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Department of International Relations

Master's Thesis

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The Activity of Organizations Supporting Civil Society in the Middle East: The Cases of Egypt and Turkey

Master's thesis

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.

2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.

3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 31.07.2018   Sarah Ahmed

References

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Abstract

First, this thesis will be focused on democracy promotion and civil society as concepts that emerged and occupied a large scholarly literature. I deem this conceptual focus necessary for scholars who closely examine case studies to better understand the concepts and thus better comprehend their contextual applications. Thus, my first chapter will be focused on the evolution of civil society as a concept and how its evolution and long history created ambiguity as well as a vast contemporary literature of debates on the meaning itself. This will be followed by the introduction of the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism in contemporary contexts. Second, the thesis focuses on democracy promotion as a foreign policy (especially through civil society organizations (CSOs)) and how this foreign policy intertwines with the promoter's own interests. As a result, the second chapter focuses on the democracy promotion of the United States (US) and European Union (EU): how it came about as well as how it is truly applied. This helps to understand the concept (of democracy promotion), which is now considered a political norm, yet its evolution and divergences help one understand contemporary politics. Finally, the last two chapters are case studies focused on both Turkey and Egypt. The choice of the two cases gives a better understanding of the concepts of the first two chapters; thus, their actual application in two different, yet similar, cases. The importance of Turkey lies in its strategic location, it's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, it's housing of millions of refugees and its phenomenal position from a country that the world looked up to as a democratic Middle Eastern country to a backsliding democracy as is reported today of Turkey (for example, the USAID 2017 report refers to Turkey as a backsliding democracy). In Egypt, its location, leadership and vitality for the stability of Israel as well as other Middle Eastern countries makes it is an important country, especially with the sudden fourth wave of the Arab Spring and its deterioration into authoritarianism yet again. Thus, the focus will be domestic politics, civil society and US and EU democracy promotion efforts to those countries. My final chapter is an attempt to try and set a coherent conclusion for this whole project. My sole purpose is to understand as well explain some of the world's most normative, yet popular, concepts of contemporary politics, those that almost always exist in any revolutionary act against injustice. Thus, I summarily show why one must address these concepts in a narrower context of a specific country's domestic as well as international politics to understand them. Hence, there are absolutely no generalizations due to the belief that generalizations lead to a misleading conclusion in world politics.

Keywords

Title

The Activity of Organizations Supporting Civil Society in the Middle East: The Cases of Egypt and Turkey

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Introduction

Over the past few years, turmoil has prevailed in Egypt, hope has turned into disappointment and young people have searched for the reasons behind the failure of the Arab Spring. Upon my travels to Turkey, the 2016 coup was followed by a complete purge in which thousands of people were fired, arrested or killed. All of this has led me to this current stream of research, particularly in regards to the concepts of democracy, authoritarianism, democracy promotion and civil society. Those concepts occupy, in a way, the air we breathe everywhere, not just in the Middle East. Political changes have always occurred, but recently it has been more obvious and normalized. Ten dead children, a thousand and a million have become just numbers. As Joseph Stalin once infamously declared, "If only one man dies of hunger, it is a tragedy. If millions die, that's only statistics."[1] This is my attempt to try and understand those concepts and the reasonings behind them. Thus, this is not a case-focused thesis, but neither is it an attempt to generalize.

My first two chapters are theory-based. The first is an understanding of the origins of the concept of civil society and civil society organizations as well as their emergence in the 1970s-1990s as an important element of democracy. Consequently, the next sections explore the elements of democracy and authoritarianism. The second chapter is further attempt to understand the two most influential political bodies of democracy promotion: the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). In line with this, I try to understand their efforts, influence and entwinement with their own domestic affairs, i.e., security vs. democracy. Finally, an understanding of these two chapters in the context of Turkey and Egypt is given in order to explain the theoretical components of this research.

As for Turkey and Egypt, perhaps my research will appear at times like a story-telling of events, but the analysis which follows this is not based on finding new theories but rather explaining, for both myself and the reader, current events in both countries that have led them both to being headline news stories every now and then with arrests or instability leading a global spreading of fear. The structure goes along with this attempted exploration: the first chapter that revolves around the concepts of civil society, democracy and authoritarianism; the second chapter is about democracy promotion throughout the history of the EU and the US with some critiques of their foreign policy methods; the third chapter opens directly with Turkish civil society, its emergence and its relation to the state

before discussing the Gezi Protests followed by an explanation of EU and US democracy efforts over the years in different political contexts; a similar approach is taken with Egypt, starting with an introduction of Egyptian civil society, followed by the Arab Spring and the state's relation to both. Finally, the EU's and the US' democracy promotion efforts over the years and the different political contexts are discussed. This is all followed by a conclusion that attempts to make some coherent sense of the whole thesis. The result is an overall understanding of contemporary concepts that have become normative, applying those in both Turkey and Egypt in an attempt to understand how civil society functions under authoritarian regimes as well as hybrid/electoral democratic regimes. The most recurring question is whether or not civil society is able to contribute to politics if it is faced with harsh policies, as well as understanding EU and US democracy promotion, the motives behind exporting ideologies and understanding if these promoted "good" concepts of democracy, peace and aid juxtapose domestic and security interests in an insecure world.

Chapter One : Civil Society, Democracy and Authoritarianism

1.1 Introduction

In everyday news as well as in common academic parlance, concepts like civil society and democracy are consistently discussed and debated. Nowadays, a country cannot change to a democratic system without the help of civil society organizations, yet authoritarian regimes have also become very aware of this, so they have invented and reinvented methods to sustain or obtain power. In local media outlets controlled by authoritarian regimes, the state of things can seem rather perfect: activists are jailed because of terrorism, and organizations are closed for illegal funds. It can all be very confusing. Meanwhile, countries from the West or the East predominantly believe (for the most part) that democracy should be adopted as the ultimate governing system, and democratic governments promote democracy for their own benefits, for they believe dealing with a democratic country and sharing the same set of ideals is easier than dealing with an authoritarian or an autocratic regime. Thus, before ambitiously asking any further questions, a brief theoretical background seems like a logical starting point. In this chapter, the interrelated concepts of civil society, democracy, democratization and authoritarianism will briefly be introduced from a historical perspective, dating from Ancient Greece to contemporary debates that have since expanded; later on and throughout this thesis, I will illustrate the different understandings of these concepts over time and in various contexts.

1.2 Civil Society: Emergence and History

The idea of *civil society* has profoundly changed over time. The modern understanding of "society" first materialised as a reaction to the Enlightenment and its "universalising nationalism" while was "civil" ironically first used in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*:[2] "Civil blood makes civil hands unclean."[3] The idea was that the history of these civil families, or civilization in general, make them do uncivilized things in the name of keeping up appearances. Going back to the roots of civil society as a concept, the phrase *Koinonia Politike,* first proposed by Aristotle, did not exactly mean civil society but was translated as such by Henry Liddell and Robert Scott. Another "lost in translation" case, according to Riedel, was when the concept was translated from Greek to Latin and from Latin to

English. Riedel articulates that the Greek phrase precisely means an "association" or a "union," yet it is the closest to what we call now civil society, at least for the purpose of studying the origins of the concept.[4] For Aristotle, *Koinonia Politike* is an association, a union of people who are "free," "equal" and united, meaning an association of people living together in the *polis*: a community inhabited by political animals with shared values serving a common good that comes naturally.[5]

Aristotle's theoretical legacy was not challenged until the ideas of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in the emergence of social contract theory. According to social contract theory, society does not come as a natural facet of human existence but rather as an agreement between those who live in any given community. Hobbes denounced Aristotle's idea of a natural society and rather saw it as a social contract between people, which creates a state. Though both Hobbes and Locke are paired together, both rejecting Aristotle's idea of the natural state, they are distinguishably different. Hobbes supported King Charles II[6] and believed humans to be selfish, violent and competitive, which consequently leads them to a constant state of war.[7] By virtue, Hobbes believed in law and order as well as in a social contract, an agreement that is between men to stop war and to live in peace; giving up liberty to the sovereign power, the *Leviathan,* will lead to peace between humans, one derived from fear.[8] On the other hand, John Locke supported the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and believed that it was people's right to overthrow the King.[9] Though Locke agreed with Hobbes on the idea of an agreement, he agreed with Aristotle and deviated from Hobbes when it came to his assertion that the nature of humans is as sociable animals. As a result and in contrast to Hobbes, he separated the judicial and the legislative, which gave people the right to overthrow their governments if need be.[10] He believed that humans have some natural rights that even governments could not intervene in and that humans should be free and equal. This is what Locke believed to be the *Natural Law,* which he asserted to be universal.

Thus, the idea of modern democracy can be traced back to Locke's *Natural Law,*[11] which greatly influenced the Enlightenment, from his argument on natural law to his theory of state legitimacy.[12] However, some thinkers of the Enlightenment like Charles-Louis Montesquieu made a distinction between non-political society and the state,[13] whereas philosophers of the French Revolution, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, disregarded Locke's natural rights entirely. Illustrating Hobbesian tendencies, Rousseau perceived the concept of natural laws as a war prone idea, one evoking conflict and

violence; later on, writers like Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel agreed with Rousseau's rejection. However, with the emergence of the Scottish Enlightenment, which is sometimes called the Second Enlightenment, the meaning of civil society began to change dramatically. The Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson followed Montesquieu's steps, following in the Locksean tradition, in distinguishing the diversity of civil societies and emphasizing their cultural differences.

However, as a pluralist rather than a universalist, he came to depart from Montesquieu's rationalism, thereby definitively breaking with the earlier philosophies of Aristotle and Locke on the nature of humans. Yet, although his ideas celebrated diversity, this was also viewed as a source that would lead humans to conflicts and wars, going so far as seeing the Athens-Spartan war as a necessity: "Athens was necessary to Sparta, in the exercise of her virtue."[14] Therefore, his notions of diversity should not be confused with contemporary theories of identity politics and the promotion of pluralist democracies. Nevertheless, even with this grim outlook, Ferguson's ideas about human helped to create our modern understandings of civil society, with self-perseverance and advancement being the motives behind this creation. Unlike other Enlightenment thinkers, he believed that civil societies, or literary societies that are civilized, were created historically as a natural evolutionary step and not based on a any conscious desire to form a coherent community.[15] Put simply, civil society was positioned as a politically and economically developed society in which people's rights were preserved.[16] The overall development of these ideas, from Aristotle to Ferguson, paved the way for the very peculiar meaning of civil society which is discussed today. By the 18th century, civil society was no longer understood as the state or a political society but rather a culture of people living together with shared rights and a shared ambition for economic advancement, and the distribution of this idea, scholarly and socially, was accelerated further in the 19th century.

Written in 1821, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* was a revolutionary landmark yet again transforming how civil society was understood, and the leaps he made move us sharply towards the concept's more contemporary usage, not only fitting the concept in its modern skin but also influencing later thinkers like Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci and Alexis de Tocqueville.[17] This was accomplished by stressing three sectors that lead to the development of ethical life: family, state and civil society. In this way, he was the first to differentiate between civil society and the state, positioning them as opposites as well as definitively redefining how the concept would be employed to date. In his formulation,

family did not result from civil society; rather, the state constituted the relation between family and civil society, thus offering the best of the two concepts.[18] Hegel defined civil society as a "system of needs" in which individuals lead a free life and have the right to private property, with civil society satisfying people's own interests. However, it was simultaneously characterized by chaos and inequality; thus, the state is a necessary balance to these inequalities if order is to be sustained, without which civil society could not exist at all.[19]

Hegel's theory on civil society, which had come a long way not only since Aristotle but Locke and Hobbes as well, was then taken up by thinkers from the left and the right. Tocqueville was to build his theory on the differentiation between the political and civil by borrowing from Hegel's conception. In addition, Marx found a base for his own theory in Hegel's ideas, and later Gramsci drew from both of them, establishing his own unique Marxist-Hegelian approach that revolutionary grounded many of our own realizations of civil society today. While unarguably indebted to Hegel, Marx strayed away from Hegel's balancing act involving the state-civil society dichotomy to stress the negative nature of civil society as one dominated by the bourgeois class, which exploited the labouring class in order to establish a society of fake freedoms founded on inequalities. Thus, by the time of Marx, one finds the institutions of civil society being portrayed as illegitimate unless ruled by the people, with the state only being projected as an oppressor encouraging these inequalities.[20]

While this formula may seem resemblant of many radical ideologies today, it was not until Gramsci, who took the Hegelian spectrum further to a more centrist position than Marx's radical leftism, that civil society as we know it today truly began to come to fruition. Of course, Gramsci used components of the Marxist approach to construct his theory of civil society, yet he was strongly critical of Marx's reductionist stance towards materialism, instead believing the relation between political organizations and the economy could not be condensed so simply to such a direct and incomplex relationship.[21] In addition, unlike Marx, who saw power to be centred mainly in the state, Gramsci saw the possibility for power to arise among the intellectuals of the proletarian class through solidarity and the determination to form a counterbalancing central power in opposition to the state. In the process, Gramsci separated the state, the market and the family in a radically innovative way, believing civil society to be an arena for both free, rational people and organizations.

In avoiding the pessimism of Marx, Gramsci has consequently come to be considered the pioneer of the idea that civil society has the potential to be either under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie or a space in which individuals could resist the state's hegemony. Through his comparisons of Russia and Italy, he formed theoretically situated civil society as a place in which autonomy from the state is a possibility, and counter-hegemony and resistance is feasible.[22] Therefore, civil society conceptually came to be inhabited by possibilities, by different people, by different organizations, by different ideologies and by disparate cultures, all of which determine the outcome of the nature of civil society: either one dominated by a bourgeoisie class that works to vindicate the power of the state or a society of social movements and resistance.[23] Without such a formulation taking hold in intellectual thought, the existence of civil society organizations (CSOs) as they function today would have been utterly inconceivable, let alone effective. Accordingly, all individuals living in a society practice politics one way or another by engaging in some sort of association, be it the school, the family, the church, etc.[24] While one can see a resemblance, and an important one at that, here to Shakespeare's usage of civil as equated with civilization centuries before, by this point one is dealing with an impeccably different conception that painfully arose from these intense intellectual and pragmatic struggles. The elite, bourgeois state's goal is to acquire and maintain hegemony, and the working class' goal is to unite, compromise and form a resistance that could eventually counter the hegemony of the state.

However, the development of civil society, conceptually at least, was not carried out as calmly as the narrative to this point might make it seem. In many ways, Hegel's theories represented a breaking point, one by which the conceptual formulation of civil society would literally break in two, yet the consequences of this scholarly debate (as will be shown in later chapters) would literally come to divide how groups would approach civil society in praxis. On the liberal side of the Hegelian spectrum, Tocqueville came to offer and add further contributions to the study of civil society, yet in a way that took a sharp turn from the lineage of Marx and Gramsci. Similar to Hegel, Tocqueville separated civil society from political society; yet, unlike Hegel, he was able to conclude from these premises that civil society could actually enhance and help political society and its associations, and in return political society could strengthen civil society. He framed his theory in *Democracy in America* through the close observation of the associations, civil society and the community of 19th century American society.[25] Whereas Marx and later

Gramsci took a fairly hostile position towards the state with civil society acting as a deterrent to state oppression, civil society and its associations for Tocqueville would be able to help in bringing about a better political life by counterbalancing the state-hegemony (if it even exists) or by simply pressuring the state for better governance, thus forming a symbiotic rather than antagonistic relationship. These kinds of activities, which he calls "the habits of the heart," assist the state as much as they do the people in developing a sense of community and trust.[26] In a similar vein, a much later 20th century thinker of this liberal Hegelian heritage, Robert D. Putnam, went on to investigate both Italy and the United States in a Tocquevillian manner, rather than a Marxist or Gramsian one, to draw out his theory. According to Putnam, Northern Italy's good democratic governance resulted from the density of the activities of civil society associations, and vice versa for the US. In his 1993 book *Making Democracy Work*, he concludes, "Strong society, strong economy; strong society, strong state," arguing that the opposite is true as well.[27] Moreover, he concluded that Northern Italy happened to have good governance because of the autonomy that civil society associations had from the state.

Nevertheless, by his 2000 book *Bowling Alone*, he saw a decline of civil society in the US as a result of the weakening of associations and their activities. Like Tocqueville, he stressed that these kinds of associations were at the heart of a successful civil society and a democratic state, and they lead people to a sense of unity, trust and reciprocity.[28] In this way, Tocqueville and Putnam asserted the importance of strengthening CSOs as a way to promote and to strengthen good governance. Thus, in more recent debates, the two most popular views of CSOs as either a revolutionary arena counterbalancing the state's hegemony or a tool of monitoring and improving governments are rooted in this Hegelian debate that was interpreted differently by the Tocquevillian and the Gramsci traditions, which is itself built on the evolution of the concept from Ancient Greece. The Gramscian argument was most obviously taken up in the 1970s-1990s protests in Latin America and Eastern Europe, where there was a stringent desire to overthrow the respective oppressive governments; however, the Tocquevillian debates exist as an ideology of Western democracy promoters who work to strengthen governmental institutions so as to strengthen the state itself, especially where an emerging sense of democracy has been perceived, in order to help it democratize further.

From Aristotle to Putnam and from Putnam to modern scholars, civil society has come a long way. Because I meant to be selective and brief in exploring the history and

theory of civil society, it is necessary to admit that this is but the shell of what scholars thought and continue to think about this concept. What started as a *Koinonia Politike,* an idea in ancient Greece, became a strand of literature and a common news headline in today's world. Yet, it is often necessary to understand how an idea started and how far it has come to give us the means to understand its modern contexts. Especially in the social sciences, a single theory can have hundreds of supporters and critics with strikingly diverse interpretations, which can at times make it very vague and confusing. Due to such broad categories of civil society, it is necessary to be explicit in framing my particular interpretation based on the discussion thus far; however, in order to do so, I must elaborate a bit on the concept most coupled with civil society: democracy. Yet even more important is to understand how the emergence of civil society organizations came about. While explicitly laying out the Gramsci and Tocquevillian traditions takes us a long way – in that they make the phantom term of civil society, so widely used today to refer to such wide-ranging phenomena – it is not enough to fully comprehend contemporary contexts alone. It is surprising how normal it is to talk about organizations of civil society or international organizations even though these did not exist a couple of centuries ago.

1.3 Democracy: Emergence, History and Evolution

Like civil society, democracy has acquired different meanings over time and in different contexts. Describing the concept's confusing history, Robert A. Dahl concludes that "democracy seems to have been invented more than once" (Dahl, 1998).[29] The Greeks coined the term democracy; derived from *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule), *demokratia* was the rule of the people, but the very meaning of people was highly contested, especially as to who had the right and the skills - as well as the wisdom - to rule. Nevertheless, for two centuries after 507 B.C., Athenes had a system of popular governance, or a democratic system.[30] At the same time, the most prominent of the Greek philosophers, Socrates, even openly opposed democracy in Plato's *Republic.* Plato himself thought of democracy differently, believing only certain, skilled people have the capacity to truly rule. Perhaps Aristotle was the most open to democracy, trying to create a middle ground between the opposite ends of the stick: a mixed constitution with certain intellectually-talented individuals endowed with education and skills as the sole proprietors of administrative work.[31]

While Ancient Greece may seem far off, the development of democracy in the 18th century often returned to these thinkers to ground their own theories of democracy, thus using them as a jumping off point. However, the debates on democracy during this period drastically expanded, spreading the idea of individualism, and natural right and social contract theories. The Glorious Revolution in Britain paved the way for representative governments, especially when the King was criticized for breaking the contract between him and the people. Later, English Whigs created the political conditions in which democracy could be sowed. In France, the French Revolution gave rise to democracy between the middle and working classes. European thinkers such as Rousseau and Locke definitely changed the face of Europe. The individualism and natural law of Locke and Rousseau called for self government and theories of a social contract, thereby planting the seeds for contemporary French liberalism and democracy. Robert R. Palmer has even called the 18th century "the age of the democratic revolution," a time when democracy and democratic ideas started spreading to the Netherlands, Italy, Poland and Switzerland. Even in those places where ideas were suppressed, it still planted a seed that would later grow. [32] Much like the big bang, a sudden explosion of chaos, social as well as political transformation, industrialization and the redistribution of political power abruptly set into motion the push for democratic governance. While it did not appear out of nowhere, when its causes erupted, there was a rapid acceleration of revolutionary ideas and pragmatic techniques that would come to define our contemporary world.

This political explosion, however, was not limited to the European continent; the Americas were meanwhile fighting their own War of Independence, and it would indeed become a milestone in North American democracy. The Declaration of Independence was to become a cornerstone for the world's proceeding generations of democratic leaders. As a result, much of Europe came to look upon the American-born democracy as a symbol of hope, but skeptic conservatives in Europe were waiting for its fall; they were finally given the chance to promote such ideas during the American Civil War. Conservatives' tried to assure their European audience that their Enlightenment ideals and democratic techniques would lead to anarchy. However, in the aftermath of their civil war, Americans would come to demonstrate their rising leadership in establishing democracy as the most popular mode of governance, establishing its place as a global democracy promoter which would later on come to significantly shape their active political role in European politics and political regimes. Thus, not only was there a global push for democracy, at least in the

Anglo-Saxon and European contexts, but this new phenomena of promoting a way of governance abroad came to definitively shape the functionings of the global political system, with the US (and later Europe) unconsciously structuring itself at the core of this phenomenon.

Yet, this transition to a new political system, with a foundational built-in belief in democracy, was not a smooth transition; it was long, arduous, shaky and inconsistent. To better comprehend this historical development of this conceptual expansion, Samuel P. Huntington's (2009) follows Dahl in his definition of democracy in order to argue that democracy has come in waves: it starts, it reaches a peak and then it finally recedes again, allowing for another wave to begin. In arguing that there had been three waves, Huntington asserts that the first wave started in the late-19th century with the suffrage movements, almost exclusively covering white males (1820s-1926); the second wave spanned the 1960s and 1970s (1960-1975, to be exact); the third wave commenced with the Portuguese Revolution in 1974 and was finally receding, as Huntington later argued, in the late-2000s.[33] More importantly for the context of this research, however, Huntington puts forward five causes leading to the third wave: (1) the failure of some countries through the military, the economy or related to legitimacy; (2) the economic flourishing of the 1960s that raised people's expectations and standards of living; (3) the Second Vatican Council of 1963-65 and their changing position from supporting authoritarian regimes to supporting democracy (this can be demonstrated in third wave democracy countries that are mostly Catholic and its spread to other Catholic countries like the Philippines, Mexico and so on); (4) the changes occuring in the European Community and its support of democracy in other European countries because of what that might bring them from various economic benefits, the United States and its democracy promotion (especially in the 1970s and the 1980s in combination with the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Eastern Europe); finally, (5) the "snowballing" effect, or the causal relation, that A leads to B which connects to C (though Huntington himself realized snowballing does not work without certain conditions that would facilitate it).[34] Since his groundbreaking assertions were established, first in 1991 and later in 2009, scholars, academics and many journalists have begun to argue that a fourth wave, rooted in a global democratic crisis set off by the Arab Spring, has begun and even started to recede.

All of these points seemingly indicate the accuracy of Huntington's theory, which came to be very influential for later scholars studying democracy and democratization. Yet,

when one takes a closer look at the details of Huntington's theory, one finds some problems with it. To list a few, Charles Kurzman (1998) has found Huntington's conceptualization of the third wave quite ambiguous. Huntington's theory of democratic waves does not explicitly explain what they entail, nor what he meant by "waves," which has remained unclear.[35] Renske Doorenspleet likewise found Huntington's theory cryptic and deceptive, arguing that Huntington ignores important data that would invalidate his own argument. For Doorenspleet, Huntington lacked two dimensions: conceptual and empirical. The conceptual problem lies in his failure to explain democracy and authoritarianism. As he follows Dahl's definition, he often ignores two of the three requirements that Dahl asserted to be found in any democracy, "inclusiveness" and "civil liberties," and instead prioritizes "competitiveness." The second problem lies in Huntington's data collection and relying on them to provide a base for his theory. For example, after the decolonization of Africa, the numbers of countries have increased, but he did not consider this in his theory, which has made it "ambiguous" and "inconsistent."[36] Even though Huntington was clearly onto something in that democracy's progression has fluctuated – being inconsistent, accelerating at times and receding at others – the flaws in his research illustrate that it is not enough to historically map out democratic governments; one must be conceptually clear on the limits and boundaries of the definition of democracy as well.

When one moves to democracy conceptually, it quickly becomes apparent that it is a rather vague umbrella term, in fact encapsulating various models of "democratic" governance that can vary quite a bit from one another; Huntington's inability to acknowledge this plurality is partially what left his research open to such harsh criticism. In fact, David Held, in his book *Models of Democracy*, provides a summary of 11 models for democracy, thereby illustrating the intricacies of the term.[37] For instance, *communitarian democracy* is grounded in the notion that the best democratic government is one that would best represent the community through means of legitimate power given to the representative of such a community, and in this way it aspires to make such a government truly representative of the whole community by seeking support through sustainable institutions of civil society.[38] Of course, there is additionally *direct* and *representative democracy*, two of the most referred to and popular models. In direct democracy, people's votes are cast directly and no representatives are needed, whereas in a representative democracy, people delegate power to representatives.[39] *Deliberative*

democracy, which is one of the scholarly popular and debated models of democracy, relies on a type of "normative reality," or the normative liberal present in a political system that allow democratic dialogue.[40] Another popular democratic model at the moment is *agonistic democracy*, whose main proponent is Chantal Mouffe and which relies on concepts of genealogical research, the pluralistic nature of communities and respecting identities.According to Mouffe, the goal is to change from an antagonistic position to that of looking at people's differences and paying respect to them, i.e., agonistic. Thus, democracy in such a case respects differences, containing people of different opinions and identities.[41]

Moreover, taking Habermas' model of categorizing democracy, there is the *liberal view* and the *republican view* of democracy (Habermas, 1994). In the liberal, or rather the Lockean, view of democracy, the governed are understood in relation to negative rights that stand opposite to the state and to one another; according to the republican view, positive rights are asserted by participating in the political process through communicating with one another and with the government. Also the liberal camp relies on the quantity of votes casted, varying opinions and political competitions, whereas the republican camp relies on values; in this way, the latter is more related to the values of democracy. The liberal version relies on compromises while the republic version relies on consensus, if necessary. Finally, an important point of departure between the two is in the liberal core belief that sovereignty can - or even should - be given to the government, who legitimately exercises its authority; its legitimacy is derived from elections. Meanwhile, republicans believe that sovereignty is not transferable.[42]

The reason this last perspective of democracy receives more attention is that it is the one necessary to grasp if one is to understand the processes of democracy promotion in contemporary politics. While not often acknowledged, democracy promotion via civil societies, whether in the Gramscian or the Tocquevillian tradition, is grounded in the idea of promoting such a model of liberal democracy, whereby liberal rights are attested and respected by the state. While democracy is a vast sea of literature, of debates and of theories – and is both the most popular as well as the most contested and debated form of governance, perhaps because the anglo-saxon writing is the dominant form of literature, thus privileging democracy – the fact that we are discussing liberal democracy in particular is necessary to outline if one is to avoid the shortcomings present in Huntington's theories. More precisely, limiting our conceptions of first civil society (the previous section) and

now democracy will help us set up a more concrete analysis as many of the debates in current literature on Turkey deal with the ambiguity of these conceptualizations in any pragmatic way as well, in that they point to an inability to properly specify the concepts of democracy and civil society; such vague connotations prevents one from drawing more solid conclusions, regardless of how thorough the research itself is. Nevertheless, promoting such types of democratic governance to the Middle East particularly contrasts with the forms of governances existing in the region, such as authoritarianism and autocracy. Therefore, it is not only crucial to theoretically enunciate what is meant by civil society and democracy (specifically liberal democracy), but it is equally important to understand why they are both used as a tool to diminish, and if possible abolish, authoritarianism.

1.4 Authoritarianism: A Brief Focus on the Middle East

The Cambridge Dictionary defines authoritarianism as a system of governance "demanding that people obey completely and refusing to allow them freedom to act as they wish."[43] Indeed, authoritarian regimes and rulers tend to govern with an iron fist, securing their ruling power by violating human rights, imprisoning activists as well as those who oppose them, dismantling rival political parties or diminishing political parties to caricatures supporting the regime, suppressing freedom of speech and using mass media to influence people or to keep them uninformed. Nowadays, there are many opinions on what modern authoritarian regimes are. Some scholars claim that there are a set of characteristics to define authoritarian regimes characteristics and differentiate them from other concepts[44]; others make a distinction between authoritarian regimes and "hybrid regimes," meaning regimes that meet one or two of Dahl's democracy, but fail to meet the others.[45] Some argue for modern electoral authoritarianism, which includes authoritarian regimes who derive their legitimacy - that is quintessential for the survival of the regime - whether or not they are staged elections.[46] Finally, some even dissolve these categorizations and establish a gray area between democracy and authoritarianism.[47] The types of regimes seen today in some regions in Africa, the Middle East or Latin America tend to be anything but democratic, and that is a point of agreement between most scholars. Another point of agreement concerns the failure of third wave democracy advocated and coined by Huntington.[48] According to Karakoc, the third wave of democracy has not really changed anything in the Middle East; if anything, it did not really exist to begin with.[49]

Democracy was introduced to the Middle East during the 1970s through a series of reforms that were mostly economic but that later failed due to an economic crisis. Later in the 1990s, one finds the US and some European countries (later the European Union itself as an entity) start a new phase in promoting democracy in the region through CSOs. One of the most interesting accomplishments of the 1990s was the introduction of elections, though others consider the shift to be not from authoritarianism to democracy but rather from authoritarianism to electoral authoritarianism.[50] Third wave democracy might have succeeded in democratizing some countries and/or establishing an unstable democratic base, but it has also reasserted authoritarianism and dictatorships elsewhere.

However, how authoritarianism can be explained in the Middle East is another story, and the Middle East is a specific case since most scholars agree that a majority of modern Middle Eastern countries are authoritarian. There are many explanations as to why authoritarianism is so strongly rooted in the region, making, as is the nature of scholarly literature, another debated gray area without clear answers. In the 1960s and 1970s, many scholars stressed socio-economic components to be the reason behind authoritarianism, i.e., development and democracy were involved in a co-linear relationship. The reasoning later changed to more economic-, cultural- and religious-centric explanations, and the cultural and religious explanations had been especially popular under the label "Middle East exceptionalism," which has since come to be highly criticized. Some other explanations have included the history of the region, gender gaps and post colonialism. [51]

Julide Karakoc, a prominent scholar on authoritarianism in the Middle East, concludes that there are 7 prominent reasons authoritarianism exists in the Middle East, which she further divides into the two categories of the past (which deal with historical reasons) and the present (dealing with contemporary contextual aspects related to politics, economics and social customs); although these points are highly debated among scholars today, all of them still exist within the academic literature. In the "past" category, the first reason dates back to colonialism and how European colonizers created instability by replacing the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment as well as their support system for authoritarian rulers that went hand-in-hand with maintaining a weak civil society. After colonialism, the new emerging countries had inherited weak institutional governments with an authoritarian heritage and almost no civil society.[52] Secondly, and highly debated as a source of authoritarianism, is the idea that Islam and democracy cannot function together, a criticism that goes back to Montesquieu. Thirdly, there are "neopatriarchy" and cultural

explanations, which are based on the idea of how the family's structure of patriarchal oppression is mirrored in government. However, Karakoc explains that empirical data does not support this explanation and, if anything, reveals how the desire for democracy in the Arab world is higher than in other places.[53]

As for the present reasons, the first involves the ideal of democracy promotion by the US and Europe in the Middle East. The primary focus of such promotion was to establish fair elections, yet the failure lies in the promoter's own interest versus what they promoted (which will be particularly important for my later discussions on democracy promotion in Egypt and Turkey). From her point of view, Karakoc concludes that multiparty elections is perhaps the only thing gained from these ambitions; other than that, these countries were not democratized but rather drifted more into authoritarianism due to leaders wanting to secure their power. Secondly, she mentions the idea of how authoritarian countries hold elections to stabilize their rule and eliminate rivals. She thirdly addresses the military as an important political actor, whether as rulers through coups or in their support for dictators. Fourth and most prominent is the idea that economic development serves as an indicator of democracy; the more economically developed a country is - the more industrialized, the more educated its people, the higher the average wages - the more democratic a country is, which is based on the modernization theory.[54] Another theory is the "Rentier State Theory," or higher taxation leads to democracy. Citizens who pay taxes have more power over the state and are thus able to make demands; similar to the "modernization theory," the empirical data of some cases has found the contrary to be true.[55]

Raymond Hinnebusch argues in the direction of modernization theory as an explanation of authoritarianism, yet he builds upon the conception put forward by Karakoc to make it more convincing. According to Hinnebusch, there are many debates around the reasons behind authoritarianism in the Middle East. However, the criteria, or the "requisites," of modernization theory have somehow proven to only be one part of many variables that must be taken into account, with other variables coming from debates in development studies, "nation building dilemmas," historical sociology, institutional frames, economy, rational choice theory, globalization and the unipolar hegemonic system of the US. The adaptive nature of authoritarian regimes is the reason behind their long survival. These regimes adapted by changing their system in a way that would not defy the powers that be. By making some reforms, such as economic liberalization and the

"westward-looking" of foreign policy, they were able to survive, and their adaptive nature will continue to allow them to stand in the face of such challenges.[56] However, as I will discuss in the cases of Egypt and Turkey, the ability to conform in such ways half-heartedly was only reinforced by the reinforced commitment of foreign actors, such as the EU and the US.

In line with this, one true obstacle that Huntington also points out is the inexperience of some countries with democracy, which can later result in democratic backsliding as well as authoritarian rulers who oppose democratization - though he believes this will disappear with time - along with the lack of commitment to democracy.[57] To conclude, many scholars have different views on how authoritarian regimes still exist today, and each strain of thought goes towards a different explanation that tries to extend its claims to a wider scope by including a group of countries to explain the phenomena, which I think only helps to defuse the theory by another scholar who simply takes the same group and empirically analyzes it. Perhaps we need a more individualistic approach to cases, without trying to widen it to more cases, to explain authoritarianism. This will not only help to analyze the concept more in depth but will also assist us in understanding current day regime variations. Though they share very similar characteristics, they still are not same. They are able to learn (or not) from the mistakes of previous dictators or silence the West by a bargain of some kind (for example, using the West's military or financial interests to deter foreign intervention), making unique cases that break previous patterns.

1.5 Towards a Meeting Point

Civil society, democracy, democratization and authoritarianism are all connected to the modern understanding of the EU's and the US' democracy promotion efforts, meaning it is clear to understand the concepts to grasp the intentions behind such efforts. It has been assumed that CSOs help democratize authoritarian regimes; simultaneously, authoritarian regimes try and sustain power by limiting CSOs or just weakening their activism. CSOs as well as organizations in general are set in opposition to the state of "bad" governance, and democracy comes as a package in the shape of the democratic model of the country promoting it (as will be the case with the US) or as individual separate elements ranging from fair elections and prosperity to the very minimal hope of not going to prison when expressing one's opinion (as will be the case with the EU). During the 1990s, these concepts dominated many debates, and civil society has been seen as an interchangeable

part of democratic theory. The revival of the concept can even be dated further back to the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Mary Kaldor actually argues that it re-emerged in Latin America before Eastern Europe (which is the most popular academic view); in both regions, civil society was used and understood as opposed to the state, as an arena of resistance to military dictatorship in Latin America and totalitarianism in Eastern Europe.[58] The idea was to democratize from below, a bottom-up approach, instead of the top-down (even though the latter still exists). Since then, the idea has proved successful in some cases, brought some sort of change in others and/or has not changed much due to the power of the regime or a failed model of democracy. Anyhow, this thesis will advance next with the emergence of democracy promotion as a foreign policy of the US and the EU, mainly focusing on the how, why and when as well as the debates behind this emergence.

Chapter Two: An Assessment of Western Democracy Promotion

2.1 Introduction

Promoting democracy in non-democratic and emerging democracies has long been the foreign policy of many countries. Democracy is assumed to be the best form of governance, a position which has only been strengthened through the triumph of democracy over other forms of governance, yet there are in reality many assumed unique approaches and consequential theories in terms of democracy promotion. Jonas Wolff and Iris Warm have summarized some of these approaches and theories by suggesting four general techniques of democracy promotion. The first is "*a materialist theory of democracy promotion*" dependent upon the benefits the promoters can get from the targeted country.[59] For example, if Europe is promoting democracy to its Eastern neighbors, it calculates the potential material benefits like opening a new market for the EU. The second is a "*normative theory of democracy promotion*" based on the claim that democracy promotion is the norm of the international system,[60] such as the US' ideology after the Cold War and how democracy was established as the normative "good." The third is "*a cultural theory of democracy promotion,*" whereby democracy promotion is part of the "constituted" ideology of cultures. Finally, there is "*a critical theory of democracy promotion*" in which it is used to resist the hegemony of a state (essentially a neo-Gramscian approach).[61]

Moreover, Christopher Hobson answers why and how international relations shaped democracy and democracy promotion. According to Hobson there are three points to be made: 1) with the end of the Cold War, democracy has spread to Europe with the help of America, which later impacted who was promoting democracy (e.g., the US, the EU) and to whom (e.g., Latin American or Eastern European countries); 2) this furthermore meant that the "international system has provided the context for democracy itself," and 3) the easiness of democracy spreading and promotion as a good thing.[62] Thus, democracy promotion has become popular, especially with the advances in the 1990s and the emergence of the US as a world power, establishing what is sometimes called "unipolarity" after the Cold War. Throughout this chapter, I will be referring to democracy

promotion and democratic aid. Democracy promotion here is considered an umbrella concept under which democratic aid and democratic assistance exist. I will first start with the US and EU democracy promotion, emphasizing the Middle East and related regions; I additionally explore democracy promotion through civil society and some of the debates surrounding the concept inside and outside academia. All of this will include a critique, ending the chapter with democracy promotion through NGOs as part of civil society.

2.2 US Democracy Promotion: History and Debates

The idea of *democracy promotion* has long been one of the main wheels of the US' foreign policy, and although relatively new, it has become the norm of international relations and foreign policy in Western ideologies. Generally perceived as "good," this "good" refers to both democracy as a mode of governance and democracy promotion as a foreign policy ideology. Henry Nau offers a very insightful argument as to how America's "self-image" led it to democracy promotion, which has been reflected in its foreign policy throughout the years. According to Nau, the US has evolved through four stages: first, the founding of a divided nation; second, the Civil War[63]; third, from the 1930s to the mid-1960s when, with the Two World Wars and the Cold War, the US reformed its institutions and took a leading international role; fourth, from the mid-1990s until the present day, there has been "the challenges of a mature liberal democracy." These four stages of the US' unique evolution have been reflected not only in domestic politics but in its foreign policy as well: the US being one of the world's most homogenous countries and its liberalism as well as nativism.[64] Accordingly, this section will advance with the changes of US democracy promotion as a foreign policy with other countries throughout its evolution, stressing how democracy promotion started and why before next broadening this stream of thought into an overall analysis. Finally, I will briefly introduce some debates concerning how this foreign policy was not always welcomed, and how the US weighs its ideologies against its own interests.

Woodrow Wilson (president from 1913-1921) was the first in line to introduce democracy promotion as one of the trademarks of US foreign policy, although in a rudimentary form that only shows resemblance to the phenomenon today. During the First World War, Wilson felt the need for a new foreign policy in line with a new international and cooperative system. Perhaps it was that he felt the need to compete with the violent ideologies of Vladimir Lenin, but the end goal was a new international desire for peace. It

was a revolutionary "liberal" way of thinking.[65] Thus, Wilson was pushing a new liberal worldview – one that, as discussed in the previous chapter, would become the cornerstone of the concept of democracy in this field – that could compete and triumph over the war-prone ideologies of the Soviet Union. Hence, Wilson is perceived by many as the patriarch of democracy promotion as he was the first to propose international peace by looking at domestic as well as international explanations.[66] From 1945 to 1953, Harry S. Truman would also go on to promote democracy and democracy assistance. After his renowned speech in 1947, referred to as the Truman Doctrine, he sent aid to Greece and Turkey, and through his advocation of international freedom and his Containment Policy, he cleared the way for US foreign policy for the next line of presidents.[67]

According to Ikenberry, after the Second World War, there was a general idea on how to have and sustain international order and an internationally secure environment. To accomplish the latter, Ikenberry developed three points of argument: 1) democracy promotion becoming the new reality, and with it the advocacy of *liberal values* upon which a stable international order could find its base; 2) the first point expands to cover liberal values as well as economic interdependence and the vitality of international institutions; 3) this kind of thinking had dominated and found a viable audience, at least until the end of the Cold War. These were indeed the accustomed values that have survived, partly at least, until present day. There might have been a devaluation of liberal values, especially in the mid-20th century, but the US has since definitely reestablished those ideals after World War II with its support to Europe, making it an example for the rest of the world as well as situating liberal democracy as the backbone of US democracy promotion (discussed in the previous chapter).[68]

However, when Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) became president, he deviated from Truman's Containment Policy to one based upon the defense of human rights. Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) nevertheless changed the game yet again, for while he advocated human rights as well, he has established a strong foundation upon which democracy promotion would take a shape.[69] In a published speech in front of the British Parliament in June 1982, Reagan announced a new campaign for foreign policy, one that would rest upon democracy promotion.[70] Before this point, democracy promotion existed but was very limited to certain areas; in other words, democracy promotion did not exist in its modern shape until this point. In the 1950s, it had been centered on security and economy; with the establishment of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the

1960s and the 1966 Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act, it shifted heavily towards relying on economic assistance to developing countries. In the 1970s, with Carter in charge, it focused on human rights. Finally, with Reagan and his new campaign, he explicitly stated democracy promotion to be a US foreign policy goal, establishing the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983, a non-profit, quasi-autonomous organization. Democracy promotion policies started to pour into Asian countries, such as the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. Reagan's strong sense of democracy support was not absolute, yet he still supported what is called "friendly tyrants," visible, for example, in his public support of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire.[71]

In a research paper by Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan and Mitchell A. Seligson measuring the efficiency of the US' democracy promotion agenda from 1990 to 2003, they attempted to understand the impact of US funds on recipient countries. The authors focused their research on USAID's budget and record programs, taking into consideration and isolating democracy-related programs from others and including control variables with careful consideration of each countries' uniqueness. They came up with four discoveries: 1) USAID has had an impact on recipient countries; 2) the process is slow and takes time to "mature"; 3) aid does not come only from international sources such as USAID, but from domestic aid givers as well; and finally, 4) USAID has had the biggest impact related to certain programs such as elections, civil society, etc.[72] Similar research on the impact of USAID on democratization in the developing world from the period 1988-2001 has had similar findings: aimed programs of democracy assistance that focus on democratizations per se payoff better than those coming in packages such as economic aid.[73]

Similar US speeches followed, such as George H. W. Bush's (1989- 1993) October 1990 speech to the UN General Assembly, where he stressed the notions of peace, human rights and democracy for an international political order, and Bill Clinton's (1993-2001) "democratic enlargement speech."[74] Furthermore, the 1990s functioned as an important decade for democracy promotion; due to the fall of communism and the Soviet Union, the US had been able to remain the world's most powerful country, so it consequently became easier for the US to promote its ideals around the world. Even in some places where there was doubt, such as in Sub Saharan countries, the Africans themselves accepted US democracy promotion. To some other regions such as Asia, democracy promotion and aid increased as well.[75] Not only did the US feel it become easier to promote notions of

democracy and liberalism abroad, the world was more at ease with it; as I believe, the memory of communism sat as a contrast to American liberalism. The US had gained consensus and legitimacy. Christopher Hobson has provided two argument for the triumph of democracy and liberalism: 1) it has explicitly called for democracy as a "universal value," a position strengthened after the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (although it was ambiguously stated as such without further clarification), and 2) when or if democracy is compared to other modes of governance, democracy wins; mainly because it was able to bring about a "good outcome," especially when compared to previous regimes like communism. Its characteristics have gained general appeal for its advocacy for peace, international cooperation, freedom, human rights, etc.[76]

The result of its success, however, has been debated. Julide Karakoc believes that it only helped establish electoral authoritarianism, but this is a point to be drawn later when I discuss the paradoxes associated with democracy promotion.[77] In the 2000s, with President George W. Bush (2001-2009), the need for democracy promotion became clearer. During the beginning of his presidency, W. Bush focused on domestic reforms, i.e. economic and institutional reforms; however, after the 9/11 terrorist act, the game changed. Bush called for a National Security Strategy (a.k.a., the Bush Doctrine) in 2002, which mainly focused on promoting certain ideals like human rights, freedom and liberty. He further called for a Freedom Agenda through a series of Fact Sheets (reports giving useful information on US democratic values) to promote these ideals globally and increased funds for organizations promoting democracy such as USAID.[78]

In the aftermath of 9/11, some changes occured reflective of US foreign policy to date. In a comparative study by Katerina Dalacoura, the activities of the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) are compared in the Middle East, especially democracy promotion to the Middle East since 9/11. The MEPI was found to be working in 14 countries to support reforms in the areas of education, media, human rights, judiciary, etc. The BMENA incorporated civil societies, private sectors and other economic entities from both BMENA countries and 68 additional countries to promote economic development. The study found their financial aid to be little in comparison to the projects they are working on, but it was effective in a very different way. MEPI and BMENA gained the support of Bush from the public; this support was mainly about Bush's vision of the importance of democracy and democracy promotion in the Middle East. Secondly, it has stirred confusion within Middle

Eastern countries concerning democracy.[79] Another point to be considered is some of the initiatives that the US started in the Middle East. As discussed earlier, 9/11 alerted the US of the dangers of authoritarian regimes abroad and the importance of changing the status quo. In 2002, Bush with Secretary of State Colin Powell signed MEPI to promote and push for reforms in the Middle East as well as to establish the BMENA in 2004 in a G8 summit. Soon, both the MEPI and BMENA lost a great part of their legitimacy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for three reasons: 1) the US invasion of Iraq, 2) their support for Israel and 3) the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, not to mention that the two organizations lacked coherence and did not have the assumed results in the MENA region.[80]

While Bush dealt with terrorism and it shaped many of his policies, Barack Obama (2009-2017) had to deal with terrorism, the Islamic State (IS), the ongoing wars and the protests breaking out in the Middle East, which is not to mention the Arab Spring and its reverberating refugee crisis. As early as his campaign, Obama made sure to assert to Americans that the focal point of his presidency would be domestic affairs, thus criticizing Bush's foreign policy, particularly in Iraq. However, in two speeches during his world tour after his elections in Cairo and Ghana in 2009, he shifted towards his ideals of US foreign policy. Obama called for "sustainable democracy" and emphasized the importance of human rights.[81] According to Eric Patterson (2012), Obama's "sustainable democracy" policies were echoed through his government's officials. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton often elaborated on Obama's vision through her talks of the US's support of human rights, minorities rights, freedom and reforms, all of which surpassed mere support for fair elections to jurisdiction reforms. As for the actualization of his vision, Obama actually increased the fund to programs existent during Bush's presidency. While he decreased the State Departments' funds targeting democracy and human rights, he simultaneously increased it to specific countries, especially to the greater Middle East.[82]

Nevertheless, the sometimes negative image associated to US democracy promotion is not an imaginary one, with the US often having to choose between what it promotes and its own interests. The dilemma here is mostly related to the economy and US security versus what it promotes in terms of human rights and democratic values,[83] which can be seen in the US' initial reaction to some countries during the Arab Spring. Oz Hassan (2015) argues that Saudi Arabia stood as a "counter-revolutionary" pressure to its own interests during this time. Indeed, the Saudi-US relationship is very strong despite the

prior being everything the US promotes against, such as human rights and freedom of speech. This dilemma was loosened a bit after 9/11 when Bush pushed for reform within the Middle East, but the US quickly found that it could not be an open opponent of Saudi Arabia. US officials have often talked about the importance of their partnership with Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi's power has only increased since. For instance, during the Arab Spring, the US backed Saudi Arabia's commitment to oppressing the anti-government Shia protests in order to protect the Sunni government because the US had economic- and security-oriented interests grounded in the existent Bahraini government as well as Saudi Arabia.

To conclude, US democracy promotion has been very important and crucial, establishing many organizations, signing agreements with foreign states to promote democracy and democratic elements, funding civil society organizations and pressuring some countries for reforms. On the other hand, American foreign policy has not always been consistent when other US interests are at stake. Even though different presidents and administrations brought different foreign policies that have affected international politics, democracy promotion has always been on the agenda, even if it faced some recession at times. The US, perceived as the world's leader and hegemony, was built upon democracy, and that has been reflected in its democracy promotion efforts.

2.3 EU Democracy Promotion: History and Debates

After the terrible wars in Europe and the conflicts that tore through the continent, it was deemed inevitable for the EU to promote democracy and export it once it establishes its own stability, peace and strong democratic rule, first to its neighbours in Eastern Europe and then abroad and overseas. The EU's democracy promotion worked to balance the unipolarity of the US, especially after 9/11 and the Bush administration's reaction, which has only accelerated the EU's response in using three strategies to promote democracy in recent decades: *linkage*, *leverage* and *governance*. Linkage is focused on the economic assistance and social change that is assumed to lead to democracy. Thus, linkage is considered an indirect way for democracy promotion, setting the foundation for democracy with prerequisite democratic elements such as economic reforms, social change, education programs, etc., Hence, it is a bottom-up approach based on two pillars: 1) an agency-based approach to strengthen civil society and 2) a structure-based approach. The assumed consequences are an independent civil society and a transnational exchange. This particular

approach to democracy promotion was popular in the early-1990s when the EU first started putting democracy promotion on the agenda as one of its foreign policies as part of the Maastricht Treaty, and this can be seen in the activities and establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Through the linkage strategy, the EU was able to establish the Barcelona Process, a partnership initiative of cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours. Though it started off with much hope, it soon proved unpromising. Consequently, the EU's democracy promotion via linkage has had limited influence on democracy.

The second of those strategies, leverage, soon took off in the 1990s. Both linkage and leverage are based on the theories of democratization of the 1960s and 1980s. The leverage approach is based on pressuring authoritarian rulers to make some reforms by offering some incentives in exchange. This strategy was most obvious during the EU Eastern Enlargement, through which the EU pressured governments to make some reforms and incorporate democratic elements, from freedom of speech to human rights, in exchange for their accession to the EU, which itself contains many economic, political and social benefits. It is considered to be a direct approach to democratization, a top-down approach aimed at introducing change from above. The assumed effect of this approach is a democratic rule, but it is highly reliable on the bargaining power of both sides, the integrity of conditionality and, of course, the domestic politics of targeted countries. However, through this approach, the EU's democracy promotion is seen to be selective and unfair. Instead of the EU offering accession opportunities to other neighbors like Ukraine or Moldova, it has instead switched to reform initiatives, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Also, apart from the EU's Eastern Enlargement case, this approach does not really fit into other scenarios.[84] On the other hand, in a study that included 36 countries from Eastern Europe and neighboring Mediterranean countries from 1988-2004, leverage was found to have immensely succeeded.[85]

The third and the final strategy of the EU is governance, adopted in the 2000s and still is in use today (along with the previous two approaches). This approach has its roots in institutionalism and assumes a blurring of lines between the domestic and external spheres. It is an indirect model of democracy promotion that works by focusing on legislation. Thus, the main actors of this approach are administrative officials working for transgovernmental modes of governance. This is most obvious within the EU, and its assumed results are the independence of administrators from the influence of particular

governments. As a result, EU democracy promotion programs overseas depends on initiatives such as the ENP.[86]

Practically speaking, these three strategies have sprouted the EU's democracy promotion as a result of the Maastricht Treaty's introduction of democracy and human rights as a foreign policy, Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). In addition, some 12 member states agreed to include democracy and human rights as crucial conditions for EU accession in 1991. From then on, the Development Council of the EU has included and expanded those two to be part of EU foreign policy. Moreover, the ENP, established in 1995, calls for peace and political stability abroad. Yet, just like the US, the EU has its own dilemma between its own economic and security interests and the promoted values. Their values have not always been consistent, which made some individuals and groups disappointed in the EU as a whole. For example, in Egypt and Tunisia and during the Arab Spring, the EU was not definitively supportive of some of the protests that called for equality, justice and democracy.

For a long time, the EU has favoured its partnerships with Arabic dictators, especially when the promoted values conflicted with issues related to the EU's economic interests. Also, in 1992 and during the Algerian Coup, the EU remained silent and hesitant to take a stand against the military so as not to lose its partnership with standing regime.[87] The EU also values Saudi Arabia as its close ally. Oz suggests that the EU's response to the Bahraini uprising was due to the influence of Britain, France and Germany and their fear of the Shia population along with the threat of a greater influence of Iran in the region. They have not really had a strong reaction other than weakly calling for some reforms.[88] To conclude, the EU tried to keep up with the US and make democracy promotion part of its foreign policy, and although not always strong, they were able to do some initiatives that supported some elements of democracy promotion, such as human rights and economic reforms. For decades now, the EU has been putting money and efforts into democracy promotion, and it has been mostly successful in the EU's Eastern neighboring countries, yet less successful overseas, especially when it opposes one of the EU's key interests. Both the EU and the US have failed the world by supporting dictatorships during the beginning of the Arab Spring, but that does not expunge their efforts in funding some other areas and program.

2.4 The US and EU Democracy Promotion Through a Bottom-Up Approach

Democracy promotion, specifically the components related to aid, takes three types. The first is directed at reforms in domestic politics and is thus usually directed at elections and political parties. The second type is directed at institutional reforms in legislative to judicial institutions. Finally, the third is directed at civil society, which has been a rising trend since the 1990s. Civil society aid can be divided into four parts: 1) aid directed at NGOs to support certain focused topics such as gender equality and human rights, 2) aid to labour unions, 3) aid focused on media and freedom of speech and finally 4) aid to spread democratic values, including educational programs to explain democracy to citizens.[89] On the same track we find the EU's and the US' support for civil society can usually be explained by Tocqueville's theory on civil society,[90] yet it has not always been Tocqueville that has dominated the minds of US foreign policy makers but rather the political events that surrounded them and which affected their powers.[91]

Consequently, before the 1990s and until the end of the Cold War, the US did not explicitly support civil society organizations in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (though arguably did covertly). Yet, with the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, the US changed its position, becoming supportive of those post-communist civil societies to strengthen or install democratic governments. In this way, the end of the Cold War and the new emerging political global trends gave a major push for democratic aid. Accordingly, such aid can be divided into three phases. The first is in the 1980s when the US aid was mostly invested in elections, the second when they added aid directed at reforms of political institutions and the last came in the 1990s with the ideology of strengthening civil society to strengthen the state.[92] The question that was in everyone's mind during that final phase was what exactly civil society was. The ambiguity surrounding the concept itself made it difficult for donors to decide what it was that constitutes civil society and how to strengthen it.[93]

Because of this ambiguity, there were two opinions regarding the role and position of civil society. On one side, civil society was part of the state; on the other side, which is the non-normative approach to civil society, it was separate from the state and the market.[94] Yet, civil society as an autonomous body has not posed much allure for aiders, and even Putnam's Tocquevillian concept of civil society (see chapter one) did not attract donors either, especially USAID because it meant deploying a lot of money and patiently

waiting for results. Another debate that occupied donors was whether or not civil society was separate from political society.[95] The majority of donors prefered seeing civil society as separate from political society for many reasons, such as not being accused of political interference.[96] As much as these debates have occupied the literature on democracy promotion and civil society, they have equally occupied those outside academia, especially in donors' understanding of what kind of aid they need to employ, to whom and how to promote democracy through such aid.

Yet, those debates did not paralyse the activities of donors. The main thesis for such donors is that civil society is "good" and "strengthening" its organizations will lead to democracy, which is assumed to be a "good," fit-all concept. Thus, we have witnessed support for civil society and specifically NGOs in the developing world, Asia, Eastern Europe, etc. The US has been very active in such fields and has been promoting the development of civil society in roughly a 100 countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Asia, former Soviet Union countries and more as a way of promoting democracy. Joining the US is Europe, Japan, Canada and private sectors among many others, all under one cause, strengthening civil society, and this has been used for over 10 years now. In this fashion, civil society is always perceived as a positive element that leads to democratization with the understanding that citizens need awareness and trust in the government, while monitoring its action to secure transparency.[97]

The most popular form of democracy promotion through civil society is that which is built upon supporting NGOs. It started in academia with Michael Bratton's argument in 1989 for supporting NGOs to better civil societies towards democratic governance.[98] Bratton triggered a variety of literatures that were soon to emerge, not only in academia but in donor arguments as well. Essentially a popular liberal view assumes the connection between civil society, NGOs and democratization as follows: NGOs fall under civil society; they strengthen it through their activities, and in doing so, they strengthen democracy and/or promote it. This is based on and supported by many scholars such as Tocqueville, Putnam, Huntington and the Modernization school.[99] Claire Mercer lists the most popular argument for such a thesis of the relations between NGOs, civil society and democratization as follows: 1) they "pluralize" the institutionalisms in the community, thus bolstering civil society; 2) they function and work on certain categories such as minorities, which would only help to "deepen" and "widen" the cooperation and support from more

audiences in the community; finally, 3) autonomous NGOs can challenge state power that might, under pressure, push governments for reforms and better performance.[100]

Julie Fisher has also argued for strengthening civil society through the activities of NGOs because they form a middle ground between the government and the governed in which discussions can be held, which is good for the health of the society; hence, the more NGOs a civil society has, the stronger it is.[101] These kinds of arguments are the most popular now between donors and the international political systems, one that is dominated by a Tocquevillian liberal view in favor of civil society and democratic governments. Yet, there are some criticisms directed at these popular views of NGOs and their relation to civil societies and democratization. First, how does one define what entitlements an entity or an organization such as an NGO should have? Second, it assumes the benefits of NGOs' work and their acceptance by all citizens, as well as governments, along with the assumption of them being part of civil society and thus the likeliness of both, which is not guaranteed. Finally, in some certain situations, NGOs proved to be anything but democracy promoters. In 1980s Sudan, independent extremist NGOs did not support civil society and did not indirectly promote democracy but rather the opposite; they damaged Sudanese civil society that had lasted up until that point.[102]

Because of the dominance of Western liberalism, and thus the underlying assumptions of NGOs, the latter has gained immense importance, and many forms of aid have been poured into bettering NGOs in an attempt to promote democracy in the Middle East. Yet, because of the complex political situations of the Middle East and its categorization as the opposite of democracy, e.g., authoritarian, semi-authoritarian or hybrid regimes. NGOs have been seen by these governments as an opposition to their power that needs to be limited. Thus, NGOs in much of the literature are seen more as support for developing countries by which they promote development rather than changing modes of governance. Western governments with liberal tendencies often portray NGOs as a "third sector" whose job is to help both the state sector and the private sector towards better social and economic development, thereby improving their relations with one another. On the other hand, from a neo-liberal perspective, the private sector would encompass NGOs due to their functionality, but they still perceive civil society to be limited to the development sector.[103]

In juxtaposition to this, leftists read NGOs through Gramsci's theory; NGOs, or civil society in general, are an arena in which people could resist the hegemony of the

state. The perceptions of NGOs on both the right and the left can be shown to be accurate assessments, but in different contexts. For example, in light of the liberal view of NGOs, Filipino and Indian NGOs were able to constitute a middle ground between the fragile relationship of unions and political parties. Looking at a different context, particularly Indonesia and Vietnam, NGOs were able to be an arena of resistance to the hegemony of the state.[104] David Korten (1990) divides NGOs into three generations which Gerard Clarke interpreted as 1) "committed to relief and welfare activities" and "non-political," 2) "local development projects" and 3), referring to Latin America in the 1970s, a space of political resistance to hegemony.[105] Thus, Clarke concludes by dividing the debate into Tocquevillian and Gramscian positions (which is the popular perception of NGOs, and indeed civil society at large). The Tocquevillian view sees the relationship between NGOs and democracy simply as NGOs supporting democratic regimes to strengthen its government and/or to establish it, which can be seen in Brazil, the Philippines and Thailand. The Gramscian position views NGOs as an arena of fighting hegemony and elitism, and this can be seen in countries such as Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s as well as in India.[106]

2.5 Conclusion: Towards Coherent Notions of Democracy Promotion, Civil Society and NGOs

Democracy promotion has consistently been on the agendas of Western countries since the end of the Cold War, with the US and the EU being the most prominent actors. It is assumed to be "good," and promoted as a "good governance agenda."[107] In addition, during the same period of the 1990s, the spotlight was shifted to civil society as a potentially beneficial way of promoting democracy. It is what David Lewis referred to as a "virtuous circle," that is the circle that connects civil society, the state and the market,[108] all of which are assumed to enhance each other for an even better governance. Although, as discussed in the previous chapter as well as this one, there is some ambiguity surrounding the concept of civil society inside and outside academia as well as in Western and non-Western contexts, with the two most popular views of civil society being those of Tocqueville and Gramsci. The Tocquevillian position places civil society as the right hand of the state, although it can be autonomous and independent; a strong civil society means a strong state, and this can be most prominently seen in the EU's support for civil society with its Eastern neighbors. With the emergence of civil society in Latin America during the

1970s and the Eastern European fight against communism in the 1980s, the Gramscian view of civil society surfaced. Gramsci believes civil society has the potential to resist the hegemony of a state, class divisions and elitism. Thus, Tocqueville can be seen in some Western contexts, Hegel in colonial contexts and Gramsci in Eastern European or Latin American resistance.[109]

With that being stated, democracy promotion has also been criticized on many levels. Most obvious has been cases where Western powers find themselves in a position to choose an important aspect of their economy or security versus refusing it for the morality of the values they promote. Along with the above-mentioned cases in which this occurred, more general paradoxes exist as well. For example, there is a debate on whether or not this kind of democracy promotion through a fit-all agenda works well with all countries. David Sogge, in studying civil society in Mozambique, finds the concept irrelevant due to its colonial history (which can be generalized to other countries).[110] Also, James Ferguson finds the concept irrelevant because democracy promotion through civil society and most importantly NGOs is impossible because NGOs cannot really resists dictatorships.[111] This exact position is what I aim to research in my next chapter. A Gramscian position in an authoritarian country would not always work because sometimes the government is too strong and makes sure to limit the work of civil society and NGOs, while a Tocquevillian position would only mean strengthening the state and state-supported NGOs and civil society organizations. With the West promoting democracy through civil society, how does all of this work? How did the West react when people demand democracy while being suppressed publically? How have the Western dilemmas of democracy promotion worked? And is it democracy promotion, with disappointment found in many contexts, still relevant and does it hold a value?

Chapter Three: Turkey

3.1 Introduction

In discussing civil society in Turkish literature, one can find many views on the relationship between civil society and the state. These views usually echo either a liberal or a social worldview of civil society. On the liberal side, civil society is a different entity from the state, whether it is a "liberal-individualist-pluralist" approach – which is the most common view – or others that are derivative of liberalism. Another shared notion is that of the importance of unity as well as differences, and in that matter they believe the solution lies in the "pluralism" of different groups' ability to gain freedom. The different approaches of the liberal view usually depart from the question, "Why would the 'strong state-weak civil society dichotomy' be a major problem" in Turkish politics. The social view of civil society echoes the importance of civil society as a place of resistance, but the literature discussing these ideas are no match for the quantity of literature on liberalism.[112] Thus, in Turkish society we can see the Tocquevillian-Gramscian debate.

Funda Gencoglu Onbasi suggests that the problem with Turkish literature is its focus on "democracy-friendly civil society" and the idea that the solution is shifting from that frame of thinking to a more "democratic civil society" approach. Another idea that appears in the Turkish case is the ambiguity of civil society as a concept. Thus, if civil society is seen as a counter-hegemony, it is unclear whether this refers to the government or the military. On the other hand, if the concept is understood to mean CSOs and NGOs, it is still not clear whether this is a reference to right- or left-winged NGOs.[113] Therefore, one must ask how to describe the current Turkish regime. The question reflects how to understand civil society itself in Turkey. There can be many arguments on how to go about this. The Turkish state can be referred to as an authoritative regime since it has all the characteristics of one. It can also be described as a hybrid regime or an illiberal democracy since it lacks "inclusiveness" from Dahl's three conditions of a democracy (inclusiveness, civil liberties and competition). On the other hand, one can argue that the regime does include everyone but is in fact a popular democracy i.e. electoral democracy.

I would have to agree with the second and third arguments because real elections still take place, and although minorities are being oppressed, the country largely depends on popular vote (that is often manipulated with through propaganda). However, we can see

general democratic backsliding, especially after the 2016 coup. Thus, the first section concerns Turkish civil society and its EU integration process. The EU promotes democracy in Turkey through the Europeanization process using bottom-up and top-down approaches, i.e through strengthening CSOs and government institutions, which were deemed effective at first but with the change of government policies and the political positions of different groups have been slowed down. Then, the discussions will be about the EU democracy promotion efforts in Turkey and how this was reflected in the Gezi protests. The third section offers a walk through of US democracy promotion via grants; in this specific section, data collection was difficult to obtain, so I opted for a year-by-year investigation to understand how politics between the US and Turkey was reflected in the US' grant scheme. Finally, in my conclusion I will add the most recent events of the 2016 coup and recent elections.

3.2 Turkish Politics Since the 1980s Reflected in Civil Society

Right-winged Turkish parties like the Justice and Development Party (AKP, also referred to as JDP), The Motherland Party (ANAP) or the Democratic Party (DP) have always believed that the military and its secular policies were a diversion from the Turkish Republic and its *milli irade* (national will), mainly conservative and religious values. However, when they have gotten the chance to take a high office position, they have not allowed their ideologies to get in the way of economic benefits. The point in all of this is that the military and its safeguarded secularism has been a source of fear for any party that took power in Turkey; thus, during the rule of these three parties, the relationship with the military has always been conflictual and mistrustful. In addition to the three parties' stress on a better economy, the fear of a military coup and defending old traditions counter positioned against secularism, meaning these parties rarely defended minorities.[114] This seeming intolerance of "the other," which is all other ideologies but one's own, has been a major theme in Turkish politics.

The 1980s is a particularly important reference point when looking at Turkish history and Turkish civil society. After the 1980 coup in Turkey, civil society established a strong base, which does not mean that it was non-existent before but, just like discussed above in relation to Eastern Europe and Latin America, civil society rose to the surface yet again. Along with civil society, the two concepts democracy and neoliberalism gained popularity as well. Along with the rise of neoliberalism, Turkey made a "structural

adjustment program,"[115] but Turgut Ozal (1989-1993) of ANAP, who ruled during these critical time,s cared too much about economic growth. However, this did not interfere with or spread to the political sphere, and Ozal cannot be described as a democratic leader. Ozal was elected in 1989 and had the vivid memory of the 1980 coup in mind; his policies were specifically directed towards restraining the military's power. He even started the EU accession plans, following and accepting some of their requirements, yet this has nothing to do with Ozal's desire for a democratic country but rather his ambition to strengthen the economy and out of financial self-interest.[116]

The 1990s were no more stable period than the preceding decade. In 1997 during the rule of a coalition government between the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Reformist Party, (IDP) and the Welfare Part (RP) and under the Islamic Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the right-wing islamic RP,[117] the military sought another coup because they opposed the rule of the Islamic leader and claimed the party violated the secular Turkish constitutional policies, thereby removing them from office. This coup is very significant to Turkish civil society because the coup received approval from CSOs.[118] As mentioned, after the 1980s, Turkey witnessed the emerging popularity and new importance of civil society. During and after the 1980s coup, CSOs were able to support the demands of particular groups such as that of the Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgenders and Queers (LGBTQ) movement and environmentalists. The CSOs did not oppose the authority of the ruling government nor debate their democratic acclimations; instead, they focused on such groups' demands, which has been essential because the support and rising significance of CSOs during the time sprouted into "multiple identities," meaning different groups of people like LGBT, women, etc.

Moreover, the newly materializing Kemalits-versus-Islamists debates played out within civil society. Civil society has certainly gained some independence. According to Markus Ketola, the positive side of this lies in the new nature of "plurality" that could represent and defend minorities rights, yet the negative side lies in its "vulnerability" to conflicts.[119] With this in mind, why did CSOs emerge? The answer is related to three incidents that raised the importance of Turkish CSOs because they shook the "papa state" (father state) propaganda: 1) the "Susurluk incident" shook the Turkish people's trust in the government when some politicians were shown to be involved with the mafia; 2) when the devastating 1999 earthquake occurred, for which the government was unable to

respond and take a lead; and 3) the market crash that led to an economic problem in 2001, revealing the Turkish government as incompetent and corrupt.[120]

3.3 EU Accession and the Europeanization of Civil Society Under the AKP

Turkey took many steps before becoming an official EU candidate country. In 1949, Turkey joined the Council of Europe, and it joined the European Court of Human Rights in 1987; these two steps have been considered a milestone in Turkish politics in its efforts towards Europeanization. Yet, Turkey was not a candidate until 1999 during the Helsinki Summit.[121] Oner Selcen differentiates between two concepts when speaking of EU accession processes: "EU-ization" and "Europeanization."[122] The first refers to the formalities from institutions to legal formalities, while the second term refers to the deeper adjustments pertaining to political and social aspects. Europeanization depends mainly on domestic politics and politicians, with such steps taken by Turkey in 1949 and 1987 being considered Europeanization. Consequently, Oner thinks of the Helsinki Summit as a life changing event for Turkey's political and social components offering a diverse approach aimed at unifying civil society and transforming the differences between minorities like Armenians, Kurds and Alevis into a point of agreement: support for the EU project.

Of course, differences remained and conflicts were a reality, but it was seen as the introduction of the possibility of a united future.[123] From its first day in office, the AKP has been supportive of the EU accession, yet since taking office through the elections in 2001, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2018, their position has changed. For the AKP, the EU has been an explanation for their domestic and international political affairs.[124] As a result of the fear of the military, who strongly opposed Islamic parties, the AKP asserted itself as the first elected "conservative democratic" party revolutionizing domestic reforms in order to be more democratic; logically,the EU accession support was an important element to their claim for democracy.[125] The AKP therefore tried to establish itself as opposed to previous leaders to gain popularity and to appear democratic, thereby legitimizing its policies and ideologies. Yet, when the AKP made changes to the National Security Council (MGK) in 2003, opposition erupted accusing the AKP of trying to use the EU to deploy its authoritative Islamic agenda. At the time, the EU accession was attacked by parties opposed to the AKP. The leftist Republican People's Party (CHP) and the military were the biggest oppositional forces to the AKP and therefore the accession, which was against

their version of a secular-Western ideology; from their perspective, the AKP was using the EU accession as an excuse. A weekly newspaper cited one of the military admirals (Admiral Ozden Ornek) as saying the military views the EU as a process that would lead to the end of the Turkish Republic by separating it into Kurdish and Turkish republics.[126]

In 2005, Turkey and the EU started negotiations.[127] The EU always thought of transforming Turkey into a democratic country, mostly through a bottom-up approach, i.e. through CSOs and particularly NGOs.[128] After the 1980 coup, CSOs were seen as an opposition to the sovereignty of the country, but right after the coup, this position was loosened; with the EU negotiations and the EU's stress on the importance of civil society and its organizations, CSOs have gained even more freedoms. As interpreted by Ayhan Kaya, Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Icduygu have listed four reasons for the increase and emergence of CSOs after the coup. According to them, the reasons are as follows: 1) the challenges made to the meanings of modernity and secular, along with the rising political significance of Islamic groups; 2) the strong state was not anymore the only reality among the rise of CSOs; 3) the EU accession process and the EU insistence on concepts like democracy, diversity and civil society; and finally 4) globalization.[129] The EU sought to promote democracy through both leverage and linkage (as mentioned above), and they imposed many reform requirement on Turkey in many fields such as human rights and democracy, consequently adding 8 reform packages for the Copenhagen criteria introduced from 2000 to 2004.

This later failed due to credibility problems from the EU as well as the nature of Turkish politics that drastically changed. As for linkage, the EU tried to support autonomous CSOs that could help in such areas as human rights, minority rights and the development of a critical area against the government. Consequently, despite the slowing down of the current "EU-ization" and conditionality since 2006, the "Europeanization" process has already affected Turkey.[130] In addition, the EU shifted their funds for Turkish CSOs from human rights to accession, even initiating the "civil society dialogue" (later published by the European Commission). Both parties wanted to make EU and Turkish citizens knowledgeable of one another, so they included the enlargement process and its progress in document records as well as stressed the themes of human rights and democracy. The Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs (EUSG) further initiated grant programs equivalent to €19,300,000 for civil society, financing 119 projects, each of which includes Turkey and an EU country/candidate.[131]

Because of the stringency on civil society, organizations sought to use the EU process to promote ideals that would transform Turkey into a democracy helping minorities; for example, in the southeast Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, the number of organizations increased from 213 to 464 from 2000 to 2007.[132] Moreover, those areas of human rights, freedom of speech and minorities rights belonging to the Copenhagen criteria were facilitated more by NGOs funded by the EU. As part of civil society, some NGOs had already emerged in the 1980s and the 1990s; however, some 20,000 NGOs were closed by the military following the 1980 coup.[133] This has been altered with the change in civil society and further strengthened with the EU's support for NGOs, which have played a major role in promoting democracy by playing their assumed role stated in the Copenhagen Criteria as "enhanced participatory democracy through strengthened NGOs." This strengthening was achieved through three pillars: 1) "training programmes," 2) "raising awareness of civil society among NGOs," and finally 3) "micro grants to NGOs."[134] There are many examples of these kinds of foundations: The Human Rights Association, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Economic Development Foundation, Turkish History Foundation, and many more.[135] In light of this, how did the AKP government react to the EU accession and civil society groups?

The AKP government cannot be described as democratic, and their policies, especially after the Gezi protests, have been anything but democratic. Perhaps from the beginning of their rule until 2009, when they were still scared of the military or people's support of a military who opposed any Islamic agenda, this could have been the case. However, since they have been reelected time and again, they have become more confident in their policies and their enforcement. From 2009 to 2014, the AKP increasingly changed their position,[136] becoming more confident in removing opposition; moreover, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current president (and previous prime minister) has tightened his grip on media outlets, removing any opposition and implementing many authoritative policies. From here on out, Erdogan closed or fired many media outlets and journalists, some of which opted for supporting the AKP after being controlled by the military. Of course, it was not just the media that has taken the brunt of Erdogan's authoritarian agenda; his policies reached private lives as well, making politics a space for both public and private spheres, but not in a good way. As argued by some scholars, the AKP has entitled itself as a "conservative democratic" party, even when their policies diverged from the concept of "democratic." In fact, Julde Karakoc elaborates upon the AKP's authoritative tendencies,

and according to her, other scholars such as Ziya Onis see the party as a "conservative globalist" party.[137]

Sefa Simsek argues that Turkish laws are only strictly (and notoriously) applied to the opposition, so when the MGK made some laws to restrict Islamic groups, secular groups in Turkey such as the Kemalists stood with the military. As a result, this is another significant problem with Turkish politics: as long as unfair, undemocratic activities are not directed towards those who apply it, it is tolerated and even supported.[138] He further argues that there are general obstacles in Turkish politics that stand in its way of democracy and democratic consolidation. Karakoc likewise argues that elections alone are not an indicator of democracy but rather one element of democracy that is not sufficient to label a country democratic.[139] For Simsek, there are many examples in Turkish politics that make it difficult for the country to consolidate democracy. For examples, how the republic's three spheres of the state, economy and civil society are not separate from each other and nor autonomous; if anything, the state controls, or partially exerts control over, the other two spheres. In addition, he argues that free media, which is considered an element of democracy, is also not independent from the state. Finally, he explains the holy charismatic leader that exists in Turkish politics, with leaders leaving office either by an opponent banning their party or death. The exception would be both Tanus Ciller, leader of the DP, and Mesut Yilmaz from ANAP after the 2002 elections; however, this is not common in Turkish politics and was exceptionally new.[140] Therefore, aside from those conditions that make Turkey prone to authoritarianism, the military also exerts influence over Turkish politics.

Uniquely, the military considers itself "the guardian of the secular state" (Karakoc, 2015); however, the military's title as the secularist guard is always on the front page of excuses when it comes to their control over aspects of Turkish politics and institutions. Moreover, the word "secularism" is different in the Turkish context, functioning as a mere tool for the Turkish military to guide politics for the Turkish military. Thus, when the AKP first won elections and Abdullah Gul became their first prime minister from 2002 to 2003 and later served as president from 2007 to 2014, the Turkish military stirred opposition and led "Republican Protests" against Islamic politicians.[141] In sum, the Turkish military does not have respect for the result of elections, but neither does anyone when it comes to the opposition; this idea of otherness is always present and usually accompanied by a complete

or partial control over the media and law, inciting people to gain support by protesting against their opponents to save the state.

Another condition in Turkish politics that has stirred debate, especially after the AKP's successful elections, is the relationship between Islam and democracy.[142] Because of this in combination with the AKP's understanding of the military's wish to regain control of the country and the military's hatred towards right-wing parties, the AKP has made some changes to the judiciary to further limit military control and expand their own spheres of influence. The referendum that was voted for in 2010 was a great example of this, in which the AKP government was able to dismiss personnel from the Judges and Prosecutors Supreme Council (HSYK); this referendum furthermore made military officers who participated in coups susceptible to prosecution, removing any legal protections. Furthermore, a year before the referendum was held, the AKP government announced their "Kurdish Opening Policy" which later fell apart. The AKP has even jailed many Kurdish scholars and media personnel. They have made such arrests against the opposition as a "punishment" to scare them.[143] All these elements of non-democracy, this power struggle between the military and Islamists and the AKP's changes to Turkish politics and society have made Turkey a non-democratic country with democratic elections, which has greatly poured over into Turkish civil society, CSOs and, naturally, NGOs. Therefore, the EU's bottom-up approach to democratization through CSOs has been affected as well.

3.4 The Echoes of Turkish Politics on EU Accession and Civil Society

Resulting from the aforementioned complications in Turkish society and politics, the problems related to civil society can be divided into two areas: 1) Turkish domestic politics 2) the EU and its enlargement policies. Simsek believes that the cause of first set of problems would be the interdependence of different institutions to the state. Thus, CSOs in general and NGOs in particular are not separate from the state. As Manceau explains, this dependency cannot be broken because many NGOs were founded on the grounds of cooperation with the state, and many others suffer from financial problems such that they support the state. This dependence Simsek mentions is happening in all aspects of social and political life, such as media, law, NGOs, economy and even education, with the staff from different schools and universities being considered employees of the government since they take their salaries from the government. Thus, education-related unions, just like

that of media and CSOs in general, cannot force a real autonomous block dedicated to democratization.[144]

Furthermore, Simsek discusses the general themes in turkish civil society that add to the previously mentioned critique of Turkish civil society. Simsek emphasizes the fragmented, conflictual nature of the groups composing civil society. Quoting Karin Vorhoff's ideas on the subject, he argues that the first problems lies in the different ideologies of economic groups, making it harder for them to unite against the state's hegemony and interference. In contrast, Simsek asserts that Tanil Bora has a different interpretation of seeing the "Turkish professional organizations" as divided between the left-right spector of politics. Of course, the right-wing organizations support the government and earn their support in exchange while the left-wing organizations hold an opposing position. Likewise, Turkish society is divided between "Turks and Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis, Islamists and Kemalists," with these divisions overriding their resistance to a non-democratic state or authoritative policies. Interestingly, two women wanted to know if the fragmentation is obvious in everyday life: "They went to a movie theatre in Fatih, a district of Istanbul known for its religious conservatism, dressed in mini-skirts, and alternatively, to an exclusive nightclub, wearing black veils. In both instances they were forced to leave the premises." Along these lines, Simsek believes two reasons lie behind the weakness and dependence of civil society: 1) the existence under a "homogeneous nation-state that rejects different identities and subcultures"; thus, its share of decisions and its fragmentation make it difficult for them to form a balancing power to the state; and 2) the military's hegemony over political and social aspects of Turkey such as the MGK.[145] Thus, he sees those divisions reflected in a civil society that makes Turkish citizens employees of the state and makes civil society's impact little. Although CSOs are adequate in quantity, they are less so in quality; even those NGOs who "look good" are not strong and autonomous enough to face the state. Funda Gencoglu Onbasi divides the failure of Turkish CSOs to the role assigned to them by the EU to democratize from below into "internal" and "external" factors. For "internal factors," she agrees with Simsek that although the number of CSOs in Turkey is high, that is not a democracy or indicator of success per se.[146] She mentions Simsek's opinion of the quantitative nature of civil society, but she also notes the more optimistic view of Ersin Kalaycioglu who sees the numbers as proof of civil society. Additionally, these CSOs are not always based on a democratic structure.[147]

Religion in Turkey is another heated debate, especially after the AKP took office and questions were introduced as to what it meant for a secular state to be controlled by a secular-oriented military. According to Onbasi, scholars have divided into two camps when it comes to Islam and democracy: those who think democracy can be consolidated in an Islamic country or a country led by a religious right-wing Islamic group, and those who do not. The scholars who do not believe Islamic countries are able to fit into a democratic model like S. Adil Saribay, who based his theories on Ernest Gellner, believe that certain ideas in Islam are not compatible with democracy, such as community over the individual. Other scholars like Ayse Kadioglu see some flaws in Gellner's theory and argue that no intrinsic problem exists between civil society and Islam. Scholars like Omer Caha agree with Kadioglu and support his argument with the number of Islamic bodies working in civil society. On the other hand, Barbara Pusch argues from her research on women's associations that the women interviewed do not see a contradiction between their religion and democracy or civil society.[148]

Onbasi goes on to explain how the debates changed after the AKP won elections in 2002, especially their effect on the ideologies of CSOs (the religious CSOs in particular). Those effects can be seen by the rising numbers of charity CSOs and the government's reliance on them to solve some of the responsibilities that government should hold, such as poverty, which is what Onbasi terms the "de-politicization" of those issues by throwing their responsibilities on CSOs. Aside from religion, the specific characteristics of Turkish culture make it resistant to democracy. Simsek talks about the "intolerance" that exists in Turkish culture as well as the idea of the "one truth" as a motivator for different groups that has led to a fragmented civil society.[149] Karakoc stresses this point in particular in relation to the AKP, who oppressed any critical voices, to the extent that Turkey reached a point in 2013, as stated in the Committee to Protect Journalists, in which it became the first on a list of countries with the most arrested journalists, even ahead of Iran. In addition, Karakoc argues that the Kurdish question has been a vital point to hindering democracy in Turkey through the oppression this group faces by the state.[150]

Finally, a vital recession of democracy in Turkey is related to Erdogan's socially conservative policies that specifically target women. Women's organizations and activism started long ago but definitely increased in number in the 2000s; however, they remain marginalized in Turkey, and the AKP's policies have a negative effect. For example, today women remain underrepresented in politics, and Onbasi argues that research conducted to

understand the relationship between women and politics illustrated this underrepresentation in politics. The end results showed that 1) women's unwillingness to participate in politics results from fear, 2) WROs are not so much involved in politics as much as other issues and, finally, 3) the WROs argued for the lack of the guarantee of women's participation safely in politics. Onbasi sees women's participation in civil society as a positive thing; however, she doubts their prioritization of gender-related issues over politics as it results in a "problem-solving" ideology focusing on this task over anything else, which might also result in a priotrization of some groups of women over the others.[151] Zehra Yilmaz expands on this issue by arguing the extent to which the AKP has interfered with social life and women in Turkey. This derives from the AKP's conservative ideology and the Islamic traditions and values that motivates them. For example, although they assigned a Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Minister Fatma Sahin followed these traditions as she constantly stressed the difference between the West and Turkey in favor of tradition.

Traditions are not the only foundation driving the AKP towards conservative policies; the economy plays a role as well. They have used their advocacy campaign for family and familial traditions, prioritizing them to make the illusion that by following these traditions, many issues related to the legal and social system could be solved. Additionally, reforms to women's legal status in Turkey that occurred under the AKP's rule only happened because the EU pushed for them, along with liberals and leftists. When a woman is educated in Turkey, it is for the sake of her role as a mother of young Turks. Women have constantly been put in the frame of private life and motherhood, with other discussions and roles being diminished. Thus, the AKP's hegemonic hands touched every aspects of social life: putting women inside, campaigns stressing the immorality of abortion and cesarean sections, limiting the rules related to alcohol consumption and sales, banning women and men from staying together in colleges, stressing childbearing as a woman's priority or suggesting having three or more children.[152] In addition, women NGOs do have a unified agenda of gender equality, but their ideological differences from the left to the right creates a crack that weakens their ability to fight for equal rights for women. This division can be shown, for instance, on two occasions: the first is during the discussions about the Panel Code, when right-wing women NGOs departed because they saw erasing any remarks about "'morality,' 'chastity' and 'honor'" as against their

ideology; the second occasion came in 2007 when leftist WROs protested against the social security reform, which caused the right-wing women NGOs to depart. [153]

These general themes existent in civil society hindered the democratization process from both within and by external actors like the EU and the US, especially when a bottom-up method was employed to impact civil society. Selcen Oner goes deeper by explaining why the EU has failed to democratize Turkey and why turkey was not able to become an EU member even though its application process began in 1999 by relying on interviews from many civil society organization in Turkey, specifically those related to democratic conditions, i.e. human rights, freedom of speech, etc. Moreover, he also opted to conduct interviews with business organizations because of their vast influence and interrelatedness to the government. Oner divides the impact of various factors into those that are "external" and those that are "internal."

For the external factors, the hindering is from the side of the EU, and this is for many reasons. As discussed earlier, the EU uses three approaches to democratization, especially in candidate countries such as Turkey. The EU has opted for leverage and linkage in Turkey through conditionality, yet the conditions that slowed down processes after the Eastern Enlargement have been applied to Turkey. Turkey thus has problems trusting the EU after so many promises, resulting in the failure of the EU's conditionality tactic. As previously mentioned, after the enlargement, the EU lost its enthusiasm and preferred initiatives over offering candidacy, and this became more prevalent after the 2008 economic crisis. Adding to this are, the diplomatic issues between both Turkey and Cyprus.

These are the consequence of the failure of the EU's conditionality and trust issues between both parties. When the EU broke its promise in regards to the Annan Plan, Turkey responded by breaking its part of the deal and closed ports for Greek Cyprus' carriers and ships. In addition, this accessions process was most noticably a failure in 2005 and 2006 when France's Nicolas Sarkozy and Germany's Angela Merkel were prominent opponents of Turkey's accession. Angela Merkel suggested a "privileged partnership" instead of full membership, which caused more damage to the strategy of conditionality and trust. Meanwhile, Nicolas Sarkozy "blocked four additional chapters during the negotiations." This did not change until 2012 when Francois Hollande became the new French president. All of this has increased the rift between the EU and Turkey, even making Turkish people

feel that they were being treated unfairly and losing their trust in EU promises. Consequently, the promising initial reforms have slowed down.

Inside Turkey, the AKP has secured their political position by winning almost every election until today, but their policies towards the EU have only caused damage, especially to Turkish CSOs. Selcen introduces and interprets two scholarly views of the EU. The first belongs to Alper Kaliber, who argues for the importance of domestic actors in Turkey's Europeanization and Turkish CSO's high importance and reliance on the EU. However, Bac Muftuler states the negative side of this process, agreeing that the reason behind the success of introducing some of democratic conditions in the beginning was because the EU was perceived, and truly acted, as an "external anchor"; however, their support and full reliance on Turkish organizations became problematic because they were not able to equal the capabilities of the state, lacking the counterbalance to the state's hegemony and pushing for reforms against Turkey's will.[154] Moreover, the economic push that Turkey witnessed and the economic crisis of the EU in 2008 caused Turkey to feel that that it no longer needed to be dependent on the EU nor did they urgently need to be granted membership, business CSOs in particular. Thus, the AKP government has been in a stronger position as a negotiator, decreasing the processes of the EU's conditions and reforms. Moreover, the Kurdish question has been always a problem in Turkey, with the EU pushing for integration, the government discriminating against all Kurds and acts of terror by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) all existing in Turkey.

Another resulting consequences that has been EU-skepticism spreading among Turkish people (this will further be explained later briefly in relation to the Gezi protests). Moreover, as discussed earlier, the quality-quantity dilemma of Turkish CSOs has been a contributive factor. One strong reason for their weakness is related to the funding of these organizations and a continuous pursuit of survival that hinders their work and weakens their influence even further. The AKP government has been a crucial reason behind this failure. First, because Turkish elites have come to feel that the EU's membership is not in line with their own interests anymore, and secondly because the government has not been giving CSOs any implementation power. For instance, in 2009, the EU agreed with Turkey on the Communication Strategy, which was meant to give more powers to CSOs by increasing their role in the decision-making process. However, the CSOs became disappointed after the strategy was deployed because the government made them attend meetings merely as listeners. Interviews conducted with members of CSOs, especially

those who participated in the Communication Strategy or the Civil Society Dialogue between Turkey and the EU, have noted many issues. They agreed on the initial changes done by the EU, but these slowed down later on. They mostly noted the government's limitation on their role as reform pushers as well as their funding problems.

A further limitation on the EU's democracy promotion in Turkey is the abmiguity of their conditionality, which problematizes applying these conditions; on the other hand, Turkey has limited the "public space" where those conditions should be discussed and applied, with Marcus Ketola mentioning that these kinds of discussions are "conducted in a binary-seeking" attitude.[155] This kind of ambiguity from the EU side can clearly be seen in cultural debates. For example, in the heated 2004 about whether or not to ban women covering their head from universities, the EU was initially assuring that the ban could be applied as it was not against any human rights; however, they later changed their position and decided to remain neutral when the debate heated up in Turkey. Not only this, but the EU's criticisms of Turkey have usually come in the shape of general statements.

Moreover, the EU has long been relying on CSOs to democratize Turkey, urging it to meet the EU's membership conditions, and it has thus given funds to Turkish CSOs to apply the required reforms. However, there are so many funding problems for Turkish CSOs that hinder their actual ability to seek goals. The funding conditions offered by the EU represent a challenge to Turkish NGOs as well. A successful grant required the NGO to have a minimum of €3000 "in cash from another non-EU source." This translates into giving funds to CSOs and thus NGOs that already have money and other sources of funding, leaving other NGOs in the dark. On the other hand, these NGOs working on reforms and meeting EU conditions additionally face difficulties in getting funds from Turkish sources. Yet, while these complications exist, these organizations do not get along with the government; thus, when the EU puts a harsh condition for funding, the NGOs who do not get it are perceived by the state as merely another opposition. As a result, some NGOs opt for domestic funders based only on the belief that this will make them more legitimate as purely Turkish NGOs. In other cases, organizations either do not get funds or do not apply for them because they do not know the application process; thus, they get the feeling that it is too complicated and their chances are zero. Oner argues that all of this creates a feeling of inequality between NGOs, resulting in "further conflicts." Finally, despite the problems with women NGOs mentioned earlier, they are still very much supported by the EU because they have proven to be successful when unified. However,

the problem is with the EU taking sides, which has made the EU causing "awkward" situations between these women NGOs.[156]

From an oppositional perspective, Ayhan Kaya believes there to be three ways in which Turkish CSOs looked at the EU and the Europeanization of Turkey: "Euro-enthusiastic, Eurosceptic and Critical Europeanist." The "Euro-enthusiastic attitude" started with the campaign for the EU and the Helsinki Summit, during which there was enthusiasm from both sides of the EU candidacy and later the membership application, but this camp was not blind to some of the problems within the EU's own institutions. The "Eurosceptic attitude" derives from the belief in the rejection of any foreign "intervention" as it is perceived as bad. It has been adopted by conservatives and nationalists who believe in the traditional customs that they base their life on; thus, a foreign country would only damage the country because it would change those traditions and beliefs with a desire to control the country. These feelings in Turkey were strengthened after the Iraq occupation by the US and the Lebanese-Israeli conflict of 2006. These nationalists perceive some of the conditions promoted by the EU to be detrimental to the Turkish state, such as the push for a Kurdish-conflict resolution, the push for a resolution to the Cyprus-Turkish issue, the pressure from some European countries for Turkey to confess to the Armenian genocide and, of course, the opinions expressed by Sarkozy and Merkel; these points are viewed as a threat to the Turkish Republic itself and seen as a way for the EU to divide Turkey. The most prominent actor for this "Euroscepticism" is the AKP, which is considered to be a very conservative, religious and nationalist party. The incident mentioned earlier about the headscarf case and the European Court of Human Rights' ruling for Leyla Sahin is believed by Ayhan Kaya to be the start of the AKP's clearcut euroscepticism. The third "Critical Europeanist attitude" is believed to be a genuine desire for the EU, but not for the economic reasons of the previous camps but rather to cementing the country into a full-fledged democracy. These debates and positions towards the EU all started and progressed before, during and after the Gezi protests.[157]

3.5 #OccupyGezi

The Gezi Park protests started with protests denouncing the AKP's construction of a shopping mall in a park in 2013, yet it quickly escalated to include more demands from the government and criticisms of the AKP's policies of no tolerance.[158] Although the Gezi Protests were initially led by students and environmentalists, secular groups and later a

diverse group of people joined them, including minorities like Kurdish and LGBT groups.[159] The protests were critical of the previously discussed authoritative policies of the AKP, and the protesters called for freedom and democracy, with the movement soon spreading to Ankara, Izmir and many other cities. Consequently, the AKP responded aggressively to the protests early on; when students and environmentalists protested the shopping mall, the police attacked them, not differentiating between children and adults, resulting in more angry protesters joining their ranks to protests the AKP's violent acts towards the protesters and their authoritative policies in the country. However this only made the police even more aggressive towards protesters.[160]

There is a significant relation between the EU and the Gezi Protests. Before the Gezi Protests, opponents of the AKP party were either against membership to the EU or just not very supportive of it. However, after Gezi, those parties changed their positions, especially the CHP. For example, a letter was sent to Germany by the CHP criticizing the police violence occurring in Gezi and all over the country and forbidding people from expressing their opinions; they even went further by asking Germany to stop Turkey's candidacy. Germany's Merkel and other European governments responded and have often criticized the violent acts of the Turkish government against peaceful Gezi protesters. This is when the the "Critical Europeanist attitude started." Conservatives led by the AKP had been skeptic about the EU integration whereas opponents and many CSOs felt more confident in supporting it. Thus, many scholars such as Ayhan Kaya believe the Gezi Protests resulted from the Europeanization reform efforts that were started in 1999, and the demands echoed the reform demands by the EU.[161]

3.6 US Aid to Turkish Civil Society: An Assessment[162]

This section will mainly be focused on data collected from USAID and NED, the two American organizations that work in Turkey through a system of grants that decrease or increase depending on the political situation in Turkey. In addition, a small section will be dedicated to US-approved local projects sanctioned by the Turkish government along with various news sources. Although very data-oriented and empirical, I attempt to make sense of the information provided. I found it very difficult to to collect data prior to 2014 for the NED as well as Turkish government reports for USAID from 2001; as a result, my starting point will be 2001, the year prior to the AKP's taking power for the first time.

During the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, the USAID organization gave assistance amounting to $6,464,864; 72% of this went to economic assistance while 28% went to the military (these are the two categories of USAID assistance that is divided into subcategories). The biggest of these subcategories was humanitarian aid, whereas a smaller portion went to "|administrative costs."[163] The economic crisis in Turkey was a consequence of previous policies that led the Turkish Lira to devalue up to 25% of it previous worth, leaving the country in economic turmoil. Responses from the opposition and CSOs came shortly afterwards, corresponding to a general agreement that the prime minister should resign; even the president accused the prime minister of bad economic policies. The Bush administration had been supportive of the Turkish government and a strong ally to it; thus, they supported the decision reached by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2001 as well as the Turkish government of floating the Turkish Lira.[164] During the same year, only one US CSO was allowed to work in Turkey: the International Geosynthetics Society (IGS), an engineering tech CSO (Turkish government report). In 2002, Turkey received the largest USAID grant, which amounted to $275,923,049, making it second to Russia in regional fund ranking, with the Turkish government receiving the biggest share of this, coming in at $200,000,000. This year, military aid decreased by 2% (26% overall) while the economy received 74% of the grant.[165] With Erdogan leading the country, Bush publicly expressed his willingness for future cooperation between the US and Turkey; moreover, with the advance of the US in Iraq, Bush pushed for good relations with the religious party of the AKP and its leader Erdogan.[166] The year did not witness any additional increase in the number of US CSOs working in Turkey.[167]

The economic crisis left the country devastated and disappointed in the ruling coalition government. The AKP came on the scene with new promises of economic development and a strong agenda for EU membership reforms; the EU and indeed the US fully supported the new government's vision, whereby the AKP tried to appear as a moderate party; thus, the strategies of the US and the EU had been aligned up until this point. Yet in 2003, the US support of Turkey via USAID witnessed a dramatic drop from $248,055,243 to $27,917,806, coming to rank 18th in regional reports. Most of this money was directed at conflict, peace and security, with the military occupying 73% of the budget and the economy only receiving 27% of the budget.[168] No new US CSOs were approved for 2003.[169] The Iraq invasion had not only complicated relations between the US and Turkey but had further increased tensions between both countries, thereby resulting in this

steep removal of USAID funds. Turkey has been involved in Iraq since 1991 to specifically limit the powers of the Kurdish population, and even though the Turkish government refused to admit its involvement in the Iraq war, they were not officially part of the US-led alliance.

Thus, when some Turkish soldiers were arrested by the US in July 2003, tensions erupted. The fiasco spread among the public in both countries, and Turkey witnessed protests in front of the US embassy and consulate in Ankara and Istanbul. The Turkish soldiers were accused by the US of "a plot of assassinate an American-backed Iraqi official," while the US was accused of detaining innocent soldiers by Turkey.[170] In light of this, During the years of 2004-2005 the situation did changed much in 2004 or 2005; USAID deployed some $49,578,112 for 2004 (with the same agenda of conflict, peace and security priotrization, with 81% of these funds going to the military) and some $53,617,491 for 2005 (again, with the same priotrization, although the military now occupied only 70% of the new budget).[171] However in 2005, the US was able to get approval for two more CSOs to operate in Turkey in 2005: the Turkish Cultural Foundation/Turkey branch (TCF), which focused on Turkish culture heritage, and Willows International/Representation in Turkey, which focused on reproductive health.[172]

In 2006, the Turkish government further approved of five more CSOs: 1) the German Marshall Fund/representation in Turkey (to strengthen cooperation between the US, Turkey and the EU); 2) the Ottoman Studies Foundation/Representation in Turkey (historical and educational); 3) the American research Institute in Turkey/Representation in Ankara (educational); 4) the American Research Institute in Turkey/Representation in Istanbul (educational); and finally 5) the Research Foundation of New York State University/Representation in Turkey (educational).[173] The importance of this lies in the opening up of the Turkish government to to foreign CSOs operating domestically, especially in the field of education; yet, this gradual opening up to US-backed organizations signifies the gradual restoration of relations between both countries. From 2007 to 2012, nothing significant happened in regards to USAID or the opening up of CSOs in Turkey. The grants were almost the same, reaching its peak in 2007 with $31,000,000 and its lowest point in 2009 with $19,000,000.[174] Even the number of additionally approved organizations were approximately somewhere between 0 to 2 per year.[175] The decrease in 2009 accompanied an overall decrease of US support abroad based upon Obama's presidency (which will be discussed later in relation to Egypt). In relation to

the Gezi protests in 2013, and perhaps as a reaction to the event, the US more than doubled their funds to Turkey: $80,929,404, 88% of which went to the economy, with humanitarian aid taking up to $66,000,000.[176]

Whereas 2013 witnessed the highest numbers of CSO approved by the Turkish government, this only managed reaching 8 additional organizations.[177] Although Obama's initial response was to denounce the state-sanctioned violence, he only spoke to Erdogan almost a month after the protests had broken out to announce that he had discussed these concerns over the phone with the Turkish president.[178] Yet, Gezi was not the only thing covered but Syria as well, thereby illustrating that the Obama administration still had security concerns in mind, which at this point overshadowed the violence gripping the country and Erdogan's heavy-handed, oppressive response to them. This was further confirmed by an earlier terrorist attack where a suicide bomber tried, and failed, to blow up the US embassy in Ankara in February 2013.[179]

Between 2012 and 2016, the situation in Turkey started to worsen; Egypt had started to deviate from its attested commitment to democracy, millions of refugees were pouring out of Syria in response to the emerging civil war, Libya decayed into chaos and the Islamic State (ISIS) started terrorizing people, even managing to reach the US and Europe. Yet, Turkey, for the most part, succeeded in ensuring domestic stability in comparison its neighboring countries. They gained regional importance for taking millions of refugees who otherwise would have turned to Europe, and Erdogan started to tighten his grip on the country, both politically and socially. As a result, the trend in USAID between 2012 and 2016 consistently increased funds year-by-year, ultimately reaching $154,594,512 in 2016, with the regional priority of this fund being the Syrian refugee crisis, even to the point where the military occupied only 2% of the budget while the economy occupied 98%.[180] (USAID report, 2016). As for NED, the biggest two grants went to "NGO strengthening" and "enhancing political party competition ahead of parliamentary elections" (or the strengthening of democratic institutions) with an equal grant amount of $700,000 for each project. The same amount of money was given again to "NGO strengthening," whereas the project of strengthening democratic institutions received $675,000. Finally, in 2016, the two most awarded projects were "NGO strengthening," with $735,000, and the strengthening of democratic institutions, which decreased to $625,000.[181] Overall, the trend in US support has been the granting of funds to Turkey, and cooperation has been the dominant scene. However, if those grants came in

a year of tense relations or rather security fears, they increased and decreased accordingly with the immediate political agenda.

3.7 Present Day Politics and Their Effects on Civil Society

In July 2016, Turkey witnessed yet another military coup. It was long believed since Ozal that the military's influence had not been dominant in the country, specifically because the policies of governments since Ozal challenged and limited the military's power and worked to position it as just another state controlled institution. As discussed earlier, because of the regime's longstanding usage of oppressive policies and the instability that spread in the region, Turkey emerged with strong negotiating powers through which it was able to challenge the EU and the US, especially with millions of refugees inside the country that could be employed as a gambling chip. Thus, after the coup, Erdogan was able to react violently and get away with it, detaining and firing those who participated in the coup, sympathizers and even opponents who did not get involved; he closed institutions and schools that once operated as left-wing or were owned by a political opponent. The numbers are terrifying, with 141,558 detained, 80,147 arrested, 3,003 educational schools and universities shut down, 6,021 academicians fired, 319 journalists arrested, 189 media outlets closed, 4,463 judges and prosecutors fired and many more whose lives were affected in one way or another.[182]

It is illogical to believe that Erdogan came up with this list days after the coup; it is apparent that the list of opponents existed and Erdogan instrumentally took advantage of the opportunity that a coup provided, using people's fear of another military regime to further limit any opposition. The EU's initial reaction was shock and criticism, even suspending Turkey's membership process to pressure Erdogan into adopting, at least, a less oppressive approach. Of course, Erdogan's aptly reacted by threatening the EU's security, saying he would allow refugees into Europe, at which point relations between the EU and Turkey were restored.[183]

As for USAID, the funds were decreased from their highest grant since 2003, which reached $155,000,000 in 2016, to their lowest point over the previous 16 years, with only a mere $3,000,000 in 2017, of which education and the economy took top priority and established 100% of the budget, which was a first; of course, after the failed coup, funding the military was not possible.[184] This has come as a reaction to the corrupt scandal involving Turkey manipulating the Syria funds received by USAID,[185] which

could in the NED grants as well; from some $700,000 in grants during in previous year, it was only $325,00 in 2017.[186] In 2018, the relations between the US and Turkey did not fare much better; Turkey's operations in Afrin, Syria made the US alarmed since both countries were NATO members. Trump talked on the phone with Erdogan about Afrin, but the situation has not been resolved to date, and the future of relations is unknown especially with both involved countries taking different trajectories in the Syria crisis.[187] As for the EU, the latest meeting in March, 2018 did not result in any useful outcome but rather "this summit turned out once more to be an occasion where sides merely listed their grievances and demands from each other."[188] Added to that is the recent reelection of Erdogan as president, which due to a 2017 constitutional referendum, gave him more powers over the country with no prime minister and Erdogan being an "executive president."[189] This is only another step closer to authoritarianism, whereby the opposition is jailed, propaganda spreads and fear becomes the headlines. As for the CSO community in Turkey, the situation is only worsening, with the State of Emergency being extended since the coup, the work of CSOs has been limited, and the relations between civil society and the state has been deteriorating.[190] Erdogan does not accept criticism and reacts to it with threats of jail time or actual arrests. Since the coup, CSOs in Turkey have been weakened in what can be called as a "crackdown on civil society."[191]

Chapter Four: Egypty

4.1 Introduction

Egypt can be described as a electoral authoritarian regime where elections are incompetitive and do not count. Egypt saw a change and an opportunity for a brighter future from 2011 to 2014 after the Arab Spring, but soon the authoritarian regime adapted and the military was able to take control of the country yet again. This section will explore the changes in Egyptian politics, how far the authoritative hands of the state reaches and how they have adapted to the political changes since 2011. Thus, the first section will explore the civil society in Egypt followed by the a section on the Arab Spring. Egypt will then be set in contrast to the EU's and US' democracy promotion efforts throughout various political contexts.

4.2 Civil Society in Egypt: An Assessment of Challenges and the State-CSO Dichotomy

CSOs in Egypt, just like many other countries, were not a new discovery in the 1980s and 1990s; their history goes back to the 1821 Hellenic Philanthropic Association. Though it was offering help to foreigners, four decades later, there were many CSOs for Egyptians. In addition, in the 1950s, it was easy to find literature on CSOs. Yet, just like the rest of the world, the waves of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and Eastern Europe reached Egypt, providing a revival of CSOs and a revision of their activities.[192] Consequently, scholars like Bakry M. El Medni argue against the idea that Egyptian CSOs are "new products imported from the West" because for him, this leads to comparisons of both West and East CSOs, which is misleading because they have both developed differently in relation to the state. Whereas the West has perceived good CSOs to be separate from the state, in the East they developed in relation to it.[193] In Egypt specifically, the relationship between CSOs and the state has always been negative; the authoritative state perceived CSOs as a threat to their policies and rule, whereas CSOs perceived the state as the oppressor. Since the beginning of the establishment of the modern Republic of Egypt, the state policies are directed towards limiting and exercising full control over CSOs; for example, the laws of 1964, 1965 and 1999 were all laws to restrict the activities of CSOs to apolitical life, not echoing any political demands or criticisms.

This legal war on CSOs specifically started with Gamal Abdel Nasser (president from 1956-1970) as a way to control all aspects of life, not only political but also social, and later presidents followed in his footsteps.[194] There are so many obstacles that Egyptian civil society runs into, but in order to understand these obstacles better, some historical context must be given since different events have affected and reshaped these obstacles, which have almost always been related to the state.

As discussed in earlier chapters, the 1990s were a period of economic liberalization, and even foreign funds were mainly focused on economic aspects. It is true that there were other aspects that international donors were supporting, such as human rights, yet the main focus was the spread of neoliberalism. Unfortunately, this caused international donors to cooperate with the state on this specific matter, thereby avoiding any rifts that other kinds of funds may cause. During Hosni Mubarak's reign in the 1990s, the US gave funds to the authoritative military, whereas the EU established the EMPI in 1995, an initiative between the EU and Egypt to help liberalize the economy. Along with the concern of donors in keeping a good relationship with Mubarak, they also cared for their interests and thus the security of the region as well as religious groups. All of this made them very cautious, selective and biased on who receives funding.[195] With the changes that Mubarak initiated leading to the start of liberalization (as a condition of the World Bank loan of 1991), the numbers of NGOs and CSOs started to rise.[196] However, Mubarak managed to limit the activities of those newly emerging CSOs by applying the 2002 Law, which very much limited their role and has failed to change, not only until the Arab Spring but also after.

There are so many conditions that limit and weaken civil society in Egypt, and the 2002 law only came to represent what had already been the government's policies towards CSOs for years; in other words, it only functioned to ban their activities legally. The problems with Egyptian CSOs lies in the fact that, despite the numbers and diversity of fields they cover, membership is low and members do not come from different social sectors, nor do their leaders reflect this fact. These compiled factors make these NGOs unrepresentative of the population as a whole. Thus, it is argued that the structure of NGOs reflects the structure of society itself, where a small group of elites rule the rest. Among those CSOs and NGOs, there is no cooperation because they cannot trust each other and because Mubarak did not allow them to, as was later the case with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and Abdel Fattah Al Sisi after that.

In this way, the relationship between CSOs and the state has never been balanced, and CSOs are weak and perceived by the state as a threat; consequently, they cannot pressure the state to do, thereby unable to change politics.[197] They do not have a role in decision-making, not even a small consultative role; rather, decisions against them are being made and applied by the state. The Law of Associations, or the NGO Law of 2002, was a leap taken by the state to assure once and for all that CSOs were kept under the control of the state. Under the new law, the government gave the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) full control over NGOs as well as the right to intervene and stop any activities that they view as undesirable, even closing some when they do not follow their regulations. It was the MOSS from one side and the State Security Investigations (SSI) from the other. While MOSS controlled NGOs, the SSI "threatened" and "harassed" them; this duality has killed the activities of NGOs and limited them to developmental fields or other sectors that do not echo any political agendas. Consequently, the law banned NGOs from politics and required them to specify their activities in details. Any non-compliance was met with fines, imprisonment and the closure of the NGO.

The MOSS has also started monitoring and controlling foreign funds, and if an NGO asks for foreign funding approval, it takes up to a year for the MOSS to approve. Even local donors were not able to give funding to any political projects, and their funds were limited to specific sectors such as development. A lack of trust between NGOs has even decreased because fear has spread. The end result was a weak civil society that only focused on apolitical issues, with the only sector resisting this formula being Egypt's human rights NGOs. However, this was not without consequences; they were seen by the government as threats that needed to be eliminated.[198] This put Mubarak in a tight position, and by 2004 protests were starting to increase throughout the country, especially workers who lost their jobs because of Mubarak's privatization of industries. These workers saw an opportunity to unify, and of course the state police repeatedly broke up these strikes violently. Another important event occured in 2005 with the formation of Kifaya (in English, "Enough"), which was expressive in its name. The movement came as a reaction to Mubarak's policies, which in turn has had irreversible effects on civil society in Egypt.[199] As discussed in earlier chapters, after the first wave of democracy promotion that focused on economic liberalization, the second wave came to focus on elections. As a result, Egypt held its first elections in 2005 in which, of course, Mubarak won, and the only opponent was jailed. Police brutality and torture became unbearable, opponents were

eliminated, a state of emergency ruled the country and was never lifted; all these authoritative policies led to the formation of Kifaya, which later had a significant role in starting the Arab Spring protests in Egypt. [200]

4.3 #OccupyTahrir

Due to the harsh policies that controlled and limited NGOs' work in Egypt, it cannot be claimed that they had a role in sparking the revolution or even participated in it, although their members as individuals did. However, other types of CSOs were crucial to the revolution, and their work definitely contributed to the resulting protests. Taking El Medni's categorization of these organizations, I will lay out a brief explanation of his argument on each organization. The first of these are the judges and the Judges Club who did not like Mubarak's control of the judiciary system. They have made their first stance against the regime in 2005 and 2006 when they organized strikes and protests. The second group of organizations were associations of civil society: lawyers, doctors and journalists. Lawyers echoed the demands of the judges in terms of giving independence to the judiciary system, whereas journalists and doctors asked for freedom and public space to express opinions. The third are trade unions, and although the Federation of Egyptian Workers was pro-government, trade unions organized very important protests and strikes showing that protests could lead to something. The fourth organization is Kifaya; as mentioned earlier, Kifaya was able to organize protests that, although little in numbers at first, allowed the Arab Spring to arrive. Fifth, the April 6 movement that came to have an influential impact during the Arab Spring. The name derives from their activism on April 6, 2008 and their call through social media for "civil disobedience."

April 6 included young people in a country where these youths rarely found a place to be active, and it also incorporated technology like social media to mobilize people and call for protests; later on, the same tools were crucial to the protests during the Arab Spring. Another unique feature of the April 6 movement is that they did not facilitate and work in urban cities only but expanded to other cities and areas where politics were less active. Thus, the unique features of the April 6 movement included participation from young people, introducing the importance and power of social media and involvement in other cities, all of which were later echoed during the revolution. The sixth group is the National Association for Change (NAC), which had also been politically active and whose uniqueness comes from its calls for Egyptians abroad to participate; beyond this, however,

was their ability to include different social classes into the political activities of NAC. Finally, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) was the only NGO which was actually able to be active after the 2002 NGO Law passed. Though banned from politics, CIHRS thought to do it indirectly by creating and organizing a public space for debates.[201]

Along these lines and due to authoritative regimes which expressed oppression in all aspects of life along with a weak civil society that started to want more as well as to citizens who could no longer handle the everyday policies of the regime, the Arab Spring reached Egypt on January 25, 2011. What started as a Kifaya protest, low in numbers, led to millions of people demanding bread, freedom and social justice. This uprising/revolution opened a public space for all people to participate in public life,[202] yet it also posed an opportunity for CSOs and NGOs to work in a transition country that was trying to find its way to democracy. Unfortunately, this only happened for a limited time until the SCAF took control of the country again, and perhaps under the government of Mohammed Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood (MBH) president in 2014; these organizations again tried to resist pressures from the government, but soon Sisi took office. Since then, NGOs have suffered far more repression. Although CSOs were not able to participate before January 25, 2011, during and shortly after the revolution they offered a great opportunity for reforms and democratization. Even some of the movements and gathering that were established during the protests started to form NGOs, resulting in a more active civil society driven by the need for a change.[203]

As argued by Özlem Altan-Olcay and Ahmet İçduygu, "Egypt has been akin to a laboratory of the Middle East for external Aid."[204] Thus, 2011 was an opportunity for those external donors to see the results of the funds they had been pouring into democracy promotion. However, the victory was "short lived," and soon the country fell under the rule of the SCAF and later Morsi and Sisi, all of whom killed this hope. As Catherine E. Herrold puts it, "By the summer of 2014 NGOs and foundations had become demoralized and were predicting the looming 'death of civil society' in Egypt."[205] Herrold depended on gathering data and interviews from March 2010 to August 2014 in order to understand what kind of changes led the sector to its "death." During and after the revolution, those NGOs started to blossom and to invade the political scene, where they were banned from entering while keeping their activities in other sectors such as development. Human rights NGOs, in addition to a few other organizations, were a pioneer in this respect, trying to pave the way for democracy by working to prepare for the first democratic elections in

Egypt. Although domestic donors were still comprehensing the changes in Egypt, international donors, who had been pouring money into this sector, started focusing on democracy promotion so as to help those NGOs flourishing in politics and help their efforts towards preparing the country for a democratic transition. Those NGOs did not let anything stop them; they even started cooperating and disregarded their previous differences and fears, and human rights' NGOs were yet again pioneers in this.[206]

However, when the SCAF took control after the fall of Mubarak and his vice president, Omar Suleiman, things started to change. In that unstable period with so many actors involved, the SCAF thought that the best option to limit CSOs was to accuse them of foreign involvement aimed at destroying the country, i.e. spreading fears among Egyptians that what they have done is US- or EU-supervised. To do so, they first got the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Faiza Abou el-Naga to regain control over NGOs by investigating the external funds they had received, later making campaigns to promote this as the right thing to do against those who cooperate with foreigners against Egypt. The committee established for these investigation accused 39 NGOs of foreign funds and 28 more of illegal work within the confines of the 2002 NGO Law. They even banned some Americans working in the NGO sector from travelling, but they later allowed them to return to their country. This specific event even drew international attention and criticism of the SCAF, but at the same time this criticism was used as propaganda claiming to prove international interference. Within this propaganda campaign, the SCAF was presented as nationalists guarding the country.

When Sisi took office, he worked to limit the activities of such civil society organizations even more, suggesting a revision of the 2002 NGO Law: the 2014 Law. This law was aimed at updating the 2002 law and close any loopholes that would allow NGOs to work on political life. Thus, the new law even some banned research, but not all of it. NGOs and scholars could still apply to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, but of course the answer has almost unilateral been rejection under authoritarian rule. In addition, some human rights organizations had been able to work under Mubarak, even if their work was limited because they were not legally NGOs, meaning the 2002 Law did not apply to them. The new 2014 law, however, forced all those NGOs to be labeled as such, submitting them to the new regulations imposed by the renovated law. Moreover, fines were unrealistically high, imprisonment did not seem like a far-fetched consequence and foreign funds needed approval from the president himself; there was even the addition

of a "life prison sentence" for those who took foreign funds without his permissions to once and for all close this subject.[207] Of course, this has all torn civil society activism apart and shut the door for any opportunities at change; Sisi has made sure to grab a tighter authoritative grip over the country in order to avoid Mubarak's mistakes. This is related to a previous discussion on why there is authoritarianism in the Middle East, and it is true that these governments' ability to adapt and reorganize their rule makes it very difficult for CSOs, or indeed any other actor, to change the political situation. The law was named the Law for Regulating the Work of Associations and Other Institutions Working in the Field of Civil Work, which came to effect in 2017,[208] was pronounced as the second "death of civil society." Consequently, how did the EU and the US promote democracy in Egypt? How was Egypt a lab for experimentation? Moreover, how was the state of civil society before and after the Arab Spring? In answering these questions in the next section, I will expound more on specific domestic issues within Egyptian civil society that have been affected by EU policies or affected these policies in return.

4.4 EU Democracy Promotion in Egypt: An Assessment

The EU always had good relations with Egypt and Mubarak. This is related to what was discussed earlier as "friendly tyrants" of the US and the EU due to other interests in the country, especially those related to security. Thus, the importance in Egypt lies in its strategic location, it being at the top of the list of trade partner and Mubarak's assurance of exerting his utmost efforts to get rid of terrorism and radicals, which is a particularly big concern of the EU.[209] The EU's efforts at democracy promotion in Egypt mostly started with the Barcelona Process in the 1990s, upon which an agreement was signed between both countries to cooperate over matters of human rights and democracy. After that, the official Association Agreement was signed in 2001 to pronounce a new era of EU-Egypt relations.[210] In the same year, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had increased the EU's fear of terrorists and radical Islam, which was reflected in the EU's Commission (EC) speech on the importance of stability, especially towards its "Southern Mediterranean" neighbors like Egypt.[211] In 2002, Mubarak passed the NGO Law that limited the work of NGOs to development and other apolitical activities; the EU only followed suit, and their focus has been only on the economy and some social development aspects. In addition, since most of the funding coming from the EU was for these two sectors, pro-government associations and the government itself was able to use these funds and grants for what they needed and

desired, but these did not go to the country itself. An example of such an organization is GONGOs, which did not make Egyptian CSOs trust the EU very much, at least those which were not pro-government or facilitated by them.[212]

The prioritizing of security over democracy could be seen the following year in the NGOs Law agreement. In 2003, both countries signed the European Security Strategy (ESS) to stress the importance of stability and security for the EU, especially towards its Southern Mediterranean neighbors.[213] The following year, the Association Agreement was updated and confirmed, yet it remained "general and spells out the principles of future cooperation"; thus, the existence of phrases such as democracy promotion remained unconfirmed and unaligned with specific future courses of actions.[214] However, with the same year's BMENA agreement, the EU showed more interest in advocating democracy promotion and human rights.[215] Nonetheless, because of the 2002 NGO Law, the EU opted for indirect democracy promotion through social and economic funding, which proved problematic and paved the way for the 2005-2008 waves of protests. Yet, before going into how the liberalization imposed by both the government and the EU led to protests and worsened the conditions in Egypt, a few words about the inbetween years is necessary.

The EU was committed to its part of the Association Agreement and its support for the economic aspects in Egypt, and it thus rapidly increased its funds. In addition, as discussed earlier, after the Eastern Enlargement, the EU's enlargement fatigue made it opt for alternatives with neighboring countries to ensure its own cooperation, stability and security. Therefore, the EU signed the ENP in 2004, which again focused on aspects of economic cooperation, although democracy and human rights were mentioned. Despite these agreements and the EU's support for Mubarak, the money allocated in Egypt only increased after the fall of Mubarak, which was the international norm after the Arab Spring. Moreover, the EU pushed for change in Egypt through conditionality, yet "negative conditionality" was never an EU strategy with Mubarak because of their prioritization of security and trade over other issues.[216] In 2005, and when Mubarak was pushed to hold the first elections in the country despite its legitimacy or fairness, the EU was biased; the relationship between the MBH and the EU illustrates this.

At the time, the MBH exerted efforts to take some parliament seats, and although outlawed, discriminated against and tortured, they managed to get support from all those people they had helped; hence, they operated with charities in poor areas that were neglected by the government (accompanying their services with religious speech). The

MBH took over 20% of seats in parliament, yet the EU distanced itself from the party and limited communication to parliament. Even during the 2007 trial of some of their members, the EU remained silent regarding the unfair trial, which was opposed to the efforts the EU had made in pressuring the government to release Ayman Nour.[217] This relationship between the EU and the MBH is related to the ideologies of both. On the one hand, the EU has always been concerned with the security and stability of the MENA region, which can affect them negatively; they have particularly been concerned with radical Muslims and terrorism. On the other hand, the MBH made some controversial statements, such as one's related to sexism and a disbelief in women's leadership; they excluded anyone who did not follow their religious ideology (specifically Christians), and their stance on Israel and their contacts with Hamas, considering themselves part of it, has been a cause of concern for the EU.[218]

In 2007 and 2008, the political and economic situation in Egypt was not stable. The EU thought to ratify the ENP and added an Action Plan that again focused on the economy, though part of it stressed politics. At the same time, the EU was renewing its conditionality and "incentives," offering these countries better movement (not as free movement, but facilitating it) rather than economic incentives. The Action Plan was really good at clearing up some of the ambiguities that had existed beforehand, and the political objectives were laid down in the first chapter. In addition, it published reports upon which the EU would decide the next 5-year Action Plan through the Indicative Programs.[219] However, some ambiguities persisted. The problem with the 2007 Action Plan was that it did not meet the realities of Egyptian politics.[220] It simply included too many objectives: 39 political objectives to be precise.[221] Between 2005 and 2008, protests started to break out throughout the country (see previous section), during which the EU seemed alienated and unsupportive of those protesters' demands. Workers were the most affected by the liberalization agenda of Mubarak's regimes, and the EU published reports about the protests; yet, they can be described as having "a technical/factual language" that is underrepresentation of why those protests broke out in the first place. Even when the Emergency Law was put into action (though it had started much earlier and lasted until the end of Mubarak's reign and the EU did denounce it), the EU remained silent.[222]

However, the EU did attempt to create more agreements with its Southern Mediterranean neighbours. As a result of this, they have initiated the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, which was first called for by Sarkozy; however, the

initiative was yet again focused on the economic aspects of cooperation, thereby failing to achieve its goals as echoed by the EC itself. With the economic crisis in 2008, other countries started pouring funds into Egypt, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia.[223] In the field of human rights, the EU was perhaps more successful since it was a very precise matter. Yet, the establishment of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was accused of having a "neoliberal preference" that was being used as a tool to "depoliticize" EU's actions in Egypt.[224] In reality, the EDIHR was civil society oriented, and their initial purpose was supporting human rights CSOs through programs such as the Management and Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture in Egypt that was facilitated as a part of the El-Nadim Centre. This was important to Egyptian CSOs, even if the impact was little. For example, the EU's support for the El-Nadim Centre was crucial in that the centre helped victims of police violence. The El-Nadim Centre was one of those human rights organizations that tried to avoid the limitations of the 2002 NGO Law by not registering as an NGO, yet the EU meanwhile supported the centre. The El-Nadim Centre was not the only human rights organization that was facilitated illegally and still got support from the EU; there were others, such as the Cairo Institute for Human Rights.[225] Before the 2011 protests broke out, the EU thought of updating the ENP, which was important in that when they did so in 2010-2011, they had started using the concept of "deep democracy" right after the fall of Mubarak.

During the protests, which first started on January 25, 2011, the EU remained silent to see where they would lead before taking a position.[226] This did not come as a surprise as the EU had always been rather supportive of Mubarak for the reasons mentioned above. However, after the fall of Mubarak, the EU's position quickly changed, and they started to pour more funds and give more support for CSOs, which had opened up the opportunity for the fall of the authoritarian regime as these organizations started to be more active and take a role in political life. The EU's fund reached €132,000,000 in 2011, and that later have turned into €449,290,000 which focused 1) "political reform and human rights," 2) "good governance and the judiciary," and 3) "developing the economy and sustainable development."[227] In addition, the EU became more engaged with CSOs and even attempted to supervise the first democratic elections in the country. Along with this, they allocated some extra €449,300,000 for Egypt to make reforms, putting conditions on such funds, but due to the country's deep state (referring to the strong authoritative state that is rooted deep

and hard to change) that was then (2012-2013) governed by the SCAF, who wanted to take control of the country again, the program failed.[228]

In sum, the EU wanted to support civil society after the fall of Mubarak and wanted to do so through the ENP, by which support for CSOs was stressed. Additionally, the "deep democracy" concept mentioned earlier was introduced in February of 2011. The importance of this concept lies in the speech and context in which it was mentioned; Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, talked about the previously mentioned critique of the EU. Ashton admitted the EU's focus on the economic aspect and their fear and stress on security and stability. Thus, it was suggested that there would be a change of positions from the old EU to the new approach of "deep democracy," but there were unfortunately no references to "deep democracy" in the 2012 Strategic Framework.[229] However, the persistence of the EU rested in its engagement with and its initiation of many programs. One significant program was SPRING, initiated as a reaction to the Arab Spring with €90,000,000 funding; even though it was not directed at political activities, it supported other sectors like education and development.[230]

The year 2012 was also important for CSOs that were still working to absorb the new political realities of Egypt's politics and their new reality of open opportunities; during that year and specifically during the Egyptian-European Task Force that was held for the first time, human rights NGOs were unable to participate due to a government order, and the EU remained silent to this.[231] In the proceeding years from 2013 until today (see previous section), the civil society sector in Egypt started to retreat after being pushed by the government, especially after the 2014 NGO law with the investigations, threats and arrests they had to face under the military, the MBH and then the military again. Thus, CSOs in Egypt felt a great disappointment in the EU, and even sent a letter to the EU in 2013 about the "passivity" the EU illustrates in reacting to the new proposed bill against any politically-oriented organization working in Egypt. The EU remained silent until 2016, when in reaction to the closure of a huge number of NGOs and arrests, they condemned the actions of the government and demanded for more freedom for those NGOs.[232]

After the military took over in 2014, the country was deemed authoritarian yet again. Despite this fact, a report shows that the EU started to go back to its old tactics, focusing on economic and development aid and staying away from politics. Even the new Action Plan report was mainly focused on the economy and the importance of

"stability;"[233] this was opposed to their previous commitment to CSOs in Egypt that had been improving, which can be see through the funds, reaching €26,700,000, those NGOs had gotten until 2014.[234] From 2011 to 2017, Egypt went through many changes, as did the EU. Stability and security have always been on the front pages of the EU's relationship with Egypt. This has only changed in the years from the fall of Mubarak to the military takeover in 2014; thus, 3 or 4 years of opening up to the country has been the only positive sign of their direct support of democracy over stability or security. It cannot be denied that sometimes the EU's efforts could be felt in other areas, specifically human rights, but those efforts were not enough (though they supported NGOs such as El-Nadim, which was vital to victims of violence). However, this position cannot be excused; the EU itself has been dealing with internal differences of member states as well as being a place of terrorist attacks, which has given rise to populist parties. On the other hand, Egypt has initiated so many programs and initiatives with the EU, one after the other. Although these programs and grants were directed at the development and business sector, they were still vital in these two sectors and helped development NGOs improve living conditions in Egypt (although it can be argued that by doing so, they supported the limitation of NGOs' work to charity and removing responsibility from the government).

4.5 US Democracy Promotion in Egypt: An Assessment

With the fall of the Soviet Union and the waves of government-challenging protests in Latin American and Eastern Europe that eventually led to the overthrow of some governments and established a new era, as well as with the rising importance and emergence of CSOs in throughout the world – including the Middle East – the US started to get more involved in Egypt through promoting democracy and giving it aid and assistance. The US position has been even more vital in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Bush administrations' stress on the importance of democracy promotion in the Middle East (see chapter 2 for more details on US democracy promotion). During Carter's presidency, he thought of using USAID to push an agenda of peace and give more incentives to both Egypt and Israel; thus, he promised aid to both countries. However, the aid was not equally fair to both countries, and the conditions bestowed upon Egypt was that the latter takes $2,000,000,000 under the direct supervision of the aid's distribution, whereas Israel took $3,000,000,000 with no conditions on how to spend the aid money.

This has made Egypt distrustful as to the fairness of USAID, and it has indeed created "tensions."[235]

With Reagan in office, things changed a bit. Although Reagan's foreign policies were directed at the Cold War dilemma with the Soviet Union, after his 1982 Westminster speech (see chapter two), he tried to look upon the rest of the world, thus creating the NED which would later be a significant organization working in the Middle East in general, and Egypt in particular.[236] With the end of the Cold War and H. W. Bush being followed by Clinton in office, the 1990s further witnessed a change in the US foreign policy. The 1990s were a period of economic liberalization, and the US played a significant role in this by providing aid to the Egyptian government to help them to liberalize their economy. Clinton focused on funding economic projects despite the fact that he was the first president to explicitly declare democracy promotion to be a cornerstone of US foreign policy. However, these democracy promotion efforts were economic- and development-based, and Clinton kept good relations with Mubarak's government, considering Egypt to be a vital strategic ally in the Middle East.[237] Thus, it was during the 1990s that the USAID first started pouring money into Egypt for economic and development projects.

The USAID fund addressed four main components of Egyptian political life: 1) "elections and political participation," 2)"civil society," 3) "rule of law" and 4) "governance." Through these areas, USAID hoped to stirr changes just like those seen in Eastern Europe. However, those four sectors did not challenge the authoritarian regime of Mubarak; instead, they focused on the economic and development aspects while keeping up cooperation with Mubarak on matters of law and elections. In 1994, USAID initiated the Administration of Justice Support (AOJS), which focused on the "rule of law" through micro programs directed at "judges and lawyers." The economy was still the main focus of USAID, and Mubarak was still presented an ally for the US; however, USAID thought that economic liberalization had to be followed by good rule of law to better it.[238] Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the USAID had put together an "Advancing the Partnership" strategic plan for Egypt, but the plan was again focused on the political aspects of economic development.[239] With W. Bush taking office in 2001 and the 9/11 attacks, democracy promotion as well as US' foreign policy changed drastically (see chapter two).

9/11 shook the world, not just the US. After the attack, the US realized that terrorism could strike even the strongest country in the world. Thus, based on the attack and as a reaction to it, the Bush administration sought to export democracy to the Middle

East to prevent a future attacks. Bush initiated his Freedom Agenda and put democracy promotion as a priority, and Egypt has been one of the most important countries in the Middle East as a result of its influence in the region; thus, the focus shifted towards political life in Egypt with the US pushing for elections to be held in the country.[240] Between 2002 and 2009, which marked the end of the Bush administration and presidency, US foreign policy shifted from focusing mainly on economic and development aspects to political reforms. This shift has been seen on many occasions; for example, Bush's public criticisms of Mubarak for arresting Saad Eddin Ibrahim (the head and founder of Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies). In addition, he initiated the MEPI, which worked mainly on reforms in sectors such as education and women; the MEPI's importance lies in its reliance on a bottom-up approach through CSOs instead of working with the government as was the norm before.[241] In 2004, the AOJS entered a new, second phase that mainly worked on the "rule of law." Another significant point came in 2004, when in addition to criticisms of Mubarak's authoritative policies, the US started monitoring the aid that they gave to the Egyptian government (before that, no actual monitoring took place), which stemmed from recommendations given by Senator Sam Brownback.

One criticisms made by the director of the MEPI was the US's previous focus on economic and development, i.e., the service-oriented approach of the US.[242] Consequently, the Bush administration pushed reforms in other sectors; for instance, throughout 2004, the US initiated the Middle East Broadcasting Network focusing on media.[243] Bush pushed for reforms in Egypt that in return confused people on how to react; the division lied between those hoping for a new stance by the US while others doubted the intentions of the Bush administration throughout the Middle East because of the war in Iraq.. As a result, movements like Kifaya prefered to stay away from the US.[244] From 2004 to 2008, anger rose in Egypt; protests started breaking out in refusal to the policies of the Mubarak regime.

In 2005, the first elections were held under pressure from internal and external actors; the same year marked the beginning of Bush's second presidential term through which he confirmed his unaltered position towards Egypt. The US saw an opportunity in the presidential and parliamentary elections that were announced to take place in 2005, and they attempted to support this manoeuver through pouring more aid and funds into the country.[245] In 2006, the US tried even more to put pressure on Egypt by refusing to initiate

free trade discussions, but soon they held these talks anyways, eventually opting to increase aid by 1.3 % for that year. In 2007, those policies were referred to as the "Updated Democracy Strategy." In fact, from 2005 to 2008, the US attempted to support CSOs in Egypt, especially human rights organizations while the MEPI additionally created Horytna, which functioned as an independent radio station.[246] The next presidential elections saw the first African American president, Barack Obama, taking office. Obama preferred to distance himself from Bush's foreign policies, mainly due to criticisms in the US of Bush's focus on external politics over internal affairs; thus, Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton worked to assure the prioritization of domestic politics. Soon after and during his speech in Cairo in 2009, Obama asserted to the Middle East his respect for the sovereignty of their states and called for "sustainable democracy" instead (see chapter two).

By 2009, Obama's name was mostly being associated with funding cuts when it came to democracy promotion. As discussed earlier, the funds might have decreased, but those funds directed at specific projects and areas of focus increased (chapter two). Overall, funding in Egypt decreased from $50,000,000 to $20,000,000. [247] It is also argued that Obama took office when those cuts were discussed, and he merely did not retract that decision.[248] The political scene in Egypt was not stable at the time, with strikes and protests breaking out, the police reacting violently towards these protestors, the instability that was sparked from Syria and waves of resentment towards Arab dictators. In addition, Mubarak's health retreating, rampant election fraud and a general sense of instability in Egypt accumulated into waves of protests following the announcement of the Arab Spring in Syria.[249]

When the protests first broke out, it left the US in a state of confusion; Mubarak had been an important ally to the US, and Egypt was vital to the stability of the region. Thus, the first reaction from the Obama administration was to call for reforms to be made by Mubarak, reinforcing the notion that he should stay. Clinton confirmed Obama's announcement by further stressing the ability of Mubarak to reform as well as his importance as an ally. However, after a phone call between the two presidents; Obama announced his support for a power transition that met the demands of protests in February 2011, a position that was further pushed and publicly confirmed as the US' position after the actual stepping down of Mubarak.[250] The US was also torn between security and democracy agendas upon the arrival of the Arab Spring.[251] The US has initiated the

Foundation for the Future that subsequently initiated the Reform 2.0 project as well as spread their activism through political education, awareness campaigns, women participation in politics and many others facets of political life; after the MBH won more assembly seats, the US cooperated with them.[252] The focus was indeed on Egypt as a regional stabilizer against the waves of protests in the region, occupying around 55% of American talks of the Middle East and ranking first on democracy discussions of the Middle East, consuming 75.16% of the discussions' attention.[253]

After initial support for Mubarak before then announcing support for a transitional government, the SCAF took control of the Egyptian government, yet they proved to be no better than the Mubarak regime had been, simply functioning as an extended version of this form of governance; yet, because the protests persisted in Egypt until the announcement of the first free elections in Egypt, the SCAF promised stability while at the same time tightening its grip on freedoms and democracy. The country erupted into violence between protesters who felt betrayed by the new regime and the SCAF, which was trying to adapt the deep state to the new changes. Thus, the US supported the SCAF while simultaneously subtly pushing for democracy; the SCAF provided an opportunity to again restore stability and peace not only to Egypt but the region as well. After the pressure on the SCAF to hold elections succeeded, the US cooperated with the MBH, the biggest organized opposition group by then, especially after winning a majority in parliament.[254] After the military took over the country for a second time, jailing the first democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi from the MBH party, the political situation further deteriorated in Egypt. A State of Emergency was declared, violence broke out and protests were oppressed; the military was trying to adopt an authoritative regime's style of governance to deal with the changes. In 2014, the US sent funds amounting to $975,000,000 as a first phase, and some $576,000,000 for a second phase. The funds were supposed to be conditionally distributed to democratic reforms, but that was never the case. The conditions put by the US were very general, and it was obvious the prioritization of security for the US was the main intention.[255]

The Sisi regime became the new Mubarak regime, and the relationship between the US and Egypt was once again dominated by security concerns above anything else, especially when the region itself began to face so many challenges, such as ISIS as well as other groups and organizations that shook the world; for example, the total chaos Syria and Libya fell into. As a result there was a rising influence for Gulf countries and their

increasing financial support for the Sisi regime. The new authoritative regime has adapted itself to these new changes, and with the new NGO law, first proposed by Sisi in 2014, CSOs retreated to social and economic aspects of development. The importance of the US in Egypt lies in its pressuring powers over the government because the government, especially the military, takes so much money from the US every year; yet, the relations are also haunted by security and stability concerns rooted in the US' own interests, especially with the emergence of terrorism as a world phenomena, with Israel on the border of Egypt and with Egypt's dictators being strategic allies to the US for so many years now. Yet, I would argue that the strength of the US and its influence is much more tangible than that of the EU; as the first owns tools of pressure on the military, if stability and security dilemmas can take a back seat to democracy and human rights, there is great potential for change.

4.6 Present Day Politics and Their Effects on Civil Society

With Egypt returning to authoritarian policies and Sisi's attempt to learn from Mubarak's mistakes, the future of the country does not look bright. Presidential races of 2018 have started with one contestant left, President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi. Four different candidates were eliminated or pushed away. The first was Ahmed Shafiq, a former prime minister and one of the close allies of Hosni Mubarak.[256] He fled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after running for presidenct and losing to the MBH candidate, Mohammed Morsi. It was believed that Shafiq has gathered support during his 5 year-stay in the UAE. After announcing his bid for presidency, however, he was deported from the UAE under the allegation that he was being held hostage. Upon his arrival, he disappeared, and rumors spread that he was taken by Egyptian intelligence. He was later released, and he denied the rumors and announced his willingness to withdraw from the elections. Some sources even told one of the newspapers that he was threatened with allegations of corruptions and "sexual misconduct."[257]

Another shocking event occured when Ahmed Konsowa, a military colonel, published a video announcing his desire to run for presidency, concluding that he sued the government eleven times and that the current policies of the regime were inappropriate for dealing with the current challenges facing Egypt. He was charged with breaking "the military code" and was sentenced to six years in prison. It was seen as ironic and hypocritical of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to take such actions because he announced his desire to

run for president in his military outfit, stating his willingness to retire from the military and become a civilian president, just like Konsowa did.[258] Lately, the former Supreme Court of the Armed Forces (SCAF) Sami Anan announced his bid for the presidency. He was seen as someone who could gather enough votes to challenge el-Sisi's presidency, yet Anan was arrested shortly thereafter, along with some of his campaign team and even members of their families. He was accused of forging document for running for presidency to prove he has retired completely.[259]

As a consequence of these events, the leftist human rights lawyer Khalid Ali withdrew from the presidential race. Before that, they sued him and made collecting votes difficult for him. He complained of the violations his campaign faced and withdrew, stating that it is no longer a race if whoever runs for presidency is arrested.[260] Critical as it was, no candidates were left. Al Ghad, a political party collecting votes for president Sisi, offered a nominee.[261] An opposition coalition called for boycotting the elections because it was not free and fair as no real competition exists.[262] In one particular speech, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi warned against doing such an act and the consequences for it, saying it would destabilize the country. He warned that what happened during the Arab Spring would not happen again, using hand and eye gestures to warn his audience verbally and physically.[263]

From all of this, what can one decipher about the situation? Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seeks legitimacy from the international community as well as from the country itself, exposing the opponents from outside the military as well as inside. He has uncovered and eliminated his rivals, all the while gathering information on both. Thus, the Egyptian president, like many other dictators, allowed elections and derived legitimacy from them, securing not only a win but also adding years to his rule. However, the EU and the US seem to embrace the new stability offered by the Egyptian military. With the EU, relations seem to be restored to the old school manner of doing things, and Egypt is to sign new trade agreements with Europe.[264] As for the US, the Trump administration has maintained good relations with Egypt's Sisi, and their strategic partnership has been restored. Thus, the 2017 suspension of military aid as a way to pressure Egypt into respect human rights has been redacted. Upon the decision and in the announcement, the issues of security and stability were once again listed a top priority, in a time where HRW and Amnesty International reported on the human rights' crisis in Egypt reaching a record high.[265] Sisi's regime has had the worst record among Egyptian regimes when it comes to human rights, civil society and freedom of speech, yet the old priorities of the US and the EU have

recently pushed aside when Sisi was able to prove himself capable of stabilizing the country and oppressing opposition.

Conclusion

Egypt and Turkey: How Similar or Different Are Authoritative Policies?

With the recent events taking place in both Turkey and Egypt, especially the Gezi Protests and the Arab Spring along with the harsh policies adopted by both presidents against opposition groups, they have come to appear to have common features that can also be found in other (especially authoritative) regimes. In Egypt, there is the underrepresentation of Christians, with them taking only 36 seats out of 596 in the 2016 parliament, but Sisi has also insisted on the idea that "We are all Egyptians," which outright ignores the discrimination against Christians.[266] For example, the terrorist attack against Christians that led to the killings of 128 people in 2017.[267] Thus, speeches made by the Egyptian president are nothing but propaganda aimed at appearing to govern in a certain way that translates to Westerners as stability. In a more direct way, Sisi's attempts to restore security and stability in the northern Sinai region have left people without homes, devastated and in need of humanitarian aid. The HRW called it a "siege;" thus, he prioritized security over life itself.[268] In Turkey, the state itself has adopted harsh policies towards Kurdish civilians, and they are hardly given rights in the country. Erdogan has been able to accomplish this with the help of propaganda that usually frames all Kurdish people into one category: terrorists.[269] Of course, this strategy has led to a worsening of human rights' conditions in both countries.

In HRW's 2017 report, it was asserted that "President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's government maintained its zero-tolerance policy towards dissent, introducing repressive legislation, notably a nongovernmental organization (NGO) law that may end independent associations, reinstating a state of emergency and continuing near-absolute impunity for abuses by security forces under the pretext of fighting 'terrorism."[270] Meanwhile in Turkey in response to the recent elections, HRW reported, "The new presidential system, which consolidates the incumbent's hold on power, is a setback for human rights and the rule of law. It lacks sufficient checks and balances against abuse of executive power, greatly diminishing the powers of parliament, and consolidating presidential control over most judicial appointments. The presidential system will come fully into force following

elections in 2019."[271] Along with this, both countries, in addition to the state emergency laws that have been used to control politics, have passed anti-terrorism laws that allow them to extend their powers to the opposition without getting blamed by the international community (playing on fears of security again). The two presidents' referral to external powers that aim to divide the country works to spread fear, arrests and media crackdowns while producing propaganda, all of which is directed at controlling the political life of the respective countries, spreading their influence and oppressing any opposition. This is all reflected in CSOs that are no longer able to influence this kind of governance or balance their powers, and with the US' and the EU's concerns over refugees, security and IS in the region, external support is limited to what cannot challenge those priority concerns.

An opportunity opened up during the Arab Spring and the Gezi Protests. Both events united people of different backgrounds, opening a space for younger generations to express their opinions about how the future of their countries should be. Moreover, both Taksim and Tahrir squares were significant places of earlier protests of leftists, and of course they were both faced with police brutality and various means of oppression, which succeeded in both countries. At the same time, they opened a window for CSOs to breathe and work freely despite the instability surrounding the situations. Yet, they were both the first to be morally attacked so as to divide the protests and spread hatred among the public. In Turkey, Erdogan claimed that the protesters hated Muslims and had attacked a headscarved woman, which was proven by an actual recorded video to be false.[272] The situation was not different in Egypt, when the SCAF attacked the morality of female protesters.[273] It seems like the policies of both countries is based on propaganda and fear (fear of the loss of morality, fear of instability, fear of crashing economies). Overall, the authoritative trends were and still are somehow similar between both countries; the difference is that change can come through elections in Turkey, whereas in Egypt it is not a viable approach any longer.

Towards an Overall Assessment

This thesis was an attempt to understand some of the concepts that are gaining more and more importance everyday, from "civil society," emerging in Ancient Greece, to "democracy" and "authoritarianism." Civil society appears to be gaining more importance in politics, usually with, but not always, a leaning towards either a Tocquevillian or a Gramscian approach. The prior refers to the strengthening civil society in order to

strengthen the state and the existence of civil society as a monitor to state policies that can lead to good governance, which is a position that is adopted in the West, mostly by the US. Meanwhile, the Gramscian approach calls on civil society to be a place of resistance to authoritative regimes; thus, civil society works as a counter-balance to state hegemony, a position that was adopted in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1970s-1990s, which consequently led to the revolutionary emergence of the vitality of CSOs. As discussed earlier, democracy has its origins in Ancient Greece, and it has taken so many shapes over the years; however, liberal democracy has been especially popular since the end of the Cold War, and the aptitude for it only increased when the US helped Europe get back on its feet.

Later on, both the US and the EU wished to export democracy to the Middle East, specifically when the Reagan administration took office and then later with a clearer approach during the Bush administration. This ambition was almost always dominated by a security dilemma, which intensified even more after the rise of IS and the waves of refugees looking for a war-free zone. In Turkey, Erdogan's religious AKP started off with the hope of an economic revival and an non-authoritative, military-free country, but they soon showed authoritative tendencies that were even more obvious after the Gezi Protests. With Erdogan gaining more powers after the recent elections, the country's future state of democracy has become unclear. The EU has granted Turkey candidacy status and worked closely to Europeanize the country, a process that came from a bottom-up approach via civil society and a top-down approach via the strengthening of government institutions. Whereas the US' was dominated by a grant programs to strengthen the overall conditions of the country and later helped with the refugee crisis. At the same time, the EU is caught up in the fear of a flood of refugees, making the relationship between Turkey and the EU more or less stable. However, the US-Turkish relations are deteriorating; with an economic crisis approaching Turkey, the deflation of the Lira and increasing debt, the Trump administration is pressuring the country to release an American pastor who was jailed on the accusation of coup-related activities by threatening to impose economic sanctions.[274] Although Turkish CSOs are weakened after so many policies aimed at limiting their capabilities, that has not meant the end for them. The very emergence of CSOs in Turkey came as a reaction to the realization of the state's failure in times of need. This very matter can occur again, with the state's main focus being more control, a crashed economy and elections that are democratically won by only 52% of the votes. Putting differences aside

and taking a step back from Turkish political parties, the CSO community might be a door out of this situation. Thus, a Tocquevillian approach to civil society is not the best of ideas; those CSOs need to provide an independent arena for minorities, human rights and freedom of speech. A Gramscian approach is more suitable for Turkey; the EU and the US have to realize the importance of stregthening CSOs to counterbalance the AKP's rising authoritative tendencies. The challenge, again, lies in balancing a certain set of ideas promoted with security and interests, which is most difficult now in a chaotic Middle East.

In Egypt, Sisi's tough measurements to improve the economy are affecting everyday-commodities; prices are constantly rising on basic services, stirring anger from the public. With previous crackdowns covering all aspects of political life, the regime's attempt to control the country and the recent spike in prices, anger has taken a toll on Egyptians.[275] The 2011 protests came as the reaction of ordinary people towards Mubarak's authoritarianism that affected their everyday life. Governments change, and a president cannot rule forever. Jailing the opposition while increasing prices and political oppression might work for a while, but not forever; those social media youngsters who took to social media platforms as their space of political expressions in an oppressive country will sooner or later pour outside the walls of computers; and the rising anger towards price increases will be the same. The problem in Egypt lies in the lack of oppositional organization, even in times of freedom of expression such as after the Arab Spring, but if differences are put aside, something might change. Moreover, although the EU restored its old partnership with the regime and preferred trade and security over democracy, the US could impose significant pressure on the government because, after all, the military partially depends on US aid. The recent restoring of aid that was cut to push for improving human rights in Egypt and the focus on security and stability might warn of a worse future, but the US (maybe with a different administration and ideology, or pressure from the senate like before) might be able to put pressure on the military government to improve conditions, especially for civil society in Egypt. If Sisi was not able to stabilize the country (which he is not trying to prove to Western powers by means of oppression) and anger rose and spread to the streets, the US and the EU might realize that the old dichotomy does not work anymore (and indeed it never did, it only suppressed anger that led to instability and violence). This is not to say that both the EU and US should stop their current support for CSOs in Turkey and Egypt in the fields of economy and social

development because they do make a difference in times of political turmoil, but to balance democracy with stability might change lives.

Notes

[1] Lyons, "Loose-Leaf Notebook."
[2] DeWiel, Boris. "A Conceptual History."
[3] Shakespeare, "Romeo and Juliet," 3.
[4] DeWiel, Boris. "A Conceptual History."
[5] Jussi, "Debating Civil Society."
[6] DeWiel, "A Conceptual History."
[7] Jussi, "Debating Civil Society."
[8] Chakraborty, "Gramsci's Idea of Civil."
[9] DeWiel, "A Conceptual History."
[10] Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political*.
[11] DeWiel, "A Conceptual History of Civil.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political*, 88-89
[14] Ferguson, *Essay on the History,* 88
[15] DeWiel, "A Conceptual History."
[16] Jussi, "Debating Civil Society."
[17] Baker, *Civil Society and Democratic*, 5-6.
[18] Chakraborty, "Gramsci's Idea of Civil."
[19] Lewis, "Civil Society in Non-Western."
[20] Baker, *Civil Society and Democratic*, 6-7
[21] DeWiel, "A Conceptual History."
[22] Baker, *Civil Society and Democratic*, 6
[23] Lewis, "Civil Society in African."
[24] Mercer, "NGOS, Civil Society."
[25] Chakraborty, "Gramsci's Idea of Civil."
[26] Foley and Edwards."The Paradox of Civil."
[27] Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 176.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Dahl. *On Democracy*, 9
[30] Ibid. 507 B.C. is listed because that is when Cleisthenes took power and changed the political system of Ancient Greece, which many historians consider to be the landmark that makes him the father of democracy.
[31] For more on Athenian democracy, see Lakoff, *Democracy*."
[32] Ibid., 104-8
[33] Huntington, "Democracy Third Wave." Huntington asserts that the first wave boasted, at its peak, 29 democracies before dwindling to 12. The second wave amassed 36 democracies before decreasing to 30. As Huntington was still writing during the third wave, he was not able to give definitive figures for it.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Kurzman, "Waves of Democratization."
[36] Doorenspleet, "Reassessing the Three Waves." Renske also suggests a solution for both problems that he found in Huntington's theory, and instead proposes three waves of democratization based on this solution.
[37] Held, *Models of Democracy*. His 11 models include classical democracy, protective and developmental republicanism, protective and developmental democracy, direct democracy,

competitive elitist democracy, pluralism, legal democracy, deliberative democracy, democratic autonomy, cosmopolitan democracy.

[38] Gabardi, "Contemporary Models of Democracy."

[39] For more on direct and representative democracy, see Budge, "Direct and Representative Democracy." Budge also replies to the criticisms directed at direct democracy and aims to explain that both models are attainable, and no opposition is conceived.

[40] For the main critique of deliberative democracy, see Mouffe, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic." In her critique of deliberative democracy, she argues that the main idea in this school of thought is to tackle the critique of "popular sovereignty" and portray it, instead, as a "communicatively generated power." Furthermore, following Mouffe's critique, deliberative democracy can be divided into those influenced by John Rawls and followers of Jurgen Habermas. Mouffe found the shared ideas of both scholars to be much more powerful and beneficial than their differences, with both Rawls and Habermas having sought to establish a link between liberalism and democracy. Rawls did so by focusing on individual rights and popular sovereignty while Habermas focused on liberty and equality to link both concepts together. Moreover, both relied on the concepts of rationality and reasoning to support the legitimacy of popular sovereignty. According to Ian Budge, deliberative democracy can be said to be grounded in four basic points: (1) a "public sphere" for people to hold discussions and debates; (2) rules and policies to secure the deliberation process; (3) reason is essential and the majority wins; finally, (4) the actualization of consensus (Budge, "Direct and Representative Democracy).

[41] Mouffe, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic."

[42] Habermas, "Three Normative Models."

[43] Cambridge Dictionary, "Authoritarianism."

[44] Linz, Juan J. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes.* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000): 160-164

[45] Stepan and Linz, "Democratization Theory."

[46] Schedler, *Politics of Uncertainty*. Moreover, electoral elections are to be discussed later in relation to the case studies of Egypt and Turkey

[47] Karakoc, "Authoritative Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[48] Huntington, "Democracy Third Wave."

[49] Karakoc, "Authoritative Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[50] Karakoc, "Authoritative Tendencies Versus Democratization," 7-8; Schedler, *Politics of Uncertainty*.

[51] Schedler, *Politics of Uncertainty*, 13-34

[52] Some scholars have even dated this problem back to the Arab conquest of the Middle East, which created what would later shaped the political landscape of the conquered countries.

[53] Karakoc, "Authoritative Tendencies Versus Democratization," 29-32.

[54] However, modernization theory fails to explain some cases, like that of India.

[55] Karakoc, "Authoritative Tendencies Versus Democratization," 29-32.

[56] Hinnebusch, "Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory."

[57] Huntington, "Democracy Third Wave."

[58] Kaldor, "Idea of Global Civil."

[59] Wolff and Warm. "Towards a Theory."

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Hobson, "Democracy Promotion."

[63] As discussed in the first chapter, this was a vital point to both the US and the World when the US started establishing its democratic governance.

[64] Nau, "America's Identity, Democracy Promotion," 136-138.

[65] Ikenberry, "America's Liberal Grand Strategy."

[66] Patterson, "Obama and Sustainable Democracy."

[67] Ikenberry, " America's Liberal Grand Strategy."

[68] Ibid.

[69] Patterson, "Obama and Sustainable Democracy."

[70] Doyle, Michael. "Peace, Liberty, and Democracy," 21.

[71] Carothers, "Taking Stock of Democracy," 181- 188.

[72] Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson, "Effects of U.S. Foreign."

[73] Scott and Steel, " Sponsoring Democracy."

[74] Doyle, "Peace, Liberty, and Democracy," 21.

[75] Carothers, "Taking Stock of Democracy," 181- 188

[76] Hobson, "Democracy Promotion."

[77] Karakoc, "Authoritative Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[78] Patterson, "Obama and Sustainable Democracy."

[79] Dalacoura, "US Democracy Promotion."

[80] Durac and Cavatorta, "Strengthening Authoritarian Rule."

[81] Patterson, "Obama and Sustainable Democracy."

[82] Ibid.

[83] Nau, "America's Identity, Democracy Promotion," 136-138.

[84] Lavenex, "Globalization and the Horizontal."

[85] Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, "Legacies and Leverage."

[86] Lavenex, "Globalization and the Horizontal."

[87] Ibid.

[88] Hassan, "Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy."

[89] Carothers, "Taking Stock of Democracy," 181-88.

[90] See chapter 1 for more details.

[91] For example, during the Cold War, the US was cautious of supporting some civil society organizations for fear that they could turn towards communism; thus, the US was more inclined to support organizations that were already very much in line with their own ideals.

[92] Ottaway and Carothers, "Burgeoning World of Civil Society Aid."

[93] See Chapter 1 for more debates on what civil society is and why such questions not only should but must be asked.

[94] For more on this, see chapter 1

[95] For more on this, see chapter 1.

[96] Ottaway and Carothers, "Burgeoning World of Civil."

[97] Ibid.

[98] Bratton, "Politics of Government-NGO relations."

[99] Mercer, "NGOs, Civil Society."

[100] Ibid.

[101] Fisher, *NON Governments.*

[102] Mercer, "NGOs, Civil Society."

[103] Clarke, Gerard. "Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World." *Political Studies,* Vol. XLVI, (1998) 36-52

[104] Clarke, "Non-Governmental Organizations."

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid

[107] Lewis, "Civil Society in African."

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Sogge, *Mozambique*, 42

[111] Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine*, 3-4

[112] Onbasi, "Life and Times."

[113] Ibid

[114] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[115] Onbasi, "Life and Times."

[116] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[117] The RP violated the Turkish Constitution according to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and was banned from politics. Recep Tayyip Erdogan was a member of the former party, and upon the ban, he separated and established the AKP.

[118] Onbasi, "Life and Times."

[119] Ketola, "EU Democracy Promotion."

[120] Onbasi, "Life and Times."

[121] Selcen, "Internal Factors."

[122] Selcen, "Internal Factors."

[123] Ibid.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Kaya, "Europeanization of Civil Society."

[129] Ibid.

[130] Selcen, "Internal Factors."

[131] These projects were supposed to address two areas: 1) good relations and a dialogue between the youth of both countries, and 2) to improve and establish a channel of information on how best to deal with EU policies.

[132] Selcen, "Internal Factors."

[133] Simsek, "Transformation of Civil."

[134] Ketola, "EU Democracy Promotion."

[135] Simsek, "Transformation of Civil."

[136] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[137] Ibid.; Onis, "Conservative Globalism."

[138] Simsek, "Transformation of Civil."

[139] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[140] Simsek, "Transformation of Civil."

[141] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[142] This discussion goes even further if one considers Islam to be the reason behind authoritarianism in the Middle East, which is discussed in the first chapter

[143] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[144] Simsek, "Transformation of Civil."

[145] Ibid., 69.

[146] Onbasi, "Life and Times."

[147] Ibid.

[148] Simsek, "Transformation of Civil.".

[149] Ibid..

[150] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[151] Onbasi, "Life and Times."

[152] Yilmaz, "AKP and Its Family."

[153] Selcen, "International Factors."

[154] Ibid.

[155] Ketola, "EU Democracy Promotion," 791.

[156] Selcen, "International Factors."

[157] Kaya, "Europeanization of Civil Society."

[158] Karakoc, "Authoritarian Tendencies Versus Democratization."

[159] Yilmaz, "AKP and Its Family."

[160] Kaya, "Europeanization of Civil Society."

[161] Ibid.

[162] All USAID Reports (from 2001 to 2018) can be accessed through:
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/TUR?fiscal_year=2001&measure=Obligations. NED reports (2014-2018) can be accessed through: https://www.ned.org/wp-content/themes/ned/search/grant-search.php?organizationName=&region=&projectCountry=Turkey&amount=&fromDate=&toDate=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&projectFocus%5B%5D=&search=&maxCount=25&orderBy=HighAwardAmount&start=1&sbmt=1. Turkish government reports on foregin CSOs in Turkey (1994-2018) can be accessed through:
https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/media/templates/dernekler/images/folder/izin_verilen_listesi_ing.pdf

[163] Foreign Aid Explorer, "U.S. Foreign Aid," 2001.

[164] Frantz and Sanger,"Turkey Floats Currency."

[165] Foreign Aid Explorer, "U.S. Foreign Aid," 2002.

[166] Gordon, "Turkey and Responses."

[167] Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Foreign CSOs Permitted."

[168] Foreign Aid Explorer, "U.S. Foreign Aid," 2003.

[169] Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Foreign CSOs Permitted."

[170] Filkins and Jehl, "Turkey Says U.S."

[171] Foreign Aid Explorer, "U.S. Foreign Aid," 2004, 2005.

[172] Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Foreign CSOs Permitted."

[173] Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Foreign CSOs Permitted."

[174] Foreign Aid Explorer, "U.S. Foreign Aid," 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012.

[175] Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Foreign CSOs Permitted."

[176] Foreign Aid Explorer, "U.S. Foreign Aid," 2013.

[177] Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Foreign CSOs Permitted."

[178] Heavey, "Obama, Turkey's Erdogan Discuss."

[179] Arango and Arsu, "Suicide Blast Kills U.S."

[180] Foreign Aid Explorer, "U.S. Foreign Aid," 2016.

[181] National Endowment for Democracy, "Award Grants Search," 2014, 2015, 2016.

[182] Turkey Purge, "Turkey's Post-coup Crackdown," contains a record of consequential events to the 2016 coup;
https://turkeypurge.com/

[183] European Parliament, "EU-Turkey Relations."

[184] Foreign Aid Explorer, "U.S. Foreign Aid," 2016, 2017.

[185] Kart, "US Gov't Suspends 14."

[186] National Endowment for Democracy, "Award Grants Search," 2016, 2017.

[187] Ali and Mohammed, "Trump Warns Erdogan."

[188] Idiz, "Latest Turkey-EU Talks."

[189] Ellyatt, "Turkey's Erdogan Might Not."

[190] International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, "Civil Freedom Monitor."

[191] Allen, "Turkey's Huge Crackdown."

[192] Khallaf, "Civil Society in Egypt."

[193] El Medni, "Civil Society and Democratic," 21.

[194] Arafa, "Tales of Post-Arab Spring."

[195] Altan-Olcay Icduygu, "Mapping Civil Society."

[196] Herrold, "NGO Policy."

[197] Altan-Olcay Icduygu, "Mapping Civil Society."

[198] Herrold, "NGO Policy."

[199] Altan-Olcay Icduygu, "Mapping Civil Society."

[200] Ibid.

[201] El Medni, "Civil Society and Democratic."

[202] It is debated as to whether to call it an uprising or a revolution; for the sake of this research paper, I will be suing them interchangeably

[203] Herrold, "NGO Policy."

[204] Altan-Olcay Icduygu, "Mapping Civil Society."

[205] Herrold, "NGO Policy," 190.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Ibid.

[208] Arafa, "Tales of Post-Arab Spring."

[209] Mari, "Democracy Promotion and Stability," 24-32

[210] Isa, "EU Promotion of Deep."

[211] Dandashly, "EU Democracy Promotion."

[212] Isa, "EU Promotion of Deep."

[213] Dandashly, "EU Democracy Promotion."

[214] Norval and Abdulrahman, "EU Democracy Promotion Rethought," 18.

[215] Ibid.

[216] Dandashly, "EU Democracy Promotion."

[217] Ayman Nour was the only oppositional candidate in the 2005 elections against Mubarak, being sent to jail shortly afterwards on claims of voting frauds.

[218] Norval and Abdulrahman, "EU Democracy Promotion Rethought."

[219] Ibid.

[220] This alienation of the EU to the political realities in Egypt can also be seen in their reactions to the protests and strikes during the 2005 to 2008 period.

[221] Mari, "Democracy Promotion and Stability," 24-32

[222] Norval and Abdulrahman, "EU Democracy Promotion Rethought."

[223] Isa, "EU Promotion of Deep."

[224] Ibid.

[225] Norval and Abdulrahman, "EU Democracy Promotion Rethought."

[226] Isa, "EU Promotion of Deep."

[227] Dandashly, "EU Democracy Promotion," 73.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Isa, "EU Promotion of Deep."

[230] Dandashly, "EU Democracy Promotion."

[231] Mari, "Democracy Promotion and Stability."

[232] Ibid.

[233] Dandashly, "EU Democracy Promotion."

[234] Mari, "Democracy Promotion and Stability."

[235] Snider and Faris, "Arab Spring."

[236] Freigang, "United States Democracy Promotion."

[237] Freigang, "United States Democracy Promotion."

[238] Ibid.

[239] Ibid.

[240] Prior to that, Egypt only held referendums instead of elections in which, of course, Mubarak was always voted for. For more on this, see chapter two.

[241] Snider and Faris, "Arab Spring."

[242] Ibid.

[243] Freigang, "United States Democracy Promotion."

[244] Snider and Faris, "Arab Spring."

[245] Ibid.

[246] Freigang, "United States Democracy Promotion."

[247] Snider and Faris, "Arab Spring."

[248] Freigang, "United States Democracy Promotion."

[249] Ibid.

[250] Ibid.

[251] Hawthorne, "Getting Democracy Promotion Right."

[252] Freigang, "United States Democracy Promotion."

[253] Meguid, "Pressure to Democratize?"

[254] Freigang, "United States Democracy Promotion."

[255] Meguid, "Pressure to Democratize?"

[256] Hosni Mubarak was the president of Egypt, until the Arab Spring. He was overthrown and currently is free.

[257] Deutsche Welles, "Egypt: Ex-PM Ahmed Shafiq"; Middle East Eye, "Shafiq Quit Egypt Election."

[258] Al Jazeera, "Ahmed Konsowa jailed launching."

[259] Michaelson, "Egypt Arrests Ex-General."

[260] Ibid., "Khalid Ali Withdraws."

[261] Trew, "Sisi Ally Mousa Mostafa."

[262] Sanchez and Samaan, "Egyptian Opposition Calls.

[263] Egyptian Streets, "'What Happened 7."

[264] Enterprise Press, "Egypt, EU Cozy Up."

[265] AP News, "US Acts to Release."

[266] Yerkes, "What Egypt Under Sissi."
[267] Sherwood, "Christians in Egypt Face."
[268] Michaelson, "Egyptians in Sinai Living.
[269] Rosenfeld, "Turkey is Fighting."
[270] Human Rights Watch, "Egypt: Events of 2017."
[271] Human Rights Watch, "Turkey: Events of 2017."
[272] Hurriyet Daily News, "Released Footage Shows No."
[273] First Post, "Egypt's Military Discredits Women."
[274] Epstein and Faries, "Turkey's Fragile Economy Faces."
[275] Raghavan and Mahfouz, "Egypt's Powerful President."

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List of Appendices

Appendix no. 1: List of Abbreviations

AKP/JDP	The Justice and Development Party
ANAP	The Motherland Party
BMENA	Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CHP	Republican People's Party
CIHRS	Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DP	Democratic Party
EC	European Commission
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EIDHR	European Instrument for Justice Support
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EU	European Union
EUSG	European Union Security General
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HYSK	Judges and Prosecutors Supreme Court
ICO	International Coffee Organization
IDP	Reformist Democratic Party
IGS	International Geosynthetics Society
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IS/ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
LGBT(Q)	Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgenders (and Queers)
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
MGK	National Security Council
MHP	The Nationalist Movement Party
MOSS	Ministry of Social Solidarity
NAC	National Association for Change
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization(s)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
PKK	Kurdish Workers' Party
RP	Reformist Party
SCAF	Supreme Court of Armed Forces
SSI	State Security Investigations
TCF	Turkish Cultural Foundation
UAE	United Arab Emirates

UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UIC	International Union for Railways
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WRO	Women's Rights Organization(s)
WTO	World Trade Organization

Appendix no. 2: Project Proposal

"Democracy is better for us, because the religious sentiment of the present time accords better with it." — Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Politics*, 1844

Democracy is the more or less rule of people usually through majority-voting in a free and just society by which they choose a representative of the people (majority), whereas democratization is a process in which a government/system transition from undemocratic to democratic. Perhaps, one of the most popular opinions is that expressed by Samuel P. Huntington about democratization coming in waves. Since then, four waves of democratization have been recognized: 1) the first is when voting rights were granted to white male Americans to choose a representative, followed by some other major democratic changes. This lasted from 1826 to 1926. 2) The second wave followed the end of World War II with the transition from authoritarian, war-prone states to that aspiring democracies, 3) and the third wave proceeded in the 1960s and 1970s following the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship.[1] Some argue that the fourth wave came with the Arab Spring.[2] Both concepts are often debated, especially democracy: what does it entail, how does it work and what are its limitations? With these waves came the critique of democratization, precisely that related to civil society. Here, civil society serves as a tool, sometimes the main tool, to democratization. Gordon White explains the relationship between the two, an opinion shared by many other scholars.[3]

For white, civil society can present four contributions to democracy (and democratization) as well as development. First, it provides some kind of a balanced power between the rulers and the ruled. Second, a strong active civil society can force the state to play by the rules and respect them. Third, it acts as an mediator between the state and society. Finally, civil society can help"redefine" the rules and its implications.[4] This research paper is relative to that literature on democracy, democratization and the use of civil society. The theories of democratization and democracy are highly important in politics and academia. The US and the EU deploys or has deployed many resources to accomplish that goal from a bottom-up approach through civil society. Recently, with the developments in the Middle East that took the name of the "fourth wave of democratization," it became even more relative. The aim of the paper is to explore how those approaches and civil society organizations (national and international) have played a vital role to set the mood; however, the Arab Spring itself is said to have failed. The question that rises is whether or not those approaches were addressed, and if they were beneficial in changing the regime, why did it eventually fail. Was it because of internal, historical reasons, or because the models that were set were not applicable? This moves us to my second case study: were the Gezi Protests a turning point in Turkish democracy? In a European candidate country, how does the European Union promote democracy? How do civil society organizations contribute? And did this contribution change after the Gezi

protests and the recent coup? All of these questions will be part of the paper that attempts to answer them.

An Introduction

This thesis will focus on civil society's efforts towards enhancing development and promoting notions such as democracy, specifically in the Middle Eastern countries of Egypt and Turkey. Because civil society organizations have been gaining more importance with the recent political changes in the region, primarily in the shift towards authoritarian regimes, they have become increasingly vital. Egypt and Turkey have been particularly chosen as they provide two very different systems of governance in the region, thus providing the most variation. Moreover, civil societies have many conflicts with the governments they work under in these countries. While there has been a general crackdown on civil society in both countries, this crackdown was on both domestic and international organizations collectively. The focal point will be American and European organizations and their efforts at changing the region. In Egypt, the political scene has taken a different turn since the Arab Spring and the toppling of Hosni Mubarak, the military leader who ruled the country for 30 years. After him, many others attempted to govern the country until it went back to a military rule under Abdel Fattah El Sisi, who took office in 2014. Although Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, the Arab Spring did not erupt there, but other recent events helped shape the country's foreign policies and domestic politics, such as the Gezi Protests and the recent coup.

It is difficult to measure the effectiveness that civil society has had during political turmoil as well as when countries move closer towards authoritarianism. However, the question should be put more precisely: if these organizations are removed, in what ways does it affect the society and to what extent? Whether the influence is little or big, those organizations are essential to providing some kind of power balance. Even though there might be limitations and restrictions can increase, the more authoritarian the regime is, the more organizations can contribute to the advancement of the society, regardless of whether this is through community development or political activism. Therefore, several questions come to mind when approaching the topic. How effective are these organizations? What roles have they played in recent political changes in the region? What challenges do they face under authoritarian governments, or rather what have the limitations and their effects been on American and European organizations working in both countries? The paper will advance with an introduction that defines the keywords it is based on along with a brief history of civil society organizations and the politics of Egypt and Turkey. For the latter, a timeline must be specified to eliminate confusion. In Egypt, the revolution was a turning point; from Mubarak to Sisi, a long list of changes occurred. It can be said that the finest point was right before and after the uprising (the two terms "revolution" and "uprising" are often debated when discussing the nature of the Arab Spring in Egypt). This is when organizations worked mostly freely without an authoritarian regime to suffocate it.

Turkey is a different story, but politics took an ugly turn after the Gezi Protests

and, of course, the recent purge. The conservative Justice and Development Party under Recep Erdogan became aware of the political changes in the neighboring Middle Eastern countries and tightened its grip more and more on organizations and oppositions, changing the situation as well as the US' and Europe's view of the country as a Middle Eastern ally. It has illuminated the other side of the country that the West did not want to look upon before.

Methodology, theoretical frameworks and methods:
Qualitative methods would further help in analyzing the political scene for civil society organizations. While graphic statistical data from official websites, for example, in stating how many of those organizations have been closed (in comparison to another significant period) will be referred to, this is meant to reinforce the qualitative investigation. Therefore, predominantly qualitative methods will be used when comparing Egypt and Turkey. Additionally, of course, the causal relations between political changes and those changes to the organizations concerned will be utilized. Party manifestos along with political speeches and other media will be analyzed using discourse analysis to explain how those were used as political tools, differently taken advantage of according to the regime's ideology. Interviews will be conducted with employees/managers from some of those organizations to depict the different point of views

Research Design
This thesis will consist of an introduction followed by four chapters. The idea is to introduce the general concepts of the research paper, analyze the concepts of democracy in depth as well as democratizations through civil society in the third world. After that, this research will be applied to the two cases of Egypt and Turkey to further the investigation into the research questions, that will eventually lead to the findings and the answers to those questions.

Introduction:
The introduction will include the research question and the aim of the paper. It will briefly introduce the concepts of democracy, democratization, authoritarianism, and civil society. Those concepts will be discussed in relevance to the topic. .Finally, stating the reason behind the choice of the case studiesand the contribution they will add to the theoretical part.

Chapter One
This chapter will take a further step into democracy along with the debates it stirs, the types of democracy and what democratization is. Additionally, it will look at civil society as a tool for the former to concepts. Previous research into the two concepts, and its advancement, will be presented. Also, there will be an introduction in Middle Eastern history and its reputation of having (mostly) authoritarian regimes.

Chapter Two
After introducing the use of civil society organizations in the process of democratization, this chapter will be devoted to exploring the American and European organizations working on democratization of the Middle East, especially in Egypt and Turkey, as well as how those organizations functioned before and after the Arab Spring.

Chapter Three
A comparative study of Egypt and Turkey will address how they differ and where they meet as well as what that means for the future of the Middle East.

Chapter Four/ Conclusion
This chapter aims at making sense of the above researched data. (This section might include some of the interviews done with members of the organizations working in Egypt and Turkey).

Timeline:
Introduction: March, 2018
Chapter One: April, 2018
Chapter Two: May, 2018
Chapter Three: June, 208
Chapter Four/ Conclusion + editing: July 31, 2018

Notes
1. Doorenspleet, "Reassessing the Three Waves."
2. Howard and Hussain, *Democracy's Fourth Wave*.
3. White, *Civil Society, Democratization*.
4. Ibid.

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Key Words

- Democratization
- Authoritarianism
- Civil Society
- Foreign Funds
- Foreign Policy
- Muslim states
- Secular states
- Middle East