Short sticks and Rotting Carrots: Changing Coup-Proofing Structures in Post-Civil War Syria

Abstract

Following the loss of Egypt as its primary ally in 1979, Syria went through a drastic build-up of its armed forces. By 1983, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had swelled to nearly 500,000 active duty personnel from 50,000 at the onset of the 1967 Israeli conflict, constituting one of the largest military forces in the region (Kurt:2016, pp.116). However, what may have appeared to external observers as a powerful regional military force, it was in fact an institution plagued with rampant paternalism, criminal business networks and various competing praetorian factions. While some would view this as simply another 'unavoidable' characteristic of a third world state, many of these factors were in fact created by the regime in power to insulate itself from potential military intrusion into the existing political status quo. With its weak civil society, low regime legitimacy, and rich history of past military putsches, Syria has always been prone to an elevated, theoretical risk of a coup d'état (Belkin & Schofer:2003, pp.595; Gasserbner & al.:2016, pp.302). It has since been proven that through various controls by the military command, no internal or domestic force would have the means nor the incentive to replace the regime, even during times of great political crisis (Luttwak:1969, pp.16). While this...