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**New Middle Ages: Geopolitics of post-
Westphalian World**

Disertační práce

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Anotace (abstrakt)

Práce se věnuje aplikaci teorie New Middle Ages na současnou politickou mapu světa. Práce argumentuje, že pro pochopení fungování mezinárodní politiky je nutné oprostit se od snahy univerzalizovat geopolitické nastavení v jednotlivých regionech, a porozumět jejich zásadním kontextuálním rozdílům. V návaznosti na analýzu teoretických textů, práce vytváří model tří světů – Durable Disorder (definovaný propojením a privatizací), Westphalian System (definovaný predominancí silného centralizovaného státu) a Chaotic Anarchy (kde nedochází k stabilizaci moci a kontrole násilí). Tento model je aplikován na globální mapu světa a následně jsou analyzovány strategie aktérů v těchto geopolitických nastaveních a vzájemné ovlivňování těchto tří prostorů.

Abstract

The thesis applies the neomedieval theoretical framework on the contemporary political map of the world. The thesis argues, that the contemporary international politics cannot be understood by an application of the unified geopolitical setting and that the key divergencies in the geopolitical environment play a crucial role for the actors operating in different regions. As an outcome of the theoretical works dealing with the selected theory, a three-world model is being presented dividing the political map among these settings – Durable Disorder (defined by networking and privatization), Westphalian System (defined by a dominant position of strong centralized state), and Chaotic Anarchy (lacking stable political power and control over means of violence). This model is consequently applied on the global political map with the consequent analysis

of the strategies of different actors located inside specific environments and mutual interactions of these three worlds.

Klíčová slova

geopolitika, mezinárodní systém, post-Vestfálský systém, networking, suverenita, stát

Keywords

geopolitics, international system, post-Westphalian system, networking, sovereignty, state

Prohlášení

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval/a samostatně a použil/a jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.
2. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne

Bohumil Doboš

Poděkování

Na tomto místě bych rád poděkoval svému školiteli za pomoc se všemi aspekty doktorského studia a hodnotné připomínky, které vznášel v průběhu práce na následujícím textu. Taktéž bych rád poděkoval všem lidem, díky kterým jsem mohl stadium absolvovat a kteří mi umožnili se této práci věnovat v míře, která vedla ke jejímu dokončení.

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List of abbreviations:

AQAP – Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC – East African Community
EU – European Union
ETA - Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
FARC - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FSI – Fragile State Index
FTA – free trade area
IORA – Indian Ocean Rim Association
IRA – Irish Republican Army
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO – non-governmental organization
PKK - Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Worker’s Party)
PRC – People’s Republic of China
RAF – Red Army Faction
UK – United Kingdom
USA – United States of America
UN – United Nations
YPG - Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Forces)

1. Introduction:

The end of the Cold War introduced significant shifts and changes to the world's geopolitics (end of bipolarism and establishment of the new world order), nature of the international system and domestic political setting of many countries all over the globe. Bipolar competition disappeared, the world became dominated (at least for some time) by a single superpower – the United States (USA) -, many countries fell into the abyss of civil war that was not fumed by the competing superpowers. Many states failed due to the end of financing from former superpowers and lack of balancing between them inside the civil conflicts taking place in the third world context. The world became globalized and interconnected via the emerging cyberspace and effects of the new regionalism as in a case of the establishment of the European Union (EU) that spread across most of the European continent or an appearance of the free trade areas (FTAs). New non-state actors that appeared in the new environment (violent non-state actors or non-governmental organizations) often utilized the caveats in the states' territoriality and gained prominence. From these examples, it is clear that the changes in the international structure are systemic and profound. Consequently, a large amount of debates regarding the nature of the post-Cold War world took place. From Fukuyama (1992) to Huntington (1997) to Giddens (1998), many authors attempted to portray the nature of the international system following the fall of bipolarism. This work, however, goes even further and claims that the changes not only disrupted the bipolar balance of power but that they challenge the Westphalian system as we know it. It might even seem that the structural limits that empowered the state to become the dominant and mutually reinforcing unit in the international system that established itself since the end of Middle Ages (Spruyt 1994, 180) might shift towards a new equilibrium that might not favour a global dominance of the sovereign state anymore. This development is following the process of power diffusion (Nye Jr. 2011, 113). It is claimed that the world is slowly turning to a new geopolitical setting – the neomedievalism.

As noted by M. van Creveld (2000), the introduction of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War dramatically changed the nature of the international system which was for previous few centuries dominated by the integrating tendencies that began in the consolidation process on the European continent¹ and culminated in

¹ See (Tilly 1975).

the establishment of the bipolar order. These trends to consolidate territory via war effort were, however, ended by the emerging possibility of nuclear annihilation and since the fall of the Soviet Empire disintegration began to lead the way – the way that shifts the system into the neomedieval future.

The possible transformation into the New Middle Ages was, however, for the first time mentioned by a different author – A. Wolfers (1962). Despite leaving just a short comment on the topic, he scratched the possibility of a return of a system of the new medievalism where a distinction between domestic and foreign affairs blurs as a result of the struggle of communism against national state and transnational movements against nationalism (Wolfers 1962, 242).

As noted in the title, the thesis argues that world is entering the post-Westphalian phase of its political development and states are playing still decreasing role in the international and domestic politics. The system is characterized by tensions and contradictions (Cerny and Prichard 2017, 3). This, however, does not mean that a state is about to disappear. The institution of state is so far prominent political actor and will in some territories and functions remain dominant or at least important for the times to come.² The end of the Westphalian system and increased levels of instability, furthermore, do not necessarily mean that the world will become a less pleasant place to live – as M. van Creveld argues, the state-based system brought horrors of Hiroshima and Auschwitz which are hardly perceivable in the neomedieval setting (van Creveld 2000).

The first scholar to adequately describe the neomedieval world setting was H. Bull in his "The Anarchical Society" which was initially published in 1977 where he delimits New Middle Ages as an alternative stream of thinking about international politics in a post-bipolar era (Bull 1977, 254-255). The foundation of the stream of thought as well as the consequent analysis are thus rooted in the realist stream of thought. The neomedieval thinking was, however, abandoned as improbable until the beginning of the 1990s where it was reintroduced either explicitly (e.g., works of J. Friedrichs (2001), P. Cerny (1998), J. Rapley (2006)) or implicitly (e.g., by R. Kaplan (1994)). The stream thus gained some prominence despite remaining on the side of the mainstream academic debate. At this point, it is necessary to stress that the systemic changes presented in this work do not portray the nature of the political activity inside

² See the discussion in 1999's special issue of *Political Studies* 47 (3).

the global system in its entirety. There was no clear dramatic short-term switch from the medieval to modern system. Inside the Westphalian system, non-state actors used to play some or even crucial role (e.g., the East India Company) and some, at least formally, alternative political units appeared (e.g., Libyan Jamahiriya). The prevalent logic of the political conduct, however, laid in the forces that are described in relation to the medieval, modern and neomedieval systems as argued in the following text.

The fact that the theory is a little bit too extravagant for the mainstream debate³ is not a fault in itself. What is more problematic is the fact that the stream remained to some extent shattered in different approaches towards the new nature of the international politics. Just by comparison of J. Friedrichs' historical neomedievalism and P. Williams' New Dark Ages we can find directly opposing ideas which, however, fall under the same basic framework. The first goal of this thesis is thus clear – a proper description of neomedievalism as a stream of thought. Given the fact, that the specific authors usually dedicated only limited space to the development of their outlooks on the theory or its application, it is necessary to carefully describe large number of these divergent views as to find some common ground that is not rooted only in a one-time opposition of the selected author to the Westphalian reading of the international system. After this goal is achieved, the delimitation of the ideal-types that can be extrapolated from the theoretical analysis of the international (geo)politics will be presented. Proper demarcation of these ideal types is essential as it will become the basis for the whole remaining work. The work will thus devote quite an ample space to a proper definition of basic terminology and overview of the literature dealing with the New Middle Ages. The first research question is thus, what is a definition of neomedievalism?

New Middle Ages as somehow fluid environment, nevertheless, cannot be seen as a rigid description of international system and the thinking thus more resemble continuum where each case's position in relation to the ideal-types differs. This is why the next logical step in the attempt to examine the theory is to establish such continuum to which the cases might be plotted into. This will enable us to place all the cases into the complex model that presents the outlook of the neomedieval post-Westphalian system. For a successful analysis, we need to deal with one other issue – the nature of researched actors and scope of analysis. As New Middle Ages are based on a

³ Despite the fact, that for some authors the suggestions made by neomedievalists do not go far enough. See for example (Bunker and Bunker 2016).

presumption about the decline of state power, it seems unsuitable to use state-based analysis as is usual in other geopolitical works. We will turn our attention to different units usually connected to geopolitical thought - regions. Regions are not, however, used as actors themselves but are researched as an environment filled by different – both state and non-state – actors interacting with each other. For region selection and delimitation, vast amount of literature by such prominent figures such as S. Cohen, Z. Brzezinski, J. Zielonka, S. Huntington, or R. Kaplan is available. Analysis of the position of the chosen regions inside the neomedieval context is the second principal aim of this work. Regional distribution of the new international geopolitical setting is thus only a step away. If it is found out that a vast majority of regions is dominated by the Westphalian setting and is not leaning (meaning there is no evident shift towards non-Westphalian international setting) towards some form of neomedieval form, the basis on which the whole thesis is based upon will fail. The second research question thus states, what is the geographical distribution of the various geopolitical (Westphalian and neomedieval) settings?

Once we know what neomedievalism is and how its different forms are distributed in different regions, we can move to the second goal of the thesis – analysis of the relationship among actors inside different types of political space (Westphalian and neomedieval) and relations among various actors inside these spaces and their adaptation to it. The work will look at the options given to the neomedieval and Westphalian actors in the new international setting with a focus on strategic options such as economic cooperation, shatter-belt creation, state-building, waging war, forms of external involvement, etc. It will be presented how different actors need to adapt their strategies and setting according to the context of the environment they are acting in⁴ and based on their capabilities and nature of their geopolitical setting. In the end, we should be able to imagine the world as more than a simple political map filled by territorial Westphalian states, but as a complex structure with different settings, different actors and various relationships. This is the primary justification for choosing the topic in the first place – presenting alternative to the classical geopolitical view on the international affairs and presenting practical advises on its impact. Understanding of the changes in the nature of the global geopolitics and reaction of different actors to such shifts is crucial for any subsequent analysis of the actions of different actors. The third and

⁴ According to the Darwinist theory - see (Spruyt 1994, 24).

fourth research questions state: How do the political actors adapt to their geopolitical environments? How do the actors inside different spaces react to each other?

Each of the questions will be researched using different methodological approach, and each chapter will, if necessary, describe used methodology in more substantial depth. At this moment, the basic summary of the major methodological points is presented. In defining and characterizing neomedievalism, we will analyse existing academic sources dealing with the issue – heuristic research. After adequately explaining the theory, we will move to the description of its poles – ideal-types. Consequently, we will compare them to find main factors that distinguish them. Once adequately described, the factors will be prepared for operationalization. Operationalization will follow methodology that E. Berg and E. Kuusk (2010) used in their article where they presented empirical approach toward understanding sovereignty. Afterwards, we will analyse the results and present geopolitical implications of state deterioration in a context of the empirical findings and the neomedieval theoretical framework. The methodological framework itself is based on the approach rooted in the French geopolitics – more consensual and liberal and lacking geographical determinism compared to the classical geopolitics and more focused on non-state actors as well. The selected school of geopolitics combines elements of classical and critical geopolitics, taking the essential thoughts from both of them. French geopolitics presents tools to analyse space as a system. This will help us with a proper delimitation and understanding of the spatial properties of different regions in relation to the neomedieval theory. The thesis also holds clear limitations regarding the empirical work. First, the global focus leads to necessary simplifications. It is not a goal of the work to make a detailed analysis of every part of the world and it cannot be. The thesis covers the evaluation of the systemic forces inside the international order and the application aims to better understand the geographical spread of the different types of geopolitical spaces. The second limitation deals with the development on the ground. As the thesis works with the recent data and evaluation of the contemporary events, it might not be capable of following all the most recent developments taking place. This, however, once again does not disqualify it from presenting the systemic evolution.

Structure of the work will follow the above-mentioned research goals. The first chapter deals with definitions and terminology; the second is dedicated to the theory itself – both description of neomedievalism as an alternative to the Westphalian system

and of its ideal-types; the third chapter discusses the way how to apply theory to empirical research – defining analysed regions and presenting the research design of the work; the fourth chapter deals with the empirical analysis itself; the fifth chapter is dedicated to a study of the relations among different actors in neomedieval world and the way, political actors adapted to their environment; finally, conclusion summarizes the whole work.

Last but not least, it is important to point out one final detail. This PhD. thesis directly follows Master's Thesis the author presented in 2013 at the programme of Geopolitical Studies at the Institute of Political Studies of Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague. Given this fact, it is probable that some parts of the first three chapters dealing with definitions, neomedieval theory, and application will be to some degree similar to the text presented in this earlier work. This is, however, by no means an attempt to plagiarise or ease the burden of preparing utterly new text but only a result of lasting interest of author in the topic and consequence of more extended research activity in the field starting before the beginning of Ph.D. studies.

2. Definitions, terminology, and concepts

Before the introduction of the New Middle Age theory and the neomedieval framework that will be serving as a theoretical basis for the empirical part of this work, it is essential to describe basic definitions, terminology, and concepts used throughout the doctoral thesis. In the first part, an understanding of geopolitics/political geography and its applicability on neomedievalism as primarily international relations theory will be presented. The second part will focus on conceptualization of the fundamental concepts, and the third part will describe medieval and Westphalian systems as a framework from which the neomedieval system might be described as well as the process of globalization that is by many seen as major factor eroding modern state system.⁵

2.1. Geopolitics and neomedieval theory

Despite being primarily created as an international relations' framework, New Middle Ages is also well applicable in the field of geopolitics, and political geography as it in no small degree deals with the territorial dimension of politics. To prove this, a conceptualization of these two terms must be first presented. Geopolitics/political geography is understood as a field of social sciences studying relation between political processes and space/geography. This relationship, however, does include not only geographic patterns but also expertise from other fields (economy, demography, etc.) so the geopolitical analysis seeks to research distinct cases as profoundly as possible (Glassner 1996, 11-12). These other fields of expertise may include study of political and economic actors/agents/systems, outlook of economic activity, or even role of ideas and ideology in the international system. It is important to point out, that the perception throughout the thesis is not state-centric. A geopolitical actor is defined, by for example S. Mäkinen (2014, 101), as any actor whose influence might be felt in at least two regions on globe and so international organizations, individuals, etc. must also be included.⁶ This definition is, however, insufficient for this research. For its purposes, it is necessary to define political-geographical actor as well. While geopolitical actor is

⁵ For the discussion over the role of globalization on the state system and sovereignty, erosion see the special issue of *Political Studies* 47 (3) (1999).

⁶ Compare with the definition of a geopolitical agent in (Flint 2006, 24-26).

defined by its impact on more regions or by its influence on the power projection capabilities and the general dynamics of geopolitical development, regional actors are comparably more static and follow the logic of political geography as a fixed discipline. Actors that are part of the geopolitical processes are involved in dynamic⁷ power projection efforts, while every actor that holds some power in a set region is a part of the political-geographical analysis of more static power distribution.

This distinction follows traditional division between political geography and geopolitics. Both fields are subfields of human geography which specializes in research of connection between human activity and geography in general. Political geography, as mentioned earlier, focuses on political processes and is thus oriented more on the state political system while geopolitics is understood as a subfield of political geography specifically dedicated to studying of great-power/global/international politics from the spatial perspective. To quote B. Hnízdo, geopolitics is merely a "*(s)cale picked at a global level, trying to overcome the limitations given by the state as a territorial unit in researching the problems of political geography(...)*" (Hnízdo 1995, 10)."⁸

Neomedievalism can be integrated into the geopolitical thinking in two ways. The first is related to the nature of actors - neomedievalism stresses greater focus on the non-state actors. The second is a mode of territorial control - the notion of absolute territorial power of state is regarded as obsolete and unjustifiable. A justification for using neomedievalism in geopolitical framework is thus the focus on territory and interaction among actors who can be defined as geopolitical/political-geographical (although not all of them are necessarily territorial).

Finally, two concepts related to the issue and coming from the French stream of geopolitical thought need to be tackled. The first is J. Lévy's system of World-spaces. He points to the fact that the existence of world system is a myth and that no global model is relevant for any scholar interested in honest description of a contemporary world. He proposes presence of four types of spatial models based on the type and quality of inter-human relations – world of groupings (based on separation), of forces (domination), hierarchical world (transaction), and world of society (communication). Each of these four models leads to a different end – community, empire, market,

⁷ „*The geopolitical perspective is dynamic. It evolves as the international system and its operational environment changes* (Cohen 2014, 5).”

⁸ Translation by the author of these (the same is applicable for all the translations from Czech in this thesis)

society. Qualities of these spaces are then leading to different territorial outcomes – horizon, borders, territorially determined network, and global network (Lévy 2000). If we fast-forward a little, we may see that this separation will be important for two reasons:

- 1) Three advanced systems' (other than world of groupings) are basis for the three pillars we will examine in description of Durable Disorder scenario.
- 2) Different territorial outcomes are similar to the setting of our three ideal-types – border zones (horizon) for Chaotic Anarchy, border lines and globalization (borders and territorially determined network) for Westphalian model, and global (universal) network for Durable Disorder.

The second important concept comes from the work of G. Dussuoy who tried to examine the composition of the world system. He shatters the idea of a single system into parts that can be adequately examined. Dussoy presents five components of the world system – physical, natural space; demographic or demo-political space; diplomatic-military field; socio-economic field; symbolic, idealistic and cultural domain. He expresses a belief that these spaces are not separate and one can become so important that it determines the outlook of the others. In his work the influence of diplomatic-military field in the Cold War is presented as an example, or, similarly, the contemporary influence of socio-economic field in the form of globalization can be seen as another example of such dominance (Dussuoy 2010). This division is essential for this study mainly because it once again points to the two-and-half pillar structure of Durable Disorder and it specifies its field of interest. We will be primarily interested in the diplomatic-military field (not only in its effects but also in actors playing major roles); demo-political space concerning the local political-geographic actors; or socio-economic field as long as it affects these two domains.

2.2. State

A proper definition of a modern state is a far-reaching task which to be done exhaustively would, similarly to other definitions presented in this work, take much more space than available here – in fact, it would be a goal for a separate monography. This work will thus only briefly summarize primary arguments that will lead us in the following text. The modern state is usually defined by a set of objective and subjective

geographic, social and political factors. Objective factors are mainly understood as a defined territory;⁹ permanent resident population; government; organized economy and a circulation system. Subjective factors are state sovereignty and international recognition (Glassner 1996, 45-46). A state might be defined as a set of four types of institutions – political, security, administrative and judiciary – with the ultimate aim of providing security for its population in exchange for resource extraction (Ezrow and Frantz 2013, 7, 16). Furthermore, modern state is a primary component of the modern international system, with unique position on the international scene, with an ability of prime invention of the legal system and expected behaviour patterns inside its sovereign territory. H. Spruyt (1994, 3) identifies modern state as being defined by an internal hierarchy and external autonomy, while another definition identifies the modern international system by consisting of „(...) *disjoint, mutually exclusive, and fixed territoriality (...)* (Ruggie 1993, 174)” – in effect a modern Westphalian state. The Westphalian state is thus a manifestation of this modernity in the international system that arose due to particular conjuncture of social and political interests in Europe (Spruyt 1994, 18-19).

Main features of the modern state are according to G. Sørensen (2005 91-99) these:

- Centralized system of rules based on administrative, police, and army institutions, confirmed by law order, and claiming the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.
- Presence of people on a given territory creating highly coherent community, connecting a nation with a state.
- The existence of a national economy that consists of all major sectors needed for its reproduction.

Additionally, P. D. Miller defines state in following words: “*The state is a human institution that successfully invokes a theory of justice: (1) to claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, the right to expropriate resources and perform other functions at its discretion, and sovereign authority to make and enforce rules within given territory and over a given human population, and to serve human life; (2) by providing (professedly) public goods to at least some of the population in a contractlike exchange: goods for legitimacy (agreement to its claims). The kind of goods that the*

⁹ Sovereign state is territorially defined – there is no authority over other units (such as was the case with Empire or Church) (Spruyt 1994, 36).

state provides are cast in terms of the theory of justice that the state embodies, and the provision of just services constitute, in part, the state's claim to legitimacy (Miller 2013, 52)."

The understanding of the term state has changed dramatically before the contemporary consensus has been reached and, according to Q. Skinner, it is impossible to present widely accepted, neutral definition of state even nowadays. Word *state* was initially used for defining a position of the ruler. Furthermore, during the 14th century, the term was used to refer to the obligation of the leading elite to keep the city in a good and prosperous *state*. Renaissance literature used this word in two senses – first in writings aiming to help monarchs to stay in their privileged *state*, second as a term used for the types (*states*) of government (republic, monarchy,...). In this context, the term *state* also referred to the territory king had to keep to stay in his ruling position. Revolution in use of the term *state* arrived in renaissance Italy, where the term was, in addition to previously mentioned uses, also connected to the governing institutions and repressive sector. Final abstraction, which led to the understanding of a state as we know it today, was the impersonalization of the concept. This last change was first clearly observable in Hobbes' Leviathan where the power of a state was clearly distinguished from the power of a ruler, or a mass of people and the abstraction of the artificial state body was created. This unnatural state is represented by its sovereign who takes action in its name. This understanding lies in a core of thoughts about political systems that came into existence since the 18th century and even though it is criticised from many positions it remains the main understanding of the term *state* even nowadays (Skinner 2012).

Another important factor connected to the concept of state is the erosion of a state that is observable in the past two or three decades. M. Glassner defines the most important factors contributing to this process as these: internationalization of illegal activities; global health problems; global economy; devolution of internal power; cultural globalism; environmental degradation; international intervention in internal affairs; science and technology progress; growth of non-governmental/intergovernmental organizations; and spread of democracy (Glassner

1996, 139-140).¹⁰ Other factors connected to the weakening of the state are: the inability of major powers to wage inter-state war due to the introduction of nuclear weapons and new technologies – only weak states directly fight each other (or are part of conflict against strong opponent, no two strong powers wage direct wars anymore); sharing of security provision among state and non-state actors; decrease of overall security; weakening of fiscal and welfare systems; or states' membership in multiple international organizations (van Creveld 2006). Nuclear weapons and effect of the modern financial institutions are also mentioned as factors weakening territorial states by H. Spruyt (1994, 183).

According to R. Cooper, three types of states are observable in the post-Cold War world: pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. Pre-modern states are fragile and no longer fulfil their primary functions and this, consequently, aids the de facto re-emergence of *terra nullius* on maps. The existence of these states destabilizes the world more than in the past since the areas of chaos are not only connected to the rest of the world due to the effects of the modern transportation capabilities but also enable a rise of potentially dangerous non-state actors.¹¹ The modern state is a classical state as we know it inside a Westphalian system, and is intimately connected to the institution of sovereignty. A post-modern system is defined by the collapse of a modern state towards a higher order. Post-modern part of the world is defined by a high level of openness and mutual interference. It is thus defined by the breaking down of the distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs; mutual interference and surveillance; rejection of the use of force;¹² growing irrelevance of borders; and security based on transparency and openness. A post-modern state is, furthermore, oriented on individuality rather than a collective. These three kinds of states must, however, co-exist and different territories may move from one type to another (Cooper 2000).

Similar distinction is made by G. Sørensen. His description of a modern state was presented above. He, furthermore, distinguishes two other forms of states – post-colonial and post-modern. A post-colonial state is a type of state with weak institutional basis; without proper legal system; with low societal coherence; and without an

¹⁰ This degradation of state is one of the primary principles on which our research stands. The issue itself will be dealt with in larger detail later in parts dedicated to differences between a neomedieval and Westphalian system.

¹¹ For a discussion over the nature of pre-modern states see also (Reno 1998, 18-24).

¹² Rejection of use of force is relevant only when discussing interaction between post-modern entities, not in relation to the modern and pre-modern entities.

appropriate national economy. Post-modern state is, on the other hand, a state based on multilevel governance; connected to the supra and international institutions; with identity of population shared between state, sub-state, and supra-state levels; and with developed transnational economy (Sørensen 2005, 100-107).

In our work, state is defined as an entity recognized by international community as a state. This recognition is manifested by the acceptance of the entity into the United Nations.¹³

2.3. Unrecognized state

Understanding a concept of the unrecognized state¹⁴ is an important task since this category consists of geopolitically important set of entities which are on one side unrecognized by the international community but are also different from a typical non-state actor. These entities hold many names such as quasi-state (Kolstø 2006), de-facto state (Pegg 1998), or almost state (Stanislawski 2008) but the characteristics of these differ only slightly.¹⁵ Unrecognized state as used in this thesis is an entity attempting to control specific territory and actively seeking international recognition, able to survive for protracted period of time and to control significant portion of territory it lays claim to with a capability to establish at least basic institutions¹⁶ - concrete length of time or size of the controlled territory is not defined as its setting is in this work seen as superfluous and artificial. Using this definition, we can find these unrecognized states on the globe in places like East Asia (Republic of China - Taiwan), post-Soviet space (Abkhazia, Transnistria, etc.), Middle East (Palestine), or Africa (Somaliland). Additionally, it is important to point out that there is no *a priori* stark contrast between unrecognized states and failed states. Unrecognized states are not by definition an

¹³ „(...) UN membership is commonly viewed as the “birth certificate” of a state (Geldenhuis 2009, 22).”

¹⁴ Term is selected as, in the author’s view, most clearly describing the nature of these entities – to some level undertaking state functions (indigenously or with foreign support) and not receiving full recognition – the terminology is, as pointed out, disputed. When dealing with other authors’ description, the terminology will be unified as to follow the unrecognized state term coherently and avoid unnecessary terminological confusion.

¹⁵ For more information on terminological confusion see (Harvey and Stansfield 2011, 14-16, Riegl 2010).

¹⁶ More precise definition is presented by S. Pegg who argues that unrecognized state “exists where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability, receives popular support, and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for an extended period of time(...)and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state (Pegg 1998, 1).”

opposition to the failed states, and many of these entities are failing/failed/ entirely dependent on a patron state (Pelczynska-Nalecz, Strachota a Falkowski 2008).

Furthermore, the existence of unrecognized states and their prolonged survival highlights major changes in the international state structure. It is important to point out that the way the regional powers incorporated unrecognized states into their structure and connection of some unrecognized states to the system of international (economic or security) system and flows tells us about qualitatively new phase in the international system (Chorev 2011, 39). The ability of the international system to accommodate these entities is of vital importance for the argument about the new phase of the international (geo)political system.

2.4. Non-state actor

In the light of definitions of a state and unrecognized state, we could easily leave a definition of the non-state actor as the remaining set of actors - actors which are neither recognized as states nor are trying to achieve such recognition on some given and reasonably controlled territory. D. Josselin and W. Wallace (2001, 3-4) point out the variety of the non-state actors and define those important for the world politics as being mostly autonomous from the central government; operating as a part of a network establishing transnational relations, and acting in a way that affects the political outcomes.

For a better understanding of the term let us now define distinct categories of non-state actors and present basic terminological lines between separate groups of these. The first distinction is between territorial and non-territorial actors. Former are trying to hold on to some concrete territory and to use it in achieving their goals no matter what these are. On the contrary, non-territorial actors attempt to promote their goals via mobility and global, or at least regional, focus and seek non-territorial goals. Following is the differentiation based on the aim of non-state actors – political, economic, ideological, societal, humanitarian, or other. Here we understand political goals as those aiming at gaining power; economic as increasing wealth, ideological as promoting ideology/religion; societal as attempting to change society; and humanitarian as targeting to help people in need. These goals are often interconnected as this brief overview is only a simplified model. Another distinction is between primarily violent and non-violent non-state actors or pre-state and modern non-state actors with the

former forming without conceptual dependence on the Westphalian state (e.g., nomads) (MacKay, et al. 2014, 104).

2.5. Sovereignty

Attempt to define sovereignty is another difficult task that needs to be performed on an inadequately short space. Sovereignty can be understood as an execution of power over population on a defined territory without any control from the outside. State power has forceful and peaceful segment. The first is a classic military, police and other security apparatus,¹⁷ and the second is understood as ideological and economic power (Glassner 1996, 46).

Sovereignty is, furthermore, a judicial tool of states which enables them to escape a rule from the outside. Sovereignty is territorially limited norm which lies as a fundamental principle of the modern state-system. It provides successfully sovereign states with final political power over given community. Sovereignty is a status, a legal standing. This legal standing can be defined as *constitutional independence* which is crucial for this sovereign status (Jackson 1999, 432-434, Sørensen 2005, 171-172). It is also important to distinguish between sovereignty as a legal principle and independence as a political reality that might but also might not be connected – e.g., a state might be sovereign but dependent and non-state actor might lack sovereignty but be independent. Independence is a prerequisite of statehood while sovereignty is its consequence (Crawford 2007, 4-34).

R. Jackson distinguishes between two forms of sovereignty. The first is so-called imperial and is characterized by the rule of one state on a different state's territory. This type of sovereignty was disregarded and ultimately made illegitimate by the notion of the immorality of the control of foreign territory and population. This claim led to the appearance of currently prevailing form of sovereignty – popular sovereignty - a notion that sovereignty lies in consent of the population. The final judge deciding who is and is not a sovereign state is still, however, the state system. The sovereignty of many states is thus not based on the principle mentioned above of popular sovereignty but rather on a historical, political and economic context leading to their emergence (Jackson 1999, 438-449). Another division of sovereignty comes from A. James. He recognizes three

¹⁷ "...state is that kind of a human community, which holds on a defined territory (...) monopoly for the legitimate use of violence (Weber 2009, 244)."

broad branches of sovereignty – or rather ways how the sovereignty is understood. The first is the sovereignty in the sense of the state doing what it wants, the second is connected to the delimitation of the decision-maker, and the third to the sovereignty as an expression of the nation's trust in state which fulfils its duties to the nation (James 1999, 457-459).

Another distinction might be made between negative and positive sovereignty as presented by R. Jackson (1993). Negative sovereignty is a legal entitlement upon which the community of formally equal states rests. It is based on judicial independence and the principle of non-intervention. Negative sovereignty lies at the basis of the post-Second World War international law.¹⁸ On the other hand, positive sovereignty is a relative concept related to the capacities of states. Positive sovereignty enables states to use their independence. Unlike negative sovereignty, this status is not defined legally but sociologically, economically, etc. It might be stronger in relation to some states, and it is a sign of state's overall development (Jackson 1993, 27-29). This distinction is crucial for an evolution of the internal situation in many weak states as the personal interest of their leaders was in many cases easier to follow under the disguise of negative (judicial) sovereignty than in case these actors acted as non-state actors (Reno 1998, 222).

The principle of sovereignty, however, by no means defines, or is defined by, the inner arrangement of the state. Domestic political and economic setting may change during the time without affecting the sovereignty of the state itself¹⁹ (Jackson 2007, 306). Furthermore, sovereignty should not be understood as a static set of rules; it is more a status which can be adapted to the given situation and is thus quite flexible. The main principles of constitutional independence remain at the core of the whole idea, but the implications and concrete application may differ according to the situation of the international politics. It is thus possible to use the defining signs of sovereignty and apply them on any of the three types of states mentioned above (post-colonial/pre-modern; modern; and post-modern) (Sørensen 2005, 89-91).

Despite the conventional wisdom and frequently propagated idea of indivisibility of sovereignty²⁰ (or its division of internal and external only) we can observe another,

¹⁸ See also (Reno 1998, 7-9).

¹⁹ Meaning democratization, or appearance of the authoritarian regime, etc.

²⁰ „*It is a legal, an absolute, and a unitary condition* (James 1999, 462).”

empirical, approach to the concept of sovereignty. E. Berg and E. Kuusk pointed out that an empirical approach to sovereignty might be developed and that the level of internal and external sovereignty is measurable. They established set of ideas defining both types which are located on axes defined by power/symbol and zero-sum/not zero-sum end points. By application of this approach, they were able to measure a level of sovereignty among different political units and thus presenting the idea that even sovereignty might be divisible and measurable (Berg and Kuusk 2010). The crumbling and divisibility of sovereignty is also described by J. Agnew who presents four types of sovereignty regimes that directly confront understanding of sovereignty as indivisible and territorial (Agnew 2005) and as a Western social construct that was enforced in many parts of the world from the outside by the system of dominant states (Agnew 2009, 79). A similar argument is presented by S. Krasner who identifies four types of sovereignty regimes – domestic, interdependence, international legal, and Westphalian sovereignty. S. Krasner argues that these principles are, however, placed in the hands of rulers who use them to meet their ends and as such we cannot take them as absolute. Sovereignty is thus "organized hypocrisy" (Krasner 1999, 9). Principles of sovereignty are in numerous times violated even though they stand as a basis of the international system. It is established as a mean to gain external and internal support and is thus usually more vigorously guarded by weak regimes for which it provides cover and support (Krasner 1999, 40-41).

Finally, it is helpful to tackle the issue of sovereignty from the political-philosophical point of view to get fuller picture of the ideas characterizing the term. For the needs of this work, only a few major ideas that appeared in a sphere of political philosophy are presented. First, there is an issue of legal adoption. This is one of the important issues discussed in famous T. Hobbes' *Leviathan*. For him "(...)the authority of the law (...) lies only in command of the sovereign" (Hobbes 2009, 190) and "(i)n all the states, the only legislator is sovereign, be it one person like in monarchy, or a gathering of people as in democracy or aristocracy" (Hobbes 2009, 184). But not only law adoption defines sovereign. As C. Schmitt famously presented: "Sovereign is he, who declares a state of emergency" (Schmitt 2012, 9). Schmitt furthermore defines sovereignty as "(...)the highest, non-derived power of the leader(...)" (Schmitt 2012, 9) and "(s)overeign stands outside the normally valid law order while still belonging to it

by holding the power to decide, when the constitution can be suspended in toto" (Schmitt 2012, 10). For C. Schmitt, the sovereignty is thus "(...)not a monopoly of coercion or rule, but rather a monopoly of decision(...)" with "(...)a monopoly of that last decision" (Schmitt 2012, 15). Last, but not least, it is important to point at the observation made by H. Arendt: "Amount of the violence disposable for a certain state does not have to be a reliable indicator of a power of that country, neither a reliable safeguard against its destruction by a much weaker and smaller power" (Arendt 2004, 12). Consequently, the power of the sovereign (or in this instance any other actor) is not directly derived from the amount of violence it uses. The more violent the actor needs to use, the less of actual power it holds (Arendt 2004).

When discussing sovereignty in the following text²¹ we will understand the term as the ability of a state to create an internal order, be independent in its decisions in domestic and foreign policy, and maintain means of provision of security. It is important to point out that any restrictions of the decision-making must be voluntary. Otherwise, it challenges the state's sovereignty – e.g., voluntary accession to the defence alliance is not a breach while foreign occupation is. Factors challenging states' sovereignty²² are thus following: inability of a state to provide its law on the whole territory; inability to maintain order and promote its decisions on the entire territory; dependence on the external actors; and the constant high level of use of violence against its population to stay in power.

2.6. Territoriality

A concept of territoriality was most prominently defined by R. Sack as a strategy for influence or more specifically as an "*attempt to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions (of people, things, and relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a geographic area* (Sack 1983, 55)." He also proposed that territoriality is "*the attempt by an individual or group (x) to influence, affect, or control objects, people, and relationships (y) by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. This area is the territory* (Sack 1983, 56)." Territoriality is thus socially constructed concept that uses physical distance and area for the means of

²¹ This is, naturally, not a case in parts where other authors' ideas are presented.

²² J. Crawford in this respect divides formal (where power over territory of state is given to separate authority) and actual independence (degree of actual governmental power). They differ in factors that are (not) considered as a breach of the independence and in their impact upon the state (Crawford 2007, 62-88).

political control (Sack 1983, 57). Territoriality is, however, not the only possible connection between power and space. The other two are based on function (e.g., policy, occupation) and personal characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, religion, or gender) (Vollaard 2009, 693). This means that the systems of rule do not have to be territorial –they are not defined by the territory – and where there is a territoriality present it does not need to be exclusive (as was the case in the European medievalism) (Ruggie 1993, 149). Nevertheless, modern state territoriality equals territorial exclusivity (Spruyt 1994, 35).

Territoriality is a dominant strategy not only from the evolutionary perspective (Johnson and Toft 2014, 88, Johnson and Toft 2013/14) but it is also preferable strategy for an establishment of collective defence (Goemans 2006, 29). Territoriality is, additionally, usually associated with the institution of state and sovereignty but that does not limit the use of this strategy to a state. As pointed by M. D. Toft or E. Gartzke, territoriality is also an important factor in conflicts as ethnic groups usually act violently in the event that their perceived homeland is being usurped by the outside group (e.g., state) and territorial conflicts hold much larger potential to become violent than non-territorial (Toft 2003, Gartzke 2006). In the following work, territoriality is understood as a social strategy based primarily on exclusion from defined geographic area as opposed to other modes of connection of power and space as presented by H. Vollaard (2009).

2.7. Regionalism

Dealing with a definition of regionalism, the first term to be understood is the concept of region. M. Keating and J. Loughlin distinguish “(…)”regions” as *the term (...) used in International Relations and early European integration literature, where it refers to groups of states, such as “Western Europe”, “North America”, “South East Asia”, and “regions” understood as territorial entities below the level of the nation-state and sometimes crossing nation-state boundaries as in cross-border regions*” (Keating and Loughlin 1997, 2). They, furthermore, define four types of regions – economic regions defined by economic characteristics and not always controlled by state due to the shift in production caused by economic globalization and technological unification; historical/ethnic regions defined by distinct culture or linguistic features marked by the historical presence of human societies; administrative/planning regions

defined for purposes of policy-making or statistic-gathering; and political regions defined by the existence of self-governing body (Keating and Loughlin 1997, 3-5).

A distinction between old (state groupings) and new (sub-state) regionalism is used even in international relations perspective, and both of these positions are still relevant (Hocking 1997, 90-91). Nevertheless, new developments towards new regional structures like mega-FTAs takes place. Effects of regionalism are eroding the Westphalian international system based on coherent sovereign units - states. The greater importance of regional identity, furthermore, destabilizes states with regional minorities such as Basques and Catalonians in Spain, or Tibetans and Uyghurs in China (Hocking 1997, 92-93). Regions hold some options of how to affect international system (mostly visible in Europe – e.g., the Europe of Regions) and their empowerment affects cross-border relationships as they engage with the adjoining region in much more direct way than state with its neighbour (Hocking 1997, 96-100). New regionalism is, furthermore, defined by its informal character and creation from “below” which makes many sub- and non-state actors a relevant part of the process (Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhove 2005, 8). New regionalism thus plays one of the key roles in dismantling the Westphalian world order by decreasing importance of borders and destabilizing states with strong historical regions.

2.8. Identity

Identity is a concept whose precise definition is almost impossible. It is alternatively possible to look at some manifestations of a group identity which are relevant for our purposes. The main object of identification of population in the Westphalian state is nation, concept developed throughout the modern era and relevant in different parts of the world since the nineteenth century. Creation of national identification is connected to the shared history of population on a given territory²³ (pre-modern myths), ethnic roots (language, ethnic groups), and process of modernization (democratization, modernization of state, economic and social development, centralized education) (Hroch 2011, 61-122). Despite the fact that the definition of nation differs,²⁴ as do theories of its development and connection to nationalism or its evaluation, it is a concept crucial for the existence of the modern state system. Furthermore, self-

²³ Nationality is territorially determined social group (Keating 2001, 15).

²⁴ See texts in (Hroch 2003).

determination in the modern world is directly connected to the nationality (Keating 2001, 4).

On the contrary, state is not synonymous to nation, and it can be suggested that the establishment of a state for each nation would lead to a perpetual instability in the international system (Keating 2001, 10). Despite the fact, that states are perceived as a symbol of self-determination, the principle of self-determination as the main criterion of statehood is not clearly set. As pointed out by M. Fabry, before the Second World War any group had the right to achieve statehood if it held the *de facto* statehood status. After the First World War, the principle of self-determination was explicitly set, but the *de facto* statehood was still an important attribute of self-determination of a nation inside a new state. After the Second World War, self-determination is the main principle of recognition, but the creation of the new states outside the colonial context is virtually impossible due to the second important principle - the territorial integrity. Realization of self-determination thus did not enable stateless or oppressed groups to secede (Fabry 2010, 117, 138, 157-164).

Historical centralization of state led to the centralization of identity, while as the Westphalian system crumbles, identification is shifting away from a single commitment to the state structure as the other types of collective identities strengthen. As J. Friedrichs points out, multiple identity is one of the defining principles of the neomedieval system (Friedrichs 2001, 475). The multiplication of identities among population towards objects like religious and ethnic groups or transnational causes leads to the weakening of the state system and emergence of the qualitatively new system, as is being discussed in the next chapter.

2.9. Terra nullius and black spots

Before approaching the systemic definitions, it is important to deal with two seemingly interconnected geopolitical phenomena.²⁵ The first is so-called terra nullius. The term *terra nullius* can be best understood as a portion of land out of control of any political actor. These areas were historically quite wide-spread, but their number significantly decreased in the 19th and 20th century due to the rapid rise of global population and technological and infrastructure developments. Nowadays they are

²⁵ This work is not dealing with definitions of other forms of anomalous geopolitical units like states-within-states or insurgent states as these are not directly referred to throughout the thesis.

mostly connected to the areas defined by harsh geography (largest *terra nullius* is the continent of Antarctica) and state failure. Out of Antarctica, all portions of land are claimed by some state structure²⁶ but not all of this land is controlled efficiently, and effective power projection is in many times virtually impossible (deserts, high mountain ranges, etc.). *Terra nullius* is thus a portion of land with no (state) power efficiently controlling it. *Terra nullius* is a land without control.

On the contrary, black spots are areas which are out of the control of the state institutions which nominally provide sovereign power over them, however, they are not without any authority. These areas are usually "hidden," meaning that organizations that control them are not trying to bring international attention upon themselves. These territories are thus usually controlled by the international criminal groups or terrorist organizations, and they provide them with safe haven. These black spots are usually hardly penetrable and constantly remain out of the reach of the state power. Black spots are dominated by criminal and illegal activities. These black spots might thus create an illegal challenge to a state in the form of the outlaw communities or criminal entity (Stanislowski 2008, 366, 368-9).²⁷ Black spots are thus areas out of state control which remain hardly accessible and try to stay out of the international radar due to the illegality of the activities of the actor(s) controlling them.

2.10. Medieval system

European medieval system came into existence by the fall of Pax Romana in the fifth century. European landscape was dominated by the barbaric tribes which made political and social environment more chaotic compared to the era of the Roman dominance. Newly established states faced instability due to their incapability to properly settle and govern newly acquired local population – kingdoms which did not successfully integrate locals usually disintegrated and vanished. This led to the incorporation of some basic properties of Roman law and Roman structure which

²⁶ With minor exceptions like small part of the Croatian-Serbian border where the so-called Liberland was proclaimed.

²⁷ Stanislowski uses definition of black spots as follows: "(...) *Black Spots constitute areas that are neither recognized by the international community nor are they under the true governmental control of the host states; they remain in the grey area between formal international recognition and semi-formal central control. On international security maps, they often are reflected as demonstrating that government control and authority are either uncertain, incomplete, or non-existent and that the internal dynamics concerning what goes on in these areas are not entirely known to the outside world. What is known is that some internal dynamics exist, so they are not empty or blank spaces, which might suggest a form of vacuum in that location. Nor are they 'ungoverned.'*" (Stanislowski 2008, 369).

proved to be rather effective. It is important to realize, that during the Middle Ages we cannot speak about the modern state. The importance of personal contacts was much more important than an abstract idea of state/kingdom. The medieval state and society are basically identical – there was no widespread sense of impersonal institution -, and there is a vast variety of contacts on both vertical (feudal²⁸) and horizontal level. On the lowest societal level, we can observe the emergence of neighbourhood communities primarily based on the common use of the agricultural soil and other means of living. These units were primarily territorial (Müller 2011a, 317-329, Contamine 2004, 15-49).

Another factor observable was the growing independence of cities,²⁹ which was later formally recognized as the city councils were created. Power of cities was important and visible especially during the times of crisis.³⁰ Moreover the higher level of local affinity and the importance of the local environment for the people was mirroring in the creation of different local communities, or guilds (Herold 2011, 291-318, Müller 2011a, 317-325) – the local identities and interests were by the time the most important ones (Strayer 1970, 14). Medieval Europe thus consisted of many mutually interconnected societies with different competencies, aims, and claims. Another important factor of the medieval European state is a presence of king on the top of a hierarchy. The state was still understood as a personal belonging of a king.³¹ The power of an individual, however, was not only important for the secular powers but even for the Church. For example, appearance of weak popes enabled the existence of the Church schism (Müller 2011a, 330-403).

The importance of a strong monarch was crucial for the strength of a medieval state. We can see, for example, that after the end of the reign of Charles le Magne vast and robust Frank Empire simply crumbled. This era can be furthermore seen as an example of unorganized medieval system with many small units competing with each other, leaving no possibility for an effective rule over them. Another factor characterizing medieval system is the feudal system which led to the establishment of feudal dominions so interconnected and fragmented that in some periods vast territories were, again, practically uncontrollable (Müller 2011a, 317-329). The map of Europe during the Middle-Ages was more a chaotic mixture of different personal and collective

²⁸ With feudals being under multiple loyalties (Spruyt 1994, 38-39)

²⁹ The most important city-community was probably the Hanseatic League, while the most prominent city-states laid in contemporary Italy.

³⁰ For example the power of cities during the Hussite revolution in Bohemia (Herold 2011, 291-318).

³¹ As noted earlier when the development of the understanding of the word state was described.

governments territorially overlapping each other than a clear system of territorially based units as we know it from the post-1648 maps (Jackson 1999, 435-438, Spruyt 1994, 12). The system, moreover, lacked a monopoly on coercive force (Spruyt 1994, 12).

On the other hand, in many ways church hierarchy was able to work as a unifying element. The Church was also based on a territorial principle of dioceses, while state was until the beginning of the 11th century mostly defined by its population³² (Müller 2011a, 367-403). State and church were on the one hand still more resembling each other in a structure, while on the other were fighting over who will receive the major power in the contemporary society. Even before the Investiture Contest (despite larger resemblance of the two powers compared to post-Investiture Conflict era (Spruyt 1994, 47)), there was a struggle present between religious and secular power over the establishment of the supreme authority based on a Roman legacy. This led to the creation of the Holy Roman Empire on one side and the universal Church structure on the other³³ (Müller 2011a, 317-403, Müller 2011b, 447-471). By 1300, the medieval state began institutionalization and centralization of its powers – mainly in England and France and in legal and economic domains (Strayer 1970, 3-56).

Another important factor is a power of non-state and non-Church actors. As S. Sousedlík writes: “(...)due to the weakness of the central power, war could have been quite easily waged by persons or groups(...)called private (Sousedlík 2011, 538).” Furthermore, with the growth of the wealth and power of the cities, these cities were able to create strong alliances which were able to oppose the central power effectively. Popular movements challenging legitimacy of both monarchy and Catholic Church emerged, and even the importance and power of independent universities arose (Žemla and Dostál 2011, 94-95). Actors relevant for “international” situation of medieval Europe were multiple – both territorial and mobile -, and the means of military conduct were cheap and easily accessible, (Grygiel 2013, 5-7) so the whole situation in Europe was more volatile. The nature of the medieval system was not territorial, but the personal ties prevailed (Taylor 1994, 152).

³², J. Grygiel presents importance of control over population in opposition to control of land as one of the defining factors of medieval system (Grygiel 2013, 7-9). Empire can also be understood as a spiritual and military authority inside vaguely defined boundaries (Spruyt 1994, 51).

³³ We may observe that in an attempt to create a universal empire both sides failed. Holy Roman Empire reduced its claims over German “nation” only (Müller, IX., 2011) and Catholic Church was in its claims held back by reformation and spread of Protestantism.

To sum up, the Western and Central European Middle Ages were characterized by the struggle between the universal claims³⁴ of the secular Empire³⁵ and the Catholic Church; complicated structure of the territorial control by feudal masters; and the vast power of smaller actors. Society was strongly territorially determined with the exception of certain parts of elite with religious, secular and university background. The private violence was nothing extraordinary, and during significant periods of time, vast territories were effectively ungoverned. Furthermore, the borders of these different actors did not necessarily respect those of others, so even those actors with some sense of territoriality overlapped each other's claims, and population could have been quite easily caught in a system of multiple identity and loyalty. This was even more problematic due to the presence of the clashing territorial units loyal to a kingdom and the Church. It is important to point out that despite the fact that the state was in 1300 the comparatively strongest political form present in Europe, it remained rather weak by today's standards (Strayer 1970, 57).

The shift from this medieval system to the Westphalian system presented in the next sub-chapter was caused by some conditions specific to the European environment. In 1500, Europe was ethnically and socially more homogenous compared to the rest of the world; society was stratified among peasantry, landlords, and nobility; urbanization levels were growing; important theories of sovereignty were already created; ad hoc assemblies began to emerge; and everyone had, at least nominally, at least one king (Tilly 1975, 17-21). These conditions were important prerequisites for creation of European nation states, but the centralizing efforts of kings were opposed not only by rivals (noblemen, bishops) but even by local population which was subjugated by the combination of positive incentives and ruthless crushing of rebellions (Tilly 1975, 22-24, Mampilly 2011, 31-34). The formation of modern state was, furthermore, not the only possibility for the political development in Europe – challenging institutions contain political federation or empire; theocratic federation; trading network; or feudal structure (Tilly 1975, 26) with other possible alternatives in independent city communes or urban leagues (Curtis 2016, 90, Spruyt 1994). These entities established themselves as adaptations to the shifts in the social, political and economic structure of Europe and

³⁴ One of the main transformations between medieval and modern political system is in “*transition from the medieval universality founded on the unity of faith to the coexistence of a multiplicity of sovereign states based on the diversity of geography and of religion (...)*” (Gottmann 1973, 43) .”

³⁵ “*Secular arm of God* (Spruyt 1994, 53)”

established a basis for the growth of the sovereign state (Spruyt 1994, 61-63). During the creation of the Westphalian system (1500-1900), the most of the states simply died and disappeared. Success of a state in Europe was determined by its access to resources; protected position in time and space; availability of political entrepreneurs; success in wars; relative homogeneity; and strong relations between state and landowners (with the possibility of one factor supplementing for another) (Tilly 1975, 40-41) in relation to the, by then, unparalleled advantage in mobilizing social resources (Spruyt 1994, 185). The transformation towards modern state system was thus characterized by a change into an increasingly more contiguous pattern of territories. This was marked by the establishment of the principle of non-interference and decline of the last powers of the Church and the Empire (Taylor 1994, 153). This development, however, was not true for the entire globe. As a large number of states came into being after the Second World War, the new principles of state recognition abandoning the de facto statehood prerequisite and focusing on importance of the territorial integrity of even artificial post-colonial states enabled foundation of many states, that unlike states in C. Tilly's argument (meaning mainly states located in Europe and Americas), were unable to control their own territory (Fabry 2010, 12-13).

Following C. Tilly's argument, we must mention another important transformation that took place during eighteenth and nineteenth century when states gradually abolished the utilization of the non-state violence. Use of the non-state violence was blurring boundaries between state and non-state authority, political and economic domain, and domestic and international realms (Thomson 1996, 19). The transitional period between the medieval and modern state system was characterized by the utilization of private violence, hiring of foreigners to the armies, and existence of mercantile companies, all with many powers and ability to utilize a legitimate use of violence (Thomson 1996, 31-2). With the emergence of the modern national state, armed forces were becoming less dependent on mercenaries bought abroad and more dependent on popular opinion (Thomson 1996, 59). Despite the fact that there was no concentrated effort to forbid non-state violence, states were continually able to banish the most of the practices that were present between the 1600s and 1800s as their interests were endangered. This process was both a sequence of unrelated actions against concrete non-state actors and progressive evolution in the state system (Thomson 1996, 105, 145). Control of non-state violence thus became a newly acquired

function of the modern state. Since the beginning of the twentieth century the use of non-state violence can no longer be used openly and the states might use it only in secrecy as the practice is widely condemned as the state is perceived as the only legitimate source of violence and it can use this right only through its legitimate institutions (Thomson 1996, 149-53). The practice is thus mainly present in the so-called proxy wars and utilization of these actors as proxies inside many conflicts (Mumford 2013).

2.11. Westphalian system

Another important definition which needs to be provided before the exploration of the neomedieval order is that of the Westphalian system. First, it is useful to read a quote from H. Bull who analysed the basics of the modern international system: *“The starting point of international relations is the existence of states, or independent political communities, each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population. On the one hand, states assert, in relation to this territory and population, what may be called internal sovereignty (...) (o)n the other hand, they assert what may be called external sovereignty (...) (Bull 1977, 8).”*. As we can see, the key features of the Westphalian system are sovereignty, territoriality, and state. States interact with each other in the international domain and set different goals. These goals are not necessarily political as are the actions taken in relation to another state. States are, furthermore, internationally active in varying degree – from active interference to isolation (Morgenthau 1993, 29-30). Fundamental principle of the international relations under Westphalia is the balance of power among sovereign states (Morgenthau 1993, 183). Balancing can be achieved by several strategies (Morgenthau 1993, 194-212) but it is unnecessary to discuss them at this place and in context of this work. We can, furthermore, differentiate states in their capabilities which enable them to equip these different strategies – these capabilities are political, economic, military, etc. (Waltz 1979, 131) and even set up a hierarchical order of powers (Cohen 2014).

The Westphalian system is based on an existence of sovereign states which are independent in their decision-making. The system is decentralized, and no formal hierarchy exists. The anarchy in the relations among the states is the basic principle of functioning of this system. Each state is responsible for its survival and other actions on

domestic or international level. Essential characteristic of every state towards the system is its relative power which delimits the scope of its respective area of interest. The balance of this system then lies in balancing of the power among the individual states (Kovářová 2012, 39-41). Westphalia defined state as a legitimate member of the European, and later of a global, international politics. The principle of sovereignty started to be the most important attribute of an international actor, and up to nowadays, any international organization aims primarily on the realm of states in a definition of its membership (Philpott 1999, 578-582). For R. Cooper, the main difference between the European medieval and Westphalian system is its focus – medieval on universal Christendom, Westphalia on a balance of power among modern states (Cooper 2000, 10-14). The Westphalian system destroyed the ambiguous and intermediary forms of authority (under universal claims) and brought in the principle of sovereignty as opposed to the division of power in the Middle Ages (Keating 2001, 11, 13).

An important feature of the modern state system is its statist and territorial nature of the use of violence – in comparison to the previous eras it is democratized, demarketized, and territorialized (Thomson 1996, 4). The Westphalian system is characterized by two major characteristics – balance of power, and unification of power which lies at the core of the system. Balancing was guided to the perfection by the creation of bipolar system where both actors were able to destroy the opponent due to the existence of the enormous number of nuclear weapons and their carriers. Unification of power was in effect ended by this development (van Creveld 2000). Impossibility to break the balance and to unify the power militarily led to the economic and cultural warfare and ultimately to the decay of the Westphalian system which now, as the argument stands, undergoes yet another transformation. The Westphalian state system is, furthermore, challenged by stateless nationalism, globalization, and transnational integration. The contemporary world is characterized by the spread of modern means of communication, effects of globalization, and decline of a nation-state, and we may observe that multiple territorial identities and systems of action coexist with the alternatives that may be found in the past (Keating 2001, 1, 16, 21). *“The nation state as we have known it since the nineteenth century is merely one way of organizing the polity, and changes in the relationship among territory, identity, political institutions, and function may open new possibilities for the future (...). Nationality as a form of*

collective identity is neither more nor less “natural” than others, and is constantly made and remade in the course of political experience (Keating 2001, 2).”

2.12. Globalization

Globalization³⁶ is a complex process with many meanings for the different authors and in different contexts. It can be defined as positive or negative depending on whether one is gaining or losing from it, and authors usually focus only on one specific part or aspect of globalization (economy, culture, politics, security, health risks, etc.) (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5). Despite the complexity and multi-sectored nature of the process, N. Al-Rodhan proposes a definition: “*Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5).*” Furthermore, as pointed out by W. Robinson, there are many schools of thought dealing with the issue, but despite the substantial disagreements, there are three factors these authors can agree on. The fact that pace of social change has changed dramatically in later decades of the twentieth century, that the process is connected to increasing connectivity among people, and that it is multidimensional (Robinson 2008, 126-7). It is also the latest stage of spatial expansion of capitalist system (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005, 192). In the following text, we will specify our use of term globalization as we will usually be interested in only some part of the process. Importantly as we deal with geopolitical framing of the neomedieval theory, we follow the work of, among others, M. Kahler and B. F. Walter who point out that despite the fact that globalization led to significant changes in our thinking of territoriality, it did not diminish human attachment to territory or its importance for the human society (Kahler and Walter 2006, 19).

³⁶ For a discussion over globalization see also (Khanna 2016).

3. New Middle Ages

Next chapter is dedicated to the research of the theoretical framework of the thesis. New Middle Ages is a theory gaining prominence as it challenges current understanding of the international order in the world as the Westphalian order decays. Some of the reasons for this erosion have been presented in the previous chapter. In the following text, the work will first deal with the theory as it is presented by different authors and bring up some additional ideas about the decay of state-centric system and rise of non-state actors. Afterwards, the argument moves to the description and delimitation of Durable Disorder and Chaotic Anarchy scenarios as challenging geopolitical environments significantly different from the currently accepted Westphalian norm.

3.1. Hedley Bull and the birth of neomedievalism

Although the first author to present the term New Middle Ages in the international relations field³⁷ was A. Wolfers, the proper delimitation of the concept was firstly adequately introduced by H. Bull in his "The Anarchical Society." At first, the concept was somewhat shallow but in the next re-prints Bull turned the scheme into a properly developed alternative to the Westphalian system. The overview of the neomedieval literature must thus begin by presenting Bull's ideas about the neomedieval system.

H. Bull introduces the New Middle Ages as one of the alternatives to the Westphalian system despite the fact that he himself does not believe that such a concept will come into existence. Neomedieval system is in his opinion defined by a qualitative change in the state system – the disintegration of states being more than just a fragmentation of the political map with the creation of the new sovereign states (Bull 2002, 257-258). Thus the establishment of the Czech Republic and Slovakia out of Czechoslovakia in 1993 was entirely Westphalian development while disintegration of countries like Somalia, Yemen or Pakistan is turning these areas into the qualitatively new position.

Second, the neomedieval order needs development of alternative universal pillars comparable to the medieval Christendom as a new universal actor. This actor

³⁷ Term New Middle Ages is presented in other fields like philosophy (e.g. (Berdajev 2004)) or law (e.g. (Holsinger 2007)) and the thesis will reflect these works only to the extent they are relevant for study of the geopolitical setting.

would be its functional secular alternative sharing power with lower overlapping entities struggling with each other. Finally, neomedievalism would be aided by the process of regionalism which further weakens the state system (Bull 2002, 245-246).

H. Bull furthermore defined five factors which are necessary for the introduction of the neomedieval order. These features are the regional integration of states; disintegration of states; the restoration of private international violence; the importance of transnational organizations; and the technological unification of world (Bull 2002, 254-266). As these points constitute one of the primary principles of neomedievalism, we will describe them in more detail.

3.1.1. Regional Integration of States

The first criterion is the broad spread of regionalism across the globe. For H. Bull, the first such important regional organization is the European Community. He, however, does not deal with the issue of the loss of sovereignty as states give up their powers to the external bodies willingly but in the shift of the identification of their population towards the inter-/supra-state body. In this respect, states might be free to leave the organization, but their population might gain strong affection towards the new political unit weakening the power of states. While (soft)power politics inside the regional bodies is not overcome, countries might in time become less relevant as the prime target of identification for its population (Bull 2002, 255-257).

3.1.2. Disintegration of States

As noted earlier, a disintegration of states is one of the prime prerequisites of the neomedieval system. However, this disintegration must be qualitatively changing the mode of governance of given territory (Bull 2002, 257-258). This means that the dissolution of the state (e.g., the dissolution of Czechoslovakia) does not constitute an example of disintegration while crumbling of the capabilities of Somalian state to govern its territory does. Disintegration of states is clearly observable in the contemporary world filled with many failed states (e.g. Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)), unrecognized states (e.g. Transnistria, Somaliland), territorial non-state actors (e.g. Afghan Taliban, pre-2017 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)), and other non-state challengers to the state sovereignty and system as such (e.g. Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula (AQAP), Boko Haram, Mexican narco gangs etc.).

3.1.3 Restoration of Private Violence

By private violence, H. Bull means violence entirely disconnected from the institution of the state. Thus the use of force by an international organization, for example, the United Nations, is not private because the means of violence and military personnel are directly connected to and provided by states. Furthermore, H. Bull distinguishes between private violence approved by (part of) the international community aiming at a creation of the new state or regime change inside set border (e.g., Kurdish struggle against the Islamic State)³⁸ and actors who use the force illegitimately such as pirate or terrorist groups (e.g., Al-Shabaab) (Bull 2002, 258-260).

The number of violent non-state actors rise, and the means of violence among the non-state actors are spreading. This objectively decreases some states' ability to provide basic functions as security to their population. In fact, even some advanced modern armies use private contractors to fulfil some of the missions these armies are tasked to do (e.g., private contractors in Iraq during the US occupation). The spread of arms still more resembles their availability during the Middle Ages (Grygiel 2013).³⁹

3.1.4. Transnational Organizations

As the transnational organizations necessary for the shift to the new medievalism, H. Bull counts multinational organizations; political movements; non-governmental organizations; religious organizations; intergovernmental organizations; and others. These organizations usually aim at goals which explicitly or implicitly disregard state borders as they try to operate out of the state control. All of these organizations are, however, dependent on the state's will in case a state holds sufficient power. It is usually the state that creates a legal environment, provides security, or decides whether or not to let the organization inside its territory (Bull 2002, 260-263). This importance of state can be, nevertheless, decreased by both decaying power of states and growing power of non-state actors and organizations – more on this later.

³⁸ Here we can add actors used by a state against another one in a proxy warfare (e.g., Russian troops in Ukraine in 2014-15)

³⁹ For more information on the private security corporations' power see for example (Rothkopf 2008, 138-163).

3.1.5. Technological Unification of World

Finally, H. Bull presents the technological unification of the world as a necessary condition for the emergence of the New Middle Ages. Unification virtually shrinks the world establishing a so-called global village while simultaneously creating new frictions and issues. This larger closeness of interconnected population thus leads to further fragmentations that develop new identities and interest groups that are present in yet another complication of already complex structure (Bull 2002, 263-266).

3.2. Post-Cold War reincarnation

The end of the Cold War, crumbling of the bipolar system, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union led many authors to change their view of the international politics and offer different visions of the future. Among theories of unipolarism, end of history, or clash of civilizations, an idea of neomedieval world setting started to gain prominence. This idea - initially refused as improbable even by H. Bull himself - begun to spur intellectual interest as a number of civil conflicts, failed states, and non-state actors with actual economic or political power in their region grew. In the following sub-chapter works of some of the authors that directly dealt with the issue of neomedievalism are discussed. Purpose of this chapter is not to present works of all authors who dealt with the theory (as this list would be likely incomplete anyway and unnecessarily long) but to display all the main intellectual streams connected to the New Middle Ages.

3.2.1. Jörg Friedrichs

The first author to be mentioned in this section is J. Friedrichs. In his 2001 "The Meaning of New Medievalism," the author presented the idea that might be called "historical neomedievalism." For J. Friedrichs the comparison of the European Middle Ages and the New Middle Ages is essential: *"For the present purpose, medievalism is defined as a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims. Thus, the Middle Ages were characterized by a highly fragmented and decentralized network of sociopolitical relationships, held together by the competing universalistic claims of the Empire and the Church. Analogously, the post-international world is characterized by a complicated web of societal identities, held together by the antagonistic organizational claims of the nation-*

state system and the transnational market economy" (Friedrichs 2001, 475). J. Friedrichs dismisses the utility of modern international relations' theories for an understanding the post-Cold War system and rather presents neomedieval order⁴⁰ as much more useful analytical tool to grasp the international politics. Mainstream ideas about the working of the global system (state-centric, weakening through globalization, split across internal lines) are in his opinion problematic as he offers an alternative view in neomedievalism (Friedrichs 2001, 477-481).

In his concept, the Westphalian system is to be ended (it is not a final state of international politics) and a new system is about to replace it. Neomedievalism can explain the competing developments of fragmentation and globalization. Another important factor vital for the neomedieval explanation is a shift of personal allegiance towards distinct non-state objects. This process will create a structure of multiple loyalties. J. Friedrichs furthermore alters the original Bull's idea by adding duality of competing claims (as inspired by the medieval European system) and thus "stabilizes" the whole system. These universal claims are connected to the institution of a nation-state system and a transnational market economy which are perceived as powerful enough to effectively counterbalance each other and bring some relative stability into the whole system (Friedrichs 2001, 481-486). Given this premise, the author does not see the neomedieval system as something horrific, as he points out, "*equation of the Middle Ages with the Hobbesian state of nature is wrong*" (Friedrichs 2001, 485). The system will not be as rationalized as the modern state system, but it will not necessarily lead to the emergence of *bellum omnium contra omnes* situation. For the comprehension of Friedrich's theory, it is furthermore important to understand his ideas about the two main powers in the New Middle Ages – nation-state system and the transnational market economy⁴¹ (Friedrichs 2001, 485-486).

The author calls the first pillar of the structure a political universalism. State system is based on the existence of sovereign units in formally equal position in relation to the international law. This model has been accepted worldwide, and we might observe worldwide establishment of units trying to, at least formally, fit into the international community. This system is self-preserving and survives by establishing a perception of the unique role the state plays in the maintenance of order and independent action on the

⁴⁰ Resemblance of some features of the post-bipolar system to those of the European Middle Ages

⁴¹ For a discussion on the resemblance of the medieval Church and post-Cold War Market see also (Reno 1998, 72-73).

international level. This system thus creates units of political action which seek control of territory, sovereignty, and place in the international system (Friedrichs 2001, 486-488). On the other side, we will find so-called economic universalism. Friedrichs points out that the allocation of capital and production is still more determined by the private non-territorial actors. The economic liberalism of the transnational market leads to the creation of strong actors which can interfere into the political sphere. By this process, a class of businessmen promoting free trade can ignore state borders and is capable of challenging the power of a state just by using its production potential. Anyway, Friedrichs points out that even though these two pillars are competing, they remain interdependent and must coexist (Friedrichs 2001, 488-491). J. Friedrichs, furthermore, adds third balancing half-pillar - society - into the mix.

These three realms create the above-presented system of overlapping identities and multiple loyalties, but they each work on a different principle: the state as a voice of popular decisions, the market as a holder of the means for the superior efficiency, and society as a promoter of substantial values. As the New Middle Ages does not create any ultimate authority, it is necessary that each of these spheres sticks to its targets and advantages. For the author these are – society’s attempt to protect itself from being overcome by both other pillars - state control and market; economy’s effort to remain independent and not being used by states for their political targets; and finally states’ attempt to keep their political power and stay alive and as powerful as possible between economy’s universalism and societal particularism. Friedrichs points out that nowadays the leverage is inclined towards a more immense power of the market over the remaining two, but this balance can be in future altered (Friedrichs 2001, 491-493).

J. Friedrich’s commonalities between the medieval and neomedieval system thus include: system of overlapping identities and multiple loyalties held together by two antagonistic forces – Church, Empire, or State, Market; existence of dominant class which is in a centre of each of the systems – feudal aristocracy, or international policy-makers and bureaucrats; characterization of both Church⁴² and Market by a high level of spatial and social mobility; propagation of both antagonistic claims by its own set of intellectuals and writers; and the inability of both of the challenging universal claims to prevail (Friedrichs 2001, 492).

⁴² Despite the fact that both hold important territorial dimension, for the case of the Church see (Sack 1986, 92-126).

3.2.2 Philip Cerny

P. Cerny is another author who in his work reflected upon the theory of neomedievalism. P. Cerny points at the fact that state as an institution is in many functions replaced by non-state actors and that population is increasingly concerned about transnational issues. States, furthermore, increasingly fail in the provision of security as a primary good they were created to grant. Traditional balance of power logic is in decay as the most powerful weapons available – thermonuclear weapons – are useless in a low-intensity conflict such as tribal or religious clashes or in countering terrorism or drug trade. The author presents globalization as the main cause of the change in the international system – globalization that was enabled by states but threatens to destroy the state system. This globalization, however, does not create the unified world but instead increases interaction among different groups around the globe. A state is not diminished altogether and remains an important actor providing social net and welfare support while implementing regulations on the international level. In the neomedieval world, states will not lose their place altogether, but their legitimacy will be contested by a number of transnational organizations which can ignore state boundaries, and are more fluid in their activities (Cerny 1998).

P. Cerny names few major features which are or will be significant for the neomedieval world - the existence of competing organizations with overlapping jurisdictions; appearance of much more fluid territorial boundaries; alienation between virtual global cities and fragmented hinterlands; increased inequality between those able to use the opportunities present from higher mobility and those who cannot; system of multiple and fragmented loyalties and identities; attempts to contest property rights and legal boundaries; and spread of areas of lawlessness. The author calls the New Middle Ages a durable disorder, meaning that the current, at least formally, orderly arranged world will become much more unstable but that this development will not lead to total chaos. The new system will contest a right to life of every political, economic and social organization and will lead to the strengthening of the survival of the fittest scenario.⁴³ P. Cerny, same as authors above, considers the future world as a system with an overlapping set of different organizations. States will play just a role of “one among

⁴³ It is important that Cerny does not use the social Darwinist term survival of the strongest but rather the classical thesis about the survival of the fittest and thus gives a chance for smaller units to survive by adaptation. For the debate on the adaptation of the social institutions see also (Spruyt 1994)

many” in the international politics. The whole system will be able to survive because there will be no strong enough exogenous pressure on it. There is a possibility that the importance of virtual spaces will overcome the significance of actual territorial ones. People will remain localized on the micro-level, but the principle of physical territoriality itself will be still less important. This emerging system cannot, according to P. Cerny, be possibly captured by a single holistic vision and by no collective identity (Cerny 1998).

3.2.3. Stephen Kobrin

S. Kobrin presents the transition from medieval system to the modern one as characterized by territorialisation of politics and by replacement of overlapping vertical hierarchies by horizontal geographically defined sovereign states. Post-modern world is similarly characterized by interconnectivity and growing irrelevance of the geography due to the spread of cyberspace and global market. Technological evolution, furthermore, leads to the establishment of the global civil society united by unregulated and non-territorial cyberspace. This non-territorial identity leads to the emergence of multiple identities and transnational elites. Another effect of the neomedieval setting is the privatization of public services (Kobrin 1998). S. Kobrin thus focuses on the role of cyberspace in the emergence of the neomedieval setting and despite some hardly justifiable claims presents an impact of the cyber-domain on the nature of international politics.⁴⁴

3.2.4. Jan Zielonka

J. Zielonka dealt with the neomedievalism in relation to the process of the European integration. He points out that the linear concept of borders was not known in the Middle Ages as borders were understood more like zones than lines. Similarly, administrative, economic, military, and cultural borders rarely overlapped unlike the Westphalian system where these borders usually follow state borders (Zielonka 2007, 3-4). J. Zielonka, furthermore, points out, that throughout history of the modern era, globe was filled by many types of states. These states turned into a centrepiece of the Westphalian system and are hierarchical with one centre of authority. Growth in the

⁴⁴ Cyberspace is not entirely unregulated, and territorialisation is also possible as evident from the Chinese, Turkish or Russian censorship attempts. For another discussion over the role of cyberspace on the international system see also (Nye Jr. 2011, 113-151).

importance of the territorial dimension was enabled by the technological advances which allowed states to control large regions. Despite the seeming homogeneity of the Westphalian system, it was always challenged by irregular entities. Point is that the medieval system was characterized by shared and fragmented authority. Central authority was inexistent and competing network of clients was in a centre of the system. Multiple allegiances were common and public authority was disunited and privatized. Jurisdiction over different areas was fragmented and overlapping. Government was, furthermore, multiplied by the existence of cities with strong guilds. Territorial “sovereignty” was usually supplemented by the universal authority of the emperor and the pope. Cultural identity was not connected to the nation – which did not exist - but to the network of authority. Tasks were not given to state – they were functionally, rather than territorially, divided (Zielonka 2007, 9-11).⁴⁵

J. Zielonka compares two competing visions of the European Union – super-state and the Neomedieval Empire – and points out that the decentralized and limited scope of the neomedieval model is a more probable scenario for the future of the EU. Main features of such an empire are: soft borders in flux; persistence of socio-economic discrepancies; coexistence of multiple cultural identities; disassociation between authoritative allocations, functional competencies, and territorial constituencies; interpenetrations of various types of political units and loyalties; crucial but blurred distinction between the centre and the periphery; different types of solidarity as a basis

⁴⁵ “New medievalism symbolizes a break with the Westphalian era, and the failure of its modernist institutional embodiment: the EU. However, it does not suggest a ‘back to the future’ scenario with a computerized version of the Middle Ages. It only suggests that the future structure and exercise of political authority will resemble the medieval model more than the Westphalian one. The latter is about concentration of power, hierarchy, sovereignty and clear-cut identity. The former is about overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, differentiated institutional arrangements and multiple identities. The latter is about fixed and relatively hard external border lines, while the former is about fuzzy borders with ample opportunity for entrance and exit. The latter is about centrally regulated redistribution within a closed national or European system. The former is about redistribution based on different types of solidarity between various transnational networks. The latter is about strict rules, commands and penalties, while the former is about bargaining, flexible arrangements and incentives. Nor does new medievalism mean the death of European nation-states; rather it implies further transformation of these states and the increased importance of other polities, be they large cities or regions. NGOs will also grow in importance, some of them defending certain values such as environmental or minority rights, while others will represent corporate or consumer interests. The result will be a multiplication of various hybrid institutional arrangements, and increased plurality of political allegiances. This is a trend that has been noted by academics for some time. The expected fall of the EU will only accelerate it and make it more pronounced. In some fields, such as defence, states may well remain the principal actors, but in other fields, such as market regulation, social policy or internal security, numerous local or transnational actors, private or public or mixed, will have a chance to gain in importance. Even democracy is likely to be less territorial with the media and NGOs monitoring politicians across Europe’s borders more skilfully than national parliaments (Zielonka 2014, 81-2).”

for redistribution between transnational networks; diversified types of citizenship with a distinct set of rights and duties; multiplicity of overlapping military and police institutions; and divided sovereignty along different functional and territorial lines (Zielonka 2007, 12). Furthermore, neomedieval empire holds some distinctions compared to the neo-Westphalian one: territorial acquisition through invitation and not conquest; polycentric rather than centralised governance structure; control through incentives and their denial as opposed to control through coercion and bribes; control by economic and bureaucratic and not military and political means; existence of fuzzy borders between metropolis and periphery – not sharp and clear ones; periphery gradually gains access to the metropolis and is not asymmetrically and hierarchically controlled; degree of universalism is low; and the sovereignty of periphery is constrained through sharing and not denied altogether (Zielonka 2007, 14).

Neomedieval Empire is thus a voluntary union of asymmetrical units that does not seek punishment as a mean to enlarge itself. The precondition for the entrance is a voluntary decision and not threat or actual use of physical force (Zielonka 2007, 55-57). The EU will be inherently heterogeneous with many units in different categories (Zielonka 2007, 70). Administrative models will grow more complex and sharing of functions between various levels of government will increase. Decentralized and flexible alliances over different issues will emerge. This intersection between markets and jurisdiction is in Zielonka's work called neo-feudalism (Zielonka 2007, 94). The system will be linked in a multilevel and multisector arrangement with the EU as only one of the sides. Social policy effort will be in the hands of many public, semi-public and private actors. Role of municipalities or welfare institutions is about to grow (Zielonka 2007, 100). Next important actors are cities and regions which gain additional power. Cities are territories with the major concentration of population and thus welfare, etc. – centres of human activity. Regions are adapted to the local environment and cannot be possibly unified on such a significant level as is the whole EU – they will remain their specifics (Zielonka 2007, 124).

However, the current system in the EU is not medieval and stands somewhere between Westphalian sovereign state and medievalism (for example due to the existence of democratic self-aware communities) (Zielonka 2007, 134) – another sign of a new system. For J. Zielonka, European system represents Bull's system of overlapping identities and multiple loyalties - system held together by two competing claims (the EU

and the USA), where members voluntarily integrated, where force is not applied, where procedures are in the centre of bargaining, and where intervention into internal affairs is not an anathema (Zielonka 2007, 162). Governance in the neomedieval Empire is polycentric, diffused, non-territorial, multicentred, and multilevel (Zielonka 2007, 179).

Even in his vision of the possible post-EU future, Zielonka follows the similar pattern. In case of the EU break-up, he predicts an introduction of the system with the changed balance of political and economic forces and new political geography. In case of the weakening of the EU institutions, new challengers to state power will rise in regions and influential cities, growing importance will be assigned to networks. States will take different shapes from quasi-failed states to quasi-Empires, and the power of NGOs will grow. Citizens will live under the scheme of multiple loyalties and with increasing disrespect to traditional communal hierarchies and values. Europe will resemble a complicated puzzle rather than a single institutionalized and legal entity. Europe with significantly weakened EU would thus be filled with plural political allegiances, overlapping jurisdictions, and socio-cultural heterogeneity (Zielonka 2014, 73-5).

3.2.5. Barry Buzan and Richard Little

As part of their monography on the development of the international system, B. Buzan and R. Little discuss the nature of the coming post-modern international system. They divide world system into two parts – the first, post-modern without security dilemma (so-called zone of peace) and the second filled with modern and pre-modern entities obeying realist “laws” of international relations (so-called zone of conflict). Important to notice is the fact that these two zones are not entirely separated and affect each other. Even some parts of one zone may exhibit factors related to the other (conflict in the Northern Ireland or success of regional development in South-East Asia) (Buzan and Little 2000, 353-358).

The new system is defined by a sectoral transformation from the military-political sector to the economic one. This change is marked by the shift in the nature of the dominant unit in the system as physical borders, and the principle of sovereignty is eroding. This erosion is followed by an emergence of principles that allow for negotiated fluid boundaries, multi-levelled sovereignty, and appearance of transnational spaces such as cyberspace or commercial space (Buzan and Little 2000, 359). This process is followed by the increase in a number of dominant units inside the political-

military sector and appearance of new political units such as the EU that do not neatly fit the traditional outlook of a modern state. Not all of these new units – differentiated in their aims – will be necessarily territorial (Buzan and Little 2000, 360-361).

The new international structure is thus influenced by the intensification of the global market and international society that affect political sphere and changes rules of the game. The emergence of new dominant units leads to the establishment of their quasi-autonomous status and the appearance of multiple types of units – neo-medievalism. The appearance of a robust international society that might occur in the future might be seen as a major game changer in the neo-medieval zone of peace (Buzan and Little 2000, 364-366).⁴⁶

3.2.6. Neil Winn

N. Winn in his conclusion to the special issue of the Civil Wars journal dedicated to the topic of neomedievalism addresses the subject of the New Middle Ages as a theory. He points to the fact that state is degenerating from below and above and that territory becomes a porous concept due to the effect of the increased importance of networks and by an appearance of a number of alternative actors with blurrily defined responsibilities. The whole structure is complicated by the presence of alternative identities and emergence of global social identity. Re-appearance of ancient identities leads to re-establishment of historical grievances that lay in the heart of many civil conflicts. On the other hand, in many parts of the world, the institution of the state is

⁴⁶ In one of the debates regarding the nature of political system B. Buzan further explained his view. He states that the international system is created out two or three different spheres with diverse rules of the game. This, however, does not mean that institution of the state is going to disappear as it still stands as a major representative of the political sphere. To quote Buzan himself: *“First, as the process of globalization unfolds, deepens and strengthens (...) this is going to raise serious questions for political structure. I think these questions are going to be answered in different ways in different parts of the global system. My sense is that in the most developed and most democratic parts of the system, like western Europe and North America, there is probably going to be a layering of power so that there will be, if you like, an unpacking or disaggregation of sovereignty. Political authority will move upwards and downwards, and will exist simultaneously on several different levels. Hedley Bull once referred to this as neo-medievalism and that is not a bad metaphor in some ways. (...) There are a lot of weak states in the international system and these are going to have much more difficulty dealing with life in the strong system. Some of them are already falling to pieces and it would not surprise me, putting on a futurist hat, if a number of quite substantial unstable zones opened up and became semi-permanent features of the system (...). One could imagine there being no effective state structures, indeed no effective political structures at all in such places except for some kind of reversion to warlordism, tribalism or gangsterism, or combinations thereof. (...) (I)t would not surprise me to see this phenomenon spread so that one had a part of the world which was very highly organised, post-modern perhaps, parts of the world which had politically collapsed and then bits in-between (Global Transformations 1996).*

challenged by more stable effects of regionalism. Neo-medieval system is more complicated and unstable than modern state system, with the more important role of alternative non-state actors and privatization of essential functions connected to the Westphalian state (Winn 2003).

3.2.7. John Rapley

J. Rapley in his description of the New Middle Ages presents a vision based on the example of Jamaica where gangs took over many neighbourhoods previously left abandoned by the state. State structure is supplemented by the private actors and failure of the state to provide basic functions increases instability but does not lead to chaos as other actors can step in. J. Rapley uses parallel of the fall of Pax Romana. At the time Rome fell, the whole Europe became less safe, and the development created many forms of authority and political units but did not completely shatter. On the other hand, the fragmentation led to creation of localized economies, plural identities, and multiple authorities. The system was sustained by the cooperation and negotiation or conflict. The medieval system was, however, in the author's thought destroyed by capitalism. The spread of trade and growth of bureaucracy led to the appointment of the richest to the offices. The need for increased military force protecting trade routes led to the establishment of centrally controlled armies with the significant portion of conscripts gathered around the patriotic symbols of states. To maintain the economic growth, countries started to enforce many kinds of regulations and other policies, increased education of their population, and built modern infrastructure.

The modern system is, however, similarly transformed by the influence of globalization. States continue to decrease the number of services they provide and increasingly use private contractors for an increasing number of tasks. State's role as a mediator between local and world economy is increasingly useless. Some parts of certain states are so dangerous that no country's official dare to enter them. Successful companies are effectively able to evade state control. Many former soldiers and fighters are now members of gangs and mercenary militias providing security for those able to pay or just controlling parts of territory on their own. These processes are visible in all states – more evident in less developed but present all across the globe. In parts of the world where state never efficiently worked, non-state actors can provide services which the population would have otherwise never received. This existence of local authorities

and transnational actors consequently leads to re-emergence of the medieval coexistence of multiple identities (Rapley 2006).

3.2.8. Phil Williams

P. Williams in his work shifts attention towards the emergence of the New Dark Age – a scenario that can in his opinion easily follow the potential appearance of neomedievalism. He challenges Friedrichs' dualism as highly selective and sees globalized market not as one of the two stabilizing pillars but rather as a cause of the disorder. Furthermore, he sees Cerny's vision of a durable disorder as an attempt to give the dark future a silver lining and predicts that the New Middle Ages⁴⁷ are just an interim on a path to the New Dark Age. For P. Williams, the decay of the state might become self-perpetuating, and the drivers causing this problem have a cumulative impact. Among the factors weakening the state the author counts: the inability of the most of the states to meet the needs of their citizens such as employment, redistribution, or security; the persistence of alternative loyalties which deteriorates the identification with a state, and empowers primordial division of a society,⁴⁸ giving those actors a larger credibility compared to state; the rise of "sovereign free" transnational actors which can operate without state control, providing network for illegal activities established on a base of organized crime or the above-mentioned primordial divisions which does not respect state borders; the rise of cities and the emergence of alternatively governed spaces, with more than a half of the global population living in cities with many of those cities becoming ungovernable, filled with slums so dangerous that even police forces are afraid to enter and with a self-made system of alternative governance leaving behind other forms of alternatively governed spaces all around the world, with not even prisons effectively under the states' control; and porous borders which successfully undermine the states' territorial claim, when state is unable to prevent a trans-border flow of goods, immigrants, etc., which is further undermined by the possibilities given to people by the internet (Williams 2008a, 5-30).

This set of challenges is creating a number of highly unpredictable outcomes. P. Williams visualizes that the limits of a state will be furthermore exposed by the struggle

⁴⁷ In one of his other works he defines current system as facing "*a combination of disorder similar to that of the Middle Ages, with modern technologies that allow dangers to spread and even mutate in complex and unpredictable ways* (Williams 2010, 40). "

⁴⁸ Tribal, religious, ethnic, etc.

between forces of order and disorder. Most of the states will fail and become hollow. Formal emphasis on sovereignty will be only an illusion veiling the fact that the state structure will be unable to contest the presence of violent non-state actors on its territory. This process will begin in the developing world and will furthermore spread into the developed world. This disorder will not only be characterized by the emergence of warlordism and organized crime, but also by the rise of religious and civilization wars. For the author, a spread of transnational organized crime, terrorism, and possible pandemics could turn Friedrichs' durable disorder into chaos. Even larger calamity will come if there is a nuclear state among the collapsed states (Williams, 2008a, pp. 30-35). This would lead to the emergence of "loose nukes" (Williams, 2008a, p. 35) creating an even higher level of insecurity.

3.3. End of state system?

Before establishing an attempt to create a unified neomedievalist theory of the three worlds, it is important to point out at two issues connected to the transformation of the state system – states' disappearance in the post-Cold War system, and the emergence of alternative actors.

3.3.1. Crumbling of state system

Despite the fact that some thoughts on the end of the Westphalian state system have been already mentioned in the previous chapter, it is important to present some of the other important works related to the topic to support the basic argument of this thesis. The first author relevant to the research is R. Kaplan. Based on his experience from Western Africa, R. Kaplan in his 1994 article presented an image of the future world where the most of the states are collapsed, and lawlessness spreads across vast territories. He compares Western Africa in 1990s to pre-1648 Europe where large portions of land are not controlled by government forces but by local militias independent on the state's will or national borders. Furthermore, governments in this area are unable to run basic infrastructure, or even control borders, which are becoming mostly useless and imaginary. Money is being smuggled out of the area, and this additionally impoverishes the whole area. States are, however, trying to keep an illusion of power and are requiring high standards for formal actions such as obtaining a visa (Kaplan 1994).

He predicted a future of the region to follow a Somalian scenario – ungovernable. The region would be left without any central power with many poor and uneducated people. The whole region was to sink into violence. R. Kaplan judged that Africa would become the pre-World War One Balkans of the contemporary world, meaning that its development will predict the future world's development. The world of the future was for him to be one full of authoritarian and failed states, with a return of primordial anxieties, and with only a few safe places where the well-being will survive. Conflicts will be de-politicized and large states' militaries useless in a number of small-scale conflicts (Kaplan 1994). It must be, furthermore, added that many conflicts described by the author are additionally fuelled by the external state patrons leading proxy wars via support of different violent non-state actors in unstable areas – Eritrea in Somalia, Pakistan in Afghanistan, Qatar in Libya, etc. Furthermore, many of the actors use statelessness as a successful strategy for survival. In many contexts being a state may be a disadvantage in conflict with non-state actors able to attack centralized critical infrastructure (Grygiel 2009).

Looking at the issue from a more theoretical perspective, as noted earlier, M. van Creveld points out that states are continually losing their most important characteristics – they are unable to fight each other due to the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation; their provision of security is no longer exclusive and is increasingly shared with other actors (e.g., spread of so-called gated communities); their financial and welfare systems are still weaker and more dependent; and they are members of a growing number of international organizations (van Creveld 2006). Another issue facing the state system are the effects of globalization that is no longer controlled by states despite the fact that states enabled globalization to emerge in the first place. The new system created challengers to state sovereignty on both territorial and functional level. P. Khanna in his work stresses out that on the global level, the establishment of supply chains and global links slowly degenerates the importance of political geography (division by borders) and increases the role of functional geography (connection by infrastructure) (Khanna 2016, 28). Some of the issues were deliberately created by some countries as they tried to achieve their goals via creating areas of softened sovereignty or by increasing importance of virtual space. States are thus likely to lose much of their influence, and their role as a guarantor of an order will be limited. Inside this system, non-state actors

will be able to fill many functions previously provided by the state.⁴⁹ This shift is observable, among other areas, in a way non-governmental actors are used in some areas to provide state-like functions – be it NGOs and their humanitarian work or mercenaries and their aid to military capacities of weak states⁵⁰ (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, 23-30).

The most important dimension of state activity is security – the state is bound to provide security as its basic good for society. First, many countries are dependent on support from mercenaries or troops of different states' armies – e.g., Gulf states, or some African states – and, in general, mercenaries continue to be used on an ad hoc basis (Thomson 1996, 90-5) – e.g., 2014/15 Nigerian Army operations against Boko Haram. There are many reasons for the reappearance of the private military forces⁵¹ but the post-Cold War development led to the proliferation of their activities throughout the world (McFate 2014, 55) and for example Liberia was in after its civil war almost entirely dependent on the presence and activities of non-governmental organizations and private military contractors (McFate 2014, 100). Second, one of the primary reasons why the state is losing its ability to provide its basic functions lies in the growth of importance of violent non-state actors – actors like warlords, militias, paramilitary groups, insurgencies, terrorist organizations, or criminal organizations (P. Williams 2008b, 9-15). “*Illicit cross-border global transfers*” introduced by some of these groups “*can, in effect, set up covert transnational governance systems to replace existing state-centric world order* (Mandel 2011, 64).” These actors prosper well in a situation where the state is seen as illegitimate (due to its failure or the fact that it never correctly worked in the first place – e.g., Paschtun areas in Southern Asia) and cannot provide basic goods. Many of such areas appear in the largest cities on our planet where large parts are ungovernable and ungoverned by state institutions and where the police are not present or enter them only during raids – some cities might become one of the most unstable parts of the world.

Violent non-state actors, however, do not only fill territorial spaces but in many cases functional spaces as well (Williams 2008b, 6-8). In some cases, these actors and organizations create a form of “*parallel state*” (Mandel 2011, 38). In some parts of the

⁴⁹ P. Williams points at the issue of growing number of states with functional gaps as a reason for the empowerment of non-state actors (Williams and Felbab-Brown 2012, vii).

⁵⁰ For more on this issue see for example (McFate 2014, Coker 2001).

⁵¹ Despite the fact that a limited role of this type of non-state actors was evident even throughout the Cold War, especially in African internal conflicts.

world, the state is so weak that even violent criminal groups provide needed relief and at least some basic governance and security structure despite their otherwise primarily predatory nature (Williams and Felbab-Brown 2012, 8-9). Despite the challenge these actors pose to some states, others will try to make alliances with some of these groups to achieve their strategic goals on other state's territory (Williams 2008b, 18). This leads to the above-mentioned use of proxies in unstable regions (Mumford 2013).

3.3.2. Alternative actors

Before moving to a delimitation of neomedievalism as understood in this thesis, it is necessary to present some of the actors that (may) play an alternative role to the state. First, there are non-state actors. We can distinguish among territorial and non-territorial actors (imagined on a continuum rather than as two distinct categories). It is, furthermore, necessary to point out that the distinction of the two ways non-state actors can work on the territory is vital for an understanding of their role as a supplement of the state power. As observable, the more territorial actors (especially, the more successful in their pursuit of the territorial control and governance) are, the more viable alternative in their relation to the state power as a sovereign entity they present. Additionally, non-territorial and territorial non-state actors can cooperate in an attempt to achieve their goals. This can be demonstrated on the case of the pre-9/11 Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda aided Taliban with its money and expertise to achieve dominance in Afghanistan (territorial pursuit) while Taliban consequently provided Al Qaeda with a safe haven from which it could operate its global network aiming at propagation of global jihad (non-territorial quest) (Abbas 2014, 78-80). Given the realities and development of any organization, it can through time move from territorial to non-territorial and vice-versa. This can be presented on the example of Al-Shabaab and its rise to territorial importance with the consequent decline in importance of territorial control for the movement and shift towards guerrilla, non-territorial, strategy (e.g. (Hansen 2013)) with the return to more territorial strategy since 2016. Territorial dynamics can be alternatively observable among other violent non-state actors such as narco-gangs in the Latin America (Grillo 2016, van Dun 2017).

A specific type of non-state actors is so-called "superclass." This set of actors concentrate an enormous amount of power and wealth in their hands and thus affects global political and economic system in various ways. D. Rothkopf points out that wealth of the largest companies in the United States is enormous with two on the top

having revenues comparable to 50% of the US defence budget (in 2015 Walmart itself generated revenue of almost 500 billion USD⁵²). D. Rothkopf further notices that concentration of power shifts not only geographically but also away from nations/states as the major companies can force their goals on states which adapt to attract their investments and not vice versa. Some companies also hold budgets larger than most of the states and employ a larger number of employees (Rothkopf 2012, Rothkopf 2008, 25). A.-M. Slaughter points out that out of the 175 largest nation-states and private companies, 112 are corporations and many of the largest have their quasi-diplomatic corps. This implies that the role of the large corporations in the international system is strong and that states need to incorporate their interests into their decision-making. Similar power goes with the global humanitarian NGOs (Slaughter 2017, 22). Additionally, the privatization of supply chains to a large degree changes the role of the state in the global politics forcing them to play more of market regulation and co-governing role as compared to their traditional role (Khanna 2016, 31). Companies can also play an important role in internal conflicts harbouring profits from predatory behaviour (Ganson and Wennmann 2016). Of course, attempts to establish large corporate entities is older than the end of the Cold War but the post-1991 proliferation of the globalized market helped this process to grow into a size described by the above-mentioned authors.

Some private actors, furthermore, take over some state functions as setting standards or resolving disputes. This is observable on the importance of the rating and ranking organizations, especially in the post-2008 (economic crisis) environment. Many of such organizations are widely perceived as an ultimate authority in their fields – e.g., Transparency International in the measurement of the level of corruption, or big three rating companies⁵³ in financial credibility (Cooley 2015, 17). *"Over the last century, the world's biggest private-sector organizations have come to dwarf all but the largest governments in resources, global reach, and influence. At the same time, even wealthy countries are now struggling with overwhelmed bureaucracies, budget crises, and plummeting confidence in government. And governments everywhere are compromised by the limitations of their borders in an era when the issues that affect their people are increasingly transnational"* (Rothkopf 2012). Furthermore, the newly established

⁵² See <http://www.statista.com/statistics/263265/top-companies-in-the-world-by-revenue/>

⁵³ Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch

"superclass" might provide an impetus for the change of identification of population from state to alternative actors as its members are more connected to their peers in the similar group than to the place of their origin or citizenship (Rothkopf 2008, 26). This group thus directly challenges state as an institution by replacing some of its roles on a global level (Rothkopf 2008, 136). Emergence of the "superclass" and working of the global system, in general, has a direct consequence in extremely disproportionate concentration of global power in all major areas – wealth (10 percent of population owns 85 per cent of world's wealth with 2 per cent owning over 50 percent of wealth), finance, business, religion (only two have over billion followers – Christianity and Islam), force (12 percent of global population in NATO countries account for more than 80 percent of military expenditure), and politics (relative strength of states is diametrically different, e.g., importance of countries in the United Nations Security Council) (Rothkopf 2008, 246-247). Not only is world uneven, but it is also becoming increasingly dominated by the non-state actors that can successfully challenge states just by concentrating a large amount of power.⁵⁴

Another important actor that re-emerges as an important alternative to the modern modes of government is cities.⁵⁵ B. Barber points out that the newly emerging reality of global challenges and trans-border networking are incompatible with the state system based on sovereignty and he sees the solution of the governance crisis in the increasing role of the prosperous cities in the global politics (Barber 2013, 20-24). Cities act as connection points as they are dependent not only on rural agricultural production but are also interconnected and interdependent with each other on a global scale. They also serve as natural centres of regions with a concentration of working places, wealth, and power (Barber 2013, 63) – they are nodal points in the global network (Curtis 2016, 2). These nodes are then territorial settings of the post-modern networks inside the space of flows that is establishing in some regions of the world (Curtis 2016, 19). Cities may overtake some of the state functions due to their peaceful nature – they do not border each other and create a global network that is more cooperative in comparison to the state system (Barber 2013, 113-114). Cities might thus provide the connection point between local politics and global economy and global and local spaces in general, thus altering the political structure at the national level (Barber

⁵⁴ Role of global governing agents is also, among others, discussed in (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010).

⁵⁵ For a prolonged discussion over the importance of cities and special economic zones for the global system see (Khanna 2016).

2013, 192, Curtis 2016, 11). Moreover, world hubs concentrate about half of the world population into an area of about 2 percent of world's surface with 66 percent of global economic output and 85 percent of scientific and technological innovations arising from forty largest mega-cities (Curtis 2016, 10). On the other hand, cities are still part of the state structure and are directly dependent on state, so their influence is more informal and their progress towards interconnection, and thus disintegration of the sovereign state system, can be halted by the state policies (Barber 2013, 214-215). Cities, therefore, may, despite many setbacks, overtake some of the roles of states in relation to local governance and networking global economy as they are at the same time a local political structure and global economic hubs. In states with failing governments, cities can, additionally, provide a functioning alternative for its citizens and mitigate the impact of the inefficient state structure.

As we can see from this brief review, the institution of the state is losing its powers in all of the spheres of geopolitical analysis as defined by the French geopolitical school. These functional and territorial gaps are filled by non-state actors with larger or smaller success. The economic role of multinational corporations or international organizations is undisputed, the role of NGOs and others in societal development as well. Spheres connected to the politics and security might be contested, but as we may observe in the case of the EU or regions of state failure, non-state actors might be effective both in the political role and as guarantors of some form of security in a given territory.

3.4. Concept of the three worlds

In the following chapter, the three geopolitical environments that appear under the overreaching frame of neomedievalism are presented. Before that, however, it is necessary to establish an understanding of neomedievalism that stands as a general theoretical standpoint from which these modes might be derived. Neomedievalism is a system that combines factors from pre-modern and modern era⁵⁶ appearing in a context of decreased stability and importance of the state. Pre-modern characteristics making their way back to the system are: increased importance and power of non-state actors; existence of competing universalistic claims; presence of competing overlapping

⁵⁶ For an analysis of the mutual relations of pre-modern and modern factors in the international politics see for example (Welsh 2016).

identities; issue of appearance of overlapping territorial claims in a context of reappearance of terra nullius on the map; proliferation of the means of violence; importance of the control over population rather than the control of territory. Modern factors important for neomedievalism are: effects of globalization; technological unification of the world; high mobility of people, goods (at least in the developed world), and information; effects of regionalism; the appearance of connected cities with non-integrated hinterland surroundings; and a crucial role of cyber-space.

Neomedievalism is a system where the traditional state is challenged by non-state actors and effects of regionalism.⁵⁷ This degradation might be more orderly or disorderly given the broader context of the region. The new system is generally less stable with many actors holding overlapping functional, territorial, or identity claims (or any combination of these) taking over many functions previously provided by the institution of the state. These new actors might be peaceful or violent, the state might survive in some diminished role, new political units might arise, and the effect of two-and-half pillars (political, economic, and societal) might stabilize the system. There are many "mays" and "mights." To better describe the newly emerging system let us now introduce the system of the three geopolitical environments: Durable Disorder, Chaotic Anarchy, and the Westphalian model. The importance of these three environments lies in their effect for the political units appearing inside them. Similarly to the uneven and multifaceted transformation from medieval to the modern system that witnessed many forms of adaptation to the new conditions (Spruyt 1994), the transformation to the neomedievalism will be accompanied by an establishment of different units reacting to their environment in order to evolve and be successful in the new setting. The difference from a European transition to the Westphalian era, nevertheless, lies in uneven geopolitical conditions that different actors in different regions face. These different conditions are summed up in the following three ideal-types.

3.4.1. Durable Disorder

Durable Disorder is a non-violent networked (post-modern) outcome of the neomedieval transformation. It is connected to concepts of post-modern state/zone of peace as discussed previously. The concept of the Durable Disorder follows Friedrichs'

⁵⁷ In this respect, it is important to point out that the co-existence of different types of units – even from a historical or developmental point of view – is nothing extraordinary in the human history (Ruggie 1993, 167).

historical neomedievalism and thus the Eurocentric vision of the neomedieval development. Despite its weakness, the state still exists and may provide some important goods for its citizens. As a functional unit, it is, however, in many functions overcome by non-territorial or regional actors. As state abandons many of its functions, alternative actors take place and provide these functions for the population. Nature of the system is peaceful, and war between states in Durable Disorder is very unlikely or impossible. Territory governed in this way is caught in a struggle between economic (globalist, Lévy's hierarchical world of transaction),⁵⁸ political (geographical, world of forces),⁵⁹ and societal (both local and global, world of society) pillars that are interconnected while still seeking to gain power over the other two pillars. This creates complicated structure of territorial control.

Unlike the Westphalian mode of territorial control, Durable Disorder presents set of actors that overlap in their functions and territorial claims on different levels (regional, supra-national). These actors are connected through cyberspace that provides network for fast exchange of ideas, information, and capital, and modern means of transportation that allow people and goods to travel across vast distances in a relatively short period. Population develops global and local awareness and identities that directly challenge limitations of state-based identity. Actors in the system need to fill functional holes or provide some goods more efficiently than its opponents otherwise they perish – survival of the fittest model. As the non-state actors usually provide higher amount of goods in the environments with previously effective alternatives (e.g., capable state) (Mampilly 2011), the provision of goods will then to be higher than in the case of the Chaotic Anarchy. Actors, however, usually do not incline to the use of violence. The decreasing capacities of state regarding regulations will be substituted by non-state actors (Schuppert 2011, 74).

The system is additionally defined by a decreased importance of borders as they are turning irrelevant due to the effects of networking connected to the rapid spread of functions conducted inside cyberspace, modern means of transportation, and effects of

⁵⁸ Here we can find a clear analogy to the medieval Church. As H. Spruyt (1994, 44-46) points out, Church established a non-territorial means of effective capital generation, and many other actors competed to get on good terms with the organization to tap into these resources. This is similar to the logic of attempting to attract important market players (e.g., large companies) to conduct their activity on one's actors' territory to get financial benefits.

⁵⁹ Similar distinction to the struggle between territoriality of sovereignty and de-territorializing effects of a capitalist economic system as noted by (Curtis 2016, 2)

regionalism. An important principle of Durable Disorder is mobility as a factor eroding territoriality. This mobility is connected to the economic pillar while political and societal pillars are more territorial – in case of societal actors, their level of territorial setting depends mainly on their aims. Borders are also playing different role. They might be seen in a similar way to what A.-M. Slaughter based on work of F. Capra describes as *"not boundaries of separation but boundaries of identity,"* keeping the unite distinct but connected (Slaughter 2017, 57). Actors in this environment succeed by opening themselves and connecting to others (Slaughter 2017, 203).

Territorial control is based on overlapping claims of actors on different levels of governance. Territoriality is eroded by advanced networking in the system. Violence is disregarded as a legitimate mean to achieve goals. Many actors are focused on functional or identity (religious groups, etc.) level rather than on territorial⁶⁰ control and may overcome some of the functions of the state similarly to territorial units in regions of no state power in pre-modern/post-colonial states. The system is less predictable than the Westphalian state system but remains peaceful with war improbable not only due to the preferences of population but even due to the inability of states to wage them due to their interconnected nature. They, however, will be, to some extent, able to defend the region against the outside attacks and threats either via interventions in the regions posing a threat or via an establishment of military force capable of protecting the borders themselves or deterring a potential invader. This protection might, however, be provided by private companies or combination of private and public forces instead. The internal functioning of the region in a Durable Disorder setting is defined by predominance of the socio-economic domain. The aim is to establish a global (universalistic) network as per Lévy's definition.

3.4.2. Chaotic Anarchy

The second geopolitical environment discussed in this work is Chaotic Anarchy. As the name suggests this mode of governance is highly unstable and violent. State disappears into larger instability, and the environment is left with many functional and territorial holes. Security is usually provided only on minimal level or is missing altogether. The environment is filled by predatory actors. Region defined by Chaotic

⁶⁰ Territorial, functional, and personal delimitation of political space are three possible strategies for political actors to mark their area of authority (Vollaard 2009, 690).

Anarchy is characterised by the emergence of state failure, disconnection from the global network, high levels of violence, conflict between local population and mobile predatory groups, rise of primordial tensions, decreased importance of borders leading to emergence of J. Lévy's border zones, spread of terra nullius, economic decline, and general insecurity. Actors are usually unable to cooperate in a longer run. Local communities are misused by violent non-state actors seeking profit, and many of such actors are used as proxies by outside forces.

Territoriality is important for local communities and ethnic groups. Predatory actors are usually mobile, and use settled population for its aims.⁶¹ There are no actors willing or able to govern territory in a longer run other than local communities interested in their neighbourhood. This inability and unwillingness to govern and provide basic goods for the population is one of the most important defining factors of Chaotic Anarchy, similarly to proliferation of cheap means of violence. A region in Chaotic Anarchy setting is easily penetrable from the outside, but any sustained activity is challenging and requires extraordinary security measurements. The appearance of quasi-states is possible as some actors might hide their activities behind a veil of establishing a legitimate state structure.⁶² The internal setting is predominated by the physical and demographic characteristics of space.

3.4.3. Westphalian system

Despite the fact that many parts of the world shift into qualitatively new stage of institutional organization of the international politics, the Westphalian setting is still a viable option in some areas of the world. The system is based on state as the most important institution. The state is delimited by its territory and population with centralized government and functions organized around its structure. As the pressures from the developing international networked community grows, states that wish to sustain their relevance need to protect their borders and their societies which leads them to an inclination towards more authoritarian forms of rule and protection against the impact of the world networks – mainly the Internet, process evident from blockages of the Internet in places like China or throughout political turmoil in Turkey in 2016 or Iran in 2017/18.

⁶¹ Here the examples of Boko Haram's misuse of local communities can be named.

⁶² For a discussion over the use of sovereignty veil for personal enrichment see for example (Reno 1998).

The state controls most of the functions, mainly the provision of security, and it overlooks actors that are allowed to provide functions on its behalf and are connected to the state structure. The state is a sole creator and guarantor of the legal system on its clearly delimited territory and is the only representative of its population on the international level. The state can limit a movement of people and goods across its borders and remains the primary holder of people's identification as well as sovereignty. The Westphalian system is dominated by the military-diplomatic field with the primary role of power being inside political circles.

3.4.4. Relation

These three worlds are, nevertheless, interconnected and regions may enter one or another if the right set of factors is met. Regions in the Westphalian model may collapse and become areas resembling Chaotic Anarchy or start integrating, connecting and enter the Durable Disorder model. Region in the Durable Disorder might be infected by areas of lawlessness (city suburbs, neglected ethnic groups, terrorist groups), or some catastrophe (natural disaster, pandemics, etc.) and collapse into the Chaotic Anarchy, or by a strong populist nationalistic case made by some local actor(s) that might re-establish a robust Westphalian state. Chaotic Anarchy might be stabilized by actors able to provide governance and security and developed into one of the more stable scenarios depending on to what degree these stabilizing tendencies promote strength of a state.

For a better introduction of the three modes system table comparing their basic features is presented.

Table 1 – Three modes of territorial control

	Westphalian system	Durable Disorder	Chaotic Anarchy
Sovereignty	Full	Shared/pooled	Judicial
Borders	Borderlines	Frontiers, penetrable	De facto non-existent, border zones
State	Central to system	One among other	None/predatory
Non-state actors	Operating under	Overtake state functions	Predatory/Local

	state		communities
Stability	Balance of power	Interdependence/universal pillars	Inherently unstable
Nature of relations	Peace/war	Cooperative/challenging	Ad hoc coalitions/Violent clashes
Territoriality	State-centred	Local/regional x global network of flows, city-networks	Ethnoterritoriality x disconnection from global network
Type of state	Modern	Post-modern	Pre-modern/post-colonial
Provision of basic goods	State	State and non-state actors	None
Nature of operations out of the region	Interventions, diplomatic relations, balance of power	Economic network, interventions, NGO activity, soft power	Limited violent spill-overs, migration, terrorism

4. Research design and regional definition

In the following chapter, the research design is presented as to establish a framework inside which the thesis explores the geographical spread of the different geopolitical environments – Durable Disorder, Chaotic Anarchy, and the Westphalian system. This research will consequently lead to answer the question whether the neomedieval setting is overcoming the Westphalian model of international politics. The first task is the establishment of the regional division of the world. Consequently, the research design is being set up.

4.1. Regions

The broader definition of regionalism was briefly examined in the chapter 2.7., so we can move directly to the delimitation of regions for the case of the following analysis. Defining regions is an intriguing task as any division will always be to some extent subjectively. This might be shown in the example of the Indian Ocean. The region defined as the Indian Ocean (Rim) region can be examined as a single geopolitical unit with significant internal interactions and dynamics (Kaplan 2010) and with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as an organization attempting to unite the area.⁶³ On the other hand, the geopolitical nature of alternatively chosen regions located on the Indian Ocean rim is very different, the nature of the countries even vis-a-vis the neomedieval setting differs substantially (Doboš 2014), and many other regional organizations are arguably more important than IORA.⁶⁴ It is thus necessary to distinguish among different possible delimitations of regions and select those that are the most suitable for the following research. The presented approaches towards the issue as well as the final selection of regions thus aims to delimit studied geographical areas in a way that they present internally coherent units *vis-à-vis* the main factors included in the theoretical delimitation of the three worlds.

The first regional definition that must be taken into account and that will serve as a basis for the further specifications comes from the United Nations (UN). The UN divides the world into following regions – Eastern, Middle, Northern, Southern, and Western Africa, Central, North, and South America, Caribbean, Central, Eastern, Southern, South-Eastern, and Western Asia, Eastern, Northern, Southern, Western

⁶³ See <http://www.iora.net/default.aspx>

⁶⁴ For discussion over the Indian Ocean regionalism, see (Muni 2005).

Europe, Australia and New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia (UNdata 2013).⁶⁵

The second important idea the work deals with while delimiting the regional division of the world is the T. Barnett's concept of the functioning core that divides the world into two parts regarding their connectedness to the globalized world. Barnett presents the world as divided between functioning core and non-integrating gap – former enjoying the benefits of globalization while later falling into the chaotic and disorganized setting (Barnett 2004). As the connectivity to the global economy and network is also important in the neomedieval world setting the understanding of this division is also useful for the delimitation of the regional setting.⁶⁶

R. Kaplan in his work presents a geographically and historically rooted approach towards the description of the Eurasian continent. He points out that “*as the map of Eurasia gets smaller thanks to technology and population growth, artificial frontiers will begin to weaken inside it* (Kaplan 2012, 125).” He afterwards divides the entity into following parts – Europe as a geographical expression of liberal humanism (Kaplan 2012, 138), Russia as a preeminent land power with power projection strategies aiming to the Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and the Central Asia (Kaplan 2012, 155-177), China with its favourable geography which makes it a natural hub of geopolitics with a power projection capabilities over artificial borders with Mongolia and Central Asia, as well as in the South-East Asia and Korean peninsula (Kaplan 2012, 188-211), India with its unstable neighbourhood (Kaplan 2012, 228), Arabian peninsula dominated by the Saudi Arabia with a little importance in the pre-20th century geopolitics (Kaplan 2012, 261, 302), Iran as a distinct entity located between Turkey and Indian subcontinent (Kaplan 2012, 266), and Turkey as a relatively stable land-bridge between Mediterranean and Black Sea bordering unstable Arab world (Kaplan 2012, 285). R. Kaplan's division is important for our understanding the geopolitical dynamics inside the Eurasian environment.

Similarly, Z. Brzezinski points at the geographic and political division of the world. He identifies the presence of the distinct European space, Russian space, "Eurasian Balkans" in Central Asia, and the Far East dominated by the clash between China and its competitors in Eurasia. Despite the fact that his work deals mainly with

⁶⁵ See Map 1 in amendments.

⁶⁶ See Map 2 in amendments.

the US power projection, the division of Eurasia he presents is useful for the understanding of the world's regions (Brzezinski 1998). We must not also forget about the work done by S. Huntington. Despite the fact, that this work does not follow the clash of civilizations hypothesis, it is useful to at least mention the distinction between core states, cleft countries and lone countries. Core countries are those located at the centre of their respective civilization and are those that are at the centre of the global great power politics. Cleft countries are located on the fault lines of the civilizations and have troubles in maintaining their unity thus becoming less stable. Lone country is a state that lacks common cultural background with others (Huntington 1997, 136-139, 207-208).

Another relevant factor for the delimitation of regions is the presence of regional organizations. There is an enormous amount of more or less successful regional organizations with different functions and varying level of enthusiasm from its member-states. To mention some of the most important we may remark sub-regional units as the Economic Community of West African States, the South African Development Community, or the East African Community; regional as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), or Mercosur; trans-regional as Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); or global like Organization of Arab States, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and BRIC(S). Furthermore, some new joint economic spaces are/were being set up, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. These initiatives are, nevertheless, less geographically determined and represent a new stage of the regional development with yet uncertain future.

We can observe that different territories are parts of different regions depending on the criteria chosen and even then the possible regional delimitation overlaps. For example, just looking at the case of People's Republic of China (PRC) – it might be considered as a unique entity and a power centre of its own, it might be part of broader geographical region encompassing Mongolia and Koreas, and it is economically tied to both Central Asia and the Pacific region. Similarly, is for Mexico's regional position more important its connection to the failing states of Central America or its membership in NAFTA? And what about Turkish location between the Middle East, Europe and

Caucasus? There are many factors that need to be taken into account – regional cooperation, culture, geography, or power relations – and these factors are not of uniform value around the globe. Next step is thus an attempt to define regions that will serve as a basis for the following analysis.

As evident regions in the world may be defined by many characteristics, they may have different sizes, and may even disregard national borders. In the previous chapter we have explained the division of the world into the three ideal-type geopolitical settings, and so the purpose of the regional setting is to make the studied entities as coherent as possible in the context of our understanding of the neomedievalism. On the other hand, for the sake of data gathering, the regions will be based on the borders of currently internationally recognized states – the regional division is thus geographic and state-centric. Following is the list of regions that will be used in the following analysis with the short justification of the selection in each case.

The first region is an obvious case of the European Union.⁶⁷ The EU will be dealt with as a single entity together with countries of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and European micro-states added to the list as these non-EU members are, nonetheless, intimately connected to the bloc (customs union, Schengen zone, security aspects, etc.) and do not create any distinct regional entity. Also, entities like Greenland or Faroe Islands (and many others) that are not the EU members will be a part of the region as they share similar characteristics with the bloc. This vast region is to some degree less homogeneous than the others, but it is considered that the regional dynamics are so important that this shortcoming is overcome by the strength of dealing with these countries in a single package. Staying on the European continent three other regions can be defined – non-EU Balkan states; Ukraine and Moldova as the post-Soviet countries striving to escape Russian hegemony geographically distinct from the other post-Soviet countries that to some degree share their fate (Georgia, Azerbaijan) and also distinct geographically and politically from the non-EU Balkan countries; and Russia and Belarus as post-Soviet countries in many aspects following the Soviet legacy.

The post-soviet region also inhabits two other regions geographically located in Asia – post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia (post-Soviet "Stans"). The remainder of

⁶⁷ S. Cohen characterizes the EU as a single geopolitical power (Cohen 2014, 52-3), J. Zielonka, as mentioned earlier, talks about the neomedieval Empire (Zielonka 2007).

the Russian neighbourhood comprises of Mongolia that is difficult to assign as it is stretched between the influence of China and Russia and will be included into the same region as China with the addition of Chinese protégée, North Korea. The east Asian dynamic is projected into the creation of the East Asian region comprising of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (the only de facto state included in a different region than its parent state) – all countries are in some opposition to China and protected by the US military presence. South-East Asia is defined by its membership in ASEAN. Oceania comprises of Australia, New Zealand and smaller Pacific nations not included in other regions.

Following the Asian part of the Indian Ocean rim, the Indian region including India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Seychelles and Sri Lanka is defined as a territory dominated by the Indian influence. Neighbouring Pakistan will form a distinct entity together with Afghanistan – as the borders between those entities are virtually non-existent and their regional dynamics is interconnected. Iran will be dealt with as a single region same as Turkey. In the Middle East, we can identify region comprising Iraq, Syria and Lebanon – places of great instability and civil conflict; Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Gulf kingdoms – stable part of the Persian Gulf; and Israel, Jordan and Egypt as a single security region. These three regions are mainly established as to follow regional political dynamics.

Moving to Africa, the issue of regional identification becomes even more problematic as the countries are in many parts of the continent just a fiction. Libya will be analysed together with Sudan, Chad, and Niger. Remaining North African countries will establish a separate region. This is mainly to accent different security challenges despite the fact that many of these are interconnected throughout the whole of Sahel. The Horn of Africa is understood as comprising of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia with Yemen included as well due to its internal issues similar to those experienced by the countries of the Horn and its connection to the region via migrant routes. Continuing south, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda establish the East African region as they seek to enhance the regional cooperation in the region. The Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea are deemed as Central Africa. All the countries south of the Central African region are to be included in the South African region as economically

connected to South Africa as a regional hegemon.⁶⁸ Western Africa will comprise all the remaining African countries.

As we do not deal with virtually uninhabited Antarctica, the last two continents to be parcelled are Americas. There are three regions in North and Central America – Canada and the USA as North America (Mexico is excluded as it shares more security aspects with its Central American neighbours⁶⁹) as connected through a common cultural, security and economic interests and similarities; countries from Mexico to Panama as Central America as countries sharing similar geopolitical dynamics and faith connected to a strong presence of the USA and effects of drug trade; and the Caribbean with its specific geography being identified as following the UN delimitation. South America is to be divided between Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Surinam, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay and Guyana; and the remaining following the Barnetts' division. Table 2 and Map 1 summarize the regional selection.

Table 2 - Regions


Region	Countries
EU+	EU28, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, microstates, minor dependent territories
Balkans	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania
East Europe	Ukraine, Moldova
Russian space	Belarus, Russia
The Caucasus	Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia
Central Asia	Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
Chinese space	China, Mongolia, North Korea
East Asia	Japan, South Korea, Taiwan

⁶⁸ Some authorities enhance the size of the Eastern and Central Africa and decrease the size of the Southern African region but in the influence of South Africa is so important that it constitutes the basis of the future geopolitical region that must be taken into consideration. The delimitation also to a large degree follows the similar delineation made by Cohen (2014, 434-7). For historical development of the ties and their importance in the post-apartheid era see also (Reno 1998, 45-78).

⁶⁹ Some authors as S. Cohen (2014, 136-7) tie the Mexican geopolitical position to that of the USA that in a major way affect the Mexican politics. Despite the fact that Mexico is apparently on a border between the two regions it is here placed among the Central American states for reason of having the same security challenges such as gang violence and drug trafficking that affect state strength in a more substantial way than its membership in NAFTA.

South East Asia	ASEAN
Oceania	Australia, New Zealand, Pacific islands
Indian space	India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles
AfPak	Afghanistan, Pakistan
Iran	Iran
Turkey	Turkey
Larger Mesopotamia	Iraq, Syria, Lebanon
Gulf monarchies	Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait
Western Middle East	Jordan, Israel, Egypt
Northern Africa	Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Niger
North-West Africa	Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Mauritania
Horn of Africa+	Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen
East Africa	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi
Central Africa	Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo
South Africa	Republic of South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Madagascar, Comoros
West Africa	Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Gambia
North America	Canada, USA
Central America	Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Belize, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama
The Caribbean	Caribbean island nations
Northern South America	Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay
Southern South America	Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile


Map 1 – Regional selection



4.2. Research design

Once the borders of the geographical entities that are to be researched are known, it is possible to move to the presentation of the research design that will be used to place these regions in a right part of the neomedieval spectrum. As the neomedieval world can be ideally divided among three poles, the research design will start with the idea of a triangle with each ideal type on one of its peaks. The position of the concrete region inside the triangle is defined by two sets of factors – one related to axis A and one to axis B as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Research triangle



Axis A is thus related to the factors influencing the state strength and relevance and Axis B to the difference in the stability of the other elements of the system. The rationale behind this distinction is that a strong state if it is willing to, is through its security apparatus able to mitigate the effects of the other elements on its role in the system. As an archetypical example, North Korea is unable to provide basic functions such as food, is totalitarian and arbitrary but is, from a geopolitical and international politics perspective, stable and relevant entity and a fully sovereign member using its strengths (blackmailing) and trying to overcome its weaknesses (mainly by totalitarian control of its population). Despite the normative issues related to the case, the government in Pyongyang acts, unlike many failed states, as a relevant regional player fully in the context of the traditional Westphalian geopolitics. However, due to this nature of policy-conduct, it is challenging for the country to transition into Durable Disorder that requires openness and networking to emerge. In case of state collapse, the country will most likely enter into some form of Chaotic Anarchy environment. It is now important to dislodge the factors distinguishing the three ideal-types into measurable units that fit one of the two axes.

Beginning with the Axis A, following criteria define the case's position on it is being defined by – breaches of sovereignty; the presence of state defying non-state actors; the level of state failure; state as being the primary actor in international relations. Each of the factors is further divided into sub-factors. These sub-factors are a basis for the empirical study on the Axis A. They are – regional dependence on outside agents; border control; state failure; state as a provider of social services; presence of non-state actors defying state on a functional level; presence of non-state actors defying state on a territorial level; number of types politically relevant actors in the region.

Axis B is consequently consisting following criteria – overall use of violence; a level of provision of goods; connection to the global network; development of regionalism; nature of actors supplementing state. Sub-factors will be – use of violence; the presence of armed conflict; provision of basic goods and social services; connection to global flows; intraregional openness; peaceful/violent nature of non-state actors; the strength of regional bodies; a spread of weaponry.

Axis A is thus characterized by seven sub-factors while Axis B by eight. Next step is to quantify these sub-factors to establish a framework in which selected regions might be placed on a research triangle.

Axis A

Regional dependence on foreign agents: To understand this factor, it must be pointed out that a connection to the international economy and establishment of a system that is not based on autarchy does not equal regional dependence on the foreign agents. What is meant here is the dependence of states' survival on a provision of direct aid. Thus, giving money to a state is (at least partial) dependence while being dependent on foreign trade is not. Buying army supplies from abroad is, in this context, not making state dependent while receiving direct military support or being under foreign occupation is. The work will thus distinguish these possible values: independent; minor foreign aid; major foreign aid; direct humanitarian intervention; occupation.

Border control: State as a territorial institution with precisely demarcated borders needs to be able to protect its boundaries in order to remain fully sovereign on its territory. This, however, does not imply fencing the territory but rather having the ability to ensure that borders can be closed, and movement can be effectively tracked. That is why the following values are proposed: full control; minor defects; major defects; complete inability to control.

State failure: There are many possible ways how to measure state failure all of them having larger or smaller problems regarding conceptualization and methodology.⁷⁰ Despite the many problems with the term failed state,⁷¹ the thesis will include the ranking as one of the categories as it points at some important systemic defects. The scale used will follow Fragile State Index (FSI) rating where every region will be judged according to the average value of the states included in it comparing data⁷² from 2017 and 2012 to present the longer-term trends as well as 2017 scores. Possible outcomes are: sustainable; stable; warning; alert.

State as a provider of social services: Provision of basic social services is one of the basic state functions (healthcare, social net, education, etc.). However, a state may stop providing these or simply lose control over their provision over time. The scale suggested is: fully competent provider/controlled and regulates privatization; parallel institutions; collapse/complete loss of control.

Non-state actors on a functional level: Another prominent symptom of the weakening of the state is a presence of non-state actors overtaking state functions. Here it must be pointed out that it is to some extent different whether state willingly shares its power (liberal approach) or whether it is unable to mitigate the impact of non-state actors. Values are thus as follow: no presence; willing sharing; overtaking; important/full presence of non-state actors.

Non-state actors on territorial level: As territory is the primary manifestation of the state's sovereignty, any actor operating on a territorial level and effectively challenging state's territorial control presents a direct challenge to the institution itself. Values are: no territorial competition; minor parts of territory out of effective reach; major organized territorial units present; large areas out of the reach of the central government.

A number of relevant political actors: Last but not least, a region with effective states will have only these as major power brokers while in case of less effective states' presence, other types of actors appear. We will differ among these situations: states as only actors; states are influenced by non-state actors; non-state actors as important brokers; state not effectively present in regional political dynamics. In a case the important regional bodies are not geographically overlapping with our selected regions, the issue will be dealt with according to the local context.

⁷⁰ See (Cooley a Snyder 2015, Dingli 2013).

⁷¹ See (Ezrow and Frantz 2013, 15-43).

⁷² Data taken from <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/>.

Axis B

Use of violence: Crucial for the nature of the system is the amount and quality of violence conducted. No matter whether the state needs to use violence as to preserve itself, civil war is raging, or a non-state actor attacks the population, this use of violence significantly pushes the region towards the Chaotic Anarchy part of the spectrum.

Values selected for this sub-factor are thus: no/insignificant amount of mainly legitimate violence; manageable use of violence; a large amount of violent attacks.

Presence of armed conflict: As the violence is a crucial factor for the model, another factor that will help project it into the neomedieval model is added. Herein, the nature of armed conflict on the region's territory is diversified. Following units are used: no conflict; limited rebellion; full-blown rebellion; foreign intervention/limited civil conflict; unmitigated civil war/ethnoreligious conflict.

Provision of basic goods: To help place cases on a correct position, it is crucial to examine who in the given region provides basic social services and goods. As the provision by the state is examined on Axis A, state provision will here be seen as neutral as not to mingle with the outcomes: (post-)modern non-state actors; combined; state; traditional actors; no one.

Connection to global flows: Region that is set up in the post-modern Durable Disorder is to a larger degree connected to the global economy and the world of flows. On the other hand, Chaotic Anarchy is defined by very limited access to the gains of economic globalization mainly via illegal flows. Values are: fully connected; limited connectedness; minimum connection.

Intraregional openness: Post-modern world is defined by a high level of interdependency and interconnectedness so the Durable Disorder scenario is to be expected to establish such norms that will allow free flows of capital, movement, and goods as to provide the smoothest possible economic transactions. Also, with the role of state significantly weakened, many barriers fall. Values picked for this sub-factor are thus: high level of openness; limited openness; closed border regime; lack of openness due to collapse of mutual relations.

The strength of regional bodies: Another defining factor of Durable Disorder is an enormous power of regional organizations that overtake part of the functions usually connected with the institution of state. The scale is: political union; economic union; free trade area; no effective regional body.

Nature of non-state actors: Whether non-state actors successfully utilize violence is of great importance for the stability of the system. The more violent the region is, the closer it gets to the Chaotic Anarchy part of spectrum. Variables are thus: peaceful nature; limited amount of violence; violent nature.

Spread of weaponry: Finally, we move to the issue of spread of weaponry. As noted earlier by J. Grygiel, the proliferation of firearms is one of the reasons many parts of the world resemble pre-modern era (Grygiel 2013). It is crucial that the actual number is not as significant as the ability of regulative institutions to limit this spread. The analysis thus distinguishes these values: low spread of weaponry; spread limited by state; state unable to properly control spread; unregulated high proliferation.

As evident, different sub-factors are divided into the different number of values, some of them will thus provide more precise differentiation than others which is also mirrored in the operationalization of the various factors. Some of the factors deemed more important are given larger total values as to differentiate among more and less determining variables. Selection of different scales is also aiming to distinguish among different distances between neighbouring positions, as actual difference of impact between for example presence of territorially bounded non-state actors on a state territory and presence of large areas of lawlessness is for our purposes much more significant than distance between the impact of free trade area and establishment of the economic union. The following table presents values given to different sub-factors.

Table 3 - Operationalization


Sub-Factor	Values	Operationalization of values
<i>Regional dependence on outside agents</i>	independent; minor foreign aid; major foreign aid; direct humanitarian intervention; occupation	3; 1; -1; -2; -3
<i>Border control</i>	full control; minor defects; major defects; complete inability to control	2; 1; -1; -2
<i>State failure</i>	sustainable; stable; warning; alert	2; 1; -1; -2

<i>State as a provider of social services</i>	fully competent provider or regulated privatization; parallel institutions; collapse/ (almost) complete loss of control	1; 0; -1
<i>Non-state actors on functional level</i>	no presence; willing sharing; overtaking; important/full presence of non-state actors	2; 1; -1; -2
<i>Non-state actors on territorial level</i>	no territorial competition; minor parts of territory out of effective reach; major organized territorial units present; large areas out of the reach of the central government	3; 0; -1,5; -3
<i>Number of relevant actors</i>	states as only actors; states are influenced by non-state actors; non-state actors as important brokers; state not effectively present in regional political dynamics	2; 1; -1; -2
<u>Use of violence</u>	no/insignificant amount of mainly legitimate violence; manageable use of violence; large amount of illegitimate violent attacks	2; 0; -2
<u>Presence of armed conflict</u>	no conflict; limited rebellion; full-blown rebellion; foreign intervention/limited civil conflict; unmitigated civil war/ethno-religious	3; 0; -1; -2; -4

	conflict	
<u>Provision of basic goods</u>	(post-)modern non-state actors; combined; state; traditional actors; no one	2; 1; 0; -1; -2
<u>Connection to global flows</u>	fully connected; limited connectedness; minimum connection	2; 0; -2
<u>Intraregional openness</u>	high level of openness; limited openness; closed border regime; lack of openness due to collapse of mutual relations	2; 0,5; 0; -1
<u>Strength of regional bodies</u>	political union; economic union; free trade area; no effective regional body	2; 1; 0,5; 0
<u>Nature of non-state actors</u>	peaceful nature; limited amount of violence/combined; violent nature	2; 0; -2
<u>Spread of weaponry</u>	low spread of weaponry; spread limited by state; state unable to properly control spread; high proliferation	2; 1; -1; -2

In the empirical analysis, cases will be placed into the research triangle according to the values they receive, and their final position will determine their location in the neomedieval model. A hypothetical case that receives final score of -8; -11 will thus approach Chaotic Anarchy; -10; 13 Durable Disorder; and 12; 1 the Westphalian system. Cases will be therefore divided into groups that are close to one of the poles – Westphalian world with cases scoring 0 - 15; 17 - -15; Durable Disorder 0 - -15; 17 - 0; and Chaotic Anarchy 0 - -15; 0 - -15. These three groups will then serve as a basis for the following analysis. Figure 2 presents operationalization in the research triangle.

Figure 2 – Visualization of operationalization



5. Distribution of the three worlds

The following chapter aims at the introduction of the map crudely presenting the distribution of the three modes of the geopolitical setting across the globe. The aim of this exercise is to test the usefulness of the application of the neomedievalist model. It will also serve as a basis for the final analysis of the international dynamics in this configuration. To this end, the previously selected criteria on the regions are applied.

5.1. Regional analysis

5.1.1. The EU+

The first set of criteria begins with the dependence on the outside actors. Despite the fact that the EU is the largest economy in the world,⁷³ the region is in no small extent reliable on NATO for its defence. Out of the 35 (including Vatican) countries included in this category, 24 are members of the defence organization⁷⁴ that is dominated by the USA that provides the most significant part of the total spending of the alliance.⁷⁵ Despite the economic strength and otherwise independent policy-making, it is essential to establish, whether the strong US presence on the old continent presents a sort of dependence or not. This is a somewhat tricky issue, but in this text, the solution is that it does not consider continent to be dependent as it provides an important market for the USA and has its capabilities including the nuclear weapons and UN Security Council seats. So, despite the fact, that the US presence makes the continent's defence more viable and stable, and the post-American Europe would find itself in a more uncertain security environment, the first criterion is understood as independent (3).

The issue of border control is of dual nature – country level (influenced by Schengen agreement) and the outside borders. Leaving microstates aside, out of the 31 states in the selected region 26 are members of the Schengen area,⁷⁶ leaving only the UK, Ireland, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria out. This area is characterized by the abolishment of the internal borders establishing an area of free movement of people,

⁷³ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/The_EU_in_the_world_-_economy_and_finance

⁷⁴ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm.

⁷⁵ <https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/us-pays-2214-nato-budget-germany-1465-13-allies-pay-below-1>.

⁷⁶ See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/schengen_brochure/schengen_brochure_dr3111126_en.pdf.

goods, and capital. Nevertheless, the Schengen countries have the ability to close their borders in case of a crisis – e.g., the recent migration crisis - and from time to time exercise this right quite successfully.⁷⁷ The establishment of the internal free movement regime thus does not qualify as a breach of the border control principle. The second issue, however, to a certain degree does. Regional external borders are hardly guarded mainly due to the complicated geography connected primarily to the long coastline of Europe. The issue was highlighted by the inability of the EU to control the migration wave that took place as a consequence of the protracted Syrian civil war. Given the limited ability to intern and vet the refugees, the region proved that it lacks proper ability to control its borders. The issue, however, also proved that the shortcomings of the border protection are manageable inside the region and that countries are to a reasonable degree able to mitigate them. The final result is thus "minor defects" (1). State failure is, in FSI methodology, not a significant issue for the regional countries, except for Cyprus due to the Northern Cyprus issue. In 2012, the average score was 38,6, and in 2017 it fell to 36,2. Summed up, the score is 37,4 – stable (1).

The EU+ region is globally known for the high level of social services it provides to its population. Basic healthcare systems and insurance is available in all of the countries and is even established on an EU level by the institution of the European Health Insurance Card.⁷⁸ European countries provide many other benefits in areas like maternal leave, unemployment support, education (some parts of Europe provide free education on all levels), or pensions. Some parts of the service provision are privatized but states set standards of the quality and have reasonable control over the most of the advanced and all basic services that are offered to the population as a part of the goods provision and establishment of the social net (1).

The issue of non-state actors on a functional level is somewhat complicated. We can observe that different non-state actors play an important role in economy and society. There is also a number of think-tanks, newspapers and other private enterprises that are directly affecting the political sphere. It can be argued that Europe in many respects follows suit described by D. Rothkopf as presented in chapter 3.3.2. Non-state actors thus play an important role but arguably can still be regulated by state institutions

⁷⁷ More on Schengen at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm

⁷⁸ See <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=559>

– e.g., Volkswagen emission scandal.⁷⁹ So despite their strong, mainly economic, presence, their role can be best described as sharing the functions with state (1). Looking at the issue of territorial non-state actors, the selected region, so far, does not have any territories out of the state control with the occasional exception of parts of the largest cities like Parisian suburbs. These territories are, nevertheless, not posing a challenge to the state institutions. There are also no successful territorial non-state actors challenging the state institutions present in any part of the region (3).

Looking at the last issue, we need to assess the role of the EU structures as an independent power broker, as well as the position of the private commercial organizations on the politics of the region. First, it is hardly speculative whether one can understand the EU structures as an independent body or as a follow up of the national governments. While looking at the issues crucial to the analysis, it is observable that the basic state functions are still primarily based on state level (police, army, right to close borders, power to declare state of emergency, etc.) but also that the EU structures follow the national principle in most of its decision-making. More problematic is the role of the EU towards the other regional actors who must negotiate with the entity as a whole. The EU thus has its bargaining potential in the intraregional politics, but the role of states is still strong enough. Looking at the other issue, the role of corporations on some bilateral and multilateral treaties is visible, but their influence is in the most important topics over-run by the EU (e.g., Google and the right for privacy⁸⁰) or state interests (e.g., sanctions against Russia following the Ukrainian crisis). In sum, this factor is awarded as influenced by the non-state actors (1).

Moving to the second set of factors, it is necessary, to begin with, the use of violence. Despite the recent surge in the number of terrorist attacks inside the region, the number of killed is still rather low in comparison to the other regions⁸¹ and mostly legitimate. There is no inter-state armed conflict taking place, and the amount of people dying in violent incidents is low.⁸² The EU+ thus receives score (2). This factor is connected to the second variable – presence of conflict. The score is no conflict (3). Turning to the less security-oriented factors, the provision of basic goods in the region

⁷⁹ See <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772>.

⁸⁰ E.g., <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-eu-privacy/google-under-fire-from-regulators-on-eu-privacy-ruling-idUSKBN0FT1AZ20140724>.

⁸¹ See for example <http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/violence/by-country/>.

⁸² Hear for example http://www.rozhlas.cz/plus/interviewplus/_zprava/utoky-v-evrope-je-duvod-k-panice-evropa-neni-epicentrem-nasili-odpovida-politolog-ditrych--1636057

is primarily a responsibility of states or is regulated by states (0). The whole region is fully connected to the global system of flows and establishes one of the centres of the globalized economy (2). A level of intraregional openness is high (2). Placing the region inside a regionalist framework is a daunting task. Given the scale selected, we can easily see that the European project overcame the free trade area phase, but the selection of a proper conceptualization is slightly problematic. This is mainly due to the issue of the uneven integration of different parts of the selected region into different integrative projects on the European continent. The problematic can be illustrated on the various membership of countries in structures like the EU, Schengen area, the Eurozone, or the Nordic Council. Nevertheless, the region will be awarded (1).

The final set of factors includes the nature of non-state actors and the spread of weaponry. Despite the fact that the threat of terrorism inside the region is growing, many far-right groups establish their militias and many criminal organized groups operate in the region. It must be concluded that the nature of the vast majority of the non-state actors in the region is so far peaceful. This is especially true following the end of the armed struggles by groups like the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Red Army Faction (RAF), or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (2). The issue of weaponry proliferation is two-fold. On the one hand, there is the overall high amount of weapons present on the continent. Despite the fact that the exact numbers differ, many regional countries are ranked as the most proliferated states in the world (e.g. (Karp 2007)). On the other hand, vast of majority of these weapons are licensed and legally own so the factor is ranked as spread controlled by state (2).

5.1.2. Balkans

The second region comprises of the remaining Balkans countries – Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. Kosovo is for the purposes of this chapter not considered to be a state as it is still too intimately connected to the Serbian politics and its open status plays a vital role in the regional dynamics. The issue of the foreign intervention is two-fold. First, there is sizeable monetary support by the EU that since the 1990s helped the region to progress in economic and social terms (the summary can be found in (Huliaras 2011, 422-426)). The second issue is connected to the direct foreign intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is a de facto protectorate, and Kosovo that hosts international military and civilian mission. The

outside influence in the region is thus significant and is for the whole region ranked as major foreign aid (-1).

Border control variable shifted in the recent years. Despite the fact that the countries had their issues with border control throughout the 1990s and 2000s (first as a consequence of the civil war and following as many non-state groups operated across the whole region), the current migration wave put the entire border system under enormous pressure and after initial collapse of the border regime, the countries were able to facilitate a reasonable degree of border protection. Nevertheless, the countries were able to react and the except for the Kosovo border that is out of the Serbian control to reasonable degree established effective regulations. Border control thus shows only minor defects (1). FSI ranked the region in average on 68,7 in 2012 and 65,1 in 2017. This means the score of 66,9 – warning (-1).

Despite the fact that the provision of the social goods is not as developed as in the case of the EU+, the regional states is reasonably capable to take care of the basic social functions of its population⁸³ (1). The issue of non-state actors on functional level is to a large degree connected to the presence of the organized crime in the region.⁸⁴ The issue is mostly intertwined with illegal drug trade and human trafficking with the follow-up issue of corruption. There is also a limited but growing influence of the radical Islamist groups, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸⁵ The variable is thus ranked as (1) as the actors do not wish to overtake the state functions, only to make the space for their criminal activities, or are yet incapable of doing so. The related issue of the territorial non-state actors is ranked as (-1,5) due to the presence of significant Kosovo enclave that presents a substantial territorial unit out of the state control. Despite its wide recognition⁸⁶ and state-like status it still displays an important derogation as Kosovo is not admitted as the UN member and fully independent and in no small degree still dependent on foreign support (situation to some degree shared by Bosnia and Herzegovina). Finally, as for the first part of the analysis, we can feel somewhat strong presence of the international organizations as brokers in the region (mainly the EU (whose conceptualization is ambivalent), or NATO). These are,

⁸³ See for example http://www.socialwatch.eu/wcm/national_reports.html

⁸⁴ See https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Balkan_study.pdf

⁸⁵ See <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/islamic-state-presence-in-bosnia-cause-for-concern-a-1085326.html>, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/radical-islamists-see-an-opening-in-bosnia/273633/>.

⁸⁶ Current level of recognition is presented at <https://www.kosovothanksyou.com/>.

however, not non-state actors in their right so this variable is given score (1) as the influence of Kosovo and some other non-state actors like violent non-state actors or NGOs affect the regional policy.

Moving to the second axis, the first variable is the use of violence. The Balkans is well known for occasional outbreaks of localized violence as exemplified, for example, by the 2016 attacks in Kosovo parliament,⁸⁷ or other usually unnoticed outbursts connected to politics, ethnicity, or more recently the migrant crisis. The variable is, nevertheless, scored (2) as the comparative use of violence is in global context after the violent 1990s still low. Given the presence of armed conflict, the region has been largely stabilized. After the end of Yugoslav civil war and stabilization of situation in places like Kosovo and Macedonia, the variable can be given at (3).

The next set of factors includes the provision of basic goods, in case of Balkans, mainly connected to (unrecognized) states (0) and connection to the global flows. This link is increased mostly thanks to the influence of the neighbouring EU. Most of the economic cooperation is related to the European space, but the overall connection can still be ranked (2).⁸⁸ Level of an intraregional openness is ranked as limited (0,5) as many barriers are decreased mainly due to the influence of the EU, while some regions (e.g., Kosovo) and issues (e.g., migrant issue) prevent the region from a higher level of connectedness. The issue of regional bodies is ranked (0) as the ultimate aim of all countries in the region (with certain ambiguity in case of Serbia) is the admission into the European structures.

The issue of the nature of non-state actors currently active and relevant in the region is hard to assess unambiguously. The Balkan region is well-known for its spread of criminal organizations or activities of particular terrorist cells, while on the other hand many NGOs are present, mainly connected to the regional development (Rossi 2015). Nature of non-state actors is thus ranked as combined (0). Finally, the issue of spread of weaponry is rated as (1) based on the research by Small Arms Survey (2014).

5.1.3. East Europe

Two countries of Moldova and Ukraine face difficult position *vis-à-vis* their neighbourhood. Both states have parts of their claimed territories carved out with an

⁸⁷ <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-parliament-idUSKCN0VZ26F>

⁸⁸ See, for example, data from <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/>.

important presence of Russian forces taking place. Following the Maidan Revolution, Ukraine became a major target of different humanitarian and development aid programmes,⁸⁹ Crimea is under Russian occupation, and Eastern Ukraine is heavily influenced by Russian politics and *de facto* controlled by local militias/Russian forces. Similarly, Moldova is a recipient of important foreign aid.⁹⁰ Given the different nature of foreign intervention in various territories of the selected region, we award the first category (-1). Border control issue is connected to the inability of both Ukraine and Moldova to control their respective Eastern borders. The criterion is awarded (-1) – major defects. Countries' FSI scores were in average 73 in both years while both countries showed utterly opposing dynamics – Moldova towards stability while Ukraine on the contrary. The resulting score is warning (-1).

State functions are in both cases taken care of very problematically. First, there is an apparent lack of provision of state functions by Ukraine and Moldova on territories of Crimea, Donbass, and Transnistria. Second, even the functions in places under the state's control, this provision is somewhat problematic, while in a global comparative perspective still present. It is thus awarded (0) as the presence of parallel structures is rather strong. Presence of non-state actors on the functional level is rather strong. This is mainly observable in case of Ukraine and strong penetration of oligarchs into politics. This penetration corrupts the whole political, economic and social structure of the country. Another example of the significant importance of the non-state actors on functional level is a high level of influence of Sheriff company in Transnistria (Całus 2013). The factor is awarded (-1). Non-state actors on territorial level constitute a significant issue of the region with presence of self-proclaimed Transnistria, Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, and Crimea as an occupied territory. The region thus holds major territorial units present (-1,5). Last, but not least, all of the above-mentioned non-state actors are very influential in regional negotiations and politics in general. States are thus apparently not the only power brokers (despite the fact that most of these non-state actors are connected to Russian interests) and the factor is awarded (-1).

The issue of the use of violence is diverse. Area of Eastern Ukraine is undergoing a violent conflict with varying levels of violence used. Rest of the region is

⁸⁹ E.g., <http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-jaresko-10-billion-foreign-aid/27512149.html>

⁹⁰ E.g., <http://us-foreign-aid.insidegov.com/l/115/Moldova>,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/neighbourhood_policy/moldova_en.htm

rather quiet. The region is thus awarded an overall (0). This issue is intimately connected to the next factor. The region is currently facing one case of violent civil conflict (Eastern Ukraine) and three instances of foreign intervention (Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Transnistria). Presence of armed conflict is thus awarded (-2). Provision of basic goods is also different across the region. In areas controlled by the state, the state remains the most important facilitator of the goods no matter the origins of these. In war-torn Eastern Ukraine, the provision of goods is, in general, very problematic. Transnistria is, as noted earlier, *de facto* controlled by Sheriff and Russia and Crimea by Russia, who claims sovereignty over the region. The final grade is thus (-1).

The connection of both Ukraine and Moldova to the global flows is limited but getting stronger as the two countries re-orient their economies towards the EU⁹¹ following the Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine. The factor is currently limited (0). Given the issues on the East and attempts to protect the borders from the side of the EU on the west, we can safely claim, that the interregional openness is limited by the closed border regime and the presence of territories out of the state control (0). The region does not harbour any efficient regional organization (0). Nature of the non-state actors can be seen as combined (0) – oligarchs aim for power, Eastern Ukrainian rebels with Russian aid use violence to create a separate instable zone on the Russian borders, and Transnistria attempts to govern its territory without creation of the unnecessary hostilities *vis-à-vis* its parent state. The spread of weaponry issue is also double-edged. First, it must be pointed out, that the area of Eastern Ukraine is flooded with arms as a consequence of the armed conflict taking place there.⁹² In the other parts of the region, the spread of weaponry is average to other regions in its neighbourhood.⁹³ This factor is thus awarded (-1) as the issues of the uncontrolled proliferation in regions out of effective state control are very grief.

5.1.4. Russian space

The region of the Russian space is in this work defined as Russia and Belarus as the two allied and interconnected states with their power-centres in Europe. Looking at the issue of regional dependence, we have to award (3), as the region is independent on

⁹¹ See https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/international-affairs/international-customs-cooperation-mutual-administrative-assistance-agreements/georgia-republic-moldova-ukraine_en.

⁹² See <http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-flood-of-arms-east-conflict-smuggling/27797454.html>

⁹³ See <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/moldova>,
<http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/ukraine>

foreign aid and there is no foreign intervention taking place. As for the second criterion, the border control is ranked as (1), minor defects, mainly given the sheer length of Russian borders and a limited ability to control the Siberian part of the borders. On the other hand, an ability to protect borders at the most exposed parts like in the Baltic countries or the places of conflict (Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), Russian troops are in control of the border lines. FSI ranked both countries on average 76,9 in 2012 and 75,8 in 2017. In this period Russia's score increased while the one of Belarus went down. The average is 76,3 – warning (-1).

The state is the full provider of services (even if of disputable quality⁹⁴) (1) and non-state actors at the institutional level are either sharing or persecuted (1) – issue in no small degree connected to the power of oligarchs. Ever since the end of the Chechen wars, there are no challenging territorial non-state actors (3). Finally, the state can be seen as the only relevant actor on the regional scene, as the important non-state actors that influenced policy were incorporated into the state structures or marginalized (2). These actors mainly comprise of oligarchs and insurgents in places like the Northern Caucasus.

Regarding the second set of criteria, the use of violence is limited, and the acts of violence are usually conducted mainly by the Russian governmental forces or pro-Russian government elements in the society, and the same goes for Belarus (2). The presence of a major conflict in the contemporary region is non-existent (3). Provision of basic goods is done by the state (0), and the connection to the global flows is limited, mainly due to the political reasons. On the one side, the region is a major exporter of natural resources, on the other, it is a target of sanctions and cuts itself from the foreign influence by, among others, censorship of the internet (0). Border regime in the region is closed (0). Both states are united in the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite its many problems, it is still ranked as an economic union (1). Nature of the non-state actors must be understood as combined (0). This is mainly due to the presence of pro-governmental militias in the Caucasus (Souleimanov 2015), actions of pro-regime groups against the opposition figures, or presence of terrorist and criminal groups. The issue of gun proliferation is somewhat problematic and is awarded (1) despite the problems of the state to tackle the spread of weaponry in some regions and among some groups. The

⁹⁴ E.g., <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-health-care-is-dying-a-slow-death-45839>.

general number of weapons among the population is understood not to be extraordinary or higher than among other countries of the wider region.⁹⁵

5.1.5. The Caucasus

Caucasus region is defined as comprising of the three post-Soviet countries of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The issue of dependence on foreign actors varies. Part of Georgia is under direct Russian occupation (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), and Armenia is mainly dependent on foreign aid from Russia as well. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is economically rather stable, despite the presence of Nagorno-Karabakh region on its territory. As even Georgia receives foreign aid,⁹⁶ mainly from its Western partners, this factor is awarded (-2). Border control has minor defects (1) as both Georgia and Azerbaijan do not control all of their claimed borders but can enforce the *de facto* borders with the secessionist entities. The region was ranked with an average FSI score of 78,9 in 2012 and 74,6 in 2017, totalling score 76,8 – warning (-1).

Provision of the basic services is at least to a relevant degree controlled by a state except for the *de facto* states' territories (1). The issue of non-state actors on a functional level is not a grief one (1), but the issue of territorial units is (-1.5). There are three established *de facto* states inside the region – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite the fact, that they differ in their composition, effectiveness, level of democracy, etc. (O'Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal 2015), they are all capable (with outside support) of denying their parent states access to their territory. As for the importance of non-state actors as regional power brokers, this last factor is awarded (1) as the *de facto* states present important actors affecting the regional policy-making but they are to a large extent controlled by the interests of the Russian Federation – a state actor.

The use of violence in the region is primarily connected to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict where occasional shootouts appear.⁹⁷ This accounts for a manageable use of violence (0). After a settlement of the Georgian separatist issues by force, the presence of armed conflict is awarded (0) – limited rebellion. Provision of basic goods is once again granted (0) as these are provided either by a state or state-like units.

⁹⁵ <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/russia>, <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/belarus>

⁹⁶ E.g., <https://www.usaid.gov/georgia>, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/eu-neighbourhood-region-and-russia_en.

⁹⁷ E.g., <http://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-Karabakh-heavy-fighting-armenia-azerbaijan/27649973.html>.

Connection to the global flows is limited, mainly given geography, autocratic type of governance in Azerbaijan and to a certain degree in Armenia and the internal problems (0). Intraregional border regime is closed (0), and there is no effective regional body present (0). Important non-state actors use limited amounts of violence (0), be it *de facto* states or criminal gangs, etc. Finally, the issue of spread of weaponry is limited by state (1) with the regulation most effective in Azerbaijan.⁹⁸

5.1.6. Central Asia

The Central Asian region is delimited by the post-Soviet "Stans" – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The issue of dependence on foreign actors is mostly connected to the reliance on profit from sales of natural resources in cases of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. There are also some forms of foreign assistance to the remaining two countries⁹⁹ but the most important path of foreign intervention is via political, economic and security influence and/or dependence from Russia and increasingly the PRC. The region is thus ranked (1). Given the large areas the countries claim control of and the high level of illegal trade passing through the region (Kupatadze 2012, 140-152, Cornell 2007), the border control can be assessed as having major defects (-1). According to the FSI, the stability of the region increased throughout the last five years from 81,4 in 2012 to 77,1 in 2017. This makes an average of 79,3 – warning (-1). The provision of social services is usually not restricted to weak or authoritarian states but is also largely provided by illicit means (Asia Today 2016). Significant amount of services that are traditionally connected to state is also provided by different non-state actors (Ziegler 2015, 137-196). The factor is ranked (0). Similarly, the non-state actors on the functional level can be seen as overtaking not only because of the provision of basic services but also due to the significant presence of different mafias and illicit economy actors¹⁰⁰ (-1). There is currently no significant territorial non-state actor present (0). Regional policy dynamics is mainly dominated by state actors (countries geographically located in the area plus Russia, China, the USA, European countries) with some influence by non-state actors which is, however, not so important (2).

⁹⁸ <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/georgia>, <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/armenia>, <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/armenia>

⁹⁹ http://amcu.gki.tj/eng/images/FAR-2014/foreign_aid_for_tajikistan_in_figures_en.pdf; [http://www.ecrg.ro/files/p2012.2\(1\)7y8.pdf](http://www.ecrg.ro/files/p2012.2(1)7y8.pdf)

¹⁰⁰ E.g., <https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/download/?id=78>.

The issue of the use of violence is problematic. The state actors being mainly authoritative regimes used the veil of war against terror to crack down on opposition and minorities. Also, the use of violence by organized crime groups can be seen as an issue. The region is thus ranked (0). The region currently undergoes no significant violent conflict (3). As noted earlier, the provision of basic goods can be rated as combined (0). The region has, mainly due to geographic and historical context, only limited connection to the international flows. This link is mainly established by penetration of the world markets via Russia or increasingly China (0). The border regime is closed despite much inefficiency in border control (0). There are no efficient regional organizations (0). The nature of non-state actors is dual – there are those providing the basic services in cases state is unable/unwilling to, and there are also violent actors like organized crime groups and terrorist organizations (0). The spread of arms is limited (1).¹⁰¹

5.1.7. Chinese space

The countries in the Chinese region are not dependent on the outside actors. North Korea is in this respect largely economically dependent on the external aid (coming mainly from China), but there is no direct foreign presence on its territory (3). Despite the enormous length of the Chinese borders, the country is to a relevant degree able to control the movement. Mongolia, on the other hand, lacks human resources to control its border effectively – this border is, nevertheless, not challenged (1). FSI scores decreased on average from 2012's 74,9 to 77,5 in 2017. This establishes a final score of 76,2 – warning (-1). The PRC can provide basic services with some deficiencies, while North Korea lacks an ability of even basic provision on a continuous basis. Mongolia in this respect once again faces an issue of enormously low population density (1). There are no major non-state actors on both functional (2) and territorial (3) level. States are the only main actors present in the intra-regional dynamics (2).

¹⁰¹ <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/uzbekistan>,
<http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/turkmenistan>,
<http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/tajikistan>,
<http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/kyrgyzstan>,
<http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/kazakhstan>, <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/central-asia>

The use of violence is quite high. Not only is the North Korean regime very repressive but also China is a world leader in capital punishment.¹⁰² This factor is thus ranked (0) as the violence is almost exclusively perpetrated by a state. The region does not face a major rebellion with the exception of the Xinjiang issue. However, there are many flashpoints in the region such as Tibet or the whole of North Korea. This factor is thus also awarded (0). Basic goods are in general provided by a state (0). The whole region is connected to the world markets mainly via China. The effect of closed North Korea and hinterland Mongolia are in this respect irrelevant (2). Region operates in a closed border regime (0). There is no effective regional body in the area (0). Non-state actors are either connected to state (e.g., large businesses) or in minority rebel movements like the one in Xinjiang. Violent non-state actors, however, remain successfully pacified in the most of the region (2). The spread of weaponry can be regarded as managed by the state with some exceptions in the Xinjiang region (1).¹⁰³

5.1.8. East Asia

In the next section, we are going to introduce the region of East Asia which is for this work delimited by countries of South Korea, Japan and *de facto* state Taiwan. Taiwan is included as it used to be fully recognized state and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council that lost its international recognition purely on a political basis without any loss of effectiveness. Unlike Kosovo, it does not affect its parent state as far as the selected criteria are considered. It is also geographically distinct. For this study, Taiwan (or the Republic of China) is attributed as a state inside this region.

The region is fully self-sufficient except for the security guarantees given to it by the US military (3). It also holds full control of its borders – in case Taiwan's claims for a mainland China territory are disregarded as *de facto* irrelevant - as these are either islands or the heavily militarised border between North and South Korea (2). FSI (not accounting for Taiwan) gives the region averages of 40,6 in 2012 and 37,8 in 2017 – in average 39,2 meaning stable (1). The state is a fully competent provider of basic services (1), and the non-state actors on the functional level are part of the system not opposing it in any significant way as evident from the position of Japanese or South

¹⁰² <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-international-perspective#interexec>

¹⁰³ <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/china>, <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/mongolia>, <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/north-korea>

Korean companies (1). There is no non-state territorial competition to states (3). Conceptualizing Taiwan as a state, states remain the only relevant actors in the regional politics (2).

Despite the threat coming from the North Korean military and nuclear programme, there are currently no significant levels of violence (2). There is no conflict taking place (3), and state is the primary provider of basic services (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows (2), and the level of intra-regional openness is also high (2). The region is currently dealing with the establishment of the free trade area (0,5). Nature of the non-state actors is peaceful (2), and the spread of weaponry is low¹⁰⁴ (2).

5.1.9. South East Asia

South East Asia is in this work defined by the membership in ASEAN organization. States in the region are mainly independent on the outside actors (3). Border control is characterized by minor defects primarily connected to the massive waves of migration arriving into mainly Indonesia and Malaysia mostly from Myanmar (Thom 2016) (1). Level of state fragility overall decreased from 75,3 in 2012 to 72,7 in 2017. The average score is 74 – warning (-1). The state is to a relevant degree able to provide basic services (1), and non-state actors on a functional level are usually cooperating except for the insurgency movements in places like Myanmar (ethnic and religious minorities¹⁰⁵), the Philippines (connected to IS and historical struggle¹⁰⁶), or Indonesia (ethnic and religious minorities¹⁰⁷). Another problem in this respect is connected to the effects of drug trafficking (Cornell 2007) or piracy¹⁰⁸ (0). The same goes for the presence of territorial non-state actors that control some territory like Shan or Kachin in Myanmar, or Islamic uprising in Mindanao, the Philippines (0). Due to this factor, the actions of states are to a certain degree affected by the non-state actors (1).

Due to the proliferation of violence in places like Myanmar and Philippines, the next factor is awarded (0) despite the fact that large swaths of the region are otherwise rather calm. Region undergoes a period of full-blown rebellions in places like Myanmar,

¹⁰⁴ E.g., <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-38365729>.

¹⁰⁵ E.g., <http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-rohingya-insurgents-myanmar-creates-its-own-frankenstein/>.

¹⁰⁶ E.g., <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/world/asia/marawi-philippines-isis-civilians.html?mcubz=0>.

¹⁰⁷ E.g., <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-human-tragedy-of-west-papua/>.

¹⁰⁸ E.g., <http://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait/>.

the Philippines or Indonesia (-1) and the provision of basic goods is combined (0). The region is with exceptions of some sub-regions fully connected to the global flows (2), and the level of intra-regional openness is of limited openness (0,5). ASEAN is based on economic integration without political ties. It is in this respect a somewhat successful organization (0,5). Nature of non-state actors is, as noted earlier, combined (0). States in the region are unable to effectively limit the spread of weaponry (-1) which is manifested in the ability of armed rebellions and other violent non-state actors to challenge the state institutions.

5.1.10. Oceania

The tenth region covered in this work comprises of Australia, New Zealand, and the smaller Pacific Ocean states. The region is entirely independent except for the non-sovereign territories¹⁰⁹ located in the Pacific Ocean (3). The states generally provide a high level of border control (Dickson 2015) (2). FSI score moved from an average 67,2 to 65,9 with Australia and New Zealand showing much better record than average. The overall rating is 66,5 – warning (-1). States are generally capable of a provision of basic services with the exception of minority cases like East Timor (1), and the non-state actors can be described as willing and sharing (1). Non-state actors on the territorial level can be summed up in the case of Bougainville which is, however, currently peaceful and in the process of transition to independent statehood (Baar 2017) (3). States are the chief actors in the intra-regional development (2).

There is no significant amount of illegitimate violence taking place (2), nor any significant armed conflict (3). States are in general providers or facilitators of basic services (0), and the region is fully connected to the global flows (2). The region is mainly closed (0). There is no important regional organization (0). The non-state actors are mostly peaceful (2), and the spread of weaponry is limited efficiently (2).¹¹⁰

5.1.11. Indian Space

The region is to a reasonable level independent on the foreign support (1), and the border defects are just minor (1) with the most substantial issues related to the lower capacity of the smaller states to control their frontiers and many border disputes of India

¹⁰⁹ Examples include American Samoa, Guam, French Polynesia, Niue, New Caledonia, or Tokelau.

¹¹⁰ E.g., <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/australia>,
<http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/new-zealand>

with mainly China and Pakistan.¹¹¹ State failure has been ranked at 87,6 in 2012 and 84,1 in 2017 making an average of 85,4 – warning (-1). Provision of basic social services is far from ideal, while the basic functions are to some degree provided (0). Presence of the functional non-state actors can be awarded as average (1). After the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the only significant semi-territorial actors remain in Kashmiri bid for independence and localized insurgencies in Indian periphery (0). The most important actors are states while to some degree influenced by non-state actors such as regional movements in India or in the near past Maoist guerrillas in Nepal (1).

The use of violence is manageable (0). There is no significant armed conflict taking place in the region, while some smaller issues are related to the ethnic tensions in Bangladesh,¹¹² regional disputes in India¹¹³ or political instability in Nepal¹¹⁴ (0). The main, if not always capable, provider of the social goods is the state (0). The region is in general connected to the global system of flows (2). The region is defined by limited openness (0,5), and there is no effective regional body present (0). Non-state actors, in general, use a limited amount of violence (0) – there are many economically oriented important actors as well as secessionist and terrorist organizations in place. The spread of weaponry can be deemed as quite high with states unable to adequately control the spread (-1).¹¹⁵

5.1.12. AfPak

The so-called AfPak region is one of the areas that remain in the spotlight of the international community. Afghanistan for a protracted period hosts foreign forces while Pakistan depends on the foreign aid from the US and China (-2). Border control is characterized by major defects with the border running through the Paschtun region practically invisible (Synnott 2009). On the other hand, the Pakistani-Indian border is heavily militarized and hardly penetrable (-1). The region is rated rather high in the FSI. In 2012 the average score was 103.8, while in 2017 it decreased to 103.1 mainly due to the improvement of the situation in Pakistan. The average score is thus 103.5 – alert (-

¹¹¹ See for example https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm.

¹¹² E.g., <http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2015/06/bangladesh-indigenous-ban-worse-apartheid-150616134617804.html>.

¹¹³ E.g., <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/05/sight-india-bloody-maoist-conflict-170508120738882.html>.

¹¹⁴ E.g., <http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/nepals-unending-political-instability/>.

¹¹⁵ E.g., <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/20/world/la-fg-india-guns-20120221>

2). Both countries lost most of the ability to provide social services¹¹⁶ with the situation being better in Pakistan (-1). Non-state actors in many parts of the region overtake the state functions (-1) with the most prominent actors being Taliban in parts of Afghanistan and historically Afghan warlords that to some degree interact with the state institutions while keeping a high level of independence (Mukhopadhyay 2014). The same actors control large swath of land especially in the northwest of Pakistan and peripheral regions of Afghanistan (-3). Non-state actors as thus in effect important power brokers (-1) – especially Taliban and local warlords in Afghanistan.

There is a significant amount of illegitimate violence being used (-2) and a long-running ethnonationalist conflict in both countries (-2). The conflict itself has an international dimension added via a presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and penetration of the international terrorist groups into the region to name a few. Goods are in large parts of the region provided by the traditional actors and Taliban (-1). Connection to the global flows is limited (0). Intra-regional openness is determined by the collapse of the border regime between the two countries (-1). There is no effective regional body (0). The local non-state actors are in large very violent and aggressive (-2) and have access to abundant amount of weaponry (-2) that was pouring to the region in high quantities since the 1980s.

5.1.13. Iran

Iran is mainly independent with a meaningful possibility of foreign assistance blocked in the past by the application of international sanctions connected to the Iranian nuclear programme, support to groups deemed as terrorist and testing of rocket systems (3). Control of borders is high even given the problematic geography and demography (Marshall 2015, 116-119) (2). Scores for the FSI in 2017 is 85.8 and in 2012 89.6. The average is thus 87.7 – warning (-1). The state is to a relevant extent relatively capable provider of basic functions. This provision differs throughout the territory and in relation to the extent of sanctions imposed. Limitations in a provision of basic goods were manifested in 2017/18 protests that took place inside the country (0). There are no important non-state actors on functional (2) or territorial¹¹⁷ (3) level. The state is the only relevant actor (2).

¹¹⁶ See for example (Thruelsen 2010).

¹¹⁷ For the discussion over the Iranian secessionist groups see (Czulda 2017).

The use of violence is mainly legitimate (meaning state-based) with some problems stemming from regions like Balochistan and Sistan (Czulda 2017) (2), and there is no serious armed conflict taking place on the Iranian territory (3). Provision of basic goods is mainly connected to state institutions (0). Iran's connection to global flows is primarily limited by the international sanctions connected to its political and military activity (0). The issue of intraregional openness is irrelevant given that the region is defined by just one country, but it can be substituted with its relation to the surrounding countries. In this case, the factor can be graded as closed border regime (0). There is no effective regional body in place (0). Nature of non-state actors is mixed between peaceful like different commercial or local actors and rebellious in regions like Balochistan and Sistan (0). The spread of weaponry is quite high but still manageable (1).¹¹⁸

5.1.14. Turkey

Next region is also defined by only one country – Turkey. Turkey is a relatively independent on the foreign actors. The example of the foreign aid provision is connected to the EU financing related to the Turkish settling of the Syrian refugees¹¹⁹ (3). Turkish border control is affected by minor defects connected to its restive southern border (1). FSI highlights a trend towards decreasing stability in Turkey. In 2012 the score was 76.6, while in 2017 it raised up to 80.8. The average is 78.7 – warning (-1). The state is quite a relevant provider of social services with exceptions in hinterland (mainly Eastern) regions (1). The most important alternative actor on a functional level is an army. However, the army itself can be hardly described as a non-state actor. The second important actor, Kurdish PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or the Kurdish Worker's Party) is a semi-territorial group operating inside Kurdish regions in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The issue of functional non-state actors is thus awarded (2) as PKK does not overcome any important state functions, and territorial groups are ranked (0) as the group's operations are capable of making some parts of territory hardly accessible for the Turkish state institutions. State operations are to some degree affected by the non-state actors (1), not only PKK but also other groups that affect the country mainly since the beginning of the civil war in Syria and Iraq.

¹¹⁸ See <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/iran>.

¹¹⁹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413>.

The country is defined by manageable use of violence (0). There is a limited rebellion taking place in Kurdish separatist movement (0). Basic goods are provided mainly by state (0). The country is fully connected to the global flows (2). The border regime is closed (0). There is no effective regional body that Turkey is member of (0) despite its long-term (fading) interest in joining the EU and NATO membership which does not influence the country's sovereignty in the sense of sovereignty pooling. Despite the presence of PKK and other radical elements in the country, the Turkish non-state actors' relation to violence can be assessed as combined (0). Even PKK was repeatedly willing to follow ceasefires (White 2015). The spread of weapons can still be seen as limited by state with a possible change to less stable situation in connection with the ongoing Syrian war and a potential penetration of the Turkish territory by violent non-state actors (1).

5.1.15. Larger Mesopotamia

Countries of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq became a symbol of instability. They face direct intervention from countries inside and outside the Middle East (Iraq since 2003, Syria since 2011, Lebanon for different periods of time) (-2). They are unable to control most of their borders (-2). State failure rating raised from 2012's 94,9 to 2017's 101,4 making average 98,1 – alert (-2). The state is unable to provide basic services to a majority of population (-1) given their institutional weakness and incapacity to control territory. Many state functions on large swaths of land are overtaken by non-state actors like Hezbollah¹²⁰ or Kurdish political institutions (-2). Large areas are also controlled by these and more radical groups like Daesh (mainly in the period 2014-16) or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (-3). Non-state actors are also important brokers in the regional politics (-1).

When it comes to the use of violence, the whole region is for a protracted period of time a centre of massive atrocities and loss of lives (-2). The region is in the midst of a violent civil conflict (Lebanon is highly unstable since civil war in the 1980s (Norton 2007), Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003 and Syria since 2011 (Byman 2015)) (-4). The basic goods are provided on a minimal level and only in limited areas (-2). The region has a limited connection to global flows (0) – mainly via the oil sales and human migration. The region is incapable of cooperation due to collapse (-1), and there are no

¹²⁰ See (Avon, Khatchadourian and Todd 2012).

effective regional bodies (0). Non-state actors are pre-dominantly violent (-2). The spread of weaponry is high and unmitigated (-2).

5.1.16. Gulf Monarchies

Gulf monarchies are generally independent, basing their power on wealth coming from the oil drilling. The only exception is a form of security guarantee given to the countries by the US military (3). The countries in the region can generate full control over their borders (2). Level of state fragility in the Gulf was in 2012 57,2 and 55,8 in 2017. This set the region as stable (1) with 56,5 on average. The states are full providers of basic services for its citizens that are also one of the leading sources of regimes' legitimacy (1). Non-state actors on both functional and territorial level are either incorporated into the state structures/cooperating with a state (large companies) or forced out of the region (jihadist groups (Hegghammer 2010)) (2), (3). States are the only relevant actors in the region as they are so far able to force the non-state actors into the surrounding regions (2).

The region is not witnessing any significant degree of illegitimate violence (2). There is no significant armed conflict taking place (3) while the regional actors are involved in conflicts in places like Syria, Yemen or Libya. Goods are provided by the state (0). The region is, with occasional restrictions of information flows, fully connected to the global flows. This connection is crucial for the wealth of the region either regarding the selling of the natural resources or import of work labour from other regions (2). The intraregional system is closed (0). There are no effective regional bodies present – despite some common forums being set up to deal with some particular issues like the oil production or security (like Gulf Cooperation Council) (0). Non-state actors use limited means of violence (re-occurring terrorist attacks, violent protests, etc.) (0). The spread of weaponry is high with the countries able to somehow control the spread (1).

5.1.17. Western Middle East

The three countries located in the region – Israel, Jordan, and Egypt – can be called partially independent. The most visible foreign assistance can be found in

military support for the regimes¹²¹ (1). The border control has minor defects (1). The average FSI score in 2012 and 2017 was the same 82.5 – warning (-1). In all cases, we can assess the provision of basic services as parallel. Israel is the most capable actor. However, part of its territory is to some degree governed by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas (0). There are important actors challenging the state on the functional level – mainly the Islamic opposition (-1). The only important territorial non-state actor is Palestine divided between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Another problematic region is the northern part of the Sinai peninsula (-1,5). Non-state actors influence the regional relations, but the central power still goes with states (1).

Use of violence is medium and can still be considered manageable (0). Conflict in the region can be in terms of this work's methodology best described as a limited rebellion (Palestine, Sinai) (0). Basic goods are mainly provided by (*de facto*) state entities in combination with post-modern (NGOs) and traditional actors (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows (2). The border regime is closed (0). There is no effective regional body (0). The region hosts a combination of violent and peaceful non-state actors. Some of them have their military and civil wing (e.g., Hamas) (0). States are unable to adequately control the spread of weaponry as evident from places like the Gaza Strip or Sinai peninsula, or as manifested by terrorist attacks in all three countries (-1).

5.1.18. Northern Africa

As the region usually understood as Northern Africa is too extensive for this study, it begins with examination of its first part in which Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, and Niger are included. Some of the countries are directly affected by the foreign agents – be it attempts to use some of the sides of the Libyan conflict for their strategic interests¹²² or to end the South Sudanese civil war. Also, Chad and Niger are recipients of some form of foreign aid (Griffin 2016) (-1). Border control is usually at a very low level mainly due to the small efficiency of the state apparatus, complicated geography of the region and existence of nomadic trade and smuggling routes in the area (-2). FSI ranks the region in average at 103.5 – alert (-2) – with scores of 101.4 for 2012 and

¹²¹ E.g., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-statement/u-s-israel-sign-38-billion-military-aid-package-idUSKCN11K2CI>, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/obama-signs-law-increase-military-support-jordan>, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-usa-aid/u-s-military-aid-for-egypt-seen-continuing-despite-rights-concerns-idUSKCN0T22E520151113>.

¹²² E.g., <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/libya-from-intervention-to-proxy-war>.

105.5 for 2017. The state is almost completely unable to present basic social goods to its population all over the region (Hicks 2015) (-1). There is an important presence of non-state actors on both functional (nomadic tribes, alternative governments, ethnic militias) (-2) and territorial (connected to different civil conflicts) (-3) level. As examples, the actors like the Islamic State in Libya, competing Libyan governments, rebels in Western Sudan and South Sudan or other jihadist groups in Chad and Niger might be presented. Non-state actors are important power brokers in the region (-1).

The region witnesses widespread utilization of illegal and illegitimate violence (-2). The region oscillates between mitigated and unmitigated civil war and ethnopolitical conflicts with the latter being true in the majority of the region (Libya, Sudan, South Sudan) (-4). Basic goods are usually missing (-2), and the connection to the global flows is very low (-2). Intraregional relations are mainly defined by a collapse of the ability of the states to cooperate (once again less visible in more effective Niger and Chad) (-1). There is no effective regional body present (0). The predominant nature of the significant non-state actors is violent (-2). The region is a zone of high unsanctioned spread of weaponry (-2).

5.1.19. North-West Africa

Next region comprised of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania is located in the western part of the Sahara desert. States are to a relevant degree supported by the foreign powers – especially in a case of Mali with direct military presence of mainly French army with additional presence of the EU and UN troops (Wing 2016) (-1). Given the problematic geography and limited power of state institutions, the border control is limited (-1). The estimated level of state fragility grew from 78.8 in 2012 to 82.5 in 2017. This makes an average of 80.6 – warning (-1). States in many areas fail to provide basic services while not losing their ability altogether (0). There are important non-state actors on both functional (-1) and territorial (-1,5) level. Non-state actors like Tuareg movements or radical Islamists are important power brokers (-1).

The region witnesses a significant amount of illegitimate violence that is, however, to a certain degree managed by either local state or foreign actors (0). The region is an area of irregular conflict mainly against local jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb or Ansar Dine (Solomon 2015) (recently merged into Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin') (-1). The state is the primary provider of basic goods where applicable (0). The region has only limited connection to the global flows (0). Region

attempts to handle a closed border regime, that is however impossible due to the local geography (-1). There is no effective regional body present with an attempt to establish regional security cooperation in G5 Sahel¹²³ (0). The nature of non-state actors is predominantly violent (-2). There is a high spread of weaponry unsanctioned by states – issue that worsened after the fall of Kaddafi regime in Libya and return of his Tuareg soldiers to Mali¹²⁴ (-2).

5.1.20. Horn of Africa+

Next region comprises of wider Horn of Africa to which Yemen is added as having more in common with the African countries than the likes of Saudi Arabia or Oman. Many of the countries are facing direct intervention (Somalia, Yemen) or are recipients of a large amount of foreign aid (-2). Border control shifts between major problems and absolute inability to control (-1). Level of state failure according to the FSI methodology reached 99.2 in 2012 and grew to 102.5 in 2017 with average score 100.9 points – alert (-2). The state is generally very weak in provision of social services even in cases where the state institutions do not face a total collapse (-1). There are important non-state actors on a functional level supplementing in many places state functions (e.g. (Menkhaus 2006/7)) (-2). Large areas are furthermore out of the state control with examples of Al-Qaeda or Houthi controlled regions in Yemen, large swaths of Somalia, etc. (-3). Non-state and *de facto* state actors are important power brokers (-1).

The region undergoes large excesses of violent attacks (-2) and civil conflict accompanied by foreign interventions (-2). Provision of basic goods out of governmental bases is provided either by alternative pre-modern actors or by no one (-1) – the state is better functioning in Ethiopia while being completely missing in Somalia with the rest of the cases located somewhere between these two. Connection to the global flows is limited at best (-2). Mutual cooperation is lacking due to the widespread state collapse (-1). There is no effective regional body (0). Significant amount of non-state actors is violent (Al-Shabaab, AQAP, Houthi movement, etc.) (-2).

¹²³ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security>.

¹²⁴ E.g., <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-for-rebellion-in-mali.html?mcubz=0>.

The proliferation of weapons in the region is high and mostly unsanctioned as documented by existence of many violent non-state actors across the region (-2).

5.1.21. East Africa

Moving further south, we can identify the region of East Africa. The region has minor dependence on foreign agents, especially in the form of humanitarian and military assistance (1). The border control has minor defects mainly in connection to bordering Somalia and central African region (1). Level of state failure is measured as stable growing insignificantly from 92,4 to 92,5 between 2012-17. The final rank is thus alert (-2). States can provide basic services to a relevant degree with some exceptions especially in remote areas (0). There is only minor presence of non-state actors connected mainly to Al-Shabaab and some minor rebel groups (1). There are no significant areas out of state control with possible exceptions in north-east Kenya and refugee camps (3). States are, nevertheless, influenced by some tribal and other non-state actors (1).

The use of force is manageable and mainly oriented against the violent non-state actors operating in the region (0). Despite some incursions from bordering regions, there is no significant armed conflict taking place in the countries (3). Provision of basic goods is connected mainly to state (0). The region is becoming fully connected to the global flows via high-speed internet¹²⁵ and trade (2). Regional politics holds limited openness (as illustrated by the attempts to establish East African Community (EAC¹²⁶)) (0,5). Despite the attempts to establish some form of regional cooperation, there is no effective regional body in place with EAC holding potential to change this in the future¹²⁷ (0). Nature of non-state actors is mixed (0). The ability of states to limit historically high and geographically determined spread of weaponry is limited (-1).

5.1.22. Central Africa

The region of central Africa is quite profoundly affected by the foreign intervention. Be it a direct military presence of forces from places like Chad or Uganda or the United Nations missions connected to the many local and transregional conflicts

¹²⁵ <http://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-rwanda-telecoms-idAFJJOE72F07D20110316>.

¹²⁶ <http://www.eac.int/>

¹²⁷ D. Bach, a leading expert on African regionalism, called the grouping as having the largest potential to establish an effective framework from all African regional organizations on his November 2017 lecture in Prague.

and violent non-state actors (Carayannis, Lombard and Marchal 2015) (-2). Regional countries are in most instances unable to control their borders as well as most of their territories (-2). FSI ranked the region with 93.2 points for 2012 and 95 points for 2017. This establishes an average of 94.1 – alert (-2). The state is generally unable to provide basic services to the most of its population (-1). There are important non-state actors on both functional (-2) and territorial (-3) level (e.g., DRC rebels, Seleka movement, Lord’s Resistance Army, etc.). States are only one of the regional power brokers (-1).

Region undergoes a period of large sustained violence dating back before the era of decolonization (Marshall 2015, 79-97) (-2). In many places the region witnesses a full-blown civil conflict coupled with multiple foreign interventions (issue especially visible in a case of the Democratic Republic of Congo) (-4). The provision of basic services is usually missing (-2). The connection to the global flows is also very low and based on the economic exploitation (-2). Mutual cooperation is impossible due to small capacity of states (-1). There are no effective regional organizations (0). The non-state actors are in many instances violent, be it separatist movements, ethnic militias or other violent non-state actors (-2). The spread of weaponry is very high and unmitigated (-2).

5.1.23. South Africa

Next region is widely defined space mostly economically connected to South Africa. As such the region has only limited levels of foreign aid (1). Border control can be characterized by minor defects (1). A level of state failure in the region was ranked as 79.8 in 2012 and 81.3 in 2017. This means an average of 80.5 – warning (-1). The capability of states to provide basic services is limited and usually weak in the peripheral regions (0). Non-state actors are generally not threatening with the exception of gangs and other forms of criminal organizations¹²⁸ with a history of civil war throughout the region (1). There are no large regions under control of territorial non-state actors – issue solved after the end of the Cold War proxy civil wars. Some regions, nevertheless, still hold some separatist tendencies¹²⁹ (3). States are the major power brokers (2).

¹²⁸ E.g., <https://www.vice.com/sv/article/4wbyqg/stars-stripes-and-blood-south-africas-most-notorious-gang-is-called-the-americans>.

¹²⁹ E.g., https://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics--power_on-the-line/2012/10/20/separatist-movement-spreading-like-wildfire-in-zanzibar.107928541-BRE.

The level of violence is manageable and connected mainly to the issue of criminality (0). There is no armed conflict taking place with only limited rebellions in some peripheral regions (3). Provision of basic goods is mainly connected to state or limited (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows – mainly through South African economy (2). The region has a closed border regime that it quite successfully enforces (0). South African Development Community is established, and its membership consists of most of the regional states. In 2008 this organization established a free trade area around much of the region¹³⁰ (0,5). Non-state actors do not usually use violence on a mass level (0). States are unable to properly control the spread of weaponry (-1).

5.1.24. West Africa

Remaining African region comprises of the western African states not included in other regions. As a region troubled by civil wars and internal conflicts, the level of foreign aid is quite high with direct involvement especially in fight against Boko Haram and developmental aid in the most of the region (-1). Borders manifest major defects in many parts of the region (-1). According to the FSI data, the overall level of state failure in the region is quite steady. In 2012 the average score was 89,5, and in 2017 it rose to 90. These give an overall score of 89,7 – warning (-1). The degree of a provision of services by a state is different across the region but overall rather problematic (0). Non-state actors on functional level are quite important. Be it NGOs helping develop the region or private military companies providing security (McFate 2014). Also, traditional and other local non-state actors play an important role (-1). On territorial level, the most prominent example of the non-state actor challenging the state supremacy is Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. Nevertheless, areas under sustained non-state control are on the regional level only limited (0). Non-state actors are important power brokers (-1).

The region undergoes major periods of high illegitimate use of violence (-2). The region experiences a period of full-blown conflict (-1). The provision of basic goods is divided between state in some areas and local actors in the rest (-1). Connection to the global flows is limited and mainly of economic nature (0). The issue of border regime and mutual cooperation is rather problematic due to the inability of states to control their territory (-1). Despite the presence of the Economic Community of

¹³⁰ <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/>.

West African States, we cannot speak of a fully functioning regional organization yet (0). The nature of non-state actors is combined with NGOs and state-supporting organizations and violent non-state actors located around the region (0). States are unable to properly manage the spread of weaponry (-2).

5.1.25. North America

The region defined by territories of Canada and the United States can be characterized as independent on outside forces (3). Despite the recent hysteria regarding the need for increased border protection, in comparative perspective, the region holds full control over its borders (thanks to geography on the north and high state capability on the south) (2). FSI gives the region scores of 30.8 in 2012 and 29.1 in 2017 – average of 30 makes it fit into a category stable (1). Provision of basic services is provided or regulated by state with different effectivity in both countries (1). Non-state actors on a functional level are usually not challenging the state capacities or undermine its basic power – be it NGOs, large businesses or others (1). There are no non-state actors at the territorial level challenging the authority of state (3). The power holders in the region are states affected by large businesses and other actors described in the chapter dedicated to work of D. Rothkopf (1).

Use of violence is comparatively low (2). There is no armed conflict taking place (3). The provision of goods is combined between state and (post-)modern non-state actors (more prevalent in the US) (1). The region is fully connected to the global flows (2). Its border regime is partially opened – having weaker internal protection (US-Canadian border) while keeping strict control over outside borders (0,5). The region is part of the North America Free Trade Agreement (0,5). The non-state actors are predominantly peaceful (2). The spread of weaponry is medium and to a relevant degree sanctioned by state with the oversight in the US weak by design instead of incapacity (1).

5.1.26. Central America

Independence of Central America is to a significant degree historically limited by the geographic proximity of the USA (a similar connection to the of Central Asia to the Russian interests). Despite that, nowadays, the situation can be evaluated as minor foreign assistance (primarily connected to the aid with security) (1). Border control has major defects related mainly to illegal migration and smuggling of illegal substances in

combination with high level of gang violence¹³¹ (-1). Average FSI score for the region was 69.8 in 2012 and 68.4 in 2017. This totals 69.1 – warning (-1). The ability of states to provide social services is limited and in many places substituted by parallel institutions¹³² (0). There is an important presence of non-state actors on a functional level, mainly connected to the activities of gangs (-1). On a territorial level, the region does not witness presence of any important non-state entity with parts of the territories under the influence of criminal organizations without broader territorial ambitions (3). States are in their dealings influenced by the non-state actors (1).

The overall use of violence in the region is high and mainly connected to criminality and drug trade¹³³ (-2). Despite the high levels of violence, there is no civil or interstate conflict in place (3). Provision of basic goods is combined between state and in some areas criminal organizations (-1). The region is fully connected to the global flows (2). The region attempts to hold a close border regime (0). Beside Mexican participation in the free trade agreement with the US and Canada, there is no effective regional body (0). Non-state actors are mainly violent (-2). The proliferation of weapons is high (-2).

5.1.27. The Caribbean

Caribbean region is defined by a presence of many small island states and a significant influence of the nearby US. The foreign assistance can be rated as minor (1). Control of borders declares minor defects (1) mainly due to complicated geography and weakness of some of the states. FSI scores are to some degree affected by high level of state failure on Haiti, but due to the high number of countries in the region, the final score is representative. In 2012 it was 68.1 and in 2017 64.3 (for comparison, Haiti's scores are 104.9 and 105.3). The average for both years is 66,2 – warning (-1). The state is a leading but usually inefficient provider of the social services (0). Non-state actors on the functional level are often criminal gangs that, nevertheless, have only limited power inside some of the states (Grillo 2016) (1). There is no sustained territorial competition except for parts of the slums being controlled by the criminal gangs (3). States are the only relevant power brokers (2).

¹³¹ See <http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/tsearch?q=violence>.

¹³² See (Grillo 2016).

¹³³ <http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle/p37286>.

The amount of violence is large¹³⁴ but still not overwhelming (0). There is no armed conflict taking place out of the criminality issue (3). The provision of goods is divided between state and in some regions local criminal actors or gang structures (-1). Regional connection to the global flows is full (2). The region attempts to hold a close border regime (0). There is no effective regional body (0). Nature of the non-state actors can be best described as combined (with NGOs or Church on one side and drug gangs on the other) (0). Finally, states are unable to adequately regulate the spread of weapons around the region (-1).

5.1.28. Northern South America

The northern part of South America as defined for this work is the generally poorer part of the continent. It is thus a recipient of minor amount of foreign aid also historically connected to the Colombian internal conflict (1). Border control has minor defects mostly connected to the presence of armed guerrillas and criminal activities (1). According to the FSI data and methodology, a situation in the most of the countries in the region is either stable or improving. Large exception is Venezuela and to lesser degree Paraguay. In 2012 the average score was 76,4, and in 2017 it decreased to 74,4. The total score is thus 75,4 – warning (-1). Social services provision is mixed with Venezuela unable to establish the basic institutions and provide basic goods,¹³⁵ Colombia having alternative actors in place (Leech 2011) (despite the shift towards their disarmament and inclusion into the state structure) and others capable of service provision on different rates (0). Non-state actors on functional level present a combination of criminal gangs, relief organizations, and other local groups. Their strength is significant but arguably decreasing (1). With the peace agreement with FARC, the most significant territorial non-state actor is to disband. Only minor parts of territories of the countries in the region thus remain under some form of control of non-state actors (0). Non-state actors, furthermore, affect the local power dynamics but do not dominate it (1).

Use of violence is manageable (0). The situation in the region can be described as limited rebellion (0) with a potential for improvement. Provision of basic goods is mainly provided by states with some local and traditional actors stepping up in specific

¹³⁴ See for example <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41175>.

¹³⁵ <http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/01/09/508986586/as-venezuelan-go-hungry-the-military-is-trafficking-in-food>.

areas (-1). Connection to global flows is limited (0) – either involuntarily as in case of landlocked Paraguay or voluntarily as by the government of Venezuela. Border regime is closed (0). Paraguay is part of Mercosur, but most of the region is not part of any effective regional organization (0). Nature of non-state actors is mixed (0). The spread of weaponry is hardly controlled by states and is quite large (-1).

5.1.29. Southern South America

The southern part of South America as defined here can be perceived as a region independent of foreign aid (3). Border control shows minor defects mainly connected to the complicated geography (jungle, high mountain ranges, etc.) and length (1). Level of state failure in the region is similar to all countries but Brazil that is showing somehow higher scores. On average, the score for 2012 is 48.7 and for 2017 48.6 – total of 48.6 - stable (1). Comparatively speaking, states are quite capable of providing basic services (1). The presence of non-state actors is connected to big businesses and in some cases with criminal gangs establishing parallel institutions in peripheral parts of towns. In some areas, traditional structures also play role (1). On a territorial level, non-state actors are active mainly in suburbs of large cities which are mostly out of governmental control (Grillo 2016). Nevertheless, security forces are capable of penetrating these areas in case they need to do so (0). States are the only relevant regional power brokers (2).

Despite the issue of gang violence in some parts of the region, the amount of violence is quite low (except for Brazil¹³⁶) (2). There is no active armed conflict taking place (3). The state is a primary provider of social services with the slums without such services or locally provided supplements (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows (2). It holds a policy of limited openness (0,5). With the exception of Chile, all the countries are core members of Mercosur (0,5). Nature of non-state actors is combined (0). The spread of weaponry is (mostly) limited, again the except for the remote or excluded areas like slums (1).

¹³⁶ E.g.,

<https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/01/29/months-before-rio-olympics-murder-rate-rises-in-brazil/&refURL=https://www.google.cz/&referrer=https://www.google.cz/>.

5.2. Analysis

Table 4, Figure 3 and Map 1 and 2 present the outcome of the empirical part of the research. Map 1 presents static results closely following the results, while Map 2 presents dynamic results showing the probable shift of regions in the near future given the current situation in them. This model takes into consideration the major shifts in the regions and a potential of the regions to enter new or remain in the current geopolitical environments.


Table 4 – Position of regions

Region	<i>RD</i>	<i>BC</i>	<i>SF</i>	<i>SP</i>	<i>NF</i>	<i>NT</i>	<i>NR</i>	A	<u>UV</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>PB</u>	<u>CG</u>	<u>IO</u>	<u>SR</u>	<u>NN</u>	<u>SW</u>	B
EU+	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	<u>11</u>	2	3	0	2	2	1	2	2	<u>14</u>
Balkan	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1,5	1	<u>1,5</u>	2	3	0	2	0,5	0	1	0	<u>8,5</u>
E Eur.	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-1,5	-1	<u>-6,5</u>	0	-2	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	<u>-4</u>
RUS	3	1	-1	1	1	3	2	<u>10</u>	2	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	<u>7</u>
Cauc.	-2	1	-1	1	1	-1,5	1	<u>-0,5</u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	<u>1</u>
Cen. As.	1	-1	-1	0	-1	0	2	<u>0</u>	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	<u>4</u>
PRC	3	1	-1	1	2	3	2	<u>11</u>	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	1	<u>5</u>
E Asia	3	2	1	1	1	3	2	<u>13</u>	2	3	0	2	2	0,5	2	2	<u>13,5</u>
SE Asia	3	1	-1	1	0	0	1	<u>5</u>	0	-1	0	2	0,5	0,5	0	-1	<u>1</u>
Oceania	3	2	-1	1	1	3	2	<u>11</u>	2	3	0	2	0	0	2	2	<u>11</u>
Ind. Sp.	1	1	-1	0	1	0	1	<u>3</u>	0	0	0	2	0,5	0	0	-1	<u>0,5</u>
AfPak	-2	-1	-2	-1	-1	-3	-1	<u>-11</u>	-2	-2	-1	0	-1	0	-2	-2	<u>-10</u>
Iran	3	2	-1	0	2	3	2	<u>11</u>	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	<u>6</u>
Turkey	3	1	-1	1	2	0	1	<u>6</u>	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	<u>3</u>
Mesop.	-2	-2	-2	-1	-2	-3	-1	<u>-13</u>	-2	-4	-2	0	-1	0	-2	-2	<u>-13</u>
Gulf	3	2	1	1	2	3	2	<u>14</u>	2	3	0	2	0	0	0	1	<u>8</u>
West ME	1	1	-1	0	-1	-1,5	1	<u>-0,5</u>	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	-1	<u>1</u>
N Afr.	-1	-2	-2	-1	-2	-3	-1	<u>-12</u>	-2	-4	-2	-2	-1	0	-2	-2	<u>-14</u>
NW Afr.	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-1,5	-1	<u>-6,5</u>	0	-1	0	0	-1	0	-2	-2	<u>-6</u>
Horn	-2	-1	-2	-1	-2	-3	-1	<u>-12</u>	-2	-2	-1	-2	-1	0	-2	-2	<u>-12</u>
E Africa	1	1	-2	0	1	3	1	<u>5</u>	0	3	0	2	0,5	0	0	-1	<u>4,5</u>

Cen. Afr.	-2	-2	-2	-1	-2	-3	-1	<u>-13</u>	-2	-4	-2	-2	-1	0	-2	-2	<u>-15</u>
S Africa	1	1	-1	0	1	3	2	<u>7</u>	0	3	0	2	0	0,5	0	-1	<u>4,5</u>
W Africa	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	0	-1	<u>-5</u>	-2	-1	-1	0	-1	0	0	-2	<u>-7</u>
N Am.	3	2	1	1	1	3	1	<u>12</u>	2	3	1	2	0,5	0,5	2	1	<u>12</u>
Cen Am.	1	-1	-1	0	-1	3	1	<u>2</u>	-2	3	-1	2	0	0	-2	-2	<u>-2</u>
Caribb.	1	1	-1	0	1	3	2	<u>7</u>	0	3	-1	2	0	0	0	-1	<u>3</u>
NS Am.	1	1	-1	0	1	0	1	<u>3</u>	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	<u>-2</u>
SS Am.	3	1	1	1	1	0	2	<u>9</u>	2	3	0	2	0,5	0,5	0	1	<u>9</u>


Legend:

Figure 3 – Position of regions inside the research triangle




Dots mark position of different regions inside the triangle.

Map 2 – a neomedieval map – static



Map 3 – a neomedieval map – dynamic



Reading the results, we can observe specific dynamics that currently occurs inside the international system. Especially the outlook of the outcomes projected into the research triangle establishes the notion that the weakening of a state is connected to its move towards the Chaotic Anarchy part of the neomedieval spectrum, while the strong states shift to the other pole. It remains to be seen whether the three regions (EU+, North America, East Asia) that move most closely to the left – Durable Disorder – and potentially Oceania where similar development can be expected mainly due to the situation in Australia and New Zealand will in the future undergo a state retreat as

promoted by the neomedieval theory or whether their states keep their sustainably strong role in the regional geopolitical environment. Example of the possible divergence of the development of the environment is the EU+. In case of the strengthening of the supranational and common institutions combined with a process of privatization, the region might move closer to the Durable Disorder scenario. If the populist and nationalist voices grow stronger and more powerful, the region will be shifting back to the centre of the model. Similarly, would the US follow the liberalization and connectivity of the past decade, they are likely to move closer to the Durable Disorder part of the spectrum. On the other hand, a recent rebuff connected to the election of Donald Trump and his nationalizing and anti-trade initiatives might increase the opposing forces that would keep the US inside the Westphalian world. In Oceania, the future might bring a divergence between networking Australia and the New Zealand, and some of the Pacific Islands more closely following relationships and geopolitical logic of China. On the other hand, regions with a robust political centralization like Turkey, Iran or Gulf states are more likely to remain inside the Westphalian world.

It can be seen, that there are currently no regions firmly set inside the Durable Disorder environment. The two regions that appear in green on the static map are on the borders of the three geopolitical environments and constitute more anomalies shifting towards the Westphalian world rather than genuine transfer of their geopolitical environment towards post-modern networked and connected setting. Many regions are to some degree still following the Westphalian model with a visible shift towards either one or the other neomedieval scenarios. It seems that unlike the proposed model, states still ensure their dominance even in the liberal globalizing part of the world while choosing different strategy compared to those in the Westphalian world. Nevertheless, we may observe an important number of regions located clearly in the Chaotic Anarchy part of the spectrum. This distinction among the environments tending towards Durable Disorder, those holding to the Westphalian model, drifting to the Chaotic Anarchy, and witnessing Chaotic Anarchy is crucial for the following analysis of the adaptation of the political units and interaction among the different spaces.

The empirical analysis thus points to some crucial points in relation to the presented theoretical framework. The 1990s Eurocentric neomedieval literature is not corresponding with global reality. Even the European space is still empirically Westphalian, nevertheless with a potential future shift. There are specific qualitative

shifts inside the Westphalian world that set apart the closed and opened regions. Development of some sort of a Durable Disorder environment is still a bid for the future. Decreased capacity of state institution is connected to the decrease in stability and appearance of the Chaotic Anarchy environment.

6. Effects on the international system

The following chapter will present two issues that are connected to the previous analysis and sketch the consequences of the transformation of the global system. The chapter will present two interrelated topics – an adaptation of the political units on the changes in the system, and the interaction among different types of geopolitical spaces. In both parts, the overall trends and some examples are examined. The analysis looks at contemporary effects of the Chaotic Anarchy, the Westphalian system and regions heading towards the Durable Disorder.

6.1. Adaptation

Similar to the transformation from the medieval to the modern state system, the new political units will appear, and the old will have to adapt to the processes that shape their environment. Each of the environments will require different set of factors for the actors to survive and thrive. Every sub-chapter thus deals with one of the three geopolitical environments and the adaptations that allow political units inside them to effectively hold power or successfully survive. It will be argued that the shift of the EU+, North America, East Asia and (part of) Oceania towards the Durable Disorder scenario allows us to observe at least some of these effects, despite the fact that the empirical analysis established that in all of these three regions the state remains rather strong and these regions are in a transition period rather than constituting a completely separate geopolitical environment.

6.1.1. Westphalian system

Seemingly, there is no need for the political actors to adapt inside the part of the world that remains embedded in a Westphalian state-based model. Nevertheless, even this space undergoes pressures and changes upon which a state that wishes to maintain its traditional central role must react. As noted earlier, modern state is defined by the centralized sovereign authority over a clearly demarcated territory. Any challenge to its sovereignty, territoriality or ability to centralize power is thus a direct challenge to a state as an institution.¹³⁷ States attempting to keep themselves inside the traditional

¹³⁷ As seen by a reaction on the process of cybernatization by so-called Balkanization of the Internet in places like China (Schmidt and Cohen 2013, 67-75).

Westphalian setting must thus react to effects of such factors as globalization, regionalism, cybernatization and state failure.

In reality, two types of reaction towards the process of globalization and regionalism can be witnessed among the capable and centralized states – acceptance and defence. Those states that accept these trends slowly move towards the Durable Disorder scenario, those who attempt to defend themselves against (at least part of) these developments try to maintain in the Westphalian framework. The next chapter will deal with the former option. The latter option will be demonstrated on the cases of Russia and China. On other point taken here is that the states must also avoid a slip to the Chaotic Anarchy - the possible survival strategy is to be examined on a case of North Korea.

The first factor that must be taken into consideration is a reaction to globalization. As noted at the beginning of this work, globalization is a multifaceted issue. We can distinguish, among others, political, cultural and economic globalization (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5). Political globalization is connected to the issue of growing interrelations among political actors and growing strength of the intergovernmental organizations and global governance thus directly challenging the central authority of the nation-state (Steger 2009, 58). Cultural globalization refers to the increase of cultural flows (as music, movies, languages, etc.) among different parts of the planet (Steger 2009, 71). Economic globalization includes the growth of markets and interconnectivity of the various regional markets (Steger 2009, 38). States wishing to remain in their modern form and establish a region characterized by the modern international system will approach each of these forms of globalization differently.

Modern Westphalian states aiming to preserve themselves in a neomedieval era without the shift towards Durable Disorder must carefully operate between absolute disconnection from the world flows that would lead them towards instability and acceptance of the globalization that would increase the role of non-state actors and flows in general. This means that the neomedieval Westphalian states are more reserved towards political and cultural globalization while more integrated into (at least parts of) the global market. The Westphalian states do not disregard all the international organizations but see them as a way to propagate their goals rather than as transformative units (UNSC membership, establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization or former BRICS Development Bank).

The disconnection of the different parts of globalization among various political actors in the Westphalian environment is quite important. Looking at China, we can see that the country is connected to the benefits (as well as ills) of the economic globalization. It acts as a large manufacturer, shipping its goods all over the globe. It serves as a central node of some of the most important trading routes in the contemporary world. The most recent manifestation of this process is an establishment of the One Belt One Road initiative that aims to connect China with Central Asia and have Europe as its end-point. Despite clear geopolitical motives for the establishment of this project, it is also a manifestation of the need to connect the Chinese economy to new markets (Brewster 2016). On the other hand, China attempts to disconnect itself from other parts of the globalization – mostly visible in political domain and its efforts to downplay an existence of universal human rights or importance of Western-style democracy. One of the projects that manifests the issue is The Great Firewall aiming to censor the access to Internet from the Chinese territory as to minimize the impact of the free-flow of information on its population.¹³⁸ This approach of a controlled connection is evident in the Chinese strategy since the beginning of its opening to the global market in the end of the 1970s (Friedberg 2018).

Similar practices can also be identified in the Russian Federation. Russian budget is on the one hand heavily dependent on the export of natural resources,¹³⁹ on the other, the Russian political elites try to minimize impact of the outside influences on its "sovereign democracy."¹⁴⁰ This attempt is connected to turn towards more considerable authoritarianism as well as substantial reliance on conservative values. This all to differentiate the country from the liberalizing and interconnected Durable Disorder environment. Somehow different model is adopted by the political elite in North Korea. The country attempts to completely cut itself from the globalization forces and decrease its cross-border interactions to minimum. This is done via establishment of extremely closed authoritarian regime based on an existence of strong security forces. It chooses very aggressive survival strategy to remain in the Westphalian environment with a

¹³⁸ See <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/everything-you-should-know-about-the-great-firewall-of-china/slows-down-cross-border-internet-traffic/slideshow/59864430.cms>.

¹³⁹ See <http://www.factosphere.com/pubfinance/budget/budgetstruct>.

¹⁴⁰ See https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/sovereign_democracy_4104.jsp.

government firmly in control of the country. It thus presents an extreme version of willing disconnection from the globalized world.¹⁴¹

Dominant political actors inside the Westphalian environment thus aim at the different levels of disconnection from the enhanced globalization that arrives in connection with cybernatization. The level of this disconnection may vary and can dictate the success of this attempt. Among the actors that do not seek transfer into the Durable Disorder part of the spectrum, we can clearly witness efforts to limit effects of political and cultural globalization on their societies and strong incentive to focus on issues like sovereignty, territorial integrity,¹⁴² and non-interference (at least on a limited scale as observable from Russian actions in its "Near Abroad"). Actors in this level, nevertheless, operate under the shadow of a double threat. First, their need to operate on the global market may lead to further adaptation to the networking nature of the post-modern policy and bring the rigid regimes closer to the Durable Disorder scenario. Second, their attempt to disconnect themselves from the effects of globalization may send their economy into a collapse, and these countries may find themselves unable to control their territory and population. Reaction to the first might be selective disconnection (e.g., the Chinese Great Firewall), the response to the second is usually a more significant focus on the role of security services and foreign policy (e.g. Russian actions in Ukraine/Syria and systematic constitution of domestic perception of NATO as an existential threat, North Korean development of nuclear weapons and support for the police-state with large military forces). Finally, there are regions that willingly strive to shift to the interconnected post-modern environment – Durable Disorder.

6.1.2. Durable Disorder

Political actors moving into the realm of Durable Disorder need to amend their *modus operandi* to be able to fully exploit the opportunities arising from the new constellation and ameliorate threats that appear. Despite the fact, that this environment is so far only more a theoretical model than practice, we can observe some practical steps that are undertaken in regions closing to this geopolitical setting and analyse some of the processes that characterize the transformation that takes place.

¹⁴¹ For a discussion over the North Korean adaptation to the neomedievalism see also (Doboš 2013, 91-100).

¹⁴² As evident from laws strongly protecting territorial integrity that were passed in China (Tancredi 2014, 74) and Russia (Maleshin 2014).

As the environment is still in the process of shaping, we can mostly observe transformational processes that distinguish the regions from the Westphalian closed system – embracing globalization, enlargement without clear territorial limitation, and diffusion of functions and power. This all leads to the multiplication of a number of political actors on a local, regional and transregional level with both territorial and networking focus. All of these actors consequently need to adapt to the new realities or risk either dying out or returning to the Westphalian model that has been observable throughout several countries in the group of regions that closed themselves to the transformation to the Durable Disorder environment.

The first adaptations must come from the side of states that to a certain degree begin to lose their authority in many aspects of the decision-making. Nevertheless, they are still the prime holder of sovereignty and authority over means of violence. They also still serve as a primary creator and enforcer of the legal system. In this way, the state recalls the same institution from the Westphalian environment. The shift, however, lies in its embrace of globalization and willingness to pool its sovereignty with other like-minded state actors. This shift is manifesting in establishment of many different organizations with collective decision-making and enforceable rules (most prominently the EU) and opening of borders for different types of flows. The process is not straightforward (e.g., cancellation of the US participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership under the Trump administration) but the states realize that in order to adapt to the new environment defined by flows, globalization, and multiplication of relevant actors the focus on strictly defined territorial sovereignty and larger control of its political, cultural and economic system on purely domestic level makes them less effective. They, to a large extent, follow what A.-M. Slaughter calls Open Order Building where the institution of state must keep relevant in many functions (like security) but will have decreased impact on other spheres of social reality and decision-making (Slaughter 2017, 204-228).

An ability to operate on an independent level enables establishment of socio-political units and actors on sub-state or regional level. These actors address many issues no longer sanctioned by a state. The range of actors is broad, from cross-border initiatives to sub-state units, to cities, to civil society groups and covers a large number of topics. B. Barber (2013) in his work maps some of these efforts undertaken by cities. Nevertheless, the same can be written about other actors as well. As a case in point,

recent attempts of California in mitigation of the climate change can be highlighted – move that was conducted despite the fact, that the Trump administration since early 2017 undermines obligations pledged by the previous government.¹⁴³ This is unthinkable in states inside the Westphalian environment. Similar efforts are undertaken by groups and individuals empowered by the access to the cyberspace with global agenda promoting different goals and thus shape the nature of parts of the globalization. Economic globalization in this part of the world is increasingly dominated by large supranational organizations as pointed previously by D. Rothkopf (2008) and they play a balancing game with the local political units increasingly resembling the theorized Durable Disorder pillar system. The power of the state and the differentiation of the pillars is, however, still not far enough to talk about a fully developed Durable Disorder system.

On the international scene, the countries aiming for the networked model of existence attempt to increase their strength by sharing not by militarization. This cooperation is visible in all aspects of the international politics. In security provision, alliances and treaties centred on the US from both sides – be it NATO or the US guarantees for countries like Japan or South Korea – are a clear example. In economic cooperation, we can see unprecedented effort to harmonize market inside the EU and increased the amount of economic cooperation inside the newly emerging environment as professed by for now buried Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or successfully negotiated EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Regional actors also attempt to set the global regimes on issues ranging from trade (through the World Trade Organization) to the outer space utilization (European proposal of Code of Conduct). Unlike Westphalian states that cherish territorially defined sovereignty and are sceptical about many aspects of globalization, the regions moving to Durable Disorder part of a spectrum adapt to pooling of sovereignty, decreasing role of territoriality inside the region, utilization of soft power and networking to achieve some of the goals and cooperation in critical spheres such as defence. These tendencies are observable with different strength across these regions with higher US focus on sovereignty and higher level of pooling of the same inside the EU etc. The shifting regions are highly dynamic, and the pooling and

¹⁴³ See for example <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/california-climate-change-cap-trade.html>.

pillar creation is not a completed process. The future outlook from functional, territorial and security perspective is thus still not set.

What is also important for the adaptation of the political entities is the transformative nature of the environment. This shift from a clearly established Westphalian structure to the Durable Disorder characterized by lesser level of stability and hierarchy brings with itself specific issues. It can be argued that troubles connected to the stability of Euro as a currency or British exit from the EU are in sync with this trend. Also, the unwillingness of some parts of the EU to fully support some of its decisions (recently most notably connected to the refugee crisis) point at the uneven structure that is directly connected to the nature of the newly emerging space. Similarly, the backlash to globalization mirrored in the election of Donald J. Trump as the US president points at the issues connected to the similar transformation in North America. The change to a less hierarchical and orderly environment will not go without troubles, and it is not set that it will be completed. There are large portions of societies that are yet to adapt to the new networked globalized model of politics/economy and these parts of society are often feeling left behind supporting political streams opposing the shift towards the Durable Disorder. Nevertheless, the irregularities and backlashes are not signs of the dissolution of these spaces but the steady shift to the Durable Disorder scenario. If the EU was to establish a clear hierarchical federal state, this would mean a return back to a form of Westphalian model. The same would be true with the end of the pooling, sharing and networking processes among the regional actors.

6.1.3. Chaotic Anarchy

The third type of geopolitical environment political actors need to adapt to is the Chaotic Anarchy. As noted earlier, this kind of environment hosts numerous types of different political actors with state often playing no or only limited role. The main reason for the state existence is often keeping the head of state in power. This is often manifested in a lack of bureaucracy and state-capacity building by rulers who fear that capable state institutions would challenge their power (Reno 1998). Many of the rulers act in a way that makes the binary nature of geopolitics – state/non-state – *de facto* irrelevant as the two establish a continuum with unrecognized self-centred non-state actors on one side, recognized state attempting to establish institutions on the other, and self-centred government not establishing institution while keeping sovereignty protection on the international stage in the middle. The nature and adaptations of these

actors, especially to the violent environments, widely differ (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot 2008, Staniland 2012). As an example, one may look at the development of the Chadian army. This previously ineffective force was made comparatively gradually robust due to the need of the ruling elite to protect itself against the attacks of eastern separatists capable of reaching the capital N'Djamena. Another reason was to protect the elite from possible *coup d'état* held by part of the army with lower level of commitment to the ruling clique (Hicks 2015, 16-38). This same army is currently capable of playing a part in efforts to contain Boko Haram forces in northern Nigeria. Similarly, Pakistan is dominated by Punjabi ethnic group, and the state institutions are predominantly established to keeping the members of this group in power (Bennett Jones 2009, 43-75, 226-290). Another region heading towards the Chaotic Anarchy environment is the Central America, where we can observe a retreat of a state as well. This retreat takes place in a face of the inability of the security forces to face growing power of narco-mafias thus protecting only limited portions of state's territory, while remaining able of limited incursions against the violent non-state actors without a capacity to hold on the territory for a protracted period of time (e.g. slums in large cities). We can clearly observe, that as the power of the state decreases it is not only unable to provide basic functions to its population, its level of territorial control will decrease and move closer to the seat of power. In case of the Central American countries that yet still did not enter the Chaotic Anarchy, this means reduced ability to control the whole territory at all time. For Pakistan, this means abandoning parts of its territory (North-West and part of Balochistan). In places like Mali or Afghanistan, the army controls capital, its neighbourhood and some strategic hubs. In places like Somalia, the centre of power needed to be temporarily moved out of country altogether. In some cases, like Sudan, the state forces rely on the utilization of violent non-state actors to provide power projection capability on its territory (Schneckener 2017).

This outcome leaves a power vacuum to be filled by different types of non-state actors that operate in different ways. A level of inclusion of various actors reflects the nature of a power vacuum left for them by the state and traditional actors. In this way, Al-Shabaab between 2009-11 successfully controlled large portions of southern Somalia, providing basic governance and legal framework for its population. It also conducted a basic economic activity connected to trade (mainly via port city of Kismayo), smuggling of sugar and charcoal around the Kenyan borders and other

activities. Al-Shabaab was also capable of conducting semi-conventional military activity against actors connected to the Somali government (Doboš 2016). Similarly, paramilitary groups in Colombia (despite not being ranked as in Chaotic Anarchy region, but in specifics on local level manifesting similar development unnoticed on a macro level) successfully control(led) large swaths of land inaccessible by the governmental forces to wage an insurgency and conduct drug production and trade operations.¹⁴⁴ The same can be repeated for many parts of the world where different non-state actors successfully filled territorial void left by state and traditional actors like in Syria-Iraq (Daesh), Afghanistan (Taliban), southern Lebanon (Hezbollah), Mali (Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine), and more. These actors need to adapt their strategies in relation to the opposition pressure caused by either domestic or external actors that to large degree decrease an ability of the non-state actors to hold territory. The nature of the operations of the violent non-state actors is also connected to their ability to establish some form of order among the population on the territory of its activity and nature of this order (Arjona 2016, 26-29). There are also non-violent non-state actors operating in the regions. Nevertheless, without the protection of some other actor, their reach is very limited, as can be presented on the case of Yemen and efforts to provide humanitarian relief to its population (Almosawa, Hubbard and Griggs 2017). Types of operation of different actors to a large extent resemble strategies of roving and stationary bandits as presented by Olson (1993).

There are also different ways of adapting to the local environment. These usually reflect the local environment and culture either in accepting or rejecting way. The former might be exemplified in a case of political marketplace as described by A. de Waal. A. de Waal convincingly argues that the political relations in the Horn of Africa reflect the money-services relationship and that possession of funds is key for any political actor to succeed in the area. A level of adaptation of different actors to this environment then determines their success (de Waal 2015). Another example is the attempt of Al-Qaeda affiliates to merge with a local population to receive acceptance and possibly dominate the local political environment (as exemplified by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Zimmerman 2017)). The later can also be illustrated by the Al-Shabaab attempts to dismantle Somali clan structure to strengthen its message of pan-Islamism and Somali nationalism (in its earlier phases) (Mwangi 2012, 514). The

¹⁴⁴ For an examination of the nature of the governance inside Colombia see (Arjona 2016).

similar process was observable in the Syrian province of Deir-e-Zour where the Islamic State attempted to weaken tribal structure by imposing strict Islamic rule, overtaking security provision and incorporating local population into its socio-economic structure (Heras, Barabandi and Betare 2017). There is also an interesting cooperation among market forces and Islamic movements taking place in places like Afghanistan or Somalia. This interaction appears to establish a mutually reinforcing novel proto-state type of social structures (Ahmad 2017).

As this kind of environment is the most complicated one, one may find many different forms of adaptations that took place in relation to the economic activity as well. Given weak law-enforcement mechanisms on ground and presence of nearby shipping lines, piracy was a large business in Somalia for a large part of the 2000s. Jihadist groups in northern Africa overtook old smuggling lines to help them finance themselves (Boeke 2016, Caulderwood 2015). In Afghanistan, Taliban tapped on the local production of opium and consequently heroin (Peters 2009). The whole jihadist movement in general, to name but one example, presents quite a varied financing streams adapting to the local environment (Neumann 2017). While the Durable Disorder pushes the political, economic and societal actors to operate in networked interaction with other actors and Westphalian system under the dominance of state, Chaotic Anarchy forces these actors to utilize the local environment. Actors do not need to adapt on rapid movement of globalization or sovereign dominance of state but historical, cultural, geographic, or environmental specifics of their area of operation. Actors operating in this environment are thus more liquid, filling the void left by stronger actors and avoiding their areas (both geographic and functional) of dominance. This liquid strategy is one of the critical factors influencing the strategies of different actors. In the absence of state power, the extended kinship structures sometimes provide the most reliable security structures (Hudson and Matfess 2017, 11-12) putting the traditional structures back into the central position in societies social and political life. Table 6.1 presents summary of this part of the study.

Table 6.1. – adaptations

<i>Environment</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Non-violent non-state actors</i>	<i>Violent non-state actors</i>
Westphalian	Disconnection, territorial protection	Submission to state	Anti-state struggle, state-controlled militias
Durable Disorder	Networking, privatization, attempt to dominate regulatory framework	Networking, functional and territorial specialization, survival of the fittest	Cooperation with state (private military companies), terrorism
Chaotic Anarchy	Limited protection of the power centre	Provision of basic functions, basic community bound	Liquid strategy

6.2. Interaction

In the following section, the interaction among the different types of spaces will be analysed. As we have seen in the development of the international politics of the past decade, the fault lines along the borders of the geopolitical environments as defined by the theoretical and empirical part of this work are deepening. Be it the troubling relation between the EU and Russia,¹⁴⁵ European reaction to the migration crisis,¹⁴⁶ or election of Donald Trump with his slogan about a beautiful wall,¹⁴⁷ there is increased evidence of a division in the global politics. The following section will hint at some significant issues in three dyads that logically emerge in the contemporary world as based on the above-researched theoretical model.

¹⁴⁵ E.g., https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en.

¹⁴⁶ E.g., <http://uk.businessinsider.com/map-refugees-europe-migrants-2016-2>.

¹⁴⁷ E.g., <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/25/donald-trump-wall-canada/100894606/>.

6.2.1. Westphalian-Durable Disorder

The first dyad to be introduced is the one between the Westphalian World and soon-to-be Durable Disorder. It has been empirically examined that no region is firmly embedded in the Durable Disorder. Nevertheless, as projected, some of the regions head towards the Durable Disorder future and exhibit some of the features that allow to present at least some interaction tendencies.¹⁴⁸ By looking at the map presented in the empirical part of the world, one can observe lines of contact in places like East Asia and Russian neighbourhood. The following section looks at these two regions of contact to briefly examine the selected strategies of the actors on both sides of the divide.

To begin with Pacific Asia, there is a clear observable division between the soon-to-be Durable Disorder region – containing Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – and the modern Westphalian North Korea and the People’s Republic of China. Despite the connectedness of both types of actors (besides North Korea, but including Westphalian Russia also included in the regional geopolitics even in a smaller degree) to the global trade network, their mutual relations remain edgy. Korean Peninsula is divided by almost impenetrable demilitarized zone. Japan holds many disputes with the PRC, Russia and North Korea. But while Japan and South Korea also have disputes among themselves, the strategic setting of the two camps point at the difference between this type of conflict and the ones along the line dividing the geopolitical environments.

The primary difference can be observed in a type of defensive postures both sets of actors utilize. While the PRC and North Korea aim at self-sufficient deterrent – a move most recently manifested by the North Korean nuclear programme -, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan share their defence with common (soon-to-be Durable Disorder) ally, the USA. This shared defence is a significant strategy for the emerging Durable Disorder environment that holds a potential to further increase a role of private actors in the future as well. This approach combined with this networking approach towards security lies in the heart of the predicted Durable Disorder defence and security logic. This is not to say that these nations do not establish their indigenous capabilities but they, for example, do not seek independent nuclear capabilities.

The defence policy is thus the best example to picture a difference between the nature of actors in these two environments. The example of Koreas exhibits a picture of a highly centralized military-oriented institution on the one side and a combination of

¹⁴⁸ That is the reason why “soon-to-be Durable Disorder” is used in this section.

effective military forces combined with the private initiative like the spread of information to the North on the other.¹⁴⁹ The case of North Korea is also an illustrative example of the different approaches of Westphalian states towards different types of actors. While the border to its southern neighbour is tightly sealed, its northern frontier is much more penetrable to all types of exchanges – both legal (trade) and illegal (migration). This concrete illustration is burdened by the historical baggage present in the region but remains the most visible realization of the divide in the international politics between the two types of environment presented in this subchapter.

The second set of actors worth looking at is the one defined by an interaction between Russia and the "West" – mainly Europe. The basic logic here remains the same – division. While in the North Korean case this division is based on clear geographical separation by border hardening process, Russia (given its geography¹⁵⁰) in recent decades prefers a strategy of shatter-belt creation. This strategy was already manifested in many regions on the Russian border like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine or Moldova and presents a *de facto* alternative to the situation on the Korean Peninsula even though not even closely as impenetrable. Geography (and history) once again plays a role – Koreas need tighter division due to their small area and closeness of population, economic centres and history of hot conflict; Russia attempts to prevent its neighbourhood from joining the Western structures, has largely unbounded geographical scale and history of imperialism. This shatter-belt creation comprises of setting up of unrecognized states like South Ossetia or Transnistria and destabilization of regions like the Donbas (Riegl and Doboš 2018).

The strategy of the Westphalian actors thus clearly follows the separation logic of their environment. On the other hand, the soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors seek to engage as many parts of the world as possible and enhance the post-modern networking logic around the globe. Examples of this can be found in the Sunshine policy of South Korea (Sundal 2014) that is to be replicated by the government elected in 2017, EU's Eastern Partnership,¹⁵¹ mediation of the Serbian-Kosovar conflict¹⁵² or other initiatives aiming at engaging regions outside the networking part of the world to bring them in –

¹⁴⁹ E.g., <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-23/fighting-north-korea-with-balloons/8834730>.

¹⁵⁰ See (Marshall 2015, 15-32, Kotkin 2016)

¹⁵¹ https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eastern-partnership_en.

¹⁵² E.g., https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-facilitated-dialogue-belgrade-pristina-relations_en.

thus following the logic of a neomedieval empire as described by J. Zielonka (2007).¹⁵³ While the Westphalian states aim at separating themselves from the spill-over effects of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment, the opposite strategy is the one of engagement and amendment of the Westphalian actors as to pull them inside the networked world. This is the case with the engagement of smaller states like Georgia or economically weaker countries like Ukraine, but also the involvement of NGOs in Russia (prevention of their activities is another show of separation logic¹⁵⁴), or informing of the North Korean public. In the relations between the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment and the Westphalian states, the selection of strategies reflects theorized nature of the actors.

6.2.2. Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy

The second dyad of actors is the one between the Westphalian world and Chaotic Anarchy. On the above-presented maps, few lines of contact between these two kinds of actors can be identified – mainly Russia/Ukraine, Saudi Arabia/Mesopotamia and Yemen, Turkey and Iran/Mesopotamia, India and Iran/AfPak, East and South Africa/rest of Africa, and potentially South and North America/Central America.

Despite the significant differences among these dividing lines, we can observe one re-appearing theme, an intervention of the Westphalian actors in the attempt to prevent the negative effect spill-over in one way and migration flow the other. Clearly, Russia/Ukraine node is different as the destabilization of Ukraine into the Chaotic Anarchy environment was initiated by the Russian intervention and strategy as noted above. Nevertheless, the flow of migrants from affected regions still takes place.¹⁵⁵ In other regions, the pattern seems to be observable, even though not uniform and not universally applicable on each and every case.

Saudi Arabia is directly involved in Yemeni conflict¹⁵⁶ and uses its proxies in the Syrian conflict and Iraqi power struggle (Phillips 2017), Turkey is militarily present in the northern Syria and Iraq and hosts around three million refugees from the

¹⁵³ A similar argument is also being developed in (Ferguson 2017).

¹⁵⁴ E.g., <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/russia-four-years-of-putins-foreign-agents-law-to-shackle-and-silence-ngos/>.

¹⁵⁵ E.g., <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-refugees/floods-of-ukrainian-refugees-seek-new-life-in-russia-idUSKCN0HW0UP20141007>.

¹⁵⁶ E.g., <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423>.

region.¹⁵⁷ Iran is largely involved in Mesopotamia via its proxies like Hezbollah or Shiites militias in Iraq (Jeffrey, et al. 2017). In Afghanistan, Iran historically supports some of the warlords in the western part of that country (Mukhopadhyay 2014). India with Pakistan presents a unique case of states that fenced their border in a way that their relationship does not follow the pattern. Nevertheless, there are increasing attempts of India to penetrate Afghanistan.¹⁵⁸ Afghans, on the other hand, fled to Pakistan¹⁵⁹ which reflects an era of enhanced stability of Pakistan that took place in history relative to the contemporary pattern that is dominated by the attempt to flee to other parts of the world. Westphalian interventionism, as a mean to prevent spill-over of negative effects, re-appears in Africa as evidenced by the intervention of the Kenyan Defence Force in the Somali conflict (since 2011) or by Burundi and Uganda (inside the African Union mission) forces in the same conflict. On the contrary, Kenya is an important settling location for the Somali refugees.¹⁶⁰

Let us look more closely at two archetypical cases - Turkey and Syria/Iraq and Kenya/Somalia. Turkey has a long-standing conflict with its Kurdish minority, especially the PKK (White 2015). As evident from the map 3 in amendments, Kurds are settled in areas not only in Turkey but also in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. For a longer period, Turkey to some degree cooperated with the representatives of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq who allowed the Turkish Army to penetrate its territory in its pursuit of the PKK members.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, People's Protection Units) that are fighting under the umbrella of the Syrian Defence Forces hold close ties to the PKK (Aras and Yorulmazlar 2017, Gunter 2017). This led to Turkish intervention in the Syrian conflict, an intervention Turkey long avoided despite many negative impacts related to the strengthening of the Islamic State on its borders. The so-called Euphrates Shield¹⁶² followed by support for the pro-Turkish opposition groups is a consequence of the interaction of the negative effects stemming from the Chaotic Anarchy environment on the Westphalian state. On the contrary,

¹⁵⁷ According to <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>.

¹⁵⁸ E.g., <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3437668/Why-India-remains-power-Afghanistan.html>.

¹⁵⁹ E.g., <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/213557-16-million-Afghan-refugees-still-in-Pakistan>.

¹⁶⁰ See (Rawlence 2016).

¹⁵⁶ (Riegl, Doboš and Landovský, et al. 2017).

¹⁶² <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/syria-euphrates-shield.htm>.

Turkey hosts an enormous number of Syrian refugees and was a target of numerous terrorist attacks, exemplified the opposite direction relationship.

The second case that is an archetype of the pattern of interaction among the two types of spaces is the Kenya/Somalia dyad. Kenya has been for a protracted period of time a place of settlement for Somali refugees given its proximity to the conflict regions, relative stability and a presence of historical Somali regions in the North-Eastern part of the country.¹⁶³ Kenyan forces entered Somalia in 2011 as a reaction to the increased threat posed by Al-Shabaab militias and an attempt to better integrate the frontier provinces (Doboš 2016, Anderson and McKnight 2014). Despite the mixed result of the intervention (re-appearance of Al-Shabaab, increase in the number of spectacular attacks on Kenyan soil), the strategy selected follows the above-mentioned pattern.

6.2.3. Durable Disorder-Chaotic Anarchy

Final dyad is the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment and the Chaotic Anarchy. The areas of contact can be identified as the European maritime frontier, border of the EU and Ukraine/Moldova, possibly the US/Mexico border will fall into this group as well. The dyad of the EU/Ukraine and Moldova constitutes a specific case as the border follows stable part of these countries and the destabilization is caused mainly by a foreign intervention that leads to an introduction of the different set of policies.

Soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors seek to introduce an interconnected, networked space of flows that would establish a basic logic of social, economic and political behaviour inside the space. This, however, does not reflect its policies towards its neighbourhood in a qualitatively different geopolitical environment. While, as presented earlier, soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors tend to spread their environment by incorporating actors from the Westphalian world, the approach towards Chaotic Anarchy is different – separation and stabilization.

Both reactions stem from the need to prevent spill-over of negative trends into a highly mobile internal environment of the networked societies. Separation is identifiable in the newly built/proposed border barriers that are aiming to prevent this form of spill-over. We are witnessing an appearance of this form of border barriers all over the world

¹⁶³ See (Rawlence 2016).

with a pattern at the above-identified fault lines. Spain protects its African exclaves Ceuta and Melilla as well as the maritime border,¹⁶⁴ numerous walls emerged as a consequence of the migration crisis on the Balkans, and one of the most vocal promises of Donald J. Trump throughout his presidential campaign contained establishment of border wall with Mexico. No matter the role or effectiveness of these proposals on the changing border regimes or a role of sovereignty in the affected regions,¹⁶⁵ this search for separation is quite obvious. This separation is not total, and there are many connecting points among the two environments on all levels of human society, but unlike the attempt to incorporate more stable parts of the world, the need to prevent negative spill-over is quite strongly visible.

The second strategy is that of stabilization. As the networking world seeks enlargement, it needs to stabilize parts of the world that present a threat to the stability of this environment and enlargement. Durable Disorder actors are prone towards stabilization missions in distinct areas of instability threatening their security. As an example, one can mention French operations in the Sahel region against the activities of the violent non-state actors there. France intervened in Mali following the collapse of its security apparatus in the face of the mixed Tuareg-nationalist and AQIM-led-Islamist uprising. Since then, the French-led European forces operate in the area to prevent the negative effects of smuggling, terrorism and migration connected to the decrease of the security in Europe (Wing 2016). Similar logic can be found behind the NGO work in places like Western Africa with the ultimate security perspective of stabilizing the region for the local population to prevent massive migration and spread of epidemics to name at least some threats. EU entrance requirements¹⁶⁶ also reflect this strategy.

The strategies following the opposite direction are rooted in an unstable nature of the geopolitical environment. Actors aiming at interaction with the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment seek to utilize its borderless networking nature to its different ends. In here, two most debated ways of this interaction will be presented. The first is the utilization of the flows to conduct acts of violence. Despite the fact, that the nature of the violent attacks planned or inspired by the violent non-state actors has in the past decade decreased in its sophistication it far better utilizes the nature of the soon-

¹⁶⁴ E.g., <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/02/hundreds-of-refugees-try-to-scale-fence-dividing-morocco-and-spanish-enclave>.

¹⁶⁵ See (Pusterla and Piccin 2012, Rosiere and Jones 2012)

¹⁶⁶ https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.

to-be Durable Disorder networking world. Freedom of movement and information gives disenfranchised segments of population possibility to reach violent propaganda and instructions on how to conduct a "lone-wolf attack" (e.g., in *Inspire* or *Dabiq* magazines). Strategy utilized towards destabilization of the "West" than follow the path of radicalization of the local population and utilization of the deficiencies of the democratic process that allow right-wing populists to quickly get a strong voice and further cast fuel into the fire.¹⁶⁷ Right timing can indeed change the countries policies as evident from the impact of the 2004 Madrid bombing on consequent Spanish election (Wright 2016, 147-166).

A similar principle can be found among the migrant population escaping conflicts or just thriving to improve their economic situation by moving to safer and more prosperous regions of the networking part of the globe. A large portion of this population has made use of the nature of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment to move throughout the region to the parts with more hospitable policies. Given the decreased restrictions on movement and wide-spread access to information, the utilization of these possibilities to non-violent means follows similar logic as the previous argument.

Finally, actors holding political and military power often utilize attempts by the soon-to-be Durable Disorder political actors to prevent negative spill-overs to increase their capital. The foreign aid given to these regimes despite their low level of effectiveness and disregard to human and civil rights and the rule of law, not mentioning development, strengthens otherwise very weak and challenged regimes in places like sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt, or the AfPak region. Political actors from networking part of the globe usually prefer stability and decrease in possible spill-overs over values that are inherently connected with the Durable Disorder part of the world (at least for now). Table 6.2 summarizes the interactions.

¹⁶⁷ See for example (Fihisman 2016).

Table 6.2 – interactions

X	<i>Westphalian</i>	<i>Chaotic Anarchy</i>	<i>Durable Disorder</i>
Westphalian	x	Intervention, separation	Separation
Chaotic Anarchy	Spill-over	X	Utilization of internal networks, obtaining resources
Durable Disorder	Incorporation	Separation, stabilization	X

Despite a definitive distinction among strategies related to different dyads, we can observe certain patterns of behaviour that to some degree support existence of pillars of society as theorized by J. Friedrichs and others. First of all, it seems that the state "political-pillar" actors in all three environments seek stability. In Chaotic Anarchy environment, this means obtaining enough resources to stay in power and charge of resource redistribution. In the Westphalian world, this need is manifested by an attempt of states to control economic and social spheres of life and prevent intervention from other actors. In Durable Disorder, the same phenomenon is demonstrated in an attempt to shield the environment from the negative spill-overs. Economic actors similarly seek mobility – utilizing state weakness, attempting to obtain better deals and using the networks to enhance its productivity. Social actors then usually seek to improve the life of the inhabitants, no matter how they perceive the idealized end state (socially just society, clan hierarchy, Islamic Caliphate, etc.).

7. Conclusion

The geopolitical environment in the post-Cold War world came through an enormous transformation. The end of the bipolar competition connected to the final demise of the attempts to unify the political map of the world had a clear impact on the nature of the international politics. Many authors attempted to capture the ongoing changes in unified theories that were to explain the new nature of the global geopolitics. The presented thesis started with one of these approaches – neomedievalism. Its primary goal was to look at the nature of the post-Cold War geopolitics through the lenses of the neomedieval thinking and evaluate to what degree is this approach justifiable and what consequences does it bring to the nature of the political activity and our understanding of it. To this end, it set up four research questions: 1) What is a definition of neomedievalism?; 2) What is the geographical distribution of the political (Westphalian and neomedieval) settings?; 3) How do the political actors adapt to their geopolitical environments?; 4) How do the actors inside different spaces react to each other?

The first, seemingly straightforward, question dealt with conceptualization of the neomedievalism as a theory. After an in-depth literature review, it turned out that the stream of thought is significantly shattered. Set in a continuum between a historical neomedievalism based on the European Middle Ages and almost apocalyptic New Dark Ages or Coming Anarchy, each author presented a little different vision of the neomedieval future. This points to the most important defining feature of the neomedievalism – an unequal level of development. As the theory is based on the assumption of the multiplication of authorities and establishment of competing global authorities, it is only natural that, unlike for seemingly homogenized Westphalian system, it will create systematically different outcomes. In the presented model, three poles – geopolitical environments – are described as ideal types that establish a continuum within which the real-world examples oscillate. These three poles are the Westphalian system, Durable Disorder and Chaotic Anarchy.

To summarize the main features of the three ideal-types, let us begin with the Westphalian system that, despite the visible shift, is still appearing on the map of the world and is unlikely to disappear. The first important factor (as summarized in Table 1) is the nature of sovereignty, which in the Westphalian environment is full, territorial and based on the modern 19th/20th-century idea of a state and the post-Second World War international practice based on the respect for the territorial integrity and negative

sovereignty. The nature of borders is that of border lines and state is a central political unit in the system. Non-state actors are operating under the authority of a state. Stability of the system is based on a balance of power with the most likely outcomes of the relations among the important actors inside the system being peace or war. The nature of territoriality is connected to the nature of borders and the overall political setting and is state-centred. State in the Westphalian environment is, according to R. Cooper and G. Sørensen, modern. A state is the primary provider of the function and services inside its territory and the main conductor of the interactions with the external environments.

Durable Disorder's first characteristic is the pooling and sharing of sovereignty among the states located inside the networked region. Borders are more penetrable, and many political, territorial actors will deal with the borders as frontiers rather than borderlines. This is, however, the case for the internal borders only as the environment attempts to some degree protect and close its external borders. The state has its defined role inside the system but is only one among the many relevant actors with limited reach and power. Non-state actors overtake many of the state functions, while refraining from the use of violence. The stability is based on an existence of three universal pillars – political, economic and societal – that challenge and check each other out. Nature of the relations inside this environment is defined by cooperation and challenge rather than war or another form of the physical armed conflict. The nature of territoriality is influenced by networking, that to a large extent defines the environment, and localization which is a natural outgrowth of the connection and degradation of the identification with the state. The nature of the state is post-modern, and the basic services are provided by either state or non-state actors. Outside interests are to a large extent propagated by commercial actors and NGOs as is clear from the presentation of the interactive effects among the different environments presented in chapter 6.

The final type of geopolitical environment to be presented is the Chaotic Anarchy. The nature of sovereignty is judicial or negative. Borders are *de facto* defined as border zones or are non-existent. The state is present only at a level needed to protect the ruling elite and bring it enough resources to buy off the needed support. The environment is highly unstable and defined by a presence of *ad hoc* coalitions and many violent clashes. The nature of territoriality is variable with control over population usually more important to the control over territory. The nature of the state is pre-modern/post-colonial. The basic goods are usually unavailable, and the connection to

the external environments is characterized by a spontaneous spill-overs whether in the form of violent outgrowth or migration. Neomedievalism is thus a system combining defining characteristics of the pre-modern, modern and post-modern system that manifests itself in different ways inside different territories.

This answer to the first research question brings the work towards the second one, the one regarding the geographic distribution of the presented geopolitical environments. As evident from the analysis, none of the regions is currently firmly set inside the Durable Disorder environment. The only two regions that appear to be located inside this framework constitute borderline situations, and it can be expected that they will shift towards the Westphalian model. The rest of the globe can be separated between the remaining two types of environment. The nature of the environment, in this case, follows the capability of the state institutions. We still cannot experimentally observe the decrease of the state power towards larger stability as predicted by the model. Nevertheless, the transformative effects can be found in some of the regions (EU+, North America, East Asia, part of Oceania) and without a strong backlash, these regions will probably establish a core of the future Durable Disorder part of the world.

Knowing the distribution of the geopolitical environments, it is important to understand how do the different political actors act inside them and how do the different environments affect each other. The emphasis on different structural factors inside the three types of spaces and varying level of stability affect the possible courses of action inside the different regions. As for the Westphalian system, states try to disconnect from the part of the flows that it perceives as threatening for their power. They also strictly follow a principle of territorial protection of its borders (as clear from the Russian experience, this does not necessarily involve the same for other countries). Non-violent non-state actors are operating under the power of the state and are limited by the state. Violent non-state actors consequently either challenge the state (separatist movements, insurgencies) or are captured by the state and used as paramilitary forces (e.g., *kadyrovtsy* in Chechen conflict (Souleimanov 2015, Williams 2015, 153-205)).

The state inside the Durable Disorder, on the contrary, accepts the globalization in all its forms and a transformation into networking setting defined by the privatization of a large portion of services. It, nevertheless, still provides some of these and act as a territorially bound provider of the basic regulation framework. Non-violent non-state actors attempt to utilize the possibilities of the functional caveats to maximize their

chances of survival inside the new system. They also overcome many functions formerly provided by states. Violent non-state actors, consequently, either cooperate with the systemic forces – e.g., private military companies – or utilize its nature to penetrate it – e.g., terrorist groups.

Last, but not least, the state in the Chaotic Anarchy is mostly interested in the protection of the power centre against possible challengers and its impact on most of the territory is very limited or non-existent. It adopts strategies of regime survival not of the development of the state institutions. Non-violent non-state actors mostly act as protectors of the local communities with a limited ability to challenge the violent competitors. They also attempt to provide some basic services based primarily on the traditional societal structure. Violent non-state actors follow the liquid strategy of expansion into the functional and mostly territorial spaces lacking effective power. When faced with a strong counter-pressure or exhausting local resources they will leave these spaces. They are rarely interested in sustained development. Exceptions are formed by hybrid groups that hold both traditional or non-violent part and violent segment (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon). These actors can present the most effective domestic political actors as evident from 2009-11 activities of Al-Shabaab inside southern Somalia.

Final question deals with the interaction of the three geopolitical environments. Different environments can react on each other in three logical dyads. The first is the interaction between the Westphalian system and Durable Disorder (or what is here called soon-to-be Durable Disorder) space. Political actors in the Durable Disorder follow the notion of connection and enlargement of the space via the power of attraction and economic and soft power potential. The Westphalian space, on the other hand, attempts to separate itself from the spill-over of these notion via border creation or establishment of shatter-belts. The reaction of the Westphalian system actors *vis-à-vis* the Chaotic Anarchy system is the one of the prevention of a spill-over of the negative effects via intervention and separation, while the Chaotic Anarchy actors to some degree conduct such spill-over activities connected to the destabilization of the Westphalian states. The final dyad of Durable Disorder and Chaotic Anarchy establishes an interaction in which the Chaotic Anarchy actors seek to utilize the security specifics of the Durable Disorder actors, and these actors try to diminish the possible threat. While the Chaotic Anarchy actors either utilize networks and the free movement to its

(often predatory) goals or attempt to obtain resources (mainly states) to seemingly prevent this effect, Durable Disorder actors try to separate themselves from the environment and stabilize via different projects.

The nature of the post-Cold War geopolitics is complex and more disorganized than in the pre-1991 system. Any attempt to theorize the nature of the global relations that aims at oversimplification will undoubtedly fail to understand some of the important phenomena crucial for certain regions. This said it must be noted that this work has its large share of simplifications as well. The real-world cases will surely show lower level of cohesion than presented and many anomalies will appear. It nevertheless presents a possible first step towards a clearer understanding of the different processes that affect the behaviour of political actors around the globe. By separating it into the three types of spaces, the neomedieval framework allows researchers to better grasp the different logic behind the actions of seemingly similar actors in separate regions. This understanding can stand at the beginning of a more nuanced and localized research that would present a clearer picture of the impacts this division of the globe holds for the future of power, politics and security in the 21st century.

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Amendments

List of amendments:

- 1 – UN regions
- 2 – Functioning Core and Non-integrating Gap
- 3 – Kurdish settlement

Map 1 – UN regions




(source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/08/United_Nations_geographical_subregions.png)

Map 2 – Functioning core and Non-integrating gap



(Source: (Barnett 2004))

Map 3 – Kurdish settlement



(Source: https://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/624/media/images/78409000/gif/_78409411_kurds_map624_kobane.gif)