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**Border Barriers in the Modern World:
Factors Contributing to Barrier-building
Practices in the post-1945 World**

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Abstrakt

Počet hraničních bariér se v posledních desetiletích rapidně zvýšil na globální škále. Tyto bariéry se objevily na hranicích mezi bohatými a chudými státy, mezi stabilními státy a státy sužovanými občanskými válkami, mezi tradičními rivaly, a dokonce i mezi partnery ve společném integračním procesu. Z tohoto popisu je zřejmé, že pro vysvětlení fenoménu hraničních bariér je nutná komplexní teorie. Překládána práce si vzala za cíl zodpovědět otázku budování hraničních bariér pomocí interakce Schmittova teorie státu založené na *nomos*, suverenitě a politické jednotě, s vlivy globalizace. Na tomto základě jsou identifikovány nezávislé proměnné – vydelení teritoria, vojenská hrozba suverenitě, hrozba suverenita od přeshraničních etnických skupin, hrozba politické jednotě z masové neregulérní migrace, teroristická hrozba politické jednotě. Dopad těchto proměnných byl následně testován pomocí regresní analýzy. Počet hraničních bariér postavený jednotlivými státy byl použit jako nezávislá proměnná. Výsledky naznačují, že státy, které častěji čelí problémům s nejasně vydelením teritoriem, zpolitizovaná přeshraniční etnickou skupinou nebo nepravidelnou masovou migrací stavějí více hraničních bariér než státy s menším počtem těchto problémů.

Abstract

The number of border barriers has increased rapidly in the last decades. These barriers appeared between the wealthy and the poor, between the stable and those ridden by civil wars, between traditional military rivals and even between partners in the integration process. This suggests that a complex theory is necessary to explain the phenomenon of border barrier building. The presented work aims to provide an answer to the question of why states build border barriers by the use of Schmitt's theory of state based on *nomos*, sovereignty and political unity in interaction with globalization. This theory served as a framework for establishing the independent variables, namely challenges to land-appropriation, challenges to sovereignty from military threat, challenges to sovereignty

from cross-border ethnic group, challenges to political unity from irregular mass migration and finally challenges to political unity from terrorism. These were then tested using regression analysis with number of border barriers constructed by a state serving as a dependent variable. The results suggest that states that often face challenges to land-appropriation, to sovereignty coming from politicised cross-border ethnic groups and to political unity from irregular mass migration build more border barriers than those that face less of these challenges.

Klíčové slova

Teichopolitka, globalizace, hranice, hraniční bariéry, opevňování hranic, teritorialita, management hranic, Carl Schmitt, suverenita, vyhrazení území, cezhraničné etnické skupiny, vojenské hrozby, migrace, terorismus

Keywords

Teichopolitics, globalization, border, border re-hardening, border barriers, territoriality, border management, Carl Schmitt, sovereignty, land-appropriation, cross-border ethnic groups, military threats, migration, terrorism

Thesis length: 69 standard pages (123 763 characters with spaces)

Statement

1. I hereby proclaim that I have written the presented thesis by myself using only the stated sources and literature.
2. I hereby proclaim that this thesis was not used to achieve another academic title.
3. I consent to the free use of this thesis for further study and research purposes.

Prague, 10.5.2018

Bc. Branislav Mičko

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Institute of Political Studies

Diploma thesis project

Topic

The main research interest of the proposed project is the increase in state-built barriers on the international borders since the end of the Second World War. As such, various types of man-made physical barriers have been used throughout history for a wide range of reason – to contain plagues or to protect a place of interest. However, with the advent of the globalized and technologically interconnected world after 1945 and especially after 1989 these practices have not disappeared, as was expected, but only transformed into a wide range of border strengthening measures all around the world. Furthermore, notions of these practices are increasingly prevalent in the political discourse of European and American societies.

With the aforementioned increase in relevance of this issue in the political arena of many Western countries and continuing construction of several border barriers all around the world the further academic study of factors contributing to these changes seems needed.

Project Goals

The presented project seeks to devise a comprehensive study intended to identify key factors contributing to country's willingness to strengthen its borders with one of its neighbours. Identification of these factors will be constructed on the already existing literature dealing with border-barriers but also on a wider body of research concerned with different material conditions that could affect state's need for better border security.

Therefore, the main project goal is to amplify the existing research of border barriers construction with new possible factors that lead to such practice. Furthermore, it also seeks to identify the relationship between different factors and different types of border barriers. These goals combined should not only provide better academic insight into the issue of barrier-building but also at least partly contribute to a wider body of literature dealing with integrative and disintegrative processes present in the globalizing world.

In summary, this project will try to answer the question: what factors contribute to states' willingness to build differing types of border barriers?

The Current State of Research

In the recent years, there has been an increasing amount of research devoted to the questions of border barriers. The first work that introduced the term *teichopolitics* was named *The Challenge of "Teichopolitics": Analyzing Contemporary Border Closures*. This article defined *teichopolitics* as any policy of space partitioning, generally linked to a more or less justified concern for the protection of a territory and its control. (Ballif and Rosière, 2009:194). Furthermore, it also introduces a typology of border barriers – namely marches, fences, walls and front lines (Ballif and Rosière, 2009:197) The conclusions it drew from the analysis of both international and intra-urban walls around the world were that while most of the arguments for wall-building refer to violence, fear and the pursuit of individual or collective security there is an underlying theme which shows that barrier-building is linked to the control of space by social groups (social class or ethnicity) in interactions with economic and financial actors (Ballif and Rosière, 2009:204). Finally, it stresses the importance of understanding this phenomenon as the opposite side of economic and political globalization (Ballif and Rosière, 2009:205).

The interaction between border barriers and globalization is also addressed by Brown in her book *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. One of the Brown's main argument in this book is that border walls result from the fact that state's sovereignty is slowly disappearing and new types of sovereigns in form of global capital and renewed religious-fervour appear on the global stage (Brown, 2010:62-66). Therefore, she argues, that these border-walls are far from defences against international invasions by other state powers but are a response to transnational economic, social and religious flows that do not have the force of political sovereignty behind them (Brown, 2010:81). Brown furthermore draws on the Schmitt's definition of the state as a political sovereign - that is one who identifies who the enemy is - and suggests that with the ongoing globalization the state is no longer the sole sovereign over the definition of the enemy (Brown, 2010:83). Therefore, she argues, the continued globalization does not limit the amount of violence, as is expected by its neoliberal proponents, but instead creates a situation of “war of all” which the perishing state sovereignty is trying to contain by creating the border barriers (Brown, 2010:94-97) while also contributing to the maintenance of clearer “us-them” distinction (Brown, 2010:104;115-119).

Another article, *Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation through the Role of Walls and Fences*, continues the inquiry into the relationship between different globalization tendencies. This article partly redefines *teichopolitics* and identifies it as a term connected to the Foucaultian notion of biopower, which is specifically manifested in rejection of human mobility rights (Rosière and Jones, 2012:219). Furthermore, it also identifies different types of border barriers similar to Ballif and Rosière (2009:197) ranging from frontlines to walls but also including closed straits in the sea borders (Rosière and Jones, 2012:222-227). According to the results provided in this work, the barrier building practices are directly linked to the state's desire to protect its economically privileged citizens (Rosière and Jones, 2012:230). However, even though the cited research outlines the basic logic and mechanisms behind border strengthening it does not provide strong empirical evidence to support its claims.

Finally, one of the most empirically focuses articles is among the most recent and is called *Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability* and builds on three hypotheses derived from three areas of interest in interstate relations – economy, security and territorial disputes. The economic hypothesis is essentially based on the same line of argument as in the previously cited work and it claims border-barriers are built on borders between states with an extremely different level of income (Carter and Poast, 2017:245). The second hypothesis assumes that there is a link between a civil war in a neighbouring state and desire to strengthen the frontier regime. Finally, the third hypothesis formulates the possible relation between territorial disputes between states and their willingness to build border barriers (Carter and Poast, 2017:247). Stated hypotheses are tested using regression analysis on the data consisting of neighbouring states dyads since 1800 along with information on variables of interest. As stated by the article, the collected data show a strong relationship between the economic factors and constructed border barriers (Carter and Poast, 2017:263). Even despite rather complex and rigorous data collection and analysis interpretation, there are problems in regard to some of the used indicators. It can be argued that the research does not reflect the latest findings in the literature on civil-war spill-over and ethnicity, which can, in turn, undermine the validity of results. Furthermore, the cited article does not include other important factors such as terrorist proliferation in the neighbouring state, health concerns and economic inequality in the barrier-building state.

Apart from these broader examinations into the problematic of border walls, there is a number of case studies dealing with different aspects of erecting border barriers. To

state a few examples. Moria Paz's *Between the Kingdom and the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immigration, and Border Walls* deals with the human rights aspect of border walls and examines it in the case of Israel-Egypt walls (Paz, 2016). The article *Protective Barriers and Entrapping Walls: Perceptions of Borders in the Post-Yugoslav Bosnian Diaspora* which examines how changing border regimes influence the identity formulation (Huttunen, 2016). Brendon John Cannon's article focuses on the comparison of Kenyan and Somali wall effectiveness in terrorist deterrence (Cannon, 2016). Finally, McGuire's work focuses on the concrete effects and effectiveness of walls in given frontier communities (McGuire, 2013).

Theoretical Background

From the meta-theoretical perspective, this research will be based in essence on the neo-positivist approach with the associated phenomenism's commitment to observable parts of nature.

In terms of theorisation of the border barriers, the proposed project will lay its foundations on the concepts and definitions provided by two of the aforementioned works. First of all, it will appropriate the concept of *strategic defence* (Keegan, 2004:142), which was also used by Carter and Poast (2017:248). Keegan, and subsequently Carter and Poast, define strategic defence as a series of continuous or individual but mutually supporting strong points devised and located in terrain to prevent entrance of any unwanted entities. However, this definition needs to be at least partly modified to better reflect different types of existing border barriers. These barriers can at certain times be hard military-kept border walls while at other times they can consist of much more temporary and administrative solutions. What they have in common is their aim to limit movement of people and products across borders (Rosière and Jones, 2012:222). Therefore, the best definition, which properly accounts for differing types of border barriers, understands border barrier as a continuous or discontinuous line of mutually supporting strongpoints, whose aim is to limit movement of people or goods across the border using military or administrative tools.

This definition allows the division of such barriers into frontlines, fences and walls. Frontline is characterised by the existence of an empty space separating two zones of military installations. They often mark a disputed area where two states continue to claim territory on the other side and a peace treaty has not yet been negotiated (Rosière and Jones, 2012:222-223). Fences then are more temporary and they do not completely

block the vision of the other side. Walls, on the other hand, are more finalised, eliminate the line of sight across the border and increasingly involve biometric solutions (Rosière and Jones, 2012:225-226).

With the definition of what border barrier is and what different types of these barriers there are, it is now possible to move towards the identification of key factors that could increase state's willingness to fortify its borders. To properly identify these factors two important concepts need to be taken into account.

First of them is the principal border barrier building entity – a modern state. According to Weber (1919:1) state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. However, while such definition provides a suitable form it does not imbue state with any substance, it tells us what state is but not what it does. Weber elaborates and claims that any state business is a political business and thus that any political action is related to striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power among groups within a state. This substance, however, as Schmitt (1932:20) correctly points out, means that the state and the political are always one and the same and thus if this was true any historical community other than the state could not be political. In Schmitt's perspective, the claim that "state = political" is not automatically correct, even though it was correct for a large part of history. Then it can be argued that there are two components joined together in modern state – a formal one and a substantial one. The formal one is correctly captured by Weber's definition of state outlined above. The substantial component is that of political sovereignty. Schmitt (1932:26) identifies the *friend-enemy* distinction as the very basis of the political. In short, this means that any type of antagonism strong enough to create groups of people willing to die and kill for their group can become political (Schmitt, 1932:37). It is this group (a political unity) that decides on who lies where on the friend-enemy distinction (Schmitt, 1932:43) – in other words, a political unity has the *ius ad bellum* and therefore can independently decide who its enemy is and when to fight him. This right is then understood as the political sovereignty. Since the peace of Westphalia, almost sole actor with this right was the modern state. To conclude then, the modern state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly on the use of physical force within a given territory and which also maintains the exclusive right to decide on its enemies.

The second important concept is globalization and the type of actors it produces. Scholte (c2011:15) defines globalization as "processes whereby social relations become

relatively delinked from territorial geography so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world of a single place.” Apart from other things, this definition suggests that country locations and boundaries between territorial states are in some important sense becoming less central to the world politics. Furthermore, globalization has been transpiring through the proliferation and growth of organizations that operate as trans-border networks (Scholte, c2011:16). These organizations, along with other factors, contribute to the shifts that transfer authority away from the realm of states and into the social and economic realms (Rosenau, 2005:50). In other words, mechanisms of control at national levels are in varying degrees yielding space to both more encompassing and narrower, less comprehensive forms of governance (Rosenau, 2005:51). Therefore, it can be argued that the advent of network forms of organizations undermined and continues to undermine the authority of states (Rosenau, 2006:140) and thus that globalization in itself implies the weakening of state sovereignty and state structures (Beck, 2000:86). In summary, globalization can be understood as processes creating an alternative place for social relations to play out resulting in a new type of network based actors and subsequent weakening of state political sovereignty.

Implicit from both the definition of state and of globalization are the reasons why states build walls. First of all, states build walls for the same reasons they built them historically – to protect the territory in which they have a monopoly on the use of force. In other words, they build barriers to maintain the formal component of statehood. Secondly, and in line with Brown’s (2010:83) argument, globalization causes states’ ability to define friends and enemies to slowly diffuse into a world of new and problematically identifiable actors. Thus, a border barrier is an attempt to maintain the control over the territory the state claims as its own and also to re-establish its political sovereignty and once again clearly define the friend on the inside and the enemy on the outside. It is important to note that in practice these two reasons can overlap. This is because the claim to a given state’s political sovereignty is first of all usurped by various trans-border networks, mainly ethnoreligious groups and terrorist organizations, but its role is also obscured by the developments in the nature of inter-state warfare, whose aim is a change in the control of territory.

In practical terms, this means that a state will try to fortify its borders when there is a danger of creation of a new type of political unity that would usurp its own political sovereignty. Such a danger is connected to the ethnic (and possibly religious) links between warring sides in the civil war and ethnic groups living in the neighbouring

country (Bosker and de Ree, 2014:214). According to this logic, a state should be willing to strengthen its frontiers with a neighbour if this neighbour is troubled by an ethnic (or religious) civil war that is connected to its own ethnic (or religious) groups. Similarly, due to the networking nature of terrorist organisations and their almost “cancerous” spreading potential (Yilmaz, 2013:359), a state can logically be wary of the possible trans-border expansion of terrorist organisation from the neighbouring states, especially if such organizations are in actual possession of the territory. Therefore a state should attempt to fortify its borders in order to prevent terrorist spread from a neighbouring country. By doing so, it is able to define in clearer terms both the “friends”, the “internal enemies” and the enemies on the outside and prevent the loss of its claim to political sovereignty (i.e. the creation of new political unity due to a spill-over of ethnic or sectarian violence into its own territory, or creation of terrorist cells within its own territory). This consideration can be summed up in the following hypothesis:

H₁: States build border barriers in order to prevent the spread of civil war or of terrorist activities from a neighbouring country.

However, the loss of political sovereignty is not the only problem states have to address. States have to also maintain its monopoly on the use of violence in a given territory, thus they not only need to deter other states from taking their territory but also ensure their authority in this territory. It seems then, that a state should try to create border barriers to simply protect its territory from a possible invasion by a hostile neighbour. However, it appears implausible that a state would hamstring itself with an immovable border barrier in times of fast-paced and highly movable warfare (Biddle, 2006:190). But, this type of territory protection is once again linked to the problem of friend-enemy distinction. This is due to the changing nature of inter-state warfare and the increase in the number of hybrid techniques that aim to create uncertainty and confusion as to who the real enemy is (Bresinsky, 2016:42, 47) even though their ultimate goal remains the same as it was historically – the acquisition of territory. Therefore, states should build border barriers when there is a danger of an invasion from a hostile state that is able to use hybrid warfare techniques. Furthermore, states not only want to keep the territory in their possession, they also want to maintain their authority in it. This authority is regularly questioned by another actor stemming from the globalization, namely the transnational criminal organizations. These organizations deteriorate state authority in its territory by

the maintenance of illegal flows through the borders. Arguably, their actions involve drugs smuggling, human trafficking and human smuggling. Since most of them involve using illegal migrants to get “products” into the targeted country (Dudley, 2012:17) it can be assumed that states will try to limit these activities by building a border barrier when there is a large influx of illegal immigrants. There are two hypotheses that stem from the aforementioned reflection:

H₂: States build border barriers when there is a danger of invasion of hybrid nature from a neighbouring country.

H₃: States build border barriers when there is a considerable amount of trans-border criminal activity coming from the neighbouring country.

Thirdly, it needs to be noted that the loss of political sovereignty or control of the territory need not be the only motivation for the state to build walls. Since states have a population that in one way or another influences their behaviour, it can be expected that there are at least two areas in which the population will influence states willingness to build border barriers. First of them is their economic well-being, the second one is health. Since border barriers are predominantly concerned with the movement of people across borders the problem of economic well-being in this area should probably be linked to the question of immigration. Therefore, it can be expected that a certain type of population will want to limit the influx of immigrants due to their negative impact on their economic well-being. In general, there are two possible ways how to research this. First of all, a general economic performance and income levels between neighbours can be checked. Logically, a large difference in incomes between two neighbouring countries can lead to increased immigration from the poorer to the wealthier and in turn to economic problems and a need for increased redistribution in the latter. This is essentially the argument Carter and Poast (2017:243) use. However, it can also be argued that this way of thinking does not take the state of the wealthier country into account. Immigration of non-skilled workers has negative impacts mainly on the less educated workforce in the country of destination (the so called “losers of globalization”) as they both compete for the same jobs, but also on the wealthy since a larger amount of poor people in the country would call for increased redistribution (Dolmas and Huffman, 2004:1161). Therefore, a country that is both wealthy but also has a high level of native income inequality – meaning there

is a lot of well-off people who do not favour redistribution and a lot of low-income people who are in need of a job – should have a higher willingness to build a border barrier on the border with less well-off neighbour. As for the health, it can be expected that if there is large scale epidemic in the neighbouring country the population will want to limit the inflows from that country. Thus this can also be linked to the choice of border regime. The spread of viral diseases over large areas has been linked to the insufficient state borders and a large number of migrants (Pineda-Peña et Al., 2016:221) (Guo et Al., 2013:11-12). Therefore, it is feasible to assume that if a state is concerned about the health of its citizens then it will try to build barriers on the borders with neighbour stricken by epidemics. Hypotheses linked to the aforementioned issues are following:

H₄: States build border barriers if the neighbouring country is significantly poorer.

H₅: States build border barriers if the neighbouring country is significantly poorer and internal division of wealth is highly unequal.

H₆: States build border barriers if there is an epidemic in a neighbouring country.

Finally, an important note. States are not equivalent in terms of economy and geography. This means that state capability, both economic and geographical, to construct elaborate border barriers needs to be taken into account. It can be assumed that wealthy states with easily protectable borders will opt for a border barrier when the circumstances are right while poor states cannot do the same even if they would like to. Therefore, the final hypothesis researched in the project will be:

H₇: Wealthier states and states with easily defendable borders will build more border barriers than their opposites.

Research Method

The method of research will, in essence, follow the division of factors described above. First of all, the different border barriers built since 1945 will be evaluated and ranked according to their type. Secondly, the presence of civil war will be ranked depending on its existence in the neighbour and possible ethnic/religious links to the

country in question. Similarly, the existence of terrorist groups and their level of influence in the neighbouring country will be evaluated and ranked. Next, a possible hostile neighbour with hybrid warfare capabilities will be identified by focusing on whether there is an ongoing border dispute with the primary country, whether there is a significant ethnic minority from the neighbouring country within the primary country and whether this neighbour has the military capabilities to wage hybrid warfare. In the fourth step, the approximate number of illegal immigrants will be used as a proxy for the level of transnational crime. Next, the differences in the level of income and general economic performance between the neighbouring countries will be rated, along with the domestic income inequality in the state of interest. Finally, the presence of a contagious disease epidemic in the neighbouring state will be researched. After these data are collected for every country-neighbour dyad in every year defined in this research's scope a limited dependent variable regression analysis will be conducted. All in all, the proposed research will perform a synchronic comparison analysis using quantitative tools.

Data Sources

In general, the data will be acquired from the public database such as UN, WHO and World Bank, but also from the available statistic bureaus of particular states. Furthermore, the list sovereign countries existing over the years, as well as their specific neighbours, will be drawn from both the membership list of the UN, world map and historical atlases.

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Outline

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1. Introduction

1.1 Border barriers around the world

Borders barriers such as walls or fences have been a part of the social world ever since the earliest times. As such they were and still are present in people's everyday lives. Ranging from fences delimitating owned land to house walls protecting from the weather, all of these barriers create borders between new spaces of the inside and the outside. Similarly, in the political life, city walls have been used throughout the history to protect the citizens and the city itself from the adversity of the outer world, be it foreigners or outright enemies. Their importance was praised by many great political thinkers of the past, such as Aristotle (1999:168) or Machiavelli (2005:99), as well as by ancient religious texts such as the Bible (Isaiah 60:18¹). Even with the "opening" of the cities and advancement in military affairs since the 15th century, accompanied by the waning military importance of defensive architecture (Pañeda Ruiz, 2014:6-7), the city walls did not disappear. In the 18th century Berlin, a customs wall (*Berliner Zoll- und Akzisemauer*) was erected by the Prussian authorities to increase the effectiveness of toll collection and remained in place well into the 19th century (Zschocke, 2007:25-47). Barriers and walls had an astonishing and brutal come back in the form of barbed wire and fences used by the armies in the two World Wars (Carlson, 2013:18-25). The employment of border barriers did not end with the great military conflicts of the 20th but continued onwards as one of the most important symbols of the Cold War. From a certain perspective, it can be argued that the Cold War was essentially a war of barriers, described by Churchill's (1946) Iron Curtain speech, cemented by the erection of the Berlin Wall ("Berlin Waill Built", c2018) and ended by the success of Reagan's (1987) appeal to Gorbachev to "tear down" that very wall.

As the Cold War came to close and the Iron Curtain disappeared from the Old Continent, voices were heard from both the academia and the public that a new world emerged, a world where states and territorial boundaries were no longer important nor effective (Ohmae, 1995:11) and that a new liberal order is about to supplant territorial sovereignty with a universal importance of the common market (Fukuyama, 1989:16). However, this borderless world was not to be. Ever since the end of the Cold War, new

¹ „No longer will violence be heard in your land, nor ruin or destruction within your borders, but you will call your walls Salvation and your gates Praise”.

barriers sprung up along the borders of thought-to-be-dying sovereign states. And those barriers that were expected to dissolve in the brave new universal world were not only maintained but strengthened.

Spain strengthened the borders of its enclaves in Morocco just three years after the end of the Cold War. The two most well-known examples of border barriers – the American fence with Mexico and the Israeli wall with Palestine – date back to the beginning of the 21st century (Granados et al., 2016). Border barriers once again returned to the Old Continent with the turbulence accompanying the Arab spring in 2011. Members of the European Union, thought to be the pioneers of the borderless world, built fences and walls to prevent the massive influx of refugees from the worn-torn countries as well as economic migrants from the third world (Baczynska & Ledwith, 2016). Similarly, some Middle Eastern countries walled off their neighbours because of the fear of terrorism or uncontrolled migration (Atkinson, 2014). Finally, the migration and terrorism appear not to be the only reasons for the resurgence of border hardening in Europe. Following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, its neighbours, namely Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and Norway, started to erect barriers along their common borders with the perceived aggressor (Granados et al., 2016).

But, Europe and the Middle East are not the only places where the revival of barriers occurs. Since the end of the Cold War, new barriers appeared between Kenya and Somalia in Africa, between India and Bangladesh in Asia or between Thailand and Malaysia (Granados et al., 2016). Furthermore, old barriers built during the bipolar competition of the superpowers remained in place. Thus, a frontline with minefields and barbed wires (Szoldra, 2017) still divides the Korean peninsula along the 52nd parallel. Similarly, the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe continues to be dominated by the electric fences erected back in 1984 (Piven, 2015).

This brief summary of the history of border barriers and walls seems to imply that the phenomenon of border strengthening accompanied humankind throughout the history of its political organisation. However, one of the most striking features of this general statement is that these borders were used for different purposes, in completely different historical contexts and by completely different actors. The ancient city state's walls were used mainly for protection of the citizenry and did not denote the entirety of the *polis* as Aristotle (1999:54) emphasizes, which is in direct contrast with some of the modern barriers built on national borders to arguably delimitate the state territory as well as its rightful denizens. Similarly, while the modern wires and fences used in the World Wars

were designed to drive the attacking enemy into the predefined killing zones (Guttman, 2009:21), the fortresses and walled cities of middle-ages were the focal points of medieval warfare and did not serve just as tools to facilitate a specific type of engagement (Bachrach, 1994:125).

Thus, it appears that whereas the material objects understood as barriers remained more or less the same throughout the millennia, reasons for their construction vary significantly. It can be argued, that during different epochs there were different factors contributing to the willingness of the prevalent political units of the day to erect walls and barriers. The focus of the presented work is therefore to identify the key factors contributing to the erection of border barriers between states, the current prevalent political units, in the era since the end of the Second World War. To achieve this goal, firstly an inquiry into the state of the academic literature of the subject was undertaken with the intent to determine the existing streams of the academic thought. This also assisted in the identification of the necessary steps needed to produce a comprehensive theory that would supply relevant hypotheses and subsequently multi-faceted variables need to properly consider the issue at hand. In attempt to formulate such a theoretical framework, the Schmittian concepts of political unity, sovereignty and land-appropriation and their interaction with globalisation were used to identify possible factors contributing to the prevalence of border strengthening around the world, including but not limited to factors such as ethnoreligious composition, military challenges or irregular and/or illegal mass migration. Along with this identification, the relevant hypotheses were formulated based on the claim that states build barriers in order to maintain, gain or regain some aspect of statehood that they are lacking. As the next step, a dataset of neighbour-dyads since 1945 was constructed encompassing the data on the variables identified previously and the data on existing border barriers. This dataset was then used to identify states with most overall challenged borders. Finally, multiple regression analyses were conducted and the conclusions were drawn from the results.

1.2 The reasons for barriers

Naturally, the resurgence of barrier building practices among modern states caught the attention of the academia and produced a number of more or less discernible streams in the literature that highlight different aspects and causes of this phenomenon. It is necessary to note, that following identification is based mainly on the theoretical prisms

and conclusions present in the particular studies. For the purpose of this work, the following streams can be identified.

First and probably the strongest stream can be termed *teichopolitical*. Arguably, this body of literature begins with the article published by Ballif and Rosière (2009:194), in which the two authors define the term *teichopolitics* as any and all policies of space enclosure aimed at the protection of the particular territory. In the conclusion of their analysis, they claim that while the barriers are often erected in the name of security, their construction is truly linked to the control of space by social groups in their interactions with economic and financial actors instigated by the processes of globalisation (Ballif & Rosière, 2009:204-205). The notion of *teichopolitics* is then developed in the article by Rosière and Jones. Authors link this concept with Foucaultian concepts of biopolitics and biopower and understand it as one of the techniques used for the subjection of the population and its individual bodies (Rosière & Jones, 2012:219). The outcome of their study expands on the link between globalisation and border barriers and claims that the wealthy states strengthen their borders in order to filter through the desired and undesired flows, in the form of poor and uneducated people or unwelcomed products, from the periphery (Rosière & Jones, 2012:229, 231-232). Another article that focuses on the barrier building as one of the biopolitical practices analyses the case of the separation wall in East Jerusalem. Its author, however, comes to a conclusion that the residents of East Jerusalem are subjected to a combination of sovereign and biopolitical powers aimed to make them unable to properly integrate into any of the two societies living in the city (Amir, 2011:787-788). Similarly, an analysis of the Middle-Eastern walls and fences points to their use as a strategy of population control, by which the motion of groups and individuals is either denied, facilitated or simply managed (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015:454-455). Probably the latest article in this school of thought is a statistical study by Carter and Poast. The study focuses on the border walls constructed between 1800 and 2014 and tests the compiled database for three hypotheses – the linkage between border walls as particular border strengthening measures and cross-border income inequality, civil war in a neighbouring state and between walls and territorial disputes (Carter & Poast, 2017:249-250,245-247). While the two authors do not link the issue of walls with the Foucaultian philosophy, their conclusions confirm the opinions that economic inequality and prevention of economic immigration is the main reason for wall building originally stipulated by both Ballif and Rosière in 2009 and Rosière and Jones in 2012 (Carter & Poast, 2017:256, 263).

The second and equally diverse stream will be for the purposes of this work called *sovereignty* stream. Wendy Brown (2010:27), possibly the first author in this line of thought, argues that it is the transfer of sovereignty from the modern state towards other actors caused by globalisation that leads states to build walls and barriers in a vain attempt to reclaim what the sovereign capabilities they are losing (Brown, 2010:24). According to her, this change is accompanied by the “unshackling” of religion and capital as the source of the new political identity (Brown, 2010:64-66). In a very similar vein, an article by Pusterla and Piccin argues that sovereignty is inadvertently moved from the nation-states to the international level and thus blurs the once-clear links between a subject and a sovereign which leads states to try to reinforce these links by building walls (Pusterla & Piccin, 2012:130). Finally, they claim that this process of sovereignty transfer is happening outside of the wills of states and thus cannot be stopped even by the erection of the border barriers (Pusterla & Piccin, 2012:132). Adding to this logic, one of the conclusions of a case study focusing on the communities divided by the US-Mexico wall suggests that both Mexico and USA materialize and rematerialize the border to assert and re-assert their sovereignty (McGuire, 2013:477). From a different perspective, the sovereignty transformation can happen only in some parts of the globe while others remain in the traditional “Westphalian” world. It is argued that it is this difference of worlds that can lead to wall building (Landovský & Riegl, 2016:276).

Another stream that touches upon the construction of border barriers can be identified as *discursive* due to its main focus on the discourse practices related to the border hardening. Kolossov and Scott (2013:11) point out that securitization was present every time a new barrier was erected and that it was often used as a tool to re-close the border which had been open and thus had allowed for the flow of illegal immigrants or products. Furthermore, they suggest that border securitization significantly alters individual rights and privacy and potentially creates mechanisms that are outside of democratic control (Kolossov & Scott, 2013:13). In a similar manner, Jones argues that the new border security projects in the US are directly related to the discourse that stemmed from the events of 9/11. Furthermore, the author suggests that these measures are just the most recent in a long line of sovereignty expansions (Jones, 2011:216). Finally, a case study of the Separation Fence and its relation to the discourses of fear and security in the Israeli society (Falke, 2012:229) analyses how the ideas of proper demarcation and security changed over time and found support in the majority of the

population and concludes that the construction of the border barrier was an important milestone in the creation of new national unity (Falke, 2012:233).

The final and probably the least ordered stream suggests that border barriers are built for *military* purposes and for conquest or defence of a particular territory. As an example, Dolphin (2006,111-138) suggests that the West Bank Wall can be understood as “a military conquest by architectural means”. Similarly, an analysis of the border wall between Kenya and Somalia concludes that the reasons for the construction of this particular barrier are first to achieve better control over the national territory and second and more importantly to protect this territory from the armed incursion of Somali terrorists (Cannon, 2016:26-27). The same logic more or less applies in the case of Moroccan Sahara wall. At first, it was intended as a defensive tool to protect key locations in the Western Sahara (Saddiki, 2012:204), while over time its main purpose shifted towards hindering the movement of Islamic militants operating in the region (Saddiki, 2012:207). Furthermore, the idea of border barriers as defensive structures used for protection of conquered or held territory dates back to early middle-ages (Curta, 2005:255-265)

It has to be noted that most of the presented works are not necessarily incompatible with one another. For example, the *teichpolitical* and *sovereignty* stream can be reconciled due to their focus on different phenomena. The attempts of state to properly filter the flows coming through their borders can be related to their progressively larger inability to control these flows in their own territory – in other words, due to their loss of sovereignty. All in all, the four stated streams present four different but possibly consistent reasons for border strengthening. These reasons can be summarized as either being of economic, political or military origin. The next chapter will firstly comment on the presented streams and then construct the theoretical framework for own research.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 The barrier building dictionary

The first necessary block in the construction of any theoretical framework is the definition of key terms that will be employed throughout this work. Therefore, the terms such as border, border policy, border regime, border hardening or softening and border barrier needs to be defined and put into relation in order to properly understand the following (and parts of the preceding) text.

The border itself can be defined as a clearly delimitated and demarcated line between a state and its neighbouring state or an unclaimed land, beyond which the state claims no jurisdiction². This border is then managed through *border policy*, which is a particular decision of a state on how the border is to be maintained and controlled. Through the combination of these policies, a *border regime* is created. This regime is the sum of all rules, tools and techniques used to manage the border. It includes everything from the number of patrollers, their equipment, the type of lighting, the existence of border barriers, the existence of border checks and so on and so forth. The combination logically suggests that there are varying degrees to which the border can be maintained. Therefore, a border regime can fall anywhere on the scale between *hard* and *soft*, the two being extremes of a continuum. A hard border regime is a collection of policies managing the border in such a way, that any transition is impossible and none or almost none cross-border interactions exist. The closest possible example would be the border regime of North and South Korea (Szoldra, 2017) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Lomsadze, 2011). A soft border regime, then, allows all transitions and contacts through the border without any sort of control. The border regime between Nepal and India can be considered a close example (Kansakar, 2001). Naturally, actual border regimes fall somewhere between these two extremes. This essentially means that they filter the transitions and allow a certain range of contacts across the border. Whenever a border regime moves towards the one or the other pole it either *hardens* or *softens*. To cite an example, the American border regime with Mexico, which originally had no artificial restraints on its entire length, was hardened when the first barriers started appearing in 1994 (“World’s barriers”, 2009).

This leads to the final and the key concept of this work. That of a *border barrier*. A border barrier is a man-made object stretching continuously along the border (or its part) that makes the movement across more difficult or even impossible. It is logical to say that the employment of such barriers inherently leads to border hardening as it invariably limits the crossings or interactions. Furthermore, there is a large number of objects that can be considered border barriers and it is necessary to categorize them. Rosière and Jones (2012:222-228) offer a useful typology of border barriers, which will be partially extended to serve the purposes of this work. The hardest type of border barrier is a *frontline*. It includes military-grade technology such as landmines dislocated in the no man’s land zone between the two borders. Generally speaking, it is guarded directly

² The definition of state and jurisdiction will be addressed later in this chapter.

by the state's army or by a similar actor with military grade equipment. No or a very small amount of cross-border movement is possible. Next, Rosière and Jones identify *walls* and *fences*. Their definition is essentially based on the question of visibility through the barrier. Thus, a wall is simply an object build on part of the border through which it is impossible to see to the other side, while fence allows such vision. This is, however, a rather simplistic definition. For example, three subsequent electric fences with floodlighting built on the border cannot be understood as less restricting than one two meters tall concrete wall that blocks the vision. That is why it is arguably better to add the notion of *active* and *passive* walls and fences. This change is implicitly suggested by Rosière and Jones and is built around the idea of biometric borders as those, which include technology designed to identify those who cross the border through a usage of data such as fingerprints, iris scans or facial recognition (Amoore, 2006:342) Therefore, an *active wall* is a continuous construction on a part or the entirety of the border intended to limit the number of crossings while also restricting the vision to the other side and employing any number of technologies designed to either increase the quality of filtration of movement (e.g. biometric technologies) or further lower its general amount (e.g. electric fencing). Similarly, an *active fence* is also an equally technologically equipped continuous construction on the border, which, however, does not limit the vision of the other side. A *passive wall* and a *passive fence* follow the definition of Rosière and Jones, which means that a passive wall is a continuous construction on a part of the entirety of the border intended to lower the number of cross-border crossings and blocking the view of the other side, while a passive fence is an almost identical construction, but it does not block the view of the other side.

2.2 Reconsidering the predecessors

Before building the new theoretical framework specifically for the presented work, it is necessary to first address the inadequacies in the frameworks used by the different streams identified in the preceding chapter. This consideration will focus on the theory advanced by the *teichopolitical*, *sovereignty* and *military* streams. While the importance of the *discursive* stream cannot be denied, it focuses on the ways the border barriers are discussed in the inner political arena and therefore does not deal with the material factors these discussions might or might not be based upon. In this regard, the consideration of when and why the discourse on a border barrier begins in a country can be an important next step, however the aim of this work is to focus on the identification

of material factors that lead states to build barriers. The main goal of this reconsideration is to point out to the necessity of integration of different streams in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of reasons for border hardening through the use of multi-variable approach.

Possibly the most important argument maintained by the *teichopolitical* authors is that barriers are built for economic reasons (Ballif & Rosière, 2009:204-205) (Rosière & Jones, 2012:220) (Carter & Poast, 2017:263). However, this argument does not appear to hold when applied to all the places where border hardening appeared. For example, the first stage of wall-building on the Indo-Pakistani borders started in 1988 (“India-Pakistan Border Fence, 2013) when India had lower GDP per capita than Pakistan (“GDP per capita”, c2018). Similarly, the difference between GDP of Greece and of Turkey in 2012 (“Greece - Turkish Border Fence”, 2017), when the border wall was put in place, was only marginal (“GDP per capita”, c2018) - a ratio of 1.2 as employed by Carter and Poast (2017:251). When considering border hardening measures other than walls, the explanatory value of the economic factors deteriorates even further. This fact can be seen on the fences between Latvia and Russia - ratio of 0.95 (“GDP per capita”, c2018) in 2015 (Bender, 2015) - or Croatia and Hungary - ratio of 1.15 (“GDP per capita”, c2018) in 2015 (“Refugee Crisis”, 2015). Furthermore, even if the economic logic is true, the question of causality remains. In almost all cases the economic differences were either long-term or extremely short-term. Using the walls recognized by Poast and Carter (2017:249-250) to illustrate, Saudi Arabia built a wall with Yemen in 2004 and with Iraq in 2009, however, the enormous economic difference between the builder and the walled-off was present for decades prior (“GDP per capita”, c2018). Similarly, a barrier was constructed by Kazakhstan on its borders with Kyrgyzstan in 2010; however, the cross-border economic inequality was large for at least the last 20 years (“GDP per capita”, c2018). From the other perspective, there are many countries that have vastly different economic performance and yet, there is no wall between them – Poland and Germany in the 90s with inequality ratio of around 3 (“GDP per capita”, c2018) provide a good example of a dyad where not only was there no wall constructed but the poor neighbour was slowly allowed a completely free crossing through the borders. Furthermore, if less extreme border hardening measures are considered, it appears that even if the logic is consistent in some cases their context suggests other conclusions. For instance, the border barrier between Tunisia and Libya was built in 2016 (“Tunisia builds anti-terror barrier along Libya border”, 2016) while the economic inequality ratio was favourable to Tunisia

(“GDP per capita”, c2018). However, the economic performance of Libya plummeted after the Arab spring in 2011 and ensuing civil wars. From the historical perspective, the ratio was almost 3 in favour of Libya.

Furthermore, Poast and Carter (2017:257) also consider variables such as border dispute, civil war in the neighbouring country or the difference in military capabilities. However, the main problem with these variables is that they are not put into context. Civil war can be problematic, but if it does not result in an irregular migration to the neighbouring country, there is no reason for the barrier building. Similarly, if this civil war is waged by an ethnic group also present in the neighbouring country, there might be a reason the border barrier might be considered. Same logic can be applied to the military capabilities. A huge difference can be problematic but the state behaviour matters in how they are going to be used. For example, the cases of Estonia and Lithuania constructing the barriers on their borders with Russia in 2015 can be explained by both the difference in military capabilities and aggressive Russian behaviour in Ukraine. Finally, the border dispute variable can definitely provide certain insights into the issue at hand; however, it once again needs to be put into context. States that can properly administer the disputed territory have no reason to build a barrier around it, as they already have enough influence in the area to effectively make it their own. On the other hand, considering the states with lower administrative capabilities and land disputes with their neighbours can provide a better insight into why these states can build a barrier on the dispute territory.

In summary, the question of why the wall was built in the year it was built appears to remain unanswered. While the economic logic seems to suggest where a border wall or barrier can occur it does not provide enough insight to explain why it happens in that particular year. Additionally, as in the case of Libya, it fails to understand that economic inequality can be a result of a long-term political unrest and thus simply be a result of another cause that can potentially lead to the border barrier. Furthermore, other variables tested by the aforementioned works might provide more insights if they are put into a larger context. This suggest that a more contextual and multi-variable approach to the study of border barriers is necessary. And while the economic wellbeing of a country or a civil war in the neighbourhood appear to be important factors, not taking other relevant phenomena into account can lead to wrong conclusions. Due to this reason, it is necessary to build the subsequent theory in such a way, that it would allow for a more comprehensive view on the reasons of border barrier building.

The *sovereignty* stream generally claims that the modern state is no longer the main focal point of political sovereignty, which is slowly but surely transferred either to non-state or supra-state actors (Brown, 2010:62, 64) (Pusterla & Piccin, 2012:132). This transfer and states' attempt to limit or overturn it, leads to the building of the walls (Brown, 2010:69-70) (Pusterla & Piccin, 2012:121). Furthermore, the notion of changing sovereignty is naturally not limited only to authors focusing on border barriers. For example, authors such as Robert Cooper (2000:15-22), Georg Sørensen (1999:595-603) suggest that the world has a number of sovereignty types that co-exist next to each other, with the West being generally understood as being in a “post-modern” world with sovereignty transferred towards supra-national actors while the rest of the world either remains in the “modern” world with traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty or it devolves into the “pre-modern” world where sub-state actors and warlords play the key roles. The much more absolute picture is suggested by the authors dealing with globalisation. Their works claim that states are losing their ability to properly control their borders, their population and the flows of ideas (Rosenau, 2006:142) (McGrew, 2014:20).

Before continuing further, it is needed to note a major difference between Brown and other authors. While the general focus when talking about sovereignty focuses on the “objective” factors – such as control of the territory, monopoly on the coercive power or sole control of the economy (Pusterla & Piccin, 2012:130) (McGrew, 2011:21) (Rosenau, 2006:142) (Cooper, 2000:15-23, 31-33) (Sørensen, 1999:595-596), Brown (2010:54-55) understands political sovereignty through the prism of Schmittian theory, which suggests that it rests mainly on the ability to *decide* who is a friend or an enemy of the state. This conception of sovereignty creates the *political* as an autonomous sphere by which other powers are subsumed in the modern state (Brown, 2010:56). It is then due to the loss of this ability to decide, not due to the simple participation on the supra-state decision making, that states resort to building walls (Brown, 2010:69-70). This distinction between different concepts of sovereignty is an empirically important one. The veracity of the focus on objective factors leading to the loss of sovereignty in the face of globalisation can be simply tested by the question, whether this loss of sovereignty is permanent or whether states are capable of not participating on it when they so decide. First case which derails this perception is that of Brexit. The “objective” logic advanced by the cited authors suggests that such an event should not be possible. If the sovereignty was and still is transferred away from the government of the United Kingdom, then the *decision* on leaving the Union simply would not be possible. However, the empirical world shows

otherwise. This logic of sovereignty maintenance was also argued by Jackson (1999:453). Similarly, the case of states like North Korea shows that a country can *decide* whether to be a part of the globalisation trend or not. Naturally, it can lead to economic downturn or bad relations with neighbours, but it shows that a state can decide to do so. On the other hand, if Brown's perspective is applied, the sole facticity of the loss of political sovereignty is not seen in the supranational organisations a country joins, nor in its accordance with international law, but in its inability to contain the forces of religion and/or capital. To illustrate this on an empirical case, the British loss of sovereignty can be seen in the increasing number of Islamist terrorist attacks ("London Bridge attack", 2017) in the country, which can arguably show that the political unity and the national decision on the friends and enemies is no longer dominant.

To summarize, Brown's understanding of the loss of political sovereignty is an important addendum to the theory explaining why border hardening occurs, as it suggests that border barriers might be erected when the level of sovereignty deterioration of a nation-state reaches a point, in which it needs to be reasserted.

The *military* stream can add more dimensions to this perspective. First of all, as Cannon (2012:26-27) suggests the border barrier can create a clear distinction between those coming legally and those coming illegally, which can in cases of possible terrorist spread from neighbouring country help maintain the political sovereignty of the walling state due the easier recognition of those "who came from the outside" and thus can be considered "the enemy". In other words, some parts of the military usage of the border barriers Furthermore, all three authors (Dolphin, 2006: 111-138) (Cannon, 2016:26-27) (Saddiki, 2012:204), mentioned in the *military* stream agree on the importance of barriers in establishing a sovereignty over a territory a state considers to be rightfully its own. However, this fact does not follow the logic advanced by Brown as the barriers are not used to reinforce sovereignty on the inside, but rather to extend it outwards.

All in all, these considerations lead to the conclusion that while states are trying to maintain their sovereignty and wealth, they are also trying to expand it on the territories they consider they own. In this regard, it appears two important concepts clash. First of them is the modern state. Of course, the modern state has been theorised and re-theorised ever since its creation. However, regarding border barriers, the Schmittian theorisation of state proposed by Brown appears to be needed for a proper investigation mainly due to its understanding of the political as the autonomous sphere containing the forces of religion and capital. On the other hand, even this conception needs to be properly extended to

include the state's willingness to build walls in order to maintain a specific territory and wealth. The second important concept is that of globalisation. In this regard, as Brown (2010:27) claims, it is the process through which the loss of sovereignty occurs. Thus, it is important to properly understand what this process does and to what actors and in what ways does it transfer the political sovereignty. Both concepts will be addressed in the following subdivisions. The subsequent one will focus on the reconstruction of the Schmittian state from three of his core books, while the one after it will talk about the globalisation as such. The impact of globalisation on the state will be considered in the penultimate part while the final one will focus on the deduction of testable hypotheses from the preceding theoretical considerations.

2.3 The Schmittian State

Firstly, before it is possible to embark on the theoretical inquiry of what a state should be according to Schmitt's writings, it is important to note the double usage of the word "state" in this work from now onwards. Firstly, the term state is used in connection to the consideration expressed hereafter. In this understanding, the word denotes an ideal and theoretical conception of state. Secondly and mainly in the methodological part, the term state will be used to refer to the real-life units that exist in the world and call themselves states. The main idea is that a real-life unit calling itself a state has acquired or desires to acquire the qualities of the theoretical state (as will be ascertained below). Due to these reasons, the first type of usage of the word state will be generally linked with words such as "theoretical", "Schmittian" or "ideal" when the context is not obviously implying which meaning is invoked³.

It is rather hard to completely ascertain what a Schmittian state is. This problem is mainly due to the fact that Carl Schmitt himself did not write any comprehensive treatise on the theory of modern state. Therefore, the task of this chapter is to reconstruct his understanding of the modern state from three distinct concepts. First of them will be the *land-appropriation* and creation of *nomos*, which Schmitt arguably considers the basis for any external or internal law (Schmitt, 2006:42) and implicitly the state. The second one will be the idea of *sovereignty* and sovereign linked directly to the preceding discussion of the territory. The final concept that will be used in this reconstruction will

³ A very similar concept of juridical and empirical states was proposed by Jackson & Rosberg (1982), however their conception is based on a specifically Weberian understanding of state and its usage here could result in a confusion of terms and theoretical frameworks.

be that of the fundamentally *political* distinction of friend and enemy and its importance in the existence of the modern state.

2.3.1 Territory

It is necessary to begin the theoretical consideration of state with the focus on its territory. As Schmitt suggests, a divided and protected territory is the fundamental basis of all order and orientation of human social life. This implies that the solid ground is inextricably linked to the law which is manifested upon it through firm borders (Schmitt, 2006:42). According to Schmitt, this territory is acquired through land-appropriation which creates the law in two dimensions. Firstly, it creates the ownership relations within the group – i.e. creates the internal conditions for the creation of the in-group law. Secondly, it establishes the group as a legal entity *vis-à-vis* other land-appropriating groups and thus allows for the creation of external dimension of law (Schmitt, 2006:42, 47). This, in essence, means that land-appropriation is the action crucial for the existence of any law whatsoever (Schmitt, 2006:46). However, this first and original act of land-appropriation, which Schmitt understands as *nomos* (Schmitt, 2006:78), is not to be mistaken for the beginning of law or for law itself. *Nomos* is the act of land-appropriation through which a group of people is settled. It is the act through which this group turns “a part of the earth’s surface into the force-field” of their own and particular order (Schmitt, 2006:70).

Thus, only through these land-appropriations and perfect divisions of what belongs to who, was the modern “state” system created in Europe after the turmoil of religious wars and the end of *res publica christiana*. Through the creation of separated land-appropriations, an establishment of single international European *nomos* was possible along with the subsequent formulation of the new international law created in 1648 and based on the famous maxim of *cuius regio eius religio* (Schmitt, 2006:128-129). In other words, the clear distinction between force-fields of these specific and newly emancipated units established grounds for the creation of both the internal and external law. Because of the new *nomoī* and land-appropriations did these laws, though still dynastic and personal in nature, acquire distinctly territorial boundaries outside of the universalistic claims of the pope and the *Romanorum Imperator*. The perfect partition of the European space was the main cause behind this revolution in the political institutions and legal concepts resulting in the appearance of states, understood as sovereign persons and mutually respected as such (Schmitt, 2006:145).

All in all, in Schmitt's views land-appropriation as a necessary condition for the existence of any law in general and internal state law in particular. The proper ownership of a territory is therefore fundamental to any notion of sovereignty and law. This means that any uncertainty about control of a territory inevitably leads to the questions of the existence of law itself as well as of the authority that promulgates such law. Above that, in case there are no proper means of a solution of overlapping claims over a certain territory, the unclear demarcation can lead to an inability to establish any international order, as such order would have to be grounded in transparent boundaries.

2.3.2 Sovereignty

Probably the most famous of Schmitt's definitions is that of a sovereign as the one, who decides on the state of exception. This decision then exists outside of the law and precedes it. From this perspective, the sovereign exists outside of the law while still being its part, because it is only by his decision that this order is maintained (Schmitt, 2012:9-10). Specifically, the sovereign, whoever it is, has the final decision on the definition of whether a state of exception occurred and what to do in order to return to the normal situation (Schmitt, 2012:12). Once a state of exception is declared, the decision-making is completely liberated from any normativity and becomes absolute (Schmitt, 2012:14). In turn, the sovereign creates the norm and decides whether this normal state has been achieved. Once achieved, it is again the sovereign who maintains and guarantees the new order until a new state of exception comes to exist. All in all, this suggests that true monopoly of a sovereign is the monopoly to decide (Schmitt, 2012:15).

How is this concept of sovereignty linked to the previously discussed question of land-appropriation? Apparently, the moment of land-appropriation is the first moment when the sovereign is shown as at this moment he or she becomes the guarantor of the new order, which is created by his decision on *nomos*, but is not yet equal to a normal situation. Therefore, it is this individual or collective "personality", which creates the land-appropriation and subsequently decides on the existence and the maintenance of law within the newly established order in that particular territory while logically also represents the land-appropriating group on the outside. This suggests two things.

Firstly, if another group claims a certain part of the appropriated territory it also challenges the right of the sovereign to create and maintain law on that particular piece of land. Naturally, if such an event occurs the sovereign can either relinquish his claim on guaranteeing the law on that land or fight a war to reinforce it. Implicitly, this leads to a

notion that a sovereign decides on the intensity of interactions with other groups. Therefore, this decision to fight establishes the highest possible intensity of relations and creates an external enemy.

Secondly, if the sovereign understands an internal sub-group as desiring to create their own law (with apparent implications on the alteration of the existing order), he or she decides on the state of exception effectively suspending the law inside the state in order to fight this particular sub-group. This appears to suggest that a state of exception essentially means a kind of a civil or internal war, when the law is suspended (generally or for a particular sub-group) and the full power of the sovereign is unleashed on the (real or perceived) internal enemies.

It is important to note, that neither of the two options challenges the established order. Once a decision on *nomos* is done and the land-appropriation is successful (i.e. order is established) any subsequent changes to the possession of the territory are redistributions (*anadasmoi*) (Schmitt, 2006:78). That is, unless the whole territory is annexed during a new land-appropriation (e.g. Mongol invasions).

2.3.3 Political unity

The idea of internal or external enemy points directly to another of Schmitt's key concept – the *political*. Schmitt understands the political as a specific dichotomy, akin to the economic polarity of profitable or unprofitable or the aesthetic contrast between beautiful and ugly. The specific political dichotomy rests on the poles of *friendship* and *enmity*. Accordingly, it is the basis for any political motivations (Schmitt, 2013:26). The identification of an enemy is inherently based on the highest possible level of intensity of disassociation. The political enemy is the “other”, a stranger with whom an existential fight is possible, a fight that cannot be avoided by norms or by adjudication (Schmitt, 2013:27). In practical terms, this suggests a group of people willing to fight against another similar group, which they understand as their enemy for their own particular reasons, be they nationalistic, religious or economic (Schmitt, 2013:29, 37). This fight, as a materialisation of the most intense disassociation, invariably includes the possibility of the usage of deadly force. In other words, the political distinction carries with it the possibility of war (Schmitt, 2013:33). Therefore, a group with an established identity or at least with an ability to decide on their enemies when the time comes is considered a political unity. Identification with this unity is then a decisive one which takes precedence over any other distinctions (Schmitt, 2013:38-39). Furthermore, this political identity

cannot exist without at least a potential enemy, as without one the distinction one's own identity is uncertain, unclear and unbounded (Schmitt, 2008:83).

From this perspective, an ideal state is a political unity, which as a whole decides on their friends and enemies and also whether and how to wage war on them (Schmitt, 2013:31, 35). State as such thus has to have *ius ad bellum*, allowing it to freely decide on their enemies and who to wage war against (Schmitt, 2013:45). Furthermore, this state has to create a normal situation inside. However, this normal situation includes the existence of law as described in the preceding part but also the creation of a political unity. Therefore, if a political unity does not exist and the state still claims to be political its sovereign, as defined above, has to decide on and identify the internal enemy against whom to fight and who to defeat in order to create a new political unity and a normal situation (Schmitt, 2013:46).

There is another important notion linked to the concept of the enemy – specifically his or hers type. Schmitt identifies three. The first one is a conventional enemy who fights by an established set of rules and understands the fighting and *status quo post bellum* as legitimate (Schmitt, 2008:54). In empirical terms, this includes traditional conventional armies of the 19th century, where enemies followed strict rules of conduct, war was something both sides understood as legitimate and it was not necessary to completely annihilate the other side in order to win. It appears that an important attribute of a conventional enemy is that he or she can fight only conventionally and by the rules, or else the limits both sides agree upon would disappear. If the rules are no longer applicable but the enmity is still limited only to the questions of a particular territory the conventional enemy becomes the real enemy. Real enemies wage wars that are either regular or irregular but they still can be solved by a new territorial delimitation and the complete annihilation of the other side is neither necessary nor desired. An important dimension of the real enemy, especially if fighting irregularly (e.g. as a partisan), is whether he or she is legitimized. Schmitt suggests that a legitimization can come from an interested third party or be forced by the enemy through his or her own power. With this legitimisation, an irregularly fighting enemy can be simply dismissed as a criminal and be dealt with according to the law (Schmitt, 2008:75, 88-89). The final type of an enemy is the absolute enemy with whom no possible agreement can be reached and the only possible solution to the conflict is the complete annihilation of one of the fighting sides. An absolute enemy is considered a threat to humanity as such and therefore needs to be dealt with once and for all (Schmitt, 2008:90-91). It is then logical to say that a fight with the absolute enemy

is fought without any limits or rules and its battlefield is the entire earth, as no territorial agreement can end such a war.

Before summarizing the results of this conceptualisation of a state, it should be noted that Schmitt generally understands a state as a form of a nation (Schmitt, 2013:19). This means that for him the political unity or disunity is generally based on the notion of nationalism. In other words, enemy/friend distinction always stems from the national identity of this and that particular state. However, it can be argued that there is a political identity beyond nation which can essentially be based on a citizenship, where one's ethnic roots are not necessarily the primary factor in his or hers choice of the political unity he or she belongs to. Of course, this understanding of the political unity needs to be established and maintained by the sovereign.

What is, therefore, the understanding of a modern state this work will use to deduce the factors contributing to border hardening? An ideal modern state is a politically unified group of people whose sovereign through the performance of *nomos* established their particular land-appropriation and in turn created and guaranteed an effective system of law.

2.4 Globalisation

The traditional understanding of globalisation denotes those processes, through which a large number of social interactions loses its relation to territorial limits, both political and geographical, and becomes structured on a worldwide basis (Scholte, 2001:15). In the political terms, this appears to suggest, that the ascendance of social interactions to the global level brought with it the deterioration in state's capabilities to manage and oversee financial transactions, electronic communications and mass media. Furthermore, the psychological effects of trans-border and trans-regional social interactions and subsequent creation of worldwide networks have led to the acquisition of overlapping identities and thus also deteriorated the clear linkages between population and state (Scholte, 2001:22).

This appears to mean that as the new groups and sub-groups emerge, the authority is moving from the traditional state political institutions into economic and social spheres (Rosenau, 2005:50). New technologies such as global telecommunications and further economic integration seem to foster this effect of deterioration of state institutions in favour of other new actors appearing on the world stage. International NGOs or trans-national companies can influence politicians or public opinion through media or networks

previously unheard of. Above that, this transfer is happening also due to the creation of norms by the international organisations that at least partly shape state behaviour and put limits on their sovereignty, for example and most importantly their ability to lead an offensive war (Mingst & Karns, 2000:2-3). Therefore, new types of networked political organisations, based on horizontal interactions, seem to arise while the more traditional hierachic states are losing their absolute primacy – actors such as transnational corporations, NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, local or provincial communities (Rosenau, 2006:140, 145) but also trans-national criminal organizations or terrorist groups (Rosenau, 2005:59) now appear to assume some form of authority over hearts and minds of their adherents.

2.5 Globalisation and the State

According to the considerations stated, above the modern state is losing power over its population and territory while its sovereignty is slowly being diluted in a web of other actors. But is it really so? As far as the definition of the state presented before is concerned, the answer is both yes and no and it heavily depends on the particulars of the actors in question.

Nowadays, the most important question regarding the characteristics of the actors is whether they somehow question or take away the three important factors identified above – that is territorial integrity, effective law or political unity. It is impossible to argue that trans-national corporations (TNCs) are questioning states' territorial demarcation or state of law, as, generally speaking, these are prerequisites for TNCs' economic success. While it is true that they might attempt to change certain laws by their sheer economic power or gain large swathes of the state territory to use for their economic goals, they do not decide on the state of exception on those territories and therefore are not the guarantors of the law. Certainly, their disfavour can have negative economic impacts on the country cooperate with them, however they can mostly do what the law allows them, which can lead to their support for specific law-maker or group, but they do not seek to manage the state themselves or annex its parts. Furthermore, the idea that employees of, for example, Google would go into an actual war against the employees of Apple or, taken to its logical extreme, against the citizens of France is not far from absurd. Thus, TNCs, as known today, simply do not usurp any amount of state's authority. At best they exercise influence on the sovereign, but do not pose as one. The very same goes for NGOs.

On the other hand, there are actors, strengthened by the globalisation trend and the advances in communication technologies, who make claims on the three “pillars” of statehood.

Firstly, many trans-border ethnic or religious groups can now interact on daily basis and thus foster their own political identity and subsequently make claims on the territory they live in and thus transform into a real enemy of the state they are trying to secede from.

Secondly, globalisation helped to create actors who are political in nature but have no claims on any particular piece of land and instead opt for enforcing their worldview on the global scale. In other words, these entities are posing as absolute enemies to some established political unities. Global terrorist groups, such as Islamic State, are a very good example. They possess territory on which they operate and where they enforce their views of political unity, however, they are also acting on the global scale, recruiting members from already established political unities to act as their agents without a necessary connection to their conquered territory. Therefore, they are waging war on the “inside” in the sphere of the sovereign and thus they try to create an uncertainty about the existence of any political unity in that particular state.

Thirdly, the globalisation changed the way migration works. The virtual interconnectedness of the world allows people to gain global awareness of how the others live and gather information on places that they may find more suitable for living. The communication technologies gave rise to smart migration, which allows the potential migrants to be linked with people who already migrated to their desired country and thus allow for much easier decision-making. This migration of different people from around the world can, however, dilute the original political unity, especially if defined in ethnic terms. While this problem has been obviously present ever since the earliest migrations and can be very well seen in the problems of the late Roman Empire, it appears to be partially worsened by the same phenomena that increased its intensity, namely social networks and instant messaging communications, whereby immigrants are fully capable of staying in daily contact with their homeland even despite the physical distance and thus maintain much of their original lifestyle. Therefore, in the states with previously ethnically and culturally homogenous population, where the definition of political unity was highly dependent on these two factors can the mass immigration, prompted by globalisation, lead to dilution of this unity.

Finally, there is the question of international governmental organisations (IGOs). While it is true, that some IGOs shape the state behaviour in a very specific way, it is generally untrue that they challenge any of the three pillars of the state, with one exception possibly being the EU⁴. Even the most important global IGO such as the UN never made any claim to a territory or suspended the law in any of its member states. On the other hand, the question of the political unity can be contentious, as some may argue that *ius ad bellum* is taken away from the states. However, it is not completely so. Firstly, states can wage war if the war has been sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Although, this is not a sufficient explanation as then the *ius ad bellum* would logically be with the UNSC and not within the states. Secondly, they can go to war even despite the will of the UN. Naturally, in the worst possible case any state that would do so, would, at least theoretically, face a coalition of other states punishing him for the aggressive behaviour. However, the rational calculation of the possible conclusion of the war does not, in reality, take away the right to declare it. To illustrate, Iraq went to war with Kuwait in 1990 even despite the possibility of world-wide condemnation and international intervention. While it could have expected the retaliation, it still could and did decide on defining the enemy and going to war against him or her. However, the illegality of offensive war has some very specific impacts on the types of enemies that exist. While in the 19th century the legitimate status of war made its regulation and conventionality possible, nowadays the ban on offensive war made any conventionality a weakness. If a state wants to declare war on its neighbour it is associated with large costs in terms of international prestige, economy and possibly much lower chance of successful war. Therefore, it is irrational for a state to wage a regular war if it desires its neighbour's territory. Due to this no conventional enemy can generally exist today, as any offensive war would automatically make the aggressor at least a real, if not an absolute, enemy. This logically leads to the aggressor's willingness to shed any regular limitations and instead opt for an irregular warfare, which prevents the defender to easily identify his or hers enemy but also enables the attacker to hide behind this uncertainty thus accruing less damage to his or her international image, economy or chances of success. Accordingly, while the *ability* to

⁴ The question of EU and its „sharing“ of member states‘ sovereignty is a problematic one and has been addressed by other authors elsewhere. However, it can be noted that if the EU was truly becoming a new political unity with territorial demarcation and sovereignty it would firstly need to take away the right to leave. Logically, if the Brexit referendum showed anything, it was that a member state can still define its own identity even in face of the EU institutions. Thus, it is possible to argue that the EU at this time still lacks the three requirements of statehood.

declare war still exists, the globalization and UN's ban on war changed the *nature* of the war that is waged.


All in all, the advent of globalisation and international organisations along with the development of modern communication and information technologies changed some of the traditional challenges states face. It made the option of waging war on an absolute enemy much easier (as witnessed in the terrorist attacks), it enabled ethnic groups new and simple ways to organise across borders and thus become real enemy of the state they find oppressive, it transformed the conventional state enemies into the real and irregular ones and finally it created unlimited opportunities for migration around the world. Finally, it transformed the way business and international politics are conducted, however, this transformation did not directly shake the basic building stones of the modern state, which still remains the cornerstone of political life.

2.5 Factors contributing to border hardening

With this theoretical basis it is now possible to turn to the question of border barriers and hypothesize the possible reasons for their construction. The main claim of this work is that states build border barriers because they lack some of the attributes of the ideal state (land-appropriation, sovereignty, political unity) or have these attributes challenged by an external actor. It is important to note, that some states existing in the real world do not necessarily achieve some or even all of the attributes of the ideal statehood. Their desire to build a border barrier then stems exactly from the attributes they are lacking. Therefore, there can be a state which has established itself territorially (i.e. it governs a certain well-defined territory) and has an effective system of law. However, there is a cross-border ethnic group questioning the existing sovereign and demanding a redistribution of the territory. Thus, a state can build a barrier on the border in order to lower the possible physical interactions of the group's members as well as reassert the territorial status quo. Similarly, a real-life state can claim certain territory, whose borders are, however, not well defined. In order to create an effective system of law over the claimed territory it firstly has to clearly show where the state's territory ends. It has to perform *nomos*. Therefore, in this case a border barrier is used as a tool for the land-appropriation. Only once land has been appropriated, can this state attempt to create law and subsequently a political unity.

The following illustration shows a theoretical scale, on which different points show different levels of ideal statehood attainment. Different states lie on different

positions on this scale and their positions in turn denote the different attributes of statehood they are lacking. Starting with land appropriation, continuing with internal sovereignty (to decide on the law) and ending with political unity, real life states then build barriers to move in the direction of the attribute that they are missing.



Picture 1: Scale of statehood

Therefore, different attributes pose different challenges for the state to which the barriers are a response.

2.5.1 Challenges to territory

As was said before, control of the territory is a paramount condition for the land-appropriation. Border barriers can assist in this by clearly marking the area which is to be governed by the particular group, especially if there are no natural borders such as mountains or rivers that would clearly separate the area from other jurisdictions. In the modern world it seems there are two cases when such a border barrier can be built. Firstly, a state, which claims a certain territory but is unable to control it effectively due to various reasons, such as problematic power projection from the centre or dispute with other states over its control, builds a border barrier to clearly show where its territory starts and ends and thus appropriates the land. It is obvious that such a territory has to be somehow valuable or its control by that particular land-appropriating group has to be questioned by other similar groups. In other words, a border barrier build on this territory would once and for all end the land division and thus enable a possible military challenge to the sovereignty exercised there by the barrier-building state. This logic is apparent for example in the construction of the Moroccan sand wall in Western Sahara, which served as a tool for Morocco to establish its sovereignty and therefore protection over the area it

considered to be its own, leaving the rest to Polisario⁵ (Saddiki, 2012:204). A hypothesis following this consideration can be formulated as following:

H_I: States build border barriers in order to clearly delimitate the territory and thus to ascertain where their jurisdiction starts/ends.

2.5.2 Challenges to sovereignty

Once the territory has been established the exercise of law from the sovereign authority can begin. However, this also brings a new type of problems to the state exercising this authority. According to the previous discussion, these can come from actors such as aggressive neighbours or cross-border ethno-religious groups. While it is true that superficially these actors challenge the state's territorial integrity, the dispute itself goes deeper and touches upon the sovereign's right to exercise law in a particular territory. That is why the dispute is no longer about mere land-appropriation but about the right to decide on the law on a piece of land. In other words, the territory in question is already managed in some way and is neither *terra nullius* nor *terra non regitur*. As was noted, there are two cases in which state's sovereignty can nowadays be questioned.

Firstly, an aggressive neighbour, claiming and demanding a piece of territory can pose a military threat to state's right to exercise law there. How is this challenge linked to the question of border barriers? The answer lies in the nature of enemy such a challenger would become. As was observed before, a conventional enemy hardly exists anymore in the modern world and thus any attacker automatically becomes at least a real enemy. Therefore, an enemy, who now has no incentive to fight regularly and uses underhanded tactics (e.g. covert operations etc.) as main tools to achieve his or her goals. This type of enemy is perfectly summarized in the concept of hybrid warfare, in which a state uses covert operations without direct link to itself or outright declaration of war in order to achieve its goals, possibly control of territory (Bresinsky, 2016:35) (Apetroe, 2016:102-103). In other words, concepts like coercion, extortion, bribery, lying, proxy wars, psychological manipulation and propaganda are used. Noticeably, these are not new tools in the state's war machine and were used at least during the last century (Raitasalo, 2017:38). Their usage, however, problematizes the identification of enemy. It is obvious

⁵ It is true that in this case the walled-out territory was that which contains something relevant for the border hardening state. However, it is still a question of division of what belongs to who, in other words, a question of performing *nomos*.

who he or she is if the aggressor wears a uniform sporting a national flag. It is much harder to identify the enemy and subsequently take appropriate actions if this is not the case. Hence, a border barrier can importantly aid in this problem. If a fence or a wall gets penetrated by a tank from the other side of the border it is hard for the aggressor to claim he or she has nothing to do with the attack. The enemy remains real but is no longer concealed and now known to everybody. This consideration leads to the following hypothesis:

H₂: States build border barriers in order to be able to identify the enemy in case of invasion by an aggressive neighbour.

It is apparent that the possible challenge to territorial integrity and sovereignty coming from a cross-border ethnic group will have some similarities to the challenge from the aggressive neighbour. An important difference is the fact that such an ethnic group does not have its own state. Therefore, the dispute of this type is not only about the question of sovereignty over the territory but touches upon the question of political unity. This is somewhat inherent in the concept of ethnic group as such, as it is defined as a subgroup within a larger society with shared experiences, culture, familial and tribal relations and material proximity (Schermerhorn, 1996:17). However, this does not automatically produce the friend-enemy distinction mentioned before, but simply creates cleavage which can potentially be politicised. Politicization in this case is the creation of the enemy along the ethnic differences with the subsequent claim on territorial sovereignty. Furthermore, if this politicization happens, no notion of conventional enemy exists (as the war had no way of institutionalisation) and once the real enemy is created in the form of the cross-border ethnic group the subsequent war is no longer external but internal. If strong cross-border ethnic or religious ties exist they tend to feed into the group's call for political autonomy and foster the deterioration of state authority (Mishali-Ram, 2011:271). Therefore, a state, which is willing to maintain the territorial status quo *vis-á-vis* such a group has to lower the intensity of cross-border ties, reinforce its sovereignty on the territory in question and strengthen the original political unity of the country (i.e. the state political identity is more important than the cross-border one). A border barrier is a tool, by which all three goals can be achieved. Its sheer existence lowers the intensity of interactions, clearly shows where the sovereignty of the state ends and, at

least hypothetically, supports the political identity of the state with the notions of “us behind the wall”. Consequently, the third hypothesis is as following:

H₃: States build border barriers in order to prevent cross-border ethnic or religious groups from supplanting the state's identity and subsequently making claim on the sovereignty in their respective territory.

2.5.3 Challenges to political unity

The final types of challenges the state faces are in their essence delinked from the question of particular territory and move towards the issues of political identity and the absolute enemy. Nowadays, it appears there are two main problems connected to these issues, namely mass migration and world-wide terrorism.

A simple logical analysis can show why modern states with their political unities are afraid of irregular mass migration. If the existence of internal peace, effective system of law and ability to define an enemy (i.e. to be political) is inextricably associated with the maintenance of a political unity, then a mass influx of people with different world-views, loyalties and identities can lead to a real or perceived dilution of the political unity, mainly when it is contingent on cultural or ethnical homogeneity. That is not to say that a political unity cannot be based upon economic, religious or even racial features, however even if this was the case, it would logically be diluted by a large number of newcomers identifying with different points on the relevant scales. It has been previously reported that the mass entry of migrants from abroad can lead to rising ethnic tensions in the targeted country (Carmignani & Kler, 2016:12), outright civil war spill-over (Bosker & de Ree, 2014:216) or lowering of lifetime utility (Dolmas & Huffman, 2004:1161-1162). If understood through the prism of political unity, it can be said that all these stem from its dilution. Naturally, if the political unity and everything that it brings is questioned then a sovereign must lower or completely stop the number of unidentified foreigners coming into the country. While the ports and airports are easily controlled for potential unwanted immigrants, the actual land borders are the area, through which these migrants can come unnoticed. A construction of a border barrier can help to limit the amount of unregistered, illegal or unwanted crossings while allowing for a proper filtration of those perceived as not dangerous to the identity. Accordingly, the hypothesis is:

H₄: States build border barriers in order to lower or stop irregular mass migration across their borders.

The situation is a bit different in case of the global terrorism. While migrants theoretically dilute the political unity, global terrorists, as absolute enemies, understand only their own political unity as worthy of existence and thus aim to destroy any other political unity in the world. They become absolute enemies by virtue of their motivations, which, in general, are either radically ideological or religious (Ganor, 2008:272) and therefore not allowing for existence of people not submitting to their worldview. It is important to note that not every ideological or religious terrorist organisation has the capabilities to act on the global scale. Such organisation only becomes an absolute enemy of the state if it has proper motivation as well as capabilities to continuously challenge the existence of state's political unity (Ganor, 2008:278). Above that, terrorist attacks not only try to annihilate other political unities, they also create war on the inside since they are not interested in leading regular warfare. Although the terrorist cells enjoy the benefits of globalisation and world-wide communication, which arguably provides them with the option of recruiting from the targeted political unities, they still need to provide training in person (Lia, 2008:537) and subsequently physically transport their fighters to where the strike is planned. Naturally, states cannot completely stop the danger of "home-grown" terrorism, nor can they hope to utterly stem the influx of terrorist from abroad lest they ban all foreigners. However, by construction of a border barrier they can limit the uncontrolled arrivals of fighters across their land borders, especially if terrorists with absolute aspirations are operating in the neighbouring state and the borders are weak (Yilmaz, 2013:356). The erection of such a barrier would limit the easily crossed terrain for the terrorist cells trying to spread and even if such a crossing occurred, it would allow the state authorities to identify the breach in the barrier and act accordingly. Furthermore, in case of terrorists coming under the guise of migrants a border barrier would allow for better control at the check points. Based on this consideration the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H₅: States build border barriers in order to prevent terrorists from crossing into their own territory.

All in all, this chapter identified five possible factors, and associated hypotheses, based on the theoretical construct of Schmittian state and its appeal to real life states. The next chapter will deal with how these hypotheses are going to be tested and how the data needed for relevant tests are going to be gathered.

3. Method

With the establishment of relevant hypotheses, it is now possible to address the issue of how to properly answer them. In this regard, the work uses two different strategies. Firstly, data was gathered on all the relevant indicators, as they are identified later on in this chapter. Similarly, data was gathered on existing border barriers and their types. These two datasets were used to perform a regressive analysis, where each hypothesis was directly represented by a specifically defined indicator/set of indicators. The specificities of the used statistical method will be defined in the second part of this chapter.

3.1 Indicators and related data

Based on the theoretical framework, there are five groups of indicators that were used in this research. Naturally, the first and the most important one was the indicator dealing with border barriers. The definition of how data on border barriers were gathered will be followed by similar definitions in regards to the indicators stemming from land-appropriation, challenges to sovereignty, political unity and ultimately from the composite scale of statehood.

Before moving on to the particular indicators, it is necessary to mention how were the data structured. Firstly, the *Direct Contiguity* database prepared by the Correlates of War project (Stinett et al., 2002)⁶ was used to supply the directed bordering state dyads, which were used as a framework for the basic data. In this regard, it is important to mention that only internationally recognized states were considered for the data (i.e. no colonies). Furthermore, only states with land border were counted as land borders are the primary focus of this work. Secondly, the raw data itself was ordered by year and contained records for all the indicators used to evaluate the independent variables as described below. Once these variables were populated, the raw data were consolidated into state level data containing counts of relevant variables that affected the given state and border barriers this state built for all years and borders the state had. As such this

⁶ Correlates of War Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.2.

expressed the long-term picture of pressures on all the state borders. This approach was taken for two reasons. In order to simulate the often-long-term pressure on the state borders that can lead to border hardening, it is better to look at the consolidated data as these provide the picture of the challenges the state faced during the entire examined period and therefore can show the differences between a state that constructs a border barrier and a state that does not. Furthermore, it is also pragmatic from the perspective of the statistical methods used, as the results achieved by the regression analysis with the data with extremely small amount of positive cases (i.e. the dyad-year record amounted to 33 000 rows, while only 84 barriers were constructed) would not be reliable.

3.1.1 Border barriers

In the beginning of this work (cf. 2.1) border barriers were defined as artificial man-made objects stretching continuously along the border (or its part) that make the movement across more difficult or even impossible. What is it that makes movement across difficult or impossible?

The most logical and obvious answer is that the key criterion is a sufficient height, which creates large enough limitation on the movement due to simply forcing the mover to scale through that particular obstacle. Because of this reason, a border barrier was recorded as existing if it was at least 1.8m tall, as this height was originally used by the American military for the protection of military bases (“Military Handbook”, 1993:3) and can also be logically supported by the fact that the average American male height is 1.75m (Fryar et al., 2016)⁷. The data on existing border barriers were gathered based on this consideration. Therefore, if there is at least a 1.8m high man-made object continuously stretching at least on the border between two states the value assigned to this indicator was 1, otherwise it was 0.

Data on the existence of border barriers came from two different sources. Firstly, the datasets in the previously published works (Carter & Poast, 2017) (Granados et al., 2016) (“Walls, Lines and Frontier Fortifications”, 2018) (Lyman, 2015) were scrutinized and repurposed based on the aforementioned criteria. Secondly, the FACTIVA news database was used to search for articles (“US Immigration Service begins work on border fence”, 1979) (“Jordanian-Iraqi Border Wall”, 1992) (“Malaysia to build new border fence”, 1992) (“Malaysia to Demolish Border Wall with Thailand, 1992) containing the

⁷ The study covers almost 70% of the population and due to historical multicultural heritage of the United States, it can be argued that this measurement can hold true around the world, with obvious exceptions and limitations.

keywords (fence, wall, border, barrier, border strengthening, and border regime) in the specified timeframe (1946-2016). Finally, data from both sources were put together to establish the border barrier dataset used in this work.

3.1.2 Land-appropriation

The most important issue to address in this section is the question of when and whether the land-appropriation actually happened. According to the previous theoretical definition, the performance of *nomos* creates a new order on the given territory. This implies, that the land-appropriating entity, be it an individual or a group, has to claim a certain territory while having specific capabilities needed to create this new order. From the perspective of the empirical states this should translate to the actual state capacity of maintaining a semblance of order on the breadth of the claimed territory. Hendrix (2010:274-276) identifies three strands of thinking about state capacity – military, bureaucratic and institutional. In general, authors (e.g. Mason & Fett, 1996; Walter 2006) in the military stream use the measurement of military personnel per capita as the tool to identify the state capacity. Similarly, some authors (Fearon & Laitin, 2003:80) in the bureaucratic strand argue for the use of GDP per capita, which in their views denotes the general administrative and military capability of a state. Finally, the institutional stream (e.g. Hegre et al., 2001) suggests the measurement of the combination of democratic and un-democratic institutions in the state in order to determine the state capacity. While an ideal solution would be the combination of all three streams, the data needed for the third-stream approach is not available for the researched period. Furthermore, as Hendrix (2008:29-30) argues, any measurement of state capacity needs to include the particular geography related to that projection. Therefore, the state capacity to perform land-appropriation was measured by the use of this formula:

$$\text{State capacity index} = \frac{\left(\frac{\text{GDP}}{\text{capita}} \times \frac{\text{Military personnel}}{\text{capita}} \right)}{\text{Terrain ruggedness index}}$$

In this regard, GDP per capita was gained from the Maddison's historical data (Bolt et al., 2018)⁸, while the military personnel per capita was deduced from the data on national

⁸ Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Where the data were missing, for the periods after 1960 the data from World Bank („GDP per capita“, c2018) were used and properly converted to fit the unit used by Maddison.

material capabilities (Singer et al., 1972)⁹. Finally, the terrain ruggedness index was taken from the work of Nunn & Puga (2012).

There are three important things to note. Firstly, the state capacity must be high enough for the state to perform *nomos*, and in the case of this research, to build a border barrier. Secondly, a state might have sufficient capability to appropriate the land but no border barrier might be constructed, if this appropriation is not disputed by a neighbouring entity. And thirdly, neither of these entities must have high enough state capacity index to be able to actually perform state functions on the claimed territory, as this phenomenon would suggest the existence of *nomos* and a sovereign who is being questioned¹⁰.

Therefore, the land-appropriation was considered as challenged or missing if the state capacity index was between the 16th and 33rd percentile of the available data, therefore in the relatively low, but not the lowest values, and a neighbouring state made a claim to a specific part of the territory already claimed by the land-appropriating state. In such case, the challenged or missing land-appropriation was coded as 1 while an existing or non-challenged *nomos* was coded as 0.

3.1.3 Sovereignty

According to the previous theoretical discussion, challenges to state's sovereignty relevant for border hardening come either from state actors or from politicized cross-border ethnic groups.

In regards to the challenge to sovereignty coming from another state, it has to be noted that barrier building is necessarily an answer to a threat of such a challenge and not to a challenge itself, since a challenge would imply a state of war. Therefore, a state will construct a barrier when it fears an attack might come from its neighbour, due to the unconventional nature of the modern enmity (cf. 2.3.3). Therefore, to confirm this theoretical link between a threat to sovereignty and border strengthening it is necessary to ask when does a state feel threatened by its neighbour. Walt's (1985:9-13) appears to be a useful theory to use in this research. The theory suggests a combination of four variables that lead to a state understanding another state as threatening. These are: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions. Aggregate power and offensive capability general speaks of the material resources a state commands.

⁹ National Material Capabilities v5.0 (2017).

¹⁰ In other words, the general condition that this paragraph is describing is that of "settlement" of a territory and the delineation of what belongs to whom. Therefore, it is by the construction of the border barrier that this uncertainty of ownership ends and the possibility of military conflict begins.

For the purposes of this research the CINC (Singer et al., 1972) was used to identify the difference between two neighbours. Logically, if this difference is very high the weaker state can feel threatened by its neighbour and his or her ability to achieve swift military victory. In order to highlight this very high difference, the ratio needs to be nine to one in favour of the neighbour. This is based on the conventional military wisdom, which emphasizes the ratio of three to one for a successful attack. Therefore, it is possible to assume that the multiplication of this ratio by three implies high threat. Proximity as an indicator can be omitted since the presented research focuses on neighbours. Finally, the offensive intentions have implication on how the national capabilities of the state are likely to be used. In order for a neighbour to be understood as aggressive, he or she must have annexed a piece of territory from another state in the last 5 years. The data for aggressive annexation will be drawn from COW dataset on territorial change (Tir et al., 1998)¹¹. Furthermore, it is not only the passive state that can feel its sovereignty over a territory is challenged. It is safe to assume that if a state conquered a new piece of land in an aggressive war it will want to ascertain its sovereignty by the construction of a border barrier. Therefore, firstly if both conditions are met (the difference is larger than nine and the neighbour is aggressive), the neighbour was marked as challenging the state sovereignty and was assigned a value of 1, if they are not met it will be assigned a value of 0. Above that, if a country annexed a piece of land it will be marked as having its sovereignty challenged for the next five years due to the necessity to protect this territory.

The question of challenge to sovereignty by a cross-border ethnic group generally rests on two important factors. Firstly, there needs to be a cross-border ethnic group without its own state existing across the border. This is logical, due to the fact that if such an ethnic group made a claim on the territory it would most probably lead to the annexation of this territory by the neighbouring state, where this ethnic group enjoys the majority. In other words, it would be representative of the previous type of challenge to sovereignty. Secondly, this ethnic group needs to be somehow politicized from the perspective of at least one state across whose borders it exists. This logic seems to be supported by the previous research suggesting that it is the politicization of an ethnic group that leads to an internal conflict (e.g. Gagnon, 1994; Collier & Hoeffer, 2004) as well as with the previous theoretical discussion on the nature of the political. Weber (2010:16, 23-24) argues that there are three factors contributing to group politicization,

¹¹ Territorial Change v5 (2017)

namely specificities of the previous colonial rule, land distribution policies and nation building policies (i.e. attempts to integrate the minority groups). From the perspective of the presented research, mainly the second and the third indicators appears to be important, as they are applicable also outside of the previously colonised lands and therefore suitable for the global focus of the work. Furthermore, the two remaining indicators (land distribution and nation-building practices) are in their essence the indicators of how the state treats the particular ethnic group. This claim is also in line with Weber's arguments (2010:16, 21). Therefore, it is possible to assume that an ethnic group that is disadvantaged or discriminated against will be or will become more politicized compared to one which is treated well. In other words, the discrimination from the state would lead the group to treat its own ethnicity as the political factor and therefore understand the state as the (real) enemy, which implies the desire to acquire sovereignty. Moreover, once the ethnicity has become politicized the links to the ethnic kin across the border can lead to the group claiming even more territory from other state entities. From this perspective, it can be assumed that a cross-border minority will be politicized if it was systematically discriminated by at least one of the states on whose territories it exists. In order to map such groups, the Transborder Ethnic Kin¹² and Ethnic Power Relations¹³ datasets (Vogt et al., 2015) were used. Combined, these datasets provided information about all the ethnic groups living in at least two countries and how those countries treated them. Therefore, if there was a significant (at least 5% of the population) stateless politicized ethnic group living in the borderlands between two countries the country discriminating it was coded as 1 for the cross-border ethnic group challenge to sovereignty. While if such a group does not exist, the relevant states were coded with 0.

3.1.4 Political unity

The fourth formulated hypothesis suggests that the large and irregular influx of migrants into state territory can lead to border hardening on the part of this state. The causal relation identified in this claim seems to be more or less straightforward, however it is necessary to define what irregular in this case means. As was said before, it addresses mainly the problems of migrants unwanted by the particular state. This necessarily implies their illegality, as a state that wants to prevent a crossing into its territory will simply not extended the legal rights required to do so. Nonetheless, the illegal migration in itself does

¹² Ethnic power relations dataset v4 (2015)

¹³ Transborder Ethnic Kin Dataset (2015)

not have to lead to border hardening measures since there is a certain absorption capacity that each economy possesses (Weyerbrock, 1995:86) and in certain cases it is even necessary for the economy of the given state (Zahniser et al., 2012). However, the problems with illegal migration (such as those identified in chapter 2.5.3) start when this absorption capacity, economic or political, is surpassed. Therefore, it is the rapid increase in the number of illegal immigrants that should lead states to strengthen their borders. The problem with this approach is the absence of any historical data on the number of illegal migrants. Because of this, a sufficiently documented proxy variable will need to be used. Possibly, the most robust data on international migration is the UNHCR data on asylum-seekers and refugees (ASRs). According to Casarico et al. (2016:19), there is a strong correlation between the number of asylum seekers and illegal migrants in the EU¹⁴. While it is true that this result is limited in time and location, it is still suggestive as it provides a way of measuring the illegal migration over time using the UNHCR data. It can be argued that a sharp increase in the number of asylum-seekers and refugees per year implies heightened desire to move to the targeted country and therefore also the possible increase in the number of people doing so illegally. This approach, however, still provides one last puzzle to solve. Specifically, while the high number of ASRs can point to the existence of irregular immigration, it still does not provide geographical direction of this phenomenon. Logically, if no geographical direction is known, no relation to the hardening of a particular border can be established. In order to address this, the ratio of yearly change between two neighbours was established. In this way the data acquired a directional dimension as it is possible to assume that a large difference can point to a migration towards the state with higher amount of ASR's¹⁵. The ratio was calculated by firstly acquiring the per thousand capita number of each state, and then dividing the state's number with that of its neighbour. As the aim was to capture the most intensive irregular migration that is beyond the absorption capacity of a state, the ratio necessary for the migration to cause a challenge to the political unity of a state was seven to one. If a state passed this number it was coded with 1, while if it did not it was coded with 0.

¹⁴ This result was confirmed by using the data provided by the EUROSTAT on the number of illegal immigrants in the EU and the number of asylum-seekers and refugees (ASR) in the EU. The best results ($p\text{-value}<0.001$) were obtained by considering the yearly change in the number of ASRs as the explanatory variable for the number of illegal immigrants.

¹⁵ It is obvious that this solution is very provisional and can result in many false positives, as this difference can be explained by many different reasons, such as the fact that the bulk of ASRs remained in the first country where it was safe and therefore did not continue to other neighbouring countries. Nonetheless, this approach will simply provide a challenge to the established model since if this hypothesis is confirmed it would be confirmed even despite the high number of false positives.

Finally, there is the question of how to measure the challenge coming from the existence of terrorist groups. As was said before, for a terrorist group to be relevant it needs to the issues discussed here, it needs to have both absolute aims and sufficient capabilities. Naturally, if a terrorist group is capable of training fighters and perpetrating attacks in one country, it can be considered as capable of doing so in the neighbouring one as well, especially if it is in line with the group's motivations. Therefore, a state was considered under a danger of a terrorist spread if there were at least twelve (one for each month) terrorist attacks in the last year in the neighbouring country if the total death toll of these attacks was above twenty-five persons killed. Furthermore, only groups with a global political agenda were considered to be relevant in that particular state¹⁶. State deemed as being threatened by terrorism in neighbouring country will be assigned with value 1, while any other state will have the value 0. Data for these attacks were gathered from the Global Terrorism Database (2016).

3.2 Regression analysis

As was said before, once the data on these indicators were consolidated, the sum of years each stated faced each of these challenges was established. Similarly, the sum of all the border barriers a state constructed in the given period was calculated.

The specific statistical method that was used to establish a relationship between the dependent (number of border barriers build by a state in the timeframe of 1946-2016) and independent variable (challenges to a state outlined above) is the multivariable ordinary least square regression, which is used to determine the relationship between two variables with interval values (Meier et al., 2012:325).

However, it needs to be noted that the data gathered are in their essence count data and therefore provide certain problems in regards to the assumptions of the linear regression model. Firstly, due to the count nature of the data there is a strong propensity for heteroscedasticity. In order to ameliorate this problem a model with standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity was used. Secondly, the errors produced by the fitted model do not have a normal distribution of residuals and it was not possible to correct this by the use of most common data transformation techniques (e.g. log, Box-Cox

¹⁶ In this regard it is necessary to mention that this filtration proved to be rather problematic as some of the group, which could theoretically be considered local were connected to larger terrorist movements. Similarly, other groups, such as for example extreme leftist student groups in the US should be according considered terrorist groups with global goal, however in reality their aims are often local. Therefore, numbers for terrorist attacks in some countries are larger than they should be, nonetheless, as with the previous note, the inclusion of attacks that are not necessarily relevant according to the used theory can provide a challenge for the tested hypothesis.

transformation). The gathered data was then fitted to models relying on different assumptions of residual distribution and the results were very similar to the heteroscedasticity corrected OLS method. In order to base the conclusions of this work on as robust results as possible all these methods will be used and their conclusions analysed in the following chapter. Furthermore, results based on different transformation methods (square root, box-cox transformation and binary transformation) will be presented and briefly commented on in the Annex B. However, before moving on to the consideration of the data themselves, a study conducted by Minitab Inc. in 2014 (Stone et al., 2014) suggests that the results of regression even without normal distribution of the residuals can be considered relevant as long as the sample size is above 15, which is the case in the presented research.

4. Research

Now that the key indicators, the way to measure and the method to establish a relation between them have been described, it is possible to move towards the commentary on the results. Firstly, the commentary will focus on the description of the acquired data from the perspective of basic statistical instruments. Secondly, the results of the abovementioned regression analysis will be interpreted.

4.1 Data description

There were 84 border barriers discovered during the designated timeline as displayed in the Table 1. Out of which 62 were constructed after the end of the Cold War (1989). The state with the highest number of constructed wall was Israel (1967, 1993, 1994, 2001, 2013, 2015), these were constructed on the borders with Egypt (1967, 1993, 2010), Jordan (1994, 2015), Lebanon (2001) and Syria (2013). The median value for the number of constructed barriers was 1, while the third quartile was 2, which implies a generally low number of barriers built as 75% of all barrier building states constructed two barriers or less.

State A	State B	Year	Type
Russia	Norway	1947	Passive wall
Russia	Finland	1947	Passive wall
Bulgaria	Greece	1947	Military barrier
Bulgaria	Turkey	1947	Passive wall
Greece	Bulgaria	1947	Passive fence
German Democratic Republic	German Federal Republic	1955	Military barrier

Czechoslovakia	German Federal Republic	1955	Active fence
Czechoslovakia	Austria	1955	Active fence
Hungary	Austria	1955	Active fence
China	Pakistan	1959	Passive fence
Zimbabwe	Zambia	1966	Passive wall
Israel	Egypt	1967	Military barrier
Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	1967	Passive wall
Thailand	Malaysia	1970	Passive fence
Cyprus	Turkey	1974	Military barrier
South Africa	Mozambique	1975	Active fence
South Korea	North Korea	1977	Military barrier
North Korea	South Korea	1977	Military barrier
Malaysia	Thailand	1978	Passive wall
United States of America	Mexico	1979	Passive fence
Morocco	Mauritania	1981	Military barrier
India	Bangladesh	1982	Passive fence
India	Pakistan	1990	Military barrier
Kuwait	Iraq	1991	Active fence
Jordan	Iraq	1992	Passive wall
Malaysia	Thailand	1992	Passive fence
Spain	Morocco	1993	Active fence
Israel	Egypt	1993	Active wall
United States of America	Mexico	1993	Passive fence
Israel	Jordan	1994	Active wall
Spain	Morocco	1996	Active fence
Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	1999	Passive fence
South Africa	Zimbabwe	2000	Passive fence
Iran	Afghanistan	2000	Passive fence
Israel	Lebanon	2001	Passive fence
Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan	2001	Passive fence
Uzbekistan	Afghanistan	2001	Military barrier
Botswana	Zimbabwe	2003	Active fence
Saudi Arabia	Yemen	2003	Passive fence
India	Myanmar	2003	Passive fence
United Arab Emirates	Oman	2005	Passive fence
Pakistan	Afghanistan	2005	Passive fence
Saudi Arabia	Iraq	2006	Passive fence
Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan	2006	Active fence
China	North Korea	2006	Passive fence
United States of America	Mexico	2006	Passive fence
Egypt	Israel	2009	Passive wall
Myanmar	Bangladesh	2009	Passive fence
Israel	Egypt	2010	Active fence
Iran	Pakistan	2010	Passive fence
Iran	Iraq	2010	Passive fence
Greece	Turkey	2012	Active fence

Bulgaria	Turkey	2013	Passive fence
Israel	Syria	2013	Active fence
Saudi Arabia	Yemen	2013	Active fence
Thailand	Malaysia	2013	Active fence
Malaysia	Thailand	2013	Active fence
Ukraine	Russia	2014	Military barrier
Morocco	Algeria	2014	Passive fence
Algeria	Libya	2014	Passive fence
Turkey	Iran	2014	Passive wall
Saudi Arabia	Iraq	2014	Active fence
Hungary	Yugoslavia	2015	Passive fence
Hungary	Croatia	2015	Passive fence
Slovenia	Croatia	2015	Passive fence
Estonia	Russia	2015	Active fence
Latvia	Russia	2015	Active fence
Algeria	Morocco	2015	Passive wall
Tunisia	Libya	2015	Active wall
Kenya	Somalia	2015	Passive fence
Namibia	Angola	2015	Passive fence
Turkey	Syria	2015	Active wall
Israel	Jordan	2015	Active fence
Jordan	Iraq	2015	Passive fence
India	Bhutan	2015	Passive fence
Malaysia	Brunei	2015	Passive fence
Malaysia	Indonesia	2015	Passive fence
Hungary	Romania	2016	Passive fence
Austria	Slovenia	2016	Passive fence
Austria	Italy	2016	Passive fence
Macedonia	Greece	2016	Passive fence
Norway	Russia	2016	Passive fence
Sweden	Denmark	2016	Passive fence
Latvia	Belarus	2016	Passive fence

Table 1 – Border barriers and their types in the World since 1946.

Specifically, from the perspective of challenges to land-appropriation, the average number of the sum of challenges was 4 for all the states examined. However, the average increased for the states with constructed barriers to 6.5, while it decreased to 3 for states without a border barrier. While the same difference cannot be seen in terms of medians, where 50% of both categories remain under 0, the difference becomes obvious for the upper 25% of the data. Obviously, while the average points to the relationship between border pressure and barriers constructions the medians suggest that majority of the data with border barriers had no challenge to the land-appropriation. It can be argued that this

suggests small number of states with very high sum of land-appropriation challenges. Upon the examination of the data for states with border barriers the three highest ranking states are Pakistan (overall 73 border-year challenges), India (54 challenges) and China (53 challenges). Compared to the states without border barriers, the state with highest number of challenges is Niger with 46. While it is impossible to make any final conclusions based on the stated information, it seems that in combination with other indicators the challenges to land-appropriation can have a certain impact on the state willingness to build border barriers.

The case is somewhat similar with the count of challenges to sovereignty coming from other state actors, where the average of all cases is 0.94, but there is a marked difference between states with (average of 1.6) and states without border barriers (0.69). However, the situation with the medians and third quartiles is the same as with the previous indicator – while medians are the same (0) the difference is only visible with the third quartiles (3 and 0 respectively). However, the major problem with the data is that upon closer examination the highest number of sovereignty challenges to a state with border barrier was 12 (Myanmar), while the highest number for a state without a border barrier is 46 (Niger) followed by 44 (Laos) and 36 (Burkina Faso). According to these observations it appears that the relationship between challenges to sovereignty and the construction of border barriers might not be very strong.

The difference is much higher for the challenges to sovereignty caused by a politicised cross-border ethnic group. The average value for all cases is 5.09, the cases with border barriers return the average of 12.97 compared to the average of 2.08. On the other hand, both the median and the quartile for both categories are equalled at 0. Once again, this suggests a small number of often challenged states. This suggestion is confirmed when the data are checked case by case, as the highest three values for states with constructed border barriers are 233 (Turkey), 169 (IRN) and 87 (Israel) but there are only seven states with any cross-border ethnic group challenge. In comparison, the highest score for states without border barriers is only 46 (Niger) and majority of the data is below 20 (19 out of 26). While it is obviously true that the challenges coming from cross-border groups are not much represented in the category of states with border barriers, those that are have a large amount of these challenges, which suggest continuous problems on different borders of these states. Based on this observation, it can be assumed that there might be a relation between these challenges and barrier building.

The analysis of the descriptive statistics suggests that the challenge to political unity from irregular migration can be considered a variable with the best explanatory value. There is a high difference between the value of the average for all the states (12.9), for the states without border barriers (9.19) and the states with border barriers (22.62). Furthermore, 50% of the values for states with borders fall below the number 13, while the same value for the second category is 0. The difference is even more visible for the third quartile threshold, as 75% of states with border barriers were challenged up to 27 times compared to 7 times the states without border barriers. Interestingly enough, states with highest number of challenges in both categories have similar values – 135 (Austria), 95 (Algeria) and 85 (Saudi Arabia) for states with a barrier compared to 99 (Yugoslavia/Serbia), 88 (France) and 81 (Argentina). On the other hand, values below ten comprise only around 40% of data for barrier building states while they amount to almost 78% of data for states without barriers. As was noted before, these statistics combined can indicate that the number of challenges to political unity coming from irregular migration have an impact on the number of border barriers constructed in the scrutinised period.

Finally, the data on terrorist activities provide similarly interesting insights. The difference between the average values of the whole dataset (18.11), states without barriers (15.46) and barriered states (25.04) suggests that the barrier-building states have higher amount of terrorist attacks. The median values have similar implications as 50% of data for non-barriered states is under/above the value of 11, while the same statistic for barrier-builders is 22. However, the third quartile shows that the higher values in both categories are very similar with – 25 and 26 respectively. Nevertheless, the maximum values for both subcategories are rather different. The highest values for states with softer borders are 77 (Syria), 58 (Brazil) and 53 (Ecuador), compared to the highest values of hard border states 124 (China), 91 (Myanmar) and 88 (Iran). It can be argued that there is a certain significant difference in the number of challenges to political unity caused by terrorist activities in the group of states with border barriers and those without them.

All in all, based on this preliminary analysis, it is possible to assume that there are some differences between the two compared subsets of data. It appears that at least in four cases (land-appropriation, cross-border ethnic groups, immigration and terrorism) the number of challenges states faced was higher in the subgroup with barriers than in the other group. This can suggest that states with higher pressures on their borders stemming from these causes build border barriers. However, the difference was not as significant in

case of sovereignty challenges coming from aggressive neighbours. Now that the preliminary exploration of the data is finished it is possible to compare these assumptions with the results of the regression.

4.2 Regression results

As was said before, the results of four types of linear regression will be interpreted here. The first used method (Model 1) is the OLS method corrected for heteroscedasticity, followed by regression relying on the Poisson distribution of residuals (Model 2), binomial negative 1 (Model 3) and binomial negative 2 (Model 4). The two values for each variable in Table 2 represent a coefficient of that variable (i.e. the positive or negative impact on the number of constructed border barriers) and p-value (i.e. how significant the individual variables are). The data used for the regression models can be found in Annex A.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
variable	coeff.	p-value	coeff.	p-value	coeff.	p-value	coeff.	p-value
LACH	0.016	0.037**	0.021	0.012**	0.023	0.022**	0.023	0.064*
SOVCHA	0.029	0.20	0.034	0.473	0.075	0.174	0.062	0.327
SOVCHB	0.009	0.013**	0.007	<10 ⁻³ ***	0.006	0.040**	0.013	0.0388**
PUCHASR	0.014	<10 ⁻³ ***	0.18	<10 ⁻³ ***	0.018	<10 ⁻³ ***	0.022	<10 ⁻³ ***
PUCHTER	0.006	0.050*	0.006	0.248	0.004	0.476	0.006	0.466
	$r^2 = 0.56$		$r^2_{\text{McFadden}} = 0.14$					

Table 2: Regression results

The four models present interesting results. Starting from the perspective of significance for the relevant hypothesis. First of all, the sum of challenges to political unity by irregular immigration (PUCHASR) is strongly confirmed to have an impact on the number of border barriers constructed by all four models. This along with the previous consideration of the descriptive statistics suggests the *Hypothesis 4* holds.

The second most important independent variable that is present in all four models is the challenge to sovereignty caused by cross-border ethnic groups (SOVCHB). It is true that models 3 and 4 do not provide as strong results as models 1 and 2, the p-value in all four cases is reasonably below 0.05 level. Similarly to the previous case, the relation between the challenges to sovereignty by ethnic groups and the number of constructed

border barriers was also suggested by the previous analysis of the relevant data. These considerations point to the possibility to consider the confirmation of the *Hypothesis 3*.

While the previous two variables were more or less clear-cut, the challenge to land-appropriation is a slightly more contested matter. Apparently, it was confirmed as relevant ($p\text{-value} < 0.05$) by three of the presented models, however it was above the traditionally important threshold in the fourth. Nevertheless, the difference from the 0.05 level was not very high (0.014) in the fourth model and the logical relation between challenges to land-appropriation and barrier-building was also suggested by the consideration of the descriptive statistics it can be assumed that the evidence is not strong enough to reject the *Hypothesis 1*.

Challenges to political unity coming from terrorism appear not to have an overall significant impact on the number of border barriers states build. Even though its p -value is exactly on the level of significance in the model using OLS method, each other method rejects the importance of this variable. These results to some extent reflect a certain degree of ambiguity present in the analysis in preceding chapter as it observed that the number of terrorist challenges was higher in the top three countries with border barriers constructed but the countries without barriers were not so far behind in this number. Furthermore, as the p -values are considerably high in other three models it can be argued that there are grounds for rejecting the *Hypothesis 5*.

Finally, the results for the variable reflecting the number of challenges to sovereignty coming from aggressive neighbours were not significant in any of the four models. Along with the similar conclusions coming from the review of the descriptive statistics it is possible to claim that it is possible to reject the *Hypothesis 2*.

Apart from the individual indicators, there is a question of the fit of entire model based on the r-squared statistic, returned only by Model 1 (OLS) and 2 (Poisson regression) returned. While in the first model the interpretation is more or less straightforward, as its value represents the amount of data variability explained by the model, the second model uses the McFadden's pseudo-r-squared statistic, which can have a slightly different interpretation. The traditional r-squared value of the Model 1 is 0.56 (the model explains 56% of the data variability) which implies a rather good fit considering the data are representative of a social behaviour. On the other hand, the r-squared value reported by Model 2 is only 0.14 which is at odds with the traditional interpretation of good fit. However, as McFadden(1979:306) himself points out, the pseudo-r-squared does not usually return values as high as the traditional one and any

value between 0.2 and 0.4 should be interpreted as an excellent fit of the model. In the light of this recommendation, it can be said that 0.14, while not in the specified range, still represents a rather good fit of the model.

All in all, it can be said that the variables individually and the proposed model as a whole provides valuable insights and can be considered robust enough to consider its results as at least partially reliable. One major caveat to this statement is the omnipresent problem of normal distribution of residuals. The attempt to address this issue beyond the presence of four different methods analysed here is available in the Annex B, where other alternative methods are used, albeit with almost the same results. Furthermore, some other models are also present to check for different data interpretation – for example the results for data limited to the period between 1989-1946 and others.

4.3 Interpretation and Discussion

Now after the commentary on the data from various angles it is possible to address the validity of formulated hypotheses and discuss the impact of the results on the constructed theory and previously considered academic theories. Before discussion of the individual hypotheses, a short note on the type of presented data. While it needs to be admitted that the data are not focusing on the specific border barriers and therefore might not provide explicit reasons for each barrier, they provide a long-term picture of the state of the borders of the countries around the world. As it is, they provide an overall contextual understanding of the barriers as they show that states that are often challenged in a certain way resort to building a border barrier.

Regarding the challenges to land-appropriation (H_1) the data and the analysis suggest that the hypothesis about the impact of these challenges on building border barriers is correct. To some extent, this partly confirms the importance of the “protection of wealth” argument (e.g. Carter & Poast, 2017), as GDP per capita was part of the State Capacity Index. However, it also puts this wealth into context and stresses the fact that barriers are not necessarily employed only by highly developed countries but also by countries with certain deficiencies in state administration and only nascent *nomos*. Furthermore, it also confirms the idea that states can use barriers for “expansive” purposes and not only as a form of protection, since it appears that in this case states use barriers also to construct barriers on territory not undisputedly under their control. From a wider perspective, it also suggests the validity of Schmittian theory of land-appropriation for the

analysis of relation between states, which can be useful for the analysis of state behaviour outside of the “global North”.

Challenges to sovereignty from aggressive neighbours do not appear to be relevant causes of barrier building in the inspected period and therefore the *Hypothesis 2* can be rejected. This confirms the conclusions of Carter and Poast (2017:257) that capability disparity does not have impact on barrier building. Nonetheless, it is possible to argue that this matter should be explored further as the cases of Estonia, Lithuania, Norway and Ukraine demonstrate, neighbour’s aggressive behaviour can lead to the decision to build a border barrier. In this regard comparative case studies of these countries with other Russian neighbours would possibly bring more light on the issue. Another possible solution to the problem would be to gather the data on reasons for aggressive behaviour and then consider only the countries with the same issue as threatened. Furthermore, even the result can also be caused by inappropriate operationalization of aggressive behaviour. The operationalization used in this work is somewhat strict, as the annexation after the second world war was not a common occurrence. Instead, as Ivanel (2015) argues, the occupation can now take form of creating puppet states on the territory the state wishes to control.

Hypothesis 3 focusing on the challenges to sovereignty coming from cross-border ethnic groups appears to be confirmed by the presented results. This finding can be considered one of the most important in this work as it points to an issue omitted by the previous research. Apparently, in order to protect their sovereignty over the whole territory, states are willing to ensure the low amount of interaction between a group living on the borders with their neighbours. This appears to be true in cases such as Turkey or Israel, where there is a significant danger (from the perspective of these states) of a territorial change if the interaction and politicisation level of the cross-border groups reaches critical levels. While these results cannot be considered completely conclusive, they at least suggest the need to study the impact of a border barrier on an ethnic or religious group living on the borders of several states.

In terms of irregular migration and connected challenge to political unity, the results confirm the expected relation between the willingness of state to construct barriers and higher influx of migrants to the country (H_4). While this interpretation is not exactly novel, it highlights the importance of considering the modern states as organised groups of people associated with a certain point on a scale they all find important, be it a nationalistic sentiment or economic wellbeing, and that the admittance of a large number

of strangers (the original meaning of *hostis* as suggested by Schmitt) into the country needs to be managed in order to welcome those that identify themselves with the same or similar points or reject those that do not. This management then normally takes place at the traditional border crossings, airports or ports, but with the irregular migration, as examined here, the management might be extended to larger parts of the border in order to be effective.

Finally, the results of the regression analysis and partly those of the commentary on descriptive statistics suggest that *Hypothesis 5* focusing on the impact of terrorist activities in the neighbouring countries and border barriers can be rejected. It is possible to assume that for the whole examined time-span the terrorist groups and cells did not maintain strong enough ties to the territory as these appear to be relevant only in years following the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, similarly to the case of sovereignty challenges by aggressive neighbour, cases studies of barriers between for example Algeria and Libya or Kenya and Somalia, both announced as anti-terrorist barriers, could serve to shed more light on the issue.

Research results provide certain new incentives for the following research as well as confirm certain generally held views. Apart from their individual contributions, they also at least partly point to the applicability of Carl Schmitt's theory on the issue of border barriers in general, as was previously suggested by Wendy Brown. However, probably the most challenging problem is the operationalisation of Schmitt's often complex concepts. This is mainly due to the fact that concepts such as political or sovereignty are interpreted differently by different projects that are necessary for the collection of data on the scale presented here. Therefore, in order to address these issues it might be recommendable to focus next research on a geographically and temporarily more limited sample. This would allow for the collection of data that are more in line with the conceptual framework stemming from the used theory. Above that, it would also allow for the collection of data on when the discourse about the border barrier appeared, which would in turn allow the analysis of causes of border hardening in temporal sequence. In other words, it would be possible to examine how the objective factors impact the occurrence of the specific discourse and when and whether their continued existence or disappearance results in a border barrier construction.

5. Conclusions

The focus of the presented work was to identify the reasons why states, as the prevalent political units of the era following the end of the Cold War, construct barriers on their borders. In order to do so, it constructed a theoretical framework of the modern state based on the writings of Carl Schmitt and then considered its relation with globalisation. This theoretical approach led to the formulation of five distinct hypotheses about why states build border barriers. The first of these focused on the challenges to land-appropriation defined as border disputes to the state without enough administrative capacity. The second one assumed a relation between challenges to sovereignty coming from a neighbour, defined in terms of large military capabilities difference and aggressive behaviour, and border barriers. The third one dealt with challenges to sovereignty coming from a politicised cross-border ethnic group, defined as ethnic group living in at least two states and being discriminated against by at least one of them. The fourth hypothesis presumed a relation between the number of challenges to political unity caused by irregular migration, defined as a ratio of number of asylum seekers in one country and in the neighbouring country, and the number of constructed border barriers. The last hypothesis expected a connection between the challenge to political unity from terrorist activities, operationalised as sufficient number of terrorist attacks and causalities in a neighbouring country, and border barriers.

Data on the defined variables were gathered from various databases on the relevant issues and compiled into a directed-dyad per year framework. This framework was then used to establish count values for the total number of individual challenges occurring to each state recognized in this period as well as on the number border barriers. In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, a quantitative approach was chosen utilising firstly the analysis and comparison of descriptive statistics between the subgroups of state with and without border barriers and secondly regression analysis.

Based on the results of these methods a relation was confirmed between challenges to land-appropriation, challenges to sovereignty coming from cross-border ethnic groups, challenges to political unity coming from irregular migration and the number of barriers built by relevant states. On the other hand, the hypotheses about challenges to sovereignty from neighbours and challenges to political unity from terrorist activities were rejected.

In conclusion, based on the aforementioned results it can be said that it appears that main factors contributing to state willingness to build walls are these. Firstly, it is the desire of states to ensure their land-appropriation in case they do not possess enough administrative capacities and part of their claimed territory is also claimed by another state. Secondly, it is the states' attempt to curb the amount of a cross-border ethnic group's interactions, which can pose a challenge to their sovereignty over the territory. Thirdly, it is the state aspiration towards maintenance of political unity questioned by an irregular mass migration. All these factors were found relevant for barrier building in the specified period, however in needs to be noted that considering the possible changes in the types of relevant political units and challenges they face in the future, a statistical inquiry implementing points discussed in the previous chapter should be conducted focusing on barrier building practices after the end of the Cold War.

Summary

The presented work attempted to discover which factors contribute to states' willingness to construct border barriers. In order to do so, it used a theoretical framework based on the interaction of Carl Schmitt's political theory and globalization. This theory identified five possible factors which can contribute to border-hardening. These were challenges to land-appropriation, challenges to sovereignty coming from aggressive neighbour, challenges to sovereignty coming from politicised cross-border ethnic groups, challenges to political unity stemming from irregular mass migration, challenges to political unity from terrorist activities. The results suggest the importance of land-appropriation, politicised cross-border ethnic groups and migration as factors explaining the construction of border barriers.

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List of annexes

Annex A – Regression data

Annex B – Alternative data transformation

Annexes

Annex A – Regression data

STATE A	BB	LACH	SOVCHA	SOVCHB	PUCHASR	PUCHTER
AFG	0	0	6	32	0	45
ALB	0	0	0	0	0	3
ALG	2	4	0	0	95	13
AND	0	0	0	0	0	2
ANG	0	0	0	0	11	11
ARG	0	0	0	0	81	1
ARM	0	0	0	0	17	20
AUS	2	0	0	0	135	2
AZE	0	0	6	0	28	42
BAH	0	0	0	0	0	3
BEL	0	0	0	0	0	1
BEN	0	0	0	0	0	16
BFO	0	36	0	0	0	9
BHU	0	0	6	0	0	36
BLR	0	0	4	0	30	25
BLZ	0	0	0	0	59	16
BNG	0	25	0	0	0	42
BOL	0	0	0	0	0	20
BOS	0	0	0	0	3	0
BOT	1	0	0	0	4	14
BRA	0	0	0	0	19	58
BRU	0	0	0	0	0	0
BUI	0	0	0	22	0	14
BUL	3	0	0	43	16	25
CAM	0	0	4	0	1	15
CAN	0	0	0	0	1	5
CAO	0	17	0	0	0	18
CDI	0	1	0	0	0	5
CEN	0	0	0	0	0	28
CHA	0	7	0	0	0	25
CHL	0	0	0	0	3	19
CHN	2	53	0	0	0	124
COL	0	0	0	0	79	16
CON	0	0	0	0	32	22
COS	0	0	0	0	0	13
CRO	0	0	0	0	27	1
CYP	1	0	6	0	20	22
CZE	2	0	6	0	0	1
CZR	0	0	0	0	9	0
DEN	0	0	0	0	0	0

DJI	0	0	0	0	0	13
DOM	0	0	0	0	1	2
DRC	0	0	0	0	0	51
DRV	1	28	0	9	0	5
ECU	0	0	0	0	13	53
EGY	1	7	0	0	2	31
EQG	0	0	0	0	0	3
ERI	0	20	0	0	0	12
EST	1	0	3	0	13	22
ETH	0	10	0	58	0	33
ETM	0	0	0	0	0	3
FIN	0	0	9	0	1	23
FRN	0	0	0	0	88	17
GAB	0	0	0	0	9	4
GAM	0	0	0	0	0	2
GDR	1	0	0	0	0	0
GFR	0	0	0	0	0	0
GHA	0	0	0	0	0	2
GMY	0	0	0	0	63	1
GNB	0	0	0	0	0	2
GRC	2	0	0	0	70	23
GRG	0	1	6	0	0	37
GUA	0	9	0	0	0	20
GUI	0	0	0	0	0	11
GUY	0	0	0	0	0	1
HAI	0	0	0	0	0	0
HON	0	20	0	0	0	42
HUN	4	0	6	0	29	4
IND	4	54	0	0	0	58
INS	0	0	0	0	0	0
IRE	0	0	0	0	0	24
IRN	3	8	6	169	43	88
IRQ	0	0	0	53	62	44
ISR	7	0	0	87	0	42
ITA	0	4	0	0	7	1
JOR	2	0	0	0	24	46
KEN	1	8	0	0	0	36
KOS	0	0	0	0	0	0
KUW	1	0	0	0	30	21
KYR	0	0	0	0	0	6
KZK	1	0	3	0	19	24
LAO	0	44	6	0	0	28
LAT	2	0	3	0	39	22
LBR	0	0	0	6	0	4
LEB	0	3	0	45	11	25
LES	0	0	0	0	0	11

LIB	0	0	0	0	43	44
LIE	0	0	0	0	0	0
LIT	0	0	3	0	8	22
LUX	0	0	0	0	0	1
MAA	0	0	0	0	56	27
MAC	1	0	0	0	12	1
MAL	5	1	0	0	68	23
MAW	0	0	0	0	0	7
MEX	0	0	0	0	0	20
MLD	0	5	0	0	0	3
MLI	0	0	0	0	0	25
MNC	0	0	0	0	0	1
MNG	0	0	0	0	11	0
MON	0	1	9	0	0	25
MOR	2	0	0	0	0	35
MYA	1	0	12	0	9	91
MZM	0	0	0	0	0	14
NAM	1	0	6	27	11	12
NEP	0	0	12	0	0	36
NIC	0	0	0	0	0	2
NIG	0	0	0	0	0	5
NIR	0	46	0	0	0	43
NOR	1	0	9	0	17	23
NTH	0	0	0	0	1	0
OMA	0	0	0	0	0	11
PAK	1	72	0	0	0	71
PAN	0	0	0	0	13	38
PAR	0	0	0	0	0	4
PER	0	14	0	0	1	39
PNG	0	0	0	0	0	8
POL	0	0	3	0	2	26
POR	0	0	0	0	0	15
PRK	1	2	6	0	0	25
QAT	0	0	2	0	3	3
ROK	1	1	0	0	1	0
ROM	0	0	6	0	0	4
RUS	2	0	0	0	66	20
RVN	0	15	0	0	0	0
RWA	0	0	0	10	0	33
SAF	2	53	0	0	0	8
SAL	0	0	0	0	0	17
SAU	4	0	0	0	85	26
SEN	0	0	0	0	3	5
SIE	0	0	0	0	0	0
SIN	0	0	0	0	0	0
SLO	0	0	0	0	7	3

SLV	1	0	0	0	17	0
SOM	0	0	0	0	0	9
SPN	2	0	0	0	27	1
SSD	0	0	0	0	12	22
SUD	0	11	0	0	23	43
SUR	0	0	0	0	3	0
SWA	0	0	0	0	0	17
SWD	1	0	0	0	23	0
SWZ	0	0	0	0	30	3
SYR	0	0	0	0	57	77
TAJ	0	0	0	0	0	20
TAZ	0	6	0	0	0	43
THI	2	2	0	0	27	11
TKM	1	0	0	0	17	22
TOG	0	2	0	0	0	0
TUN	1	0	0	0	0	25
TUR	2	0	6	233	9	41
UAE	1	0	0	0	10	3
UGA	0	0	0	20	0	31
UKG	0	0	0	0	13	0
UKR	1	0	0	0	53	22
URU	0	0	0	0	0	4
USA	3	0	0	0	25	4
UZB	2	0	0	0	0	22
VEN	0	1	0	0	45	38
YAR	0	16	0	0	0	0
YEM	0	26	0	0	0	3
YPR	0	9	0	0	0	0
YUG	0	0	0	0	99	5
ZAM	0	12	0	0	0	23
ZIM	1	0	0	16	2	18

Annex B – Alternative data transformation regression results

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<i>variable</i>	<i>coeff.</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>coeff.</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>coeff.</i>	<i>p-value</i>
LACH	0.038	0.123	0.034	0.0435**	0.023	0.059*
SOVCHA	0.002	0.95	0.148	0.0512*	0.006	0.745
SOVCHB	0.075	0.003***	0.019	0.146	0.045	0.010**
PUCHASR	0.064	<10 ⁻³ ***	0.025	<10 ⁻³ ***	0.028	<10 ⁻³ ***
PUCHTER	0.013	0.517	0.005	0.633	0.003	0.588

Model 1 – OLS with log-transformed data.

Model 2 – Logit binary regression with binary transformed data

Model 3 – OLS with box-cox transformation

These models with alternative data transformations generally results similar to the models used in the main body of the work. Especially the result for irregular migration are as strong as those in the original. On the other hand, the logit regression did not confirm politicised cross-border ethnic groups as significant, while the other two returned strong significance. Similarly, the land-appropriation is less significant than in the original research.

Nonetheless, even these results highlight approximately the same factors as the research in the main body. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the even despite certain differences, the impact of irregular migration, cross-border ethnic groups and to a certain degree also of land-appropriation can be maintained.