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Anti-Corruption Mechanism in Economic Models of Corruption
dc.contributor.advisorOrtmann, Andreas
dc.creatorKrajčová, Jana
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-02T17:06:37Z
dc.date.available2018-10-02T17:06:37Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/21564
dc.description.abstractAnti-Corruption Mechanisms in Economic Models of Corruption Jana Krajčová Abstract This dissertation consists of three chapters that, theoretically and experimentally, address the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent's incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent's type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: 1) the principal does not monitor and only observes output; 2) the principal monitors the agent's effort choice; and 3) the principal monitors the agent's corruptibility. I find that monitoring of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of corruption does not improve the sorting of types but it negatively affects the agent's incentive to be corrupt. In the second and in the third chapter I analyze experimentally how promising as anti-corruption measures leniency policies really are. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) had conjectured, based on theoretical work, that ill-designed legal environments might, in fact, produce results that contradict the intentions of the designers of the leniency policies. And, indeed, I...cs_CZ
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation consists of three chapters that, theoretically and experimentally, address the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent's incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent's type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: 1) the principal does not monitor and only observes output; 2) the principal monitors the agent's effort choice; and 3) the principal monitors the agent's corruptibility. I find that monitoring of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of corruption does not improve the sorting of types but it negatively affects the agent's incentive to be corrupt. In the second and in the third chapter I analyze experimentally how promising as anti-corruption measures leniency policies really are. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) had conjectured, based on theoretical work, that ill-designed legal environments might, in fact, produce results that contradict the intentions of the designers of the leniency policies. And, indeed, I demonstrate, for the first time as far as I know, that real-world subjects...en_US
dc.languageEnglishcs_CZ
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniverzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních vědcs_CZ
dc.titleAnti-Corruption Mechanism in Economic Models of Corruptionen_US
dc.typedizertační prácecs_CZ
dcterms.created2009
dcterms.dateAccepted2009-12-17
dc.description.departmentCERGEcs_CZ
dc.description.facultyFaculty of Social Sciencesen_US
dc.description.facultyFakulta sociálních vědcs_CZ
dc.identifier.repId84640
dc.title.translatedAnti-Corruption Mechanism in Economic Models of Corruptioncs_CZ
dc.contributor.refereeFrank, Bjorn
dc.contributor.refereeSpagnolo, Giancarlo
dc.identifier.aleph002053542
thesis.degree.namePh.D.
thesis.degree.leveldoktorskécs_CZ
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEkonomiecs_CZ
thesis.degree.programEkonomické teoriecs_CZ
thesis.degree.programEconomic Theoryen_US
uk.faculty-name.csFakulta sociálních vědcs_CZ
uk.faculty-name.enFaculty of Social Sciencesen_US
uk.faculty-abbr.csFSVcs_CZ
uk.degree-discipline.csEkonomiecs_CZ
uk.degree-discipline.enEconomicsen_US
uk.degree-program.csEkonomické teoriecs_CZ
uk.degree-program.enEconomic Theoryen_US
thesis.grade.csProspěl/acs_CZ
thesis.grade.enPassen_US
uk.abstract.csAnti-Corruption Mechanisms in Economic Models of Corruption Jana Krajčová Abstract This dissertation consists of three chapters that, theoretically and experimentally, address the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent's incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent's type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: 1) the principal does not monitor and only observes output; 2) the principal monitors the agent's effort choice; and 3) the principal monitors the agent's corruptibility. I find that monitoring of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of corruption does not improve the sorting of types but it negatively affects the agent's incentive to be corrupt. In the second and in the third chapter I analyze experimentally how promising as anti-corruption measures leniency policies really are. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) had conjectured, based on theoretical work, that ill-designed legal environments might, in fact, produce results that contradict the intentions of the designers of the leniency policies. And, indeed, I...cs_CZ
uk.abstract.enThis dissertation consists of three chapters that, theoretically and experimentally, address the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent's incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent's type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: 1) the principal does not monitor and only observes output; 2) the principal monitors the agent's effort choice; and 3) the principal monitors the agent's corruptibility. I find that monitoring of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of corruption does not improve the sorting of types but it negatively affects the agent's incentive to be corrupt. In the second and in the third chapter I analyze experimentally how promising as anti-corruption measures leniency policies really are. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) had conjectured, based on theoretical work, that ill-designed legal environments might, in fact, produce results that contradict the intentions of the designers of the leniency policies. And, indeed, I demonstrate, for the first time as far as I know, that real-world subjects...en_US
uk.file-availabilityV
uk.publication.placePrahacs_CZ
uk.grantorUniverzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, CERGEcs_CZ
thesis.grade.codeP


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