

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of International Studies
International Area Studies

Matěj Voda

**Reconceptualizing Securitization Theory:
A Case Study of the United Kingdom's
Securitization of Libya in 2011**

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Author of the thesis: **Matěj Voda**

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Academic supervisor: **doc. Mgr. Tomáš Weiss, M.A., Ph.D.**

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Abstrakt

Prvním cílem této práce bylo popsat kroky z pohledu Velké Británie, které následně vedly ke schválení rezoluce 1973 a vojenské intervenci do Libye. Druhý cíl práce vychází ze sekuritizační teorie a má za cíl zdůraznit roli obecnstva v sekuritizačním procesu. Za tímto účelem je v práci nejprve představena sekuritizační teorie, která je následně podrobena kritice a upravena, aby lépe odpovídala výzkumné otázce. Následně je teorie aplikována na případovou studii sekuritizace Libye od 15. února do 21. března 2011. Tyto události jsou popisovány z pohledu Velké Británie, což má společně s následnou analýzou ukázat, že kabinet Davida Camerona byl sekuritizačním aktérem na mezinárodní i národní úrovni. Práce následně ukazuje, že se sekuritizační diskursy lišily na základě obecnstva. Přestože lidská bezpečnost a přechod k demokracii byly hlavními referenčními objekty v obou diskurzech, v případě obecnstva na národní úrovni byla referenčním objektem také národní bezpečnost. S tím také souvisí hrozba terorismu a uprchlické vlny, která by zasáhla Velkou Británii v případě, že by Kaddáfí zůstal v čele Libye. Bezletová zóna představovala speciální opatření v obou sekuritizačních diskurzech. Hlavní legitimizační argumenty byly také stejné v obou diskurzech. Rozdíly v sekuritizačních diskurzech tedy potvrdily poznatek, že sekuritizační teorie by měla více zohlednit roli obecnstva.

Abstract

The first aim of this thesis is to describe the steps from the perspective of the United Kingdom, which led to the passing of the resolution 1973 and the subsequent military intervention in Libya in 2011. The theoretical framework is securitization theory. The second aim of this thesis is grounded in the theory and tries to highlight the importance of the concept of audience in the securitization framework. In order to achieve this goal, securitization theory is introduced; its limitations described and subsequently reconceptualized to better suit the research question. The theory is then applied on a case study of the securitizing discourse, preceding the intervention from 15th of February until 21st of March 2011. These events are described from the perspective of the United Kingdom, which together with the general overview corresponds with the hypothesis that the Cameron administration was a securitizing actor towards both national and international audience. Consequently, the analysis shows that the securitizing discourses differed based on the relevant audience. Although human security and democratic aspirations were the main referent objects in both discourses, protection of national security as a referent object was specific only to the national audience. In addition, Gaddafi regime was the main threat presented towards both audiences. However, in the context of national security, the threats of Gaddafi supported terrorism and refugee crisis were present only on the national level. The no-fly zone represented extraordinary measures in both discourses. The differences in the securitizing discourses confirmed the insight that securitization should put more emphasis on the role of the audience in the process as the securitizing moves are often audience-specific.

Klíčová slova

Kodaňská škola, sekuritizační teorie, lidská bezpečnost, referenční objekt, obecnstvo, Libye 2011.

Keywords

Copenhagen school, securitization theory, human security, referent object, audience, Libya 2011.

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TEZE BAKALÁŘSKÉ PRÁCE

Jméno: Matěj Voda
E-mail: fsvmatejvoda@gmail.com
Studijní obor: Mezinárodní teritoriální studia
Semestr a školní rok zahájení práce: Letní 2016/2017
Semestr a školní rok ukončení práce: Letní 2017/2018
Vedoucí bakalářského semináře: PhDr. Marek Pečenka
Vedoucí práce: doc. Mgr. Tomáš Weiss, M.A., PhD.
Název práce: Reconceptualizing Securitization Theory: A Case Study of the United Kingdom's Securitization of Libya
Charakteristika tématu práce (max. 10 řádek): Bakalářská práce je teoretizována v rámci sekuritizační teorie. V práci sleduji, jak se proměňuje chování (z hlediska tzv. řečových aktů a také v sociologickém kontextu) vzhledem k danému obecnství. Tento záměr vychází z kritiky, která byla namířena vzhledem k původní sekuritizační teorii, která byla představena kodaňskou školou. Ve své případové studii se budu zaměřovat na rozdíly v sekuritizačních procesech, předcházející vojenské intervenci do Libye, z pohledu sekuritizačního aktéra Velké Británie (Cameronovy administrativy) na úrovni národní (Parlament) a mezinárodní (Rada bezpečnosti OSN). Zajímá mě, jak sekuritizační aktér upravuje "legitimizaci" intervence vzhledem ke změně relevantního obecnství. Budu zkoumat především rozdíly: v referenčních objektech, existenciální hrozbě a přijetí speciálních opatření daným obecnstvím.
Zdůvodnění úprav a změn tématu od zadání projektu do odevzdání práce (max. 10 řádek): Došlo k výrazné změně oproti původnímu zadání projektu. Práce se soustředí pouze na jednoho sekuritizačního aktéra a jeho sekuritizační kroky. Práce byla navíc časově vymezena. Práce se také již nesnaží o popsání tzv. bezpečnostního prostředí (security dispositif), ve kterém bylo sekuritizováno. K těmto změnám došlo za účelem zpracování práce ve formátu bakalářské práce a pozměnění výzkumné otázky od původního projektu. Práce se totiž již nesoustředí jenom na lidskou bezpečnost (referenční objekt), ale také na existenciální hrozbu a přijetí speciálních opatření. Současným cílem práce je tedy určit, jak se proměňuje chování sekuritizačního aktéra vzhledem k proměně obecnství. Současná výzkumná otázka: Jaké byly rozdíly v sekuritizačních diskurzech Velké Británie vzhledem k daným obecnstvům? Rozšíření analýzy by tedy mělo pomoci lépe zodpovědět výzkumnou otázku.
Struktura práce (hlavní kapitoly obsahu): Práce se skládá ze dvou hlavních částí: teoretické části a případové studie. V první části nejprve představím sekuritizační teorii, limity teorie a následně teorii rekonceptualizuji, aby zahrnovala i širší souvislosti. Následovat bude metodologická část, kde provedu kritiku literatury a představím metodologii práce. Samotná případová studie začne nejprve přehledem událostí v Libyi od 17. února do 21. března s důrazem na roli a perspektivu Velké Británie v debatách předcházející vojenské intervenci. Následně ukážu, jak se mohou řečové akty rozdělit do jednotlivých diskursů na základě dvou typů obecnství, kterým byly adresovány sekuritizační kroky.

Samotná analýza práce bude tedy vždy rozdělena na dvě části na základě dvou obecností. V závěru shrnu poznatky z analýzy práce a pokusím se o krátké doporučení týkající se teorie sekuritizace.

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
EU	European Union
CS	Copenhagen School
HRC	Human Rights Council
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
LAS	League of Arab States
NTC	National Transitional Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Introduction

The field of security studies, a sub-field of international relations, has reconceptualized its perception of security in recent decades. The broadening of the discipline was achieved by two simultaneous academic endeavours. Academics started to focus on other issues besides the traditional emphasis on military force, war and peace, which was the so-called “widening” of the field. Moreover, critical scholars sought to include other levels of analysis next to states e.g. individuals and international organisations, the so-called “deepening”.¹

Indeed, the traditionalist lacked the theoretical tools to explain issues such as the peaceful end of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts, the fear of immigration in Western societies, environmental issues or HIV/AIDS epidemics. The widening and deepening of the field was also, to a certain extent, an answer to the calls of policy-makers, who sought to tackle these issues. Thus, the discipline broadened its agenda beyond the traditional emphasis on states and military force.² The camp of “wideners” gradually became more heterogeneous and various schools like constructivism, post-colonialism, critical security studies, human security and Copenhagen school joined the ranks of long-established schools of post-structuralism and feminism.³

The Copenhagen School has since gained much prominence primarily on behalf of securitization theory. Although the theory has been criticized by many scholars since its inception for various limitations, the very concept of securitization has become influential in the field of security studies. One of the key critiques, which this thesis seeks to examine, has been that the theory should put more emphasis on the role of the audience, whose assent is necessary for a successful securitization. The thesis seeks to highlight the importance of the audience by observing the interaction of one securitizing actor with two kinds of audience. Therefore, the goal is to demonstrate that the securitizing actor will appropriate its securitizing moves based on the target audience.

The case study of my thesis will be centered on the role of the United Kingdom (more specifically Cameron administration on the national level) in the debate prior to the military intervention to Libya in 2011. This decision has been driven by the aim of this research, which is to compare the differences between the securitizing moves of one

¹ Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution Of International Security Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 180–183.

² Some scholars argue that the narrowness of security studies was a symptom of the Cold War paradigm. With the omnipresent threat of global destruction gone, other issues gained attention of policy-makers. *Ibid.*, 188.

³ *Ibid.*, 180–183.

securitizing actor towards a specific audience. In order to compare, there need to be at least two different audiences, whose approval is required. In the case of Libya, my assumption is that it was the United Nations Security Council and the British Parliament.

The reason why I chose to focus on David Cameron and his administration as the securitizing actor was due to the role of the United Kingdom in the events preceding and also following the adoption of the UN resolution 1973. The UK was one of the chief advocates of the resolution 1973 and also one of the states, which carried out the subsequent intervention. In addition, the case of Libya in the British discourse is important because the original support for the intervention has since evolved into a strong critique of the British involvement in Libya after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, the intervention itself and the R2P as a legal basis for humanitarian intervention. There has been a lot of research done on how the actual implementation took place but not what arguments shaped the debate prior to intervention. Hence, I wanted to test the assumption that human security was the primary referent object in the British discourse prior to intervention.⁴

Thesis structure and hypotheses

The thesis consists of two main parts; these are a theoretical part and a case study. I will begin by introducing the theory before proceeding to the methodological part of my thesis because the methodology is strongly grounded in the theory itself. In the theoretical part of the thesis, I will first introduce the original securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School and the limitations connected with this view of securitization. Secondly, I will outline the amendments put forward by other scholars and establish a revised version of securitization theory. This will be done with a specific focus on the role of the audience in the theory. In the ideal case, this part of the thesis should serve as an introductory overview of literature concerning the theory. Finally, the case study methodology will be elaborated together with caveats, which need to be taken into account before proceeding with the analysis. In this chapter, I will also describe discourse analysis as my method of inquiry and provide an analysis of the case study literature.

In the second part of the thesis, I will begin with the actual case study, in which I will first outline the overview of events since the start of the uprising on 17th February

⁴ Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho, “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection”, *Global Society* vol. 30n n. 1 (2016): 114, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

until the final vote in the House of Commons. This will be done with the emphasis on the role and perspective of the United Kingdom. Throughout the case study, I will be applying the reconceptualized securitization theory on the case study of the intervention in Libya. After determining that the United Kingdom was a securitizing actor, I will examine the interaction of the Cameron administration with the British Parliament (national audience) and the United Nations Security Council (international audience), each within a specific sociological context. Thereby, demonstrating that the securitizing discourse will differ while interacting with different types of audiences.

This will be done with an emphasis on the referent object, the existential threat presented and the extraordinary measures to tackle the threat. The main research question of my thesis is: What were the differences in the securitizing discourses by the Cameron administration? The outcomes of my thesis will be twofold, which is caused by the theoretical grounding of the thesis. In the conclusion, I will summarise the findings of the case study analysis and propose some theoretical recommendations that result from these findings.

My first hypothesis is that there will be differences in the securitizing moves by the Cameron administration, which confirm the need for audience-centered approach to securitization.

My second hypothesis is that the Cameron administration was a securitizing actor and human security was the primary referent object of securitization towards the international audience, whereas a combination of human security and national security concerns was the referent object towards the national audience.

Theoretical framework

One of the founding fathers of the ‘widening’ camp was Barry Buzan. Buzan argued for the widening of the traditional concept of security actors, which was dominated by states, to all other human collectives. Furthermore, Buzan recognized the need to enlarge the traditional emphasis on military security by a sectoral approach that would include following sectors: political, societal, economic and environmental. Buzan’s work gained more prominence after the end of the Cold War and his book *People, States and Fear* introduced new sectors of analysis to the field.⁵

Barry Buzan is also one of the members of the so-called Copenhagen School, which largely influenced the evolution of security studies after the end of the Cold War. The term Copenhagen School was aimed at a group of researchers from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, which was created in 1985. One of the key contributions of the school was the so-called securitization theory, which introduced a fresh take on how to analyze and understand security issues. Although the first account on securitization was published by Ole Wæver in 1995, the essential review of the theory was published in the book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* in 1998.⁶

Security: A new framework for Analysis became a synthesis of Buzan’s sectoral approach, the theory of regional security complexes and Wæver’s securitization. The researchers from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute occupied themselves with the question: why are some issues perceived as threatening and states or other security providers need to tackle them, using extraordinary means, while other issues are not? Their answer was that issues are perceived as threatening to a referent object (the thing that needs to be protected) if they have been socially constructed in discourse as security issues. The latter is achieved by a process of securitization.⁷

The original securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School placed a strong emphasis on language. When Ole Wæver created the concept, his main sources were John L. Austin’s and Searle’s linguistic theories. According to Austin, not all statements are only descriptive, some are “performative”. We cannot simply say if these statements are true or false. Instead, these utterances are a linguistic performance of a

⁵ Paul Williams, ed., *Security Studies: An Introduction, 2nd edition* (London: Routledge, 2012), 4–5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 70–73.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 73–74.

certain action - a speech act.⁸ Austin's famous example is "I name this ship Queen Elisabeth - as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem".⁹

In fact, Austin argues that each sentence can have up to three different acts in itself.¹⁰ "Distinction is between locutionary (an act of saying something), illocutionary (an act in saying something), and perlocutionary (an act by saying something)".¹¹

For instance, if I say: "Do not eat the apple!" I just constructed a sentence and thus performed a locutionary act. This speech act is also illocutionary because it conveys an order, which is serving a function of convincing someone to abandon their idea to eat the apple. If the listener decides to follow this order and will not eat the apple, I would have succeeded in performing a perlocutionary act. Hence, the perlocutionary act is non-linguistic; a speech act becomes perlocutionary if the listener heeds the message.¹² The very concept of speech acts is based on illocutionary acts. Wæver argues that the utterance of the word security has by itself a performative character. "The utterance itself is the act and securitization is a self-referential practice." Put simply, the very word "security" has the ability to transform social reality and just by using the specific language of security, the speaker securitizes.¹³

The securitization process

The classic securitization process starts when a securitizing actor (most often state or political elite) names something as an "existential threat"¹⁴ to a referent object (unit that is being threatened). Moreover, a securitizing actor has to argue that there is a necessity to adopt "extraordinary means" (extraordinary measures). This part of the process, which consists of a speech act, is called a "securitizing move". However, the securitizing move alone is not enough for an issue to become a security issue. The securitizing actor needs to gain consent of a relevant audience in order to implement the extraordinary means.¹⁵

⁸ Barry Buzan, et al., *Security: A New Framework For Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998), 25–28.

⁹ John Langshaw Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 5.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹¹ Balzacq, Thierry, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge And Dissolve* (New York: Routledge, 2011): 5.

¹² Austin, *How To Do Things With Words*, 100–104.

¹³ Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization", in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 55.

¹⁴ The threat has to endanger the very survival of the referent object.

¹⁵ Barry Buzan, et al., *Security: A New Framework For Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998): 25–28.

Although it might not seem like that at first, securitization is, in fact, a two-stage process. The audience e.g. electorate has to give its approval for the implementation of the extraordinary means. In other words, if the issue is given “sufficient saliency to win the assent of the audience, that enables those who are authorised to handle the issue to use whatever means they deem the most appropriate”. It is the assent of the audience, which grants the inter-subjective status to the threat.¹⁶ The speech act by itself is therefore not enough for an issue to become securitized. Indeed, as Weaver points out “successful securitization is not decided by a securitizer, but the audience of the security speech act”.¹⁷

Furthermore, there are certain conditions concerning the speech act and the securitizing actor that have to be met in order for the securitizing move to be considered as successful. Regarding the speech act, the securitizing actor needs to use a special language of security, which includes phrases that emphasize the urgency of the threat. Moreover, securitizing actors are required to have enough social capital to have an influence on the audience. Although it may seem that there are many potential securitizing actors, in reality, the ability to successfully perform the securitizing move is very restricted. The government, lobbyists, politicians have a considerable advantage over the others, thereby limiting the number of possible candidates. Finally, in practice, some perception of threats is usually already established in the society and this can further improve the chances for the success of the securitizing move¹⁸

The authors of the theory argue that each political issue is located on a certain continuum, which has three main stages. Firstly, issues can be non-politicized, which means that they are not a part of the political debate. Hence, non-politicized issues do not concern the state. Secondly, issues that have been politicized are discussed in a public debate. Correspondingly, the government deals with these issues, but they are dealt with in the “realm of normal politics”. At last, the issues that have been securitized - security issues. These have acquired a status of existential threats to a referent object, which elevates these issues from the normal political arena. Naturally, issues move on this continuum, depending on time, specific actors and other factors involved. Indeed, it is when the issue is taken out of the “established rules of the game”, meaning the normal political arena, that it becomes securitized.¹⁹

¹⁶ Ibid., 25–28.

¹⁷ Ibid., 25–28.

¹⁸ Ibid., 32–33.

¹⁹ Ibid., 25.

The normative-political of the Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School argues that the phenomenon of securitization can have negative consequences. Security is always a trade-off and when the audience accepts the extraordinary means, there is always a cost e.g. certain discourses are prevented access to the political arena. The social constructivist aspect in the theory, in particular, the role of language, can be key in trying to reverse the trend of securitization. If we focus on the “special rhetorical structure” that is necessary to frame the problem as a security issue, we can also successfully de-securitize it.²⁰

In order to bring back the issue to the normal field of politics, the proponents of the securitization theory suggest the process of de-securitization.²¹ The latter would require for the discursive deconstruction of security as well as the discarding of policies that prevent other discourses from entering the political arena. In a normal political arena the issues can be subjected to discursive legitimisation, consequently, they can be criticized and transformed.²² The Copenhagen School model, therefore, puts forward a new way to tackle issues, which should not have been securitized, in a form of de-securitization but also allows for broadening the security agenda, because every issue can now be labelled as a security issue if it is perceived as such²³

Applying the theory to non-democratic regimes

The design of the original securitization theory has been criticized for a certain “democratic bias”, which makes it difficult for the theory to be applied on non-democratic regimes. In the democratic systems, the concept of public accountability is expected of the national governments in contrast to non-democratic regimes. Put simply, politicians in democracies should legitimise their political actions, whereas the fact that leaders of non-democratic regimes do not have to legitimise their decision is one of their defining factors. Nevertheless, Juha Vuori argues that purely coercive rule is unsustainable even for non-democratic governments, although the legitimizing aspect might look differently in democracies.²⁴

²⁰ Ibid., 26.

²¹ Ibid., 29.

²² C.A.S.E. Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto”, *Security Dialogue* 37, 4, (2006): 455, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

²³ Buzan, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, 29.

²⁴ Juha Vuori, “Illocitinary logic and strands of securitization – Applying the theory of securitization to the study of non-democratic political orders”, *European Journal of International Relations* (2008): 65–68, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

In response, Vuori tried to reconceptualize securitization in order to answer this critique. While applying his framework on the case study of securitization in the People's Republic of China, he argues that securitization utterances differ based on four different functions they are supposed to serve. These functions are: "1. Securitization for raising an issue on the agenda, 2. Securitization for deterrence, 3. Securitization for legitimating past acts or for reproducing the security status of an issue, and 4. Securitization for control". As a result, the new framework put forward by Vuori can serve as a tool to analyse the language of security used by authoritarian leaders (or other non-democratic forms of government).²⁵

The absence of gender

Moreover, Lene Hansen criticized the original design of the securitization theory for neglecting gender in its framework due to its emphasis on speech act. Hansen describes the honour killings in Pakistan as an example of gender-based insecurity, which is missing in the Copenhagen School. When a woman in Pakistan accuses a man of rape, she faces a threat of further punishment for her decision to speak out about the crime. Hansen calls this phenomenon "Security as silence" and it happens to be the case when a victim finds herself in a situation where the voicing of insecurity would intensify the threat.²⁶

Indeed, the focus on security as "speech act" is in strong contrast with the phenomenon of "Security as silence" described by Hansen. The issue of Pakistani women that have very limited possibilities to speak out about their situation demonstrates that the securitization theory has blind spots and the process of securitization/de-securitization itself can create new threats.²⁷ In the same fashion, Ken Booth argues that "if security is always a speech act, insecurity is often a zipped lip."²⁸

Reconceptualizing the theory

One of the most serious attempts to reconceptualize securitization theory was done by Thierry Balzacq. Balzacq develops a common theoretical ground, which can serve as a framework for future empirical research. He contends that there are two ideal approaches to securitization, the so-called "philosophical" approach, which relies heavily on the speech act theory (i.e. theorized by the Copenhagen school) and the

²⁵ Ibid., 73–77.

²⁶ Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 285–290.

²⁷ Ibid., 295–296.

²⁸ Ken Booth, *Theory of world security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 168.

“sociological” approach, which sees securitization primarily in terms of power relations, context and practices (advocated by Balzacq). Nevertheless, while applying the theory, researchers will usually find themselves somewhere between these two ideal types.²⁹

Following the logic of Austin’s speech act theory, a successful securitizing move is actually a perlocutionary speech act. However, the perlocutionary effect is literally not a part of the speech act. In the original securitization theory, the success of speech acts then relies primarily on the so-called “felicity conditions” (conditions that have to be met for the speech act to be considered a securitizing move).³⁰ Balzacq’s counter-argument is that if we practice security by saying security, we are basically “reducing security to a mere procedure such as marriage”.³¹

On the contrary, the sociological approach to securitization proposed by Balzacq would describe securitization as a pragmatic process that occurs in a specific context, emphasizing the role of the audience and the power relations between the speaker and the listener. While the first approach outlines the use of language to attain a certain goal, the second seeks to examine the underlying rules of communication. The sociological variant emphasizes the notion that performatives should be examined as results of power games within context. In addition, the sociological approach claims that the discourse on securitization creates a specific agency and that the securitizing actors and audiences mutually constitute and shape one another.³²

According to Balzacq, securitization can thus be defined “as an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc. are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implication (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investigating the referent object with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development”.³³

²⁹ Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge And Dissolve* (New York: Routledge, 2011): 1–4.

³⁰ Buzan, et al, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, 28.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1–4.

³² *Ibid.*, 2.

³³ *Ibid.*, 3.

Two approaches to Context

The philosophical and sociological approaches to the theory have also a different attitude towards context. The philosophical view of securitization highlights the so-called “internalist” approach to context. If a speech act is successful, the context alters accordingly. Indeed, the very concept of security converts the existing context into something different or creates a new one. Moreover, the approach of the Copenhagen School emphasizes that a “real rhetorical urgency” is not dependent on the existence of a “real threat”. According to the CS, all security issues are based on their linguistic representations, which construct our social reality.³⁴

However, Balzacq disagrees that this is always true. He argues that how we linguistically depict a problem is not constructing our reality, it can sometimes only change our perception of it. Balzacq calls this the “externalist” approach to context. Put simply, what we say about a security issue does not always establish its “essence”. He argues, for instance, that “what we say about a typhoon does not change its essence”. Hence, the researcher should examine how a securitizing actor uses the external context to justify the adoption of extraordinary measures. When a securitizing speech act is uttered with a relation to some external context, it forces the relevant audience to seek for the threat, which was presented. In this regard, the timing of a securitizing move is one of the crucial aspects of its success.³⁵

Audience-centered theory

The researchers from the Copenhagen School argue that an issue is successfully securitized only when the audience accepts the securitizing move. In its original form, the Copenhagen School defined the concept of the audience as “those that the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept the exceptional procedures”.³⁶ However, Balzacq asserts that the audience has been paid little attention by the Copenhagen School.³⁷ This view is shared by Salter, who confirms that actual politics of the acceptance have remained “largely under-determined”.³⁸ McDonald observes that how

³⁴ Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge*, 11,

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 12–14.

³⁶ Buzan, et al, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, 41.

³⁷ Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ Revisited: Theory and Cases,” *International Relations* 30, no. 4, (2016): 501.

³⁸ Mark B. Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority”, *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11, no. 4, (2008): 324.

we know when securitization happens remains strongly “under-theorized”.³⁹ Balzacq contends that the inadequate definition of the audience can be contributed to the attitude of the CS, which claims that security at once a self-referential speech act and an inter-subjective agreement.⁴⁰

According to Balzacq, although the audience is crucial for both approaches to securitization, the philosophical view describes audience as a given category that is primarily passive. The key argument for the audience-centred approach is that the successful and failed securitizations can be best observed by disaggregating the audience. Additionally, there can be different types of audiences, which can be more open to specific kinds of securitizing moves by the securitizing actor.⁴¹

In the same manner, Côté asserts that the audience has been conceptualized as an agent without agency. According to Côté, the empirical literature suggests that securitization is an inter-subjective process, which involves an active audience. Furthermore, the audience has more abilities than to simply accept or reject a speech act. The reactions of the audience influence the shared security understanding and the design of policies meant to tackle the menace. Hence, as the empirical literature suggests, the audience has a greater possibility to contribute to the creation of security beliefs, ideas, practices and norms.⁴²

In order to put the audience in the spotlight of securitization, Roe argues that the audience can have two different functions based on its role in the securitization process. It can provide a moral support for the securitizing move or grant the securitizing actor a formal mandate to counter the threat, which was presented. Roe demonstrates this in the case study of Britain’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. He highlights how Prime Minister Tony Blair failed to secure the support of the British public (“moral support”) for the intervention, but managed to receive the mandate to invade Iraq by the British Parliament (“formal support”). Moreover, Roe argues that Blair’s administration could have hoped that the actual deployment of British troops (implementation of extraordinary measures) would swing the public opinion in favour of the invasion.⁴³

³⁹ Matt MacDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security", *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4, (2008): 572 , <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

⁴⁰ Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited": 500–501.

⁴¹ Ibid., 500–501.

⁴² Adam Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory", *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 6 (2016): 549–555, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

⁴³ Paul Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq", *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (2008): 632–633, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

Roe's last point demonstrates that the ability of the audience to sanction or completely reject a securitizing move is firmly grounded in the power relations between the audience and the securitizing actor. Unsurprisingly, the result of a successful securitizing move can often produce a further increase in power of the securitizing actor. In other words, the securitizing actor might use the special privileges granted by the audience to "break free from the rules" that he would otherwise be bound by.⁴⁴

Viewing Human Security from the perspective of securitization

Proponents of human security argue that security should be centred around people over the traditional emphasis on states. Historically speaking, the concept of human security is closely tied to the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report, which is considered as a landmark in the progress to shift the attention from states to individuals. The report states that "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" for all human beings is what the global community should strive for so it can face the challenge of global insecurity.⁴⁵

For the case study of Libya, the most important aspect of human security is, however, that the concept has been reflected in the way the international community received the right to violate the sovereignty of another state if it fails to safeguard the human rights of its population. More specifically, the debate about when militarized humanitarian intervention is legitimate. This debate was heavily influenced by the strongly criticized inadequate response of the international community to the Rwanda genocide and the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.⁴⁶

In response to the history of unsatisfactory humanitarian interventions, the Canadian government created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which produced a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report in 2001. The key initiator of this report was Kofi Annan, who challenged the international community to create new ways in order to respond to the inherent problems of humanitarian intervention. Hence, the primary aim of this report was to create a clear framework, which determines when humanitarian intervention is legitimate and how it needs to be carried out. The Responsibility to protect report also strove to change the discourse connected to humanitarian intervention by replacing the so-called 'right to

⁴⁴ Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited", 502.

⁴⁵ Adam Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies 2nd ed.* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2010), 141.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 142–143.

intervene' with the 'responsibility to protect', emphasising the sense of necessity and a shared global responsibility.⁴⁷

Adopted unanimously by heads of governments in 2005 at the UN World summit and reaffirmed by the UNSC, R2P is defined by a so-called pillar structure. The first pillar is centred on the state's own responsibility to protect its citizens from "ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide". The second pillar calls on the international community to help other states in fulfilling its responsibility characterised by the first pillar. The final pillar urges states to take timely and decisive action when other state fails to protect its citizens from one or more of the four crimes defined in the first pillar. For the purpose of the case study, the specific language of human security, which can be primarily found also in the Responsibility to Protect, will be highlighted when used by the Cameron administration. More specifically the words: responsibility to protect, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.⁴⁸

One key issue, which needs to be addressed, is that if we apply the securitization theory on the above-described shifting of paradigm, the act of passing the R2P at the UN World summit can be theorised as a case of successful securitization. This creates an important dilemma regarding the need for exceptionality to determine whether securitization is taking place or it has already become institutionalized. In response, Watson contends that humanitarian intervention can be understood on a spectrum of exceptionality-institutionalization, which relies primarily on emergency relief aid carried out by established institutions. According to Watson, a case of humanitarian response can be thus understood as an "intensification of humanitarian securitisation" rather than a move from normal to exceptional. However, a case of militarized response is always exceptional.⁴⁹

Case Study Methodology

To quote Robert Yin "a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon in depth and with its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". Moreover, Yin describes that "a case study copes with many variables and data points, relies on multiple sources

⁴⁷ Ibid., 143.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 336.

⁴⁹ Scott Watson, "The 'human' as referent object? Humanitarianism as securitization", *Security Dialogue* 42, no.1, (2011): 7–10, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

of evidence, with data having to be analysed in a triangulating fashion and benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.⁵⁰

Thierry Balzacq distinguishes four methods that can be applied to the securitization framework. These methods are discourse analysis, process-tracing, ethnographic research and content analysis. As a matter of fact, however, the members of the Copenhagen School rely primarily on discourse analysis and most of the empirical work done on the theory has taken advantage of this method.⁵¹

In my work, I wish to observe differences among the securitizing moves in regard to specific audiences. I will be analysing the change of a specific discourse of security, which will be apparent in the language of security and the associations it is supposed to invoke towards a specific audience. In particular, I will be interested in the differences in the securitizing discourse with an emphasis on the referent object of securitization, existential threat and acceptance of extraordinary measures. Hence, I believe that qualitative discourse analysis should serve as a suitable method for such endeavour.

Discourse Analysis

According to securitization theory, issues become security issues if they were socially constructed in discourse as such. There are many definitions of discourse and various ways how to undertake discourse analysis. In the field of international relations, the application of discourse analysis has been primarily connected to the post-structuralist analysis of international relations. Post-structuralists focus primarily on identity. However, their analysis of the relationship between identity and Foreign Policy is co-constitutive and not causal, which distinguishes the post-structuralist understanding from the constructivist understanding of international relations.⁵²

In the post-structuralist analysis, identity is constructed through a process of linking. Derrida establishes that it is not just the character of the thing itself that gives it meaning but also by juxtaposing the thing to something that is less valued.⁵³ Hence while we are constructing the identity of the object through positive process linking, we are simultaneously doing the same through a negative process of differentiation.

⁵⁰ Robert Yin, *Case study research: Design and methods* (Beverly Hills: CA: SAGE, 2008), 18.

⁵¹ Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge*, 39.

⁵² Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 15–18.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 18–19.

Eventually, the identity of “the Other” is constructed. The ontological significance of language is crucial because only through language can be subjects given identity.⁵⁴

For students of securitization, discourse analysis is particularly useful because it helps to map the “emergence and evolution of patterns of representations which are constitutive of a threat image”. Following this logic, discourse can be understood as the vehicle of meaning. More specifically as bodies of texts,⁵⁵ which bring “ideas, objects and practices into the world”. Texts are also the conventional method through which discourse materializes. Hence, the main advantage of discourse analysis is, if applied correctly, its ability to create a “thick description of the social practices associated with the construction and evolution of threat images”.⁵⁶ In my thesis, I will follow this insight when comparing the threat image of Gaddafi regime prior to the adoption of the resolution and the extraordinary measures, which were deployed to tackle the presented threat.

Discourse analysis will require searching for a history of a selected concept. The process of “genealogy”, in Foucault’s terms, will urge the analyst to cover a vast number of texts that need to be approached through a process of intertextuality.⁵⁷ This method is based on a classic postmodern approach to literature as Umberto Eco would put it “Books always speak of other books, and every story tells a story that has already been told”.⁵⁸

Methodological Caveats

The aim of my thesis is to highlight the differences between two securitizing discourses. I have chosen to limit my bachelor thesis primarily through the focus on only one securitizing actor. This means that my work does not aspire to examine the entire securitization process of intervention in Libya. If I sought to describe this process, I would have to include all sorts of securitizing actors e.g. international organizations, Gaddafi himself, Libyan rebels, and most importantly other states such as France or the United States. However, it seems that Cameron’s administration and David Cameron in particular, were one of the key securitizing actors also considering the international context. The most important securitizing actor next to the United Kingdom would arguably be France that often took the lead in securitizing initiatives. Furthermore, the main aim of this thesis is not to describe the motivations for such securitization, but to

⁵⁴ Ibid., 23–25.

⁵⁵ Not just written texts but all forms of communication such as symbols, Pictures, music, utterances etc.

⁵⁶ Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge*, 39-41.

⁵⁷ Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, 55.

⁵⁸ Umberto, Eco, *Postscript to the name of the Rose*, (1983): 19–20.

describe the securitization itself. To discover all the motives for securitization of the United Kingdom would require a more comprehensive approach.

Moreover, my thesis is not entirely audience-centered as it ignores the particular members of the two main audiences. Although both of these levels could be further divided into the British Public and the British Parliament on the national level and the individual members of the international community on the international level, I have chosen to focus my analysis primarily on these two levels for the sake of keeping the research manageable and also to fit into the thesis constraints. Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is to highlight how securitizing actor appropriates its securitizing move to a particular audience. Hence, for the purpose of the research question two audiences are sufficient.

It should be noted that this approach to securitization includes a caveat, which would arise from the specific focus on these particular audiences. It is that each of these discourses is a part of a larger securitization discourse and it can be sometimes difficult to distinguish, which of these audiences, if not all, are being addressed. Especially, due to the fact that English is being used to address both audiences. Furthermore, in the case of Libya, the second stage of implementation of these extraordinary measures is very important in order to understand the subsequent unfolding of events in Libya.

Literature analysis

The primary sources of my thesis will be all those, which will be used for the speech act analysis. I have analysed official documents from Cameron's cabinet meetings, House of Commons meetings, and Cameron's speeches. The sources from the United Nations and other institutions include resolutions, press releases and speeches both in the form of written documents and videos. All these documents were publicly available on the website of the United Nations or the British Government. Although there is a considerable amount of information online, there is definitely more information available in the archives of these institutions. However, as I do not possess access to the archives, this remains to be a limitation of my thesis. Moreover, I will use newspaper articles, particularly, from The Guardian, the Telegraph and BBC as a primary source for a speech act analysis when other sources will not be available. The securitizing moves directed towards the other international actors, in particular, the UN Security Council, will be also analysed with regard to the specific language of human security, established by the Responsibility to Protect and other UN documents.

The secondary sources will be primarily those, which will be used to provide context for the specific speech act. I will use newspaper articles in the overview preceding the actual analysis again from BBC, The Guardian, The Telegraph, Reuters and The New York Times. I have chosen these media outlets because they have established reputation. Moreover, they ran a detailed coverage of the events in Libya, since the start of the Libyan uprising until the subsequent intervention and the aftermath. Although I have been trying to avoid using newspaper articles when describing the overall context of the Arab Spring and the adoption of the resolution 1973, I had to use them as a source to outline the detailed perspective and role of the United Kingdom. This was caused by the fact that the overview takes a very specific viewpoint, which hasn't been that well addressed in literature. When checking these sources, I triangulated these articles with other sources when possible, starting with written text and looking for other sources of information. The theoretical part of the thesis, which consisted of secondary literature, should also serve as a review of literature in relation to securitization theory.

As for other secondary sources for the case study, I have used the book by Alison Pargeter: *Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi* when providing a general overview of the events in Libya prior to intervention. Pargeter is a Senior Research Associate at RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) and has also held a range of academic posts including at the University of Cambridge and Kings College, London. Pargeter specializes primarily on Libya, Tunisia, Iraq (including the Kurdish region), and Egypt. Although the book would not have been an adequate source for an in-depth analysis because it was published in 2012, I believe that it was a good source for a general overview of events in Libya in particular and Arab Spring in general.

The article: "Libya and the Lessons from Iraq: International Law and the Use of Force by the United Kingdom" by Nigel D. White to describe the matters regarding the international law. More specifically, whether NATO exceeded its mandate granted by the UNSC. Nigel D. White specializes in UN law and post-conflict law. He is also a professor of international law at University of Nottingham. Whereas Laura Roselle's article (professor of political science at Elon University) "Strategic Narratives and Alliances: The Cases of Intervention in Libya (2011) and Economic Sanctions against Russia (2014)" was particularly helpful in trying to understand the position of the United States in the securitization of Libya and the strategic narratives used by France and the United Kingdom to gain the support of the United States.

Case study

An overview of the events in Libya with an emphasis on the role and perspective of the United Kingdom

Starting in January 2011, a wave of popular uprisings shook with the Arab world; this movement will be later referred to as the so-called Arab spring. It all began in Tunisia with the ousting of the long-time President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Egypt was next, eventually resulting in the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak's regime. Other countries followed suit when people in Bahrain, Yemen, Oman and Libya also charged to the streets. The strength of the protests and the response to them differed from country to country; these ranged from non-violent protests in Morocco to revolutions such as in Tunisia or Egypt or to what later became a full-scale civil war in the case of Libya.⁵⁹

The protests in Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya started on 15th of February with an arrest of a human rights activist Fathi Terbil. In response, around 200 Libyans, mobilized primarily on social networks, went to the streets of Benghazi and protested in front of the Police station, where Terbil was held. Although Benghazi was the first place of protests, soon these spread to the rest of the country including the capital – Tripoli. The official start of the Libyan revolution⁶⁰ was on the so-called “Day of Rage” on 17th February 2011.⁶¹

The opposition was inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and chose this date in memory of the demonstrations, which took place in Benghazi five years before. The protesters were subsequently attacked by the Libyan security forces with live ammunition. Some army personnel and security forces refused to follow orders and joined the protesting crowd. Many Libyan high-ranking officials chose to resign in response to the violence. World leaders urged Gaddafi to abandon violence and engage in a political dialogue with the protesters.⁶²

⁵⁹ Alison Pargeter, *Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 214–216.

⁶⁰ Or the First Libyan civil war.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 214.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 216–217.

David Cameron was among the first European leaders, who called for support of the Arab Spring.⁶³ During his trip around the Middle East, Cameron made his first comment on the events in Libya, when he called the violence inflicted on the Libyan people by Gaddafi as “appalling and unacceptable”. Foreign Secretary William Hague used to word “deplorable” on the same occasion. In spite of the international response, Gaddafi remained adamant in his position and chose a very strong rhetoric when addressing the opposition.⁶⁴

On 22nd February, while on his Middle East tour, Cameron spoke in front of the Kuwaiti National Assembly. In his speech, he emphasized that the United Kingdom and the U.S. supported instability in the region by supporting dictators. He stated that previously Britain’s Foreign Policy promoted self-interest over democracy. By doing so, he also criticized former Prime Minister Tony Blair for establishing close relations with Libya.⁶⁵

Zolman argues that Cameron tried to present Libya as a low-risk opportunity to improve the relations with Arab states after Iraq and distance itself from “grand scheme Blairite liberal-interventionism”, which characterized the previous British foreign policy. When Cameron spoke about the Arab spring, he often emphasized the importance of the shared values among Britain and those, who are striving for democracy in the Arab Spring protests.⁶⁶

At that Point in time, the British administration was primarily concerned with the safe evacuation of the remainder of originally about 3500 British citizens, who lived mostly in Tripoli. Cameron also appealed to British citizens to leave Libya, if they have the possibility to do so.⁶⁷ However, the UK’s evacuation plans went off with a rocky start, when the Cameron administration failed to aptly respond to the quickly deteriorating crisis in Libya. In fact, only a few planes with British citizens on board

⁶³ James Kirkup, “Middle East: David Cameron arrives in Egypt to push for democracy”, *The Telegraph*, February 21, 2011. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8337601/Middle-East-crisis-David-Cameron-arrives-in-Egypt-to-push-for-democracy.html> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁶⁴ “Libya unrest: David Cameron condemns violence”, *The BBC*, February 21, 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12524470> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁶⁵ “Prime Minister’s speech to the National Assembly Kuwait”, GOV.uk, February 22, 2011. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-to-the-national-assembly-kuwait> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁶⁶ Zoe Holman, “The Price of Influence: Ethics and British Foreign Policy in the Arab Middle East after Iraq”, *Contemporary Levant* 1, no. 1 (2016): 16–17, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

⁶⁷ Nicholas Watt, “Libya unrest: Cameron apologises for delay in evacuating Britons”, *The Guardian*, February 24, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/24/libya-plane-britons-lands-uk> (accessed March 25, 2018)

actually had the possibility to leave the country. British Prime minister later apologized for the government's handling of the evacuation.⁶⁸

On 22nd February, Gaddafi urged loyalists to take to the streets to fight “greasy rats”. He also vowed “I will die as a martyr at the end ... I shall remain, defiant. Muammar is the leader of the revolution until the end of time.”⁶⁹ The international community responded and the Arab League issued a statement in which it urged Gaddafi to stop the violence and de-escalate the situation. Moreover, 15 members of the United Nations Security Council published a statement condemning the violence. Although the situation in Libya was deteriorating, some members of the UN Security Council such as Russia and China showed reluctance to join the plan to put more pressure on the Gaddafi regime.⁷⁰

Towards the end of his Middle East trip in Oman, Cameron told BBC that “The behaviour of this dictator cannot be allowed to stand” and that “I think Britain, with her allies, should be looking at all of the options for the future.”⁷¹ On Thursday, Cameron spoke with Obama over the phone about the deteriorating situation in Libya. Naturally, for any kind of international response, the role of the United States was crucial. When Cameron spoke with Obama, according to the Downing Street Spokesman, he emphasized “the importance of seizing this moment of opportunity for change in the region.”⁷²

Primarily on behalf of the French initiative, the EU member states also found some consensus on the need for concrete measures against Libyan administration. On 23rd February, the High Representative Ashton, in her statement, condemned the Libyan authorities and urged Libya to abandon violence. On the same day, the UN Security Council considered travel ban, asset freeze and arms embargo on Libya.⁷³

⁶⁸ “Libya unrest: David Cameron apology for UK response”, *The BBC*, February 24, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12566254> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁶⁹ Ian Black, “Gaddafi urges violent showdown and tells Libya I’ll die a martyr”, *The Guardian*, February 22, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/muammar-gaddafi-urges-violent-showdown> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁷⁰ Ed Pilkington, “UN Ambassador clash over condemnation of Gaddafi,” *The Guardian*, February 23, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/23/un-ambassadors-clash-gaddafi> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁷¹ “Libya unrest: Cameron warns Gaddafi over repression”, *The BBC*, February 24, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12564870> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁷² “Libya: Barack Obama and David Cameron discuss how to depose of Gaddafi”, *The Telegraph*, February 25, 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8346822/Libya-David-Cameron-and-Barack-Obama-discuss-how-to-depose-Gaddafi.html> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁷³ “Declaration by the High Representative Ashton on behalf of the European Union on Libya” The press office HR Ashton, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/119453.pdf (accessed March 25, 2018)

At that point, France was pushing for a stronger response on Libya. French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for international sanctions and establishment of a no-fly zone so that Gaddafi could not use country's warplanes against the civilian population. Although Cameron was strong in condemning the actions of Gaddafi, he wasn't quite ready to support the no-fly zone idea yet. One of the reasons for this could have been that the United Kingdom was still trying to evacuate the rest of its citizens from Libya and antagonizing the Libyan government could have made this process riskier. Nevertheless, in an interview with Al Jazeera in Doha, Cameron stated that "Sanctions are always an option for the future if what we are seeing in Libya continues. Of course, if Libya continues down this path, there will be a very strong argument [for sanctions]." ⁷⁴

While the international community was coordinating its response, the anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya created the origins of what will be later known as the National Transitional Council. Simultaneously, the fighting between the two groups intensified. On 25th February, the Libyan representative at the UN, H.E. Abdurrahman Shalham spoke in front of the UNSC in New York, in his speech, he condemned Gaddafi and asked for concrete moves by the UNSC. He also compared Gaddafi to Adolf Hitler. In response, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States pushed for the resolution 1970. ⁷⁵

On 26th February, the UNSC approved the resolution 1970, which expressed "grave concern" over the situation in Libya, implemented an arms embargo, travel ban on government officials and Gaddafi's family and also financial asset freeze. ⁷⁶The EU also agreed on sanctions, which were imposed on the Libyan regime on 28th February. These sanctions included an assets freeze, a travel ban on 16 members of Gaddafi administration and an arms embargo. ⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Nicholas Watt, "Libya no-fly zone call by France fails to get Cameron's backing", *The Guardian*, February 23, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/23/libya-nofly-zone-david-cameron> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁷⁵ Eduard Gombár, *Dějiny Libye*, Dějiny Států, (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové Noviny, 2015): 165–167.

⁷⁶ "Resolution 1970 (2011)", United Nations Security Council, February 26, 2011. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970%20%282011%29 (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁷⁷ "Libya: EU imposes arms embargo and targeted sanctions", Council of the European Union, February 28, 2011. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119524.pdf (accessed March 25, 2018)

The United Kingdom joins France in a push for a no-fly zone

In his statement to the House of Commons on 28th February, David Cameron vowed that “Colonel Gaddafi’s regime must end and he must leave“. Prime Minister highlighted that Britain is taking the lead on the action in Libya because it managed to secure an agreement in the UN Security Council to sanction the Gaddafi regime. Cameron also insisted that Britain was in charge of the agreement with the European partners. Cameron later in his speech reiterated “My message to Colonel Gaddafi is simple: Go now. “Prime Minister also stressed the opportunity that the current push for democracy in Arab nations represents and the danger of a humanitarian crisis in Libya.⁷⁸

On 1st March, Prime Minister declared that he asked the British Ministry of defence to work with “our allies” on plans for military intervention. This came after a statement on Monday, in which Cameron said that “Britain in any way did not rule out the use of military assets.” However, his plans for establishing a no-fly zone and arming Libyan rebels were met with little support on the side of the United States, who distanced themselves from Cameron’s plan. Hence, Britain chose, for now, to backtrack on this suggestion.⁷⁹ The fighting between the National Transitional Council forces and loyalist troops continued in the first week of March. On the same day, in an unprecedented move, the UN General assembly suspended Libya as a member of the UN Human Right’s Council.⁸⁰

Roselle asserts that the United Kingdom and France used a strategic narrative of abandonment when they emphasized liberal international order, common values and their readiness to act in Libya without the assistance of the United States to gain the support of the United States for the no-fly zone. Roselle contends that the Obama administration was not eager to intervene in Libya as it was focused on ending the intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, most of Obama’s foreign policy advisors opposed the intervention in Libya.⁸¹

⁷⁸“Prime Minister’s statement on Libya”, GOV.uk, February 28, 2011, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-libya--2> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁷⁹ Ewan MacAskill, “Cameron backtracks on Libya no-fly zone as U.S. distances itself”, The Guardian, March 1, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/mar/01/cameron-backtracks-libya-zone-us> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁸⁰“General Assembly suspends Libya from Human Rights Council”, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11050.doc.htm> (accessed March 25, 2018)

⁸¹ Laura Roselle, "Strategic Narratives and Alliances: The Cases of Intervention in Libya (2011) and Economic Sanctions against Russia (2014)", *Politics and Governance* 5, no. 3 (2017): 103-106, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

On 9th March, David Cameron emphasized that the United Kingdom is in charge of the international push for a no-fly zone. The UK and France were also, at that time, drafting the UN resolution for a no-fly zone, the US highlighted the importance of wide international support for the operation. At that moment, French and British were waiting whether the Arab League, the EU or the African Union would give formal support to the proposal in order to persuade other UN Security Council members.⁸²

On 10th March, France surprised other states by the decision to recognize the National Transitional Council as a rightful representative of the Libyan population. At that point, other states chose caution and did not follow. On the same day, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron wrote a letter addressed to the president of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, In this letter, they urged “European partners, our allies, and our Arab and African friends” to undertake a set of steps including the support for a no-fly zone, resignation of Gaddafi and his administration and implementing a full arms embargo.⁸³

Also on 10th March, the general secretary of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen emphasized that "We stand ready to consider other options [than a purely humanitarian response]." He also highlighted that any military action would require three key principles to be met, which were “demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and regional support”.⁸⁴

The next day, the European Council had an extraordinary meeting on Libya. The meeting was held on the French and British initiative. During this meeting, David Cameron had a confrontation with the High Secretary Ashton, who opposed establishing a no-fly zone as it would lead to more civilian casualties. Once again, the Anglo-French bloc was pushing for a no-fly zone in Libya. Yet most European leaders were still not convinced that this would be the best option.⁸⁵ During the national briefing, Cameron reiterated that Gaddafi should step down.⁸⁶

⁸² Louis Charbonneau, “U.N. split on Libya no-fly zone; oil scroll mullied”, *Reuters*, March 9, 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-un/u-n-split-on-libya-no-fly-zone-oil-escrow-mullied-idUSTRE7285VI20110309> (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁸³ “Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy”, *The Guardian*, March 10, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/10/libya-middleeast> (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁸⁴ “Libya uprising – Thursday Day 10,” *The Guardian*, last modified March 10, 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/mar/10/libya-uprising-gaddafi-live> (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁸⁵ Ian Traynor and Nicolas Watt, “Libya no-fly zone plan rejected by EU leaders”, *The Guardian*, March 11, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/libya-no-fly-zone-plan-rejected> (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁸⁶ “National Briefing: United Kingdom”, European Council Newsroom, March 11, 2011, <https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/event/extraordinary-european-council-march-2011/national-briefing-united-kingdom-part-1-5#/event-media> (accessed March 26, 2018)

Moreover, although European leaders supported the National Transitional Council, many believed that the move by France to recognize NTC was premature. For instance, the Dutch PM said “I find it a crazy move by France. To jump ahead and say 'I will recognise a transitional government' in the face of any diplomatic practice is not the solution for Libya.”⁸⁷ During a press conference after the extraordinary summit, Herman Van Rompuy declared that “The current leadership must give up power without delay; all 27 are saying it loud and clear. We have the situation under constant review and will keep up the pressure....the EU welcomes and encourages the National Transitional Council.”⁸⁸

The support for the no-fly zone came on the next day when the Arab League backed the no-fly zone idea. The Arab League vote was opposed by Syria and Algeria, all other member states agreed on their support. This decision was supported by the situation on the ground in Libya, where the Libyan rebel forces continued to lose ground to the superior loyalists.⁸⁹ The support of the Arab League for the no-fly zone put forward by the United Kingdom and France was, according to Roselle, a strong legitimising argument for the intervention.⁹⁰

France and Britain hoped to win over the support of G8 members during their meeting in Paris. However, especially Germany and Russia blocked the no-fly zone idea completely. As a result, the decision was left up to the United Nations Security Council on 17th March.⁹¹ In the meantime, the Gaddafi forces started attacking the areas around the rebel-held Benghazi. Prior to the vote, the US, France and the United Kingdom emphasized the urgency of the situation and put pressure on other states. The US warned of “another Srebrenica” during the negotiations, whereas “the discussion among diplomats outside the Council, took the form: ‘Do you want to wake up tomorrow and there is no Benghazi?’”⁹²

⁸⁷ Nicolas Watt, “Nicolas Sarkozy calls for air strikes on Libya if Gaddafi attacks civilians”, *The Guardian*, March 11, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/nicolas-sarkozy-libya-air-strikes> (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁸⁸ “Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy following the extraordinary European Council on EU southern neighbourhood and Libya”, European Council, March 11, 2011, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119779.pdf (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁸⁹ Colin Freeman, “Libya: Arab League calls for no-fly zone”, *The Telegraph*, March 12, 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8378392/Libya-Arab-League-calls-for-United-Nations-no-fly-zone.html> (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁹⁰ Roselle, “Strategic Narratives and Alliances”: 103-106.

⁹¹ John Irish, “France fails to get G8 accord on Libya no-fly zone”, *Reuters*, March 15, 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g8-libya/france-fails-to-get-g8-accord-on-libya-no-fly-zone-idUSTRE72E7RL20110315> (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁹² Brockmeier, Stuenkel and Tourinho, “The Impact of the Libya Intervention”: 119

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 was proposed by France, Lebanon and the United Kingdom. The resolution was supported by ten states and five states abstained, namely: Brazil, China, Germany⁹³, India and Russia. The Resolution was surprisingly broad, imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, demanding an immediate ceasefire, authorizing all necessary means to protect civilians, extending arms embargo and other measures.⁹⁴ China and Russia had reservations to the actual implementation of the resolution, which included practicalities when enforcing such a no-fly zone. The strong support of African and Arab states for the resolution, together with the urgency of the situation in Libya were the main reasons why Russia and China chose to abstain instead of blocking the resolution.⁹⁵ For instance, President Medvedev stated on 21 March that he made this decision consciously in the aim of preventing an escalation of violence.⁹⁶

Following the decision by UN Security Council, Cameron made a speech on the next day, in which he vowed that Libya fulfils all three necessary principles for intervention already outlined by NATO General Secretary Rasmussen, namely regional support, demonstrable need and clear legal basis. Prime Minister announced that the cabinet decided to deploy “Tornadoes and Typhoons as well as surveillance aircraft and air-to-air refuelling.” Cameron also called upon the member of House of Commons to support the substantive motion next week.⁹⁷

On the following day, France, the United Kingdom, the Arab League and the EU supported Barack Obama’s ultimatum to Gaddafi, ordering the Libyan leader to stop the advance on Benghazi. Although the regime officials promised cease-fire, loyalist forces continued to attack Benghazi.⁹⁸ This was perceived as a clear breach of the ultimatum and on 19th March, the Operation Odyssey Dawn began when British and

⁹³ For an analysis of Germany’s abstention, see Brockmeier, “Germany and the Intervention in Libya”, *Survival Global Politics and Strategy* 55, No. 6 (2016).

⁹⁴ “Resolution 1973 (2011)”, United Nations Security Council, un.org, March 17, 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973%20%282011%29 (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁹⁵ Brockmeier, Stuenkel and Tourinho, “The Impact of the Libya Intervention”: 119–120.

⁹⁶ “Why Russia Voted to Abstain on Libya ‘No-Fly’ Resolution (Excerpts from English Translation of Press Conference by President Medvedev)”, *The Mendeleyev Journal*, March 21, 2011, <https://russianreport.wordpress.com/2011/03/22/russias-view-on-libya/> (accessed March 30, 2018)

⁹⁷ “Libya: David Cameron statement on UN resolution”, *The BBC*, March 18, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12786225> (accessed March 26, 2018)

⁹⁸ “Libya Military action – Friday 18 March,” *The Guardian*, March 18, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/mar/18/libya-military-action-live-updates> (accessed March 26, 2018)

American rockets and French jets destroyed Libyan air-defence systems across the country.⁹⁹

On 21st March, before the vote on the involvement of British forces in Libya, Cameron insisted that "...the UN resolution is limited in its scope. It explicitly does not provide legal authority for action to bring about Gaddafi's removal from power by military means." However, Defence Secretary Fox stated that targeting Gaddafi was "potentially a possibility". Prime Minister added that "Our view is clear - there is no decent future for Libya with Colonel Gaddafi remaining in power."¹⁰⁰ After the debate in House of Commons, the Members of Parliament overwhelmingly supported British involvement with 557 for and 13 against.¹⁰¹

As it turned out, Prime Minister managed to galvanize strong support for the move. This was anticipated as many opposition politicians voiced their support for no-fly zone days before the vote, including the leader of Labour party Ed Miliband.¹⁰² However, some Members of Parliament such as conservative Edward Leigh insisted that the action in Libya should be about protecting the civilian population and not about a regime change.¹⁰³

Consequently, the position of the US, France and the UK can be summarized in the following statement by Presidents Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron less than a month after the start of the military intervention: "Our duty and our mandate under UNSC Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Qaddafi by force. But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power".¹⁰⁴

In the following months, the countries leading the intervention dismissed efforts by the African Union to negotiate a ceasefire among the Gaddafi regime and the

⁹⁹Mark Townsend, "Operation Odyssey Dawn commences to end Gaddafi onslaught on Benghazi", *The Guardian*, March 19, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/19/operation-odyssey-dawn-tomahawks-libya> (accessed March 26, 2018)

¹⁰⁰"Libya: Removing Gaddafi not allowed, says Cameron", *BBC*, March 21, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12802749> (accessed March 26, 2018)

¹⁰¹"The Full List of how MPs voted on Libya action", *BBC*, March 22, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12816279> (accessed March 26, 2018)

¹⁰² Allegra Stratton, "Libya no-fly zone supported by Ed Milliband", *The Guardian*, March 14, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/14/libya-no-fly-zone-hague> (accessed March 26, 2018)

¹⁰³"In quotes: House of Commons debate on Libya action", *BBC*, March 22, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12809496> (accessed March 26, 2018)

¹⁰⁴Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, "Libya's Pathway to Peace", *The New York Times*, April 14, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html> (accessed April 30, 2018)

National Transitional Council. Although it is hard to determine whether these would have any chance of success, leading NATO officials did not even allow for an attempt. In addition, NATO members including the United Kingdom attacked Gaddafi's command centres, which were far removed from the actual battlefield. France also delivered arms directly to rebel forces. Moreover, the intervention was terminated almost immediately after the death of Gaddafi, regardless of continued violence in some parts of the country and dangerous security vacuum. It seems that although the intervening countries always denied that the intervention is about a regime change, in practice the intervention resembled a regime-change in almost all aspects.¹⁰⁵

This point is made also by Nigel D. White describes how this original aim of the intervention gradually transferred into a regime change as NATO forces, led by France and the UK, "increasingly engaged government forces with rebel forces to defeat government forces and dislodge Gaddafi from power". It seems that NATO was getting increasingly impatient with the prolonged civil war in Libya and the further in time the military intervention moved from the acceptance of the resolution 1973, the more it diverged from the level of force approved by the resolution.¹⁰⁶

Distinguishing between the two securitizing discourses

In order to answer the research question of the thesis: What were the differences in the securitizing discourses by the Cameron administration? The proceeding analysis will include examples of particular speech acts. The following figure represents some of the sources that have been analysed in order to provide a clearer picture of how to distinguish between two securitizing discourses. I have divided these sources into two groups based on the audience, which was the main recipient of the particular securitizing move. This has been done primarily by taking into account the context during which the speech act took place.

Naturally, most securitizing moves that have a national audience as their main recipient were uttered in the British Parliament or in one case during the extraordinary European Council meeting. Conversely, the securitizing moves that were aimed at the international audience were uttered either in front of the United Nations Security Council, while addressing the Kuwait National Assembly or in one case a direct letter to the President of the European Council. In other words, to convince other states or

¹⁰⁵ Brockmeier, Stuenkel and Tourinho, "The Impact of the Libya Intervention": 121–125.

¹⁰⁶ Nigel D. White, "Libya and the Lessons from Iraq: International Law and the Use of Force by the United Kingdom", in *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law* 42, eds. I. Dekker and E. Hey (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press: 2011): 227–229, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

international organisations to accept the extraordinary measures to tackle the presented threat.

Figure n. 1: Distinguishing between the two securitizing discourses

Date	Context of the securitizing move	Audience
22nd February	Addressing the Kuwaiti National Assembly	International
25th February	UK ambassador at the UN Human Rights Council	International
26th February	United Nations Resolution 1970 + the statement by the UK after the vote	International
28th February	Statement to the House of Commons	National
10th March	Letter by Sarkozy and Cameron to Herman Van Rompuy	International
11th March	Extraordinary European Council meeting - National Briefing	National
14th March	Prime Minister's update on Libya and the Middle East	National
15th March	Foreign Secretary's update on Libya following G8 meeting	National
18th March	Statement to the House of Commons	National
18th March	Scottish Tory Conference in Perth	National
17th March	United Nations Resolution 1973 + the statement after the vote	International
21st March	The Debate in the House of Commons before the vote	National

The subsequent discourse analysis will be divided into five parts. The first two parts will use the speech act analysis to determine whether the Cameron administration was a securitizing actor on the national and international level. The third part will determine the differences in the referent object on the national and the international level. The fourth part will outline the differences in the discursive construction of the threat in both discourses. Finally, in the fifth part, I will compare the representation of

the extraordinary measures meant to tackle the threat presented towards both main audiences and provide a table, in which I will summarize the findings of the analysis.

Was the United Kingdom a Securitizing Actor on the international level?

The leading role of the United Kingdom in the securitizing initiatives towards the international audience can be apparent from the formerly presented overview. Nevertheless, in order to illustrate the securitizing framework, the letter by David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy on 10th March complies with the necessary requirements to be considered a securitizing move. The letter says that “Gaddafi's regime continues to attack his own people including with aircraft and helicopters...This deliberate use of military force against civilians is utterly unacceptable. As warned by the Security Council, these acts may amount to crimes against humanity...We support continued planning to be ready to provide support for all possible contingencies as the situation evolves on the basis of demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and firm regional support. This could include a no-fly zone or other options against air attacks¹⁰⁷”.

Firstly, as the Prime Minister, David Cameron possessed enough social capital to be considered a securitizing actor. Secondly, a clear picture of an existential threat in the form of Gaddafi is demonstrated together with a referent object of Human Security. Thirdly, the statement is enshrined in the language of security. Finally, Cameron emphasized that the actions committed by the Gaddafi regime may amount to crimes against humanity. This could potentially conform to the principle of “demonstrable need”, seen as one of the legitimizing principles for the intervention.

This particular letter was aimed to win over the support of the European Council President Herman van Rompuy due to the extraordinary European Council meeting called for the next day. Hence, the relevant audience is, in this case, President Rompuy in particular and the heads of EU member states (members of the European Council) and EU institutions in general. The letter contains a mention of the no-fly zone, which could be seen as the extraordinary measures for which the securitizing actors wanted to acquire support. Therefore, this speech act confirms to the conditions put forward by the securitization theory and can be considered as a securitizing move.

¹⁰⁷“Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman van Rompuy”, *The Guardian*, March 10, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/10/libya-middleeast> (accessed 22.4.2018)

Was the Cameron administration a securitizing actor on the national level?

When it comes to the national audience, Cameron's speech in the House of Commons on the 28th February can be seen as a watershed moment; Cameron stated that "there is a real danger now of a humanitarian crisis in Libya." He then added, "My message to Colonel Qadhafi is simple: Go now "there is a real danger now of a humanitarian crisis in Libya."¹⁰⁸ Moreover, Cameron, for the first time, put forward a clear picture of the extraordinary measures when he said "And we do not in any way rule out the use of military assets. We must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people. In that context I have asked the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone."¹⁰⁹

This message fulfils the securitizing criteria. Firstly, Cameron claims that there is an existential threat to the referent object. The existential threat, which is presented, is the Gaddafi regime, whereas the referent object that needs to be protected, are the people of Libya. The message is delivered in the grammar of security as it conveys a clear sense of urgency and the necessity to act now. As the Prime Minister, Cameron clearly had enough social capital. The relevant audience is, in this case, the Members of Parliament and to some extent the British public.

The differences in the securitizing discourses: referent object

As the formerly outlined securitizing moves indicated, the protection of Libyan civilian population against Gaddafi forces was presented as the referent object in both securitizing discourses. Most importantly, it was the only referent object in both resolutions, which were drafted also by the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the condition of "Demonstrable need" for the intervention was presented in both securitizing discourses and was connected to human security. Primarily on the international level, this particular discourse was strongly connected to the language of the R2P as the legal basis for military intervention.¹¹⁰

In the resolution 1970, which was drafted, among others, also by the United Kingdom, the text makes a clear reference to the R2P when it recalls "the Libyan

¹⁰⁸ "Prime Minister's statement on Libya", GOV.uk, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-libya--2>, (accessed March 25, 2018)

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Brockmeier, Stuenkel and Tourinho, "The Impact of the Libya Intervention": 116.

authorities' responsibility to protect its population. ¹¹¹Moreover, in order to fulfil the condition of "demonstrable need", the resolution considers "the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity"¹¹².

During a press conference on 11th March after the Extraordinary European Council meeting, when asked: "How heavily does it weigh on you that previous governments stood by and allowed genocides to take place in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda?" Cameron answered: "Well, I think you're making a good point, which is many people say we have to learn the lesson of Iraq, and yes we do, but we also have to learn the lesson of what happened in former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia as well, and I think that is important."¹¹³

The aforementioned question highlights another discourse, which influenced the behaviour of David Cameron's administration when considering whether to intervene in Libya. Indeed, it seems that Cameron recognized its responsibility to protect the Libyan population in case the Gaddafi regime was about to commit genocide. In addition, this particular discourse was crucial during the creation of R2P and legitimizing humanitarian intervention, which was already demonstrated in the theoretical part of the thesis. Similarly, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs committee, when conducting interviews with the main members of Cameron administration, found that "Shadow of Srebrenica" influenced the decision-making of the officials in the Cameron administration and the Prime Minister himself.¹¹⁴

Another shared referent object by both audiences was the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people. Although this referent object was not mentioned in the resolutions itself, it was strongly apparent in the securitizing discourse by the Cameron administration towards the individual members of the international audience and linked to the context of Arab Spring, for instance, during Prime Minister's speech to the Kuwaiti National Assembly on 22nd February.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹"Resolution 1970 (2011)", United Nations Security Council, February 26, 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970%20%282011%29 (accessed March 25, 2018)

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ "Press conference in Brussels", GOV.uk, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/press-conference-in-brussels> (accessed April 22, 2018)

¹¹⁴ "Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK's future policy options", House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmcaff/119/119.pdf> (accessed April 22, 2018)

¹¹⁵ "Prime Minister's speech to the National Assembly Kuwait," GOV.uk, last modified February 22, 2011. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-to-the-national-assembly-kuwait> (accessed March 25, 2018)

Cameron's support for the Arab Spring was, according to Bebbir and Daddow, grounded in the conservative foreign policy agenda, which the party adopted since December 2005. This agenda was named the "liberal-conservative" attitude to foreign affairs. In the words of David Cameron, "Liberal – because I support the aim of spreading freedom and democracy, and support humanitarian intervention. Conservative – because I recognize the complexities of human nature, and am sceptical of grand schemes to remake the world."¹¹⁶

Similarly, the protection of democratic aspirations discourse was presented towards the national audience. For instance, in the speech on 28th February, Cameron stated in the House of Commons that "What is happening in the wider Middle East is one of those once in a generation opportunities, a moment when history turns a page." He also made a parallel to the democratic transition in the Central and Eastern Europe after the end of Cold War: "...there is no doubt that many of those who are demanding change in the wider Middle East can take inspiration from other peaceful movements for change, including the Velvet Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe or the peaceful transition to democracy in Muslim countries like Indonesia."¹¹⁷

During Prime minister's update on the Middle East in the House of Commons on 14th March, Cameron stated: "We have seen the uprising of a people against a brutal dictator, and it will send a dreadful signal if their legitimate aspirations are crushed, not least to others striving for democracy across the region." Once again, democratic aspirations are mentioned as the referent object in the context of the support for the Arab Spring towards the national audience.¹¹⁸

As it was getting closer to the final vote in the British Parliament, national security or national interest as the referent object was increasingly emphasized by the Cameron administration towards the national audience. This particular securitizing discourse was specific only to the national audience, which naturally results from the fact that national security arguments are by definition aimed at the national audience. On 14th March, Cameron stated "To those who say it is nothing to do with us, I would simply respond: Do we want a situation where a failed pariah state festers on Europe's

¹¹⁶ Mark Bevir, and Oliver Daddow, "Constructing a 'great' Role for Britain in an Age of Austerity: Interpreting Coalition Foreign Policy, 2010–2015", *International Relations* 29, no. 3 (2015): 304, <http://journals.sagepub.com>.

¹¹⁷ "Prime Minister's statement on Libya", GOV.uk, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-libya--2> (accessed March 25, 2018)

¹¹⁸ "Statement from the Prime Minister on Japan and the Middle East", GOV.uk, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-pm-on-japan-and-the-middle-east> (accessed April 2, 2018)

southern border, potentially threatening our security, pushing people across the Mediterranean and creating a more dangerous and uncertain world for Britain and for all our allies as well as for the people of Libya? “¹¹⁹

The same discourse can be apparent in the speech by Foreign Secretary Hague on 15th March when he stated “If Libya was to be left as a pariah state, particularly after these recent events with Gaddafi running amok exacting reprisals on his own people, estranged from the rest of the world, as a potential source for terrorism in the future, that would be a danger to the national interest of this country.”¹²⁰

Cameron spoke in the same fashion on the Scottish Tory conference on 18th March, Cameron highlighted that taking action in Libya is in the “national interest”. He also emphasized that if Gaddafi succeeds, this would lead to a strong destabilization of the region and Libya would become "A state from which literally hundreds of thousands of citizens could seek to escape, putting huge pressure on us in Europe."¹²¹

Differences in the securitizing discourses: the existential threat

Gaddafi’s regime represented the main existential threat in both securitizing discourses. For instance, during the national address after the extraordinary European Council meeting on 11th March Prime Minister urged that “This is a dangerous moment. We are witnessing frankly what can only be called barbaric acts, with Gaddafi brutally repressing a popular uprising led by his own people and flagrantly ignoring the will of the international community. Things may be getting worse, not better, on the ground.”¹²²

However, in the context of the national security as the referent object of securitization. Gaddafi supported terrorism was presented as the main existential threat only vis-à-vis the national audience. When Cameron pointed out the threat of terrorism, he often referred to the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. This discourse was further supported when the former Libyan justice minister alleged that he had evidence that

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰“UK is at the forefront of international action to isolate Qadhafi regime”, GOV.uk, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-is-at-the-forefront-of-the-international-effort-to-isolate-qadhafi-regime> (accessed April 22, 2018)

¹²¹ “Cameron: Libya action in ‘national interest’”, *BBC*, March 18, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-12761264> (accessed April 2, 2018)

¹²²“National briefing: United Kingdom part 1”, European Council, <https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/event/extraordinary-european-council-march-2011/national-briefing-united-kingdom-part-1-5> (accessed April 22, 2018)

Gaddafi personally ordered the attack.¹²³ The threat of terrorism to national security was increasingly highlighted as the vote on Libya was getting closer, for instance, in the statement before the vote on 21st March.¹²⁴

Similarly, Cameron chose to emphasize the threat of terrorism also at a Scottish Tory party conference "We must remember that Gaddafi is a dictator who has a track record of violence and support for terrorism against our country and against Scotland specifically." "The people of Lockerbie, 100 miles away from here, know what he is capable of."¹²⁵ To give another example, Cameron delivered a very similar speech after the vote in the United Nations on 18th March, hours before the attack on Libya by British rockets. He said "Let us be clear where our interest lies. In this country we know what Colonel Gaddafi is capable of. We should not forget his support for the biggest terrorist atrocity on British soil."¹²⁶

Differences in the securitizing discourses: acceptance of the extraordinary measures

The international audience was often interacting with the securitizing actors and on a number of occasions rejected the securitizing moves. The international audience also outlined the three necessary legitimizing principles, which would have to be met for the military intervention to take place. These were "demonstrable need", "clear legal basis" and "regional support". On the other hand, the national audience was more passive and rather waiting whether these principles will be met.¹²⁷

The principle of "demonstrable need" was strongly connected to the external context to which it was referred to and whether Gaddafi's forces attacked from the air on civilians or used chemical weapons, which could have amounted to crimes against humanity. The second principle of "clear legal basis" would hence mean the UNSC resolution. However, as it was still unclear whether Russia or China will choose to veto the intervention. The Cameron administration suggested that there was still a possibility of action without the resolution. Possibly under Geneva Convention, if the Gaddafi

¹²³ "Colonel Gaddafi 'ordered Lockerbie Bombing'", *BBC*, February 23, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-12552587> (accessed April 2, 2018)

¹²⁴ "PM statement to the House on Libya", GOV.uk <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-to-the-house-on-libya> (accessed April 22, 2018)

¹²⁵ "Cameron: Libya action in 'national interest'", *BBC*, March 18, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-12761264> (accessed April 2, 2018)

¹²⁶ "Libya: David Cameron Statement on UN Resolution", *BBC*, March 18, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12786225> (accessed April 2, 2018)

¹²⁷ Stephen Castle, "European Leaders don't rule out armed intervention in Libyan Conflict", *The New York Times*, March 11, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/europe/12diplomacy.html> (accessed April 22, 2018)

regime was found guilty of crimes against humanity. In the words of William Hague “In cases of great, overwhelming humanitarian need, then nations are able to act under international law, even without a resolution of the security council.” Finally, “regional support” meant support by the African Union and especially the Arab League for the no-fly zone.¹²⁸

As it turned out, Cameron had to negotiate more with the international audience. In addition, he often had to back down on his suggestion of a no-fly zone and then re-introduced it later when met with more support as he could lose credibility among allies. This can be apparent, for instance, on the interaction with Cameron administration when the US distanced itself from the no-fly zone.¹²⁹ Similarly, when met with a strong opposition of High Secretary Ashton during EU Council meeting, Cameron did not have an explicit reference to the idea in his statement.¹³⁰

The lack of clear opposition from the British Parliament is also indicated by the fact that the substantive motion took place two days after the start of the intervention in Libya. Most importantly, the leader of the labour party Ed Miliband said that he supports the move already on 14th March.¹³¹ Likewise, the United States and some other European leaders showed support for the no-fly zone as the Arab League and African Union stated that they support the no-fly zone. In other words, the principle of “regional support” was a crucial legitimizing factor as the intervention could not be seen as another unilateral move by the West. These states then joined France and the United Kingdom as securitizing actors primarily ahead of the vote in the UNSC.¹³²

In order to determine whether this was a case of successful securitization, the extraordinary measures need to be accepted by the relevant audience. In this case, both audiences gave their assent to the intervention. On the international level, it was the approval of the UNSC, which authorized the resolution 1973. On the national level, the

¹²⁸ Allegra Stratton, “Libya no-fly zone supported by Ed Miliband”, *The Guardian*, March 14, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/14/libya-no-fly-zone-hague> (accessed April 22, 2018)

¹²⁹ Ewan MacAskill, “Cameron backtracks on Libya no-fly zone plan as US distances itself”, *The Guardian*, March 1, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/mar/01/cameron-backtracks-libya-zone-us> (accessed April 22, 2018)

¹³⁰ Ian Traynor, “Libya no-fly zone rejected by EU leaders”, *The Guardian*, March 11, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/libya-no-fly-zone-plan-rejected> (accessed April 22, 2018)

¹³¹ Allegra Stratton, “Libya no-fly zone supported by Ed Miliband,” *The Guardian*, March 14, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/14/libya-no-fly-zone-hague> (accessed March 26, 2018)

¹³² Colin Freeman, “Libya: Arab League calls for no-fly zone”, *The Telegraph*, March 12, 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8378392/Libya-Arab-League-calls-for-United-Nations-no-fly-zone.html> (accessed March 26, 2018)

acceptance was the vote in favour of enforcing the resolution in the substantive motion on 21st of March.

The framework outlined by Roe suggests that both votes (in the UNSC and in the House of Commons) represent a ‘formal’ support for the move. However, especially the vote in the UNSC can be also seen as a ‘moral’ support since the approval of the resolution 1973 was in itself one of the legitimizing arguments for the intervention. However, this also raises questions about the necessity of the UNSC for the military intervention after France and the United Kingdom managed to gain the support of the Arab League (moral support) and the US. It is possible that they could have acted without the permission of the UNSC.

The securitization by the Cameron administration started prior to the introduction of the idea of a no-fly zone on 28th of March. However, no-fly zone clearly represents the extraordinary measures, which had to be accepted. Naturally, a clear legal basis in the form of a resolution 1973 represented a strong legitimizing argument, which later influenced the vote in the House of Commons. Although the extraordinary measures were accepted by the relevant audience, the audience had little ability to influence the actual implementation of extraordinary measures, which diverged from the extraordinary measures that were proposed. Moreover, Russia, China, Germany, Brazil and India did not approve the resolution 1973. They only abstained, which suggested future problems for the concept as a legal basis for intervention.

Figure n. 2: Differences and similarities in the securitizing discourses by the Cameron administration

Type of Audience	International	National
Referent Objects	Human Security Democratic Aspirations	Human Security, National Security, Democratic Aspirations
Existential Threat	Gaddafi regime	Gaddafi regime, (Gaddafi supported terrorism, Gaddafi supported regional instability)
Extraordinary Measures	No-fly zone	No-fly zone
Acceptance of the E.M.	Yes, UNSC resolution	Yes, vote in Parliament

Conclusion

The analysis confirms the hypothesis that human security was the main referent object in both discourses, whereas national security as the referent object was specific only to the national audience. The referent object of democratic aspiration was also highlighted in both discourses. The existential threat presented was the Gaddafi regime, which was shared by both discourses. The three main legitimizing principles: “demonstrable need”, “regional support” and “clear legal basis” were likewise shared by both audiences. However, in the national discourse, this threat was referred to in the context of the threat of terrorism and refugee crisis, which was audience-specific. In addition, each audience had a different role in the securitizing process. The analysis reveals that the international audience was more active in shaping the securitizing discourse. It is also evident that the preventing genocide discourse influenced the decision-making of the Cameron administration.

As for the theoretical framework, there were some issues that appeared repeatedly when conducting the analysis. Firstly, in the particular case of the United Kingdom, English is the language used to address both the national and international audience. Correspondingly, this decreases the differences between the language of security used towards the national and international audience. For that reason, the analysis had to focus primarily on the emphasis given to individual discourses in the securitizing moves. Hence, the distinction between the two securitizing discourses can be clearer in the case of other countries, where English would be used only to address the international audience such as France, Russia or China. This could include a specific security language deployed in case of national discourse. In that case, the theoretical framework developed by Vuori can be very helpful to establish how the particular securitizing phrases appeared and what they are trying to achieve in terms of securitization.

Secondly, it is possible that if the securitizing actors failed to acquire the UN resolution 1973, Cameron and some members of his administration suggested that they would still consider intervention if the Gaddafi regime clearly committed crimes against humanity. In that case, the national audience might have taken on a more active role in the process as the intervention might face a stronger opposition in the House of Commons. As a result, it is possible that there would have to be a vote prior to the start of the military intervention. This makes the idea of the necessity of the UNSC resolution for the actual military intervention ambiguous. Similarly, the military intervention took place prior to the vote in the British Parliament. The framework of

‘formal and moral’ approval by the relevant audience developed by Roe is thus slightly problematic.

This issue is connected to the limitation of the analysis, which did not examine the individual members of the international and national audience. In practice, the actual vote in the UNSC and the British Parliament can thus have a strong symbolic value but negates the fact that securitization is a process and the support of individual members for the extraordinary measures usually comes prior to the actual vote. Finally, this analysis focused primarily on one securitizing actor and for this reason cannot determine the actual importance of the United Kingdom in the entire securitization process.

Nonetheless, one of the main advantages of the securitization theory is that it can map the discursive construction of threats. This analysis suggests that the Gaddafi regime was presented as the main threat. David Cameron suggested on many occasions that there is no decent future for Libya with Gaddafi in power. In addition, the analysis outlines how the Gaddafi regime was presented as a clear threat to the national security of the United Kingdom. This implies that the United Kingdom had little interest in keeping Gaddafi in power already prior to the start of the military intervention. This highlights an important paradox, even though the UK, France and the US have never explicitly supported regime-change, they stated on numerous occasions that they see no future for Libya with Gaddafi in power. Most importantly, the actual military intervention led by NATO directly targeted Gaddafi’s command facilities, ignored the attempts by the African Union to negotiate a ceasefire and only ended with the death of Gaddafi.

The theoretical part of the thesis outlines the conflict between the inter-subjective and self-referential understanding of securitization. It also highlights the critique put forward against the theory, which demonstrates the lack of attention to the role of the audience in the original securitization framework. This thesis attempted to underscore the need for audience-centered securitization by comparing two securitizing discourses. The comparison considered the differences in the referent objects, the existential threat and the acceptance of extraordinary measures. The outcome suggests that the securitizing moves undertaken by the securitizing actor are often audience-specific. Indeed, securitization is an inter-subjective process and audience-centered approach to securitization takes full advantage of this insight. Such attitude can shed more light on how security problems emerged and on what grounds was the answer to them legitimized.

Resumé

Analýza práce zohľadnila rozdiely v referenčnom objekte, existenciálnej hrozbe a prijatí špeciálnych opatrení, aby potvrdila hypotézu, že sa budú sekuritizační diskursy v týchto parametroch líšiť na základe daného obecnstva. Lidská bezpečnosť a prechod k demokracii sa ukázali ako hlavné referenčné objekty v oboch diskursoch. Zároveň v prípade obecnstva na národnej úrovni bola referenčným objektom národná bezpečnosť Veľkej Británie. S tým tiež súvisí hrozba terorizmu a uprchlické vlny, ktorá by zasáhla Veľkou Britániu v prípade, že by Kaddáfí zostal v čele Libye. Bezletová zóna predstavovala špeciálne opatrenie v oboch sekuritizačných diskursoch. Hlavné legitimitačné argumenty boli rovnaké v oboch diskursoch. Medzinárodné obecnstvo ovšem ďaleko aktívnejšie ovplyvňovalo podobu sekuritizácie. Táto práca sa snažila ukázať, že je úloha obecnstva v sekuritizačnom procese kľúčová. Teoretická časť práce ukazuje kritiku teórie, ktorá zdôrazňuje, že sekuritizácia je predovšetkým intersubjektívny proces, čož pôvodná forma teórie dostatočne nezohľadňuje. Analýza rečovných aktov následne potvrdila tento poznatek a ukázala rozdiely v sekuritizačných diskursoch na základe obecnstva.

Intervencia v Libyi bola kritizovaná, pretože intervenujúca zem prekročila mandát, ktorý jej dala Rada bezpečnosti OSN rezolúciou 1973. Jednou z najväčších výhod teórie sekuritizácie je, že dokáže zmapovať diskursívny vytváranie hrozieb. Z toho vychádzala i samotná analýza práce, ktorá ukazuje, že hlavnou existenciálnou hrozbou sekuritizácie bol Kaddáfího režim. David Cameron niekoľkokrát zdôraznil, že Kaddáfí musí odstúpiť. Analýza ďalej ukázala, že Kaddáfí bol Cameronom a jeho administratívou vykreslený, ako hrozba pre národnú bezpečnosť Veľkej Británie. To súhlasí s následným vývojom v Libyi po schválení vojenskej intervencie rezolúciou 1973. Pretože Veľká Británie, Francie a Spojené štáty nikdy priamo nepodporili režimnú zmenu, niekoľkokrát zdôraznili, že Libyi s Kaddáfim v čele nečeka dobrá budúcnosť. Samotná vojenská intervencia sa pritom dá považovať za režimnú zmenu. Táto práca teda ukazuje, že bol tento vývoj udalostí z hľadiska jedného z sekuritizačných aktérov naznačený už na základe vykreslenia existenciálnej hrozby a referenčných objektov sekuritizácie.

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