When Deterrence Fails: Simulating a European Counterattack in Latvia and Assessing the Consequences of Casualty Rates
Když odstašení selže: Simulace evropského protiútoku v Lotyšsku a odhad dopadu ztrát
diploma thesis (DEFENDED)
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http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/214940Identifiers
Study Information System: 286184
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- Kvalifikační práce [21212]
Author
Advisor
Referee
Landovský, Jakub
Faculty / Institute
Faculty of Social Sciences
Discipline
Geopolitical Studies
Department
Department of Political Science
Date of defense
23. 9. 2026
Publisher
Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních vědLanguage
English
Grade
Excellent
Keywords (Czech)
Deterence, Simulace, Lotyšsko, NATOKeywords (English)
Deterrence, Simulation, Latvia, NATOThis study examines the operational and political cost of a NATO offensive to retake occupied territory from Russian forces. It models the offensive through Stephen Biddle's formal model of force employment and runs it as a Monte Carlo simulation over three scenarios. The results are interpreted through established literature on casualty aversion in democracies. The findings indicate that a European force can prevail against a prepared Russian defence, if sufficient forces are allocated to the offensive. However, the human cost of carrying out the operation is likely beyond the political capacity to sustain for some NATO members. Consequently, the key constraint on such an operation is therefore not the military capability of European NATO members, but their willingness to tolerate severe casualties to uphold the principle of collective defence. The study concludes that because lost territory is so costly, the failure of deterrence presents NATO with a dilemma that depends less on its military capabilities, than on the political unity of the alliance.
