

## Abstract

Recently, world leaders are making efforts to finally gain control over the issue of tax havens and financial secrecy through various policy measures. Thanks to combating financial secrecy, tax fairness is slowly being achieved which enables jurisdiction to collect tax revenue which they lose due to the existence of secrecy jurisdictions. In my thesis I update and extend the existing research concerning bilateral approach of empirical identification of tax havens' financial secrecy and based on it I quantify for 111 countries the secrecy they supply and for 82 countries the secrecy they receive. Next, I primarily quantify which jurisdiction wins or loses due to secrecy by developing the Net Bilateral Financial Secrecy Index and estimate it for 68 jurisdictions by setting for each country the financial secrecy received and supplied against each other. Then, I focus on working with the established Net BFSI and I based on it conclude several findings, and also analyse how the Net BFSI changed during recent decade. Subsequently, I assess how international organizations and particular countries are successful in targeting the jurisdictions most benefiting from the secrecy with their policies, I evaluate their recent policy measures using my results of the Net BFSI, and I suggest how they could improve. I assess two most recent EU lists of tax havens and two global lists, as well as the engagement of countries in Automatic Exchange of Information by March 2019.

<b>JEL Classification</b>	F36, F63, F65, H26, O16
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