

Abstract (in English)

How can we explain political oppression if we claim ourselves to be metaphysically free subjects? As a basis of *The Second Sex*, the question is there analyzed in its specific case – a woman. According to Beauvoir, woman has been expelled to an immanent domain, surrounded by the shared world, foreign to her in its absolute givenness. Yet at the same time, she claims just as Sartre does that freedom, transcendence, and the world are inseparable parts of the structure of a subject. Can these claims be truly brought together? In most cases, interpretations of *The Second Sex* turn to one and omit the other. Contrariwise, the aim of this thesis is to preserve both, and in the light of *Being and Nothingness* explain them as parts of one structure. I demonstrate that ontologically, woman and man are transcending, free subjects. Man chooses his own fundamental project for himself, and with this choice the world appears in its meaning – as his own. Man can thus choose from his possibilities either authentically, or run from his condemnation to freedom towards insecurity. For woman, her fundamental project is chosen by others and she only accepts it – and with it, a foreign world which belongs to men appears to her. Therefore, she factually remains in her immanent domain of womanhood. Her situation is based on givenness and acceptance of her fundamental project rather than on free choice, and therefore it condemns her to the impossibility of an authentic choice. The oppression strips women of any chance to assert herself as a subject. From her situation also arises her character, typical for oppressed groups – woman loses her own authenticity and becomes a case of general ideal of womanhood.