CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of International Relations

Diversity of interests of OSCE member states and its effects on internal policy of the organization: Case of Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Master's thesis

Author: Jelizaveta Nestercova

Study programme: International Relations

Supervisor: Bc. Michal Parízek, M.Sc., Ph.D.

Year of the defence: 2018

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

Prohlášení

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval/a samostatně a použil/a jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.

2. Prohlašuji, že práce nebyla využita k získání jiného titulu.

3. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne   Jelizaveta Nestercova

References

NESTERCOVA, Jelizaveta. *Diversity of interests of OSCE member states and its effects on internal policy of the organization: Case of Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.* Prague, 2018. xx pages. Master's thesis (Mgr). Charles University, Institute of Political Studies. Department of International Relations. Supervisor Bc. Michal Parízek, M.Sc., Ph.D..

Length of the thesis: 99.316 characters

Abstract

The armed conflict in Ukraine once again opened space for the operations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that was in times of Called War was established as a platform for political dialogue between the western allies and Eastern Block. The OSCE as the only international agent was able to deploy a monitoring mission provided with a mandate to operate on the whole territory of Ukraine and whose observers should ensure impartially gathered information on events in the country. The organization therefore faces a great pressure: the monitors must carefully impose its authority as their mandate is limited by wide range of measures imposed by the OSCE participating states and at the same time bring to light information that may be hurtful for the interests of some of the key member states of the OSCE (namely the Russian Federation and Ukraine). The aim of this thesis is to examine the OSCE proceedings regarding conflict of interests among OSCE member states which it may create with its own acts and decisions. How does the OSCE deal with the diversity of interests of its key member states? How does the diversity of interests of the key member states affect OSCE acts and decision? These questions are followed by two hypothesises on the possible scenarios that may occur.

The research questions are answered through a content analysis of official document and statements published by the mission officials. The findings above all provide the result of testing of the two hypotheses.

Abstrakt

Ozbrojený konflikt na Ukrajině znovu otevřel prostor pro působení Organizace pro bezpečnost a spolupráci v Evropě (OBSE), která v době takzvané studené války vznikla jako platforma pro politický dialog mezi západními partnery a východním blokem. OBSE je jedinou mezinárodní organizací, která byla schopná nasadit do regionu pozorovací misi s pravomocí operovat na celém ukrajinském území a jejíž pozorovatelé jakožto nestranný aktér mají mezinárodnímu společenství zajistit pravdivé informace o situaci na Ukrajině. Organizace tak ve své snaze zajistit tyto informace, které navíc do značné míry mohou poškodit zájmy jednoho nebo i více členských států OBSE (především Ruské federace a Ukrajiny), čelí obrovskému tlaku ze strany svých členů, kteří regulují její fungovaní celou řadou opatření. Cílem této diplomové práce je prozkoumat, jak organizace reaguje na

konflikt zájmů mezi svými členskými státy, které by OBSE mohla vytvořit svými vlastními rozhodnutími a aktivitami. Jak se organizace vyrovnává s různorodostí zájmů svých členů? Jak zájmy klíčových členských států ovlivňují fungování a rozhodování OBSE? Z těchto výzkumných otázek pak vyplývá i několik hypotéz o možných scénářích, které v takových situacích mohou nastat.

Odpovědi na tyto výzkumné otázky hledám pomocí obsahové analýzy oficiálních dokumentů a výroků pozorovatelů mise OBSE, jimiž zároveň testuji vymezené hypotézy.

Keywords

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ukrainian conflict, Ukraine, Russia, Donbass, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Content Analysis, international organizations

Klíčová slova

Organizace pro bezpečnost a spolupráci v Evropě, ukrajinský konflikt, Ukrajina, Rusko, Donbas, Zvláštní monitorovací mise na Ukrajině, obsahová analýza, mezinárodní organizace.

Rozdílné zájmy členů OBSE a jejich efekt na vnitřní politiku organizace: případ Zvláštní monitorovací mise na Ukrajině

Acknowledgement

Diploma project

Diversity of interests of OSCE member states and its effects on internal policy of the organization: Case of Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Introduction

The Organization for the Co-operation and Security in Europe is a forum for political dialogue on a wide range of security issues, with 57 participating states, it is considered to be the largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization. Its agenda is focused on three dimensions: political-military, economic, environment and humanitarian. By building the cooperation of participating states in these so-called three baskets, the OSCE claims to contribute to developing networks, and towards building the confidence among the states that significantly increase security in Europe and Central Asia. In particular, it attempts to play a significant role in conflict prevention and resolution. For such purpose the so-called filed operations are used as a main tool.

Despite building the position of provider of soft power in the international system, the OSCE also has some limits in its very nature as an organization. For example, the decisions are taken by consensus within the OSCE, but they lack legal enforceability and are binding politically only, therefore may weaken the position of the organization as such (OSCE 2007: passim). How does the OSCE keep the balance between diversity of interests among its member states and its own goals? Is the organization even able to stay neutral in dispute between two member states, especially when one of them is a key player in international politics, or does the OSCE immediately lose its position in order to keep 'cooperation' alive? What happens when goals of the organization are contradicting with the interests of one of its key members?

On the 21st May 2014 the Permanent Summit of the OSCE decided to deploy a Special Monitoring Mission of international observers to Ukraine following the request of the Ukrainian government, after development in Ukraine during November 2013 resulted into tensions not only across the country, but also between Ukraine and Russia. Among others, the tasks of the mission as declared are for example: "*...gather information and report on the security situation in the area of operation; establish and report facts in response to specific incidents and reports of incidents, including those concerning alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principles and commitments; facilitate the dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalization of the situation*, etc."(OSCE 2014). Although the decision of deployment was taken by consensus and therefore Russia was one

of the states that approved it, considering Russia's foreign policy and Russian interests within Ukraine, deployment of the mission could potentially create conflict between the two. By staying neutral and providing transparency within the member states, there is massive pressure placed on the OSCE, which also opens the question as to whether, and if so how, the organization itself is capable to balance between its own purpose, and the politics and the diversity of its members interest, key members in particular.

Research questions

The aim of this thesis is to examine the OSCE proceedings regarding conflict of interests among OSCE member states which it may create with its own acts and decisions. The core of the thesis is following research questions:

1. How does the OSCE deal with the diversity of interests of its key member states?
2. How does the diversity of interests of the key member states affect OSCE acts and decision?

Consequently, these research questions lead to following hypotheses:

1. In case the OSCE acts may oppose a key member state's interests, the state tends to discredit the organization and its action.
2. In case the OSCE acts may oppose a key member state's interests, the organization tends to limit its own acts in order to diminish the conflict of interests. Whereas the bigger the conflict, the weaker the acts of the organization become.

Conceptual framework

As a theoretical basis for this thesis Keohane's functional theory of regimes will be used as it very well captures the essence of the OSCE as an organization and its purpose. In his concept Keohane works both with the basic conditions in world politics, such as crucial actors (states), the environment (state of anarchy) which they are in, and nature, motivation and factors that affect the acts of these actors. Further, Keohane acknowledges rational egoism in the behaviour of the actors in pursuing their own interests. In his point of view *rationality* means that actors have consistent preferences and are able to calculate cost and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences. *Egoism,* on the other hand, means in his perception that their utility functions are independent of one another: thus they are indifferent to what others gain or lose (Keohane 1984: 27). Keohane assumes that states have some mutual interests in some

situations which however must overcome the fundamental obstacle of uncertainty. Functional theory of regimes argues that regimes reduce the uncertainty and thus enable and further the cooperation between the actors by providing states with information or reducing their information costs.

For further analysis of the relations within the OSCE so called principal–agent approach will be used. Several scholars use PA approach to analyze conflicts within the international organizations caused by the diversity of the interests within the organization (its principals and agent as such); it provides therefore a sufficient framework for researching the hypotheses of this thesis.

Defining factor of principal–agent relations is delegation of the authority given to an agent by principal which consequently might cause emerging of the conflict situation within the organization. As both principals and agents differ in their goals and interests some scholars conclude that the delegation of the authority leads to agency losses for the principals. Such argument consequently opens the questions of how does principal deal with resulting situation.

Da Conceição-Heldt argues that there are several reasons for the conflict to occur. Although agents are expected to behave on behalf of the principals, they are not neutral actor and may have interests that slightly differ from the interests of the principals. In particular, in some cases they do not desire the same policy outcome – as the agent is focused on the reaching the agreement rather than on its specific content.

Another reason of the conflict is the degree of the agent autonomy established in the contract between the principal and the agent (Da Conceição-Heldt 2010: 1110). Based on the contract Howkins distinguishes two types of the delegation: rule-based and discretion-based. Discretion-based delegation provides more autonomy for the agents since principals state their goals but do not specify which actions the agent must take to fulfil its assigned mandate. Rule-based type of delegation provides specific instructions for agents on how they are supposed to act (Hawkins et al. 2006).

Further, some also argue that the position of the information gatherer gives to the agent an informational advantage over the principal. Information gathering and analysis are the significant part of the preparation for the decision-making process. Consequently, agents may be able to influence the policy outcome and therefore fulfil better their own interest. In order to reduce information asymmetry principals use control mechanisms which may be collective or unilateral (Dijkstra 2014: 24–26).

Methodology

For the purpose of the analysis the method of case study will be used in this thesis. In order to provide answers to research questions and test the hypotheses, I chose the case of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The case of Ukraine is suitable for the analysis for several reasons. First of all, both Ukraine and Russia are members of the OSCE, whereas Russia certainly can be considered as a key member given its position in the international politics. Secondly, even though Russian officials refuse Russia to be directly involved in the conflict, there are undeniable Russian interests in the region and the outcomes of the conflict.

In the analysis I will chart the mandate of the mission and try to identify key spots which may lead to conflict of interests. As I already mentioned above, I assume two situations may appear: either the key member tries to discredit the acts of the organization as soon as it starts to threaten its own interests, or the organization starts to limit its own acts in order to diminish the conflicts within the organization, and consequently weakens itself by its own acts. For the testing of the hypotheses, I will analyse official documents, reports and statements made by the OSCE, as well as the official statements made by Russian government and rhetoric used by Russian media towards the OSCE.

Structure and outline

This thesis will be structured into chapters and subchapters (see outline below). After the introduction of the topic, the aims, research questions and hypotheses will be presented. The next chapter will be dedicated to the empirical framework of the thesis; that is the OSCE, its policy and, in particular, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. In the third chapter I will introduce conceptual framework – the definition and application of the theories will be explained. Furthermore, I will discuss the methodology of the analysis and data used. Chapter six will be fully focused on the analysis and its evaluation, whereas my final chapter will provide answers on the research questions and the final conclusion.

Outline

1. Introduction
2. Research questions as asked
    a) Brief overview of the topic
    b) Research questions and hypotheses
3. OSCE
    a) Organization overview

Bibliography of the project of the thesis

DA CONCEIÇÃO, E. Who controls whom? Dynamics of power delegation and agency losses in EU trade politics. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 48, 4, 1107-1126, Sept. 1, 2010. ISSN: 00219886.

DIJKSTRA, H. Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN peacekeeping. *Review of International Organizations*. 19p., Sept. 19, 2014. ISSN: 15597431.

HAWKINS, Darren G et al.. *Delegation and agency in international organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-521-86209-4.

KEOHANE, Robert O. *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, c1984. ISBN 0-691-07676-6.

OSCE Handbook: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In: *The OSCE*[online]. Viena: Press and Public Information Section, 2007 [cit. 2016-09-16]. Available at: http://www.osce.org/files/documents/b/3/22624.pdf.

Permanent Council Decision No. 1117. In: *OSCE* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2016-09-28]. Available at:: http://www.osce.org/pc/116747.

Planned bibliography of the thesis

Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2015. In: *The OSCE* [online]. Viena: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2016 [cit. 2016-09-16]. Available at: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/255921.

BOTHE, Michael, Natalino RONZITTI a Allan ROSAS (eds.). *The Osce in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997. ISBN 9041104461.

DA CONCEIÇÃO-HELDT, E. Variation in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 18, 3, 403-419, Apr. 1, 2011. ISSN: 13501763.

DA CONCEIÇÃO, E. Who controls whom? Dynamics of power delegation and agency losses in EU trade politics. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 48, 4, 1107-1126, Sept. 1, 2010. ISSN: 00219886.

DIJKSTRA, H. Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN peacekeeping. *Review of International Organizations*. 19p., Sept. 19, 2014. ISSN: 15597431.

DOMINGUEZ, Roberto. The OSCE: soft security for a hard world : competing theories for understanding the OSCE [online]. Brussels, Belgium: Peter Lang AG, 2014 [cit. 2016-09-16]. Euroclio. Studies and documents. ISBN 9783035263886.

GAWRICH, A. Emerging from the Shadows - The Ukrainian-Russian Crisis and the OSCE's Contribution to the European Security Architecture. : Die Europäische Union und die Ukraine Von enttäuschten Erwartungen zu konstruktivem Krisenmanagement?. *Die Friedens-Warte*. 89, 1/2, 59-80, Mar. 2014. ISSN: 03400255.

HAWKINS, Darren G et al.. *Delegation and agency in international organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-521-86209-4.

KEOHANE, Robert O. *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, c1984. ISBN 0-691-07676-6.

LIECHTENSTEIN, S. The OSCE special monitoring mission has become the eyes and ears of the international community on the ground in Ukraine. *Security and Human Rights*. 25, 1, 5-10, Jan. 14, 2014. ISSN: 18750230.

OSCE Handbook: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In: *The OSCE*[online]. Viena: Press and Public Information Section, 2007 [cit. 2016-09-16]. Available at: http://www.osce.org/files/documents/b/3/22624.pdf.

OSCE: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine [online]. [cit. 2016-09-28]. Dostupné z: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was created in 1975 as neutral actor and an arena for political dialogue between the West and the East during so called Cold War. Although, the organization developed through time and covers wide range of security topics that brings together participating states from Europe, America and Asia and had a great potential in disposal in 1990s, some scholars may argue that it has failed to secure a stronger position on the international level. The OSCE was in time overshadowed by the other more powerful actors namely in European region which is under influence of the other international organizations that aspire to secure international cooperation apart from other also in security dimension (for example European Union or NATO). Furthermore, these actors benefit from stronger position of its institutions or high degree of the autonomy and additionally from legally binding decisions that are adopted by its authorities. After more than forty years thus remained the OSCE merely a forum for political discussion which struggling to fulfil its goals is dependent on the diplomatic capabilities of its officials (Gawrich 2014, 68).

As one of the greatest controversies in the OSCE's operational capability I consider a decision-making process that is based on the principle of consensus which provides each of 57 OSCE participating states with a veto right. The lack of the consensus among such great group of states thus may prevent the organization from adopting stricter decisions, such as for example using the exceptional decision-making procedures which would not request the approval of all states. The organization is that way forced to balance between its own goals and interests and the interests of its member states. The issue consequentially leads to following questions: How does the OSCE keep the balance between diversity of interests among its member states and its own goals? Is the organization even able to stay neutral in dispute between its member states, especially when one of them is a key player in international politics or does the OSCE immediately lose its position in order to keep 'cooperation alive'?

According to some scholars the conflict in Ukraine bought about a notion of new Cold War and undeniably worsen tense relations between Russia and the western countries. The struggle for influence in Ukraine resulted between 2013 and 2014 into deep internal crisis, growing nationalistic tendencies in the country and eventually annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russian forces and armed conflict in eastern Ukraine (Hove 2017, passim). The conflict consequently brought the OSCE back to the foreground as other

forces seemed to be too controversial to deal with the situation. Furthermore, at that time the OSCE gained its advantages from then Chairmanship of Switzerland, a guarantee of neutral actor. In May 2014 the Permanent Council of the OSCE adopted a decision to deploy a Special Monitoring Missions of international civil observers to Ukraine. The monitors' task is among others to neutrally provide true information on the security situation in the country, namely in the eastern regions which were taken by violence.

In its attempt to secure the transparency within the participating states, is the OSCE under massive pressure which opens a question on whether the organization is capable to balance between its own purpose and the diversity among its members and their interests. The aim of this thesis is to examine the OSCE proceedings regarding conflict of interests among OSCE member states which it may create with its own acts and decisions.

In order to do so I seek to answer following research questions: How does the OSCE deal with the diversity of interests of its key member states? How does the diversity of interests of the key member states affect the OSCE acts and decision? Analysing the issue, I will focus on testing two hypothesis:

H1: In case the OSCE acts may oppose a key member state's interests, the state tends to discredit the organization and its actions. In other words, in case the OSCE openly criticizes the offences and misconduct made by either side providing the strong evidence for its stance based on gathered information, the affected party would tend to discredit the organization's argument and the organization as such.

H2: In case the OSCE acts may oppose a key member state's interests, the organization tends to limit its own acts in order to diminish the conflict of interests. Whereas the bigger the conflict, the weaker the acts of the organization become. Or even though the OSCE may have a strong evidence and could draw the conclusion leading to resolution of a dispute the organization chooses not to openly release them as it may hurt the interests of its member state. Instead, it limits its rhetoric on simple list of statements in fear that the key participating state might reduce its autonomy or restrict its area of operations. In result, the organization stays mute towards violation of its own norms and principles.

The answers to research questions will be introduced trough the content analysis of the official documents published by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and by the statements of its officials. The focus is on the way the mission presents its position towards the concrete critical points or so called hot spots of the conflict that are defined as: 1)

definition of the mandate of the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine and its enforcement and 2) Russian military activity in eastern Ukraine. Specifically, I concentrate on the material and statements used by monitors to provide information that would eventually led to resolution of the conflict in the eastern Ukrainian regions. The final outcomes are expected to reveal whether the organization can draw conclusions that are based on the strong evidence the OSCE itself provided as a neutral actor.

The thesis analyses whether the organization is able to express strong opinion which is based on the facts the OSCE itself considers to be true and as trust-builder to pressure the obvious guilty party into complying with its commitments and if so, how does the actor react to open critics from the OSCE. Or whether the organization remains in the shadows of the authority of a participating state which has a significant influence over its operations.

The thesis is divided into four main sections. The first one provides an introduction into the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, its development, goals and activities; further it reviews the development of the crisis and armed conflict in Ukraine and Russian role in the country and describes the role of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. The second part draws theoretical framework for the thesis, outlining Robert Keohane's functional theory of international regimes in combination with principal-agent model that describes the relations among participating states and an international organization. The third section outlines analytical framework of the analysis of the OSCE rhetoric and the last one presents the outcomes of the analysis.

For the introduction of the topic, the organization and Ukrainian conflict I use official documents of the OSCE and other relevant international organizations (such as UN), academic articles on the issues, public speeches by relevant officials published by the western but also Ukrainian and Russian media and official statements of the actors involved. For drawing the theoretical framework, I use namely relevant scholarly books and academic articles. Analysing the issue and testing the hypothesis I will use mainly the official documents publicly available on the website of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and eventually speeches given by the OSCE mission's personnel available in other media.

2.The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Ukraine

The chapter aims to draw overview about the Organization for Security and Cooperation as such and introduce the development in Ukraine. Firstly, I focus on goals, activities, design and relations among the participating states of the organization. Secondly, I examine the conflict in Ukraine. I provide the overview of situation before the emergence of conflict, its brief development as well as Russian interests in Ukraine and information about the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

2.1 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

2.1.1 The goals of the organization

The Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe was established in 1975 as a forum for political dialogue on wide range of security issue which would connect and namely provide a 'communication bridge' between the West and East during so called Cold War which dominated in Europe after Second World War. The organization emerged as a result of the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in which representatives of 35 Easter, Western and non-aligned countries took part. Since then the membership of the OSCE expanded to other more than 20 states and with its 57 members in Europe, North America and Asia (See Table 1) the organization aspires to become a provider of soft power in the international system (Galbreath 2007, 9).

Table 1 – Membership of the OSCE

Albania	Finland	Luxembourg	Slovenia
Andorra	France	Malta	Spain
Armenia	Georgia	Moldova	Sweden
Austria	Germany	Monaco	Switzerland
Azerbaijan	Greece	Mongolia	Tajikistan
Belarus	Holy See	Montenegro	the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Belgium	Hungary	Netherlands	Turkey
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Iceland	Norway	Turkmenistan
Bulgaria	Ireland	Poland	Ukraine
Canada	Italy	Portugal	United Kingdom
Croatia	Kazakhstan	Romania	United States
Cyprus	Kyrgyzstan	Russian Federation	Uzbekistan
Czech Republic	Latvia	San Marino	
Denmark	Liechtenstein	Serbia	
Estonia	Lithuania	Slovakia	

Source: OSCE, 2017.

The organization pursue to follow a comprehensive security approach, in particular in three dimensions such as politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human rights, all of which are anchored in so called Final Helsinki Act[1], that is the politically binding agreement, signed by participating states of the CSCE. Apart from these areas, or in other words 'baskets', the Final Act also contains the organization's Decalogue which defines its principles and priorities. Six of which focus on namely the politico-military dimension, such as "*sovereign equality* [and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty]*, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention in internal affairs[2]"* (CSCE 1975, 4–5).

---

[1] The Helsinki Final Act is the product of two years negotiations between five different categories of actors: firstly, states which were strong advocates of the Warsaw Pact (USSR); secondly, the Warsaw Pact members concerned of Soviet dominance in the region (e. g. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania); thirdly, neutral actors (e. g. Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland); fourth group consisted of European Community states and finally strong stalwarts of NATO (e.g. USA, UK) (Galbreath 2007, 27).

[2] Decalogue further contains of principles such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

According to Galbreath (2007, 35) in terms of security and military the Final Act in general aims to establish four methods for promoting confidence and security among the participating states. Firstly, it provides members with information about military manoeuvres and movements. Secondly, participation states may observer such military movements by themselves[3]. Thirdly, it focuses on the disarmament efforts and finally, it aims to promote transparency.

As for the other two 'baskets' the Final Act focuses on issues such as trade and industrial cooperation, science and technology or transnational character of pollution, as well as broad concept of the human rights, exchange of information, such as print matter and films, and cultural and educational cooperation (ibid, 36–37; CSCE 1975, passim).

2.1.2 The structure and activities of the OSCE

In the early 90s the CSCE was transformed from a conference to an organization and some of its permanent institutions have been established; in particular the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre and the Office for Free Elections, High Commissioner on National Minorities and Forum for Security and Operation. Additionally, the others such as Permanent Council have been institutionalized (See Table 2). The transformation process was finished on 1994 Budapest summit, where the Heads of State from member states agreed on change the conference to the organization. Nevertheless, the significant feature of the organization remained the loose institutionalism with range of autonomous entities within the OSCE, such as the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions or Human Rights High Commissioner (Galbreath 2007, 45–46; OSCE 2017).

---

co-operation among states and fulfilment in good faith of obligation under international law (CSCE 1975, passim).

[3] The member states are requested to invite other monitors; however, they may define how many and under what conditions these observations can take place (author's note).

Table 2 – Institutional structure of the OSCE

Main OSCE Institutions		
Operational Structures and Institutions		**Decision-making Bodies**

Chairman-in-Office Troika (Vienna)	OSCE Secretariat (Vienna)		Ministerial Councils and Summits
High Comissioner on National Minorities (The Hague)	• Secretary general • Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) • Anti-trafficking Assistance Unit • Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) • External co-operation	• Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities • Gender mainstreaming • Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) • Training Section	Permanent Council (Vienna)
Representative on Freedom of the Media (Vienna)			Forum for Security Co-operation (Vienna)
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw)	OSCE Field Activities (Various states)	OSCE Field Activities (Various states)	Parliamentary Assembly (Copenhagen)

Source: Galbreath 2007, 48.

The main OSCE decision-making bodies are Summit, Ministerial Council, Permanent Council and Forum for Security Co-operation. The priorities of the organization are set by Summits which consists of heads or governments of member states. Additionally, the agenda-setting power is exercised by the Chairman-in-Office and so-called Troika system and the Ministerial Council. The Chairman is a foreign minister of a participating state of the OSCE who is at the top of the OSCE Permanent Council. The official is assisted by Troika consisted of preceding, present and succeeding chairmanships. Main purpose of the Troika is to ensure the consistency of the agenda and adopted initiatives so they won't be dropped after the state is no longer holding the chairmanship mandate (Galbreath 2007, 50).

Unlike the OSCE Summits which take place periodically, the Ministerial Councils meet annually, except the year summit take place, and are consisted of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. According to Galbreath (2007, 59) the decisions made by the council and summit are in general likely to be issue-oriented.

Further, the decision-making power within the organization is exercised by the Permanent Council consisted of the participating states' delegates. The size of the delegation is based on the size of the state and partially on its international influence and additionally

on the importance of the OSCE to the participating state[4]. The Permanent Council is the main agenda-setter of the organization, moreover it also employs the power to deploy missions and field operations of the OSCE and it takes decisions on the budget and other measures of the organisation (ibid, 59; OSCE 2007, 13 – 16).

The Forum for the Security and Cooperation represents one of the heritages of the Cold War; created also in the 90s it aims to deal with the political and security problems of the new post-war era. Its main task among others is to facilitate the information exchange but it also provides several services such as assistance with small arms especially on former Soviet states which are source of both legal and illegal small arms. In addition, it focuses on ammunition which could pose security risks in the conflict but also in environmental degradation. Further, the Forum manages the assistance projects specifically in Belarus and Tajikistan, which were established on the requests of the mentioned states (Galbreath 2007, 60–61).

According to the OSCE Rules of Procedure the bodies of the organization are authorized to take decisions which have only a politically binding character for all the member states. The decisions are taken by consensus which is understood as an "*absence of any objection expressed by participating State to the adoption the decision*" (OSCE 2006, 2). Decisions can be taken during the regular meetings of decision-making bodies of the organization or through so called silence procedure. This means that the decision is adopted within expiration of period of silence, if there is no objection made during such period (ibid, 16).

During Prague Summit in 1991 the OSCE participating states' representatives adopted the first exception to the consensus decision-making rule – so called consensus minus one. This means that in case a state breaks its commitment to the organization, the decision regarding such state can be made without its consent so that a state cannot block the OSCE's measures[5]. Second exception was adopted by the Summit in Stockholm in 1992 – so called consensus minus two. The mechanism concerns the peaceful settlement of disputes whereby the Ministerial Council can "*instruct two participating States that are in*

---

[4] The American and the Russian organization are one of the biggest; the EU member state however, are used to work together, their delegations to the OSCE therefore tend to be smaller (Galbreath 2007, 59).

[5]Such exception was made only in 1992, when the member states suspended Yugoslavia from the organization (OSCE 2007, 14).

dispute to seek consolidation, regardless of whether or not the participation states object to the decision". The option, however, has not been used so far (OSCE 2007, 14).

As mentioned above the OSCE aims to deal with wide range of activities following comprehensive security concept. More specifically, its policy aims to prevent emerging conflicts from escalating by trust building and increasing openness and transparency among actors involved. For such purpose, the organization has developed several mechanisms focusing on promoting democratization and human rights, monitoring and early warning mechanisms, mediation tactics during ceasefire negotiations and security management in post-conflict regions. (Cottey 2001, 50; Galbreath 2007, 66–69).

It carries out a huge number of activities that can be defined as peace operations, according to Kemp (2016, 4) such operations include "*special envoys and mediators; political missions, including peace-building operations; regional preventive diplomacy offices; observations, including both ceasefire and electoral missions; multidisciplinary operations both large and small drawing on civilian, military and police personnel to support peace process implementation*" and so on.

Generally, the OSCE field activities can be divided into three categories: field mission, field centre and field office. The field offices and centres have usually broader mandate than a field mission and focus on managing the cooperation between the OSCE institutions, the Chairman in Office and member state. The missions on the other hand are ordinarily more limited in terms of issue-orientation, size and durations (Galbreath 2007, 55–57).

The vast majority of the filed activities of the OSCE is at the same time geographically focused on post-Soviet countries and former Yugoslavia states. Gawrich (2014, 68) has noted that all of the OSCE institutions executed over 30 missions in more than 20 countries since the beginning of the 90s; 14 of these were focused on the former Soviet republics (See Table 3).

Table 3 – Current activities of the organization

Type	Destination
Mission	Bosnia and Hercegovina
Mission	Kosovo
Mission	Montenegro
Mission	Serbia
Mission	Skopje (Macedonia)
Mission	Moldova
Special Monitoring Mission	Ukraine
Project Co-ordinator	Uzbekistan
Project Co-ordinator	Ukraine
(Boarder) Observer Mission	Checkpoint Gnukovo and Donetsk (RU/UA)
Representative of ChiO	Minsk (Belarus)
Centre	Ashgabat (Turkmenistan)
Office	Astana (Kazakhstan)
Office	Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan)
Office	Dushanbe (Tajikistan)

Source: OSCE, 2017a.

The activities of the organization are paid from unified budget of the OSCE which is funded by all participating states. Table 4 provides an overview of main contributors to the OSCE budget in years between 2012 and 2016. The main contributor are on the long-term basis the United States. Controversially, with the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 some of the participating states begun to increase their subscriptions; this relates to namely some of the members of the European Union such as Germany, Italy or France but also the United Kingdom or Russia.

Table 4 – Contributions by participating state between 2012 and 2016

Contributions by participating state

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
USA	18 655 825	11 065 715	18 553 434	18 362 819	18 322 817
Germany	2 576 781	1 462 746	15 677 727	15 508 383	15 465 020
UK	646 839	286 696	14 679 830	14 679 830	14 651 989
Russia		21 027	5 474 399	5 476 833	5 532 837

Source: OSCE, 2017.

2.1.3 Problems of the OSCE in practice

The emergence of then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe provided the opportunity to create a new and ideal institutional basis for continent-wide security system. The aim to become a greatest provider of security and order in Europe, however, remained according to some scholars unfulfilled, as the eastern Europe states still face real security threats and violent conflicts. Since its appearance the OSCE played a significant role in defining norms and rules of international and domestic behaviour approved by all European states. Additionally, it has developed important position in the areas such as conflict prevention and resolution or arms control. However, at the same time it remains relatively weak, namely in the states of Eastern partnership.

The role of the OSCE decreased almost immediately after the end of Cold War. Though the 1990 Paris Summit extended the norms and principles of the organization and established new OSCE institutions, for example Council of Foreign Ministers or a Secretariat, it failed to push more radical reforms of the organization, such as the revision of consensus model of decision-making which would strengthen its position (Cottey 2001, 45–46; Galbreath 2007, 23).

As Galbreath (2007, 15) noted one of the main obstacles that the OSCE face in particular in Euro-Atlantic region is dense net of the international organizations, such as European Union, NATO or the Council of Europe. Of which majority of European countries are also members. The OSCE with its wide membership involves also NATO members, former Warsaw Pact members, as well as neutral or formerly non-aligned states. Although,

during the Cold War the task and aims of each of these organizations differed and was narrowly defined in social, economic or political dimension, such conditions had changed rapidly in 1990s. Comparing to the OSCE, however, these organizations have one advantage that helped them to build stronger position on the continent; contrary to the OSCE they all are based on the legal commitments that Helsinki Final Act have successfully avoided. In some researchers' opinion thus, the success and failure of the OSCE's mission currently depends to some extend on the diplomatic capabilities and reputation of its rotating Chairmanship (Gawrich 2014, 68).

One of the biggest limitations to the organization's ability to operate on high level is based on the consensus decision-making procedure which in practice provides any member state with power of veto. The weakness of the OSCE was for the first time proved in 1991 when the USSR vetoed the discussion over armed conflict in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania[6], lack of agreement persisted among the CSCE/OSCE members also in case of Yugoslavia which eventually led to strengthening the position of NATO and European Union. Additionally, although the use of low-profiled diplomacy and building the "moral authority" helped to resolve some of the conflicts in the early 1990s, still ongoing conflicts in Georgia, Moldova or Nagorno-Karabakh however point on the limitations of the organization (ibid, 46–47).

Further, the organization also faces the problems regarding the lack of legal binding of the principles, norms, rules and decisions taken by its institutions that led to fragile respect of commitment of some OSCE participating states, namely in post-communist Europe. Cottey (2001, 59) noted that the organization lacks the mechanisms for promotion and enforcement of its own notes. The OSCE nevertheless imposes its will by subtle and often long-lasting political persuasion and low-profile engagement, such practice on the contrary is considered by some scholars as more effective in long-term development.

---

[6] The former Soviet republics proclaimed their independent on the USSR, but Soviet arms intervened and suppressed the pro-independence movement (author's note).

2.2 Ukrainian conflict and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

2.2.1 Situation in Ukraine before the emergence of conflict

Ukraine gained its independency in 1992 which ended more than seventy years lasting domination of the Russian empire. The collapse of the Soviet Union is often considered by Russian politicians to be one of the greatest tragedies in the history of the country. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the dissolution of USSR was a geopolitical catastrophe in which Russia „*voluntarily gave up huge territories to former Soviet republics, including those territories that had historically always belonged to Russia. As a result, twenty-five million of Russians suddenly found themselves outside of their motherland*" (Utkin 2014). Ukraine was in the Russian perspective one of the most important part of the territory and the separation of the two countries was even unthinkable (Magosci 2010, 729–730; Mearsheimer 2014).

During the transformation stage of political system there was established unstable parliamentarism with strong position of a president. The typical figure of the country's internal policy then became governmental instability and frequent elections. The country was divided by many factors and cultural differences caused by historical development of the region. Ukrainian population and consequentially the country can be divided into two parts: the western and the eastern each of which is following its own political, economic but also cultural roots and traditions. Western Ukraine is traditionally pro-western oriented following the heritage of the time when the region was part of the early Lithuanian state and further the Habsburg monarchy until it was annexed and together with eastern Ukraine became a part of the Soviet Union. The eastern regions together with Crimea on the other side were part of Russian empire practically since 17th century. The historical development therefore created a basis for demographic diversity in wide range of factors, such as ethnicity, religion and language that has significant influence over political struggle in the country [7] (Kubicek 2008, 46—51, Magosci 2010, 727–729).

---

[7]Out of 42.9 million population in the country in 2015 were 77 percent of the people ethnic Ukrainians, about 20 percent were Russians who are the biggest minority in the country. Other minorities constituted less than one percent of the population: 0.6 percent of Belarussians, 0.5 percent of Moldovans, 0.5 percent of Crimean Tatars, 0.3 percent of Hungarians, 0.3 percent of Jews and others. Most of the ethnic Ukrainians (about 90 percent) live mainly in the central and north-western part of the Ukraine, less of the Ukrainians live on the

Aside from political instability, Ukrainian population suffered from low standard of living, high unemployment, low incomes and high range of corruption. As in Russia in Ukraine as well the oligarchy class was established. For example, the mandate of former President Viktor Yanukovych was based on the support of businessmen and oligarchs from eastern Donbass regions, who led a half of Ukrainian ministries in 2013 (Magosci 2010, 737).

The opinions on the solutions of the both political and economic problems differ within political spectre but also Ukrainian population itself. While majority of Ukrainians in the western regions considers the West with European Union on top to be true partner of the country, the population in eastern and southern Ukraine with large Russian minority consider the Russian federation to be a guarantee of Ukrainian security and prosperity. These differences are further projected in both internal and foreign policy of the country. Already in 1991 Ukraine agreed on establishing together with Russia and Belarus so called Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS) which later established a platform for economic cooperation and was eventually joined also by most of the Central Asian and Caucasian states. However, the CIS membership was never ratified by Ukrainian parliament and the country therefore remained in the organization as an observer only. On the contrary, Ukraine showed the interest in becoming a part of the European Union and NATO. In 1994 Ukraine became a part of NATO's partnership for peace and even took part in several NATO and United Nations peacekeeping missions, for example in the former Yugoslavia or Lebanon (ibid, 732; NATO 2017).

2.2.2 Development of the conflict

The conflict in Ukraine emerged firstly as a crisis in defining future strategic orientation of the country. The unrests began after series of decisions made by former president Viktor Yanukovych, who eventually refused to sign association agreement with the European Union in 2013. At the top of it, government additionally intended to start

---

contrary in the east and south regions of the country (about 25 percent in Crimea, about 50 percent in Luhansk and Donetsk regions) where Russian minority dominates.

Controversially, an important factor which significantly influence the politics in Ukraine is the language. One of the consequences of the country being part of the USSR is the widespread use of Russian language which speak not only ethnic Russians but also many ethnic Ukrainians the Eastern part of Ukraine, Crimea (only 4 percent of the population on the peninsula consider Ukrainian language as their mother tongue) but also Kiev (See Appendix no 1) (Dezhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrajiny 2015; Demjančuk, Pešková 2006: 47– 49).

negotiations with the Eurasian economic union and Russia. The events triggered massive anti-government protests in Kiev, which eventually led to removal of Yanukovych from his function[8], establishing temporary government, Russian annexation of Crimean Peninsula and emergence of separatists' tensions in eastern Ukraine and proclamation of independence of two Ukrainian regions – Donetsk and Luhansk[9]. The armed clashes between Ukrainian governmental forces and separatists who are supported by Russia continue in the eastern regions till these days (CSIS 2017; Gordon, Larrabee, Wilson 2015, 4–5).

According to the United Nation report the conflict caused since the beginning of the clashes up to May 2017 over 10.000 deaths, about 2700 of which were civilians, and more than 23.900 people were injured. Additionally, more than 1.6 million people fled the territory controlled by rebels, while about tree million people still live there. There is increased number of violations of human rights, including the right to freedom of movement or to fair trial on conflict-related charges. Individuals are often unlawfully deprived of their liberty or abducted. Such cases happen on the both side of the demarcations line, but are more common for the territory under separatists' control (UN 2017).

During the conflict two peace agreements were signed between representatives of Ukraine, Russia, pro-Russian separatists and the OSCE, namely so called first and second Minsk Agreements (or Minsk Protocol and Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements). The first agreements signed in September 2014 the parties agreed on 12 points which defined ambitious peace plan contained of among others these conditions: an immediate bilateral ceasefire which would be monitored by the OSCE, release of all hostages and illegally detained persons and guarantee of their amnesty and withdrawal of all illegal armed groups and military equipment from Ukrainian territory (Gordon, Larrabee, Wilson 2015, 10; OSCE 2014a).

Because of constant clashes and breaking of the first agreement second negations of top leaders were held in Minsk in February 2015[10]. As the result Minsk II Agreement laid out a plan for total ceasefire as well as a long-term plan for broader political concerns by the end of 2015. The agreement included an immediate bilateral ceasefire, the bilateral

---

[8]Violent demonstrations in the metropole and hard repressions by Yanukovych's regime resulted in a rapid loss of president's support within his own Party of Regions (Gordon, Larrabee, Wilson 2015, 5).

[9] The independence was based on referendum held in May 2014 (author's note).

[10] In Minsk II negotiations took part Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko, Russian president Vladimir Putin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Francoise Hollande (author's note).

withdrawal of heavy weapons both monitored by the OSCE, creation of the buffer zone separating both sides, complete amnesty for persons involved in Donbass conflict and release of all hostages but also constitutional reform in Ukraine and adoption of new constitution by the end of 2015. The new constitution would acknowledge a special status of Donbass region in Ukrainian administration and fully decentralise the country (BBC 2015a; OSCE 2015a).

2.2.3 Russian interests and position towards Ukraine

Russian federation and its government with President Vladimir Putin in lead are known for their perception of international affairs in the light of the geopolitical order which means that the world according to Russia is still virtually divided as it was during the Cold War. It is thus very sensitive about any kind of the Western action in so called near abroad, the territory of former Soviet Union in which Ukraine in particular plays the most significant role. Putin considers post-Soviet states to be fragments of "Russian World" in which Russia has full right and even obligation to actively interfere and operate as a security guarantee[11] (Mearsheimer 2014, Utkin 2014).

Using states of near abroad Russia is trying to build a buffer zone which would prevent the expansion of Western political, economic and military alliances, the European Union and NATO in particular, to its close boarders. NATO expansion eastwards brought about tensions between Russian and Western world and the situation was considered by Russian officials as critical namely after 2008 Bucharest summit when NATO members declared that Ukraine and Georgia will eventually become members of the alliance[12] (Mearsheimer 2014).

Additionally, the European Union too made its moves towards integration of Ukraine into the organization. Eastern Partnership initiated in 2008 aimed to foster Ukrainian economy which would further lead to integration of the country into Union. Russia therefore using political and economic pressure in the past several times pushed Ukraine to adopt more

---

[11]The activity consists of both so called humanitarian work, such as spreading of Russian culture or language, and military and economic interference. In 1993, former Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev said that Russia reserved the right of interference in former Soviet republics. Before Ukrainian conflict Russia was militarily active for example in Georgia in 2008 (Beaumont 2014).

[12] Putin then openly declared that the two countries joining NATO would represent a "direct threat" to Russian federation (Mearsheimer 2014).

pro-Russian position after all[13] (ibid; Gordon, Larrabee, Wilson 2015, 5). Unexpected overthrown of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was perceived by Russia as violations of the agreement between Yanukovych and opposition signed in February 2014 and more importantly a coup which enabled Russian officials to ignore newly formed Ukrainian government until presidential elections in May 2014 (Utkin 2014).

As mentioned above Ukraine plays significant role in Russian politics, according to some scholars it is a key part of Putin's plan for establishing an imperial power, thus it could also pose a potential political-ideological threat to what western scholars call Putin's model of authoritarian state capitalism. An independent and democratically oriented Ukraine as completely opposite of Putin's managed democracy would represent dangerous neighbour on Russian boarders. Moreover, Russian project of Eurasian Union has little chance to be successful without Ukrainian membership, not to mention if Ukraine joins the EU (Gordon, Larrabee, Wilson 2015, 3–5).

While using an argument of protection of Russian minority from illegitimated hostile government Russia deployed its soldiers on Crimean Peninsula in February 2014 which eventually led to a speedy referendum and the approval Crimea into the Russian federation. The action, however, had more a strategic aim as Russia was protecting its military positions on the peninsula. After removing Yanukovych from the office Kiev became anti-Russian oriented which now also threaten Russian Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea whose guarantee was namely President Yanukovych[14] (Utkin 2014).

Although, Russia is formally neutral in Ukrainian conflict and considers it to be strictly internal issue, it is the main supporter of separatists' tensions in eastern Ukraine. Russian state officials in their statements regularly criticize Kiev's inability to fulfil Minsk agreements and provide justification of leaders in Donbass. In particular, Russia is advocate of decentralisation and federalisation of Ukraine with legal basis in newly adopted constitution which would also guarantee the regions of Donbass special status with expanded jurisdiction in the administrative system of the country. Additionally, Russia also demands

---

[13]Cancelling negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU by then President Yanukovych in 2013 was considered to be the result of escalating Russian pressure. According to Ukrainian government Ukraine wanted to "fully analyse the impact of the planned agreement" on its trade relations with Russia (CSIS 2013).

[14]After elections in 2010 Yanukovych signed an agreement with Russian then President Dmitry Medvedev which approved the presence of Russian Black Sea Fleet on peninsula. Ukraine received in return more favourable conditions for obtaining Russian gas (Utkin 2014).

to approve Russian language as the second official language in Ukraine, recognizing Crimea as a part of the Russian federation and establishing political and military neutrality of Ukraine (Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii 2017).

The natural resistance of Kiev to some of the suggested above provide Kremlin a solid basis for arguments in the critique of Ukrainian officials who according to official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian federation is unwilling to fulfil Minsk agreement threatening the regulation of the conflict and security in the regions (ibid).

2.2.4 The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

The deployment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) was approved by consensus in March 2014 on the request of the Ukrainian government. Currently it is the only monitoring mission in Ukraine whose mandate enables the observers to enter the entire territory of the country with exception of the Crimean Peninsula. The aim of the mission is to reduce tensions, foster the stability, peace and security and facilitate dialogue between all sides involved. Among others the mission gathers information on security situation in the area, reports facts on specific incidents and monitors respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. To current state in November 2017 the SMM consisted of as many as 1100 unarmed civilian monitors from 44 OSCE member states, about 500 out of which are based in eastern Ukraine and over 600 across the country. The main stuff contributors to mission are the United States (with 57 monitors), the United Kingdom (with 44 monitors) and Russian Federation (with 39 Russian personnel) (Gawrich 2014, 70–71; Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 2017).

According to Dunay (2014, 20—21) the OSCE took the leading role in managing Ukrainian conflict which was given by the increasing tensions between Russia and NATO and EU and sensitive position of Moscow towards operating of these organizations in former Soviet countries. In the perspective of all actors thus the OSCE was considered to be 'lesser evil' which was caused namely by inclusive structure of the organization, its broad agenda in addressing international security and weak instutionalization ensured by consensus-based decision-making with veto power of all members. In addition, as Gawrich (2014, 68) pointed out the organisation in 2014 had also convenient preconditions to open debate and moderate the dialogue on the issue because it was not chaired by a member state involved in conflict or EU member or post-Soviet country. The authorisation of the SMM was thus fostered by the chairmanship of Switzerland which is internationally perceived as neutral broker.

Further, Gawrich (2014, 71) noted that the mandate of the SMM remained soft and was approved by consensus only because it was vague with regard to the Crimea region, even though it should have addressed the whole Ukrainian territory[15]. Apart from SMM the organization strive to build a significant mediating role in negotiating Minsk peace agreements, however, lack of the authority of the organization as such and limitation of the SMM lead to lose compliance of the parties to the treaties.

Nevertheless, the SMM to Ukraine differs from the common understanding of monitoring program which is usually defined as interaction between targeted state and an international organisation. The OSCE mission interacts with Ukrainian government as a primary target of the dialogue, separatist rebels and additionally with Russian government (ibidem, 68–69).

3. Theoretical framework

This chapter will serve as the theoretical background of the thesis. Firstly, I will elaborate on Keohane's functional theory of regimes which has been chosen as a core of the paper. For the further analysis and researching the hypothesis of the thesis so called principal-agent approach will be used. The approach will provide basis for the examination of the causes of the conflict which might occur within the international organisation.

3.1 Functional theory of regimes

The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the regime theory. The regime theorists argue that international regimes provide states with means to overcome or at least reduce the obstacles that they may face in their attempts to cooperate in the anarchical international system. The central issue at the same time is identified as a problem of uncertainty (about partners' behaviour) (Keohane 1984, 92) or in other words transparency or availability of regime-relevant information (Abbott, Snidal 1998, 15; Mitchell 1998, 110). Further, states also face so called transaction costs which are related to costs of negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of an agreement (Abbott, Snidal 1998, 15; Keohane 1984, 89).

Robert Keohane built the functional theory of regimes on the contrary to Realists' and Marxists' theory of cooperation which is based on the concept of hegemony. According

---

[15] The controversy led to various statements by Ukraine, the US, Canada suggesting that mission covers the Crimea peninsula as well, while Russia denied such claims (author's note).

to researchers, cooperation in the international arena is dependent on the existence of strong leadership of hegemonic power. Keohane acknowledges that states are the main actors of international system and anarchical and conflictual nature of international relations. However, he argues that though the dominance of a single power may contribute to international order and appearing of the international cooperation, it is not sufficient condition for its maintenance. The author dismisses the argument that the conflict as an obstacle to cooperation and suggests that cooperation can arise from any conflictual or potentially conflictual situation and can be maintained and facilitated by an international regime (ibid, passim).

John Ruggie (1975, 570) defined an international regime as "*a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states*". More complex and comprehensive definitions was designed by Stephen D. Krasner (1983, 186) who identifies an international regime as "*set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice*".

Analysing actors' behaviour in the international arena Keohane used Realists' model of rational egoism, according to which actors' behaviour is affected by their own interests. Keohane defines rationality as consistent, ordered preferences and constant calculation of costs and benefits of courses of action which are aimed to maximize actors' utility in context of those preferences. Additionally, egoism in his perception means that actors are indifferent to what others gain or lose (Keohane 1984, 27).

Regime theorists argue that international organizations help to overcome uncertainty by monitoring and informational gathering ensuring that way transparency of the cooperation. According to Mitchell (1998, 113) there are two types of transparency based on the content of the information gathered. Firstly, there can be collected regime behaviour/effectiveness related information, such as compliance and enforcement activities; secondly the organisation can monitor the state of the given problem.

Nevertheless, some authors pointed out that the effectiveness of the international organisations depends on the institutional setting and the scope of autonomy and dependence they are employ.

Abbott and Snidal (1998, 9) highlight two advantageous functional characteristics that lead actors to use an international organization as a platform for cooperation – centralisation of the institution ("*concrete and stable organizational structure and an administrative apparatus*") and its independence ("*the authority to act with a degree of autonomy*"), both of which may increase the efficiency of the organisation.

Establishing structure of the international organisation actors create a stable neutral political negotiation forum which would enhance interaction between states and allows members to quickly respond to sudden development. Its procedural setting also creates balance between states with different levels of power, interests or knowledge providing that way the protection for weaker states (ibidem, 10). Structuring the organisation may, further, ease to ensure the monitoring of enforcement of the agreements and provide the information which would induce corrective measures, such as resolution of the dispute or sanctions (Sanchez, Urpelainen 2014, 602).

The independence of the organisation, further, influences agenda setting; an independent organization can initiate the new negotiations and provide new ideas for problem solving. The position of politically neutral third party provides the organization with the advantage in such process by reducing the uncertainty among the states (Abbott, Snidal 1998, 17). Additionally, authors emphasize both importance of the information and differences in their quality. Independent neutral organisation free of national biases can provide truly reliable information which both deters cheating among states and helps members assure other actors of their own compliance (ibid, 20; Sanchez, Urpelainen 2014, 601–602).

3.2 The Principal-Agent Theory

Analysing relations between the participating states and the institutions of the OSCE I use Principal-Agent Model which is based on concept of the delegation of power. Although the model is not derived from Keohane's theory of international regimes it is naturally compatible with it; specifically, while the regime theory is macro theory the model allows to examine different issues regarding the functioning of the international cooperation.

According to Principal-Agent Model the power/authority is delegated from a principal, a state, to an agent, an organization, which empowers the organization to act on behalf of a principal. The relationship between principal and agent is established on the basis of a contract which assures principals' right to grant but also rescind the authority (Hawkins et. al 2006, 7–8).

Such relationship may provide several benefits, namely, for the principals. Firstly, it may help to coordinate mutual decision-making process in cases in which large policy externalities are likely to appear. In such cases neutral coordinating agent may evaluate policy alternatives and reduce transaction costs (ibid, 15-16). Further, principals seek impartial and autonomous agents in order to resolve disputes between themselves and additionally to enforce the approved decisions and to enhance the credibility of their policy commitments (ibidem, 18 - 19).

However, some scholars argue that although agents are expected to behave on behalf of the principals, they are not completely neutral actors. Their preferences thus may systematically differ from those of the principals. They may pursue their own goals in order to either gain more power or to consolidate their reputation; the outcome of their measures nevertheless may not be satisfying for all principals. Hence the basis for the conflict is often the range of the autonomy given by principals to an agent (Conceição-Heldt 2011, 405; Da Conceicao 2010, 1110; Hawkins et.al 2006, 27).

To overcome such difficulties the principals may impose mechanisms of the control which are also established in mutual agreement. Howkins (2006, 27–30) identifies several of such measures: firstly, an agent may be subjected to so called rule-based delegation, when the principals provide an agent with set of concrete instructions on the way an agent should do it job. Secondly, the principals may require the reports which would inform about the agent's actions. According to McCubbins and Schwartz (1984, 166), the monitoring requirements can be distinguished to so called police patrols and fire alarms. The police patrol is more centralized, active and direct mechanism. The principals directly control the actions of an agent in order to find a misuse of power. In police alarms on the contrary the principals rely on parties affected by an agent's actions who may bring the evidence of negligence. Instead of direct examining of the possible individual violations of the PA agreement by an agent, principals create a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable also other affected actors out of PA relationship to examine administrative decisions of an agent.

Additionally, the PA agreement may be contained of institutional checks and balances that prevent agents from opportunistic behaviour or principals may use punishments and rewards for undesired and desired actions of an agent which are typically performed for example by budgetary changes (Hawkins et. al 2006, 29–30). And finally, a principal may choose to delegate a power to an agent whose interests are most likely to correspond to those of the principal. Using careful screening process, the principals may choose the agents "*who are likely to do what they themselves would do if they carried out the task directly*" (ibid, 28).

4. Methodology

The chapters above drew the overview about the current situation in Ukraine which eventually led to conflict between two OSCE participating states – Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Although, Russia denies its direct involvement in military activities in Ukraine, it certainly represents one side of the dispute. Firstly, Russia as well as Ukraine claims its sovereignty over (officially Ukrainian) Crimean Peninsula causing a conflict also among other OSCE member states which were not able to reach compromise over the issue. Secondly, Moscow openly supports and often represents the separatist groups from regions in eastern Ukraine during negotiations, portraying itself as a guarantee of rebels' interests.

That way the Organisation for Security and Co-operation once again became an arena for a dialogue between the West and the East. Providing the neutral information, the OSCE monitoring mission may help to overcome a problem of uncertainty building trust among actors. However, strict mechanisms of control may be detected in the design of the organization which may to certain extend limit its activity. The participating states as principals employ wide range of measures which influence also the OSCE monitors in Ukraine: the mandate of the mission is designed on the basis of rule-based delegation, providing observers with limited set of concrete instructions on the way they should behave. Both police patrol and alarms are used in reviewing monitors' action. Moreover, principals take advantages in check and balances that should prevent mission (and eventually the organization) from taking more radical stance on the issue; whereas the reward for the mission is extension of its mandate in Ukraine (made every six months) and punishment would be the termination of its authority in the country.

This thesis is a single case study which focusing on the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is at same time a most likely case. According to Bennett (2004, 29) a

most likely case is "*one that is almost certain to fit a theory if the theory is true for any cases at all. The failure of a theory to explain a most likely face greatly undermines out confidence in the theory*".

In order to study the relations among the OSCE participating states and the approach of the organization toward conflict between its members, I examine so called hot spots of conflict in Ukraine which represent central critical points of the dispute. Since the fighting in the eastern Ukrainian regions still goes on l will be focusing namely on the period between 2014 and 2017.

Examining the issue and testing the hypothesises on the behaviour of the organization in the situation when the key participating states are in the dispute following their own interests the method of content analysis is used. This research technique is used for "*making replicable and valid interfaces from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use* (Knippendorff 2003, 18) and hence can reveal a complete overview about the attitude the OSCE has taken in the dispute How does the organization operate with information gathered by the OSCE monitors? Does it actively provide any conclusions that would lead to resolution of the dispute even though it may hurt the interests either of parties involved? Or does the organization limit its actions on providing a simple list of observations and stay mute towards violations of its own norms and principles?

As a sampling unit of the analysis from which I make inferences is considered any OSCE official document or report or any speech or interview provided by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission officials regarding to those issues which were selected as a crucial for testing the hypothesises. Since during four years of its operations the OSCE mission has published over thousand reports and provided hundreds of statements I create a random sampled of each kind of used material which are to be further analysed. Further, each sampling unit is coded according to a procedure that is described in one of the following chapters of the thesis. The categorization of a sample may constitute a certain image of the OSCE's rhetoric and stance towards given issue.

Firstly, I focus on the design of the mandate with which the OSCE monitors were provided by participating states. For the OSCE to be successful in its efforts to resolve the dispute between its members I consider the mandate of the mission to be crucial. Violation of missions' authority may be therefore considered to be strong efforts to discredit its capability to fulfil its duties and moreover its goals. The second hot spot I define as the discussions on Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine which Russian state

representatives deny. In Ukrainian perception, however, the Russian federation is an aggressor directly involved in violent acts on Ukrainian territory.

4.1 Data

The main source for the analysis of the OSCE SMM's monitoring activities and stances on the hot spots of Ukrainian conflict I chose namely material published by the OSCE mission, such as daily reports, thematic reports or statements by monitors, which are publicly available and relevant to the topic. During the period between 2014 and 2017 the mission published approximately 1460 daily reports covering the events on the whole territory of Ukraine and several thematic reports on topics such as civilian casualties in eastern Ukraine, restriction of freedom of movement of monitors and other impediments to fulfilment of mission's mandate, conflict-related displacement in Ukraine, access to justice during the conflict, gender dimensions of mission's monitoring, freedom of movement across the administrative boundary line with Crimea and so on.

For the purpose of the analysis I created narrowed dataset contening of several samples that examine the way the organization reacts on fragile relations between several actors, some of which are the OSCE key participating states. Firstly, I created two sample each of 100 OSCE mission's daily reports which usually describe in detail the actions of the SMM monitors and the outcomes of their observations. The content, structure and volume of monitors' daily reports was developing in time the same way as did the conflict. In the first year of the conflict the mission provided on the daily basis the information on the events in other (ten) major Ukrainian cities but as the situation in the rest of Ukraine has become relatively calm the mission has focused on the fights in the eastern regions reporting only major events, such as demonstrations or local elections, in other parts of the country.

In the last two years of the conflict (2016 and 2017) the structure of the daily reports become steadier covering the same set of topics. As the example from May 11, 2017 report shows, almost third of the reports contains information on ceasefire violations and eventually casualties related to military activity:

"*In Donetsk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 180), compared with the previous reporting period (about 510 explosions).*

On the night of 10-11 May, while in "DPR"-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-west.

On the evening and night of 10-11 May the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, one undetermined explosion, two projectiles in flight from west to east, three undetermined explosions, six projectiles in flight from east to west, followed by aggregated totals of one undetermined explosion, ten projectiles in flight (seven east to west, two west to east and one north-west to south-east) and nine illumination flares in vertical flight, all 4-5km east-south-east […]" (OSCE 2017b).

Further, the monitors provide the information on disengagement process and developments in the disengagement areas, as shown in the report from December 20, 2016: *"The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM's access to all three areas remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* The SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.*
The SMM crossed the Zolote-Pervomaisk main road in the disengagement area from north to south and back. Positioned in "LPR"-controlled Zolote-5 (61km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 32 shots of small-arms fire 1km north (assessed as outside disengagement area). […]" (OSCE 2016a).

The third section of the OSCE mission's daily reports contains observations regarding withdrawal of weapons and armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone, as seen in the report from September 29, 2016:
"The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.
Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed six tanks at the known training area in "LPR"-controlled Myrne [...]
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: an IFV (BMP-2) in the yard of a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside of the disengagement area; two armoured personnel carriers (one BTR-3 and one BTR-4) with a mounted heavy machine-gun (30mm) and two armoured vehicles (KOZAK) - one of which was mounted with a heavy machine-gun in government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk)" (OSCE, 2016b).

Additionally, in the end of each report the observers provide gathered information related to other topics, such as the presence of mines and process of demining, situation of civilians living near the contact line, public gatherings in eastern Ukraine but also in other places of the country, observations in border area which is under control of pro-Russian separatists and so on.

Each daily report is concluded with information on restriction of monitors' movement and other impediments to fulfilment of mission's mandate, as shown in report from August 2, 2017:

"*Denial of access:*

Armed men prevented an SMM patrol from proceeding east from an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), for the sixth consecutive day. The SMM informed the JCCC [...]

Delayed access:

Armed men delayed an SMM patrol from proceeding west from an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), for about 40 minutes" (OSCE 2017c).

Each OSCE mission's daily report is about three to four pages long (and about two thousand words per one report). Analysing each hot spot, I examined approximately four hundred pages of the OSCE documents (eight hundred pages in total). Additionally, focusing on violations of the OSCE mandate I examined two thematic reports published by the OSCE observers which contain in total fifty pages. Further, each sample is contained of 45 video records (each about ten to twenty minutes long, in total approximately six hundred minutes long record) of so called weekly updates provided by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission Principal Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug in the period between 2014 and 2017.

4.2 Operationalization

Analysing the conflict in Ukraine I chose two hot spots of the dispute, solution of which may have significant impact on both Ukraine and pro-Russian separatist groups, Russian Federation respectively. Firstly, I will analyse the design of mandate of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the attitude all sides to its fulfilment and possible obstacles they may put to monitors in order to achieve its own goal. The OSCE mission consists of civilian observers who are information gatherers without any means to enforce its authority. Additionally, its power may be restricted in disputed regions such as annexed

Crimean Peninsula which both Ukraine and Russia consider to be part of its own territory. Secondly, I will analyse the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission's actions and efforts to clarify the dispute over alleged Russian military assistance to separatist in so called Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics in eastern Ukraine. According to Ukrainian authorities, Russia provides military equipment to separatists and Russian military personnel serve in the region. Moscow denies such allegations and the conflict considers to be an internal dispute. According to its officials, however, Russia provides with humanitarian aid the people living in the eastern regions.

Analysing the OSCE efforts to resolve the dispute namely between Russian Federation and Ukraine I will focus on the information gathered by the Special Monitoring Mission in their daily reports and other thematic materials publish by the observers between 2014 and 2017. In publicly available written reports I will identify the statements regarding mission's mandate restrictions and military activity in the area which is under pro- Russian separatists' control. As one statement in written material I define one paragraph in the text related to concrete topic. As one statement in audio and video documents I define one particular case or event mentioned by the person.

Further, I will focus on two characteristics of each statement that are defined based on the answers to two questions: 1) Is the statement a neutrally formulated information describing the situation/issue? (Yes – 1; No – 0), 2) Does the statement provide clear evaluating information on the issue which may eventually lead to establishment of guilty party? (Yes – 1; No – 0).

5. Case Study: The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

In this part of the thesis I analyse the performance of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (SMM) during almost four years of the conflict in the eastern part of the country. In the analysis I focus on the critical points or in other word hot spots of the conflict that may in any case influence its outcome and at the same time the interests of the OSCE participating states (namely Russian Federation and Ukraine). Specifically, I examine the stances and reports of the OSCE SMM on restrictions of the mission's mandate which was approved unanimously by the OSCE participating states. This critical point has two dimensions: the first dimension is related to the restrictions of movement of the OSCE monitors which is guaranteed in the OSCE SMM's mandate; the second dimension is related to the problem of Crimean Peninsula which both Ukraine and Russia consider to its territory.

Further, the second critical point is regarded to alleged activity of the Russian military troops and military support to pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine which Moscow resolutely denies.

5.1 The mandate of the OSCE Mission as the source of its authority

The Organization of Security and Co-operation is currently the only one international organization provided with the right to send its own civilian monitors who are neutral and impartial observers of the situation on the ground. Therefore, analysing the critical points of the conflict the SMM might be perceived as one, if not the only one, of the most significant provider of sufficient, complete and relevant information on the situation in the region where fights take place as well as in the whole Ukraine. To be able to do so the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) has been provided with strong authority based on the mandate approved by all the OSCE participating states and allegedly respected by all sides involved in the conflict which means Ukraine, Russia and pro-Russian rebels, as well as other powerful members of the organization, such as some members of the European Union or the United States. Analysis of the mission's operations in Ukraine, however, shows that the SMM has major problems with enforcement of its authority with monitors facing movement restrictions and direct threats from actors involved in the conflict.

Officially, the OSCE participating states have provided the SMM monitors with authority to enter the whole territory of the Ukraine, in order to:
- *"Gather information and report on the security situation in the area of operation;*

- *Establish and report facts in response to specific incidents and reports of incidents, including those concerning alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principals and commitments;*
- *Monitor and support for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of person belonging to national minorities;*
- *Report on any restrictions of the monitoring mission's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*"[16] (OSCE 2014b).

Additionally, with accordance with Minsk peace agreements the SMM observers monitor ceasefire regime and verifies the withdrawal of heave weapons (OSCE 2015a, OSCE 2015b).

Reporting on the SMM's mandate violations the SMM monitors provide detailed information on restrictions on the freedom of movement of the mission's personnel as well as security threads as the sides involved in the conflict supposed to ensure safe and secure access to the area where monitors operate. The SMM divides the restriction of the movement of the mission into four categories: full denial of access, conditional access which is reported as an access to an area only after accepting certain conditions (such as being escorted, presenting documents like national passports of SMM monitors or being subjected to vehicle searches), delay in providing the access to the area (reported on the occasion when the waiting time was deemed longer than reasonable) and other impediments such as obstructions of the technical capabilities of the SMM or reluctance to cooperate with monitors. As for the security threats, the monitors mostly face shelling or shooting or the

---

[16] Further, the monitors "*establish contact with local, regional, and national authorities, civil society, ethnic and religious groups, and members of the local population* [in order to fulfil the goals and tasks of the SMM]; [the monitors] *facilitate the dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promo normalization of the situation*", and "*Co-ordinate with and support the work of the OSCE executive structures, including the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, in full respect of their mandates, as well as co-operate with the United Nations, the Council of Europe and other actors of the international community*" (OSCE 2014b).

anger of mines, unexploded ordnance or other exploded devices in the area near SMM operations[17] (OSCE 2016c, unpaged).

The SMM reported about 500 incidents every six months during second two years of the conflict, most of which have occurred in the regions which are under control of the pro-Russian rebels (See tables 5–9). At the same time, in the second half of year 2017 the mission reported roughly 40 percent increase in incidents involving violence and threats against or in the presence of the SMM (OSCE 2016c, unpaged; OSCE 2017d, 1–3).

Table 5 – Types of restrictions of movement of the SMM between January and June 2016


(OSCE 2016c, unpaged).

---

[17] The most serious incident happened in April 2017: one of the member of SMM died and two others were injured after the explosion of one of the SMM patrol vehicles which most probably came into contact with mine (OSCE 2017d).

**Table 6 – Types of restrictions of movement of the SMM between January and June 2017**

(OSCE 2017d,3).

Table 7 – Freedom of movement restrictions by area between January and June 2016


(OSCE 2016c, unpaged).

Table 8 – Freedom of movement restrictions by area between July to December 2016

(OSCE 2017d, 19).

Table 9 – Freedom of movement restrictions by area between January and June 2017

(OSCE 2017d, 1).

5.1.1 The restrictions of the SMM's mandate

Analysing the SMM policy on the subject I created a sample consisted of one hundred out of approximately 1460 daily reports published in period between 2014 and 2017 and two annual reports which have been published on the topic during four years of the conflict. Additionally, I used sample of 45 video records (each of approximately ten to twenty minutes long) of so called weekly updates provided once in two weeks by SMM's Principal Deputy

Chief Monitor Alexander Hug published by Ukraine Crisis Media Center in the same period[18].

The tables 10 and 11 attached below show that analysing daily reports I identified in total 424 neural facts describing situation on the ground where fighting takes place. As the conflict evolved number of violations and impediments to fulfilment of SMM mandate rose: out of 424 statements on restriction on freedom of movement of monitors only six were reported in 2014, 74 of them were in 2015, 168 in 2015 and 176 in 2017[19]. Analysing the character of the mission's statements I identified a zero number of clear evaluating information providing any conclusion on the issue.

The rise of restriction of fulfilment of the OSCE mission's mandate is further documented in the only two annual reports on the issue in 2016 and 2017. In the two thematic reports on the restrictions of movement the mission has faced I identified in total 99 neutral facts that described the concrete incidents and over all situation on the ground and a zero number of clear evaluating information which would provide a conclusion on the issue. Seventeen of those neutral facts were recorded in 2016, other 82 in 2017.

Further, analysing weekly updates by the SMM's Principal Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug I identified in total 84 neutral facts in 45 recorded media updates. Zero of Hug's statements provided any clear evaluation information, a conclusion on the issue or a significant criticizing comment on the actions of either of the sides. Zero of 84 neutral facts were identified during updates in 2014, 24 in 2015, 22 in 2016 and 38 in 2017.

Table 10 – The OSCE reports and statements

	Daily reports	**Annual reports**	**A. Hug**
neutral facts (total per 4 years)	424 (100 reports)	99 (2 reports)	84 (45 updates)
critical statement (total per 4 years)	0	0	0

---

[18] The whole sample of 45 video records is approximately 600 minutes long (author's note).

[19] The rise of such restrictions to SMM's mandate is also evident on the way the monitors report them and the structure of daily reports. While in the first year of conflict the observers simply described the situation they observed, with the growth of various violations in years that followed the category gained its own sections below the report (author's note).

Table 11 – Number of neutral facts reported in four years

	Daily reports	Annual reports	A. Hug
2014	6/424	0	0/84
2015	74/424	0	24/84
2016	168/424	17/99	22/84
2017	176/424	82/99	38/84

5.1.2 Crimean Peninsula and the SMM's mandate

In addition to countless violations of the SMM mandate and obstacles that monitors face in eastern Ukraine on the daily basis the OSCE as such was not able to resolve the controversy regarding the Crimean Peninsula which became disputed region after its annexation by Russia in March 2014.

Annexation of Crimea became one of the most significant milestones of the conflict in Ukraine that served as cause for the escalation of the crisis in the country, raising separatism and bursting out the violence in the east and other parts of Ukraine. The referendum on the independence of Crimea was not only considered to be illegitimate by all OSCE members, apart from Russia, but also was highly criticized by then Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs and the OSCE Chair Didier Burkhalter. The form of the referendum was rejected by the OSCE Chairman before it even took place; Bulkhalter highlighted that the voting was in contradiction to Ukrainian Constitution (OSCE, 2014c). However, the peninsula and its cities were not directly stipulated in any of the OSCE documents regarding the monitoring mission and the organization was not able to secure the SMM monitors an entrance to Crimea with Russia denying it (Reuters 2014a).

The Ukrainian government considers the events in Crimea in February and March 2014 to be Russian invasion which eventually led to illegal annexation and temporary occupation of Crimean Peninsula[20]. According to Ukrainian officials the Russian actions

---

[20] At the end of February 2014 Russian military reinforced the position of the Russia's Black Sea Fleet with new warfare and military personnel. Shortly after that armed men in unmarked army uniforms have seized Crimean parliament and took control over other administrative buildings, including two airports on the peninsula. Russian president Vladimir Putin at that time denied that armed men in unmarked army uniforms were members of Russian military but eventually he had admitted that they were Russian soldiers. Additionally, in 2015 Putin revealed that plan to annex peninsula was approved weeks before military seized the strategic positions and buildings in the region. In March 2014 Russian parliament approved the official invasion of

were an open act of military aggression leading to breaking of the international law and other obligations to which Russia has made a commitment, including the fundamental OSCE principles (Prokopchuk 2018).

The status of the peninsula has become the reason of conflict among the OSCE participating states in which Ukraine, the US and the EU members are strong advocates of territorial integrity of Ukraine and therefore consider Crimea to be a part of SMM mandate[21]; and Russia who considers peninsula to be an integral part of its own territory and refuses to allow any OSCE monitors there since March 2014 (OSCE 2014d, Reuters 2014a). The delegation of Russian Federation to OSCE as well as other Russian officials constantly argued that Crimea is no longer part of Ukraine and that the SMM observers have no mandate for their work in the region. Russian representatives to the OSCE as well as Russian Foreign Ministry several times highlighted the geographical area of deployment and activity of the SMM observers which is covered in the mission's mandate as ten Ukrainian cities. They therefore dismissed the calls for allowing monitors to enter the Crimean Peninsula (Kelin 2014a, Novosti Kryma 2014).

According to Russian representatives to the OSCE was the referendum held in Crimea expression of "*the right to self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and numerous basic international legal instruments*" (Kelin, 2014b) and at the same time in Helsinki Final Act commitments. In Russian rhetoric the procedure was democratic as it came from the initiative of Crimean legal authorities, Russian representatives also often point out that such expression of free will has been done so without any use of force (ibid, Putin 2014)[22].

Russian permanent representative to the OSCE Alexandr Lukashevich in his interview to Russian news agency RIA Novosti in 2016 highlighted that Crimea is an integral

---

Ukrainian territory arguing that lives of Russian nationals living in the region are under a threat. On March 16 the Crimean officials held a referendum on joining the Russian Federation and on March 18 Putin signed a bill recognizing the peninsula as part of the Russian territory. According to Ukrainian officials the following referendum was not only illegal but also held "*under the barrels of Russian guns*" (BBC Russkaja Sluzhba 2014, BBC 2015b, Euromaidan Press 2015, Reuters 2014b).

[21] During the extraordinary meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council in March 2014 Ukrainian Ambassador to the OSCE Ihor Prokopchuk has asked for international mission of observers, including those from the OSCE, to be send to Crimea for the first time (Prokopchuk 2014).

[22] According to Russian officials more than 96 percent of the electorate have voted in favour of reuniting the peninsula with Russian Federation with the turn out over 83 percent (author's note).

part of Russia and added that the SMM monitors are highly aware of that fact. According to Lukashevich the international observers understand that they have no right to operate on the Crimean territory which is the reason why the OSCE won't ask for the access to the peninsula (Lukashevich 2016).

These arguments go in accordance with Kremlin's policy. In his speech to both champers of the Russian parliament and other Russian representatives in March 2014 the president Vladimir Putin has insisted on the legality of the procedures in Crimea. According to Putin were Russians living in Crimea in danger which was caused by political coup in Kiev which forced Russia into action. He argued that Ukrainian government attempted to deprive Russian nationals of their rights, they suffered from the constant political and state crisis and became the victims of strengthening Russophobia. Russian president also dismissed the argument that Russia and Crimea broke the international law and stressed out that the declaration of the independence of Crimea was in accordance with United Nations Charter which ensures the right of nations self-determination[23] (Putin 2014, Welsh 2014, 31).

5.1.3 The OSCE SMM and neutrality

The reports by OSCE Special Monitoring Mission are characteristic of absolute absence of any king of criticism of either actor involved or any evaluating comments on collected information. In the daily reports monitors publish only rough list of observed violations appeared on the ground, even though in some cases it is possible to identify more or less obvious guilty par, as it is seen bellow:

"*Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-

---

[23] Putin based his argumentation on the fact that Ukraine used the right to self-determination after the dissolution of the USSR and on so called Kosovo precedent during which the West approved unilateral separation of Kosovo region from Serbia and considered it to be legitimate (Putin 2014).

Russian Federation international border, particularly those controlled by the "LPR", have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM" (OSCE 2015c).

The strict neutrality is even more evident in both annual reports on restrictions of freedom of movement of the SMM's monitors. In the documents the monitors state that for the 70 to 80 percent of violations of SMM's mandate in the eastern Ukraine are responsible separatist groups. Although, there is possible to find some conclusions on misbehaviour of actors involved, the SMM uses a general term 'perpetrators' to name them avoiding direct identification of guilty party (OSCE 2016c, unpaged).

Possible vague critics of the rebels can be found in the thematic report from 2017, in which the mission addressed the problem of boarder security as the pro-Russian separatists hold control over part of the boarders between Ukraine and Russian Federation. The observers noted that "*border security remains a matter of national sovereignty and responsibility of States, and instrumental in preventing cross-border movement of persons, weapons and funds connected with criminal activities.60 By denying the Government access to about 400km of the border, those in control of these areas continued to interfere with this OSCE principle*" (OSCE 2017d, 11).

Rather than directly addressing either of the actors, the SMM observers criticize the work of so called Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC), the special group focused on controlling the implementation of Minsk agreements which until December 2017 consisted of Ukrainian and Russian representatives[24]. The JCCC is also responsible for ensuring effective monitoring and verification by the SMM and responding to impediments the SMM observers face. In 2016 thematic report the mission highlighted the lack of an effective and rapid response by the JCCC to reported violations and a passive approach by the centre which responded mostly in letters informing the relevant actors about the incidents and reminding them about the SMM's mandate in Ukrainian territory. Same rhetoric is evident in thematic report from 2017, as according to the observers the JCCC seemed to accept the restrictions of the SMM's mandate as a norm, namely in areas not controlled by the Ukrainian government. The monitors blamed the JCCC of not being able to adequately react on majority of the incidents, taking not enough action to decrease the danger of mines

---

[24] In December 2017 Russia announced its intention to withdraw its officers from the JCCC in Donbass. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Ukrainian government created "unbearable environment" for the Russian representatives with the aim to shut down the centre (Unian 2017).

and other unexploded ordnances and inability of Ukrainian and Russian representatives to make joint decisions (ibid, passim; OSCE 2016c, passim).

The stringent neutrality of the SMM observers is the most evident in the weekly updates by the Principal Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug. Alike as in the daily reports most of the time Hug would provide a list of incidents the mission has already informed about. The monitor usually addresses all actors involved and highlight the importance of the monitors' freedom of movement saying that without unconditional access the SMM cannot monitor and verify the facts and provide any true information on the situation on the ground (Hug 2015, Hug 2016).

One of Hug's strongest statements that underline the meticulous neutrality and impartiality was on answering the question of Crimean journalist who pointed out that according to Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov the SMM in one of its reports confirmed that Ukrainian government was guilty of February's 2017 escalation of fighting in Donbass. Deputy Chief Monitor has firmly refused such claims saying that "*the OSCE SMM does not point fingers at any side.* […] *We establish and report facts on the ground and these facts are available to everyone publicly on our website every day and it's up to our readers to draw conclusions and it's their conclusions and it's not the SMM's conclusions*" (Hug, 2017).

5.2 Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine

After Russian annexation of Crimea nationalist tensions have emerged in the eastern Ukrainian region Donbass, consisted of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, which has been taken by violent demonstrations. In the beginning of April 2014 pro-Russian protesters have seized the governmental buildings, confiscated lethal weapons and eventually declared independence of Donetsk region and forming of the people's republic. Additionally, the leaders of so called DPR have urged Russian government to send troops to the region as a peacekeeping force, although there was no imminent threat to the security of the region. Such development led to accusations by Kiev supported by the Western countries that Moscow have encouraged the revolt in Donbass trying to replicate the Crimean scenario (RBK 2014a; Herszenhorn, Roth 2014).

According to Ukrainian and the US officials many of the strategic location of towns seized by the protesters are the evidence of the deliberate sparking off violence. Kiev and the Western countries pointed out that the government buildings were seized by well-

organized and well-equipped professionals wearing military uniforms without identifying insignia comparing the situation to initial steps Russia took during the annexation of Crimean Peninsula and arguing that Russian government deliberately organized the unrest in the eastern Ukraine in order to further destabilize the country (Grant 2014, 5; Power 2014, 4; Sergeyev 2014, 13).

As the conflict was the developing Western and Ukrainian authorities accuse Russia of continuing to supply pro-Russian separatists in Donbass with weapons and arms. With time the separatists have become increasingly well-equipped and capable. Besides weapons captured or looted from Ukrainian military some analysts argued that the rebels are provided with older Soviet weaponry along with rarely exported recently developed Russian arms, such as self-loading VSS rifles, light machine guns PKP, Soviet era anti-tank rifles, MRO-A disposable incendiary rocket launcher systems and so on (Bender 2014). The Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg condemned Russia's military supplies to separatists calling it an act of aggression: "Russian Federation continues to supply separatists in the Eastern Ukraine with modern weaponry, air defence and military personnel – this is an act of aggression" (Stoltenberg 2015).

While denying direct involvement in fighting in eastern Ukraine, addressing the violence in Donbass Moscow usually builds its argument on the events taken place in early 2014 in Kiev that according to Russian officials created dangerous environment to Russian nationals living in the country. Russia argues that people in Donbass face threats from various far-right activists and neo-Nazis who took control over the Ukrainian government. In May 2014 for instance Russian Foreign Ministry accused Ukrainian military of "cleansing in some populated areas" in Donbass, labelling Ukrainian armed forces as so-called punishers (karateli), the term used in context to Nazi violence against civilians on occupied territory (Pynnöniemi 2016, 72–73; Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii 2014a).

As well as in case of Crimea Russian officials often point out that Moscow has right to protect those Russian nationals living on Ukrainian territory. Claiming that Russia is receiving "many requests to protect peaceful civilians" Russian authorities have argued that Kiev has "no control over the situation in the country," and that "Russia is aware of its responsibility for the lives of compatriots and nationals in Ukraine and reserves the right to defend these people" (ibid, 100; Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii 2014b). Although Russia denies military support or involvement of Russian military troops in eastern

Ukraine, Russian officials insisted that if there are any Russian officers operating in Donbass they are volunteers who are not paid by Moscow. During annual press conference in 2015, however, Russian President Vladimir Putin has admitted Russian military presence in Donbass insisting there are no regular troops. "We have never been saying that there (in Ukraine) were no people who carried out certain tasks including in the military sphere but that does not mean that there are regular military troops. See the difference!" said the president (RBK 2015).

5.2.1 The OSCE and military activity in eastern Ukraine

Analysing the SMM's approach towards the issue I created a sample consisted of one hundred out of approximately 1460 mission's[25] daily reports in period between 2014 and 2017 and a sample of 45 approximately 10 to 15 minutes long video records of so called weekly updates provided once in two weeks by the SMM's Principal Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug published by Ukraine Crisis Media Center in the same period. In both daily reports and Hug's speeches I focused specifically on any military movement the SMM's observers detected in on the territory under pro-Russian rebel's control, including movement of already reported military equipment, and information about military personnel wearing military uniforms without identifying insignia. Searching the answer on whether a statement was critical or provided clear evaluating information in this particular case, I asked whether the SMM was able to provide a clarification on the issue, whether it supports either of side's stance or provide its own position on the issue.

The tables 12 a 13 attached below show that analysing daily reports I identified in total 158 neutral facts regarding military movement on the territory under separatists' control. As the conflict evolved the number of statements on the military activity in the region rose: out of 158 statements only five were reported in 2014, 59 out of them were reported in 2015, 52 in 2016 and 42 in 2017. Analysing the character of the statements I identified a zero number of evaluating information that would provide a conclusion on the issue.

Further, analysing weekly updates by the SMM's Principal Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug I identified in total 54 neutral facts in 45 recorded media updates. Zero of Hug's statements provided clear evaluation information, conclusion on the issue or

---

[25] The whole sample of 45 video records is approximately 600 minutes long (author's note).

significant criticizing comment on the actions of either of sides. Two of 54 neutral facts were identified in 2014, 15 out of 54 were identified in 2016 and 24 of them in 2017.

Table 12 – The OSCE reports and statements

	Daily reports	**A. Hug**
neutral facts (total per 4 years)	158 (100 reports)	54 (45 updates)
critical statement (total per 4 years)	0	0

Table 13 – Number of critical facts reported in four years

	Daily reports	**A. Hug**
2014	5/158	2/54
2015	59/158	15/54
2016	52/158	13/54
2017	42/158	24/54

6. Conclusion

The crisis in Ukraine once again brought about an armed conflict to Europe opening this way a space for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. As the platform that connects both western allies and the Russian Federation the organization was able to deploy the only mission that has a mandate to operate in the eastern Ukrainian regions where the fighting takes place as well as in the rest of Ukrainian territory. The OSCE as agent however faces a massive pressure: firstly, it has to stay true to its purpose ensuring that the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is able to fulfil its goals which would eventually lead to de-escalation and resolution of the conflict; secondly, it must be careful not to exceed its authority as it is limited by wide range of measures that were imposed by all participating states as principals with each one of them possessing the veto power.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the OSCE proceedings regarding conflict of interests among the OSCE member states which it may create with its own acts and decisions. How does the OSCE deal with the diversity of interests of its key member states? How does the diversity of interests of the key member states affect OSCE acts and decision?

For the purpose of the analysis, I conducted a content analysis of more than 250 official documents and other records on the issue. Specifically, I was focusing on the two so

called hot spots of the conflict – the mandate of the OSCE mission as such and Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine; and the way the organization deals with the problems. Examining the OSCE operations I assumed that two possible scenarios may occur:

H1: In case the OSCE openly criticizes the offences and misconduct made by either side providing the strong evidence for its stance based on gathered information, the affected party would tend to discredit the organization's argument and the organization as such.

H2: Even though the OSCE may have a sufficient evidence and could draw the conclusion leading to resolution of a dispute the organization chooses not to openly release them. Instead, it limits its rhetoric on simple list of statements in fear that the key participating state might reduce its autonomy or restrict its area of operations. In result, the organization stays mute towards violation of its own norms and principles.

The results of the analysis show that in case of the restrictions of the OSCE SMM's mandate the OSCE may possess a sufficient evidence that Russia backed separatists are at most of the time responsible for violations of monitors' authority. The SMM monitors however decline to stress that out even though it follows from their daily reports and other materials on events in the eastern regions. The observers usually highlight that both sides committed several violations urging them at the same time to abide the mission's authority. Specifically, in case of the restrictions of freedom of movement of monitors which is guaranteed in the mission's mandate the SMM avoids any kind of criticism of either of the side and instead addresses so called JCCC, a special group focused on controlling the implementation of Minsk peace agreements, criticizing its lack of effective response on the issue.

In addition, the OSCE stays mute towards the violations of its mandate in Crimean Peninsula which is according to most of the participating states under Russian occupation. The organization was not able to specify the status of the peninsula in the SMM's mandate and although most of the OSCE members considers Crimea to be Ukrainian territory the mission and the organization show no effort to impose its authority in the region.

That way the analysis has confirmed the hypothesis number two as the organization does indeed limit its rhetoric and eventually its actions towards the issue even though it has a strong evidence that could build a sufficient basis for such decisions. In result the OSCE officials stay mute towards violations not only own norms (e. g. the SMM mandate) but also its principles in general (e. g. refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states in case of Crimea).

Further, the organization avoids the discussion on the Russian military involvement in the eastern Ukrainian regions as it provides no stance on the issue. Even though the OSCE missions is the only mission operating in the area and has observed military equipment of pro-Russian rebels on the several occasions it provides no details on its origin. It did not confirm or deny any allegations rose by either of the side or provide its own argument or comments on the issue. Monitors' actions are limited merely on notification of military movement in the region or observations of number of arms possessed by the separatists.

The attitude of the OSCE toward the issue once again confirms the second hypothesis as the organization distances itself from the topic as it constitutes a major cause of the conflict between the Russian federation and Ukraine and eventually Western allies.

To sum up, in dealing with the diversity of interest of key members of the organization the OSCE stays obsessively neutral actor. Such decision may be caused by the fear of the consequences as the participating state have a wide range of control measures, for example in case of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine it is time limited mandate that could not be extended if the observers damaged the interests of either side as all OSCE members exercise a veto power. The OSCE therefore limits its own autonomous actions in order to diminish the conflict of interest of its members and in its effort to keep the cooperation alive it provide a platform for negotiations between the member than rather leading the path of the events.

List of References

Monographies and Chapters

Bennet, A., 2004. Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages. In Sprinz, D. F. & Wolinsky-Nahmias, Y. eds., *Models, numbers, and cases: methods for studying international relations*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 19—55.

Cottey, A., 2001. The OSCE: crowning jewel or talking shop?. In Smith, M. A. & Timmings, G. eds., *Uncertain Europe Building a New European Security Order?*, London: Routledge, pp. 43—61.

Demjančuk, N. & Pešková, M., 2006. Ukrajina a Ukrajinci dnes. In Pešková, M., *Slovanské národy dnes*, Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, pp. 45–53.

Dunay, P., 2014. The OSCE in the East: The Lesser Evil. In Nünlist, Ch. & Svarin, D. eds., *Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis*. Zurich: Center for Security Studies, pp. 17-22.

Galbreath, D.J., 2007. *The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, New York: Routledge.

Hawkins, D.G., Nielson, D.L. & Tierney, M.J., 2006. *Delegation and agency in international organizations.* D. A. Lake, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press.

Keohane, R.O., 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Krippendorff, K., 2004. *Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology* 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

Kubicek, P., 2008. *The History of Ukraine,* London: Greenwood Press.

Larrabee, S., Gordon, J. & Wilson, P.A., 2015. *The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR903/RAND_RR903.pdf [Accessed May 06, 2018].

Magosci, P.R., 2010. *A history of Ukraine: the land and its peoples*. 2nd, rev. and expanded ed. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.

Pynnöniemi, K., 2016. The Metanarratives of Russian Strategic Deception. In Pynnöniemi, K. & Rácz, A. eds., *Fog of falsehood: Russian strategy of deception and the conflict in Ukraine*. Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti, pp. 71—119.

Periodical Articles

Abbott, K.W. & Snidal, D., 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), pp.3–32.

Da Conceição, E., 2010. Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics. *Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 48 (4), pp. 1107—1126.

Da Conceicao-Heldt, E., 2011. Variation in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round. *Journal Of European Public Policy*, 18 (3), pp. 403—419.

Gawrich, A., 2014. Emerging from the Shadows - The Ukrainian-Russian Crisis and the OSCE's Contribution to the European Security Architecture. *Die Friedens-Warte*, 89 (1/2), pp. 59—80.

Hove, M., 2017. The Emergence of the New Cold War: The Syrian and Ukraine Conflicts. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 22 (2), pp. 135—156.

Krasner, S.D., 1982. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. *International Organization*, 36 (2), pp. 185—205.

Kemp, W., OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments. *International Peace Institute*. Available at: https://www.ipinst.org/2016/06/osce-peace-operations [Accessed December 12, 2017].

Mearsheimer, J. J., 2014. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. *Foreign Affairs*, 93 (5), pp. 77—89.

McCubbins, M. & Schwartz, T., 1984. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms. *American Journal Of Political Science*, 28 (1), pp. 165—179.

Mitchell, R. B., 1998. Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes. *International Studies Quarterly*, 42, (1), pp. 109–130.

Ruggie, J. G., 1975. International Responses To Technology: Concepts and Trends. *International Organization*, 29 (3), pp. 557—584.

Sanchez, T. & Urpelainen, J., 2014. A Strategic Theory of Effective Monitoring Arrangements for International Institutions. *Journal Of Theoretical Politics*, 26 (4), pp. 599—628.

Welsh, S., 2014. Putin Lays Out Strategic Import of Crimea Annexation. *Executive Intelligence Revue*, 41 (13), pp.24—35.

Utkin, S., 2014. The Ukrainian Crisis: Russia's Official Position and How the Situation Can Be Resolved. *Russian International Affairs Council*. Available at:

http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-ukrainian-crisis-russia-s-official-position-and-how-the-/ [Accessed December 12, 2017].

Online Sources

BBC, 2015a. Ukraine crisis: Leaders agree peace roadmap. *BBC News*. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31435812 [Accessed May 6, 2018].

BBC, 2015b. Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot. *BBC News*. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

BBC Rossijskaja sluzhba, 2014. Putin: nashi vojennye "vstali za spinoj" samooborony Kryma. *BBC Rossijskaja sluzhba.* Available at: https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/04/140417_putin_phone_line [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Beaumont, P., 2014. Russia makes latest high-risk move to keep pieces of its 'near abroad' in check. *The Guardian.* Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/russia-moves-keep-near-abroad-soviet-states-in-check [Accessed May 06, 2018].

Bender, J., 2014. Here Are All the Russian Weapons Separatists Are Using In Ukraine. *Business Insider.* Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-weapons-separatists-using-in-ukraine-2014-11 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

CSCE, 1975. Helsinki Final Act. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act [Accessed September 1, 2017].

CSIS, 2017. The Ukraine Crisis Timeline. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. Available at: http://ukraine.csis.org/kyiv.htm#2 [Accessed January 3, 2018]

Euromaidan Press, 2015. Chronology of the annexation of Crimea. *Euromaidan Press.* Available at: http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/03/05/chronology-of-the-annexation-of-crimea/ [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Grant, M.L., 2014. 7154th meeting Sunday, 13 April 2014. *Security Council Report*. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7154.pdf [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Herszenhorn, D. & Roth, A., 2014. In East Ukraine, Protesters Seek Russian Troops. *The New York Times.* Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/world/europe/russia-crimea-ukraine-unrest.html [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Hug, A., 2015. OSCE SMM. Ukraine Crisis Media Center, 29th of October 2015. *Ukraine Crisis Media Center Youtube channel.* Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nFC_OqIokfM [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Hug, A., 2016. General update on OSCE SMM activity and the security situation in Ukraine. *Ukraine Crisis Media Center Youtube channel.* Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YH-Y8hiN-4k [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Hug, A., 2017. Weekly updates from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. *Ukraine Crisis Media Center Youtube channel.* Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtBSkcW5k8A [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Kelin, A., 2014a. Statement by Mr. Andrey Kelin, permanent representative of the Rusian Federation, at the 1022nr (special) meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council. *OSCE.* Available at: https://www.osce.org/pc/126406?download=true [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Kelin, A., 2014b. Statement by Mr. Andrey Kelin, permanent representative of the Russian Federation, at the 990th meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council. *OSCE.* Available at: https://www.osce.org/pc/116859?download=true [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Lukashevich, A., 2016. Rossija ne predstavit dostup v Krym nabljudateljam OBSE na Ukraine. *RIA Novosti.* Available at: https://ria.ru/politics/20160812/1474233803.html [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii, 2014a. Kommentarij MID Rossii v svjazi s poslednimi sobytijami na Ukraine – dvojnaja blokada. *Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii.* Available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/62010?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=ru_RU [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii, 2014b. Zajavlenie MID Rossii v svjazi s tragicheskimi sobytijami v Donecke. *Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii.* Available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/ua/-/asset_publisher/ktn0ZLTvbbS3/content/id/70634?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_ktn0ZLTvbbS3&_101_INSTANCE_ktn0ZLTvbbS3_languageId=ru_RU [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii, 2017. Ob uregulirovanii krizica na Ukraine. *Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj Federacii.* Available at: http://www.mid.ru/ru/situacia-na-ugo-vostoke-ukrainy [Accessed May 06, 2018].

NATO, 2017. Relations with Ukraine. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm# [Accessed December 12, 2017].

Neselennja Ukrajiny, 2015. *Derzhavna sluzba statystyky Ukrajiny*. Available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/index.htm [Accessed January 12, 2018].

Novosti Kryma, 2014. Moskva schitaet popytki misii OBSE ocenit situaciju v Krymu davleniem. *Novosti Kryma*. Available at: https://crimea-news.com/politics/2014/10/10/49363.html [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2006. Rules of Procedure. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/22775 [Accessed December 12, 2017].

OSCE, 2007. OSCE Handbook. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/item/22286.html [Accessed September 1, 2017].

OSCE, 2014a. Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.citacepro.com/dokument/HyzIg7k62SfDdta5 [Accessed May 06, 2018].

OSCE, 2014b. Permanent Council Decision No. 1117. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/pc/116747 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2014c. OSCE Chair says Crimean referendum in its current form is illegal and calls for alternative ways to address the Crimean issue. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/cio/116313 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2014d. Ukraine requests continuation of visit by unarmed personnel. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/fsc/116308 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2015a. Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/cio/140156 [Accessed May 6, 2018].

OSCE, 2015b. Permanent Council Decision No. 1129. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/pc/121532 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2015c. Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 16 April 2015. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/151791 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2016a. Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 20 December 2016. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/317041#_ftn1 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2016b. Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 29 September 2016. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/270696 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2016c. Restrictions to SMM's freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/261066 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2017. Participating States. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/participating-states [Accessed October 22, 2017].

OSCE, 2017a. Where are we. *OSCE*. Available at: http://www.osce.org/where-we-are [Accessed November 11, 2017].

OSCE, 2017b. Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 May 2017. OSCE. Available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/317041#_ftn1 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2017c. Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2017. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/333961 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

OSCE, 2017d. Restrictions of SMM's freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate. *OSCE.* Available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/338136 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Power, S., 2014. 7154th meeting Sunday, 13 April 2014. *Security Council Report*. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7154.pdf [Accessed May 07, 2018]. Putin, V., 2014. Obrasshenie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii. *Prezident Rossii*. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Prokopchuk, I., 2014. Statement at the extraordinary meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council on current situation around Ukraine. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/pc/116035?download=true [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Prokopchuk, I., 2018. Statement on "Four years of illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation". *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.* Available at: http://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/63411-

zajava-delegaciji-ukrajini-chotiri-roki-nezakonnoji-okupaciji-ar-krim-ta-msevastopoly-rosijsykoju-federacijeju-movoju-originalu [Accessed May 07, 2018].

RBK, 2014a. V Donecke objavili o sozdanii Doneckoj narodnoj respubliki. *RBK*. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20140407141123.shtml [Accessed May 07, 2018].

RBK, 2014b. V Luganskoj i Doneckoj oblastjah podveli itogi referenduma. *RBK*. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/12/05/2014/57041c8c9a794761c0ce9c48 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

RBK, Putin priznal nalichie v Donbasse "reshajushih voennye voprosy" rossijan. *RBK*. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/12/2015/56728d4c9a7947794fc63cea [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Reuters, 2014a. OSCE military observers barred from entering Crimea. *Reuters*. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-osce-mission/osce-military-observers-barred-from-entering-crimea-idUSBREA251MN20140306 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Reuters, 2014b. Timeline: Ukraine crisis and Russia's stand-off with the West. *Reuters*. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-events-timeline/timeline-ukraine-crisis-and-russias-stand-off-with-the-west-idUSBREA3Q0CC20140427 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Sergeyev, Y., 2014. 7154th meeting Sunday, 13 April 2014. *Security Council Report*. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7154.pdf [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2017. Status Report as of 29 November 2017. *OSCE*. Available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/360091 [Accessed May 06, 2018].

Stoltenberg, J., 2015. NATO nikogda ne spit. *Deutsche Welle Russkaja Redakcija*. Available at: http://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%B9%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%81-%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B3-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%82/a-18560359 [Accessed May 07, 2018].

UN, 2017. Conflict in Ukraine enters fourth year 'with no end in sight'. *UN News*. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/06/559322-conflict-ukraine-enters-fourth-year-no-end-sight-un-report#.WaKIIH03JCU [Accessed May 06, 2018].

Unian, 2017. Russia to withdraw its officers from JCCC – OSCE. *Unian*. Available at: https://www.unian.info/war/2302289-russia-to-withdraw-its-officers-from-jccc-osce.html [Accessed May 07, 2018].

Summary

The thesis sought to examine the OSCE proceedings regarding conflict of interests among the OSCE member states which it may create with its own acts and decisions. How does the OSCE deal with the diversity of interests of its key member states? How does the diversity of interests of the key member states affect OSCE acts and decision? To do so I was testing two hypothesises that consequentially follows the research questions, these are: 1. In case the OSCE acts may oppose a key member state's interests, the state tends to discredit the organization and its action.

2. In case the OSCE acts may oppose a key member state's interests, the organization tends to limit its own acts in order to diminish the conflict of interests. Whereas the bigger the conflict, the weaker the acts of the organization become.

After brief overview of the OSCE, I introduced the conflict in Ukraine, its actors and development and the OSCE mission that is operating on the ground. Subsequently, I defined theoretical framework for the analysis. Analysing the issue, I focused on two so called hot spots that are in the centre of the conflict of interests of the OSCE member states, these are the design of the OSCE mission mandate and its fulfilment and Russian military involvement in the eastern Ukrainian regions. The final content analysis included more than 250 official documents and statements by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission officials which helped to test the hypothesises.

The results of the analysis proved the second hypothesis to be true as the organization seem to stay fully mute towards the two hot spots as define above. It remains strictly neutral even if it has sufficient evidence that one of the sides in most of the time violate the mission's mandate and was not able to enforce its authority in the disputed Crimean Peninsula despite the fact that the organization rejected to recognize its annexation by Russia. In addition, the OSCE avoids the discussion on possible Russian military activity in the eastern Ukrainian regions as it has no official stance towards the issue.

The organization therefore stays obsessively neutral regarding diversity of the interests of its participating states as it faces a wide range of control measures for example in case of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine it is time limited mandate that has to be extended every six months. It therefore limits its own authority to in favour of member states' interests.

List of Appendices

Appendix no 1: Demographic map of Ukraine

Source: RUSI, 2014. Ethnicity and Language in Ukraine. *RUSI*. Available at: https://rusi.org/commentary/ethnicity-and-language-ukraine [Accessed May 08, 2018].

Appendix no 2: the OSCE budget

Year	Country	EUR	% of budget	source
2016	USA	18 322 817	13,00	http://www.osce.org/annual-report/2016?download=true
	Germany	15 465 020	11,00	
	UK	14 651 989	10,4	
	Italy	14 651 989	10,4	
	France	14 651 989	10,4	
	Canada	7 643 997	5,4	
	…			
	Russian Federation	5 532 837	3,90	
	Ukraine	506 916	0,40	

2015	USA	18 362 819	13,00	http://www.osce.org/annual-report/2015?download=true
	Germany	15 508 383	11,00	
	UK	14 679 830	10,4	
	Italy	14 679 830	10,4	
	France	14 679 830	10,4	
	Canada	7 640 956	5,4	
	…			
	Russian Federation	5 476 833	3,90	
	Ukraine	498 276	0,40	
2014	USA	18 553 434	13,00	http://www.osce.org/annual-report/2014?download=true
	Germany	15 677 727	11,00	
	UK	14 679 830	10,4	
	Italy	14 679 830	10,4	
	France	14 828 603	10,4	
	Canada	7 703 094	5,4	
	…			
	Russian Federation	5 474 399	3,80	
	Ukraine	494 960	0,30	
2013	USA	11 065 715	38,07	
	Norway	2 484 377	8,55	
	EU Commission	2 274 637	7,83	
	EU	1 771 369	6,00	
	Germany	1 462 746	5,03	
	…			
	UK	286 696	0,99	

	Russian Federation	21 027	0,07	
	Ukraine			http://www.osce.org/secretariat/116947?download=true
2012	USA	18 655 825	48,4	
	Germany	2 576 781	6,7	
	EU	2 111 443	5,5	
	EU Commission	1 832 368	4,8	
	…			
	UK	646 839	1,7	
	Russian Federation			
	Ukraine			http://www.osce.org/secretariat/100193?download=true

Appendix no 3: Table of coding and sources – OSCE SMM Mandate

Daily reports

date	impartiality (neutral facts)	critics (evaluating statements)	source	
2014-04-18	0	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/117859	
2014-04-23	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/117995	
2014-05-07	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/118321	
2014-05-15	2	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/118648	
2014-05-21	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/118963	
2014-06-02	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/119479	
2014-06-13	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/119790	
2014-06-29	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/120584	
2014-07-02	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/120778	
2014-07-20	1	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/121485	
2014-08-10	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/122570	
2014-08-25	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/122970	
2014-09-02	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/123159	

2014-09-11	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/123526
2014-09-22	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/124062
2014-10-01	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/124979
2014-10-16	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/125660
2014-10-30	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/126237
2014-11-05	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/126446
2014-11-11	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/126628
2014-12-04	1	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/130111
2014-12-15	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/132101
2014-12-22	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/132941
2014-12-30	0	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/133251
2015-01-06	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/133551
2015-01-15	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/135121
2015-02-02	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/138896
2015-02-16	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/141281
2015-03-05	3	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/144046
2015-04-17	1	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/151826
2015-05-07	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/156046
2015-05-29	4	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/160991
2015-06-22	3	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/166171
2015-07-09	3	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/171821
2015-08-03	4	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/175826
2015-08-13	5	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177581
2015-08-16	7	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177826
2015-08-26	4	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/178951
2015-09-16	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/182861
2015-09-21	1	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/183951
2015-10-01	5	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/189231
2015-10-21	4	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/193961
2015-11-15	3	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/200271
23/11/15 - 27.11.2015	15	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/212951

2016-01-03	14	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/214676
2016-01-12	5	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/215721
2016-01-20	6	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/217711
2016-02-03	8	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220581
2016-02-16	1	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/222896
2016-02-28	5	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/225061
2016-03-06	6	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/226211
2016-03-16	3	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/228741
2016-03-21	2	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/229576
2016-03-29	6	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/230566
2016-04-05	5	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/231601
2016-04-14	1	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/234141
2016-04-22	1	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/235816
2016-04-27	1	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/237451
2016-05-05	5	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/239111
2016-05-18	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/241421
2016-05-30	7	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/243941
2016-06-07	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/245731
2016-06-21	4	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/248136
2016-07-12	5	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/253631
2016-07-31	14	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/257361
2016-08-08	2	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/258361
2016-08-19	1	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/260516
2016-09-12	6	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/263921
2016-09-29	8	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/270696
2016-10-19	8	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/276006
2016-10-30	9	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/278336
2016-11-08	4	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/280291
2016-11-22	10	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/283716
2016-12-05	9	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/286651
2016-12-20	8	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/290711
2017-01-03	9	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/292336

2017-01-15	14	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/294081
2017-02-07	8	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/298361
2017-02-26	13	0	http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/302051
2017-03-01	8	0	https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/302556
2017-03-17	6	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/306076
2017-04-05	11	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/310341
2017-04-17	11	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/312026
2017-05-11	1	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/317041
2017-05-26	6	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/319816
2017-06-06	4	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/321951
2017-06-14	4	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/323316
2017-07-02	5	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/327506
2017-07-20	8	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/331521
2017-08-02	7	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/333961
2017-08-14	4	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/335736
2017-08-30	7	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/337466
2017-09-18	6	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/343526
2017-09-27	8	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/346731

2017-10-20	7	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/351586	
2017-10-29	6	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/353491	
2017-11-01	5	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/354376	
2017-11-14	4	0	https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/356881	
2017-12-12	6	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/362576	
2017-12-25	8	0	http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/364126	
total	424	0		

Thematic reports

year	impartiality (neutral facts)	critics (evaluating statements)	notes	source
2016	17	0		http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/261066
2017	82	0		http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/338136
total	99	0		

Statements by A. Hug

date	impartiality (neutral facts)	critics (evaluating statements)	notes	source
2014-12-12	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCZUMHCVb98
2015-03-12	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24JEMe1jTRA
2015-05-07	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mj9OMGPt2QA
2015-05-21	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8l8Ew1mksQ
2015-07-30	6	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHfqPBmod0s
2015-08-13	5	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihHqT7U_p5E

2015-09-24	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjoioOI_nUU
2015-10-29	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nFC_OqIokfM
2016-01-29	3	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YH-Y8hiN-4k
2016-06-17	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQkbfCkoFCU
2016-06-30	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGSrh2Tfpzg
2016-07-15	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p8MGhB-OLUU
2016-09-02	5	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THkz8P6DHwA
2016-09-08	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XtCdgRT0l9A
2016-09-16	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VabVnlqZjbA
2016-09-23	3	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxgmiTQPrX8
2016-09-30	5	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I5GHslvTzEg
2016-10-27	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RySz-8VjGKg
2016-11-03	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9F3o_vozAF8
2016-11-11	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5soxVSsgPc
2016-11-25	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udYBi-rNM5E
2017-01-27	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTONv1X52w8
2017-02-03	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ru0iOxMqCk0
2017-02-10	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtBSkcW5k8A
2017-02-16	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=__zW3nlmzV8
2017-02-24	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9Fow9iNB_w
2017-03-17	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdYyRDwYk0Q
2017-03-30	5	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=13JHjjFh9uM
2017-04-14	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XoUaOWV5C_E
2017-04-21	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ChOeuFgJuoI

date	impartiality (neutral facts)	critics (evaluating statements)	notes	source
2017-04-28	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ec3Asr9zA_o
2017-05-05	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3d44PgTNUBI
2017-05-12	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh2JRhyZLrs
2017-06-09	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MG4WIJYa8-E
2017-06-15	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2_kbQIbdQU
2017-06-23	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i2VcydGrPlo
2017-06-30	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWy7JeENvmY
2017-07-07	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urYp6P24I_8
2017-08-04	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1qdeP_QLcQ
2017-08-11	3	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cy3UuA78MKE
2017-10-13	3	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbao7dJ1_mQ
2017-10-27	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBscCreCbhw
2017-11-17	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMYNl8W0-Ik
2017-12-15	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6szNRVIYe7I
2017-12-22	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bgxsuygNx94
total	84	0		

Appendix no 4: Table of coding and sources – Military activity in eastern Ukraine

Daily reports

date	impartiality (neutral facts)	critics (evaluating statements)	notes	source
2014-04-18	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/117859
2014-04-24	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/117995
2014-04-25	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/118379

2014-04-26	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/118856
2014-04-27	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/119403
2014-04-28	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/119901
2014-04-29	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/121431
2014-04-30	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/121929
2014-05-01	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/122189
2014-05-02	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/122661
2014-05-03	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/122970
2014-05-04	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/123159
2014-05-05	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/124062
2014-05-06	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/125117
2014-05-07	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/125660
2014-05-08	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/126446
2014-05-09	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/127019
2014-05-10	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/132481
2014-05-11	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/133156
2014-05-12	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/135121
2014-05-13	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/136966
2014-05-14	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/138296
2014-05-15	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/138896
2014-05-16	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/141281
2014-05-17	4	0		
2014-05-18	5	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/143526
2014-05-19	4	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/145931

2014-05-20	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/150046
2014-05-21	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/151826
2014-05-22	1	0		http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/156046
2014-05-23	4	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/160991#sdfootnote1sym
2014-05-24	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/163771
2014-05-25	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/166171
2014-05-26	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/171821
2014-05-27	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/175826
2014-05-28	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177581
2014-05-29	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177826
2014-05-30	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/178951
2014-05-31	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/179776
2014-06-01	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/182861
2014-06-02	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/187286
2014-06-03	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/189231
2014-06-04	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/193961
2014-06-05	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/196756
2014-06-06	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/200271
2014-06-07	6	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/207021
2014-06-08	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/211971
2014-06-09	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/215721
2014-06-10	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/219216
2014-06-11	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220926
2014-06-12	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/222181

2014-06-13	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/225061
2014-06-14	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/228741
2014-06-15	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/227051
2014-06-16	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/229681
2014-06-17	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/231891
2014-06-18	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/233676
2014-06-19	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/237451
2014-06-20	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/239361
2014-06-21	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/241421
2014-06-22	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/243941
2014-06-23	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/245731
2014-06-24	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/248296
2014-06-25	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/250526
2014-06-26	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/254731
2014-06-27	5	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/257361
2014-06-28	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/257641
2014-06-29	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/260681
2014-06-30	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/263461
2014-07-01	5	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/268261
2014-07-02	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/274286
2014-07-03	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/276006#_ftn2
2014-07-04	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/282156
2014-07-05	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/285331
2014-07-06	0	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/286896

Date				URL
2014-07-07	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/290711
2014-07-08	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/292336
2014-07-09	1	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/294856
2014-07-10	3	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/299546
2014-07-11	2	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/301781
2014-07-12	4	0		https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/303666
2014-07-13	4	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/309051
2014-07-14	3	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/310951
2014-07-15	4	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/312026
2014-07-16	1	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/317666
2014-07-17	0	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/319816
2014-07-18	1	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/323166
2014-07-19	2	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/325171
2014-07-20	1	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/328081
2014-07-21	3	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/333056
2014-07-22	1	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/333666
2014-07-23	2	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/338746
2014-07-24	1	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/344836
2014-07-25	0	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/349206
2014-07-26	1	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/351841
2014-07-27	1	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/354936
2014-07-28	3	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/358986
2014-07-29	2	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/360361
2014-07-30	0	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/363086

date	impartiality (neutral facts)	critics (evaluating statements)	notes	source
2014-07-31	1	0		https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/364021
total	158			

Statements by A. Hug

date	impartiality (neutral facts)	critics (evaluating statements)	notes	source
2014-12-12	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCZUMHCVb98
2015-03-12	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24JEMe1jTRA
2015-05-07	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mj9OMGPt2QA
2015-05-21	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8l8Ew1mksQ
2015-07-30	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHfqPBmod0s
2015-08-13	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihHqT7U_p5E
2015-09-24	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjoioOI_nUU
2015-10-29	5	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nFC_OqIokfM
2016-01-29	2	0	21.01.2016 (tanky)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YH-Y8hiN-4k
2016-	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQkbfCkoFCU

06-17				
2016-06-30	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGSrh2Tfpzg
2016-07-15	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p8MGhB-OLUU
2016-09-02	4	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THkz8P6DHwA
2016-09-08	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XtCdgRT0l9A
2016-09-16	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VabVnlqZjbA
2016-09-23	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxgmiTQPrX8
2016-09-30	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I5GHslvTzEg
2016-10-27	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RySz-8VjGKg
2016-11-03	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9F3o_vozAF8
2016-11-11	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5soxVSsgPc
2016-11-25	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udYBi-rNM5E
2017-	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTONv1X52w8

01-27				
2017-02-03	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ru0iOxMqCk0
2017-02-10	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtBSkcW5k8A
2017-02-16	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=__zW3nlmzV8
2017-02-24	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9Fow9iNB_w
2017-03-17	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdYyRDwYk0Q
2017-03-30	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=13JHjjFh9uM
2017-04-14	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XoUaOWV5C_E
2017-04-21	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ChOeuFgJuoI
2017-04-28	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ec3Asr9zA_o
2017-05-05	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3d44PgTNUBI
2017-05-12	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh2JRhyZLrs
2017-	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MG4WIJYa8-E

06-09				
2017-06-15	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2_kbQIbdQU
2017-06-23	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i2VcydGrPlo
2017-06-30	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWy7JeENvmY
2017-07-07	3	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urYp6P24I_8
2017-08-04	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1qdeP_QLcQ
2017-08-11	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cy3UuA78MKE
2017-10-13	2	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbao7dJ1_mQ
2017-10-27	1	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBscCreCbhw
2017-11-17	3	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMYNl8W0-Ik
2017-12-15	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6szNRVIYe7I
2017-12-22	0	0		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bgxsuygNx94
total	54	0		