<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<title>Ročník 2023</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183762" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle>Volume 2023</subtitle>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183762</id>
<updated>2026-04-04T18:08:09Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-04T18:08:09Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Why It’s OK to Love Bad Movies by Matthew Strohl</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183947" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Livingston, Paisley</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183947</id>
<updated>2024-01-05T02:25:38Z</updated>
<published>2023-09-14T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Why It’s OK to Love Bad Movies by Matthew Strohl
Livingston, Paisley
A book review of Matthew Strohl, Why It’s OK to Love Bad Movies. New York: Routledge, 2022, 206 pp. ISBN 9780367407650.
</summary>
<dc:date>2023-09-14T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>In Defence of Tourists</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183946" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Xhignesse, Michel-Antoine</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183946</id>
<updated>2023-12-14T02:14:21Z</updated>
<published>2023-09-14T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">In Defence of Tourists
Xhignesse, Michel-Antoine
It is not uncommon for art historians and philosophers of art to deride the kinds of aesthetic experiences tourists seek out by characterizing them as bowing to the will of the herd, succumbing to peer pressure, or simply seeking out what is popular. Two charges, in particular, tend to be levelled against tourists. The first, which I call the motivation problem, contends that tourists are motivated to seek out aesthetic experiences for the wrong kinds of reasons. The second, which I call the appreciation problem, maintains that tourist tastes are aesthetically uninformed and are thus the inauthentic product of aesthetic luck. But there is a better way of thinking about aesthetic tourism, one that can capture both the tourist’s motivations and the role of aesthetic luck. I argue that aesthetic tourists, like many experts, subscribe to the acquaintance principle, and that doing so generates aesthetic obligations to their practical identity. The tourist, in the end, is no more – and no less – a product of aesthetic luck than the expert connoisseur.
</summary>
<dc:date>2023-09-14T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Aesthetic Absence and Interpretation</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183945" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Fenner, David</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183945</id>
<updated>2023-12-17T02:12:13Z</updated>
<published>2023-09-14T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Aesthetic Absence and Interpretation
Fenner, David
At least within the last century, artists have produced works that seem to have something missing. Salvatore Garau’s sculpture Sono is (apparently) composed of empty space; the original drawing at the heart of Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing is essentially gone; Rauschenberg’s White Paintings are primarily just white canvases. In this paper, I examine this ‘something missing’ – which I call an ‘aesthetic absence’. These absences are aesthetically relevant to the identities, meaning, and value of the works of art where audiences find such absences, but such relevance can only fully be ascertained and assessed once the absence is resolved, and this resolution comes through an act of interpretation.
</summary>
<dc:date>2023-09-14T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Aesthetic Disagreement with Oneself as Another</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183944" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Tooming, Uku</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/183944</id>
<updated>2023-12-15T02:15:41Z</updated>
<published>2023-09-14T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Aesthetic Disagreement with Oneself as Another
Tooming, Uku
Can disagreement with my past self about aesthetic matters give a reason to reconsider my present aesthetic verdict and if it does, under what conditions? In other words, can such a disagreement be a sign of my failing in my present aesthetic judgement? In this paper, I argue that revising one’s judgement in response to disagreeing with one’s former self is appropriate but only when the former and the present self share the same aesthetic personality. The possibility of failure in one’s aesthetic judgement is therefore bound up, among other things, with facts about one’s aesthetic identity over time. The resulting view has implications for our understanding of the scope of the autonomy in aesthetics and is consistent with empirical evidence regarding the way in which people evaluate aesthetic judgments.
</summary>
<dc:date>2023-09-14T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
</feed>
