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dc.contributor.advisorSerdarevič, Goran
dc.creatorMoldovanu, Victoria
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-27T01:30:04Z
dc.date.available2017-04-27T01:30:04Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/33589
dc.description.abstractThe main goal in this paper is to make an in-depth analysis of the regulatory situations that can arise during mergers when political involvement takes place. The research is based on four controversial merger cases of undertakings within the same country (E.On-Ruhrgas), European Union countries (E.On-Endesa, Unicredit-Hypoverein) and between companies from the USA (Boeing-McDonnell Douglas) that have effect on the European market. We analyze the four mergers using Michele Ruta and Massimo Motta models from the paper "A Political Economy of Merger Policy in International Markets" (2008). By the end of the research we reached the conclusion that due to some lapses in the European Commission Merger regulation at the time of the mergers, as well as due to government involvement in the mergers, they are not always cleared in the benefit of the market competition or consumer welfare, but due to nationalistic interests of governments to have big players on the market or to keep governmental power in certain industries, even with the risk of harming competition. Along with this, from the mergers analyzed here, it becomes clear that local or union authorities scrutinize the foreign acquirers more.cs_CZ
dc.description.abstractThe main goal in this paper is to make an in-depth analysis of the regulatory situations that can arise during mergers when political involvement takes place. The research is based on four controversial merger cases of undertakings within the same country (E.On-Ruhrgas), European Union countries (E.On-Endesa, Unicredit-Hypoverein) and between companies from the USA (Boeing-McDonnell Douglas) that have effect on the European market. We analyze the four mergers using Michele Ruta and Massimo Motta models from the paper "A Political Economy of Merger Policy in International Markets" (2008). By the end of the research we reached the conclusion that due to some lapses in the European Commission Merger regulation at the time of the mergers, as well as due to government involvement in the mergers, they are not always cleared in the benefit of the market competition or consumer welfare, but due to nationalistic interests of governments to have big players on the market or to keep governmental power in certain industries, even with the risk of harming competition. Along with this, from the mergers analyzed here, it becomes clear that local or union authorities scrutinize the foreign acquirers more.en_US
dc.languageEnglishcs_CZ
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniverzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních vědcs_CZ
dc.subjectfúze a akvizicecs_CZ
dc.subjectpolitická ekonomiecs_CZ
dc.subjectEvropská Uniecs_CZ
dc.subjectregulacecs_CZ
dc.subjectantitrustcs_CZ
dc.subjectmerger controlen_US
dc.subjectpolitical economyen_US
dc.subjectEuropean Unionen_US
dc.subjectregulationen_US
dc.subjectantitrusten_US
dc.titleMerger Control in the European Unionen_US
dc.typediplomová prácecs_CZ
dcterms.created2011
dcterms.dateAccepted2011-06-21
dc.description.departmentInstitute of Economic Studiesen_US
dc.description.departmentInstitut ekonomických studiícs_CZ
dc.description.facultyFaculty of Social Sciencesen_US
dc.description.facultyFakulta sociálních vědcs_CZ
dc.identifier.repId109125
dc.contributor.refereeVacek, Pavel
dc.identifier.aleph001369681
thesis.degree.nameMgr.
thesis.degree.levelnavazující magisterskécs_CZ
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics and Financeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEkonomie a financecs_CZ
thesis.degree.programEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.programEkonomické teoriecs_CZ
uk.faculty-name.csFakulta sociálních vědcs_CZ
uk.faculty-name.enFaculty of Social Sciencesen_US
uk.faculty-abbr.csFSVcs_CZ
uk.degree-discipline.csEkonomie a financecs_CZ
uk.degree-discipline.enEconomics and Financeen_US
uk.degree-program.csEkonomické teoriecs_CZ
uk.degree-program.enEconomicsen_US
thesis.grade.csVelmi dobřecs_CZ
thesis.grade.enVery gooden_US
uk.abstract.csThe main goal in this paper is to make an in-depth analysis of the regulatory situations that can arise during mergers when political involvement takes place. The research is based on four controversial merger cases of undertakings within the same country (E.On-Ruhrgas), European Union countries (E.On-Endesa, Unicredit-Hypoverein) and between companies from the USA (Boeing-McDonnell Douglas) that have effect on the European market. We analyze the four mergers using Michele Ruta and Massimo Motta models from the paper "A Political Economy of Merger Policy in International Markets" (2008). By the end of the research we reached the conclusion that due to some lapses in the European Commission Merger regulation at the time of the mergers, as well as due to government involvement in the mergers, they are not always cleared in the benefit of the market competition or consumer welfare, but due to nationalistic interests of governments to have big players on the market or to keep governmental power in certain industries, even with the risk of harming competition. Along with this, from the mergers analyzed here, it becomes clear that local or union authorities scrutinize the foreign acquirers more.cs_CZ
uk.abstract.enThe main goal in this paper is to make an in-depth analysis of the regulatory situations that can arise during mergers when political involvement takes place. The research is based on four controversial merger cases of undertakings within the same country (E.On-Ruhrgas), European Union countries (E.On-Endesa, Unicredit-Hypoverein) and between companies from the USA (Boeing-McDonnell Douglas) that have effect on the European market. We analyze the four mergers using Michele Ruta and Massimo Motta models from the paper "A Political Economy of Merger Policy in International Markets" (2008). By the end of the research we reached the conclusion that due to some lapses in the European Commission Merger regulation at the time of the mergers, as well as due to government involvement in the mergers, they are not always cleared in the benefit of the market competition or consumer welfare, but due to nationalistic interests of governments to have big players on the market or to keep governmental power in certain industries, even with the risk of harming competition. Along with this, from the mergers analyzed here, it becomes clear that local or union authorities scrutinize the foreign acquirers more.en_US
uk.publication.placePrahacs_CZ
uk.grantorUniverzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut ekonomických studiícs_CZ


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