External Examiner's Report on the Dissertation of Ivan Gutierrez
"On the Incorporation of Technological Tools"
Submitted in 2018 at the Philosophy Faculty

I. Brief summary of the dissertation

The dissertation attempts to merge certain elements of phenomenology and analytic philosophy in order to lay foundations for a new philosophy of technology.

II. Brief overall evaluation of the dissertation

The goal of bringing together two competing schools of thought is highly appreciated. Yet previous attempts to do so are ignored, and so the "wheel" of philosophy of technology is "reinvented". It is interesting to read the analyses of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty et al, yet a review of secondary resources of contemporary philosophers is missing, especially postphenomenology. All in all, it is an interesting exercise, that should be further developed in the years to come.

III. Detailed evaluation of the dissertation and its individual aspects

1. Structure of the argument

The argument is well-built, written in a clear form and demonstrates the required capabilities of a PhD degree. The analysis of the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty is beautifully written and correct. Unfortunately I cannot comment on the description of the other thinkers for not being enough familiar with their important works, yet I learned a lot from reading on them and would like to thank the author for the clear introductions to the works of Sartre and Searle.

I found the integration of Searle's understanding of intentionality into the phenomenological framework very interesting, yet I thought a comparison to Husserl's notion of intentionality (and its contemporary developments by Dan Zahavi, for example) could have enriched the work.

Another direction that could have improved the argument is the discussion of autonomy in the works of Peter-Paul Verbeek in the context of philosophy of technology. His book *Moralizing Technology* (2011) contains a concise analysis of autonomy vs freedom, with references to key authors like Michel Foucault, Andrew Feenberg and Langdon Winner. Relying only on the analytic tradition poses a partial view. These are directions for future works that can explore the intersections between phenomenology and analytic philosophy.

Additionally, the historical account could have been enriched with the works of historian and philosopher of technology Carl Mitcham and Ciano Aydin's critic of the Extended Mind Theory.

Some minor comments:
   a. The dissertation could have been as convincing as it is without the discussion on animals, though this discussion is interesting in and of itself. Same for the description of the history of the Internet.
   b. The description of postphenomenology could have been more accurate with the usage of the notions of co-shaping and co-construction.

c. Contra to the statement made on p. 11, there are works in postphenomenology that deal with technologies and not only science – Robert Rosenberger, Galit Wellner, Stacey Irwin, to name a few.

2. Formal aspects of the dissertation

The dissertation has the right look-and-feel of a high-quality dissertation. The English is good and clear, and the page layout is appropriate.

I marked some minor typos on p. 3, 117 (3rd para), 120 (1st para), p. 123, p. 127 (2nd para), 134, 150, 152

3. Use of sources and/or material

While the author beautifully describes and analyzes the theories of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and others, secondary sources could have improved the work. For example, there are many thinkers who analyzed Heidegger's tool analysis and more broadly his book *Being and Time* from the perspective of philosophy of technology: Don Ihde's *Heidegger's Technologies* (2010), Graham Harman's *Tool Being* (2002), Bernard Stiegler's *Technics and Time* (especially vol 1 1989), to name a few. The following secondary sources could have helped the author to provide a more complete analysis on

- memory and storage on p. 29 & p. 46 - Stiegler (1998);
- language and hand on pp. 30-31 - Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, "Heidegger's Hand," and "the Geschelcht";
- sedimentation on p. 78-9 - Rosenberger (2014) (esp. the references to Gurwitz);
- transparency - Van Den Eede;
- freedom and autonomy on p. 132, 163, 165 - Dorresteijn 2012, Verbeek 2011.

Also there lack of references to the arguments made. For example on p. 20 the statement "although some paleoanthropologists argue…" is not followed by references to those works. Usually philosophers like Derrida and Stiegler refer to Andre Leroi-Gourhan by mentioning his name and the relevant works. References could have been useful also on:
- p. 46 first paragraph (where the definition is taken from? Or is it suggested by the author?);
- p. 116 "Zero point" section – Hayles' work on the body and the virtual (1999) can enhance the discussion and contextualize it in contemporary philosophy;
- pp. 127-130 for referring to the digital body (Ihde's *Bodies in Technic*, Tamar Sharon the Quantified Self, Hayles etc). These references and others discussing QS can enhance also the discussion on pp. 143-4.

In one place, when reference was made to the attention economy (p. 162 1st para), it would have been better to use academic references to this topic, i.e. Yves Citton, Tiziana Terranova, Goldhaber etc.

Missing references also on p. 26 - last paragraph, p. 28 – Donald (year? Pages?), p. 35 - the para. starting with "this body of knowledge", p. 45 - para starting with "the digitally connected", p. 46 - 1st and 2nd para, p. 93 - 3rd para (which work of Gallagher and Zahavi?), p. 97 - 1st para, p. 99 – para starting with "Performing", p. 111 – "Rube Goldberg machine", p. 125 – last para, p. 136 ("under one

conception" and later "privacy claims"), p. 138 – 2nd para, p. 139 – para starting with "since privacy", p. 141 – Eriksson (year? Pages?), p. 156 – last para,

4. Personal contribution to the subject

[Is the dissertation merely a compilation of information, or does the author employ the primary and secondary sources to propose an original, organically formulated contribution to the field?]

The author provides an original thesis with two foci of academic innovation. The first is the establishment of a link between Merleau-Ponty and Searle (p. 101) is original in itself, and more broadly in paving a new way between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Same for the links between the physical and the experiencing body (p. 102).

The second focus of originality can be found in the last parts of the dissertation where he offers an important analysis of privacy. I highly recommend publishing it as an article of a series of articles in peer review journals.

IV. Questions for the author

I would like to propose the following questions as topics for discussion:
1. Why Searle's notion of agency was selected? There are some interesting discussions on agency in continental philosophy that are related philosophy of technology, such as Bruno Latour's analysis (2005).
2. What are the challenges in combining continental and analytic philosophy?
3. What is the difference between intentionality and agency? What is the relation of each of these notions to technology? And is there a difference between agency and "Sense of agency" (p. 94)?
4. If the dissertation discusses questions like "How does this technological mediation factor into our privacy concerns?" (p. 145) or "how we are constituted phenomenologically" (p. 167), and if postphenomenology asks how technologies mediate a worldview for us, then why refraining from using the postphenomenological tools of embodiment, hermeneutic relations and others? Why avoiding postphenomenological references?

V. Conclusion

I recommend the submitted dissertation with the tentative grade of pass.

27 May 2018   Dr. Galit Wellner