Risk assessment: VNSAs' ability to achieve CBRN capabilities
Posouzení rizik: Schopnost násilných nestátních aktérů (VNSA) dosáhnout chemických, biologických, radiologických a jaderných (CBRN) schopností
diplomová práce (OBHÁJENO)

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Trvalý odkaz
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/178379Identifikátory
SIS: 249012
Kolekce
- Kvalifikační práce [18181]
Autor
Vedoucí práce
Oponent práce
Aslan, Emil
Fakulta / součást
Fakulta sociálních věd
Obor
International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies (IMSISS)
Katedra / ústav / klinika
Katedra bezpečnostních studií
Datum obhajoby
14. 9. 2022
Nakladatel
Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních vědJazyk
Angličtina
Známka
Výborně
Academics disagree on the risk of VNSAs being able to build or acquire CBRN weapons. Their analysis is based on motivation, geographical factors, potential targets, and VNSA group attributes. Missing is the detailed investigation of how and where a VNSA obtains the necessary precursor materials and the type of security surrounding common materials used for CBRN weapons. This paper will explore the possible routes an actor could take to acquire the knowledge, skills, and materials necessary to make an operable CBRN weapon. Case studies are used to show past routes that allowed VNSAs to achieve capability and the type of weapon and attack utilized. The implementation of regulations, both in response to CBRN attacks and their effectiveness in preventing VNSA CBRN weapon capability, are analyzed. Public online forums, weapons manuals and weapons research along with past prosecuted criminal CBRN attacks revealed the financial capacity needed to acquire materials as well as the technical capacity required to build a successful CBRN system. Existing databases logging insecurity in nuclear facilities, radioisotope thefts, chemical and biological incidents and more are used to establish trends among past and present pursuits and use of CBRN weapons. Viable routes to CBRN capability remain reenforcing the...