. Julian and C. Daase, ‘Germany’, in H. Biehl et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, vol. 13, 2013, p. 130.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p. 140.

<sup>29</sup> B. Irondelle and O. Schmitt, ‘France’, in H. Biehl et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, vol. 13, 2013, p. 133.

<sup>30</sup> T. Tardy, ‘The Reluctant Peacekeeper: France and the Use of Force in Peace Operations’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 37, no. 5, 2014, p. 770.

country is sometimes characterized as “structurally risk-adverse”.<sup>31</sup> This shows a contradiction between multilateralism and anti-militarism within German strategic culture.

The common point between France and Germany’s strategic cultures is the willingness to work within a multilateral framework. Both nations traditionally cooperate within the UN framework, but also through the NATO and EU frameworks, even though they do so at varying degrees and for different purposes. The Gaullist legacy is responsible for pushing France’s military cooperation toward the EU in order to seek independence from the US in the field of security.<sup>32</sup> This is why the vision of an independent European defense strategy with the primacy of the military dimension in foreign policy is very present within the French strategic discourse and culture. “The French approach to foreign and security policy issues tends to depend increasingly on complex and fluctuant ‘bilateralism’ and ‘trilateralism’ with different partners on different issues (terrorism, CSDP, use of force, military capabilities, nuclear issues).”<sup>33</sup> It results in France being a key player in security multilateralism because of its membership in all the relevant multilateral security and military institutions. Germany has a focus on multilateralism as well. The country tends to levitate in a middle ground between the European and Transatlantic focuses, not favorizing either the EU or NATO. The latter is generally used for robust military interventions, whereas the EU is preferred for its broad civil and military toolbox. Both organizations have complementary benefits and Germany is using them as efficiently and wisely as possible.<sup>34</sup>

In France the decision-making process is very centralized and there is a presidential supremacy in defense and foreign affairs with a high level of flexibility because of the ‘reserved domain’ (defense, security and foreign policy).<sup>35</sup> The military answers to the President, making this highly flexible situation unique in the democratic world. The parliamentary control is low in terms of defense issues, especially concerning the deployment of armed forces. However,

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<sup>31</sup> J. Junk and C. Daase, ‘Germany’, in H. Biehl et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, vol. 13, 2013, p. 146.

<sup>32</sup> E. Sheppard, ‘France’s return to the NATO fold, a revolution in military and diplomatic affairs?’, Paper, *Northeastern Political Science Association Annual Conference*, 2009.

<sup>33</sup> B. Irondelle and O. Schmitt, ‘France’, in H. Biehl et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, vol. 13, 2013, p. 131.

<sup>34</sup> J. Junk and C. Daase, ‘Germany’, in H. Biehl et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, vol. 13, 2013.

<sup>35</sup> B. Irondelle and O. Schmitt, ‘France’, in H. Biehl et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, vol. 13, 2013.

there is a strong parliamentary and a posteriori control of external operations. The German federal government is the main player in German foreign and security policy, although it is strongly regulated by the parliament. This is the reason why the Bundeswehr (German armed forces) can be referred to as “parliamentary army”, which is traditionally an army of defense: “Verteidigungsarmee”.<sup>36</sup> According to Julian Junk and Christopher Daase, the German strategic culture is based on a constant consensus-finding exercise, based on continuity since the executive increasingly needs the support of the parliament, the public opinion and the constitutional court.<sup>37</sup>

As seen above, the selected cases are reflecting the diversity existing among member states of the European Union, as well as their diverging strategic culture, improving the validity of the study, should the research find similar responses to the terrorist attacks within these countries. France’s shrinking military force undermines the country’s presence in the main multilateral security institutions and its overall ambition of playing an important role in the international community, which can sometimes clash with the reality of the nation’s influence. It can be classified as a belligerent country, whereas Germany is much more pacifist. The latter has difficulties to reconcile its strategic culture, based on a defensive and pacifist mindset, and the necessity to respect its engagements vis-à-vis its partners, making it resilient to the changing global environment.

### **Section 3: Why Jihadi terrorism?**

This section focuses on the reasons why the specific terminology of Jihadi terrorism was used in the research question and why it is relevant.

The expression of Jihadi terrorism has been controversial in recent years and used interchangeably with Islamic terrorism. There is no consensus regarding their definition or what are the intentional acts they are referring to. However, considering the struggle for the use of a proper term to characterize the current global terrorist threat, there is a need to choose which phraseology fits better to the framework of this study. Jihadi terrorism seems to have become a term of common use in the popular discourse over the recent years, especially since 9/11. It is more widely used and referred to when talking about the global terrorist threat plaguing the

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<sup>36</sup> M. Langlois, *Dossier Stratégique Comprendre l’Allemagne*, Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, 2013, p. 10.

<sup>37</sup> J. Junk and C. Daase, ‘Germany’, in H. Biehl et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, vol. 13, 2013.

international community than the term of Islamist terrorism, as Samaan and Jacobs do when they mention the global discussion on Jihadist terrorism in their paper.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the Black and White Paper on Terrorism in Europe uses the terminology of jihadists to designate the perpetrators of terrorist acts.<sup>39</sup> The reoccurrence of such locution is important because strategic culture is composed of identity-derived norms and patterns of behavior. The use of Jihadi terrorism might only be a visible part of cultural norms and not yet have an impact in the long-term through its incorporation into deeper artifacts of culture, but it is still an indication of usage by influential actors and social groups, who consider Jihadi terrorism as an important term to incorporate into the political discourse and use in the implementation of strategic policies. In light of this observation, the term of Jihadi terrorism will be used in this study, and not Islamic terrorism.

It is, however, important to note that Jihadi terrorism is a colloquial term that might not be used accurately. In fact, “the word ‘jihad’ is widely used, though often inaccurately, by Western politicians and media.”<sup>40</sup> It can be translated as a fight or a quest.<sup>41</sup> It also has a noble connotation to it since “it involves the effort of each Muslim to become a better human being, to struggle to improve him- or herself and, as a result, to be a good Muslim.”<sup>42</sup> This is the positive understanding of Jihad, even though this side of the definition and origin of the term has not been portrayed quite as much by the media and political figures as the negative understanding has been. “The term ‘jihadist’ has been used by Western academics since the 1990s, and more widely since the 11 September 2001 attacks, as a way to distinguish between violent and non-violent Sunni Islamists.”<sup>43</sup> Jihadi terrorism, in the framework of this study, is “a combination of Islamist ideology and the idea of jihad.”<sup>44</sup> It represents the struggle or quest of a terrorist or jihadist for a political system that governs the state legally, economically and socially through a specific interpretation of Islamic law. Even though this struggle is crucial for all terrorist organizations and groups, each of them has a different interpretation of the Islamic

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<sup>38</sup> J. Samaan and A. Jacobs, ‘Countering Jihadist Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of French and German Experiences’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 7 February 2018.

<sup>39</sup> Pagazaurtundua, M., *Black and White Paper on Terrorism in Europe*, European Parliament, 2018.

<sup>40</sup> BBC News, *What is Jihadism?*, [website], 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30411519>, (accessed 6 May 2019).

<sup>41</sup> E. Bakker, ‘Jihadi terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study’, *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, 2006.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> BBC News, *What is Jihadism?*, [website], 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30411519>, (accessed 6 May 2019).

<sup>44</sup> E. Bakker, ‘Jihadi terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study’, *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, 2006, p. 1.

law, meaning a different vision of the new political system that should be implemented. Moreover, Edwin Bakker describes this branch of terrorism as having fluid characteristics that are subject to change.<sup>45</sup> This means that Jihadi terrorism designates a wide range of terrorist groups and organizations that are characterized by diversity, making it difficult to have a proper terminology and to describe them accurately.

#### **Section 4: Methodology**

The last section of this chapter presents the methodology used in order to find overlaps in France and Germany's response to terrorism. Moreover, it maps out the components of strategic culture that need to be studied to prove the existence of common European strategic policies and behaviors regarding the fight against terrorism.

In the book of Meyer and the collective work of Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas, the concept of strategic culture has been divided into sub-categories to make it possible to study its characteristics within each case studies and be able to make inferences regarding similarities between these strategic cultures, suggesting a rapprochement and the formation of a European strategic culture. Meyer designated his four sub-categories as norms regarding defense policy: the goals for the use of force, the way in which coercive means are used, the preferred mode of cooperation and the international and domestic authorization requirements.<sup>46</sup> The collective work of Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas identified four issue areas reflecting essential facets of national strategic cultures: the level of ambition in international security policy, the scope of action for the executive in decision-making, the foreign policy orientation and the willingness to use military force.<sup>47</sup> These sub-categories are based on the respective research questions of these publications, which is mainly the assessment of the existence or non-existence of empirical grounds justifying the convergence toward a European strategic culture. The scope of this study is, however, not as large. To that extend, the components of strategic culture that are going to be studied need to be adapted from the existing body of research to a more specific framework, encompassing the hypothesis that a European strategic culture regarding Jihadi

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> C. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006

<sup>47</sup> H. Biehl, et al., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, *Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr*, vol. 13, 2013, p. 13.

terrorism is being built, following the wave of terrorist attacks in Europe. These sub-categories are the following:

- Popular discourse regarding terrorism,
- Threat perception of terrorism and immigration,
- Modalities of the use of force regarding terrorism,
- Institutional structure of counterterrorism.

They are mostly derived from the collective work of Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas, who are not as focused on the military aspect of strategic culture, as it is the case in Meyer's work; and because it focuses on Jihadi terrorism and not on European strategic culture as a whole. Culture is characterized by visible and invisible layers depending on the importance of cultural artifacts and behavior, as well as on their short or long-term affiliation with the dominant culture. The more short-term behavior are usually the visible ones because they are differentiable from the base of the dominant culture and because people are still noticing the way they are acting. When behaviors are based on a more long-term assimilated norm, they are more subtle and difficult to notice. This vision of culture can be applied to the way in which strategic culture is studied. In fact, the formation of a strategic culture starts with the visible layers of culture that can be observed easily and are characterized by short-term incorporation to the dominant strategic culture. The invisible layers are the ones that are consistent and have been engrained into the frame of strategic culture, forming a long-term internal coherence. These different layers of strategic culture can be observed within the components mentioned above.

The popular discourse regarding terrorism and immigration is a visible layer of strategic culture because it is the easiest to notice in the newspapers and during speeches of politicians, as well as during everyday conversations. As norms are socially transmitted, as mentioned by Meyer, discourse is a vector of norms on a visible layer because it is the transmission of way of thinking and behavior through speech. Studying the popular discourse of a nation informs us of public opinion on specific topics, which are later on translated into strategic policy, so that it reflects this same public opinion.

The threat perception of terrorism and immigration is a specific component for this study and is also part of the visible layers of strategic culture, even though it is not as evident as the popular discourse. If a common threat is proven to exist within the countries studied, it can account for the formation of a mutual identity in terms of defense and security, which can in turn justify the building of a European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism. Nations have the same goals of protecting and defending their citizens from an identical threat, which is the basis for observing overlapping patterns of behavior and the formation of a

common identity, as discussed by Meyer in his definition of strategic culture. Terrorism is the main focus of this study, but immigration is a crucial theme, considering that the recent terrorist attacks in the cases studied have often been linked to the fact that terrorist were immigrant or refugees. Finding concomitant feelings toward immigration in France and Germany would also show a rapprochement of identities, justifying, to some extent, the rapprochement of European strategic cultures regarding Jihadi terrorism.

The modalities of the use of force is a common denominator in the sub-categories of the publications mentioned above, even though it is more prominent in Meyer's work. The use of force is often linked to identity and norms because it can explain and justify the behavior of states in international relations, as well as their relation to interventions in a foreign land. The present study will focus on the authorization mechanisms for the use of force and the degree to which force can be used.

Finally, the institutional structure of counterterrorism refers to the norms of cooperation mentioned by Meyer and to the level of ambition in international security policy in the collective work of Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas. Considering the focus of this study on the European Union, the level of ambition regarding security policy will be examined on the European level. Institutions represent a community's pursuit of security and defense goals as Meyer puts it, because they are created to last and have longstanding goals, which is why they are a crucial component of strategic culture, representing its long-term reach.

To highlight the response to the terrorist attacks in France and Germany in order to analyze their similarities and differences, this study will use five sources of empirical data. The first source of data will be collected through the content coding of press articles to analyze the popular discourse following the wave of terrorist attacks since 2015. "Coding is [...] a method that enables you to organize and group similarly coded data into categories or 'families' because they share some characteristic – the beginning of a pattern."<sup>48</sup> It allows you to link the data to the idea and to link the idea to all the data relating to that idea. However, content coding also has its limits. It is not only summarizing data in order to analyze them, but it is distilling or condensing the data as well, considering that coding a text already leads to interpretation. Nonetheless, it enables the researcher to simplify the reality and find patterns that can confirm a research hypothesis. In this case, the hypothesis is the existence of a common European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism. The analyzed press material will be taken from two newspapers in each country and represent the political spectrum of each nation. In

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<sup>48</sup> J. Saldana, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., London, Sage, 2013, p. 9.

France, the articles will be taken from *Le Monde*, as center-left newspaper and *Le Figaro*, a center-right newspaper. The German newspapers are the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The study will use 10 commentaries and analytical pieces from each newspaper. The threat perception will be studied through public opinion surveys, as well as through the strategic orientation of each nation. The strategic orientation will also be studied for the purpose of finding data regarding the modalities of the use of force. The implementation of cooperation agreements and partnerships, as well as the legislative texts of France and Germany in regard to the fight against terrorism will constitute another source of data. Finally, the study of the counterterrorism institutions and bodies will incorporate the data concerning the institutional structure of counterterrorism.



## Chapter 2: France

This chapter focuses on France's response to the recent wave of terrorist attacks and what it reveals concerning the nation's strategic culture.

### Section 1: Popular discourse

The first section of this chapter deals with the popular discourse regarding terrorism as it is observed in the press.

The first layer of reaction to the terrorist attacks can be observed through the popular discourse. Even though the latter is only a reaction to the attacks and isn't embedded into the strategic culture of the country, it is nonetheless an indication of the feelings of the population, as well as of the direction in which the response is going to be oriented by the government. In the case of France, two newspapers have been selected, representing a range of political ideas, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. The number of articles related to terrorism being too high to study all of them for the scope of this study, the key words "response to Jihadi terrorism" has been used to narrow down the number of articles and be able to do a proper selection. 176 articles in *Le Monde* and 370 in *Le Figaro* fit the key words. Among those, 10 articles from each newspaper were selected randomly, so that they could be analyzed using the content coding method.

The content coding method is to be applied to the selected 20 articles. However, a number of themes could already be observed when doing the preselection. The matter of the failure of Europe, of the government and of the legal and judicial system is recurrent among these articles. The radicalization and Islamization of the society is seen as a threat in the French popular discourse and as a result of the inaction and of a lack of efficiency of the authorities. This bind in which the society currently resides is also the result of identity problems, as well as of the increase of immigration, which are a danger for the stability and peace in the country. Considering that terrorism is seen as the biggest threat for the French population, the popular discourse illustrates the willingness to harden the judicial response to jihadists and terrorists. To that extent a number of legal solutions have been implemented and are at the heart of the issue of terrorism on a very visible layer of the strategic response to terrorist attacks. The loss of nationality, the placement under house arrest and the repatriation of the French jihadists and their children are a focus of the discussions related to terrorism. Moreover, the question of the extension of the state of emergency and its incorporation into common law has been at the

forefront of the debate plaguing the response to the recent terrorist attacks. Finally, the need for a better management concerning the victims of terrorist attacks, the deradicalization of the society and more social cohesion are also recurrent themes observed during the preselection. This can be an indication that the popular discourse on Jihadi terrorism is evolving around core themes which can be an illustration of the current strategic policies regarding the fight against terrorism, since the government represents the population it was elected by.

A deeper analysis of the popular discourse is however needed in order to assess the veracity of the existence of core themes linked to the formation of a strategy in the response to the terrorist attacks. The length of the present study doesn't allow for the analysis of more than 10 articles per newspapers, which can seem limiting to display the popular discourse as a whole, even though in a simplified version. On the other hand, if these themes are common to the ones observed in the rapid analysis achieved during the preselection, it is not conceited to assume that they match with a toned-down version of the popular discourse. The mapping of this content coding can be found in the annex.

The themes at the center of the discussion over the response to Jihadi terrorism are, the jihadists as persons and the extremization of the society. Jihadists are surrounded by a number of sub-themes that characterize them in a positive or negative fashion. They are seen as terrorists by the society and described as traitors to their nation, linked to the lexical field of disloyalty. They see their actions as legitimate and representing a sacrifice for the building of a better society. Another lexical field linked to the jihadists is the necessity to deradicalized them and dismantle their networks. Finally, there is the question of their repatriation following their departure to Jihad in the Middle East and the fate of their children who are French nationals. This is linked to the theme of the responsibility of the State towards these sensitive population. The central theme of the extremization of the society is linked to the negative lexical field of radicalization, Islamization, communitarianism, fundamentalism and fanaticism, among others. This extremization is achieved through propaganda, ideology and indoctrination and the society sees it as a process.

A number of themes gravitate around these central points like the lexical fields of war, the failure of the system, the solutions and improvements needed to better the situation, the legislative response and the youth. War is characterizing the situation that the population feels like it is experiencing, as well as the threat to its existence through the lexical field of combat, confrontation, adversary, enemy, holy and religious war, barbarism and revanche, among others. The failure of the system is divided among the government as a whole, the President, the judicial system and Europe as a supranational entity. The common qualification of these

entities is negative with a disfunction, compartmentalization, stagnation of the system and a lack of communication and scattering of forces. Europe is then linked to the sub-themes of Schengen, immigration and borders as issues in the fight against terrorism. Considering the failure of the system, the popular discourse emphasizes the need to change and adapt to the current situation through the recurrence of the theme of solutions and improvements. The necessity to have a precise diagnosis of the situation, a roadmap and/or a global strategy linked to a strong response to Jihadi terrorism is seen as prominent. Another lexical field linked to the needed improvements is the planification, prevention, adaptation, to the current situation, as well as the mutualization of efforts, the deradicalization of the society, the need for national cohesion and finally the urgency of such approaches. Within the theme of solutions and improvements, two important sub-themes can be highlighted, the need for national cohesion and the need for prevention. Prevention entails the detection, accompanying and rehabilitation of radicalized elements, the deradicalization of the society, all of this through cooperation. Cooperation constitutes, in itself, a small lexical field within the analyzed articles, linking the need for international cooperation, as well as the cooperation with the civil society and the Muslim community. Finally, national cohesion, as mentioned above, is a sub-theme of the lexical field of solutions and improvements. It illustrates the need for public order, education and a sense of community and unity through the republican values, within the popular discourse.

The themes related to legislation are an important component of the popular discourse on terrorism. The most central one is the sentences involved with the commitment of terrorist acts, including elements such as the loss of nationality, the use of police search and house arrest, the strong legislative response and the use of exceptional justice concerning terrorist crimes. Another theme related to the legislative field is the implementation of the state of emergency and its consequences. Two sub-themes are noticeable within this larger theme. The first one is composed of elements such as the constitutional reform, the prolongation, consolidation and temporality of the state of emergency, which is considered as a political response to the terrorist attacks. The second is linked to the questioning of the legitimacy of such measure, the outbidding and the intrusive nature of the legislation. The last theme related to the legislative field is the carceral environment. Its lexical field includes, among others, isolation, radicalization, and contagion, but also the sub-theme of the need for Muslim chaplaincy, as well as the overpopulation, evaluation and regrouping of jihadists within the same space. Another important theme linked to the legislative fields and the central themes of Jihadists and extremization of the society is the topic of youth. It includes, but is not limited to, the loss of points of reference, identity disorder, isolation and change in personality.

Within the popular discourse there are a number of less significant themes that gravitate around the central themes mentioned above. The consequences of terrorism is one of them, composed of the existence of victims and the need for justice, as well as the compensation and the prejudice caused by the terrorists and the society. Emotions constitute another theme linked to almost all the ones previously mentioned, through the lexical field of distaste, shock, fear, anger, but also empathy. These are directly articulated with the less imposing topic of the fear of others, which includes the lexical field of immigration, refugees, Muslims and stigmatization. The last of the themes is the discourse, which encompasses two separate lexical fields. The first one refers to, among others, the reduction and amalgamate of Islam to terrorism and the existence of a debate and its violence. The second lexical field relates to the counter discourse as a challenge. Finally, the theme of discourse is divided into two sub-themes, the apology of terrorism and communication. The apology of terrorism includes, but is not limited to, penalization, urgency, recidivism and multiplication. The sub-theme of communication is composed of the lexical field of media, social media, internet, rumors and posthumous glorification.

All these themes and sub-themes are linked and articulated together, forming the popular discourse on terrorism. It is generally pointing to the urgency of the current situation and the need for the government to do better than what has been done until now. A strong response to the terrorist attacks is seen as a prerequisite in order to solve the issue of terrorism. Moreover, the scattering of the forces is a crucial part of the previous failure of the government to overcome the terrorist threat. Lastly, a number of themes and notions appear across the categories mentioned earlier such as the issue of identity and the need for deradicalizing the society.

## **Section 2: Threat perception**

This second section will focus on the threat perception of the French population regarding terrorism and immigration.

The threat perception toward terrorism is also a visible layer of the reaction to the recent terrorist attacks on French soil, even though it expresses something a bit deeper than the popular discourse analyzed above. In fact, popular discourse is the expression of the feelings and perceptions of the population, which means that it is a representation of the perceptions of that population. In the case of this study, the important factor is terrorism in general, but more specifically Jihadi terrorist and the perception of the population on the matter. If terrorism is

considered a threat by the French population, it will certainly lead to the government and elites to put into place a strategy to defend against such threat. The study of such strategy is needed to assess the potentiality of the existence of a common strategic culture regarding Jihadi terrorism in the European Union. The strategic decisions and policies are a part of a state's strategic culture and the inclusion of a new threat, such as jihadi terrorism, within the strategic planning of a nation shows the affiliation of such field to the dominant strategic culture.

“The concern for terrorism was nearly insignificant before the terrorist attacks of 2015, but has become, since then, the main concern of people of 14 years old and more; getting ahead of unemployment and the precarity of employment, poverty, health, delinquency, environment, racism and discriminations or even road security.”<sup>49</sup> The concern for terrorism in France has steadily been increasing since 2014 to stabilize around 30% in 2018.<sup>50</sup> In fact, this tendency is confirmed by the IRSN Barometer which finds that “the response related to terrorism stay high with 38% of citation picked in terms of added results,”<sup>51</sup> making terrorism the first concerns of the French as well. Moreover, the French consider the risk of terrorist attacks to be high in 64% of the cases and mid risk in 32% of the cases. This means that the risk of terrorist attacks is considered to be nonnegligible by 96% of the interrogated people.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, terrorist attacks are considered to be the main threat for the European Union in the coming years by 60% of the French people interrogated by the Eurobarometer for the future of Europe.<sup>53</sup>

As seen earlier, immigration is a recurrent theme, even if not central, in the popular discourse on terrorism. It is imbedded in the fear of other and considered a threat to the French society, because of the potential risk of terrorist elements hiding among the immigrants. In 2017, 79% of the French agree that among the migrants currently arriving in Europe, there are terrorists as well.<sup>54</sup> This number is an illustration of the threat perception toward immigration, as a vector for terrorism. It also shows the need for the government to include the management of immigration within the strategic policies regarding terrorism.

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<sup>49</sup> H. Cazaux-Charles, ‘Victimation 2017 et perceptions de la sécurité’, in H. Cazaux-Charles, *Résultats de l’enquête Cadre de vie et sécurité 2018*, Observatoire National de la Délinquance et des Réponses Pénales, 2018, p. 105.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> M. El Jammal, S. Charron and L. Gilli, *Baromètre IRSN: La perception des risques et de la sécurité par les Français*, Institut de Radioprotection, 2018, p. 3.

<sup>52</sup> J. Nancy, *Les Européens en 2016 : Perceptions et attentes, lutte contre le terrorisme et la radicalisation*, Service de Recherche du Parlement européen, 2016, p. 38.

<sup>53</sup> *Future of Europe: Special Eurobarometer 479*, European Commission, October-November 2018, p. 14.

<sup>54</sup> *Les Européens et la question des migrants*, Ifop pour la Fondation Jean-Jaurès et Friedrich Erbert Stiftung, Paris, 2017, p. 14.

### Section 3: Strategic orientation

This section deals with the French strategic orientation regarding the use of force when addressing terrorism, as well as the nation's stance on cooperation.

#### *A. Use of force*

France has never been considered shy in the matter of external intervention, with a historically high tendency to partake in coalitions. The willingness to intervene abroad, as well as the level of the force used in such circumstances and the requirements necessary to be able to launch an intervention are a component of a state's strategic culture. In fact, the willingness to use force is influenced by, among others, history and past experiences, which are mirroring a state's identity and strategic behavior. The study of the requirements and modalities of the use of force will display a clearer view of the circumstances under which external intervention is authorized, regarding the fight against terrorism. The comparison of these results with the modalities of the use of force in Germany should help to determine whether or not there are any overlaps that could suggest the existence of a common European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism.

The main pillar of France's external strategic intervention is strategic autonomy. This is explained by changes in context, which might lead France to take the initiative in operations or assume a higher level of responsibilities inherent to conducting military operations.<sup>55</sup> The 2013 French White Paper on Defence and National Security fixes the strategic policy of the nation and specifies its articulation with the strategic policy of the European Union in the same fields and what are the required capabilities to carry it out for the next 15 to 20 years. It is the fourth document of its kind after the versions of 1972, 1994 and 2008. The White Paper on Defence and National Security is accompanied by laws of military programming that define the military budget, as well as the capabilities France needs to acquire or maintain in order to fulfill its strategic goals. "External intervention responds to a triple objective: ensuring the protection of French nationals abroad; defending our strategic interests and those of our partners and allies and exercising our international responsibilities."<sup>56</sup> The French armed forces intervene in three types of operations in the areas having defense and security interests for the nation:

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<sup>55</sup> *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 2013.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, p. 79.

- “operations conducted on an autonomous basis, such as evacuation of French or European nationals, counter-terrorism operations or response to attacks;
- operations as part of a coalition – in the framework of the European Union, an established alliance such as NATO or on an ad hoc basis – in which France may take the initiative and command or in which it will exercise a dominant influence;
- operations as part of a coalition in which France will make a contribution, but where command is entrusted to an allied nation, most commonly the United States.”<sup>57</sup>

These areas of interest are the regions on the fringes of Europe, the Mediterranean basin and part of Africa (from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa, the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean).<sup>58</sup>

Regarding the requirements of the use of force, the government should inform the Parliament (Senate and National Assembly) of its decision of sending troops abroad no later than 3 days after the beginning of the intervention. Moreover, it informs them of the objectives of the intervention. In case the operation lasts longer than 4 months, the prolongation should be submitted to the authorization of the Parliament.<sup>59</sup> These rules allow the French government to independently take the decision to send troops abroad without previous authorization from the Parliament, even though such authorization is required a posteriori. This illustrates the high autonomy of the executive power in the matter of the use of force.

The use of force is usually considered in relation with the military forces, also called armed forces. However, in this domain, France has the particularity of possessing the Gendarmerie, a special branch of the armed forces referred to as military police. Unlike the military forces, the gendarmerie is allowed to intervene on the French soil on a much more regular basis and for the purpose of the maintenance of the public order.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, the military means of the Gendarmerie can be made available for the purpose of the fight against terrorism, again, on the national territory. The major difference between the Gendarmerie and the Army is that the former is under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, while the latter answers directly to the President.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p. 80.

<sup>58</sup> *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 2013.

<sup>59</sup> *French Constitution*, Article 35.

<sup>60</sup> Article L1321-1 du Code de la défense

## B. Cooperation

The 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security emphasizes four priority areas for the protection of the European citizens, which include the reinforcing of the cooperation against terrorism and organized crime. Moreover, the White Paper expresses the need for a European White Paper on defense and security.<sup>61</sup>

National security has always been two-folded in strategic policies, between internal and external security. However, it seems that this traditional distinction between external and internal security is not relevant anymore, especially concerning the terrorist threat.<sup>62</sup> This is linked to the globalization of the international community. Such continuity has nowadays a strategic dimension, which is in urgent need to be understood and used by France and Europe. “Bilateral and multilateral cooperation must be reinforced to enhance the exchange of information and assessments between countries exposed to the same threat. This cooperation will, in addition, enable better integration of the continuity between internal and external security.”<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, the French President Emmanuel Macron pleaded for the creation of a European army for security purposes in the continent.<sup>64</sup> This idea is predominantly/for the most part supported by the French population according to a recent survey on the implementation of a common army of the European Union member states.<sup>65</sup>

France is also part of a number of international organizations and dedicated, fully or in part, to the fight against terrorism. Those include, but are not limited to, the Council of Europe, the Financial Action Task Force, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989. “The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.”<sup>66</sup> “The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) is an international forum of 29 countries and the European Union with an overarching mission of reducing the vulnerability of people worldwide to terrorism by

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<sup>61</sup> *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 2008.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 2013, p. 100.

<sup>64</sup> Jsgq, ‘Macron plaide pour une « armée européenne » capable d’agir’, *La Croix*, 6 November 2018, <https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Macron-plaide-armee-europeenne-capable-agir-2018-11-06-1300981213>, (accessed 6 May 2019)

<sup>65</sup> ‘Une majorité de Français favorables à une armée Européenne’, *Le Figaro*, 30 March 2019, <http://premium.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/sondage-une-majorite-de-francais-favorable-a-une-armee-europeenne-20190330>, (accessed 9 May 2019)

<sup>66</sup> *Financial Action Task Force*, [website], <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/>, (accessed 6 May 2019)



preventing, combating, and prosecuting terrorist acts and countering incitement and recruitment to terrorism.”<sup>67</sup> It is also taking part in the international coalition against IS. Finally, France committed itself to the counterterrorism strategies of the EU and of the OSCE.

#### **Section 4: Legislative framework**

The following section focuses on the French legislative framework regarding the fight against terrorism. The first half of the section concerns the French legislation, while the second half deals with the adaptation of European legislation in France. The legislative framework is a component of the institutional structure of counterterrorism.

##### *A. France*

After the recent terrorist attacks on the French soil, a series of legislative texts has been implemented since 2015 to protect the French citizens, as well as the integrity of the French territory. Legislative texts are part of the deeper layers of strategic culture as they are implemented within a long-term frame. They are a response to the popular discourse and the threat perceptions, which are more visible manifestations of strategic culture. Nonetheless, an overlap of themes between the popular discourse and the themes present within the legislative texts would suggest the existence of a common strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism. The next step would be to compare these factors in France and Germany in order to ascertain whether or not it can prove the existence of a common European strategic culture in the field of counterterrorism.

There is a pattern of recurrent themes among these legal texts: apology of terrorism, national coordination, state of emergency, census files, financing terrorism, criminal procedure and public security. The need for national coordination within the institutional framework of French counterterrorism is a significant theme in the popular discourse analyzed above, as are the questions regarding the state of emergency and the concerns over the criminal procedures and the need for harsher sentences. The lexical field of the apology of terrorism is also distinguishable in the popular discourse, even though it is on the sidelines and of less significance. Taking measures to ensure the non-proliferation of terrorist ideas is in line with the response to the recent terrorist attacks and to avoid such attacks in the future. To prevent

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<sup>67</sup> *Global Counterterrorism Forum*, [website], <https://www.thegctf.org/>, (accessed 6 May 2019)

the access of internet users to websites that encourage the commission of terrorists acts and those that advocate for terrorist acts, the government implemented a disposition forcing the internet providers to block the incriminating websites under 24 hours, after the former transmitted the website's address to the latter.<sup>68</sup>

National coordination is a prerequisite for the efficiency of counter-terrorism measures, which is why the French government has extended the functions of the National Intelligence Coordinator to add the section regarding the fight against terrorism. He is now the National Coordinator for intelligence and the fight against terrorism. His role is to advise the President in the field of intelligence and counterterrorism and has to report to the President or the Prime Minister. Furthermore, he is in charge of the coordination of the activities of the specialized intelligence services, as well as the enhancement of the mechanisms of exchange of information between the different services. Finally, his role includes the coordination and development of initiatives in terms of European and international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism.<sup>69</sup> The cooperation among different services has also been improved regarding the File of Wanted People through the centralizing of the information into a single file that can be looked at by the authorized authorities fighting terrorism.<sup>70</sup>

The application of the state of emergency has been the cornerstone of the strategic policy of the French government following the terror attacks of November 13, 2015. It is an exceptional measure taken by the government "either in case of an imminent peril resulting from serious violations of the public order, or in case of events presenting, by their nature and gravity, the character of public calamity."<sup>71</sup> The application of this measure of exception has been extended six times since its entry into force on November 14, 2015 and until November 1<sup>st</sup>, 2017. Moreover, the latest extensions have strengthened the measures relating to the fight against terrorism, and by that, have increased the power of the executive. These counterterrorism measures include, but are not limited to, administrative house arrests and police search, the possibility for the prefect of placing an electronic tag without involving any judicial decision and the shutting down of places of worship.<sup>72</sup> They confer increasing power upon the executive without being plagued by temporal limits as it was previously the case. In fact, a number of components of the state of emergency have been included into common law

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<sup>68</sup> *Decree n° 2015-125*, 5 February 2015

<sup>69</sup> *Decree n° 2017-1095*

<sup>70</sup> *Decree n° 2015-174*, 13 February 2015

<sup>71</sup> *Law n° 55-358*, 3 April 1955

<sup>72</sup> *Law 2015-1501*, 30 October 2017

by the coming into force of the law reinforcing the internal security and the fight against terrorism on October 30, 2017. However, an amendment established the necessity for a limit to the application of the dispositions authorizing the individual measures of administrative control and of surveillance for the 31 December 2020. Moreover, the government needs to write a report clarifying the measures taken and submitting it for parliamentary control every year, as well as for an evaluation of the utility of such measures.

A stronger emphasis on the legal aspects of terrorism is part of the popular discourse. France has been the target of a number of terrorist attacks in recent years. This reality pushed the government to take actions and reinforce the tools at its disposition to fight the terrorist threat. The law n° 2016-731 published on June 3rd, 2016 forms the basis of this new legislation. Its goal is to reinforce the efficiency of the judiciary investigations, as well as the repression of terrorism. The section 4 bis of the law created a category of Big Events that are “exposed, by their size or the particular circumstances surrounding them, to an exceptional risk of terrorist threat.”<sup>73</sup> They are designated through decrees and necessitate the implementation of increased security measures to protect it from potential terrorist attacks. Finally, this law is the first step towards the guaranty of a criminal procedure in relation to terrorist acts and its simplification. The representant of the State can institute a security perimeter in order to ensure the protection of a specific location or of an event exposed to a high terrorist threat considering the number of visitors.<sup>74</sup>

The measures against the laundering and financing of terrorist activities are a cornerstone of the fight against terrorism, be it in Europe or more specifically in France, as the French government transposed a European direction on such matter into French law. The people, structures or companies practicing an activity that could lead to the laundering of money to finance terrorism are required to take the necessary measures and protections or control measures in order to avoid such a situation. Furthermore, the ruling mentions the need for cross border banking relation to share information in order to gain the necessary knowledge in order to assess the funds and assets that are transferred and to make sure that they are not financing any terrorist organization or the organization of a terrorist attack.<sup>75</sup> This is the transposition of a European directive on the same matter. The French dispositive of the fight against the financing of terrorism rests upon a couple of approaches: “the enlargement of the Tracfin prerogatives, the enlargement of alertness measures towards electronic money and the

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<sup>73</sup> *Law n° 2016-731*

<sup>74</sup> *Law n° 2017-1510*, 30 October 2017

<sup>75</sup> *Ruling n° 2016-1635*, 1 December 2016

consumer credits, the enlargement of the field of requirements of custom statements.”<sup>76</sup> Tracfin in an intelligence service under the authority of the Ministry of the Action and the Public Accounts for the purpose of a clean economy, which include the fight against the financing of terrorism. It stands for Intelligence Processing and Action against the Illegal Financial Channels. “The Service is charged with collecting, analyzing and supplementing the statements of suspicion that the professionals are subjected to for the purpose of a clean economy and are required, by law, to declare to the Service.”<sup>77</sup> The combination of those measures are part of the French dispositive to stop the financing of terrorism.

To conclude, the legislative texts implemented following the recent terrorist attacks have emphasized the increasing need for cooperation with international organization, especially the European ones, in order to fight terrorism. One of the domains concerned by such cooperation enhancement is the automatic data processing and storing of fingerprints and palmar prints and the circumstances under which such data are shared with or received by organizations of international cooperation.<sup>78</sup>

## *B. Europe*

The French legislative texts are not the only ones illustrating an adaptation of the law to the current environment. In fact, they are sometimes the reflection of European legislative texts and emphasize the willingness to standardize the laws of the European member states regarding terrorism. On December 8, 2015, France ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. On January 4<sup>th</sup>, 2016, it entered into force in the French law.<sup>79</sup> The purpose of this convention was to recognize that terrorism could be financed not only by money laundering through criminal activities, but through legitimate activities as well. “The text addresses the fact that quick access to financial information or information on assets held by criminal organisations, including terrorist groups, is the key to successful preventive and repressive measures, and, ultimately, is the best way to stop them.”<sup>80</sup> Within this Convention, the principle

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<sup>76</sup> Decree n° 2016-1523, 10 November 2016

<sup>77</sup> Tracfin, [website], <https://www.economie.gouv.fr/tracfin/missions-tracfin>, (accessed 25 April 2019)

<sup>78</sup> Decree n° 2015-1580, 2 December 2015

<sup>79</sup> Council of Europe Portal, [website], [https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/198/signatures?p\\_auth=LOJXnQnW](https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/198/signatures?p_auth=LOJXnQnW), (accessed 25 April 2019)

<sup>80</sup> Council of Europe Portal, [website], <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/198/>, (accessed 25 April 2019)


of international cooperation is reiterated in the field of investigation and confiscation of the proceeds of terrorist activities. Moreover, the signatories have an obligation to assist, if asked, in tracing properties liable to confiscation and share banking information in answer to a request sent by another signatory.<sup>81</sup>

The Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism<sup>82</sup> was ratified by France on October 12<sup>th</sup>, 2017. It makes a number of acts, including taking part in an association or group for the purpose of terrorism, receiving terrorist training, traveling abroad for the purposes of terrorism and financing or organizing travel for this purpose, a criminal offence.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, to be able to receive timely and relevant information regarding a person traveling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, the signatories should establish a point of contact available on a 24-hour, seven-days-a-week basis.<sup>84</sup> This is another illustration of the increased cooperation among European members states when addressing terrorism.

**Section 5: Counterterrorist institutions and bodies**

The last section of this chapter covers the institutions and bodies involved in counterterrorism, as well as their purpose within the larger system that is the French institutional structure.

The institutions of a nation are a reflection of its strategic culture because the strategic policies implemented by the government are imbedded within the structure of the state through institutions. The strategic policies and behaviors are influenced by the dominant strategic culture and need a framework to be implemented, which is the reason why institutions exist. The latter’s adaptation to the influence of strategic culture is a sign that the dominant strategic behavior sets roots for the long-term. Considering this, the structure of the institutions and bodies is an indication of the state’s strategy in the field of counterterrorism.




<sup>81</sup> CETS No. 198

<sup>82</sup> CETS No. 217

<sup>83</sup> Council of Europe Portal, [website], <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/217/>, (accessed 25 April 2019)

<sup>84</sup> CETS No. 217



This larger framework of counterterrorism institutions and bodies is fragmented among different services and ministries. It was a significant topic within the popular discourse and was described as one of the deficiencies of the larger institutional structure of the fight against terrorism. The first part of this structure is framed within the intelligence community.

“The National Intelligence Council, specialized formation of the Council of Defense and National Security, defines the strategic orientations, the priorities in terms of intelligence and establishes the planification of the human and technical means of the intelligence services.”<sup>85</sup> The purpose of this Council is to determine the national intelligence strategy, which includes the fight against terrorism as one of the major threat to the nation.<sup>86</sup> Since the terrorist attacks of July 14, 2016 in Nice, a Council of Defense and National Security is held every week. “This sustained frequency of the councils turned out to be necessary because of the persistence of a high level of Jihadi terrorist threat against French interests on national soil, as well as abroad.”<sup>87</sup> In June 2017, the government created the National Center for Counterterrorism as a part of the National Intelligence Council, commonly labelled as counterterrorist task force and that is in charge of “the strategic steering of the intelligence services.”<sup>88</sup> The National Coordinator of intelligence and of the fight against terrorism is in charge of the National Intelligence Council, as well as of the National Center for Counterterrorism. He coordinates the action of the specialized intelligence services regarding terrorism and the sharing of information among the concerned services.<sup>89</sup> The French government created this specialized center because the intelligence services are “conscious of the necessity of an increased collaboration, while facing the terrorist threat.”<sup>90</sup>

Besides the intelligence community, other services are also hosting counterterrorism institutions such as the General Directorate of the National Police, the Prefecture of Police of Paris, the National Gendarmerie and the Direction of the Carceral Administration.

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<sup>85</sup> *Académie du Renseignement*, [website], <http://www.academie-renseignement.gouv.fr/coordination.html>, (accessed 25 April 2019)

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Le Secrétariat pour le Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale*, [website], <http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/le-sgdsn/fonctionnement/le-secretariat-pour-le-conseil-de-defense-et-de-securite-nationale/>, (accessed 25 April 2019)

<sup>88</sup> ‘Pierre Bousquet de Florian patron du nouveau Centre national de contre-terrorisme’, *Le Monde*, 7 June 2017, [https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2017/06/07/pierre-bousquet-de-florian-patron-du-nouveau-centre-national-de-contre-terrorisme\\_5139973\\_823448.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2017/06/07/pierre-bousquet-de-florian-patron-du-nouveau-centre-national-de-contre-terrorisme_5139973_823448.html), (accessed 6 May 2019)

<sup>89</sup> *Décret N° 2017-1095*

<sup>90</sup> ‘Interrogations sur le rôle du Centre national de contre-terrorisme’, *Le Monde*, 20 June 2017, [https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2017/06/20/interrogations-sur-le-role-du-centre-national-de-contre-terrorisme\\_5147995\\_1653578.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2017/06/20/interrogations-sur-le-role-du-centre-national-de-contre-terrorisme_5147995_1653578.html), (accessed 6 May 2019)

The Coordination Unit for the Counterterrorism Fight was created in 1984 (UCLAT). It was designated in April 2014 as “the kingpin of the new dispositive of the fight against violent radicalization and the Jihadist sector.”<sup>91</sup> The missions of the UCLAT are diverse:

- Evaluating the terrorist threat in order to adapt the security measures,
- Centralizing the report forms for radicalization,
- Centralizing and coordinating all the measures of administrative police preventing terrorist acts,
- Raising awareness for the threat caused by radicalization and contributing to the production of a counter-speech to radicalization on social media,
- Representing the French counterterrorism community in the international and European organizations on counterterrorism.

The UCLAT is composed of a number of structures. The central level is in constant communication with the administrative authorities to gather information regarding terrorism and radicalization. These administrative authorities are the prefect, the prefect appointed to the security of the department, the police and gendarmerie’s directorates, the intelligence community and the penitentiary community. The second level of structure in the UCLAT is a committee located in Pau. The last level is composed of liaison agents in Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK.<sup>92</sup> In its function as a representative of the General Directorate of the National Police, the UCLAT attends interministerial meetings with the General Directorate of the Civil Aviation and the General Secretariat of Defense and National Security. At the European level, the meetings are held with the European Union, the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) and Europol, whereas at the international level they are held, among other, with Interpol, the G7, the UN and the OSCE.

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<sup>91</sup> *Unité de Coordination de la lutte AntiTerroriste*, [website], <https://www.police-nationale.interieur.gouv.fr/Organisation/Entites-rattachees-directement-au-DGPN/UCLAT>, (accessed 6 May 2019)

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.



## Chapter 3: Germany

The present chapter will focus on Germany as a case study and how it has responded to the recent wave of terrorist attacks. Such response will be studied through the popular discourse on terrorism, the threat perception of terrorism and immigration, the strategic orientation of the nation, the legislative framework and the counterterrorist institutions and bodies.

### Section 1: Popular discourse

The first section of this chapter analyzes the German popular discourse on terrorism through content coding. The goal is to find themes that match the ones observed in the French popular discourse.

The popular discourse is one of the first layers composing the strategic culture of a nation. In fact, it is an illustration of what the population is thinking concerning the terrorist issue and the direction in which the response to the terrorist attacks is going, as the government needs to respond to the popular demands as a representative of the people. For the case of Germany, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* were the newspapers selected for their representation of a large range of political ideas within the German context. The key words used to narrow down the number of articles due to their sheer number varied slightly depending on the newspaper. For the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, “response to Jihadi terrorism” were the key words, as previously used for the French case study. However, those words found no match within the articles of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, which is why the key words were reduced to “response to terrorism”. 329 articles in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and 234 in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* fit the key words. Among those, 10 articles from each newspaper were selected randomly, so that they could be analyzed using the content coding method.

Even though the content coding method was applied to only 20 articles, a number of themes could already be observed when preselecting the articles. Those themes included terrorism, Europe, migration, security, solidarity, the fear of the terrorist threat, the need to fight, Turkey and France. During this preselection, Europe and the strengthening of European integration was clearly linked to the fight against terrorism, as well as the necessity to work together for that purpose. The security issue posed by the current terrorist threat was also abundant in this preview of the articles, which led to the need to fight it and try to find a solution for this issue. Finally, Turkey and France were two countries often mentioned in this discourse.

The first because of an apparently long-standing cooperation between Germany and Turkey, and the second because of the high number of terrorist attacks happening on its soil, as well as its status of neighbor and partner to Germany.

The content coding of the selected articles highlighted that three major themes in the popular discourse, with a number of other less prominent themes gravitating around them. The first one is, not surprisingly, terrorism, followed by Europe and migration. Terrorism being the focus of the content coding, it is one of the main themes of the popular discourse. It is linked to different lexical fields illustrating the current representation of terrorism in the German society. The first one of these lexical fields centers around the violence of terrorism, the assassinations, terrorist attacks, provocations, crisis, the war on terror and even the driving amok or the types of attacks used by terrorists. The second lexical field relates to the solution that can be implemented to fight terrorism, such as concrete answers, the Franco-German initiative and appropriate instruments. Moreover, it is linked to the costs incurred by such measures. The last lexical field relating to terrorism is its changing nature like digitalization, internationalization and increased networking. The issue of terrorism is strongly linked to Europe in the popular discourse and to the need for more cooperation among member states in order to fight against this threat. The lexical field include the capabilities of action of the European Union, the commitment to solidarity and the teamwork needed when addressing terrorism, but also the need for structural reform and stringer policies in the field of counterterrorism, migration and security. European stability is seen as a cornerstone of the fight against terrorism, which is linked to the sub-theme of Great Britain. The latter's departure from the Union with Brexit is a matter of concern for the stability of the European Union, leading to the concern for its ability to fight terrorism. Migration is the third big theme of the German popular discourse on terrorism. The lexical field of borders is significant in this theme with the need to have better border control through the implementation of European systems such as Frontex and Schengen but also a stricter immigration policy and the reducing of the influx of illegal migrants. However, this is supplemented by a lexical field surrounding humanitarian action, the need for solidarity and the migration of skilled workers, as well as the fight against the causes of migration. An important sub-theme linked to migration is integration, with the difficulties it leads to and the time needed for the migrant to integrate.

Terrorist is a sub-theme of the larger topic of terrorism. Its lexical field includes the names of the different terrorist organization posing a threat for Europe in general and Germany more specifically, such as the Islamic State, Al-Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front and the Muslim Brothers. The government is another important theme of the popular discourse. The first small

lexical field linked to it is the self-criticism concerning the recent terrorist attacks and the implementation of drastic measures of protection. A second lexical field regroups the failure of the government as a system through decentralization, compartmentalization, uncertainties and disorder. The last lexical field within the theme of government links the implementations it could bring for a better and more efficient fight against terrorism, such as stronger security and refugee policies, the strengthening of defense mechanisms, cooperation with other nations and the stabilization of the Near and Middle East. The latter is directly associated with the fight against the causes of migration presented in the previous theme.

The matter of the radicalization of the society is linked to the three main themes of the popular discourse, terrorism, migration and Europe. Its lexical field include, but is not limited to, extremism, fanaticism, ideology, fundamentalization, and Islamization of the society. Moreover, it has some links to criminality, prisons, the increasing of the prisons' capacities and the strengthening of the specialized department within them. Islamization is a sub-theme of radicalization. It is linked to the migration background, Muslim immigrants, patriarchal families and its breeding ground in schools, seminars and Mosques. Islamization and radicalization of the society are linked to the topic of populism, which is a growing concern in Europe. The lexical field of populism includes a hard family situation, the rebellion against the family or the authority, the identity problems and the search for a place in the society. The young men seem to be more affected by such situations, linking the sub-theme of youth to populism, radicalization and Islamization of the society. The theme of prevention is the solution to solve the issue of radicalization and is a prominent part of the popular discourse. Its lexical field include democracy building, security planning, prevention of criminality, establishment of international norms and the sub-theme of deradicalization, which should be implemented in nurseries, schools and other places.

Turkey is a recurrent theme within the popular discourse because of the traditional cooperation ties with this nation and Germany. Two distinct lexical fields are present in this theme. The first one concerns the alliance's commitments regarding the fight against the Islamization of Europe and the controls over immigrants. The second lexical field approaches the matter of the difficult cooperation between the two countries, especially because of the recent decision of the Turkish government, which restrict freedom for its citizens in an unruly manner for Germany. The divide between freedom and security is also significant in this discourse. On one hand people feel the need for security and stricter measures to be taken, which is linked to the implementation of the state of emergency in France, the increasing of house searches and data retention. On the other hand, Germans are very attached to the freedom

of expression or association and their fundamental rights, which can be interfered with and restricted by the need for security. Moreover, there is a strong attachment to the values of the judiciary control and of the independence of the judiciary system.

The theme of emotions is pretty central within the popular discourse, acting as an articulation among other themes. Its lexical field relates to anxiety, fear, sorrow and appeasement but also humiliation, hopelessness and frustration concerning the youths that turn to terrorist actions because of the Islamization of the society. Finally, religion, propaganda and victims are three small themes linked to a number of others because of their nature that forces relationships. The lexical field of religion includes topic such as debate, argument, freedom of religion, diversity but also the perverse religious dimension, which is directly connected to propaganda. The theme of propaganda is specifically linked to terrorism, radicalization and Islamization as an instrument, with the lexical field of rhetoric and polemic. The topic of victims is linked to terrorism through the casualties occurring because of the terrorist attacks. Its lexical field includes matters such as sympathy, sorrow, minute of silence and commemoration.

The common trends within the popular discourse on terrorism are Europe and migration, linked to the need for a stronger cooperation through the deradicalization of the society and prevention of terrorist acts on a European level. The distinctive feature of the German popular discourse on terrorism is that it is very neutral in the sense that it doesn't really use the term Jihadi or Islamist terrorism. However, it mentions frequently the international and transnational aspects of terrorism.

## **Section 2: Threat Perception**

The second section of this chapter deals with the threat perception of terrorism and immigration.

The threat perception toward terrorism is an important part of the formation of a common European strategic culture in the field of Jihadi terrorism. Strategic policies and orientation have a security goal, which means that there needs to be insecurity related to terrorism in order to have a strategic response to it. If the population places terrorism high on the threat perception list, it means that the government needs to handle it and to include the threat within its strategic policies. Considering this, there cannot be a common European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism if there is no existing feeling of threat regarding terrorism. On a similar note, the threat perception toward immigration is important as well while studying the possible existence of a common European strategic culture in the

field of counterterrorism. In fact, a common cause for the arrival of Jihadi terrorist on the European soil would push for common strategic measures to be taken in order to ensure the disappearance of such cause. If the population feels threatened by immigration as a way for terrorists to arrive in Germany, and the same is found in France, it suggests a rapprochement in the understanding of terrorism and its causes, leading toward a common or similar response from both governments.

The threat perception can be assessed through surveys realized among the German population. In 2016, Germans consider in 45% of the cases that the risk of terrorist attacks on their territory was high and at 47% that it was a mid-risk. It shows that a total of 92% Germans see the threat of a terrorist attack as having a big impact on the society.<sup>93</sup> Germans consider political extremism to be the biggest threat for the European Union in the coming years in 50% of the cases, and not terrorism.<sup>94</sup> However, Jihadi terrorism can, in some circumstances, be considered as a form of political extremism considering that the terrorists are acting, in their own eyes, in order to implement a better society and political system. Nonetheless, political extremism englobes much more than just Jihadi terrorism, which is not considered as the biggest threat for the European Union for the Germans that were consulted for this survey. Regarding the threat perception for immigration, there is an increased worry that potential terrorists are hiding among the migrants. This fear went from 64% in September 2015 to 87% in September 2017.<sup>95</sup>

Observing the strategic policies is also a good mean to find the threats that are considered of high level for the German society. According to the 2016 German White Paper, terrorist attacks are the most immediate challenge to the German society and are seen as an important and growing threat, as is the question of the financing of terrorist activities through crime. Illegal and uncontrolled immigration is recognized as another threat when happening in large numbers. “Organized crime and terrorist networks in their countries of origin are exploiting the desperation of migrants in order to generate income or to recruit fighters.”<sup>96</sup> It is not migration in itself that poses a threat for Germany’s security, because the country needs

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<sup>93</sup> J. Nancy, *Les Européens en 2016 : Perceptions et attentes, lutte contre le terrorisme et la radicalisation*, Service de Recherche du Parlement européen, 2016.

<sup>94</sup> *Future of Europe: Special Eurobarometer 479*, European Commission, October-November 2018.

<sup>95</sup> *Les Européens et la question des migrants*, Ifop pour la Fondation Jean-Jaurès et Friedrich Erbert Stiftung, Paris, 2017.

<sup>96</sup> *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 2016, p. 42.

migration to replenish its workforce. However, the risk appears with the overflow of refugees and migrants, which can cause instability. It needs to be regulated. “This challenge can, however, only be appropriately controlled and managed on the basis of an effective European strategy and practice.”<sup>97</sup>

### **Section 3: Strategic orientation**

This section focuses on Germany’s strategic orientation. It is divided into three subsections dealing first with the issue of the use of force and second with the question of cooperation with other European states, as well as at the international level. The third subsection concerns the internal and external interface of counterterrorism.

#### *A. Use of force*

The modalities under which a government is allowed to use force constitute an important part of the strategic culture of a state. In fact, force is one of the tools used in order to implement strategic policies. Considering this, it is important to study the requirements of the use of force in Germany in order to determine what is the preferred behavior in this regard, for external operations.

Traditionally, Germany is seen as unwilling to use force except for defensive purposes since the end of the Second World War. However, it seems that it is only caused by the narrow interpretation of the Basic Law by the successive German governments. In the decision of July 12, 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that “article 24(2) of the Basic Law impliedly authorized the government to fulfill its obligations under treaties like the U.N. Charter and the North Atlantic Alliance, including the deployment of armed forces.”<sup>98</sup> (Germany’s Basic Law and the Use of Force. 2010) This decision came after the German involvement in peace-making and humanitarian efforts in support of NATO and the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Serbia-Montenegro. “Yet the Court went on to hold that any deployment of the German armed forces for non-defensive purposes requires prior parliamentary approval.” This shows that even though Germany is able to use force under other circumstances than defense, there are strong constitutional limitations to it. This decision of the Federal Constitutional Court is referred to

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> R. Miller, ‘Germany’s Basic Law and the Use of Force’, *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, vol. 17, No. 2, 2010.

as AWACS I Case. Moreover, the Basic Law gives jurisdiction to the Federal Constitutional Court to hear challenges to the federal government's decision to deploy forces abroad."<sup>99</sup> This means that the Constitutional Court has an influence over the strategic policy of the government, which limits all the more the power of the executive concerning the use of force.

Germany has a practice of strict parliamentary control over the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad. "The fact that decisions on Bundeswehr missions abroad are made by the German Government in concert with the German Bundestag helps servicemen and women see themselves as a parliamentary army on operations with broad support and approval."<sup>100</sup> On the matter of intervention on national soil, armed forces can be deployed at the request of the federal state or the German government in case of emergency situations. Large-scale terrorist attacks can be considered as such, which allows the Bundeswehr to "perform sovereign tasks and exercise powers of intervention and enforcement."<sup>101</sup> The use of force on national soil, even though allowed under very specific circumstances, is still subjected to a strict and very limiting control regarding its scope and purpose.

### *B. Cooperation*

In the forewords of the German White Paper on security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr, Angela Merkel stated that "we need to strengthen resilience throughout government and society in Germany and the European Union. Only this way will we safeguard our open society and protect the freedom that is fundamental to our way of life."<sup>102</sup> This illustrates the German partnership-based approach within the international community, which means that the country "must be an attractive and reliable partner across the entire range of security instruments."<sup>103</sup>

The 2016 White Paper states that Germany's main security interests are:

- protecting our citizens as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country;
- protecting the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the citizens of our allies;
- maintaining the rules-based international order on the basis of international law;
- ensuring prosperity for our citizens through a strong German economy as well as free and unimpeded world trade;

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 2016, p. 109.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p. 110.

<sup>102</sup> *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 2016.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

- promoting the responsible use of limited goods and scarce resources throughout the world;
- deepening European integration and
- consolidating the transatlantic partnership.

Germany conceives its security in terms of multilateralism and considers that it is “inextricably linked to that of its allies in NATO and the EU.”<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, the German government advocates for the “progressive integration of European armed forces”<sup>105</sup> through its strategic orientation. This shows a readiness to operationalize the role of the European Union in security matters, instead of relying only on the member states’ willingness to use their national forces when required. Moreover, it illustrates the increased reliance on the European Union as a security actor and the reinforcing of the wish to cooperate more on security issues, especially concerning the terrorist threat currently plaguing the Union.

The deepening of European integration is a long-lasting tradition of Berlin’s foreign policy. The shaping of the world order to match the interests of the citizens is only seen as attainable through a strong and united Europe. Which is why, “Germany is striving to achieve the long-term goal of a common European Security and Defence Union.”<sup>106</sup> However, the complex challenges and threat that the European Union has to face, such as transnational terrorism, necessitate the involvement of other actors and a stronger take on multilateralism, as emphasized by the German strategic policies. “Given that NATO has primary responsibility for ensuring security in Europe, and since the majority of its members are also members of the European Union, NATO’s relationship with the EU is of particular importance.”<sup>107</sup> The 2016 German White Paper advocates for a pan-European capability planning coordinated at transatlantic level to have a complementary approach and achieve greater effectiveness, through a greater security framework involving NATO and the EU. This will be achieved through the German-French partnership which is considered to be “the driving force for deepening European integration and ensuring peace, freedom and security.”<sup>108</sup>

Finally, in concordance with this multilateral approach, Germany is part of a number of international organizations and dedicated, fully or in part, to the fight against terrorism. Those include, but are not limited to, the Council of Europe, the Financial Action Task Force, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forums. It is also taking part in the international coalition against

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid, p. 49.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p. 42.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, p. 73.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, p. 69.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, p. 80.



IS. Furthermore, Germany committed itself to the counterterrorism strategies of the EU and of the OSCE.

### *C. Internal versus external interface of counterterrorism*

The terrorist issue is nowadays evolving considering that it is an internal issue with external roots or causes. An important concern over this evolution of the terrorist threat revolves around the question of whether or not there are cross-cut national boundaries when addressing terrorism. The vision of the EU member states on the matter is important while studying the possible rapprochement of national strategic cultures towards the formation of a common European strategic culture in the field of terrorism. Indeed, the strategic policy of a state regarding terrorism will depend on the understanding of the divide between internal and external boundaries of terrorism. The discursive preferences of the internal-external divide provides the ground for the method and tools used in the fight against terrorism, meaning that the strategic policies of a nations and by extension its strategic culture, is dependent on whether terrorism is seen as an internal or as an external threat.

In the case of Germany, the strategic orientation of the nation recognizes the radicalization of the population and the return of foreign fighters to Germany and other EU states and more generally to the Schengen area, as an increasing risk. This shows a link between the European states through the free travel of people within the Schengen area and from out of Europe destinations through the return of foreign fighter. It is also a reality concerning the immigrants that enter the country, legally or illegally, and might pose a threat to the society. Such issues are “occurring at the interface between internal and external security.”<sup>109</sup> By this, the German strategic policy recognizes that fight against terrorism, is characterized by the double-edge sword of external roots and internal consequences of terrorism. This is why the terrorist threat is dubbed as transnational within the White Paper on German security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr.

## **Section 4: Legislative framework**

This section will focus on the legislative framework regarding the fight against terrorism and the laws that have been implemented in this regard since the beginning of the wave of

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

terrorist attacks in Europe. It is divided into two sub-sections, the first presenting the German laws and the second one dealing with the matter of European laws translated into German national law.

#### *A. Germany*

The legislative framework regarding terrorism is an integral part of the strategic culture of Germany. In fact, it solidifies the strategic orientation of the country through legislation, which is characterized by a long-term lifespan. The translation of the strategic orientation by laws is an illustration that the measures put into place are going to last. Moreover, legislative texts are, most of the time, voted by the Bundestag, which represents the German population, meaning that the laws are an expression of the shared strategic vision of the population. Considering this, it is necessary to observe the laws that entered into force since 2015 and that could constitute an indication of the existence of a common European strategic culture when addressing terrorism.

The first significant part of those new legislations concerns the exchange of information regarding the fight against terrorism. In fact, the law concerning the better exchange of information for the purpose of the fight against international terrorism was a milestone within the legislative framework, as it illustrates the willingness of Germany to cooperate in the terrorist matter. It deals with the time limits under which the authorities are allowed to store information on a person and the establishment of common files with foreign intelligence services for the purpose of investigating the illegal efforts and activities relating to particular people or groups. The creation of such files is authorized when:

- “the research is of a considerable security interest to the Federal Republic of Germany and the respective participating state,
- the adherence to the fundamental constitutional principles is guaranteed in the respective participating states,
- the definitions and commitments pursuant to the first sentence of subsection 5 are reliable and
- the Federal Ministry of Interior has approved them.”<sup>110</sup>

In regards to the participation of foreign intelligence services, which are not neighboring Germany, the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty, to such data storage and exchange

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<sup>110</sup> BGBl. I 2016 Nr. 37, S. 1818 ff, 16 July 2016, p. 1.

of information, special security interests must be involved. “This is the case when efforts or activities are being carried out to commit serious crimes against the continued existence or security of a State or an international organization.”<sup>111</sup> The purpose of the files is to ascertain whether or not participating foreign intelligence services have information on people, objects or events of interest. If such information exists, access to more detailed intelligence can be required by partnering countries. Considering the sensitivity of such information, the partnership requires strict measures of protection to be taken such as the possibility of non-disclosure of information for the protection of citizens or national interests, a limited period of storage of the information and the prohibition to disclose the information on the files to third parties.

The search of the place of residence of a private individual authorized by the administration or executive power is another topic within this new legislative framework. Germany has a high level of requirements and protections concerning house searches, which has been ascertained by the recent laws on counterterrorism. Indeed, the measures involving the search of the place of residence of a private individual, by the police or an agent of the intelligence service, for suspicion of terrorist activities, must be allowed by a Court. In case of an imminent danger, such procedures can be authorized by the President of the Federal police Headquarters, his representative or the head of a division of the Federal police Headquarters. However, the order must be confirmed by the Court within three days, otherwise, it becomes invalid.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, it must be limited to a three months period, which can be extended, one month at a time, by a Court order. Covert investigations are allowed by the existence of a legal mandate or with the permission from the entitled person to enter his or her place of residence. In any case, the person must be notified of the measure, unless overriding interests of data protection are conflicting with such notification. If such case occurs, the notification of the police must come after the events.<sup>113</sup>

The limitation period of regulations under the anti-terrorist laws constitutes another significant theme within the German legislation regarding the fight against terrorism. The anti-terrorist laws put into place in Germany are, somewhat, affecting the fundamental rights of the citizens because of the special circumstances under which they are applied. This is why those laws must be evaluated by the federal government before January 10<sup>th</sup>, 2021. The latter should appoint a group of scientific experts for that purpose, in agreement with the Bundestag. “The

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>113</sup> BGBl. I 2016 Nr. 37, S. 1818 ff, 16 July 2016.

frequency and effects of the encroachments on fundamental rights associated with the powers of intervention must also be taken into account in the investigation and the relationship established with the effectiveness to be demonstrated on the basis of facts for the purpose of combating terrorism.”<sup>114</sup> The anti-terrorist laws concerned by such measure are the Counter-Terrorism Act of January 9<sup>th</sup>, 2002, the Counter-Terrorism Supplementary Act of January 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007, the Act Amending the Federal Constitutional Protection Act of December 7<sup>th</sup>, 2011 and the provisions of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act, the MAD Act, the BND Act and the Security Review Act.

The last significant addition to the German legislation regarding the fight against terrorism concerns social networks. The Network Enforcement Act refers to social networks<sup>115</sup> that have more than two million registered users in Germany. In the case of more than 100 complaints received per calendar year by the providers of social networks, the latter have an obligation to produce reports on the handling of complaints about unlawful content on their platform. These reports need to be published every 6 months in the Federal Gazette and on the website of the provider.<sup>116</sup> The points needed to be featured in the reports are listed in the Network Enforcement Act. Moreover, “the providers of a social network shall maintain an effective and transparent procedure for handling complaints about unlawful content.”<sup>117</sup> “The procedure shall ensure that each complaint, along with the measures taken to address the situation, are documented within the scope of Directives 2000/31/EC and 2010/13/EU.”<sup>118</sup> Finally, the Network Enforcement Act compels the service providers to disclose subscribers’ data if it is necessary for the enforcement of civil law.

Finally, Germany signed a cooperation agreement with Georgia related to, among others, the fight against terrorism and the smuggling of humans, human trafficking and illegal migration. This illustrates the willingness of the government to develop its cooperation framework in regard to terrorism even outside of the EU borders. The purpose of this agreement is to “exchange information on criminal offences already committed or planned, on groups of perpetrators, their structures, links and methods of their activities, insofar as this is necessary

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<sup>114</sup> BGBl. I S. 2161 Nr. 49, 3 December 2015, p. 2.

<sup>115</sup> Social networks refer, in this case, to “telemmedia service providers which, for profit-making purposes, operate internet platforms which are designed to enable users to share any content with other users or to make such content available to the public.” NetzDG, p. 1.

<sup>116</sup> NetzDG

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

to prevent, investigate and solve serious crimes”.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, Germany and Georgia agreed to send their experts for advanced training to the other nation, with the goal of increased efficiency.

## *B. Europe*

The German legislative framework is only a component of the larger legislative framework when addressing terrorism. It is strongly articulated with the European legislative framework considering that often, the national level of legislation is a reflection of the European one. It illustrates the readiness of the German nation to be part of a larger scheme regarding the fight against terrorism. On June 20, 2017, Germany ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. On October 1st, 2017, it entered into force in the German law.<sup>120</sup> As stated in the previous case study, the purpose of this convention was to recognize the fact that the successful prevention and repression of terrorist groups involves the need to address the financing of terrorist organizations, particularly through the laundering of money. In order to achieve such goal, it is necessary to recognize the principle of international cooperation and the obligation for the signatories to assist, if asked, in tracing properties liable to confiscation and share banking information in answer to a request sent by another signatory.<sup>121</sup>

Similarly, Germany signed the Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism<sup>122</sup> on October 22, 2015. However, it still hasn't ratified it.<sup>123</sup> It makes a number of acts, including taking part in an association or group for the purpose of terrorism, receiving terrorist training, travelling abroad for the purposes of terrorism and financing or organizing travel for this purpose, a criminal offence.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> BGBl. II 2017 S. 10, 9 July 2014.

<sup>120</sup> Council of Europe Portal, [website], [https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/198/signatures?p\\_auth=LOJXnQnW](https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/198/signatures?p_auth=LOJXnQnW), (accessed 6 May 2019)

<sup>121</sup> CETS No. 198

<sup>122</sup> CETS No. 217


<sup>123</sup> Council of Europe Portal, [website], [https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/217/signatures?p\\_auth=t9Kof2Vo](https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/217/signatures?p_auth=t9Kof2Vo), (accessed 6 May 2019)


<sup>124</sup> Council of Europe Portal, [website], <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/217/>, (accessed 6 May 2019)

**Section 5: Counterterrorist institutions and bodies**

The last section of the chapter focuses on the German counterterrorist institutions and bodies and how they are articulated with each other.

As strategic culture is formed by layers of components, each of them building on the previous, and more visible layer as a basis, it is necessary to go through these layers from the more obvious to the deeper ones in order to understand how the strategic culture in question is structured. The institutional framework of counterterrorism is one of those deeper components that has to be looked at while studying a nation’s strategic culture in the specific field of counterterrorism. It represents the deeper part of the strategic culture considering that institutions are embedded into the country’s administration and are created for a long-term purpose. Moreover, they are put into place because a nation feels threatened by terrorism, which creates a need for a legislative structure framing the fight against terrorism, as well as the, measures, tools and institutions needed for this purpose.





In the case of Germany, the institutionalization of the fight against terrorism dates back to the 1960's and 1970's. At that time, the focus was on domestic terrorism. International terrorism and more specifically Islamist terrorist began to pose “an additional threat to the

German counter-terrorism apparatus in the early 2000s.”<sup>125</sup> Considering this, there was no need to build a counterterrorist architecture from scratch and the German government only built up on the existing structure and refocused it on the present threat. The Joint Counter-Terrorism Center (GTAZ) was created in 2004. It is a “joint co-operation and communication platform used by 40 internal security agencies”.<sup>126</sup> The GTAZ is only a framework bringing together already existing agencies for the purpose of cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The following agencies cooperate on an equal footing within this framework:

- The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)
- The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)
- The Federal Intelligence Service (BND)
- The Federal Public Prosecutor General (GBA)
- The Federal Police (BPOL)
- The Central Office of the German Customs Investigation Service (ZKA)
- The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)
- The Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD)
- The intelligence services of the federal states (LfVs)
- The Criminal offices of the federal states (LKA)

Two pillars were established within the Joint Counter-Terrorism Center: the Intelligence Information and Analysis Unit (NIAS) and the Police Information and Analysis Unit (PIAS). “The NIAS consists of representatives of the BfV, the LfVs, the MAD, and the BND, while the members of PIAS represent the BKA, the LKAs, the GBA and the Federal Police.”<sup>127</sup> NIAS and PIAS’ members cooperate in a number of working groups on daily briefings, threat assessment, operational information exchange, Islamist terrorism-related analyses, individuals from the Islamist-terrorist spectrum, deradicalization, transnational aspects and on accompanying measures concerning the status of legal residency. There is also an Intelligence Board tied to NIAS. The GTAZ is based on the cooperation between the intelligence and police services and actors, as well as a comprehensive approach. “Successful counter-terrorism depends on co-operation among the various intelligence and police actors, flanked by measures

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<sup>125</sup> P. Burke and J. Feltes, *Counterterrorism Overview: Germany*, [website], <http://counterterrorismethics.com/the-counter-terrorism-landscape-in-germany/>, (accessed 6 May 2019)

<sup>126</sup> Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, *Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ – Joint Counter-Terrorism Center)* [website], <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work/islamism-and-islamist-terrorism/gtaz-en>, (accessed 6 May 2019)

<sup>127</sup> P. Burke and J. Feltes, *Counterterrorism Overview: Germany*, [website], <http://counterterrorismethics.com/the-counter-terrorism-landscape-in-germany/>, (accessed 6 May 2019)



concerning the law on foreigners and the co-ordination of preventive and repressive requirements aimed at long-term effectiveness.”<sup>128</sup>

The Joint Internet Center (GIZ) was created in 2007 and is focused on issues of Islamist extremism. While cooperating with the GTAZ, it is an external structure. The Federal Public Prosecutor General, the BfV, the BKA, the BND and the MAD are working together within this additional structure.<sup>129</sup> Finally, the Bundeswehr is also part of the counterterrorism institutional structure, even though it is not included within the GTAZ because it is not allowed to intervene on German soil unless in a state of national emergency. It is strictly restricted to the support of coalition forces and of NATO troops in regions plagued by terrorist organizations.

The German institutions follow a counterterrorism strategy in five points<sup>130</sup>:

- Information collection to prevent terrorist activities,
- Prevention and deradicalization,
- Strengthening of physical security, which include the protection of critical national infrastructures, aviation security and the strengthening of the police force,
- Response and crisis management,
- International cooperation.

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<sup>128</sup> Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, *Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ – Joint Counter-Terrorism Center)* [website], <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work/islamism-and-islamist-terrorism/gtaz-en>, (accessed 6 May 2019)

<sup>129</sup> P. Burke and J. Feltes, *Counterterrorism Overview: Germany*, [website], <http://counterterrorismethics.com/the-counter-terrorism-landscape-in-germany/>, (accessed 6 May 2019)

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 4: Analysis

### Section 1: Popular discourse regarding terrorism

Norms are an important part of the strategic culture of a nation. In his book, Christophe Meyer describes them as socially transmitted and derived from the identity of the nation in question, shaping a ranked set of options for the community's pursuit of security and defense goals. Such idea can be applied to the field of counterterrorism since terrorism is a security and defense matter for nations. Discourse is a vector of norms on a visible layer because it is the transmission of ways of thinking and behaviors through speech. The public opinion, expressed in the popular discourse, can later be translated into strategic policies, which often reflect the former. This is the reason why this research project considered the popular discourse regarding terrorism in both France and Germany as a way to examine the overlaps in the thinking and understanding of terrorism across Europe. Those overlaps contribute to the justification of the formation of a common European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism.

During the content coding of the newspaper articles selected for each case study, a number of themes became apparent as central in the respective popular discourses of the two nations. For France, it was the extremization of the society and the Jihadists as persons. For Germany, it was terrorism itself, Europe and migration. At first glance, these themes don't seem to be very similar. However, they are forming, with the other themes observed in the articles, a larger discursive framework around terrorism, simply articulated differently depending on which side of the border we are looking at. In the French popular discourse, the term Jihadist is used in the same capacity than the term terrorism in the German popular discourse. In fact, the articles from French newspapers are much more articulated around the threat posed by the persons perpetrating terrorist acts, rather than around the threat of terrorism as a whole, as it is in German newspapers. It is a much more tangible approach to focus on the Jihadists as persons than on terrorism as an invisible and non-physical threat. Moreover, the French popular discourse is much more specific considering that it is easily pointing out at the terrorists as Jihadists, whereas the German popular discourse is again much more vague about the threat, only mentioning terrorism as an issue. The main characteristic attributed to terrorism in Germany is its transnational aspect, which is why the key words attributed for the preselection of the articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine didn't include the term of "Jihadist" and there was barely any mention of Jihadists in the German newspapers.

It is important to note that the terminology of Jihadi terrorism is in fact used in France, be it in the popular discourse or in the strategic orientation of the nation, whereas the terminology of Islamist terrorism is preferred in Germany. In fact, there were only rare mention of Jihadism and Jihadi in link with terrorism in the German newspaper articles, where terrorism was usually neutral or associated with the idea of transnationalism. Inherently both terms designate the same threat of terrorism but call it differently. Such difference between the cases might be linked to the longer standing of the counterterrorism institutions in Germany and their early reference to Islamist terrorism following the events of 9/11. It seems that the term of Islamist terrorism was much more widely used in the early 2000s that it is nowadays. Moreover, the use of Jihadi terrorism as an expression and to designate a specific type of terrorism seems to be due to the recent changes concerning the terrorist threat in Europe. Considering this, the divide between France and Germany in terms of terminology might be linked to the timeframe in which the latter's institutions were established and the fact that it hasn't been adapted to the current environment and designation of the terrorist threat. In any case, such divide needs to be breached in order to establish a more comprehensive and efficient cooperative framework when addressing terrorism.

The extremization of the society is a recurrent theme within the French popular discourse. Similarly, the theme of radicalization is present in the German popular discourse. It is not designated using the same terminology, but it is nonetheless referring to a similar topic and concern within both societies. The increasing number of radicalized individuals is seen as an issue for both the German and the French populations as it is affecting their security. Moreover, in both cases, the solution to such process is seen in the use of preventive measures, especially measures of deradicalization. In France, deradicalization is implemented through the lexical field of national cohesion, whereas it is implemented through education within nurseries and schools in Germany.

In Germany, Europe is another main theme of the popular discourse, while this is almost absent from the French context. For Germans, Europe and more specifically the European Union is closely linked to the fight against terrorism as an unavoidable tool which stems directly from envisioning terrorism as a transnational phenomenon. There is a need for cooperation and stability within the Union to improve the efficiency of counterterrorism. Interestingly, this aspect is absent from the French popular discourse, where the mention of Europe and the European Union is included within the theme of the failure of the system. There is no vision of the Union as a solution in the fight against terrorism. In this sense, the German popular discourse is much more positive and less threatening than the French one. It gives credit, to

some extent, to the government and the different systems in place, despite the recent terrorist attacks on its national territory. Then again, it might be because France has been much more affected in terms of casualties and number of attacks since 2015 than Germany has been.

The legal and legislative themes are very significant within the French popular discourse with the topics of the state of emergency, the carceral environment and the sentences directed against the perpetrators of terrorist acts. It illustrates the willingness to have stricter measures and strengthen the existing ones used in the fight against terrorism. Such component is not present in the German popular discourse but can be linked to the divide between freedom and security, which is as important within the discourse as the legal and legislative themes are within the French context. It is apparent in the discussions within the articles that freedom is essential in Germany and that fundamental rights and the *parliamentarian control* cannot be relinquished for a better sense of security. There are some reserves to the judicial inflation apparent in the French popular discourse, however, there is a tendency to strengthen the legislative response to terrorism.

The themes of emotions and victims are present in the discourses of both nations, even though they are framed differently. They are interlinked within the discourse and are articulated within to most of the other themes. Communication is also present in the two cases, linking terrorism and Jihadists, depending on which one, to the emergence of a new form of terrorist threat because of globalization and the use of new technologies such as social media, internet or chat programs on private messaging applications. The theme of discourse for the French case study and propaganda for Germany are similarly framed within the rhetoric of the articles studied. Each is linked to the radicalization or extremization of the society, as a tool of terrorists and Jihadists to spread their message.

Globally, the French and German popular discourse have similar features and corresponding themes even though they are framed a bit differently. The major difference is that the discourse in France is very focused on the legislative response to Jihadi terrorism and narrows down the fight against terrorism to the use of force or the military response, whereas the discourse in Germany is much more comprehensive, including the larger frameworks of the European Union and of the migration issue within the mix. Moreover, the German discourse seems to indicate a positive vision for the future through Europe and a possible improvement of the situation through increasing cooperation among member states, while France seems much more skeptical towards the possibility of the European Union playing an important and efficient role in the fight against terrorism. The fact that Germany has a more positive vision for the future of Europe and is more willing to frame the terrorist threat as transnational than France

might be linked to the fact that the latter has suffered much more from the recent terrorist attacks in terms of the number of casualties. In fact, the Black and White Paper on Terrorism in Europe, an initiative of the European Parliament, established that 254 people were victim of terrorism in France between 2000 and 2017, whereas Germany's victims amounted to 29.<sup>131</sup> Moreover, the study of the German popular discourse reveals that France is regularly mentioned under the framework of the response to terrorism, illustrating the significance of the transnational aspect of terrorism. On the contrary, the French popular discourse rarely mentions Germany within this framework and is much more concentrated on the internal legislative and legal response to terrorism than Germany is.

However, it is clear in both cases, underlying in the themes mentioned above, that there is a need for a stronger response when addressing terrorism and increasing the cooperation among the member states of the European Union. The French popular discourse might illustrate a stronger stance on the matter than the German does considering that the former advocates for the use of harsher sentences and investigative tools, whereas the latter is more focused on the potential of developing a stronger counterterrorism framework through the European Union. Nonetheless, the French and German popular discourse have a hard stance concerning the measures to be taken when addressing terrorism.

## **Section 2: Threat perception of terrorism and immigration**

In order to be able to talk about the building of a strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism, it is necessary to observe an overlap in the vision and understanding of the terrorist threat in France and Germany. The fact that the fight against terrorism is a part of the strategic policy is not enough to regard it as a proof of a common strategic culture. The threat needs to be considered of a comparable level in both countries and be framed similarly as well. The rank of a threat within a nation and the way it is framed is important because it determines which types of behaviors and norms can be legitimately used in order to fight it. As seen in the empirical data, terrorism is considered to be the security issue of primary importance for both France and Germany. Moreover, the possible presence of terrorists among the immigrants and refugees seeking shelter in Europe is also seen as threatening for both nations.

The implementation of the state of emergency in France and of specific anti-terrorist laws in Germany constitute a suspension of normal rules and procedures in order to deal with

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<sup>131</sup> M. Pagazaurtundua, *Black and White Paper on Terrorism in Europe*, European Parliament, 2018

the current terrorist threat. These measures are considered extraordinary because they are needed for the security of the nations which are faced with an extraordinary threat. Moreover, the French and German governments consider these dispositions extraordinary because they implemented a temporal limit for their application, as well as a control of legitimacy of such measures in the long-term. These harsher legislative rules when addressing terrorism are reconfiguring power relations and practices in France and Germany, even though Berlin is a bit more cautious on this matter than Paris is, considering the integration of the state of emergency into common law. These actions increase the power of the executive within the society because the government is allowed to take measures restricting the liberties of the citizens without prior authorization of the legislative power. This is also true in Germany, even if the legislative control is stronger than the French one is.

This illustrates the link between the current terrorist threat, recognized by the French and German populations, and the implementation of exceptional measures in order to protect the citizens against this threat. The French and German nations have been undergoing a process of securitization of the terrorist threat. These exceptional measures taken by the governments show their willingness to recognize terrorism as an existential threat considering how they chose to react and talk about the terrorist threat. The idea of emergency is present within the new dispositions related to the fight against terrorism, because it is seen as a threat for the nation in France and as a threat for the European Union in Germany. Even though the populations of both nations are recognizing terrorism as an important and growing threat, the governments are the ones increasing the threat perception through their speeches and acts. This highlights that the securitizing actors are the French and the German governments. The existential threat is terrorism and the referent object is security. Terrorism and the recent terrorist attacks on European soil are threatening the security of the citizens. Both France and Germany have securitized “the new phenomenon of jihadist terrorism.”<sup>132</sup>

Such process can also be observed concerning immigration, even though it is to a lesser extent, and even more so in France. The possible presence of terrorists among the immigrants and refugees arriving in Europe is considered a threat by the population in general. However, such issue is much more present in the German popular discourse than it is in the French context. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the wave of immigrants in Europe has been considered as a crisis that threatens the stability of the European Union. The securitizing actors are again the French and German governments and even to some extent the European Union.

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<sup>132</sup> J. Samaan and A. Jacobs, ‘Countering Jihadist Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of French and German Experiences’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 7 February 2018, p. 5.

The existential threat is immigration, or more specifically the possible presence of terrorists among the migrants arriving in Europe. Finally, the referent object is also security.

To conclude, Germany and France have securitized the terrorist threat, as well as immigration as a possible vector for terrorists to enter Europe.

### **Section 3: Modalities of the use of force regarding terrorism**

The modalities of the use of force have long been regarded as a crucial part of a nation's strategic culture, as it was shown in Meyer's book and the collective work of Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas. Usually, it designates the requirements under which military force can be used for external intervention, as well as the purposes for which such intervention can occur. As this study focuses on the strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism, it is important to put such understanding of the use of force into perspective. In fact, even though the use of force traditionally refers to the framework of external interventions, it is not the only way in which it can be understood when dealing with the terrorist threat.

The study of the strategic orientations of both, France and Germany, shows that the divide between internal and external intervention doesn't apply when addressing terrorism. In the case of Germany, this understanding is dubbed as the interface between internal and external security, whereas it is referred to as the continuity between internal and external security in the case of France. Both nations recognize the fact that terrorism is transnational because of its external roots and internal consequences, which means that the issue can only be solved through cooperation and a continued effort both internally and externally. Considering this, the modalities of the use of force, as a component of strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism, should be studied within both the internal and external frames.

#### *A. External use of force*

The use of force for the purpose of external interventions conforms to the traditional understanding of the concept of the use of force. France has traditionally been actively involved in external interventions through coalitions but also unilaterally. Such circumstances can be explained by the fact that strategic autonomy is one of the pillars of the French strategic policy abroad, because of the Gaullist legacy. The military capabilities of the nation are well developed and crucial as an illustration of the role that the French government is willing to take in the international community, which leads Paris to take a leadership role and a higher level of

responsibilities while conducting military operations. On the other hand, Germany is much more restrained in its employment of the use of force. In fact, since the end of the Second World War, the country is characterized by a certain aversion for the use of force except for defensive purposes.

Despite a slight shift of the German stance on the use of force, the core of Berlin's military orientation remains unchanged. Indeed, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the German government was allowed to use force in order to fulfill its obligations imbedded in the treaties it signed, such as the UN or NATO. The decision of leading the German armed forces in such interventions still requires the approval of the Parliament. This is why the Bundeswehr is described as a parliamentary army. In the case of France, the government has the ability to deploy the armed forces for external intervention without requiring the previous approval of the Parliament, which gives the executive a higher level of power in terms of the use of force than what the German executive is given.

To conclude, France is significantly more than willing to use force and send military troops abroad, be it in the framework of a coalition or not, for defensive purpose, for the protection of national interests and the maintaining of France as a crucial player in the international community. Germany is much more averse to the use of force, except for defensive purposes and has a high parliamentary control, as contrasted with France. The empirical data show that France continues to be a relatively (at least in the European context) belligerent country when considering the use of force abroad, while Germany remains a pacifist nation.

### *B. Internal use of force*

The use of military forces in the contemporary European context is usually limited to external interventions. However, with the growing threat of terrorism and changing framework, the threat has moved from abroad to home and the government start to see a need for using military forces on national soil. France implemented the state of emergency following the terrorist attacks of November 13, 2015 in order to protect the French citizens. This allowed the government to take special measures in the fight against terrorism, affecting the freedom of the citizens for security purposes and to use military forces on national soil for the same purpose. In the case of Germany, armed forces can be deployment on national soil at the request of the federal state of the German government in case of emergency situations. Large scale terrorist attacks can be considered as an emergency situation.



Despite this authorization for the Bundeswehr to intervene in case of an emergency situation, the mission of the armed forces under such circumstances are still subjected to a strict and very limiting parliamentary control regarding its scope and purpose. The French parliamentary control also exists but is only applied after the actual deployment of forces, as the government needs to write a report clarifying the measures taken and submitting it for parliamentary control every year, as well as for an evaluation on the utility of such measures. This illustrates the importance of parliamentary control in both countries. However, the French executive power possesses much more leeway than the German one on the matter of the deployment of military forces on national soil. Moreover, France has the particularity of possessing the specific institution of Gendarmerie, or military police. Such force is considered as a military force and not a police force, but is under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and not of the President, as is the regular military. The requirements of their deployment on national soil is much more lenient than the traditional military forces, making it easier for the executive to use force internally than it is in Germany.

Despite the theoretical possibility of the deployment of military forces on national soil, Germany's parliamentary control and restriction on the use of force internally remains high. Dissimilarly, France has a high tolerance for the deployment of military forces on national soil, especially through the use of the Gendarmerie. The fact that both countries support, at least nominally, the creation of a *European army* could be the solution toward a rapprochement between the two, concerning the modalities of the use of force. In fact, Germany is against the use of force other than for defensive purposes but is willing to employ it for the respect of its international engagements, as it has been done during NATO operations. Under those circumstances, the operations are implemented under NATO's authority and not the authority of the German government, which causes less of an issue regarding the willingness to use force for other purposes than defense. Creating a European army could be a way to bridge the gap existing in the modalities of the use of force among EU member states.

#### **Section 4: Institutional structure of counterterrorism**

The institutional structure of counterterrorism is the last step of the formation of a common European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism. In fact, once the strategic policies and behaviors have been imbedded within an institutional structure, it illustrates the long-term reach of their implementation. Considering this, it is important to analyze whether or

not there are sufficient overlaps between the institutional structures of counterterrorism in France and Germany, to prove the existence of such common strategic culture.

#### *A. Comprehensive framework*

The first step of analyzing the overlaps between the institutional frameworks of Germany and France is to whether or not the structures of these institutional frameworks are comprehensive, meaning whether or not they have been in use for a long time. The existence of a counterterrorism institutional framework during a long timeframe would prove that it is steady and is unlikely to be affected by changes in the environment. Such conditions could provide an additional proof of stability for the institutional framework, thereby validating the existence of a common European strategic culture when addressing terrorism, considering the need for continuity in strategic culture.

The first French coordinating body in the fight against terrorism was created in 1984 as a part of the police forces but was only designated as the kingpin of the fight against Jihadi terrorism in 2014. The other important coordinating institution is the National Center for Counterterrorism headed by the Coordinator of intelligence and of the fight against terrorism. It was created in 2017 as a part of the intelligence community and under the direct authority of the French President. The realization of the necessity of increased coordination and the implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorist institutional framework followed the recent terrorist attacks on French soil. In the case of Germany, the need for more coordination within the counterterrorism structure appeared earlier on, in the early 2000s when Islamist terrorism began to pose an additional threat, especially following the events 9/11. The Joint Counter-Terrorism Center was created in 2004 and built upon the existing structure, while refocusing it on the present threat. The G7+5 is only a coordination framework bringing together the existing agencies and institutions fighting against terrorism.

The institutional counterterrorism framework is not only composed of the institutions involved in the fight against terrorism, the legislative framework is an important part of it as well. Such framework is implemented for the specific circumstances that the terrorist threat represents, which means that the measures taken under the legislative framework and for the purpose of the fight against terrorism are dispositions which should hold a limit to themselves considering that they deprive people from their liberties in some cases and can be seen as anti-constitutional. The dispositions authorizing the individual measures of administrative control and of surveillance, part of the state of emergency included into common law in France, have

been limited in their application to the 31<sup>st</sup> December 2020. Similarly, the anti-terrorist laws voted in Germany should be evaluated by a group of scientific experts before January 10<sup>th</sup>, 2021 because they constitute a breach of liberty for the citizens. This illustrates the understanding, in both Germany and France, that there needs to be temporal limits to the implementation of anti-terrorist laws because they threaten the fundamental rights of the citizens, even though it is for the purpose of security.

Germany and France both seem to understand the necessity of the implementation of coordinating institutions or bodies within their counterterrorist institutional framework for an increased efficiency, even though France was a decade late in its implementation. Moreover, they agree on the value of temporal limits to the implementation of anti-terrorist legislations because of the divide between freedom and security and the need to protect the citizens on one hand, and the need to respect their fundamental rights on the other hand. It is clear that, Berlin and Paris are pushing for the implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorist institutional framework as an essential part of the fight against Jihadi terrorism.

### *B. Cooperation framework*

The second step of analyzing the overlaps between the counterterrorist institutional frameworks of the two nations is to determine whether or not they are oriented towards cooperation and a multilateral framework. The French strategic orientation emphasizes the need for the reinforcement of the cooperation against terrorism as a priority area for the protection of European citizens. Moreover, it shows its commitment to the creation of a European White Paper on defense and security as a tool in the counterterrorism field and for the implementation of more cooperation among member states. Similarly, Germany conceives its security, especially concerning the terrorist issue, in terms of multilateralism and the increased need to rely on the European Union as a security actor. Moreover, it advocates for the progressive integration of European armed forces as another important tool of the fight against terrorism. The creation of a European army of defense is also seen by French leaders as a way to increase cooperation and security within the European Union. The future of the fight against terrorism is only seen as attainable through a strong and united European Union.

Furthermore, France and Germany are members of a number of international organizations, which participate in the fight against terrorism. Those organizations include, among others, the Council of Europe, the Financial Task Force and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. Adding to this, both nations are taking part in the international coalition

against IS and have committed themselves to the counterterrorism strategies of the European Union and of the OSCE. Germany stepped up its multilateralism tendencies by signing a bilateral cooperation agreement on the fight against terrorism with Georgia.

Regarding the legislative framework of cooperation, France and Germany seem to be on the same pace, even though the timeframe of adaptation to the European legislation is slightly different. The Council of Europe's Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism was ratified by both nations. It was opened for signature by the member States in 2005. However, France and Germany only ratified it respectively in 2015 and 2017, following the wave of terrorist attacks. It is possible to conjecture about the idea that they signed it in an attempt to move towards a common policy regarding the fight against the financing of terrorism. What is certain, however, is that both countries ratifying the Convention illustrate an overlap forming in the field of the prevention against the financing of terrorist activities.

The emphasizes, both in Germany and France, on the need for a stronger European cooperation and an enlargement of the cooperation framework beyond the European Union and within the international community shows a commitment to multilateralism.

## Conclusion

This research project sought to answer the following question: Does the European Union have a common strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism? To answer this, I used the empirical data gathered in the previous chapters to assess the similarities and dissimilarities between the French and German responses to terrorism. Moreover, I tried to account for the overlaps observed in regard to the four components of strategic culture: the popular discourse, the threat perception of terrorism and immigration, the modalities of the use of force and the institutional structure of counterterrorism.

The popular discourses, even though diverging in their respective framing of terrorism and the themes related to it, are very similar in terms of the issues seen as linked to the terrorist threat. The threat perception towards terrorism and immigration is very strong in both countries and the terrorist threat has even been securitized by the governments, as well as, to a lesser extent, the presence of potential terrorists among the immigrants arriving in Europe. The institutional frameworks are growing closer, be it in terms of cooperation or comprehensive measures. The coordinating institutions within the German institutional structure of counterterrorism might be older than the French ones, but that doesn't prevent them from being similar in body. Moreover, both institutional structures are characterized by a comprehensive framework. The only major diverging point within the response to Jihadi terrorism is the modalities of the use of force. France is much more willing than Germany in this department, be it the internal or external use of force. Those findings are reported in the table below.

		FRANCE	GERMANY
Popular discourse		Hard stance on the response to terrorism	Hard stance on the response to terrorism
Threat perception		Securitized	Securitized
Modalities of the use of force	External	Belligerent	Pacifist
	Internal	High tolerance	Low tolerance
Institutional Structure of counterterrorism	Comprehensive framework	High	High
	Cooperation framework	Multilateral	Multilateral

To conclude, the empirical data gathered regarding the response to terrorism in France and Germany show the increasing rapprochement between the strategic orientations of both nations and the formation of a common European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism.

Despite the findings of this study justifying the building of a common European strategic culture when addressing Jihadi terrorism, there are still grey areas regarding this topic. In fact, there is still no consensus regarding the definition of the terrorist threat and the employment of the terms of Jihadi or Islamist terrorism. Moreover, if an increased integration and cooperation is observed among EU member states in regard to terrorism, it is necessary to study in more details the relations of the European Union with NATO and what this increasingly integrated European framework would entail for the relations of the member states with the United States. Those are recommendations for further studies.

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# Annex

## Content coding tree for the French popular discourse

	State of emergency	Sentences	Carceral environment			Terreur islamique
Réforme constitutionnelle	Questionnement	Assignation à résidence	Foyer du terrors inams			Préceptes
Renforcement pouvoirs publics	Surveillance Inflation législative	Dechéance de nationalité	Disimulation	Aunonomie musulmane		Irrational
Réponse politique	Arbitraire	Prison	Contagion	Surpopulation		Monde binaire
Temporaire	Intrusive	Eta de droit	Isolément	Evaluation		Doctrines
Moyens élargis	Prolongation	Droit	Radicalisation	Centre spécialisés		Processus
Rassemblement	Temporaire	Incompressibles	Regroupement			Intégrisme
Ordre public	Moyens élargis	Juste d'exception				Progression
Paque	Consolidation	Perquisition	Dissolution assos culturelles			Phénomène
Republican	Sécurité	Arsenal sécuritaire				Propagande
Citoyenneté						<b>Extremisation of the society</b>
Engagement	Problemes	Consequences				Isamisme
Civisme	Identitaires	Victimes				Islamisaton
Education	Intégration	Justice				Radicalisation
Communauté		Indemnisation				Délinquance
Unité		Recueillement				Fondamentalisme
Service civique		Préjudice				Salafisme
Democratie						Ghettoisation
Collectif						Sectarisme
Valuers						Prosélytisme
républicaines						Totalitarisme
National cohesion						Populisme
						Communautarisme
						Fanatisme
						Obscurantisme
						Intolérance
						Désengagement
						War
						Criminels
						Ennemis
						Bataille
						Lutte
						Violence
						Guerre civile
						Combat
						Barbarie
						Attentats
						Aussaut
						Confrontation
						Adversaire
						Danger
						Operationalisatic
						Frontières
						Immigration
						Risque
						Des idées
						Meutres
						Assassinsats
						Ideologique
						De religion
						Terrorism advocacy
						Penalisation
						sévérité
						Condamnation rapide
						Contrôle Judiciaire
						Récidive
						Multiplication



# Content coding tree for the German popular discourse

