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**Governmental Approaches Towards Countering Violent Extremism and
Radicalization: A Comparative Analysis of the United Kingdom and the
Kingdom of Denmark**

Master Thesis

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Abstract

This thesis compares counter and deradicalization policies of the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Denmark. Both countries have one of the oldest policies in Europe and are characterized as different, even opposite, and therefore were chosen for the comparative analysis. Thesis assesses concrete policy initiatives preventing radicalization mainly in prisons, schools, on the Internet, governments' deradicalization initiatives; initiatives addressing foreign fighters, the extremist ideology; and other approaches in preventing radicalization. The comparison is based on the theoretical-analytical framework of the most prominent theoretical approaches towards explaining radicalization. Through the comparison, the thesis explores, sometime subtle, differences and similarities of both approaches and links them together with theoretical explanations. The thesis highlights many possible policy responses to one phenomenon, corresponding to many theoretical explanations behind it. The comparison has shown similarities and differences between the two policies and correlation between the definition of radicalization and extremism and certain policy objectives and programs. It is structured into four chapters, the first one is theoretical introduction into the concept of radicalization which creates an analytical framework. The second and third chapters are dedicated to British and Danish deradicalization policies respectively. The last chapter is the comparison of the policies based on the analytical framework developed in the first chapter.

Abstrakt

Tato magisterská práce se věnuje komparaci proti- a deradikalizačních politik Spojeného království a Dánského království. Obě krajiny mají jedny z nejstarších deradikalizačních politik v Evropě a byly charakterizovány svou odlišností, a proto byly vybrány jako případy komparace. Práce posuzuje konkrétní iniciativy politik ve vybraných oblastech, a to zejména na konkrétních místech, jako jsou věznice, školy nebo online prostor internetu. Dále se věnuje

odpovědi na problematiku zahraničních bojovníků, extremistické ideologie a konkrétnímu procesu deradikalizace. Samotná komparace využívá teoreticko-analytický rámec nejvýznamnějších teoretických přístupů k radikalizaci a vysvětlení příčin vzniku tohoto fenoménu. Díky komparaci je práce schopna poukázat na jemné rozdíly a podobnosti mezi přístupy a spojit je s teoretickými vysvětleními a znalostmi. Práce vyzdvihuje značný počet možných politických odpovědí, což koresponduje s mnohými teoretickými vysvětleními fenoménu. Přes komparaci a vyzdvižení jemných podobností a rozdílů, bylo možné nalézt spojení mezi definicí extremismu a radikalizace a konkrétními politickými nástroji. Práce je strukturována do čtyř kapitol, první kapitola představuje koncept radikalizace a vytváří analytický rámec pro komparaci. Druhá a třetí kapitola představují vládní přístupy Británie a Dánska a poslední kapitola je komparace strukturovaná podle analytického rámce vyvinutého v první kapitole.

Keywords

Extremism, Radicalization, Deradicalization, Terrorism, United Kingdom, Denmark, comparison

Klíčová slova

Extremismus, radikalizace, deradikalizace, terorismus, Spojené království, Dánsko, komparace

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Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

In Prague May 11, 2018

Ingrida Haringová

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Introduction

The world was shocked after 9/11, and again after terror attacks in Madrid in 2004 and year after in London. These attacks, even though equally shocking, have given rise to different sets of questions. While 9/11 has been a “foreign” attack, coming from outside by foreign nationals, attacks on European soil have been done by Europeans. This has shocked Europe and sparked the debate about who these attackers are, why are they attacking so far from zones of conflict and why are they attacking their home countries, or countries where they live. Both states, and academia were asking similar questions, why are these attacks happening, who is attacking and how to prevent them. Additional factor influencing European security context has been upsurge of its young people interested in and traveling to zones of conflict, such as Syria or Iraq.

States, as providers of security, not only had to come up with plans to stop these attacks, but also prevent them. Through prevention, policies of counter and deradicalization have become dominant. First countries introducing such policies were not in Europe, but in the Middle East and South Asia – Egypt¹, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Among first European countries introducing such policies were the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands² (El-Said, 2017: 93-94).

The thesis chooses two countries from above and compares their counter radicalization efforts. The focus is on the United Kingdom and on Denmark. Both countries are among first European countries which started developing these policies, but for the purpose of the thesis they have been chosen for their perceived differences. Media has published numerous articles which put the two approaches in strike contrast. The Danish approach has been labeled as radical (Crouch & Henley, 2015: 1), aiming at reintegration (Cobiella, 2015: 1) through offering rehab (Naik et al., 2014: 1; Higgins, 2014: 1). It has been described as soft-handed (Faiola & Mekhennet, 2014: 1) and welcoming (foreign fighters back) (Williams, 2015: 1). This lies in stark contrast to what has been described as more punitive approach in the United Kingdom (Naik et al., 2014: 1). British counter-terrorism laws were labeled as “the most Orwellian (Bowcott, 2017: 1) in Europe” with “extreme surveillance as law” (MacAskil, 2016: 1). In contrast to Danish “offers

¹ Egypt was the first country with a deradicalization program, already in 1997 a program for prisoners from violent offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood was designed to meet and discuss their core ideology (Plessner, 2015: 1).

² At least 32 countries had had developed counterradicalization policies by 2009, out of which only six were Arab states and ten were European states (El-Said, 2017: 93).

of rehab” British officials have said that “British foreign fighters should be killed” (Elgot, 2017: 1). Even though the contrast presented by the media is striking, is it really true that the policies are so different? Therefore, the aim of this thesis is a comparative analysis of the two approaches. The goal of the thesis is to show subtle differences between the policies, together with reactions they might spark (in public or academia). As all these articles have been considering measures against radicalization of Muslims, or Islamist extremism (and for example measures against far-right extremism), the focus of this thesis is the same.

The thesis is structured into three sections. The first section serves to explore many different lenses through which one could look at radicalization. Radicalization studies encompass several approaches explaining the phenomenon, which are presented depending on their level of analysis – micro, meso and macro. The exploration of the theoretical approaches towards radicalization serves for better understanding of the differences (or similarities) of the two approaches, but mainly for understanding of their underlying assumptions about the phenomenon.

The second section consists of the introduction of the two policies. I focus on the background of the development of the policies, on the definitions of radicalization and extremism in the both countries. The policies are examined in specific settings, mainly prisons, schools and on the Internet. Additionally, they are examined on how they stood up against the foreign fighters. The description parts are supplemented with critical analysis based on academic literature, which helps to analyze them in broader context.

The last, third section of the thesis is the actual comparison. The first section of the thesis serves as the guiding principle for the comparison through which similarities and differences are shown. The policies’ specific sections are analyzed against each other to examine the subtle differences. Moreover, the theoretical guidelines also serve as an analytical tool to understand if approaches are based on any of the theoretical assumptions about radicalization. As such the thesis links theoretical explanation of radicalization with concrete policy options. As deradicalization is only an emerging policy field in Europe, this thesis should serve to better understand two of the most developed approaches and hopefully approaches in general as concrete programs are linked to theoretical understandings of radicalization.

Theoretical-analytical Framework – the Concept of Radicalization

History of the Concept and its Conceptual Uncertainty

To understand the concept of radicalization it is important to look at the basis of the word – the word radical. The word radical has been already used in the 18th century and became widespread in the 19th century when it was linked to the Enlightenment and the French and American revolutions. It was applied in the context of political agenda which was in strike contrast with the current status quo and which was advocating thorough social and political reform. Additionally, it also referred to representing or supporting an extreme section of a party (Schmid, 2013: 6).

Radicalization as a word does not have a meaning without context. It is relational, which means that its meaning is dependent on who, when and where we are. It depends on what is considered normal, what is mainstream and what is considered unacceptable. In the late 19th and early 20th century in England, “radicals” were pleading for universal voting rights and oftentimes the term just described a wing of the Liberal Party. Many of their “radical” demands, oftentimes propagated by illegal means, are now mainstream and common entitlements (Schmid, 2013: 7).

The point of this historical excursion was to show that the concepts of radical, radicalization and subsequently deradicalization and counter radicalization are relative. This relative nature illustrates the fact that in the 19th century the term was used to describe liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic and overall progressive political positions, now, its contemporary usage mainly as “radical Islamism” describes an anti-liberal, fundamentalist, anti-democratic and overall regressive agenda (Schimid, 2013: 7).

The wide spread of the concept of radicalization into academic, political and public sphere is relatively new. Before the year of 2001 the word “radicalization” was barely used in the media and only a small part of academic sphere was paying attention to the concept. The biggest increase in the attention to the concept occurred between years 2005-2007. According to Sedgwick, the increase of the popularity of the concept and spread of the word into media correlates with occurrence of home-grown terrorism in Europe, mainly the terrorist attack in London in 2005. Since the London attack, governments have funded much of the research in order to work on the deradicalization programs. These attacks showed that the threat of terrorism cannot be understood only as a foreign or Middle Eastern. Importantly, there has been a significant increase in funds aimed for research of radicalization and deradicalization and the

concept has spread into many spheres of life – political, academic, and public (2010: 480, Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013: 363).

After the attacks in Madrid (2004) and in London (2005) the European policymakers have spread the notion of “violent radicalization”. Schmid notes that notion of “violent radicalization” creates two types of confusion. The first one is that it is not clear what is meant - if „radicalization by violence” or „radicalization to violence”. The second is that the violence meant is not of any kind, the violence meant is of very particular type - political violence aimed at civilians and non-combatants in general. Schmid notes, that radicalization is not only a socio-psychological concept used by academics, but in addition, it is also a political construct, which was introduced to the public debate mainly by national security establishments. Additionally, the way how it was constructed by politicians focused on a somewhat narrow, micro-level group of problems. Now, it suffers from politicization and is fuzzy. Furthermore, it is not established what is the end product of radicalization and governments too quickly see the end product of radicalization process terrorism³ (2013:1, 19).

As mentioned, before 2001 the notion of radicalization was in research undermined and neglected. However, at that time not only the concept of radicalization was undermined but also other, currently very much researched topics, were neglected. Silke in his research found out that the most researched terrorist organization in the late 90s was not the Al Qaida (as one may assume) but the Irish Republican Army. Surprisingly, the Al Qaida was not even in top twenty most researched terrorist groups (Silke, 2007: 76-93 in Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013: 363).

As discussed above, much of the literature on radicalization and subsequently on deradicalization is quite young – the overall publication process has started in the last decade. Schmid, unlike Sedgwick and Neumann with Kleinmann, sees reason behind the boom of radicalization research in bad reaction to the non-authorized American led intervention to Iraq in 2003 as it has angered many Muslims around the world – not only in the Middle East but in western countries as well (2013: 1). Eliza Manningham-Buller, director of MI5 at the time of the Iraqi intervention has said that „*Our⁴ involvement in Iraq radicalized, for want of a better word, a whole generation of young people – not a whole generation, a few among a generation – who saw our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as being an attack upon Islam*”. Moreover,

³ This does not have to be true in every case, as it will be discussed later.

⁴ Meaning the British involvement.

according to her the conflict has „substantially” intensified the threat of international terrorism in Britain (Norton-Taylor, 2010:1).

Neumann and Kleinmann see the reason for increase in the research on radicalization in the American led war on terror after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. They note that the questions were not new, but the intensity and meaning with which they were asked were new. Additionally, the question of radicalization used to belong into terrorism research as a debate about the root cause of it (2013: 363; Schmid, 2013: 1). Furthermore, Kundnani observes change of the meaning of radicalization - when the term radicalization was used informally in academic literature before 2001 it meant “*a shift towards more radical politics*”, however, he sees change in its definition as it acquired “*new meaning of a psychological or theological process by which Muslims move towards extremist views*” (2012: 7).

Radicalization is one of the many concepts in social sciences which does not have a precise definition and its exact meaning is contested. This lack of definition creates many controversies and misunderstandings of the concept. Two of them were already outlined above. The first one is what is the end of radicalization process – ideas or acts, the second point of controversy is connected to the normative issues and context in which is word used (Neumann, 2013: 874).

As outlined above, countries identify different causes of radicalization. Unfortunately, this uncertainty is present in the academic sphere as well. Radicalization can be “*conceptualized as a kaleidoscope of factors creating almost infinite individual combinations*”. There could be identified around 50 factors contributing to the process, divided into several categories such as individual socio-psychological factors, social factors, political factors, ideological/religious factors, culture and identity crisis, trauma and various trigger mechanisms, group dynamics, radicalizers, and social media (RAN, 2016a: 3-4). Coolsaet describes the concept of radicalization as “*ill-defined, complex and controversial*” (Coolsaet, 2011: 240 in Schmid, 2013: 1). Nasser-Eddine et al. note that defining radicalization is as difficult as defining terrorism and that there is no single definition used throughout the field. In their work they list several definitions from the academical research and note that “*about the only thing that radicalization experts agree on is that radicalization is a process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to make existing research incomparable. It is like comparing eggs to oranges and concluding that oranges, therefore, come from chickens*” (2011: 13).

As mentioned by Schmid, radicalization does not have meaning without a context and it is highly dependent, relational word (2013: 7). Sedgwick notes that when we are using the concept of radicalization it changes its meaning depending on the context, respectively agenda. There are three most common agendas with which is the concept used: security, integration, and foreign policy. Additionally, all of these three agendas have two different levels: public and political. The only solution to this multiple meanings of the word Sedgwick sees in recognizing that radicalization is a relative word and stopping to treat the concept as an absolute one (2010: 479, 485).

The problem with having three different contexts using the same concept is that they sometimes have conflicting goals. So, for example, from the standpoint of the security agenda it would be valid to support extremists which do not represent a direct threat to the state or society, because these would entice supporters from groups which are a direct threat. However, this practice would be unacceptable from the standpoint of integration agenda. Sometimes it is possible to have groups or individual who represent issue for security agenda, but not for integration agenda. In this case it is home-grown terrorist, who before the terrorism were very well integrated. Additionally, the integration agenda does not pay attention to converts to Islam who will become radicals and/or terrorist. Moreover, the security agenda could come into a disagreement with foreign policy agenda. The example of this instance is when citizens of one country support a terrorist group, operating abroad while at the same time reject use of violence in their home country. For the security agenda they do not represent a problem or an issue, however, for the foreign policy they do (Sedgwick, 2010: 488-489).

All these conflicting agendas and spheres word is used in, are in the middle of the reasons behind the disagreements in official definitions of radicalization. Moreover, they cause disagreements also over whether the threat is action or thought and subsequently if non-violent radicalization should be considered danger (Sedgwick, 2010: 489). As Borum notes the debate has practical consequences on the political practices. The debate is not an example of post-modern epistemological academical debate. The debate very much influences the political praxis and society because the definitions influence our understanding of the threat itself and the counter-measures as well (2011: 9).

As discussed, radicalization is not easy to define. This chapter will try to show the most important viewpoints on the radicalization. It will start with addressing the question about the end product – if the radicalization is behavioral or cognitive. Further, the chapter will be divided

into three sections based on the levels of analysis -individual, meso, and macro. All three levels address different factors possibly contributing to radicalization.

The Distinction between Cognitive and Behavioral Radicalization

As outlined before, radicalization has many meanings, definitions and understandings. Neumann claims that all academic models of radicalization expect that it is a process with various elements which start the radicalization. However, he sees one underlying problem with the concept of radicalization which is that it works with the word “extremism”. The problem is that extremism is manifested by ideas, thoughts as well as by acts and actions. Based on this conceptual uncertainty many distinguish between cognitive and behavioral radicalization. This influences work in academic sphere, but also the government positions, as different governments produce different policies focused either on behavioral or cognitive radicalization⁵ (Neumann, 2013: 874-875).

According to Hafez and Mullins many definitions of radicalization in the academic literature highlight the important distinction between cognitive and behavioral dimension of radicalization. Cognitive radicalization entails acquiring new values, standpoints and political opinions which are drastically different from the mainstream society. Behavioral radicalization entails participation in different radical activities (does not matter if legal or illegal), which could culminate in terrorism. In general, cognitive radicalization is much more widespread than behavioral and most likely much more extensive than statistics suggest (2015: 961).

Borum, for example, distinguishes between “radicalization” which refers to process of acquiring the extremist ideology and ideas; and between “action pathway” or “action script” which refers to the process of getting involved in terrorism and/or violence. Additionally, it could be that some terrorists (involved in the violent acts) are not ideologists and they have only shallow knowledge about the group’s doctrine. Therefore, ideology does not have to be always

⁵ So, for example the Royal Canadian Mounted Police sees radicalization from the cognitive viewpoint as a change from common life viewpoints to extreme ones. American Congress Research Service defines radicalization as a process of acquiring radical and extreme opinions. However, the definition of Ministry of Homeland Security does not see radicalization as purely cognitive – radicalization is process of acquiring extremist opinion system including the will to use, support, or allow violence. The British government’s definition connects radicalization and acts of violence more clearly – radicalization is process, during which people start to support terrorism and violent extremism and in some cases they get involved in terrorist organization (Neumann, 2013: 875-876).

connected to acts, as radicalization is only one of the pathways (2011: 9). Moreover, della Porta and LaFree think that opinions and attitudes, and actions are linked, but they do not have to be dependent on each other and/or corresponding to each other (della Porta & LaFree, 2012: 7 in Dzhekova et al., 2016: 12). However, Dzhekova et al. note that some scholars reject the distinction between thoughts and acts, as it would be impossible to achieve holistic understanding of radicalization. These many different understandings and viewpoints have caused rise of many diverse theoretical and policy approaches (2016: 12).

It seems like there could be a wider agreement that radicalization seems to be a “*process which involves different multidimensional factors and dynamics*”, with different underlying ideological justifications, which would suggest diversity in forms of radicalization (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 12). Nasser-Eddine et al. also suggest trend in recent radicalization research which is to examine different pathways into terrorism and therefore different forms of radicalization. She suggests that it is in agreement with a viewpoint that there are multiple “terrorist personality types” and multiple reasons why people become terrorists (2011: 15).

Levels/Units of Analysis

The effort to understand radicalization must come from aspiration to comprehend not only what people think, but also how they end up thinking it. Additionally, it is also necessary to pay attention to process of change from ideas to acts and why some people decide to act. Borum thinks that it is not the task for only one theory or one discipline, because any useful framework must be able to connect mechanisms in micro-level (individual level) and macro-level (societal and cultural level) (2011: 8; Dzhekova et al., 2016: 15).

To bring some clarity and structure to many approaches towards radicalization, the review of the concept is structured based on the level of analysis. The main part of the review is divided into three levels of analysis – micro, meso and macro⁶. The research on radicalization is very varied and this distinction into units of analysis gives the chapter a structure, a guideline for many different views and approaches toward the radicalization. The micro-level is focused on the individual level, it involves problems with identity, rational choice theory approach towards radicalization, and some sequential metaphors, primarily the staircase to terrorism metaphor. Meso-level is focused on the social surrounding of the radicalized people, integration, feelings of alienation and marginalization; the role of networks, and role of religion. The meso level

⁶ However, not all authors can be fitted into this division.

also includes the role of the Internet and prisons as specific sites for radicalization. Macro-level is focused on the role of the government and the whole society, specifically the role of international relations; lacking socio-economic opportunities which leads into mobilization of the discontent people caused by globalization and modernization, and approach of French sociology. It is important to note that some authors do not fit into this conceptualization, or their work is strictly empirical.

To include several levels of analysis of radicalization is important because radicalization is often understood as the intersection of personal level experience and enabling environment. For example, Schmid uses multi-level approach to the studying of radicalization, including similar factors that are presented in this chapter⁷ (2013: 4). Therefore, to analyze several levels of experience makes sense and many scholars advocate it. An analysis with more levels attempts to address the shortcomings of other analytical methods, which often overemphasize only one of the levels. Among other authors differentiating between explanations on different levels are Lis and Skjølberg (2004)⁸ and della Porta and LaFree which stress the importance to set individual experience into broader structural conditions (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 19).

However, which concrete factors are put into which level, might be dependent only on the author, as the distinction is sometimes small and dependent on the author's viewpoint or reasoning. Also, authors assign different levels of importance to the researched contextual factors. So, for example Schmid sees macro- and meso-level factors playing a bigger role in the radicalization process than individual and small group factors. He sees these factors as downplayed in the research because there was attention paid mainly towards the micro-level. The reason behind it sees in bigger sensitivity of the macro-level as it encompasses the study of interactions of Western governments and repressive governments in the other parts of the world and politically charged discussion on the integration and discrimination (2013: 5). However, some see research focused on bigger units of analysis as failing to give the answer why only few people react to broad structural factors affecting the whole mainstream violently.

⁷ He talks about, but the chapter specifically does not pay attention to for example, role of democracy and participation politics, as it is not relevant to the case of British and Danish radicals (Schmid, 2013: 4).

⁸ On the individual and group levels the use psychological and socio-psychological approaches, and on societal and national level they look for correlations between instances of terrorism and society's socio-political, historical, and cultural characteristics, the impact of modernization on factors such as income inequality. Lastly on the international level they consider role of international relations and foreign policy (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 19-20).

The two most prominent researchers paying attention to the radicalization on the group level are Wiktorowicz and Sageman, who claim that radicalization happens in smaller groups, because bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination are essential. The individual level of analysis looks into pathways of participation and personal histories and processes. For this level social learning theory adopted from criminology is important and how individuals get feedback from the social environment and the observation of prizes and punishments/castigations (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 48-49).

Dalgaard-Nielsen uses somewhat similar structure in her review of books, articles and studies connected to militant Islamism in Europe published between 2001 and 2008. The material⁹ she uses divides into three groups, based on the types of explanations of radicalization¹⁰. The first group she differentiates is group of scholars basing their research on French sociology. Their conclusions point to overall sociological background factors (like globalization, rupture of traditional communities and identities). The second group of scholars works with social movement theory or network theory. These authors point to variables on group level, like dynamics of social network and interaction to be behind radicalization. The third group distinguished points to the individual factors and their work is not primarily based on theory but on empirical research and they mostly point to the specific individual needs or inclinations (2010: 797-798).

Micro level

Dzhekova et al. point out the Dutch Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management work on identification of sets of factors contributing to Islamist radicalization on different levels. On the micro level, they identified as important factors certain psychological characteristics (like depression, violent, sensitive to humiliation etc.), personal experience (ideology is not a causal factor in this case), rationality and they identified recruitment and trigger events as catalysts (ISSCM, 2008 in Dzhekova et al., 2016: 22).

⁹ She uses only studies based on primary data (like interviews and observations), she omits official government reports and journalistic accounts (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 797).

¹⁰ Dzhekova et al. try to explain such a variety in approaches towards one phenomenon and they see it in various backgrounds of the scholars – political science, sociology, criminology, psychology, religious studies and terrorism studies (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 47).

This part of the thesis will be focused on social identity theory, rational choice theory application in radicalization research, and on application of sequential models of radicalization, primarily the staircase to terrorism metaphor.

Self-Categorization and Social Identity Theory

One of the most important factors at the individual level is identification with social groups as it is said to be an accurate predictor of social behavior. It means that *“to a large extent, how we behave depends on with whom we identify”*. Among the most prominent social identity approaches are self-categorization theory¹¹ and social identity theory¹², both of them implying that people define themselves usually in terms of group membership and not in term of self. The important social identity we have provides a framework, a scheme which helps us to interpret and analyze the world and therefore, determines how we think, feel and act. This could mean that we in order to feel good about ourselves, must first feel good about the group we identify with. This could be a very prominent reason behind the Islamist radicalization (Murshed & Pavan, 2009: 12; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 40-42).

Social identity can be understood as a *“membership in a group that helps to define a person’s self-concept and provide self-esteem”*. One can have more social identities, e. g. identity as a family member, identity of your nationality, ethnicity, social identity connected to one’s favorite sport team. These identities help person to define who they are relative to the society. The identification with certain group provides a specific sense of self-worth. The important part is that people can and have more available identities. From these available identities all are not salient at a given moment. Usually, there is only one salient identity, and which one depends on the social context (Crosset & Spitaletta, 2010: 26).

The social identity theory assumes that people want to keep, but preferably boost, their self-esteem; that certain value is assigned to a social group and belonging into one; and the judgement of the belonging into the group is calculated through social comparison¹³. According to these three assumptions, three principles have been formulated: people aim to achieve or

¹¹ The main work is Turner, 1982, 1984; Turner et al. 1987 (Murshed & Pavan, 2009: 12).

¹² The main work done by Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Ellemers et al., 1988; Ellemers et al., 2002 (Murshed & Pavan, 2009: 12).

¹³ The relationship among the groups after their formation is of a competitive nature. The competitiveness is a product of the process of evaluation of the membership in these groups which is done through social comparison.

keep positive social identity; the positiveness of social identity is based on favorable juxtaposition to other groups; and lastly, when people are not happy with their current social identity, they will either leave the group and join another or try to make the existing group better (Arena & Arrigo, 2006 in Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 26).

The importance of social identity theory for the radicalization studies lies in the understanding of forming and transforming collective identities. The applicability of the social identity theory in the research of radicalization is in a notion that individuals susceptible towards radicalization have had their self-esteem damaged. As a group, they might view themselves as unfortunate with their position in the society. This negative viewpoint might lead into creating feelings of frustration, leading them into contact with a radical group which would help them, at any cost, with their position in the society as a group (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 26).

Rational Choice Theory Use in Radicalization Research

The theory was originally developed in the school of microeconomics and it assumes that people behave based on pros and cons calculations. This theory views terrorism as political behavior and terrorists as rational actors, while psychological variables support or prevent participation in terrorist activities. The motivations for radicalization according to rational choice theory could be divided into preconditions - they influence people over the long run, and precipitants – they are specific events which spark the incidence of terrorism (Keys-Turner, 2011: 27).

In 2005 a very interesting reason behind the attacks in 9/11 was published. The point was made by jihadist analyst with nick name Sayf Allah. According to him, the attacks were supposed to fulfill very specific aim, and were rational. The aim which they were supposed to fulfill was to “*arouse the sleeping body of the Islamic Nation to fight against Western power and the contaminations of Western culture*”; “*to force the Western snake to bite the sleeping body, and wake it up*”. That means that the goal of the attacks was to provoke western military action in a Muslim country and the presence of western troops would “wake up” the Muslim community to jihad, similarly to Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (Allah, 2005: 1 in McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011: 157).

Perry and Hasisi in their article list several rewards of martyrdom which play a significant role in rational choice model of terrorism, more specifically martyrdom. They distinguish between religious, personal, and social rewards. They review jihadi literature and statements and have found several rewards presented for martyrs: eternity in paradise; seeing Allah’s face and

meeting Prophet Mohammad; washing past sins and protection from hell; 72 black eyed virgins, food and wine; paradise for 70 of martyrs loved-ones; honor, fame and glory; empowerment and feeling of identity¹⁴; feelings of moral superiority; revenge; upgrade of social status of martyr and his/her family; and family monetary upgrade (2015: 58-66).

Perry and Hasisi view suicide bombing as „*a result of rational situational choice, based on the decision-making process of evaluating the costs and anticipated benefits of one’s actions*“. They believe, based on the case study of Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab and statements said by other terrorists that suicide attacks are essentially not irrational or altruistic, but based on calculation of future self-gratifying benefits, or anticipated costs. However, they do not deny that feelings of anger and frustration play an important role in radicalization process, but the martyrdom reward system reassures terrorist in embracing terrorist acts (2015: 72). Pape sees committing suicide bombing as a “*strategic effort directed toward achieving particular political goals*” – terrorists through threat of punishment want to coerce a government to change policy. Additionally, suicide terrorism maximizes the coercive leverage which terrorism can provide (2003: 345).

Staircase to Terrorism and Other Sequential Metaphors

The staircase to terrorism is a micro-level view of process of radicalization with roots in a psychological perspective. The trajectory is bottom-up and it considers socio-cultural permissive factors through motivational framing. Specific psychological processes (from psychological perspective) distinguish floors of the staircase. The metaphor of a staircase “*contributes a view of socio-psychological dynamics at various points in the process of radicalization and examines the permissive factors that might prompt an individual to go further*” (Keys-Turner, 2011: 30-31).

Moghaddam has developed a staircase to terrorism act metaphor. In the metaphor, there is a building with five floors and individuals climb the staircase, seeing less and less options. It is important to note, that Moghaddam remarks that how the individual perceive the whole building is important for “climbing the floors”. On the ground floor, the most important factors are perceptions of fairness and just treatment, and feelings of relative deprivation¹⁵. Additionally, it is necessary to distinguish between egoistical deprivation and fraternal deprivation. Egoistical

¹⁴ Performing a suicide attack can help defeat emotions of helplessness and fear of death. It can give a new purpose, new control in life and an escape route from unhappy life (Perry & Hasisi, 2015: 63-64).

¹⁵ Perceived deprivation will be discussed in more detail in other parts of the chapter.

deprivation means that an individual sees himself/herself as deprived because of the position within the group, while fraternal deprivation is developed because of the perceived position of the individual's group relatively to others¹⁶. Those who seek to improve their situation climb to the first floor, as they seek social mobility. The most important psychological factors on this floor are individuals' perceived possibilities of social mobility and perceptions of procedural justice. As options for social mobility are more open, there is smaller chance for individuals to climb higher. On the second floor, individuals are influenced by leaders to shift their anger and frustration to perceived enemy. Individuals are encouraged to displace their aggression towards perceived enemies. Oftentimes anti-Americanism is used to shift criticism from governments in the Middle East. The third level is characterized with engaging with the morality of terrorist organization and seeing terrorism as an acceptable strategy. Only on the fourth floor, recruitment to terrorist organizations take place. Potential recruits are taught to see world more rigidly in dichotomy of "us versus them". The commitment to the groups is strengthen through engagement into its traditions, methods, and goals. On the fifth floor, individuals are selected for training and specific missions (Moghaddam, 2005: 161-165).

The Slippery Slope

The slippery slope metaphor is used to describe slowly increasing radical behavior. An individual is increasingly but slowly being radicalized and self-persuades oneself into justifying one's behavior. Individual moves into more and more extreme behaviors, while increasingly using more and more extreme reasons and justifications. Social psychology has been studying the phenomenon of self-persuasion for a very long time and hundreds of experiments have showed its power. Among one of the most famous ones are those conducted by Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (1971). Both experiments show slow progress into more extreme acts while individuals reason previous and current steps. Additionally, more extreme acts make it more difficult to stop and draw the line. McCauley and Moskaleiko show few examples of slippery slope radicalization. The first one is Russian terrorist Adrian Michailov living in the 19th century. More contemporary example is Omar Hammami (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008: 419-421; McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2011: 35-47).

¹⁶ This distinction was developed by Runciman in 1966 (Moghaddam, 2005: 163).

Meso level

Meso level is in this chapter characterized as level of a small group. According to Allan et al. meso level comprises social and cultural factors, mostly affecting religious, ethnic or group identity. It affects smaller communities or identity groups. However, it is important to note that majority of the people affected by these factors do not become involved in radical activities. This suggests that these factors are significant, but not sufficient alone (2015: 2, 11-12). Additionally, Crossett and Spitaletta identify several group radicalizations. For example, among them are group radicalization in like-minded groups, under isolation and threat, in competition for the same base of support, and in competition with state power (2010: 60). Moreover, McCauley and Moskalenko also identify radicalization in larger numbers at once – group could radicalize under isolation or threat, or in competition for the same base of support, or in competition in state power, or within-group competition (2008: 423-426). Moreover, the chapter is added with exploration of role of the Internet and prison, as I consider them a specific site contributing to radicalization.

Networks

Networks, or social groups are essential in the process of radicalization. The groups interactions play the influential role on individual attitudes, beliefs and commitments to acts. The processes behind the group influence are in-group/out-group biases, conformity, compliance, group think, polarization, and diffusion of responsibility (Davis & Cragin, 2009: 74). Sageman (2004) and Bakker (2006¹⁷) found in their research that terrorist networks are oftentimes composed of people with similar demographic characteristics. Other research also suggests that networks are frequently internally socio-demographically homogenous with similar attitudes and behavior. This similarity in networks is described as homophily, which is the tendency to seek out friends with similar beliefs and interests. Additionally, the behavior is influenced not only by the social setting in which it occurs but also by the presence of authority figure, by the group itself and its dynamics. Strong ingroup influences are mutual encouragement and punishment, which together form and enforce conformity with norms (with the norms of the group) (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 43-44).

¹⁷ He analyzed case studies of 242 based jihadis in Europe. In the sample he found out that in over 35 percent of cases networks of friends or relatives were instrumental for the radicalization process (in Davis & Cragin, 2009: 75).

Person's peers and friends are from the standpoint of radicalization very important as previous research has found out that already existing friendships and relationships make the recruitment process easier. People oftentimes get connected with a radical group because they already know someone in it. The recruitment process is usually very personalized and local, meaning it includes interpersonal relationships, solidarity bond, and most importantly trust. When there is already existing bond between people, it makes the recruitment easier, because it is not necessary to make and build the new one. Additionally, these bonds already connect persons with similar ideas, attitudes, viewpoints or similar social category. All these similarities help to create the feeling of collective identity. From the recruitment process viewpoint, it is easier to address people, who already share feeling of unity and identity with the recruiter. Secondly, because the radical groups are oftentimes involved in illegal and/or risky behavior, it is essential for the group to trust the new potential member. For the recruiter it is easier to develop this trust with someone who already knows. Thirdly, group of friends may serve as a tool of group/bloc recruitment. Bloc recruitment is recruitment which does not aim to recruit an individual but aims at a smaller group of people, which already know each other. This type of recruitment is facilitated by psychological tools like peer pressure, fear for your reputation, group think, desire to hold on the existing friendships and feeling of guilt when not joining like others. Lastly, the recruitment process is never ending quest to strengthen the commitment to the group. Recruits should not tell their aims to anyone who could discourage them from them. The group encourages them to "burn the bridges", so it is more difficult for members to go back to their previous "normal" life. Additionally, groups want to build extreme mutual dependency among the members to strengthen the cohesion among them. All these steps follow basically only one goal – to unify opinions and viewpoints on the world within the group and to build very strong interpersonal relationships. When the group is successful in these goals, it is extremely difficult to leave it. Defector would lose not only friendships but identity as well. Moreover, before the actual exit from the group, defector would feel guilty to abandon his/her friends, the group and issue they are fighting for. Furthermore, members who want to leave are oftentimes scared of return to the majority of society, because they might not know anyone, and they are afraid they would be ostracized. Oftentimes, they are also worried about revenge from the group or its members (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 964-965).

McCauley and Moskaleiko describe similar process, but they call it "the power of love". They describe the radicalization of an individual to a terrorist organization via personal connection. As recruiters do not want to decoy someone who would betray them, they often recruit among

friends, lovers, and family. McCauley and Moskalenko distinguish between trust and love – terrorist would recruit someone who they trust, but “*love determines who will join*”. Additionally, emotions of love for friends and comrades are not important only at the beginning. For members of the group it increases the group cohesion and it basically holds the group together under pressures from outside (2011: 421-422).

In general, studies working with social movement theory and network theory often note the intersubjective and interactive nature of radicalization – that means that how radicalization looks like (and if happens) is very much dependent on who one knows (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 805).

Foreign Fighters

Foreign fighters are people who has joined an insurgency but are not a citizen of any of the parties to the conflict. Also, they are not a parts or affiliates of an official military organization and they are not paid in sense of mercenaries. The phenomenon has evolved throughout the years and is not a new one. There have been two mobilizations already before 1980’s, however most of the cases of mobilizations of foreign fighters has happened after the 1980’s (since 1954 Hegghammer identifies 18 foreign contingents altogether, two were before 1980, one between 1980 and 1990, ten were during 1990’s, and five during 2000’s) and the biggest continents before Syria, were Afghanistan during 1980’s and 2003 Iraq (2010: 57-58, 60-63). The most recent and the biggest development in the phenomenon was the Syrian conflict which has attracted over 30 000 foreign fighters from all over the world, half of them coming from the neighboring countries and a quarter from Europe and Turkey (Norton-Taylor, 2015: 1). Majority of European foreign fighters came from just four countries - Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, with Belgium having the highest proportion of foreign fighters per capita (Kroet, 2016: 1).

The reasons behind their travels are very varied, and sometimes difficult to research. From the research it seems that the reasons are specific and local, with of religious reasoning, but also young rebellion and thirst for adventure. Researchers therefore identified several “push” factors such as, religious and historical factors, emotional resonance of the cause, facilitation due to social media and the ease of travel, and ties to new and already existing networks. Moreover,

there has been additional pull factors by the recruitment tactics of especially ISIL¹⁸, desire to live in an area ruled by Islamic law, desire for jihad, and prospects of life in caliphate (such as marriage and housing) and even state-building (UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2017: 14; Sheikh, 2016c: 62-63).

Foreign fighters represent security risks for the country in which they operate, because they could be instigators of promoting “*sectarian violence and indiscriminate tactics*” and could foster rivalry and clashes with local populations (Hegghammer, 2010: 53), but also for countries they want to return to. Returnees are dangerous because they pose operational expertise, as most likely they have undergone a training and they have insight into Western society. Additionally, they pose also long-term risk, which should be dealt with community-based approaches. Many of them suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder being potentially dangerous to themselves and/or society. Furthermore, they often suffer from moral damage as their belief systems have been shaken and they are questioning belief systems and moral image of the world (Briggs & Silverman, 2014: 37-39).

Grievances Influencing Groups¹⁹

Lately, an important strand in radicalization research is based on the perspective of communities and diasporas. Research looks for explanations of radicalization in “*particular cultural, social, economic features of the Muslim communities in Europe*”. Interestingly, Dzhekova et al. found different radicalization models depending on the generation of migrants in Europe. The radicalization occurring among the first generation is oftentimes based on the worries about the development in their home countries with which they keep strong ties. The second and third generations are more prone to radicalization through “*indoctrination and bringing conflicts home through videos and graphic pictures of the suffering of Muslims in conflict zones*” (2016: 50). Crossett and Spitaletta list several examples of grievances present in the study of radicalization. Motivations for radicalization include grievances against governments, disgust over perceived erosion of fundamental values, alienation from society, outrage over uneven economic opportunities, and a desire to belong to something bigger and important (2010: 61).

¹⁸ The change between recruitment tactics and recruiters has been identified between AL Qaeda in Iraq and ISIL. Al Qaeda has attracted majority of foreign fighters from Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and most of them wanted to be suicide bombers (60 percent). ISIL has attracted substantially more foreign fighters from western countries and majority of them want to be fighters and not suicide bombers (Byman, 2015: 1).

¹⁹ Focus is on possible grievances of Muslim communities in Europe, as it is overall focus of the thesis.

According to Hafez and Mullins there are several reasons why many Muslims in Europe are disenchanted with the life in their new home countries. Among these reasons are worse socio-economic status of Muslims compared to the rest of population. This is caused by disproportionately higher unemployment among Muslims than among the rest of the population. Additionally, when unemployment is combined with residential discrimination and segregation, ethnically homogenous quarters emerge, usually more destroyed and older. Furthermore, high population concentration with worse housing situation are breeding ground for higher rates of criminality (2015: 962)

Unemployment, poverty and criminality produce stereotypes about the Muslim population among the majority of European society. These stereotypes mixed together with anti-foreigner feelings spreading throughout Europe and populist politicians have given rise to popularity of far-right parties and xenophobia. Now, Muslim identity is oftentimes connected to immigrant identity and cause double discrimination. Immigrants are often perceived as an economic burden and Muslims are viewed as a cultural threat. Feelings of not belonging has been multiplied by securitization of the Muslim identity after the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, after securitization of Muslims and their identities, their feelings of abjection have been multiplied. Their loyalty to their new home countries is questioned, when they criticize foreign policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Syria and in other Middle Eastern countries. European foreign policy in the Middle East entails controversial topic like the future of Palestine and Kashmir, and military interventions. Moreover, these interventions produce images of suffering of Muslims because of foreign, western intervention and therefore are a source of Muslim anger. Furthermore, the security discourse within the terrorism debate feeds conspiracy narrative that war against terrorism is actually war against Islam (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 962-3).

To the feeling of not belonging is adding also the phenomenon of anti-Muslimism caricatures, books and movies. Majority of the European Muslims feel that this production is an another attack on their identity. The majority opinion that these caricatures are a rightful expression of freedom of speech might strengthen the feeling of an attack. However, Muslims oftentimes feel humiliated and offended that their identity is connected to the feelings of danger and insecurity. These publications may stigmatize Muslims because they portray them as the main source of intolerance, extremism and violence, while ignoring the legacy of colonialism and its influence on (mal)-function of post-colonialism states in the Middle East. Additionally, they also ignore past and present support of western government to the autocratic regimes in the Middle East (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 963). Also, Keys-Turner sees grievances from home country as a

source of feelings of alienation which may help to spur radicalization process. An absence of the cultural norms and traditions of their home country can add to the feeling of alienation and isolation. Currently the level of remote connection to the home country has increased thanks to the modern technologies, mainly the Internet. Now, immigrants, as well as second and third generations are more connected to their home-country, and the grievances of the home-country are spread faster and with more intensity. Additionally, what is spread faster are also propaganda and possible inspiration of violence (2011: 64-65).

Majority of Muslims in Europe do not want and do not have an option to come back to their countries of origin. This adds up to the general feeling of not belonging in Europe and creates a double feeling of not belonging – a lot of them lost roots in their countries of origins and do not feel connected to their homeland²⁰. Hafez and Mullins claim that they are caught somewhere in between and create an idealized viewpoint on Islam and transnational ummah. Murshed and Pavan see individual identification with group grievances as essential to collective action behind the Muslim radicalization. However, it is essential to note that these grievances affect millions of people, but only a few become radicalized. This difference between widespread grievances and such a small number of manifestations suggest role of other factors in the radicalization (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 963-964; Murshed & Pavan, 2009: 4). Additionally, the grievances do not have to be experienced directly. The concept of vicarious victimization addresses grievances which are experienced only through either self-study, media exposure, or learned through individual's social network, (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 61).

Many of the group grievances are influenced by an underlying feature of a poor integration into the new home country. In general, Muslims in Europe differ from the main population in the socio-economic profiles – in the achieved educational level, in the neighborhoods in live in. Oftentimes, in the labor market they face bigger difficulties than non-Muslims. In addition, in many European countries Muslims are not integrated in the political domain and are very much under-represented. Institutional discrimination of Muslims (intended or not) poses a dangerous threat to their economic and political integration. In addition, the perception that they are discriminated and rejected by the society and the state has important social and psychological consequences which jeopardize their cultural and social integration²¹. Moreover, research

²⁰ This topic will be more discussed in the part about French sociology.

²¹ Discriminated groups may resort to group-based strategies as increased identification with group members and distancing from the majority population (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007: 1449 in Murshed & Pavan, 2009:14).

suggest that Muslim communities in Europe are also victims of negative stereotyping and prejudicial attitudes (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 30-32). To illustrate, Muslims in the United Kingdom are more disadvantaged than Catholics in Northern Ireland in 1969. The unemployment rate is three times higher than among the majority of population; significantly higher proportion of them are unqualified²², there is a higher number of them living in deprived areas. In addition, they are underperforming in secondary education. Moreover, only 0.3 percent of Members of Parliament and 0.9 percent district councilors are from Muslim background, which is a massive underrepresentation of minority with three percent (Silke, 2008: 112-113).

Religiously Based Pathways and Theories of Salafi-Jihadi Radicalization

Salafism has its roots in an intellectual movement in Al-Azhar Academy in Cairo at the late 1880s and 1890s. Its goals were to reinstate the purity of religion by relying more on the testaments from the early days of Islam. Salafism advocates pure Islam strictly following the teachings of Mohammed, the Quran and the Sunnah. By minimizing human subjectivity, they want to find the singular truth of God's words and commands without the impurities added to the practice during the centuries. Additionally, there is a jihadi branch of Salafism. This branch has emerged only some 40 years ago, during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Other conflicts like those in Chechnya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq and Syria have been functioning the role of radicalization triggers for younger generations. These conflicts served a significant role in the creation of a jihadi narrative of oppression of Muslims by the Western powers (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 40-41).

In other words, the Salafi movement can be defined as an effort to purify Islam and re-connect members of Ummah. The Salafi movement is one of the fastest growing religious branches of Islam with global reach. The word "Salafi" is deduced from Arabic "salaf" which means "to precede". Additionally, salafs are Companions of the Prophet Mohammad and more generally first three generations of Muslims. Salafists believe that these companions (or first generations) enjoyed true understanding of Islam, without innovations and schisms. The deviations stray Muslims from the true path of Islam and are product of passage of time and incorporation of local customs to Islam. Because of their strict understanding of Islam, Salafists get into clashes with number of Islamic sects, which they claim are un-Islamic. Maybe the biggest conflict they

²² 43 percent of Muslims compared to 36 percent of the whole population (Silke, 2008: 112).

have with are Sufists, whose practices²³ and rituals Salafists perceive as heretic (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 20-21).

Salafi-Jihadi ideology holds that Islam has been corrupted by centuries and centuries of innovation which need to be corrected. The sources of modern faithlessness are perceived the United States and their client Arab regimes. By promoting divergences²⁴ from true teachings of Quran, these regimes pose an existential threat to ummah. Salafi-Jihadists may be interested in several things: one of the most obvious ones is to establish the Caliphate (a unified transnational community of true believers); but they may be interested in advocating and carrying on jihad as an act of worship; they are also interested in being rewarded for martyrdom; or they just want to go on adventure modeled and glamorized by Islamic literature. The ideology provides, simply put, a “what to do list for salvation”, meaning it provides steps which Muslims need to follow to reach Paradise. In addition, it also says expenses of not listening to word of God. Using violence to achieve the ideology’s divine imperatives (such as martyrdom, liberated Sharia areas or the continuance of jihad as an end itself) is its ultimate function (Cozzens, 2006: 2, 4).

Nasser-Edinne et al. identify several tenets underlying what they call “*religious portion of the terrorist ideology*”. Generally, the Western civilization, seen as democratic and modern by many, is seen by terrorists as morally corrupt, because it is only “true Islam” which enjoys the qualities that can provide for just and good world. Another frequent feature is an opinion that predominantly Muslim states are no longer exclusively Islamic and therefore Muslims are in a state of Jahiliya. Additionally, many extremists believe that Western culture is overwhelming Islamic culture and purposely tries to undermine Islam by European occupations. Perceived decay of Muslim countries is caused by stray from their religion and now they are doomed to live in state of subjugation, humiliation and fragmentation. They see themselves as liberators and fighters for a noble social cause (2011: 23-24).

Dzekova et al. note that even though the role of religion is to be studied in the process of radicalization, it should not be approached as the cause of it and it is important to distinguish between “jihadi thought” and Salafism (2016: 42). Wiktorowicz notes main differences between Salafi mainstream thoughts and jihadism. The first point of departure is if whether

²³ One of the biggest points of departure is the use of saints in some Sufist prayers.

²⁴ These divergencies may be seen as when Muslim regimes do not rule by only Sharia law; exercise of Sufism, failure to counter Western influences (Cozzens, 2006: 2).

Muslims can claim that leaders are apostates and go on jihad against them. The second disputed point is what is the nature of jihad and the third point is if it is permissible to target civilians and the last one is if suicide attacks are permissible²⁵ (2005: 76). Additionally, within Salafi-Jihadi movements is one very important point of disagreement. After the end of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, there has been a disagreement over permissibility of jihad. The conflict in Afghanistan in 1980s basically radicalized²⁶ the mujahedeen in their pursuit to “export” jihad into different theaters and against new enemies. This has created conflict with Salafi reformists²⁷ who criticize broader military actions (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 22).

Cozzens notes that religious ideology is not the only factor in the radicalization process, but it does matter; it works together with social process and grievances. In his theory religion is a basis for motivational framings, which influences people differently, depending on stage. He has developed his diagram of five steps to “*highlight the function of ideology while adding a further layer of analysis to capture its ability to shape jihadi violence and legitimize it after the fact*”. He has developed these steps into diagram shaped like triangle to illustrate a limited number of those who follow the ideology at the very last stage and to show how the ideology is shaping more focused and personal phases (2006: 3, 5).

²⁵ Jihadists claim that they are possible because they are viewed as sacrifice in the name of Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2005: 76).

²⁶ The war in Afghanistan has brought two folds of radicalization: as mentioned it has promoted export of jihad, but it is essential to note that before the conflict there was only a very limited number of groups supporting use of violence. The war in Afghanistan produced mainly Saudi support for religious schools where they were teaching the religious justifications of jihad (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 22).

²⁷ Reformists believe that before jihad could be waged, there are several important steps to be taken before. The main step before jihad is to follow the straight path of Islam, because without it, Muslims could not wage successful jihad, meaning that “*any premature movement toward the use of violence is doomed to fail*”. Many reformists use an example post-Soviet faith as an example of prematurely engaging in jihad. They see its faith as a failure, because even though Soviets were expelled, Afghanistan fell into disarray and chaos. This was caused because the fighters were not ready to be involved in jihad. Additional steps before jihad include uniting the ummah and agreeing on the true faith and doing correct practices. Second reason why engaging in premature jihad is wrong is that it will create harsh responses (for example state response against propagating Salafist thoughts), therefore it does not follow the conditions of creating more good than harm. However, it is essential to note that the reformist do not prohibit jihad per se. they just believe that the time has not yet come for it – the movement must first go through the more basic stages of to purify Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 29-31).

At the first level, the ideology is a simple answer to ills²⁸ which are Muslim individuals and ummah facing. Mujahedeen through violence try to secure salvation to them, their families and most importantly to the entire ummah. Further in this stage, notion of brotherhood²⁹ is promoted through separation of people supporting the cause and those who do not. The promise of fraternity seems to be essential for the recruitment, especially in the West. At this stage, majority of the medium and modes of communication can be found and most of them are passive in their nature – they do not explicitly guide to violent jihad and they are targeting wider audience. Generally, they want to stress perception of Muslim oppression, fuel discontent with current status quo and speak out for personal and community transformations (Cozzens, 2006: 8-12).

On the second level – separation and the third level – obligation the ideology is spread more narrowly and is targeted. Instead of passive means, it has a more active character and it is done on a much smaller scale, usually personal or cell level. The active character is manifested in aiming at individuals perceived as vulnerable and/or receptive mainly friends, family and those who look for new identities. An example of an online medium at this level could be a chat room (Cozzens, 2006: 15-16).

The fourth level – activation is done through both passive mediums but also through face-to-face contact. The nature of mediums is lightly shifting to active and passive mediums of religious assurance, guidance and inspiration. The mediums at this level help to define the style and target of violence. The last, fifth stage, is there to defend the use of violence and makes a jump into the first stage (Cozzens, 2006: 7, 17).

With framing theory works also Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004). The theory works with social production and how individuals start to see themselves more as a collective with others than one individuality. Frame is defined as set of values and beliefs, together creating an individual's worldview. Based on the frame we interpret social reality and events happened. Therefore, the success of any social movement is dependent on its capability to promote its frame as the one we are interpreting the world with. The process of acquiring the organization's frame as one's own is called frame alignment – the emergence of congruence between two frames. He used this framework in case study research of the UK based group al-Muhajiroun. He noticed that

²⁸ For example: the “Jews and Crusaders” and their agents, including the international community; apostate Muslims and their regimes (Cozzens, 2006: 2).

²⁹ Salafists see themselves as a „brotherhood of the oppressed” (Cozzens, 2006: 8).

the process is often started with an individual's crisis which shakes previously held beliefs (Wiktorowicz, 2004 in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 801-803).

Another model of process of radicalization aligned with the religiously based Salafi-Jihadi model is religious conveyor belt theory developed by Silber and Bhatt. They have developed a model of radicalization which consist of four stages. Their model primarily claims that radicalization in Western countries is driven by Jihadi-Salafi ideology. They view it as a religious and political ideology with those two dimensions³⁰ (2007: 16-17).

Their four stages of radicalization are: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization³¹. Pre-radicalization is a time period before the exposure to Jihadi-Salafi ideology. They note, that this phase could very unremarkable and to identify potential radicals at this stage is almost impossible. The second stage is self-identification during which an individual explore Salafi interpretation of Islam. They start to adopt the ideology as their own and they are slowly retreating themselves from the old lifestyle. The catalyst at this stage is a cognitive opening or crisis which causes an individual to abandon previously held beliefs and search for new ones. The third stage is indoctrination in which the beliefs are strengthened and adopt the belief for necessity of action – necessity for militant jihad. The phase is typically driven by “spiritual sanctioner”. The last stage in their process model is jihadization in which people accept personally the duty of jihad – they accept the participation. As they self-designate themselves as holy warriors, groups start to plan an action (Silber & Bhatt, 2007: 6-7).

However, this model has caused some criticism in academic sphere. Apart from criticism, that when you are choosing only Muslim terrorists, Islam will be an important factor connecting all of them; Aly and Striegher claim that the model “*fails to make an important distinction between the religious and secular factors and gives undue and empirically unsupported precedence to religious orientations in the radicalization process*”. In other words, Silber and Bhatt's model reproduces the political discourse and pushes for political response which advances “moderate” Islam based “*on an assumption of vulnerability to radicalization by virtue of religion*” (2012: 852). Keys-Turner notes, that when this model was used by the law enforcement to develop

³⁰ In the political dimension they see its importance in rejection of democracy as it undermines God's will (Silber & Bhatt, 2007: 17).

³¹ They note that all these stages have specific characteristics. Importantly, not all people have to go through all stages and some may leave the process in various moments. Even though they have created it as sequential, it is not necessary to pass all the steps in this order (Silber & Bhatt, 2007: 6).

some counter-radicalization policies it caused allegations of religious profiling. It was because this model was developed mainly on religious behaviors and cited Islamic mosques as incubators; when practices are developed on these models, agencies need to be very cautious because it could cause schism between the law enforcement and Muslims (2011: 8, 42).

Aly and Striegher do not only criticize the above mention model, but they think that any model based primarily on religion, conflate a range of issues and motivations into one single, simplified understanding. They suggest that religious and secular factors must be differentiated. Secular factors are dependent on political, economic and social context and could be discontent with foreign policy (mainly towards Middle-eastern countries) and discontent with broader economic and political conditions (2012: 852). However, when differentiating between different factors it is quite complicated to separate the role of ideology and the role of radical network because both serve as sources of inspiration for new ideas and worldviews. For some, their friends and peers are an important source of “verified” information. Friends and already existing activist networks serve as a connection between “cognitive opening” and “absorbing of ideology” (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 966).

In conclusion, ideology serves several functions in the process of radicalization. Groups use ideology as a way to propagate and spread doubts about the existing order. For individuals it serves as a glue which ties them together and gives their existence new meaning. The new sense of being is presented like epic fight between good and evil, between justice and injustice. Ideology facilitates change of life goals, aims and value ladders. Furthermore, it is essential for demonizing and dehumanizing of enemies. This allows otherwise moral people to engage into immoral violence (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 967).

Additionally, to sum up the meso level it is essential to note that circumstances affecting on the whole community do not directly explain why isolated individuals get radicalized. Some claim that because of this, it is not sufficient to explain radicalization only on this level. Another argument against the community paradigm is that when a counter-radicalization policy is based on this level, there is a risk of targeting entire Muslim community and creating “suspect communities”. This could negatively affect community cohesion and even present as radicalization trigger (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 50; Pisiu, 2014: 788 in Dzhekova et al., 2016: 50).

The Role of the Internet

According to Hafez and Mullins digital media extend opportunities to radicalize people because it is now easier to distribute the propaganda materials and validate the extreme ideas by likeminded peers. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear and proven that the Internet and social media accelerate socialization because they do not substitute for in-person meetings. In addition, many researchers agree that online training is not enough to make capable terrorists (2015: 970). Veldhuis and Staun see the Internet as a “*prominent facilitator of network formation and interpersonal or intergroup interaction*” which “*offers possibilities for mobilization and social involvement in collective action*”. In addition, it improves opinion formation, it serves as a platform for seeking identity, expressing grievances and for obtaining membership of a social group (2009: 45-46).

However, the precise role and importance of the Internet in the process of radicalization is not yet known. Many claim that radicalization is a social process, which needs real social settings. But, the role of the Internet cannot be undermined because it contains free and unlimited information with opportunities for live chat among peers (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 45).

Internet, together with social media could be both labeled as enabling environments and support structures³². These support structures back the process of radicalization through providing ideological and material help for future members of organizations. After governments’ reaction against spreading of radical ideas in mosques and other places, many recruiters have turned into the Internet. The Internet is a source of two types of information – the first is ordinary, non-personalized information, the second is information which help to build relationship between group and potential members. For building the relationships social medias, chats, Whats app and other applications are used. The experience on these social media platforms is highly personalized and it serves as a substitute for meetings in the real life. The communication is horizontal, personalized, interactive, and mainly mobile. Hafez and Mullins note three important developmental characteristics of these media. The first is the change in language - they used to be dominated by Arabic language, but lately, there has been a switch into more multilingual settings, with focus on English and other European languages. Secondly, there has been an enormous qualitative shift in the propaganda videos, thanks to the spread of HD quality video cameras and edit software. Thirdly, new social media have created before unseen speed with which new propaganda can be spread, almost unstoppable (2015: 968-970).

³² Foreign training camps could be also put into this category (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 968).

Even though the Internet's main attraction is seen in its ability to give a platform for easy dispersal and access to propaganda news, articles, videos etc. it is also useful for communication, management and planning. Generally speaking, the terrorist use of the Internet could be distinguished into several categories based on online activities and their goals. One of the categories is psychological warfare to provoke "cyberfear", spread helplessness, disinformation, threats and images of violence etc. Images of violence caused by the group itself or affiliated groups may serve as "marketing" tool for new recruits. Additionally, their aim is to evoke Muslim hatred and anger around the world. Another important goal of terrorist activity online is publicity and propaganda. Radical Islamic webpages stress limitations of freedom of their expression, they oftentimes claim that they have no other choice than violence. Additionally, they aim to dehumanize and demonize the enemy and making the enemy responsible for the violence. Another use of the Internet is to look for information on target selection, structural plans of building and other facilities like airport or dams. One more important use of the Internet is fundraising. Furthermore, it is possible to identify wider terrorist media strategy. Example of wider strategy could be the aim to formulate identities – collective and individual. In doing so, they combine "*establishing forms of rhetoric and propaganda with new ways to reach the targeted public through both popular culture and religious ideologies*" (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 29, 31).

Terrorist cells also differentiate their approach on the Internet based on the target audience. That means they change their approach depending on whether they are producing for possible future recruits or to their members or other terrorist cells/organizations. The possibility of online undetectable recruitment and global mobilization is very much feared option of the use of the Internet. The use of the Internet towards members of the group and other cells is mainly based on networking and information sharing³³. The internet has reduced the expenses on communication and has increased the speed of information. Because of the many terrorist organizations were able to decentralize their organizational structure. Additionally, thanks to the Internet it is now easier to plan and coordinate their activities (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 32-33). However, some authors note that the same exact qualities which make the Internet useful for extremist groups (democratization of the Internet done by user-generated content) could be

³³ Ryan sees the invasion to Afghanistan as an import reason behind groups decisions "going online" as it interrupted groups' somewhat centralized command structures (Ryan, 2007: 995).

a double-edged sword, because the message is harder to control (and could easily deviated from extremist intention (Ryan, 2010 in Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 38).

Ryan conducted a discourse analysis of Islamist militant rhetoric and found an easily understood formula of heroes, grievance, and goals communicated through four Ps: persecution, precedent, piety, perseverance. Additionally, an important feature of Islamist radical rhetoric online are historical grievances. The crusades serve as a catch word supplying vague historical basis. Oftentimes contemporary military actions by Western powers in the Middle East (like invasion to Afghanistan and Iraq) are compared to crusades to highlight long lasting injustices. Very important feature highlighted by Ryan is that the campaign is defensive, therefore the extremists are not those to be blamed for the violence (2007: 996, 997,1006). Additionally, similar analysis conducted Payne in 2009, finding similar results as Ryan with just additional two words – vengeance and justice (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 38).

Role of Prisons

Prisons are thought to be a “good” surroundings for radicalization and few prison radicalizations have been documented and are known³⁴. Prisons are considered to be such a fertile ground for radicalization for their hostile character. In such environment morally and physically supportive group becomes even more important than in outside world. These groups are oftentimes created alongside ethnic and religious lines. Additionally, personal networks of prisoners are rather restricted, which makes it easier to adopt ideas and actions of the more influential members of the group. Furthermore, imams in prison play an essential role in the radicalization process in prisons. Imams in prison have a great deal of attributed authority, mainly from Muslims without much knowledge of religious issues and can serve as a powerful source of radicalization in prison. However, they also can serve the opposite way (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 46).

Macro-level

The question of influence of macro level structures on the individual is older than the research of radicalization. The question was part of the debate about the emergence of deviant and violent behavior. Veldhuis and Staun list as an example of Douglas Hibbs, who paid attention

³⁴ Among the most famous radicalized persons in prison is Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber” who wanted to blow up commercial airline with bomb hiding in his shoes. In addition, Theo van Gogh’s murderer evolved into radicalized circles while in prison (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 46).

to examining the emergence of political mass violence at a collective already in 1973³⁵ (2009: 29).

Barlett, Birdwell and King examine several macro-level factors possibly influencing the process of radicalization. Among them are foreign policy and military actions, marginalization from state and social structures, alienation, ideology and culture (Barlett, Birdwell and King, 2010: 37-38 in Dzhekova et al., 2016: 23). Veldhuis and Staun in their work from 2009 list several potential causes of radicalization on the macro level - poor integration, international relations, poverty, globalization and modernization (2009: 22, 24). The Dutch Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management identifies as macro level factors contributing to radicalization poor integration, perceived marginalization, discrimination, perceived war on Islam; poverty and deprivation; globalization and modernization, clash of civilization, and conflicts between radical and moderate Islam (ISSCM, 2008 in Dzhekova et al., 2016: 21). Some of the above issues were already mentioned in meso level of analysis, so this part will be focused only on the role of international relations, poverty, globalization and French sociology approach as it addresses the structural context.

International Relations

By many, international relations have been given the importance of incubating Muslim fundamentalism at both, national and international levels. The radicalizing rhetoric claims that the western foreign policy is threatening Islam and its values. In addition, by many British Muslims was western war on terror perceived as war on Islam. Many of them became skeptical towards mainstream media and felt that majority of the population do not trust them (BBC, 2002: 1). Western foreign policy in the Middle East also plays a significant role as a possible point of discontent (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 32). Additionally, western backing of the repressive tactics of the Middle Eastern countries in the fight against terrorism can incite anti-Western sentiments among Muslims in the Middle East and in Europe, as it may be seen as a support for a repressive regime (Coolsaet, 2005 in Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 33).

³⁵ He conducted an analysis of the institutional determinants of mass political violence. He came up with a model which took into consideration system level variables such as political development index, sanctions, repression to explain civil war and protest. Later on, many researchers paid attention to the importance of the type of government and the electoral system on the occurrence and the development of political collective actions (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 29).

Leaders of violent extremist groups often use perceived victimization of Muslims around the world, but there is not enough agreement to suggest that it is a driver of extremism and not just a justification to legitimize extremist activities. Nevertheless, research suggest that violations of human rights and perceived overseas aggression can have radicalizing impact on diaspora communities (Allan et al., 2015: 51).

As many factors in process of radicalization are interconnected, the role of international relations, in especially creating certain grievances is explored more in the part on grievances influencing groups.

Poverty

The relationship between poverty and radicalization is not yet clear. Some researchers³⁶ study the possible correlation between deprivation and poverty, and origins of terrorism, but some part of research points to the fact that the even though the majority of Europe's radicalized Muslims are coming from lower economic strata of society, it is possible to find radicalized Muslims across all economic classes³⁷. Veldhuis and Staun claim that the relationship between poverty and radicalization could be indirect one and it would be determined by social and individual factors. What indicates obliqueness is the assumption that other factors intervene because "*not every poor person radicalizes*". A possibility for further research could be attention on relative deprivation as a source of radicalism. One strand of research³⁸ developed a hypothesis that relative deprivation can trigger violent, collective action. Relative deprivation means that people perceive a lack of something they ought to have. It means that they are unable to obtain something they feel they should have or they have right for (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 33-34).

Additionally, Davies' (1962; 1969) research of rising expectations can help to explain why radicalization happens also across all socio-economic classes. The theory suggests that deprivation is not only relative in relation to relevant others but also to own expectations. Oftentimes, people whose conditions are improving feel deprived because they perceive that the pace of the progress is not as fast as it should be. In addition, Muslims form higher economic

³⁶ They list Gurr, 1970; Portes, 1971; Muller, 1985; Lichbach, 1989; Brock Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, 2004; Bravo & Dias, 2006; Franz, 2007

³⁷ As an example of this type of research they list Sageman, 2004 and Bakker, 2006.

³⁸ Veldhuis and Staun use Runciman, 1966; Koont & Fränkel, 1992; and Tiraboschi & Maass, 1998 as an example (2009: 34).

strata could feel deprived because they have high expectations of integration and socio-economic prosperity and the reality does not meet their expectations (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 33-34, 46-48).

Piazza focused in his research on minority economic discrimination as a new factor to explain domestic terrorism using theory of relative deprivation. He found out that countries with minority group economic discrimination have much higher chance of occurrence of domestic terrorism. Additionally, countries in which minorities do not experience discrimination are much more likely not to experience domestic terrorism. Furthermore, “*the overall economic status of a country has a smaller effect on terrorism than does the economic status of a country’s minority groups*” (2011: 339, 350). Furthermore, Victoroff et al. found in his research a connection between a sense of discrimination and support for suicide bombings among Muslims living in the western countries (Victoroff et al. 2012: 799 in Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 962).

Globalization and Modernization

Globalization can be viewed as a two-edged sword. It opened markets and allowed for free exchange of ideas, goods, investment and people; however, it has created dire conditions for some people in many regions of the world. These dire conditions could cause in some nations political instability, cultural alienation and economic stagnation. People perceive a corruption of their local customs and habits, languages, religions and economies³⁹ caused by the very system. Additionally, many developing nations may perceive a worse moral situation because of spread of drugs, addictions, crimes and psychological problems (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 31-32).

Moreover, globalization could have an impact on the whole way of life. It could break up whole communities and family networks with promotion of individualism, but also with changes in economy. Globalization could have an impact on dresses we wear, how we speak and what we eat and even what we consider important, all resulting in breaking young people from their traditions and customs. Propagation of consumerism and different “modern” lifestyle could

³⁹Many people in developing world perceive restructuralizing processes in their economies as imposed by western powers and western institutions (such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund). The reforms are usually done through market liberalization – discharge of subsidies and protectionist policies and regulations. This could cause among the poorest farmers and peoples economic insecurity, inequality and alienation further fostering radicalization and extremist movements (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 32).

develop opposite reaction – a reversion to “*a world defined by religion, hierarchy and tradition*”. In addition, globalization could be perceived as a westernization in an attempt to gain control over the Islamic world. (Sandbrook, 2010: 1013 in Nasser-Eddine, 2011: 33; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 34).

The hypothesis that social change drives individual and small-group vulnerability is supported by political science, sociological and historical approaches that examine external factors. Forces of globalization together with economic reforms can create instability which is blamed for causing violent extremism (Allan et al., 2015: 19). Additionally, globalization with ever faster connection to everyone has facilitated the emergence of transnational ideological movements with fast spread of their messages easily reaching large communities. For these movements it is now easier to recruit new followers and organize collective activities. Among such movements one may include global Salafism which tries to link Muslims into “*a virtual community through a common approach to Islam*” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 34-35).

French sociology

Dalgaard-Nielsen lists three scholars which understand Islamism as a cultural, social, and political phenomenon – Gilles Kepel, Farhad Khosrokhavar, and Olivier Roy. In their work they argue that “*radicalization occurs as individuals seek to reconstruct a lost identity on a perceived hostile and confusing world*”. They point out that there is no single explanation for violent radicalization and not one single profile. Dalgaard-Nielsen sees their main contribution to the research in their capability to clarify why a radical and violent understanding of Islam is compelling to more well-off and seemingly well integrated Muslims. Their explanation is in search of identity. All of them argue that an increasingly Westernized generation of young Muslims in Europe is trying to shape their identities. This search is even more complicated and dire for second and third generations, as they are more Westernized as their parents and they do not feel part of their home community (2010: 797-800).

Younger generations do not feel belonging into their home countries’ community and also to their new home countries’ community, as they feel different forms of discrimination and disadvantages which creates double sense of non-belonging. Militant Islamism serves as an answer to their search for identity and belonging. It provides with set of values, community and an outlet for the everyday frustration. Additionally, it explains the sense of not belonging and exclusion as a result of hostile Western culture and not possible personal failings

(Khosrokhavar, 2005: 174,185; Roy, 2004: 15, 193; Kepel, 2004: 250 in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 800).

However, Dalgaard-Nielsen points out one central question which is not answered by this stream of thought. They do not address the issue of why same structural influence affect only small number of people in joining radical groups. This issue is not studied as thoroughly as it should be, even though they offer some explanations: the effect of travel, social network and individual experience; the role of radical preachers (Kepel, 2004: 456; Roy, 2004: 195 in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 801).

It seems like underlying macro-level factors are not a sufficient explanation and condition for radicalization. Veldhuis & Staun agree with this position and believe that it is essential to add to macro-level also micro-level features, therefore it is essential to look at the “*individual and the way he or she is embedded within social structures*”. Therefore, macro-level can be understood as preconditions for a climate favorable for radicalism (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 23; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 24-25).

Olivier Roy has worked on a slightly new approach to radicalization. His work assumes that systematic choice of death among jihadists is a recent development, because attackers in 70s and 80s carefully planned their escapes. He does not think that the issue is the radicalization of Islam, but the “Islamization of radicalization”. To understand current trends in radicalization is essential to see the nihilist aspect of it, the idea of pure revolt where “*violence is not a means but an end in itself*” (Roy, 2017: 1).

Empirical Approaches to the Study of Radicalization

The chapter and approaches towards radicalization were structures based on the units or levels of analysis. However, there is an approach which is case-study driven and does not use particular theoretical framework, but individuals’ experiences. This approach adds valuable empirical factors to all the frameworks. The value of such research is in showing that there is not one single socio-economic reasoning behind the radicalization but a multiply of sets driving radicalization on the individual level. Dalgaard-Nielsen list few of the researchers taking this approach: Peter Nesser, who analyzes cases across Europe, Slootman, Tillie and Buijs et al. analyze cases only in one country – the Netherlands. Obviously, these studies cannot provide definitive answers on how radicalization happens, but they add very import data to the whole field (2010: 806, 810).

Above mentioned researchers agree on few things: to held radical views leads to bigger and bigger isolation – members of radical groups do not meet other people with different views that often. This isolation just reinforces the extremist views and building the oppositional identities. In addition, both emphasize the role of the activist leader as a key figure in radicalization (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 808).

Nesser does a survey of the motivations behind Sunni Islamist terrorism in Europe between 2001-2004. The survey is based on four case studies of best documented Islamist terrorist plans, attributed to Europe based, Salafi-Jihadi Islamists. Even though the survey has empirical approach, it methodologically considers three levels of analysis – local MENA context, European diaspora context, and global context. To establish the relative importance of these contexts, a contextual interpretative analysis was conducted of mainly media coverage. The analysis has found out that the motivations for all four attacks could be found on all levels of analysis. However, their relative importance is dependent on related political contexts (2004: 14-15, 68-69).

Critique of the Concept of Radicalization and its Research

Neumann and Kleinmann criticize not the concept itself but academic approach to it and its research. They claim that research of radicalization was not as good as research in other fields. First, the problem is in the fact who finances the research. Radicalization research (like terrorism research) is from a big part financed by governments programs and institutions (instead of research institutions). These government institutions oftentimes do not have standards of academic research as high as academic institutions. In addition, there was a lot of resources dedicated to this research topic, which might have undermined the quality of research at the end, because also less quality research was financed. Additionally, governments most likely do not have such a precise peer processes. Because of all these reasons there could have been “*some bad research financed in last years*”. Secondly, research of terrorism and radicalization is relatively more difficult because the number of terrorist and potential terrorists is relatively small. Those who exist are very difficult to find and even if they are found they are most likely not willing to talk to researchers. Therefore, any fieldwork is almost impossible to do. So, the most of quantitative research papers are not based on interviews, but on big datasets about terrorist attacks and macroeconomic data. However, this approach does not have to best suited for such a micro phenomenon like terrorism. In this case, interviews and qualitative approaches might be more suited. Thirdly, because the research of radicalization is relatively

new and interdisciplinary, many researchers who are experts in other fields are drawn into this research. Interdisciplinarity of research of radicalization might be an advantage for the research, however it also may produce many inconsistencies and incoherency. Additionally, there no best agreed practices, tested methodologies and ways how to collect data (2013: 377- 379).

Kundnani also criticizes the radicalization research and condemns the research as “*supplying what policymakers demand*”. He claims that after the murder of Theo van Gogh and the 7/7 attacks in London, governments began to devise counter-radicalization policies in hope to pre-empt such violence. Thinktanks and terrorism studies departments who were called to help governments to set these programs, according to him, did not provide governments with a full analysis of the causes of home-grown terrorisms, but rather began to model simplified process of radicalization without taking into consideration wider political context and foreign policies (2012: 6).

Additionally, the field is hurt by lack of original research because over 80 percent of all research and articles are based on secondary data already published in books, journals etc. and there is lack of primary data (Silke, 2008: 10). In the radicalization research there is a high risk of missing data when creating any datasets, which may jeopardize the whole research and conclusions. Additionally, studies based on interviews must be very careful in interpreting them. The problem is that interviewees either do not remember the truth, they do not want to tell it or just simply they interpret their reasons for joining the group differently (Davis & Cragin, 2009: 73). When data comes from publicly available sources such as media reports it does not have to be always trustworthy and such a lacks juxtaposition to non-members of violent groups (Silke, 2008: 101).

Nasser-Eddine et al. accuse the radicalization research from selection bias because it selects only “successful cases”. Therefore, even though someone would find a consistent theme of radicalization it would not confirm that this is the cause behind radicalization and terrorism (2011: 16). Studies which do not use non-terrorist control groups are unable to clarify how terrorist clearly differentiate from non-terrorists (Davis & Cragin, 2009: 73). Additionally, it is necessary to use different subgroups within groups and movements. This would allow to research the differences between “activists” and “violent activists” as it would compare views of convicted terrorists and individuals holding radical views (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 805).

According to Schmid the radicalization research does not pay attention to obvious question of our western past. He claims that radicalization researchers do not take into consideration

obvious questions like “*how did the radicalization that led to the American revolution come about?*” and “*how was the ‘de-Nazification’ (deradicalization) of Germany achieved after the Second World War?*” (2013: 2). Borum adds tasks on which the radicalization research should focus. Among them are questions of not only why people get involved in terrorism, but mainly why they continue being involved in such an organization and how they decide to leave (2011:8-9).

Furthermore, some question the usefulness of academic focus on the cognitive radicalization, which produced an assumption that extremist beliefs precede violent action. Horgan claims⁴⁰ that because of this focus research did not pay sufficient attention to the terrorist behavior (Horgan, 2011 in Neumann, 2013: 878).

Kundnani criticizes the definition of the concept itself. As it was described earlier, there is a distinction between behavioral and cognitive radicalization. However, it is usually not clear from definitions or from the concept itself. Also, in the research itself there is a lack of distinction between researching of adoption of radical ideologies and questioning what causes violence (2012: 21). Most importantly, Borum warns that “*a focus on radicalization risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy – or at least a necessary precursor – for terrorism*”, which is not true (2011: 8).

The widespread use of the words “radical” and “radicalization” by political bodies such as governments, state institutions and politicians have had an impact on the term itself. The term radical is oftentimes viewed as political, serving a certain political agenda instead of serving as a definition for a certain social phenomenon which ought to be studied in an objective manner. Additionally, because the word radicalization is seen in this politicized way any its use may be viewed⁴¹ with distrust as an attack on free speech and freedoms (Neumann, 2013: 877-878). Its widespread use confuses the audience as Hoskins and O’Loughlin found. British audience do not understand its current use and context and see it as “*mis-appropriated in politico-media security discourses*”. They are asking if the British Government has made a strategic error in mis-appropriating the term, or it was knowing obfuscating (2009: 107-108).

⁴⁰ John Horgan’s remarks at START Symposium „Lessons Learned since the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001” in Washington DC, 1 September, 2011 cited in Neumann, 2013: 878

⁴¹ Mainly by American liberals and libertarians

Deradicalization

The definition and model of radicalization a certain state uses and considers correct inevitably influences the state's deradicalization and disengagement programs. According to Veldhuis and Staun, when country uses phase models of radicalization their policy is only negatively formulated⁴², because these models imply that to fight against radicalization it is necessary to prevent people from moving into next step of radicalization process. However, they believe that it is better when policy aims to shape the circumstances, is proactive and stimulates wanted behavior. So, for example, at the macro level, governments' goals should be to encourage positive intergroup relations (2009: 66).

According to Horgan deradicalization is "the abandonment of terrorist ideology and disengagement is the cessation of terrorist activities" (Horgan, 2009 in Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 70). There are several reasons why one may leave a radical group. Among them are developing repulsion of group's violence, one's reasons for joining are no longer consistent with the experience in the group, they do not like the operational role they were given, they have personal obligations outside the group, or the membership in the group is not financially satisfying. However, to truly understand the reasons behind the exit, it is necessary to acquire primary data (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 70).

Simply said deradicalization is the opposite of radicalization – it is becoming less radical. Regarding behavior it means the cessation of violent actions, regarding beliefs it means building up confidence in the system, wanting to be part of the society, and rejecting of non-democratic means⁴³. Sometimes people deradicalize both beliefs and actions, but sometimes not. Form of deradicalization when beliefs may stay the same is disengagement from a radical movement, when individual leaves a radical movement, but does not have to moderate the ideas⁴⁴ (Slootman, Tillie and Buijs et al., 2008: 13-14). Disengagement programs do not necessary try to change the mindset of an individual. Essentially, they try to change networks and activities in which are individuals engaged (from radical to not radical). Some of them try to involve

⁴² Meaning that policy tries to prevent something, usually an action of people

⁴³ That does not mean they no longer want to change something or the system (Slootman, Tillie and Buijs et al., 2008: 13).

⁴⁴ However, the process of moderating one's beliefs is often connected to the process of disengagement (Slootman, Tillie and Buijs et al., 2008: 14).

one's family⁴⁵ and some try to minimize economic barriers of disengaging with several services (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 70).

Deradicalization programs are created to change one's beliefs and opinions and significantly differ from disengagement programs. For example, the programs in predominately Muslim countries are made up of religious debate and dialogue with moderate imams. However, it is quite difficult to measure programs' success as there is a lack of reliable data on recidivism of terrorist behavior (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 70-71).

Application of the theoretical-analytical framework

The theoretical introduction into the concept of radicalization serves as a guiding principle for description and comparison of the two governmental approaches. The relevant theoretical approaches will be constructed into the assessment model used as a framework for a comparative analysis of the British and Danish counter/deradicalization initiatives.

The framework will be predominantly used for the comparison part as I assume that it will not be completely possible to use for the separate governments policies, because most likely they are not addressing all the underlying issues on different levels e.g. globalization and modernization, and hopefully this could prevent repetition. Policy chapters present also issues which are not directly mentioned in the theoretical framework, such as short historical background of the policies, to understand in what historical context they were created and drafted. Another "extra" part is focused on the definitions of the radicalization and extremism the governments are using, as I believe it will be interesting to see how an essentially contested concept has been defined.

Both chapters presenting the individual policies are based on their stated goals and policy objective in respective government documents and on same levels of analysis as in this chapter. Even though the chapters are unique because they are based on the concrete policy measures, the application of levels of analysis gives them a better structure.

In the chapter addressing the comparison will be framework most visible as a guiding principle, in order to better show the differences, or similarities. The result will be synthesis of knowledge based on the theoretical chapter and two chapters describing the policies, practically resulting

⁴⁵ Saudi one tries to create a new one – it helps former radicals to find a new wife (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 70).

in brief and clear table linking the concepts explaining radicalization with government policies. Through linking the chapters together, the theoretical chapter should help determine if the government approaches are based on any of the theories, and therefore what are their ontologies.

The comparison of the national policies should contribute to better understanding of the policies and its ontological backgrounds. However, it is essential to address the limits of this approach, due to differences in political systems and legal cultures. Additionally, as the study is based only on publicly available information, news sources and academic articles some information might be missing, especially if it was not made public. Academic literature was used to interpret the policies and clarify the experience with the policies, as it was not in the scope of this thesis to conduct a field-based research on lived experience with the policies.

British Deradicalization and Counter-Radicalization Policy

This chapter presents British counter- and deradicalization policy. Firstly, it gives some background of the policy, such as when it has been developed and updated and in which context it has been developed. It is important to explore this first as it helps to understand what has shaped the policy better. Next, the chapter pays attention to the main aims of the policy structured into levels of analysis as in the first chapter (e.g. policy considering prisons, or the Internet are structurally on the meso level in this chapter). The main policy objectives of the 2011 Prevent continues to be: a) “*respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it*”; b) “*prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support*”; c) “*work with a wide range of sectors (including in particular education, faith, health, the internet and criminal justice*”. All these objectives serve one goal which is to stop “*people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism*” (HM, 2011: 60, 62).

After the introduction to the policy, concrete initiatives are presented depending on the level they are addressing. So, the first part, micro level, addresses the initiatives a) and b), which means how the British government responded to the ideological challenge of terrorism and it addresses the program Channel. The second part addressing the initiative on meso level analyzes British initiatives in concrete settings such as education, the internet, and criminal justice. A very important policy initiative considers the relatively newly emerged threat of foreign fighters, which 2011 Prevent does not mention in its objectives. However, I consider it important to include it in the analyzes because of later documents. Foreign fighters are positioned on the meso level as well, as measures against them are targeted on a group (of foreign fighters). The chapter ends with assessment of theoretical background of Prevent and with short conclusion.

Background of the British Deradicalization Program

The first British comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy – CONTEST - was developed in 2003. It was created as a response to 9/11 attacks and realization that the United Kingdom “*faced a threat from transnational terrorism qualitatively different from anything previously experienced*” (Pantucci, 2010: 252). The details of CONTEST were for the first time published in July 2006 (revised in 2009 and in 2011). The strategy is built on four pillars - Pursue, Prevent,

Protect and Prepare. In March 2008 CONTEST became an integral element of the UK's National Security Strategy (HM, 2009: 56, HM, 2011:17).

The London 7/7 attacks were seen as a result of home-grown terrorism and they sparked the focus on the domestic Muslim communities. The Intelligence and Security Committee investigating the failure to prevent these terrorist attacks, found that the security agencies had had not adjust to the growth of home-grown terrorism (HM, 2006a: 16). These attacks and failed attacks on 21/07 influenced how the UK government, media and communities are defining threat, effectiveness, and collaboration (Griffith-Dickson, 2014/15: 27). Moreover, there has been a shift from counter-intelligence to prevention, signaled by report Preventing Extremism Together⁴⁶, which listed 64 recommendations, such as incentives to improve relations between police and Muslim communities, create British imam education and such (Klausen, 2009: 405). Similarly, the report Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy⁴⁷ emphasized the need to counter domestic radicalization among British Muslims (HM, 2006b: 3). The shift from mainly reactive, law enforcement approach to a more preventive one was one the most innovative aspects of the UK strategy. To involve communities, as main partners to fight radicalization stemmed from a desire to deal with deeper cause of terrorism, which has resulted in CONTEST (Griffith-Dickson, 2014/15: 27). Pantucci sees underlying narrative for the British approach in its history when Islamist individuals used to be based in the UK for raising money and providing ideological support for causes abroad, but also, they were "*attracting constituency of local directionless youths to their meetings and networks*", and therefore balance of home-grown and external is important (2010: 254).

Prevent

Prevent was already part of CONTEST in 2003, however it was least developed part of the program. The analytical picture was not complete because resources were devoted mainly to investigative work, to protect people from the immediate threat, rather than understand what the drivers of radicalization were. Back then, engagement with Muslim and other faith

⁴⁶ Preventing Extremism Together was a consultation exercise with Muslim communities. Its aim was to develop practical steps for tackling violent extremism, their findings were published in report in November 2005. Some recommendations were incorporated in 2006 CONTEST (HM, 2009: 82)

⁴⁷ Klausen sees the report as sensitive in discussion of extremism as the report emphasizes the great contribution of Muslim minority to the society and stresses the distinction between Islam and small minority of radicalized Muslims (2009: 405).

communities was attentive on improving social cohesion and interfaith dialogue, working with community-based measures (HM, 2009: 82). Prevent published in 2006 aimed at setting out the community-led approach based on several initiatives like “Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds” established by the Department for Communities and Local Government. In addition, the department launched a £6 million Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund supporting 135 local authorities and establishing programs building civic leadership and strengthening the role of faith leaders and institutions. Muslim scholars were supported to challenge the “global terrorist ideology”. Islamic studies should become strategically important subject with UK as center of excellence outside of Muslim world. Standards in mosques should have be strengthen, with addition of strengthening the guidance to universities and in prisons (HM, 2009: 82-83). At the beginning the Prevent encompassed a variety of projects, some of them were government led, but the majority stemmed from Muslim (community) initiatives. However, this sparked some controversy where exactly government money goes. This controversy was additionally fueled by party politics “partnering with wrong Muslims” resulted in political vulnerability (Griffith-Dickson et al., 2014/15: 28-29).

The first Prevent strategy aimed to “*challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; disrupt those who promoted violent extremism and support the places where they operated; support people vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists; increase the resilience of communities; and address grievances exploited in the radicalization process*” (HM, 2011: 60) and to achieve its goals it has developed two pilot schemes of interventions to support vulnerable people. These two pilot models were developed on other European models, and on crime prevention and support programs. Based on these two schemes a whole program in key cities has been developed. The essential part of the program is cooperation between police, local authority and community resources. Since the beginning the Prevent program and its affiliate initiatives have spread into more sectors and institutions (HM, 2011: 60-61).

Labor’s Prevent (meaning before 2011) focused on wider social inclusion and communitarian approach entrenched in community cohesion. Close work with and between communities should have ensured winning “heart and minds”. However, the conflation between funding of cohesion and prevention of terrorism have resulted in a loss of trust in the government. The new government coming to power in 2010 had to encompass two things into reform of Prevent: parliamentary reviews of the program and massive budget cuts. The new government wanted to simplify and modify the program. Griffith-Dickson et al. see these changes as political,

ideological, and economical and not systematic and strategic. The new government was focused on stronger assessment of partnerships. Groups promoting “British values” got priority over groups who seemed more socially conservative with views deemed not fitting these values (2014/15: 32). According to Stanley et al. the new Conservative and Liberal Democratic Coalition took away the focus from community cohesion and focused more on centralized and integrationist approach. The new focus has start emphasizing fundamental British values, deducing than any ideology opposing these values, without violence, is a threat and should be dealt with and Channel interventions (2017: 134; Abbas & Awan, 2015: 19).

One of the main differences between the two Prevent strategies is refraining from engaging with extremist groups, but many scholars consider the non-engagement approach problematic. They contemplate that extremist’s or potential extremist’s concerns need to be identified and comprehended to be able to combat radicalization (Powell, 2016: 62). Hesitancy to work with certain groups foster a “divide and rule” approach and is problematic considering that nonviolent extremists might be best to deal with violent extremists (Silverman, 2017: 1098).

The updated version of Prevent “*has been broadened to cover all forms of terrorism*” (HM, 2011: 17), but, its main focus is terrorism associated with Al Qaeda and its related groups (HM, 2011: 62). Additionally, its focus has been enlarged to non-violent extremism⁴⁸ as well. The reasoning behind it was that some groups are intentionally creating an environment in which people would be more susceptible into terrorism while purposely avoiding open support for violence and the strategy wants to intervene with such groups. The strategy notes that it “*has no intention of labelling particular faith groups (and orthodox faith in particular) as inherently extremist*”. Additionally, it does not want to be perceived as judgmental which faiths are appropriate or acceptable. Its aim is to bring varied communities together and help them marginalize those who are advocating violence. But it needs to deal with extremism where “*extremist and terrorist groups share common views and where people who are extremists are being drawn towards terrorism-related activity*” (HM, 2011: 62).

One of the changes in Prevent was putting more emphasis on local management of projects. There is a bigger emphasis on localism than before, resulting in reduction of central control, mainly in youth justice. Additionally, local authority is in charge of many projects and is said

⁴⁸ Defined as “*the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs*” with addition of “*calls for death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas*” (HM, 2011: 62).

to have more responsibility on decision making than before (HM, 2011: 63, 70). Local authorities and its partners have duty to provide support to vulnerable people at risk of being drawn into terrorism (HM, 2015a: 2). All local authorities must have Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCB) which coordinates all agencies safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children in the specific area. LSCB is composed of members of police, health service, probation service, the local youth offending team, Children and Family Courts Advisory and Support Service, and possible others. Additionally, safeguarding adults is also essential, as per Care Act 2014 there has to be local Safeguarding Adults Boards. The boards are charged with giving strategic leadership in the development of policy and practice to the work the local authority and its partner agencies (HM, 2015a: 4, Citizens Advice, 2018: 1).

Definition of Radicalization by the British Government

The British government defines radicalization as *“the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups”* (HM, 2015c: 21). The main driver of radicalization is seen as ideology, which *“sets Muslims against non-Muslims, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and both obliges and legitimizes violence in its defense”* (HM, 2011: 36). Additionally, vulnerabilities and grievances felt by people play an important part because they are exploited by radicalizers. Recruiters specifically target personal vulnerabilities and local factors to make their ideology more attractive and compelling. These grievances, real or perceived, include disaffection with British foreign policy, experience of Islamophobia, and perception that the west is at war with Islam⁴⁹ (HM, 2011: 27). From the definition it is clear that the British government agrees with the major part of research that radicalization is a process. The ideology is seen as main driver of radicalization, but grievances are also considered as a factor. The strategy nicely observes that these grievances do not have to be real, but they can be only perceived.

Micro level

The chapter analyzes two parts of the British deradicalization program on the micro level. One is its Channel program, which is the program of actual deradicalizing. The second major part is dedicated to British policy towards propaganda, as one of the policy objectives.

⁴⁹ According to Home Office, these grievances concern only Al Qaeda inspired terrorism (HM, 2011: 60).

Channel program

Channel works on assumption that people susceptible to radicalization and people on the path of radicalization can be identified. To people who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism wants to provide support, in other words the program aims to deradicalize them⁵⁰. It has started in 2007 in selected areas and after five years it was rolled out across Wales and England. Scotland does not work with Channel but has a similar project – Prevent Professional Concerns Process (HM, 2011: 64, HM, 2015d: 5).

Channel helps to coordinate the efforts of multiple agencies, working between police and local statutory partners, to evaluate referrals of individuals. Channel is solely concerned with *people* becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, therefore it is not concerned with organizations. Additionally, the program aims to support dialogue between local police groups and faith groups, as this dialogue is substantially helping in effective functioning of the identifying of vulnerable people (HM, 2011: 64-68). It has several programs, which are prioritized “*around areas and places of higher risk, defined as those where terrorist groups and their sympathizers have been most active*” (HM, 2011: 65).

The program has developed several steps to protect vulnerable people: first, it identifies people at risk of being radicalized; secondly it assesses the nature and extent of that risk; and lastly it creates the best, most appropriate support plan (HM, 2015d: 5).

The very first step is usually done by ordinary citizens who make the referrals. When individuals are referred to the program, they are first screened. The screening process makes sure that there is a specific vulnerability and individual was not referred to program maliciously or because of misinformation. If yes, individual leaves the program, without even entering or in some cases he/she is referred to a different, better suited program. When an individual is at risk of being radicalized, one’s specific vulnerabilities are collectively assessed by the Channel panel. The vulnerabilities are assessed with help of vulnerability assessment framework built around three criteria: 1) engagement with a group, cause or ideology; 2) intent to cause harm; 3) capability to cause harm. These criteria are assessed separately, as many people do not fulfill all of them in. The assessment is built on 22 factors (13 connected to engagement, six to intent and three to capability) which all together contribute to vulnerability. These factors, taken together, can help to assess whether the individual needs help and what help would be best suited for them (HM, 2015d: 7, 10).

⁵⁰ The strategy refers to deradicalization as “*cognitive and behavioral change*” (HM, 2011: 64).

The Channel considers these factors as important to assess an engagement⁵¹ with a group: to spend more and more time with suspected extremists; to change personal appearance or style to fit with accordance to the group's; to center day-to-day behavioral around an extremist ideology, group or cause; to abandon friends and interests not associated with an extremist ideology, group or cause; to have things (and symbols) connected to an extremist cause; to try to recruit other people to the ideology/cause/group; and others; to desire for status and/or for excitement and adventure. These factors are sometimes referred to as psychological hooks. In general, they contain needs, motivation and contextual influences (HM, 2015d: 12, Annex C).

Intention is assessed based on these factors: to identify and blame another group of people as cause of all social and political ills; to call the group with insulting or derogatory names, to dehumanize the group; dichotomy us vs them thinking; to talk about the importance of taking action as soon as possible; to offend on behalf of the group; to excuse or support violence; to plot or conspire with others. In general, they are associated with a readiness to use violence (HM, 2015d: 12, Annex C).

Indicators of capability of causing harm or contributing to terrorism are: to have a history of violence; to use criminal networks for support of extremist goals; to have skills helping in planning and executing a terrorist act (for example work at civil engineering, pharmacology or construction); to have technical expertise such as IT skills, knowledge of chemical, military training and such (HM, 2015d: 12).

Multi-agency panel assesses all factors mentioned above and decide if person is at risk of being radicalized. If yes, the panel develops action plan and identifies appropriate support package. In addition to creating a plan, the panel keeps the support given under review, it revises or withdraws a plan if appropriate, it carries out assessments of individual's vulnerability along while plan is in action. The plan is developed on the specific risks and vulnerabilities of the individual's and on local resources. These kinds of support might be provided: mentoring support contact – an adult role model is providing personal guidance and helping with addressing extremist ideology; development of life skills such as how to deal with peer pressure; formal or informal anger management sessions; cognitive or behavioral therapies working on attitudes and behaviors; supervised constructive leisure activities; development of education

⁵¹ “Association with organizations that are not proscribed and that espouse extremist ideology is not, on its own reason enough to justify a referral to the Channel process”. However, when an individual is associated with or supports proscribed group, he is committing criminal offence (HM, 2015: 12-13).

and skills; help with search for employment; help build personal relationship and strengthen family relationships, including parenting programs; address any physical and mental health issues; address living arrangements; substance misuse interventions. When the individual requires theological or ideological support, it is provided by special intervention provider. The intervention provider mentors the individual to develop theological understanding and dispute extremist ideas (HM, 2015d: 15-17).

The panel determining risks individuals face consists of members of local authority and the local police. Additionally, depending on the nature of risks, the panel may be added with representatives of National Health Service, social workers⁵², schools (of any type), youth offending services, chairs of Local Safeguarding Children Boards and Safeguarding Adult Boards, Home Office Immigration, housing, prisons, and probation (HM, 2015d: 7).

The program does not expect panel members to be experts in deradicalization, for this stage, it is enough that they are equipped to recognize signs of being drawn into terrorism which are taught through attending Channel General Awareness eLearning and Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) (HM, 2015d: 10). WRAP is a training workshop for frontline professionals, such as teachers and health workers, security agents and community organizations to help them identify signs of vulnerability to radicalization in people and support them (directly or refer them to authorities). WRAP understands radicalization as social, with social origins and consequences. It emphasizes the role of groups and peer pressure. For WRAP the main vulnerable group of people is young people, who are recruited by people “*cynically preying on the vulnerable and their grievances*” (Blackwood, Hopkins & Reichen, 2016: 598-602).

Factors partly responsible for and indicating this vulnerability are, according to WRAP, twofold – internal to the individual and external to the individual, beyond one’s control. Among the internal the program includes factors such as an identity crisis, low self-esteem, and social exclusion; the external factors may be foreign policy, media, group identity, and unemployment. These factors combined make people susceptible to messages of violent extremism. However, the workshop focuses more on the internal factors, as external ones are “impossible to change”. These factors should not serve as a check list, because they affect

⁵² When a child known to social services has been referred to the program, and there is a concern that he or she is at risk of significant harm, relevant social worker should be member of the panel (HM, 2015: 7).

communities in different ways, in other words there are many different cases of radicalization (Blackwood, Hopkins & Reichen, 2016: 602-603).

The program is built around giving an intervention. The interventions are provided by specially hired people, who are credible, relatable and able to reach people. The strategy makes sure that, the government knows who and how works for it – especially making sure that the intervention providers do not promote extremist ideas (HM, 2011: 65). To participate in the Channel is voluntary and confidential. It provides several types of support, such as educational, vocational, development of career skills, mental health, health awareness training, anger management, common is ideological mentoring. When a person is involved in Channel, its panel monitors one's progress. An individual leaves program when panel decides he/she does not have terrorism-related concerns. Non-radicalization concerns could be continued being addressed, but with help of different program (HM, 2018: 6). Between 40 to 60 percent of the cases receive help connected to mental health (RAN, 2016b: 4; HM, 2018: 6).

Channel is based on intensive and regular but informal talks, usually once a week per up to two hours. Not only dialogue, but also settings of the talks can be informal, as one mentor leads them in park, to show the mentees life in community, outside of their house or computer. Many times, it is about showing them different ways of involvement in the issue, for example, supporting charity in Syria instead of fighters. Moreover, the talks often evolve around employment or ways how to constructively contribute in the society. Additionally, one mentor from the program assigns an important role to the growing up of the mentees, as they are usually referred to the program as teenagers (Ferguson & Walker, 2015: 1).

To ensure Channel would be delivered consistently nationwide, it became statutory in 2015. Making the programs statutory aims to secure effective local cooperation and delivery in all areas. It means that local authorities are required to ensure a multi-agency panel exists in their area; the panel is required to develop a support plan for accepted cases; panel partners are obliged to cooperation; and Secretary of State is allowed to identify intervention providers (HM, 2015d: 13, 16; HM, 2014: 1). Ideological and theological mentors working for Channel (selected and approved by the Home Office) come from different backgrounds – from Imams to ex-cage fighters and speak variety of languages (RAN, 2016b: 4).

6 093 individuals were subjected to a referral to Channel as they were seen as vulnerable to radicalization in 2016/17. The most referrals were made by education sector (1976) and almost the same number was made by police (1946) – each accounted for 32 percent. Out of this number 1 146 were considered suitable to be discussed at a Channel panel. 332 received Channel support after the panel. 61 percent of referrals were connected to Islamist extremism and 16

percent were connected to right wing extremism. From 332 people receiving Channel support, 184 (55 percent) were connected to Islamist extremism and 124 (37percent) were connected to right wing extremism (HM, 2018: 4, 11).

Even though Channel is built on multi-agency cooperation Stanley et al. found that practitioners from other agencies than police working on Channel panels believe that multi-agency information sharing is poor, and sometimes they do not even have sufficient information to be well involved in some meetings. Sometimes they did not have information to know if they should escalate the case and sometimes they feel that “*there was often a rush to name radicalization when it was not*” (2017: 136). Additionally, they are concerned about the shortcoming of practical ways to work with families and communities, as most assessment tend to focus on the child or adult of concern. Families are often neglected, Stanley at al. seeing cause behind decades of neo-liberalist influences and reinforcement of individualism (2017: 137-138).

Prevent duty

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act from 2015 has had an impact on Prevent, because it has created a Prevent duty - employees of various government organizations working with the public have a duty to prevent people from radicalizing (HM, 2015: 17). The Department for Education has given guidance on how to implement Prevent in educational institutions. Teachers and school staff in general ought to identify children being at risk of radicalization and how to proceed further, promote fundamental British values⁵³ to build resilience to radicalization, and to provide a safe space in which knowledge and skills challenging extremist arguments could be developed (DfE, 2015: 5; Taylor & Soni, 2017: 243).

In June of 2015 there were 327 referrals made, in July it was 349, but in August (during which is summer holiday in schools) it was only 120. These statistics show the big role of schools in referring young people in Channel program (Tran, 2015: 1). Not all those referred to the program are deemed as vulnerable to radicalization. Two-thirds of referrals are made in connection with Islamic extremism, and ten percent are referred for concerns about right-wing extremism. Only one in five individuals referred to the program was assessed as needing help

⁵³ Strategy defines “mainstream” British values as democracy, rule of law, same opportunities for everyone, freedom of speech, individual liberty, mutual respect, tolerance of different faiths and beliefs (HM, 2011: 34, 108).

from Channel and moreover, 17 percent of people deemed suitable for help from Channel withdrew from the process between 2015 – 2016 (Travis, 2017: 1).

Academic literature studying Prevent in school settings, in general, found that Prevent Duty “creates a culture of fear and suspicion with regards to those communities or ideologies which have become associated with radicalized views”. In addition, teacher professionalism has been put into questioning and culture of fear and uncertainty has developed⁵⁴ (Taylor & Soni, 2017: 243). The problem is if now students feel they cannot express their ideas or maybe claims they have heard at home. If they do not express controversial views, because they are afraid of being reported, then there is no space for debunking and addressing myths or misconceptions (for example conspiracy theories about 9/11 being an inside job). As a result, schools would not be places of challenging ideas and other points of view (Williams, 2015: 1). In other countries, like Denmark (SSP structure) and the Netherlands (the Dutch Safe House) exist similar projects, but they are not as criticized as Prevent Duty, which I consider very interesting. RAN identifies as possible explanation for it in different perception of them – as not forced upon employees or not being part of counter-terrorism legislation (RAN, 2016b: 5).

And even though Prevent Duty has been criticized quite heavily, there could be also positive effects identified. According to RAN positive effects of the Prevent Duty are: growth of number of referrals for the Channel, professionals received increased training, there have been more local prevent projects, a new higher education body and prison and probation network has been created (RAN, 2016b: 5).

Countering terrorist ideology

Ideology⁵⁵ is viewed by the strategy as a central factor in the radicalization process and therefore one of its essential goals is to challenge it. The strategy aims to mobilize communities and empower them and is careful to note, that it does not want “give the impression that they need to be convinced terrorism is wrong”. Through its work it wants to reach the small amount of people who might be susceptible to radicalization. The strategy supports projects in education, communities and the criminal justice system to help people challenge terrorist ideology effectively. In addition, it recognizes the imperative for theologians, academics and

⁵⁴ The teachers’ pay is subject to performance-related pay, making the appraisal process even more important, which might lead to fear of confronting matters of radicalization and actually limit freedom of expression in education system (Taylor and Soni, 2017: 244)

⁵⁵ Defined as „set of beliefs (HM, 2011: 107).

communities to engage in matters of theology, as the strategy itself does not want to be engaged in it (HM, 2011: 63). Furthermore, the government stays absolutely dedicated to protecting freedom of speech (HM, 2015a: 3).

Even though this is one of the most prominent goals of the strategy, the government does not see fast progress in countering and understanding⁵⁶ how to counter terrorist ideology. The cross-departmental Research and Communication Unit (RICU) has been authorized to develop counter-ideological and counter-narrative work. The authors of the latest Prevent strategy think that RUCI is not very successful in doing so. Some of its projects did not have the necessary impact and were hard to evaluate. The strategy wants to create new, more thorough, measuring of impact of RUCI's work. Additionally to RUCI, the strategy identifies communities and theologians as important actors in countering the ideology. These past shortages Prevent wants to solve by addressing broader issues, such as the relationship between integration⁵⁷ and Prevent, non-violent extremism, how to evaluate and monitor⁵⁸, and lastly the course of Prevent overseas. Moreover, it wants to strengthen communities' resilience to terrorist ideology by building stronger sense of belonging and citizenship. To overcome past shortages of RUCI, the strategy wants to continue in communication research, in order to innovate and experiment with counter-narratives (HM, 2011: 61, 64).

Despite this, RAN (Radicalization Awareness Network) thinks that UK RICU is very well developed. The communication plan and counter-narratives are perceived as extensively researched and strategic and it especially stands out because in many countries this approach is lacking. However, RAN identifies that resources for such a complicated work are often lacking (RAN, 2016b: 8).

⁵⁶ Mainly in understanding of more complex texts.

⁵⁷ On how to make the relationship better, the strategy just notes that Prevent should not be merged with integration work, as the whole success of integration policies could be jeopardized by "*being given a security label*" (HM, 2011: 61).

⁵⁸ A major motive in the government's increased pressure for evaluating intervention programs have been political – "*justifying the funding but also the choice and effectiveness of groups (Salafi groups in particular) through evaluation was always highly politicized issue for officials and their partners*". Beforehand there had been particular pressure from the media and commentariat and mood of vulnerability over partnering with some Muslim groups (Griffith-Dickson, 2014/15: 32).

The strategy aims to counter radicalization propaganda online as well, as most of it goes unchallenged. It wants to make positive messages easier to find online and ensure greater challenge to extremist ideas. To make the best of communicating on the Internet Prevent wants to keep cooperating with civil society groups (HM, 2011: 76). Lately, RICU's biggest focus has been on countering online propaganda of ISIL. RICU creates some government-branded communications, however the most important counter-radicalization message spread through discreet campaign without any acknowledgment of UK government support. It utilizes YouTube, Twitter and Facebook, and more old-style propaganda methods like feeding stories to press and leafleting. According to Guardian, RICU officials do not like the word propaganda, the term they prefer is "strategic communications". These aim to "*effect behavioral and attitudinal change*". Employees of RICU include linguists, psychologists, anthropologists, digital media experts, film-makers and marketing consultants. Its three divisions include watching and studying digital and traditional media; researching audience reactions, and a campaign teams delivering the covert propaganda (Cobain et al., 2016: 1).

One of the objectives of Prevent strategy connected to countering terrorist ideology is "*promotion of fundamental British values in order to build resilience to radicalization*" (DfE, 2015: 5). However, this is seen as problematic, as Panjwani notes that students and teachers are critical of how British values are defined by the strategy, their utilization and application. Teachers see promoting British values as further alienating Muslim students and because of other Prevent policies they feel like they are becoming "anti-extremist watchdogs" (2016: 337). Revell and Bryan have found out that participants feel that promoted British values are not being specific enough to Britain and they see them as a part of political agenda (2018: 350). Taylor and Soni, considering the criticism which promotion of fundamental British values has gotten, assume that this part of the policy has limited efficacy to interfere into radicalization process (2017: 247).

The entrenchment of British values in deradicalization policy is seen as problematic also by Awan and Guru, as they consider it reflecting past colonial practices⁵⁹. The employment of third sector in deradicalization, while perceived positively, might be compared to creating and employing middle class in colonial India to control its own population (2017: 30). Instead of promoting British values as a distinct category (from Islam) the program should paid attention

⁵⁹ Authors view a historical continuity between current and historical practices of governing subject and suspect communities mainly in pressures to use English at home and to inculcate British values (Awan & Guru, 2017: 27).

to identifying and highlighting overlaps and consensus between traditional Islam and many of British values (Taylor & Soni, 2017: 246).

Meso level

The meso level is characterized by the last objective of the deradicalization policy which is to “*work with a wide range of sectors (including in particular education, faith, health, the internet and criminal justice)*” (HM, 2011: 60) and the chapter is organized in the same order. Last section is dedicated to foreign fighters. As mentioned, these were not yet addressed in the 2011 Prevent, but since then has become a policy priority, and therefore, it is essential to mention them.

Education sector

The youngest person⁶⁰ in Britain convicted of terrorism was only 14 when he was planning the attack on the Internet. He plotted to kill police officers during an Anzac Day⁶¹ parade in Australia, with another Australian teenager. It seems that he was radicalized online, and also online he has created an older jihadi persona, radicalizing others. Before the police found his messages to the Australian teenagers, he was actually referred to the governmental program Chanel, by his teachers. The school has referred him to the authorities, several times as he once threatened a teacher to cut his throat and watch him bleed to death (BBC, 2015: 1). Building on examples of very young people radicalizing and on statistics of how many young people are vulnerable to radicalization the strategy argues that it is essential to work proportionately⁶² with kids in schools. Schools are already protecting children from drug and gang violence and Prevent hopes they could do the same about extremist and violent views (HM, 2011: 66).

Department for Children, Schools and Families developed primary prevention toolkit “Learning Together to be Safe” in 2009 aiming at reducing the chances of children and young people becoming radicalized. It concentrated on building resiliency against radicalization through promoting active citizenship, pupil voice, encouraging safe debate of controversial issues, trying to minimize gaps between pupils, anti-bullying programs and creating connection

⁶⁰ At the time of writing of the 2011 Prevent strategy, the youngest person convicted of terrorism was 16, 15 when he was recruited by a terrorist organization (HM, 2011: 66).

⁶¹ It commemorates Australian and New Zealand personnel killed in conflicts.

⁶² Children should be referred to the Chanel program only if there is “very clear evidence” of them radicalizing (HM, 2011: 66).

between families and schools, and also promoting diversity and shared values (Taylor & Soni, 2017: 242; DCSF, 2009: 21-24).

As some people have radicalized during their university studies, Prevent has been adopted by many universities as well. In top of that, some of them have developed a special dialogue with police about what risks radicalization present and National Union of Students is providing support to children. Additionally, schools and universities should be able to build a constructive dialogue with local Prevent groups and community organizations. Universities should work more closely with the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills to develop understanding of the risk of radicalization on campuses and the department should “*secure wider and more consistent support from institutions of most concern*”. Institutions at the biggest risk should work more closely with local police and to ensure that student societies and employees of the university provide correct information on guest speakers (HM, 2011: 61, 67).

Taylor and Soni reviewed academic literature considering the lived experience of Prevent in educational settings. They reviewed seven UK-based studies done between 2013-2016 with qualitative methodologies. Two of these studies involved school staff, four involved students and one included non-educational background professionals who were part of Workshop for Raising Awareness of Prevent (WRAP). Sample sizes of reviewed articles were between 30-60 people at a variety of school settings (community, grammar, university, training center etc.). The studies’ goal was to analyze individual perceptions of Prevent in schools (2017: 243-244).

According to Taylor and Soni majority of experiences with Prevent in schools and in educational settings in general were negative but one. The efficacious aspect of Prevent in schools was project Theatre in Education with play called Tapestry. The play uses humor to challenge radicalization discourses. It tells the story of three people – Nazia, a British Pakistani Muslim girl, her white working-class brother-in-law – Jason, and Hassan her Nigerian Muslim friend. Jason and Hasan attend the same violent demonstration, but at opposite sides. Both of them talk to Nazia about their radical beliefs and they share life events that led to their beliefs. At this time, audience is invited to question and challenge Jason’s and Hassan’s views. The play ends with them questioning their membership in extremist groups and audience gives them ideas what they can do if they still want to enact change (Taylor & Soni, 2017: 249, The Play House: 1).

Additionally, prevent in higher educational institutions is perceived effecting freedom of expression. These institutions have been securitized and a culture of surveillance have been

created, seriously hampering universities abilities to ensure academic freedom. Muslim students feel restricted on their ability to discuss certain topics freely, because of their fear of being labeled as potential terrorists or radicals. Furthermore, Prevent measures on universities have had impact on universities' Islamic societies, as certain restrictions have been put upon their activities (Brown & Saeed, 2015: 1954).

Blackwood et al. interpret the workshop critically because it focuses only on individual vulnerability and it neglects social identity theory. Effects of emphasizing individual factors may exacerbate the already existing scrutiny of the behavior British Muslims. Furthermore, it may aggravate real or perceived discrimination, leading to stronger feelings of alienation and even intergroup conflict and in some cases radicalization (2016: 604; Taylor & Soni, 2017: 249). Therefore, Wrap should be focused more on social contexts in which people live and points of view helping to understand these contexts, because "*interventions premised on the search for those with diverse forms of individual vulnerability may contribute to forms of alienation and even radicalization*" (Blackwood et al., 2016: 604).

Blackwood et al. are worried that interest in Muslims' views and behavior as encouraged by WRAP might be experienced as a form of "othering". In addition, they are worried it may produce distrust and distance from various legal institutions and social institutions associated with good citizenship (2016: 607).

Faith Sector

Mosques, as other open spaces in communities are exploited by radicalizers. For this reason, government sets its goal to work with communities to disrupt this from happening and will use the full range of legislative powers. As Imams have a key role in reaching and engaging with young Muslims, mosques have taken a leading position in challenging terrorism and Prevent wants to continue in cooperation (HM, 2011: 64; HM, 2009: 88). One of the Prevent's strategy is, with cooperation with the independent Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board⁶³ (MINAB), to strengthen standards in mosques. Additionally, there is "the Islam Citizenship Education Project" supported by Department for Children, Schools Development Support Agency and number of community-based organization which is supporting the development of citizenship education in mosques (HM, 2009: 82, 88).

⁶³ "An alliance of four Muslim groups, established to set standards and establish a system of self-regulation for mosques" (HM, 2009: 82).

Health Sector

Health sectors includes several organizations, the biggest one being the National Health Service with 1.3 million employees. They are in contact with 315 000 patients daily, from whom some may be vulnerable to radicalization. The key is to spot and interpret the signs of being vulnerable correctly and to refer the individual for support (mainly through Channel program). The main aims of the program in the health sectors are training to develop knowledge about radicalization among frontline workers and improve the general guidelines for practitioners. The strategy wants to work closely with regional and local health organizations, to ensure that all key partners have advice and support on Channel (HM, 2011: 83-86).

The Internet

The Internet is seen by the strategy as not fully sufficient for the radicalization process, however the danger of the Internet is in its neverending sources of extremist material. Additionally, internet enables ideologues from overseas to reach to the UK (HM, 2011: 74).

Schools and other public places providing the Internet, together with providers of the Internet, should aim to forbid extremist and terrorist webpages from these places. A special Internet referral unit - Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU; a dedicated police unit) has been established to encourage people informing about extremist webpages; content breaching UK legislation is referred to the communication industry. As the nature of the threat can change easily, e. g. Prevent had to adjust to threat represented by ISIL, its tactics and approach. Therefore, CTIRU has changed its focus and between 2013-2014 70 percent of its workload was connected to Syria and Iraq (HM, 2011: 61; HM, 2015a: 15).

Criminal Justice System

Prisons are often perceived as breeding grounds for radicalization as they are places of vulnerability. Many seek identity, protection and there are more “rebels” than in other environments. According to Neumann, they provide almost “*perfect conditions in which radical, religiously framed ideologies can flourish*”. In addition, prisons play an enormous role in narratives of radical movements. Prisons and treatment of prisoners inside is oftentimes an important point in groups campaigns. In prisons people are more likely to look for new beliefs, answers and associations. Despite all this, prisons can and often do facilitate peaceful change, transformation, disengagement and deradicalization (2010: 2, 7-8).

According to the British government, there are people in British prisons wanting to radicalize inmates. However, it is not yet clear if the radicalization process behind the bars continues also outside of the prison⁶⁴. In 2011, the government stated that there is need for more information on radicalization in prisons and how widespread the process is (HM, 2011: 70). Even though it is not precisely known how big the phenomenon is, it is perceived as a growing problem. To address the problem, displays of extremism must be reported systematically, and to deter and punish such a behavior sanctions must apply. According to Ministry of Justice Islamist ideology in prisons can present itself as “*a struggle for power and dominance in which perceived weaknesses are exploited by a gang culture which threatens or undermines legitimate authority and security*”. Concrete examples of such behavior are: Muslim gang culture, support for ISIL, charismatic Islamism extremist prisoners acting as “emirs” exercising control over inmates, aggressive encouragement of change of religion to Islam, unsupervised collective worship, Islamist extremist prisoners trying to engineer segregation, holding of material promoting extremist literature, intimidation of prison imams, and abuse of employees fear of being labelled racist (Ministry of Justice, 2016: 1).

The main agency in charge of deradicalization in prisons is National Offender Management Service (NOMS). It runs targeted counter-radicalization and deradicalization interventions in prisons and also in communities during the license phase of sentence⁶⁵. In addition to interventions, NOMS is charged to develop research on which measures are the best to mitigate radicalization. Also, it will implement screening tools and extremist assessment guidance helping at assessments and prevention of extremist offending (HM, 2011: 70). NOMS has “*allocated resources to tackle radicalization and extremism including overseeing the management of the most high-risk extremists, working with partner agencies to manage threats and supporting frontline staff to counter extremist ideology*” (NOMS, 2014: 28).

Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth Justice from 2016 identified few necessary changes for functioning NOMS. Lack of confidence and evenness in challenging intolerable extremist behavior and views were recorded. Cultural sensitivity of NOMS employees towards Muslim prisoners has grown beyond the necessary requirements and

⁶⁴ Meaning of the perceived radicalization in prison was not used only for protection inside the prison.

⁶⁵ British deradicalization program works with terrorist offenders on probations, in prisons and people under police investigation. In this case, interventions are mandatory (as compared to Channel) and consist of obligatory non-theological mentoring, theological mentoring, family support, and possibly financial support for practical assistance. However, a well-developed family program is missing in the British policy (RAN, 2016b: 7).

actually inhibits effective work. Safely practice of Islam in prisons and effective confrontation of Islamist extremism must be ensured at the same time. In addition, NOMS should work more closely with police and other state agencies (Ministry of Justice, 2016: 1). Despite their work, there is a lack of control in prisons over access to extremist literature and materials. The former head of the National Counter Terrorism Security Office noted that the prisons hardly keep drugs and mobile phones outside of them and he is skeptical that without rise in number of staff the policy would be successful (Kotecha, 2015: 1).

To mitigate the serious risks of radicalization the prison staff is trained to identify risks⁶⁶, gather intelligence and form a good relationship with prisoners. To minimize risks and stop radicalization process they often transfer inmates, who are spreading extremist ideas (Rowe, 2014: 1). In 2016 Justice Secretary Liz Truss announced a plan to separate imprisoned Muslim extremists from the other inmates in order to stop radicalization in prisons. The plan was to hold them in separate, special, units. However, this idea had its critiques - Peter Dawson, director of the Prison Reform Trust, claimed that the program should aim to get people back to the mainstream population, because this is just storing the problem until they are released. Additionally, isolating extremists together might help create networks and exchange ideas, as it happened in Northern Ireland (DW, 2016: 1). Such a move changes 50 year of British policy⁶⁷ of dispersing the most dangerous prisoners and it may fuel claims of “British Guantanamo”. What might have sparked the idea of isolation is Anjem Choudary facing years in jail for preaching support of Daesh (Syal, 2016: 1).

Considering the need for religious service, questions of Imams had to be resolved. To secure that no extremist Imams would serve in prisons all of them must be specially vetted⁶⁸ (Rowe, 2014: 1). There are around 244 Muslim prison chaplains, 69 of them are full time, 65 part-time, and 110 are sessional and around 75 percent of them follow the Deobandi denomination. Predominance of Deobandi denomination might little bit problematic, mainly if non-Deobandi prisoners and chaplains feel marginalized (Ministry of Justice, 2016: 1).

⁶⁶ But to suspect Muslim prisoners could be unfair and mainly counter-productive as it would fuel resentment and cause even more trouble (former chief inspector of prisons, Dame Anne Owers in Kotecha, 2015: 1).

⁶⁷ From 1960s terrorists in British and Welsh prisons were dispersed among six most secure prisons and moved often to prevent long-term relationship between inmates (Syal, 2016: 1).

⁶⁸ Review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice from 2016 identified a need to strengthen the vetting process (Ministry of Justice, 2016: 1).

Majority of European governments, except for the Netherlands, did not work with prison Imams combating radicalization until mid-2000s. In addition to the realization that they could be useful, their role has been widened – not only they should provide religious service, they have become counsellors, social workers, experts in radicalization and extremism and they are acting as interlocutors between the prison staff and Muslim prisoners in variety of issues. The institutionalization of the prison imam however has risen concerns that government is introducing a state-sanctioned version of Islam. This may be easily used by extremists, as it fails to reflect variety in Islamic faith, therefore variety of Islamic faith of prisoners (Neumann, 2010: 33 -34)

What might be adding to risks of prison radicalization is staff shortages. The former head of the National Counter Terrorism Security Office has warned about staff shortages in prisons, which might make it harder to tackle Islamic radicalization. The number of prison officers has been cut by almost 30% between 2010 and 2014, resulting in rise of the prisoner-to staff ration from 3.8 to 4.9 (Kotecha, 2015: 1). What be troubling is how between years 2004 – 2014 the number of Muslims in prisons in England and Wales has doubled, in 2014 being almost 12 000⁶⁹. The statistics claim that majority of them are moderate Muslims and around 100 are Islamist terrorist⁷⁰ (Rowe, 2014: 1).

Foreign fighters

In 2014 then-prime minister David Cameron said that one of the biggest threats to the British national security is British nationals fighting in Iraq and Syria alongside ISIL and other groups (Reuters, 2014: 1). British government has several tools for disrupting travel of people and manage their potential return. It consists of using the Royal Prerogative to remove passports or using travel restrictions, utilizing Temporary Exclusion Orders to control the return. Upon return everyone has to be examined by the police to determine if they committed criminal offences. It is essential to understand and mitigate the risks these returnees pose, for example by providing intense mentoring and psychological help. Prevent through Channel aims to dissuade people who want to travel to Iraq, Syria and other problematic regions. Additionally, it aims to challenge the beliefs of people who have returned from these regions. Prevent also contains protecting and safeguarding the children of people who seem like traveling to troubled regions. Resulting from this policy, family courts safeguarded around 50 kids from travelling

⁶⁹ Out of around 85 000 (Kotecha, 2015: 1).

⁷⁰ However, some authors are critical to these statics, which will be discussed later.

to Syria only during 2015 (HM, 2017: 9). In addition to frontline state workers, parents as well are asked to report on signs of radicalization in their kids. They are asked to watch their kids' attitudes, thoughts, beliefs and activities. Police urges parents to report if they have any information or suspicion that their kids want to travel to Syria or Iraq. Police wants parents to report their kids on reasoning that once they leave the country they cannot help them anymore (Whitehead, 2015: 1). Such requests suggest a relationship of trust between the police and Muslim parents, which is, however, hardly there⁷¹. It is important to note that where “*the community lacks trust and confidence in the police, community policing is likely to be ineffective because it is viewed with suspicion*” (Awan & Guru, 2017: 35).

The questions surrounding foreign fighters is not only about how to prevent them from leaving, but what to do when they return. The prosecution is often difficult as in many cases it is problematic to prove intention of terrorism behind the travel to Syria and Iraq or that returnees committed criminal offences there (Dworkin, 2017: 1). Even though the aim is to prosecute returned foreign fighters, the success rate is quite low. According to official statistics only one of the eight returnees is caught and prosecuted. Such a low number suggests that many of the returnees are now “off the radar” (Mendick & Verkaik, 2016: 1, Lord Keen, 2016: 1).

Moreover, there has been some controversial suggestions on how to deal with returned foreign fighters. Rory Stewart, the Minister for International Development, said that in almost every case the best way how to deal with British foreign fighters still in Syria and Iraq is to kill them while they are there. According to the BBC, the government agrees with his statement, as it is in line with the British stated position. The same position holds Gavin Williamson, the Defense Secretary. He has said that “*Britons who have fought for Islamic State abroad should be hunted down and killed to ensure they never return to the UK*”. His remarks have hinted that British foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria are already deliberately targeted (BBC, 2017: 1; Elgot, 2017: 1). Reasons behind these calls do not have to be necessarily rooted in the worries about national security, but more in the “*desire to avoid the pragmatic problems, imposed by a commitment to the rule of law*” (Dworkin, 2017: 1).

According to a Home Office spokesman everyone who is a returnee from Syria or Iraq is subject to investigation to decide if they are a threat to the security (Mendick & Verkaik, 2016: 1). Unlike views to deliberately target them or to prosecute them, Max Hill, the independent

⁷¹ Majority of the respondents of Awan and Guru study viewed the police with caution and without trust (Awan & Guru, 2017: 35).

reviewer of terrorism legislation, thinks that it is important to select British nationals who joined ISIL through „naivety”, as they should not be prosecuted, but reintegrated (BBC, 2017: 1).

The threat and its severity presented by returned foreign fighters is not clear. According to Thomas Hegghammer most of the foreign fighters prefer fighting abroad and only a minority would attack at home. However, the presence of returned foreign fighters might significantly increase the effectiveness of the attacks – the probability that a plot will be executed is risen by 1.5 factor and the likelihood that the attack would kill people is doubled (2013: 11).

Age of people being subjected to deradicalization program in the UK and people who joined ISIL is quite young – one in six of people considered for deradicalization program is under 20 years old and people who joined ISIL are quite young - men who have joined were in general around 25 years old, women around 21 (Silverman, 2017: 1093). Majority of the foreign fighters from the UK come from a small number of cities. Even though one may assume that these cities must be those with the largest Muslim minorities, it is not true. Geographical clusters seem to be result of traveling in groups because of friendships and peer groups. It seems that face-to-face contacts are way more important than online friends. Additionally, it seems that prisons and universities play a role in the radicalization process of foreign fighters, (Corera, 2015: 1), as for example, there was a group of female friends traveling from Portsmouth. Moreover, area with a disproportionate number of travelers is High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire (Silverman, 2017: 1093). These geographical clusters would support the social networks theory presented in the first chapter.

Theoretical Inspiration Behind Prevent and its Critical Analysis

Griffith-Dickson et al. argue that the beginning of British deradicalization program was more of a “set of operational premises” than a strategy. The program was based on premises intuitively generated from deep experience, such as: communities and citizens are not only providers of intelligence, but they should play an active role; as there was an absence of evidence for best deradicalization programs, a diversity of response was deemed appropriate, rather than one strategy; wider public should be engaged. This has not changed that much even after change in the government and update of the strategy (2014/15: 36 - 37).

According to my understanding, Prevent significantly works on assumption that ideology is predominant factor behind radicalization process. Prevent wants to disprove the ideology and make it irrelevant through work of RICU, the Channel program and by promoting fundamental

British values. However, by targeting ideology the policy can lead to casual forms of Islamophobia. By inscribing its premises and biases into the structural operations Prevent is disseminating and normalizing Islamophobia. The policy, by focusing on Muslims, draws the attention on their cultural and religious norms and values, and not on their socio-economic disadvantages (Abbas and Awan, 2015: 16, 19-20; Qurashi, 2018: 3). However, this does not have any “peer-reviewed evidentiary basis showing a link between violence and ideology” (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009 in Powell, 2016: 16). Additionally, Powell sees it in the “youth bulge” theory. This theory is prevalent in US policymaking after 9/11 and it presupposes that young people are more susceptible to indoctrination by various ideologies than other (older) people (2016: 56).

To critically assess the government policies is important because they not only directly intervene into one’s life but because “*the approach adopted by those in authority can set the tone for how ordinary people behave towards one*”. Blackwood et al. use the example of Smelser’s work (1962) on McCarthyite repression against anarchists and communists and argue that it legitimized popular hostility towards these groups and its members (2016: 608). Abbas and Awan believe that UK counterterrorism policy (part of which is PREVENT) has created a notion of suspected communities. The policy is alienating young Muslims at the community engagement level, which can lead to the institutionalization of Islamophobia. The notion of suspected community is not new – but before 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, this community was Irish. Both communities have faced relentless assault⁷² from politicians and media, who now concentrate on “*seemingly problematic characteristics of Islam and Muslim culture*” (2015: 16, 18).

Generally, Prevent is seen as increasing “*the securitization of social policy and its operation in non-judicial, pre-emptive spaces*” (Stanley et al., 2017: 134). By communities it is considered to be part of the counter-terrorism measures and it is very much top down approach⁷³. It is perceived as not helping vulnerable people but rather putting them under suspicion, possibly stigmatizing whole cultural groups (RAN, 2016b: 8). Additionally, by emphasizing psychological “risk indicators”, individuals’ patterns of behavior and beliefs, instead of socio-

⁷² Evidence suggests a rise in hate crimes against Muslim, both in real life, but mainly online (Abbas and Awan, 2015: 18).

⁷³ Prevent strategy has been criticized as being imposed on professionals (RAN, 2016b: 8).

economic and political cause it has received quite a lot of criticism for pathologizing and alienating effects on British Muslim communities (Awan and Guru, 2017: 26).

Conclusion

Britain has originally developed its counter-terrorism policies to address the issues stemming from conflict in Northern Ireland. After the turn of millennium, it had to re-evaluate them to address the changing threat. It has developed its current counter-terrorism policies (part of which is deradicalization policy) mainly after London attacks in 2005, with specific focus on home-grown threat with specifically Islam character. As it has faced far greater threat from terrorism than other European countries, it has developed its policies relatively sooner than others and served as a prototype for other countries⁷⁴ (Klausen, 2009: 407).

Not only because it has served as inspiration for other countries is essential to highlight one of the most predominant critiques of the program. It is seen as creating an elaborate system of state control of people, especially in public spaces, as state employees have duty to prevent people from radicalizing. Together with use of surveillance technologies, Prevent is seen as an attempt to contain a certain population and its political agency. Surveillance allows for identifying and disciplining the unacceptable, abnormal behaviors, like Foucault's process of soul training, during which individuals learn to control their behavior to be with prescribed social norms (Qurashi, 2018: 3). Additionally, the channel identification process seems to be suppressing and affirming certain types of identities, based on the government wishes. Prevent through technologies of the self is trying to secure the discipline of the Muslim minority and making sure that "*individuals adopt and invest in modes of subjectivities that are deemed sanitized and certified by political authorities*" (Elshimi, 2015: 124). Furthermore, the omnipresent surveillance in form of CCTV cameras, strengthen police work, but most importantly in form of Prevent Duty resembles panopticon, as it gives state a permanent visibility, while threatening people into compliance (Sabir, 2014: 19).

⁷⁴ Mainly Dutch and Spanish authorities were curious how is Britain addressing the issue of domestic recruitment (Klausen, 2009: 407).

Danish Deradicalization and Counter-Radicalization Policy

The chapter first presents the background and development of the Danish deradicalization policy, in order to understand its context better. Afterwards it is structured based on government's 2014 action plan's key priorities and levels of analysis developed in the first chapter (micro, meso and macro). These key priorities were: a) arrange greater involvement by local authorities (they should be able to spot signs of radicalization and take preventive action); b) develop new tools for prevention and exit work⁷⁵ (with focus on online presence and recruitment to armed conflict); c) enhance international partnership (for example through capacity building in the third countries); d) mobilize civil society (ensure relevant stakeholders are contributing in preventive work and minimize the negative influence of preachers of extremism) (The Danish gov., 2014: 7). The priorities a) and b) are discussed first and together, as they consider more practical steps of working the strategy itself, and therefore are not on any of the levels. The micro level describes priority b) individual intervention to radicalization and greater parental involvement, as identified improvement to the strategy. Meso level of analysis is focused on special places of radicalization, e.g. prisons, the Internet and schools (together with more general focus on young people) and measures of prevention of foreign fighters, as highlighted in priority b). Last, macro level explores the priority c) to enhance international partnerships.

Background of Danish Deradicalization Program

The period after 9/11 was symbolized by introducing anti-terror laws and stricter immigration policies and the criteria to get permanent residency as a refugee were tightened. The result was that the number of accepted refugees decreased from 5 211 (in 2001) to 233 (in 2007). Denmark started to select refugees based on "integrational potential", meaning that in practice it accepted more Christian refugees, at the expense of Muslim ones. Moreover, the rules on family reunification were hardened, making it one of the strictest in Europe. Additionally, policies regarding integration were revised. For example, until 2002 teaching of the mother-tongue had been obligatory in Danish schools, but later it was abolished under the reasoning that children should speak Danish at home⁷⁶. Moreover, there has been a substantial reduction in subsidies

⁷⁵ The plan wants to make sure that people who want to leave extremist groups they would get all necessary help (The Danish gov., 2014: 7).

⁷⁶ However, research shows that bilingual children, when fluent in Danish and their mother tongue do better in education (Holmen, 2002 in Rytter & Pedersen, 2014: 2308).

for immigrant associations. According to Rytter & Pedersen these associations were before 9/11 regarded as encouraging involvement in civil society, but after they were monitored and regarded as suspect (2014: 2307-2308).

Politically, Danish deradicalization efforts have been developed in the context of so called cartoon-crisis⁷⁷ - Danish daily newspaper Jyllands-Posten published several cartoons of prophet Mohammed. The crisis has been strengthened when number of other European papers have republished the caricatures, which has led to numerous protests across the Muslim world, few of them escalating to violence and causing one hundred deaths. Danish embassies have been attacked in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran; some Muslim leaders have issued death threats and there was a boycott of Danish products. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service has evaluated situation as making Denmark more vulnerable to jihadist attacks and concluded that together with Danish participation in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq caused a stronger focus on Denmark in militant extremist circles. In 2006 Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri condemned the cartoons and again in 2008 (cartoons were reprinted at that time) and in June 2008 Danish embassy in Pakistan was attacked with a car bomb. In addition, three men were arrested for an alleged plot to murder the main cartoonist (Jones, 2008: 22-23).

A prominent role in developing Danish deradicalization efforts had the European union. In 2008 Denmark was invited by EU's Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove to be a lead country on deradicalization, meaning that Denmark would gather knowledge and carry out research in order to share this knowledge with other EU members. In 2010 the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs published results of its work in report "*The challenge of extremism – examples of deradicalization and disengagement programs in the EU*" (The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2011: 1).

The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs has launched two bigger EU projects. One of them is "*Deradicalization – targeted intervention*". There are two parts or aims of the project: one is concept of exit talks and the second is a concept of mentoring of young people socializing with extremists which could be called resource person schemes. The second project is "*Deradicalization – back on track*". The project is ran by the Danish Prison

⁷⁷ The most controversial cartoon was showing the prophet with a lit fuse in his turban. The publication has sparked domestic and international controversy, Islamic groups in Denmark demanded an apology, 5000 people have protested in front of newspaper office and several Muslim predominant countries requested to meet with then Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, which he has refused (Jones, 2008: 22).

and Probation Service and the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. Denmark, similarly to the UK, sees prisons as a conducive setting for radicalization and extremism. The support is offered through mentoring schemes, involvement of families and social networks (The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2011: 1-2).

The recent changes in deradicalization approach are driven mainly by online presence of extremist agenda, the need to address foreign fighters and the first and only terrorist attack in which victims were killed on Danish soil in February 2015. Omar Abdel Hamid el-Hussein⁷⁸ shot to kill two civilians and six policemen were injured at the cultural center and synagogue in Copenhagen (Hemmingsen, 2015:11).

Danish Deradicalization Efforts and their Development

Deradicalization efforts were presented in “A common and safe future” national action plan in 2009⁷⁹. In 2014 was drafted new action plan “Prevention of radicalization and extremism”, addressing new issues, such as foreign fighters and online propaganda⁸⁰ (The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2011: 1; Hemmingsen, 2015: 11). And in 2016 the newest version “Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalization: The National Action Plan” was published.

The Action Plan “A Safe and Common Future” from 2009 was in 2014 evaluated by COWI⁸¹ which came to an end that the initiatives presented in the plan are achieving satisfactory results while identifying several areas in which efforts should be strengthened. As a result the Danish government has created special working group between the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. The inter-ministerial

⁷⁸ As he was former prisoner, the case will be in more detail discussed in the section about deradicalization work in prisons.

⁷⁹ The 2009’s plan encompassed 22 concrete initiatives, such as international cooperation, development and democracy; anti-discrimination efforts; access to education, jobs; equal opportunities; promoting integration and intercultural dialogue. However, the plan was criticized for “confusing security threats with social challenges” (Hemmingsen, 2015: 12).

⁸⁰ These two plans were written by different governments; the first was written by center-right coalition between the Liberal Party and Conservative party, the second was by center-left coalition between Social Democrats and the Danish Social Liberal Party. However, according to Hemmingsen, the changes are not only results of the change of the government, but also because of learnt experience (2015: 12).

⁸¹ An international consulting group

working group was in charge of the process of developing new action plan including new challenges and threats, such as efforts to prevent people from travelling to Syria and Iraq and coming back, and it includes new exit efforts supporting early exit from extremist circles (TerRa, 2014: 21-22). Another challenge was the increasing use of the Internet and social media. Extreme propaganda is identified to be available to more people on social media like Facebook and Twitter and not in closed forums like before⁸². Additional challenge was criminals (included people connected to gangs) increasingly having connections to extremist circles. This poses a particular security risks because the connection may make weapons easier to come. Moreover, additional measures were needed to be taken to address the negative influence of radicalizers – key figures exerting a substantial influence on radicalization and recruitment (The Danish gov., 2014: 5).

Lindekilde sees three improvements in the newer plan. The first was professionalization of the initiatives, techniques and organization. Second improvement was in separation of policies regarding integration and discrimination from policies regarding security⁸³. This allowed for a change from the notion of battle of ideas to a stronger focus on forestalling violent acts. The third positive change was that a more complex and nuanced perception of radicalization instead of simplified phase-models has been included (2015a: 439; Hemmingsen, 2015: 36).

In October 2016 the most recent Action Plan has been launched (Warrington, 2018: 129). The new plan was drafted because “*the concrete challenges involved in tackling extremism and radicalization change over time*” therefore there is a need to “*continuously develop and adapt the preventive effort*”. The plan identifies cases of radicalization as being more complex in nature and more serious than before (The Danish gov., 2016: 6-7).

Definitions of extremism and radicalization

Radicalization is defined as “*short- or long-term process where persons subscribe to extremist views or legitimize their actions on the basis of extremist ideologies*”. And extremism “*refers to persons or groups that commit or seek to legitimize violence or other*

⁸² The action plan sees the phenomenon on far right, far left and Islamist circles (The Danish gov., 2014: 5).

⁸³ This has been an important step, as research suggests that any good intentions towards counter-discrimination and strengthening equal opportunities might be perceived by a target groups as problematic when they are addressed as a part of counter-radicalization approach (Lindekilde, 2012b: 399).

illegal acts, with reference to societal conditions that they disagree with” (The Danish gov., 2016: 7).

Moreover, other state actors have also defined extremism and radicalization. For example the municipality of Copenhagen defines extremism as *“an animosity towards the established society and its order which is based on beliefs such as: rejection of basic democratic values and norms and of democratic decision making; simplified world views and conspiracy theories; enemy images where groups or social conditions are labelled as threats that must be removed; intolerance and lack of respect for other people’s views, freedom and rights. These beliefs might be accompanied by the support or use of extreme actions which are illegal and possibly violent means of achieving a political or religious ideological goal”*. Radicalization according the municipality is *“a process in which a group or an individual gets increasingly extreme viewpoints and/or support the use of illegal or violent acts to promote them. It is far from everyone who commits such actions, but the risk leads to the viewpoints to be problematic”* (Municipality of Copenhagen, 2016: 6 in Warrington, 2018: 130-131).

From these definitions some aspects of them reveal the underlying understanding of the causes and processes of radicalization. Definition of extremism encompasses ideas as well actions. Therefore, extremism and radicalization are perceived as cognitive/ideological and physical/behavioral processes. Clearly, radicalization is defined as *process* of accepting extreme ideas and methods. Moreover, radicalization is seen as an individual phenomenon and does not focus on radicalization of groups. Additionally, Lindekilde sees Danish definition as a matter of demand and supply – youth’s search for identity is perceived as demand and while supply is present by explanations and feelings of belongings extremism is trying to offer (The Danish gov., 2009: 8, Lindekilde, 2012b: 390).

The Danish Model of Prevention

Denmark conceptualized prevention through interventions depending on the target group⁸⁴ – creating three types of interventions – general/preventive interventions, anticipatory interventions, and direct interventions. Direct interventions are aimed at persons in extremist environments who have already committed or are likely to commit criminal act. In charge of direct interventions are PET, the Police, the Danish Prison and Probation Service⁸⁵. The aim of

⁸⁴ The approach is possible to illustrate through pyramid and it is also used in crime prevention efforts (The Danish gov., 2016: 16).

⁸⁵ Via the municipalities’ mentoring schemes and social measures (The Danish gov., 2016: 16).

these interventions is to prevent (further) extremist criminal acts and help people to leave extremist environments. All these efforts are done in conjunction with the relevant criminal procedures. Anticipatory interventions are designed for people at risk of radicalization – displaying risk behavior or signs of radicalization. They are carried out in conjunction with crime-preventive efforts and more general social efforts, such as social housing initiatives in vulnerable areas. They are implemented by municipalities' social efforts and mentoring schemes. Lastly, the preventive measures are aimed at all people, but predominantly at young people and children. They are not “deradicalization” activities per se, they are more intended to advance the welfare, develop active citizenship and prevent risk behavior. They are aimed at providing people with democratic skills, strengthening their critical thinking and social competences (The Danish gov., 2014: 6; The Danish gov., 2016: 16-17).

Main actors of deradicalization process are: The Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs; the Ministry of Justice; the National Board of Social Services; Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), the Danish Prison and Probation Service and local agencies such as local councils and police districts all work in inter-agency collaborative approach. Key actors of preventive work are local authority experts and the police because of their general duties of crime-prevention. Together with schools and social services are part of SSP⁸⁶ co-operation – a crime-prevention partnership. All around Denmark regional networks of SSP experts were set up (The Danish gov., 2014: 6). The first such model was established already in the 1970's in Aarhus with the main focus of cooperation related to gang problems (Koehler, 2015: 131).

The National Board of Social Services gives advice when individuals and groups show signs of radicalization. It also takes part in long-term counselling and partnerships with local authorities requesting help. Among its responsibilities belong devising preventive measures and improving social programs aiming at young people at risk of radicalization. Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) runs Centre for Prevention which provides advice on radicalization. Its aims its focus on violent extremism through interviewing people in extremist circles. In addition, it tries to build sense of trust through outreach to community and civil society⁸⁷ in preventive work (The Danish gov., 2014: 6).

⁸⁶ This is a cornerstone of crime prevention among youth (Lindekilde, 2015b: 235).

⁸⁷ The action plan highlights the importance of working together with civil society as local people may be better off at reaching out and creating constructive dialogue with vulnerable people (The Danish gov., 2014 6).

Deradicalization efforts in Denmark are linked to regular crime prevention efforts. According to Lindekilde, this has several advantages, but also disadvantages. Advantages were a quick establishment of new projects and quick accustomedness of frontline and municipalities workers to mentoring program and work with signs of radicalization. As new approach has been anchored to the “normal system”, referrals to psychiatrist or social-economic support instead of mentors, when appropriate and easier to make. However, the challenge of linking radicalization to crime prevention efforts is “*making radicalization yet another parameter of concern*”. By putting together radicalization with crime, one might argue that the political nature of deradicalization work is covered – “*the attempt to normalize and battle political and religious attitudes and practices that are not unlawful as such but that are deemed risky by authorities*”. Additionally, lumping together radicalization and drug abuse might be controversial among staff, but also among the target group (2015b: 235).

Greater Involvement by Local Authorities

This is one of “more practical” measures of the deradicalization plan and therefore, I do not put it on any level of analysis of the program itself. It focuses on strategic partnerships with local authorities, skills-enhancement programs, and on closer collaboration between local authorities and civil society and between communities and PET (The Danish gov., 2014: 8).

Strategic Partnerships with Local Authorities

Local authorities are essential at preventing radicalization and extremism. At every local authority there should be trained experts and Info-house⁸⁸ providing advice locally, with individual and group cases, but also with cases involving violent extremism⁸⁹. Moreover, there will be a legal and social-work assessment of cases of radicalization conducted to improve knowledge of processes and underlying risk factors behind radicalization (The Danish gov., 2014: 9). The local supporting and prevention efforts should be strengthened because there has been a rise in number of serious prevention cases with high level of complexity. The base for local work is police district, municipality and Info-house. They work together on preventing

⁸⁸ An Info-house represents partnership between municipality and police. It is a place to share knowledge and to discuss challenges and methods of deradicalization work. It also serves as framework for reviewing concrete cases (The Danish gov., 2016: 14)

⁸⁹ In charge of the former is VISO (The National Organization for Knowledge and Specialist Consultancy), the later PET’s Prevention Centre.

and providing support and municipality is in charge of efficient follow-up of cases. Municipalities are encouraged to formulate local actions plans, as every municipality knows the best how to create comprehensive and integrated approach in their settings (The Danish gov., 2016: 28).

Local level has been concretizing the policy objectives of the national action plan. Lindekilde specifically highlights two of them – one in Aarhus and the second one in Copenhagen. The program in Aarhus, first of its kind in Denmark, provides training to the local street/youth workers about radicalization and providing them with tools to use in their everyday work. Local radicalization mentor corps have been established in Aarhus, which provides mentors to people deemed at risk of radicalization. Lastly the program includes information house which provides information for state employees needing more information on radicalization (2012b: 392).

Copenhagen has developed its VINK-program. Similarly to Aarhus, it focuses on knowledge gathering and providing state employees with information to help them identify and tackle such challenges. It has made available similar support like Aarhus with mentors, but it calls them resource persons. They not only provide mentoring to those who need it, but also train street and youth workers (Lindekilde, 2012b: 392). In 2004, three sectors of one municipality in greater Copenhagen area agreed on intensifying their cooperation to enhance sharing information and supportive measures for citizens at risk. A new cooperation model PSP was developed – meaning the local police department, social services, and psychiatry/mental health. As it was deemed as efficient, and in 2009 this type of cooperation was scaled up to national level. In 2011 the cooperation was officially evaluated stating that “*the PSP cooperation contributed towards highlighting marginalized citizens at risk, which the authorities often lose focus on in their work*”. The cooperation at beginning was not developed particularly because of concerns of radicalization. These three sectors were working on identification of citizens at overall risk (such as suicide, social decline, mental illness or substance abuse) and organized relevant help and intervention. Later, as the prevention of radicalization has been included in already existing models, radicalization became “*another parameter of concern for the ordinary prevention system*” (Sestoft et al., 2017: 350-351).

Skills-enhancement programs

The skills-enhancement programs are meant for frontline state workers coming in touch with community, such as teachers, SSP consultants, workers in after-school centers, job-center staff, residential social workers and Prison Service employees. The aim of these programs is to

provide the relevant knowledge to spot signs of radicalization and ensure early intervention (The Danish gov., 2014: 9-10). SIRI⁹⁰ and PET are in charge of training the professionals and they offer additional supplementary training. After the trainings, these professionals should become source of knowledge for their colleagues. Additionally, PET and SIRI offers supplementary trainings for a wider range of professionals working closely with public. An educational material to enhance the knowledge about radicalization processes and worrying signs has been developed. Furthermore, handbook series “*Extremism and Prevention*” exploring processes and signs of radicalization in more depth have been developed (The Danish gov., 2016: 18).

Cooperation across agencies is enhanced through 2-day course for professionals. Aims of the course are to raise awareness about radicalization in PSP network and teach professionals about radicalization, its signs and possible steps. The focus is put on ensuring proportionality of interventions and handling of cases, because measures must match the risks. Additionally, it is emphasized that cases should be addressed by the PSP cooperation and not PET, as this might help to reduce or even prevent stigmatization. The course was assessed predominantly positively by the participants. According to the majority of them, instructors were able to relate and interpret the course to the participants’ daily work. Majority of participants could apply new knowledge and tools in their work. Within six months after the course, one third of participants had dealt with case of extremism or radicalization. Additionally, the knowledge they gained during the course was shared informally among their colleagues (e.g. at staff meetings and similar forums) (Sestoft et al., 2017: 352-353).

Closer collaboration between local authorities and civil society

The development if these initiatives has been inspired by experience from the United States and Sweden which show that “*systematic collaboration between local authorities and civil society provides a boost to endeavors to prevent radicalization and extremism*”. Additionally, some parts of Denmark have already tried direct dialogue between municipalities and groups about which local community was concerned about with positive experience. The aim here is to help civil society to be more active in rejecting extremism and help them promote an alternative, more positive sense of community. A counselling program and a methodological handbook have been created to show local authorities concrete methods and models of closer collaboration. Local associations and resource persons are offered skills enhancement and

⁹⁰ The Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration.

capacity building programs to help them attract and keep youth in the communal activities (The Danish gov., 2014: 18; The Danish gov., 2016: 22)

The underlying logic behind these efforts is that presence of associations, clubs, resource persons and social housing employees can strengthen the resilience against extremism and radicalization, even though it is not main purpose of their activities. They should present positive and inclusive alternative to the sense of identity offered by extremist circles. Connection between local authorities and civil society should serve to counter the development of parallel societies, which the action plan sees as a seedbed for radicalization in vulnerable residential areas and “vulnerable residential areas” will be specially targeted by new initiatives of the government (The Danish gov., 2016: 32).

Initiative of more dialogue – more outreach is primarily aimed at creating trust between vulnerable communities and PET. Additional, work with relevant actors of civil society should be strengthen (The Danish gov., 2014: 20). The newer Action plan identified need to extend PET’s outreach effort, the already existing network of civil association and resource persons should be used more efficiently, and the effort should be coordinated with the work of police districts (The Danish gov., 2016: 32).

Micro level

On the micro level are described two parts of the Danish strategy. The first is process of individual intervention to radicalization process and another smaller part pays attention to the aim of Danish government to more work with parents, as they could help with early intervention and identification of needs.

Methods of Prevention and Intervention Early in the Radicalization Process

Early prevention has been an integral part of Danish approach to crime prevention, health child care⁹¹ and more (Hemmingsen, 2015: 19). Available tools for preventing radicalization are those already being used to prevent other different risk behaviors. There is a range of methods available, such as mentoring and dialogue with youth at risk of radicalization. Mentoring schemes are also available in prisons, which will be discussed later on (The Danish gov., 2014: 11). Program “Deradicalization – Targeted Intervention” aims to provide long-term support and

⁹¹ During the first year after baby is born, all new parents are offered health visits at home (Hemmingsen, 2015: 19).

advice to young people so they could break out from extremist environment and remain out of it. The program involves mentoring schemes which are based on mentor⁹² working every day with a mentee and having the trustful relationship. The mentor should be able to help mentee with all aspects of life. Mentors are usually people already in a close contact with young people in need, such as youth workers, and teachers (Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2010: 25-26).

This is the main process of deradicalization⁹³ starts with “notification of concern” which is usually done by state employees working with public, such teachers, youth club employees, street workers etc. When there is a concern that it might be an example of radicalization, the case is advanced to a steering committee (municipality staff, school- social services-police cooperation coordinator, specially trained police officer) which investigate the case and assess if intervention is needed. If yes, the best type of intervention is decided. Involvement of different professional groups is to ensure a detailed and holistic view on the cases. However, this sometimes might create problems as different professional groups have different views on vulnerable individuals and signs of radicalization and result in risks of potential under-reaction or-over reaction (Lindekilde, 2015b: 230-231).

After the individual’s acceptance of intervention, they are screened for “signs of concern” and “resilience factors” to amend the plan accordingly. There four main types of concern: image concerns, behavioral concerns, attitudinal concerns, and relational concerns. As resilience factors are perceived stable family, good social skills, close friends, high self-esteem, empathy and sense of belonging. Afterwards, specific personal plan is created identifying overall goals, intermediate goals, necessary actions, motivation and barriers for change, and mentee’s capacity and willingness to change. The plan serves as a “road map” away from extremism (Lindekilde, 2015b: 231). The aims of interventions could be incredibly varied – a young Muslim man was exploring radical Islam and in school was underperforming, the assigned mentor supported the man in working harder in school, graduating and overall distracting from radical Islam. Another example is showing a young Somali Muslim man supporting Al-Shabaab and wanting to engage in jihad. His mentor, himself a Somali, moderated his views through poetry, music and literature. Other example is a young girl interested in extreme left milieu and

⁹² The most important to become a mentor is key knowledge about the local area of mentee and predisposition to get in touch with them (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2010: 27).

⁹³ Originally, it was established in municipalities in Aarhus and Copenhagen and later on spread on national level, now including also mentoring of adults (Lindekilde, 2012a: 230).

skipping school. Her intervention was focused on reducing absence in school and nuancing her political views (Thomsen, 2012: 19 and SI, 2011: 12-13, 19 in Lindekilde, 2015b: 233).

Moreover, the need for options on how to address older people has been identified, as many of the options suitable for people under 18 years of age were not available. Local authorities did not have mandate for outreach work (but still can provide advice if the person requests it). This has changed as the Danish Social Services Act has been amended so the municipalities could easier reach and intervene in cases when person at risk is older than 18 (The Danish gov., 2014: 10, The Danish gov., 2016: 19).

Furthermore, the Danish government offers exit programs, for people already involved in extremist groups wishing to leave them. The plan acknowledges how difficult it can be to leave such groups and sometimes even dangerous, that is why a stronger help should be offered to them. Exit program aims to enable people to start a new life, help them with making new friends, finding a job, a place to stay, or starting to attend school⁹⁴. The program also should work on helping them question the old, extremist, worldview and adopt more constructive one (The Danish gov., 2014: 14). The program offers continuous personal support. It is important to note that program is voluntary and ideological alternatives are not given and provided by the program, but the individual's ideology is challenged by the mentors to reconsider stereotypes (Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2010: 26).

Greater parental involvement

The first signs of changing behavior are oftentimes spotted by parents and closest relatives; therefore, it is essential to build greater parental involvement. Among signs of radicalization the plan lists behavior such as “*seeking out a new social circle with extreme political or religious ideology*”, “*expressing fascination with or admiration for political/religious violence*” and “*frequently visiting online propaganda sites*”. The stronger parental involvement has been tried by several local authorities with a great success and some local authorities have already established formal networks of parents of kids at risk where they meet and provide support to each other. Furthermore, a national hotline has been established offering guidance and advice for parents and relatives seeking advice when they are worried that someone they know is at risk of being radicalized. Selected local authority staff has been trained in family-oriented

⁹⁴ No financial support is given (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2010: 26)

parental coaching⁹⁵ and the government aims to train larger share of women than before. For parents whose children are, returned or may be traveling to conflict zone as foreign fighters the government has prepared an information leaflet in six languages. The leaflet informs parents about the risks associated with traveling to conflict zones and also about which authorities can help them and how (The Danish gov., 2014: 19-20; The Danish gov., 2016: 19-20, 29).

Meso level

Meso level of analysis of Danish deradicalization efforts is focused on special places of radicalization, e.g. prisons, the Internet and schools (together with more general focus on young people). Last, but not least, the subchapter includes Danish measures aimed at foreign fighters.

Deradicalization – Back on Track, Exit Programs in Prison

Prisons are shown to present a specific risk for people becoming influenced by extremist ideology. Additionally, inmates are often searching for identity and place to belong while in prison. As prisons have a significant impact on the increased risk of radicalization, they also can serve as a place of a positive change. To prevent radicalization in prisons, the Danish government implements number of preventive steps. It aims to strengthen the educational program for prison employees, so they would be more capable to identify signs of radicalization. Secondly, practical lessons of democracy should be established in prisons. Thirdly, prison inmates will be offered social reabsorption measures and coaching and lastly, religious preachers in prisons should undergo an approval scheme⁹⁶ (The Danish gov., 2009: 23; The Danish Department..., 2014: 4).

It is an essential right for inmates in Denmark to practice their religion in prisons and in probation facilities. Religious chaplains have an essential role for inmates and for prevention work. They can serve as positive role models, they listen to them and can bring inmates back from path to radicalization. However, there is a need to prevent them to preach radical beliefs in prisons and ensure they serve as a positive example. That is why the Danish government introduced new tighten supervision of the religious preachers and required that sermons to be held in Danish. Additionally, the process of recruiting religious chaplains has become more

⁹⁵ Municipalities which do not have their own mentors and coaches can then borrow from other municipalities thanks to the inter-municipal agreements (The Danish gov., 2016: 19).

⁹⁶ It is implemented to ensure that they are qualified and responsible, and their activities aim to prevent radicalization and not vice versa (The Danish Department..., 2014: 4).

comprehensive and rigorous, involving thorough background checks, interviews and spiritual experts panel examination. Furthermore, the religious chaplains have reporting duty – they have an obligation to avert terrorism (and other serious crimes), if needed through report despite their confidentiality agreement with clients (Christiansen, 2017: 25-26).

Coaching will be held through special mentor programs in which mentees get their own special mentor. Prison inmates, remand prisoners, and people under supervision charged with or convicted of terrorism or hate crime and clients “*deemed to be vulnerable to radicalization*” are all eligible for the program. Mentors help inmates to become better at handling everyday situations, problems and conflict. They should motivate inmates for positive change and guide them towards a law-abiding lifestyle. After the release mentors help ex-inmates with issues like looking for a place to live and work and help them identify alternative social networks. Important goal of the approach is, when possible, to involve family and former friends and social circle of the inmate in general (The Danish Department..., 2014: 4, 9). Unfortunately, the Danish government at no point in any of the documents mentions risk assessment or its instruments. Christiansen assumes that either it is not commonly used or more likely, it is not disclosed to the public (Christiansen, 2017: 28).

The mentor program has been developed by private consultancy firm Navigent and psychologist Malene Winfeldt and has used experience from the gang exit programs. The program consisted of three two-day seminars, two additional seminars, and two-day course on extremism and radicalization guided by the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality Integration and Social Affairs and the PET. Additionally, seminars were supplemented with networking events so the mentors would know each other afterwards and were able to share their knowledge and experience among each other (The Danish Department..., 2014: 6, 11).

In 2015 the government revealed a new plan to separate inmates who could be possible radicalizers as according to Justice Minister “*people with radicalized beliefs pose a real threat to our [Danish] security*”. Inmates with extremist views will be separated from those who deem to be susceptible to radicalization, meaning they will not be isolated, but they will be kept in groups where the others are not perceived as being at risk of adopting extremist views (AFP/ The Local, 2015: 1). The incentive for developing new measures regarding radicalization in prisons could be seen in the aftermath of February 14-15, 2015 shootings at a Copenhagen cultural center and synagogue by Omar El-Hussein⁹⁷. Two weeks prior to the shootings he was

⁹⁷ However, similar approach has been used to separate gang members from each other (Christiansen, 2017: 27).

released from prison (he was sentenced for stabbing) where he was reportedly radicalized. Prison staff reported him to PET three times for expressing extreme viewpoints, however PET claimed that there was no reason to suspect he was dangerous and planning any attacks. The case has caused an upsurge in reporting extremist inmates by prison staff – just during ten weeks after the attack prison staff have reported fifty individual inmates presumably having radical beliefs. This is an enormous increase as during two years before the attack only 37 prisoners have been reported⁹⁸ (The Local, 2015b: 1). Since 2017, the exit program has become a condition of inmate's parole. The purpose behind it was to motivate radicalized prisoners to enroll to these programs and motivate them to disengage (The Local, 2017a: 1; The Danish gov., 2016: 31). With addition to separating inmates, their contacts to the outside world will be limited as well. Prison staff will be focused on some inmates' access to the Internet, reading material and possession of mobile phones. To ensure no mobile phones policy, different types of scanners will be installed, and cell searches will be conducted more (Christiansen, 2017: 29).

Enhanced Efforts Online

The issue of online extremism has been addressed since 2009 (Lindekilde, 2015a: 425). The Danish officials see online extremism as a gateway to offline engagement (Warrington, 2018: 134). Therefore, the dissemination of extremist materials should be prosecuted more rigorously. The Danish Criminal Code should be amended so it would be easier to prosecute dissemination of terrorist propaganda, on social media included (The Danish gov., 2016: 29).

In 2017, there was a new additional four-point plan of counter-radicalization measures announced. One of the points aims to block access to webpages advocating propaganda for terror organizations. The decision to block a page would not be taken by one actor, but by court after a police request. However, the Procedural Code has given the legal basis for automatic blockade of ISIL sites, while sending data to PET. Other extremist content is flagged mainly by civil society⁹⁹. PET should establish a dedicated group for identifying and in some cases removing the extremist content. Additionally, monitoring data serves for building a knowledge base to boost understanding the best way how to interact on social media and how to create best alternative narratives (The Local, 2017a: 1; AFP/The Local, 2016: 1; Warrington, 2018: 132-

⁹⁸ In 2013 it was seven inmates, in 2014 it was 16 and at the beginning of the year 2015 it was already 14 (The Local, 2015bc: 1).

⁹⁹ Heightened participation of civil society is based on an assumption that some groups do not trust state (The Danish gov., 2016: 29).

133). However, any counter-narrative initiatives could have negative consequence „*if they fall into the trap of attempting to expose, correct, or ridicule the ideology, or simply promote their own normality as superior*” (Warrington, 2018: 137).

The Danish government works with an assumption that elimination of online radical content is almost impossible and, therefore, it is essential to increase resilience of young people to such content and strengthen their critical thinking (Warrington, 2018: 137). Examples of such proactive measures include establishment of alternative discussion forums for youth. The forum should foster debate about democracy, extremism and international issues. Essential is to make the young people take co-ownership of the forum, as this will make it more interesting to others (The Danish gov., 2009: 20). Moreover, the Danish government wants to counter online radicalization propaganda through “corps of digital voices of reason”, formed by PET, driven by people from civil society and involving also authorities. The aim of the group is to be “*present on social media, engage critically in relevant forums, take part in dialogue and challenge extremist views*” (AFP/The Local, 2016: 1, The Danish gov., 2016: 29).

Additional Danish deradicalization efforts online are enhancing teaching of critical approach to digital media at elementary schools, youth-education programs and upper-secondary schools. Other actions include teaching material for young people to strengthen their online critical thinking and hackathons where school-children build up and share some positive non-violent messages. This project should strengthen skills of young people to engage in creating dialogue and help them acquire knowledge about online radicalization and also propaganda (Warrington, 2018: 134-136).

Moreover, local authorities should forge international links to understand how the Internet is currently used by extremist groups and how to counteract it. The 2016’s Action Plan identified a need for new digital mapping project. It should be organized by PET and the national police and should be more systematic than the previous one. This project will give a “*more comprehensive, exact and updated picture of the role that social media plays particularly in relation to radicalization and hate crimes in Denmark*”. Furthermore, new initiatives should be used to help civil society to present constructive alternatives to extreme messages. For example, relevant members of civil society, family members of radicalized people, former extremists will be taught to engage in the online debate that presents alternative world-views and questions extremist propaganda. On topics such as source criticism, digital literacy, propaganda

techniques and conspiracy theories will be an online educational material developed (The Danish gov., 2014: 12; The Danish gov., 2016: 29).

Focus on Young People

Denmark has had several cases of radicalized youth. A 15-year-old girl was arrested for planning to bomb two schools – one was her previous school the other one was a private Jewish school in Copenhagen. She was reported to the police by school, which was alerted by her classmates who were worried about her statements on social media. She was the first female in Denmark accused of terrorism. During her trial she claimed that ISIL has been exciting and that she felt great that she was not “just part of the background”. The district court gave her six years in prison, however the sentence was extended to eight years by the higher court (Barrett, 2017a: 1; Barrett, 2017b: 1; Barrett, 2017c: 1).

This could serve as an example of why it is essential to focus on work in schools and generally with younger people. 2009’s Action Plan had subtitle “An action plan to prevent extremist views and radicalization among *young* people”. The general level of counter-radicalization efforts is primarily aimed at young people and people in position to have an impact on young people. The plan sees young people as specifically vulnerable to radicalization because young people are described as searching for identity, for a platform in life. But even though the plan sees young people as specifically vulnerable, it does not forget to note that the vast majority of youth rejects extremism and endorses open and democratic society (The Danish gov., 2009: 8-9; Hemmingsen, 2015: 24).

In the area of education, the Danish focus is on strengthening pupils’ sense of citizenship and abilities of critical thinking. Both were addressed by making slight changes in pupil’s curriculums: human rights became compulsory subject on health, sexuality and family education. Moreover, more focus will be paid to ability to use sources critically (including digital sources) and critical competencies in relation to communication. New special theme week on community feeling, democracy and citizenship was held in autumn of 2017 to talk about these issues in more depth. Furthermore, teachers and pedagogical staff were given educational materials with concrete tools which could be incorporated into their activities in school which are aimed to prevent marginalization and radicalization. Since the new action plan (from 2016) there has been an increased focus on early prevention in schools and in day care facilities thorough strengthening children’s and youth’s resilience to extremist views (The Danish gov., 2016: 21, 32). Additionally, in schools is also explained Danish foreign policy and

positions abroad. Foreign Ministry officials regularly visit to high schools and youth centers to these topics. Aim of these visits is to engage students and dispel myths and misconceptions surrounding the foreign policy (Vidino, 2013: 2).

Moreover, Denmark would like to advance the use peer-to-peer dialogue in which young people will be taught to run discussions and workshops with other young people about stereotypes of “the enemy”/extremism, identity etc. (The Danish gov., 2014: 11). A nationwide “dialogue corps” should be set up consisting of young people between 18 and 35. It should spark and fuel a debate among youth on such topics like identity, family relations, how to self-express, social control, honor-related conflict, freedom and responsibility, discrimination, intolerance and more (The Danish gov., 2016: 22).

Stricter Measures to Stop Recruitment of Foreign Fighters

In recent years the number of people traveling to Syria and Iraq has been on the rise. At least 150 people have left Denmark to fight in Syria or Iraq since 2012. This number represents the second highest among Western nations relative to the size of country (after Belgium). These two countries are the latest destination for young Danes, but before they traveled also to Afghanistan and Somalia. Danish foreign fighters are predominately young Sunni Men, women constituting around ten percent. Since 2015 the number of people leaving to fight in Syria and Iraq has been gradually slowing down, but those who go stay there longer, are younger and overwhelmingly joining the ISIL. The aim of the policy is preventing people from traveling to the conflict zones as soonest as possible and to prevent them radicalizing others after their return. Apart from the more traditional prevention approaches, it is also possible to revoke passports and residence permits to stop people from traveling (The Danish gov., 2014: 12-13; CPH POST, 2018: 1; The Local, 2015a: 1).

As the conflicts in Syria and Iraq constitute the most significant factors in the threat assessment in Denmark, especially because of those returning from warzones can pose a terror threat as they have fighting training and experience (The Local, 2015a: 1). Therefore, the Danish Criminal Code was amended to make joining an “*armed enemy force that fights against the Danish state, or to recruit others into such armed enemy forces*” to a criminal offence (both for Danish citizens and aliens residing in Denmark). Moreover, authorities gained possibility to prohibit people from travelling to a certain zone without a prior permission. Several areas of Syria and Iraq were ban from traveling to without a special permission (The Danish gov., 2016: 19).

PET was also given new powers – via the Danish Customs and Tax Administration can access relevant data gathered by the airlines about the passengers. It would make monitoring transit of certain people from and to Denmark easier. Additionally, a new special task force on foreign fighters was established. Several state agencies¹⁰⁰ are participating, and its objective is to ensure the “*best possible conditions for initiatives in relation to people who, because of their active participation in the armed conflict in Syria and Iraq, constitute a threat to Denmark*” (The Danish gov., 2016: 19-20).

From the above mentioned 150 people who travelled to Syria and/or Iraq at least 84 people were receiving some form of public benefit while fighting abroad, according to Ministry of Employment. 37 percent of them were receiving “cash assistance” intended for citizens who would not be able to support themselves and/or their families and 36 percent were getting SU education grant (CPH POST, 2018: 1). Therefore, new measure about ensuring that they do not receive these benefits has been announced¹⁰¹ (The Danish gov., 2016: 30).

Aarhus Model

In 2013 Aarhus initiated a special exit program for returned foreign fighters to help them find way back to the society. When the exit program is approved as feasible, person is assessed to identify specific services needed. Additionally, their resource person is identified (family, peers, work, school etc.). help regarding employment/ education, housing, psychological counseling, and medical care is offered. The program is based on the assumption that the returnee has not done criminal offence and they do not present any security risk (Bertelsen, 2015: 245). The Aarhus model’s root is in a pilot project preventing radicalization from 2007. It included an info-house assessing concerns and coordinating the prevention efforts, professionals were given counselling and advises on radicalization, information about radicalization was provided to the public, mentoring program was established together with counseling, advising and exit program for people traveling to or returning from Syria, counseling and advising parents, outreach to local communities (Hemmingsen, 2015: 31). The Aarhus model has developed several elements, such as workshops in schools to teach kids about

¹⁰⁰ The National Police, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Copenhagen Police, the Regional Prosecutor for Copenhagen and PET (The Danish gov., 2016: 20).

¹⁰¹ It will be done through extending the validity of arrangement of suspended payment and claims of repayment; the freezing of payment should be valid for all social benefits – social security, unemployment, integration benefits, education grants, employment and support allowances and sickness benefits (The Danish gov., 2016: 30).

violent radicalization and its signs, but also about digital behavior, prejudice, exclusion, social life, community etc. to develop resilience to the risk factors of radicalization. Its mentoring program is guided by several mentors with very different backgrounds to meet specific needs of mentees. Mentors help to try find paths of inclusion, to discuss challenges of everyday life but also deeper existential, political and religious questions (Bertelsen, 2015: 243-244).

Macro level

Macro level is based on Danish efforts in the international sphere, as extremism and radicalization are not only national issues. To enhance the international partnerships was one of the goals of 2014 strategy.

Enhancement of International Partnerships

As challenges of extremism are international, it is essential for Danish government to share information and experience with other countries around the globe¹⁰². Most important is to share new knowledge about research and practical tools. The Danish government would like to encourage partnerships on development and testing interventions and prevention methods. Results of this goal should be shown in new Nordic ministerial network for prevention of radicalization and enhancing work of international forums and international partnerships. In addition, Denmark aims to allocate funds for national and international research projects (The Danish gov., 2014: 16-18).

Promotion of democracy and respect for human rights is seen as one of the most effective and long-term ways of countering radicalization. It is essential to build a wider-ranging approach including the underlying causes of radicalization. It is useful, for international security, to share with third countries the principles of prevention work in Denmark, as main principles of this work are transferrable. Denmark focuses its efforts primarily to Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and countries of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. The main tool for support

¹⁰² Denmark is part of several international forums like Policy Planners Network (network of civil servants working on challenging radicalization), The EU Commission's Radicalization Awareness Network (platform for sharing practical experiences of prevention work), The group of like-minded countries (to discuss challenges connected to people leaving to fight in Syria and Iraq), Global Counterterrorism Forum (informal alliance of 30 Western and non-Western countries) and International Center of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism (The Danish gov., 2014: 16).

and coordination of these international efforts is the Danish Peace and Stabilization Fund (The Danish gov., 2014: 17-18).

In Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia Denmark is carrying out Strong Cities Network project. Its focus is on an “*early prevention of violent extremism through networks at a municipal level*”. Additionally, in Libya and Jordan Denmark is promoting the importance of preventive measures in anti-radicalization strategies. In Africa, Denmark is helping to implement counter-radicalization project in Kenya. Moreover, it has supported the rehabilitation program for Al-Shabab defectors through providing vocational training. Additionally, Denmark is helping Ethiopian authorities to strengthen their counter money laundering and financing initiatives. Lastly, it is supporting Niger’s, Burkina Faso’s and Mali’s projects fighting organized crime and violent extremism. Anti-radicalization and counter-terrorist initiatives promoting religious tolerance are supported in Indonesia (The Danish gov., 2016: 24, 33).

Conclusion

Danish deradicalization efforts have been built up on existing structures and initiatives created for other purposes. The approach is based on multi-agency – it includes state, regional and local actors. Its efforts aim at different spectrums of society – from the wider to more narrower groups. The approach is predominately focused on an individual (Hemmingsen, 2015: 5, 36), especially on a young individual.

According to Koehler, the Danish approach has been built on a “*tradition of cooperation between police, social services and civil society in a small community*”. The approach is exceptionally effective because of already established cooperation and high levels of legitimacy. Therefore, it is deemed unlikely to transfer to other settings successfully (2015: 132). However, as the “*mentoring strategy is anchored within the normal system of crime prevention*”, it makes radicalization just another concern indicator and it obscures the political conflict between norms of majority and individual’s beliefs (Lindekilde, 2015b: 238). Some frontline staff and target groups might feel that the strategy is more legitimate because of the de-politicization strategy. However, the analogy between crime prevention and deradicalization efforts and interventions is substantially not accepted (Hemmingsen, 2015: 36).

The approach’s aim to increase awareness and network of trained professional in spotting signs in radicalization could be very effective. However, the approach carries on risks of being

perceived as detailed surveillance of everyone, in worse scenario only part of the population. When the preventive program is increased particularly into “at risk communities”, citizens of these communities might feel selected targeting (Hemmingsen, 2015: 39). Especially after reports that Muslim communities and mosques are monitored and that the Danish authorities use undercover informers infiltrating some Islamist groups (Skjoldager, 2009 and Crone 2010 in Rytter & Pedersen, 2014: 2307).

In practice, the impact of counter-radicalization policies depends (partly) on how these policies are implemented and presented to citizens by street workers and state staff which works with public. Additionally, it is important if the target group considers and perceives the policy as legitimate (Winter & Nielsen, 2008 in Lindekilde, 2012b: 396). According to Lindekilde’s research interviewing people in particular neo-orthodox Muslim milieu in Denmark vast majority of people they spoke to were “*surprisingly well informed about the policy initiatives and quite critical of their design and potential effects*”. However, some interviewees were generally positive towards the plan, as they saw it as a necessary move. Mainly, efforts aiming to improve anti-discrimination were applauded. Additionally, some thought that prevention plans were okay, but they would not have a strong affect (Lindekilde, 2012b: 396).

Interestingly, the Danish approach is not focused on ideology or on radical Islamism per se. In 2009’s Action plan the radical Islamism was deemed to constitute a “new type of global threat” (The Danish gov., 2009: 9). In the plan from 2014 the word Islamism was not mentioned. In 2014’s plan, one of the signs of radicalization parents could spot was “*seeking out a new social circle with an extreme political or religious ideology*” (The Danish gov., 2014: 19). In the plan from 2016 the word ideology is not mentioned anymore.

In sum, the Danish approach is to a large extent bottom-up, as many efforts were developed and tested in municipalities, especially in Copenhagen and in Aarhus, and just later were spread to national level. The local cooperation among different actors has been built on experience, as it has been used for crime prevention. Incorporation of deradicalization efforts into standard crime prevention has its advantages, but also disadvantages as was already discussed. The Danish deradicalization efforts are broad especially at home, but it also focuses on work abroad.

Comparison

This chapter works on synthesis of all three previous chapters, because the first theoretical-analytical part serves as a guiding principle, through which it will be possible to see differences and similarities between the two policies. The policies are compared in their specific parts and in detail, to hopefully see the small nuances between them. The chapter's structure is predominantly based on the first chapter; however, I have found necessary to include extra parts, which were already mentioned in respective chapters considering the concrete policies. Based on the description and analysis of the separate policies, it is necessary to pay attention to their background, definitions of radicalization and extremism. These parts are structured at the beginning. Additionally, extra part is dedicated to policy towards schools and with specific focus on young people, as deemed important by both policies. Based on the governmental policies, the most attention will be paid on micro and meso level, as none of them pay substantial attention to the factors on macro level.

I would like to note, that the aim of this chapter is not to assess or compare the effectiveness of these policies, as it is not in the scope this thesis. Additionally, the effectiveness would not be possible to assess with only publicly available sources, as assessments with more access show several methodological problems, as is shown in Lindekilde's review of impact assessments focusing on Danish counter-radicalization efforts. Firstly, the evidence for the assessments is often anecdotal and narrative in nature with limited number of individuals participating. The nature of the evidence "*makes generalization of impacts and valid conclusions on causality difficult*". Secondly, it is difficult to exclude alternative explanations of observed impact, e.g. there could be other reasons for an individual deradicalization/disengagement, such as changed family situation. Lastly, the multi-layered and often abstract policies lead to problems in creating clear indicators of success (2012b: 396-397).

Development of the Policies, their Methods and Definitions

The first British deradicalization efforts were developed in 2003 as a result of 9/11 attacks, but were published only in 2006 (Home Affairs Committee, 2009: 4; HM, 2009: 56). What has influenced the development of the policies the most were 7/7 attacks in London, which shaped the definition of threat (Griffith-Dickson et al., 2014/15: 27). Danish efforts were also influenced by 9/11, but mainly by so-called cartoon crisis (Wheeler, 2015: 1). In the Danish

case the first deradicalization efforts on national level were presented only in 2009 (Hemmingsen, 2015: 11).

It is important to note, that the both policies saw change in the government, and both new governments in both countries introduced updated versions of policies. In the British case the first version, produced in 2003, but published in 2006 was under the Labour government, the changes in 2011 (and any newer ones) were introduced by the Conservative government of David Cameron (or Theresa May), which is in power since. In the Danish case, the first publication of deradicalization policy came under Venskres-led coalition government (in 2009), the updated version was published under Social Democrats government in 2014, and the latest update from 2016 was published under minority government of Venskre.

Lindekilde highlights the similarities of British and Danish approaches at their beginnings. He sees both of them as mixing agendas of community cohesion and integration with agendas of security and risk assessment. Both cases of mixing the agendas together have caused public criticism, however in Denmark the criticism was much smaller. When the both approaches were revised, the agendas and the goals of counter-radicalization and social cohesion have been separated (2015b: 224-225). That radicalization can serve different meanings and deradicalization can represent different goals based on the agenda reflects Sedgwick's notion, that radicalization is dependent on agendas, or contexts, as radicalization is used in three contexts: security, integration, and foreign policy (2010: 479).

The British government defines radicalization as *“the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups”* (HM, 2015: 21). Extremism is the *“vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs...and calls for the death of members of our armed forces”* (HM, 2015c: 9).

According to the Danish government radicalization is defined as *“short- or long-term process where persons subscribe to extremist views or legitimize their actions on the basis of extremist ideologies”* (The Danish gov., 2016: 7) and extremism *“refers to persons or groups that commit or seek to legitimize violence or other illegal acts, with reference to societal conditions that they disagree with”*. The term encompasses left-wing, right-wing extremism and militant Islamism (The Danish gov., 2016: 7).

Both countries view radicalization as process during which person subscribes to/comes to support *extremist ideologies*. Extremism in the British view is vocal opposition to their

fundamental values and in Danish view it is more connected to acts (either committing or legitimizing) against the societal conditions. I believe that the slight difference in the definitions suggests stronger Danish focus on behavioral actions than on cognitive radicalization - efforts of deradicalization intervention are designed to “*stem risk behavior before it escalates into something more serious*” (The Danish gov., 2016: 16). In contrast, the British deradicalization’s policy key objective is to “*respond to the ideology of extremism and terrorism and the threats we face from those who promote it*” (HM, 2014: 15).

Moreover, I would like to focus on the question of cooperation between agencies and the development of the policies in the sense, if local authorities were involved, because I think the more local authorities were involved the more they would be satisfied with the policies. In Britain the multiagency cooperation¹⁰³ is showed in the assessing of the individual for suitability for deradicalization program. Denmark is using the same approach in assessing an individual, but its multiagency has been more institutionalized throughout the years. The cooperation between schools, social services and police has started already in the 70s. In the late 2010s new cooperation between police, social services and the prison services; and between police, social services and psychiatric health care were established. This cooperation helps and facilitates cooperation, information-sharing and trust between the authorities (Hemmingsen, 2015: 18, 33). Additionally, what is important in the Danish case is that prevention of radicalization has been added to already working structures of prevention of drug abuse and youth criminality. This depoliticization of such strategy could have two results: it can make the strategy more legitimate because but also, it obscures the political conflict between norms of majority and individual’s beliefs. Moreover, the analogy between crime prevention¹⁰⁴ and deradicalization efforts and interventions is by many not accepted (Hemmingsen, 2015: 36; Lindekilde, 2015b: 238).

The Channel program, which has been prioritized around “*areas and places of higher risk*”, which means around areas where terrorist groups have been most active (HM, 2011: 60). Moreover, also the funding for Prevent local authorities (Channel being part of the Prevent strategy) is based on the government’s calculation of the risks of radicalization in concrete

¹⁰³ Members local police, representatives of NHS, social workers, schools (of any type), youth offending services, chairs of Local Safeguarding Children Boards and Safeguarding Adult Boards, Home Office Immigration, housing, prisons, and probation (HM, 2015: 7).

¹⁰⁴ As mentioned in the previous chapter, radicalization is put together with other types of risk behavior that may lead to criminality. Therefore, some methods and tools are used both for crime prevention, social work and prevention effort (the prevention efforts were supplemented with other specific measures (The Danish gov., 2016: 16).

locations (HM, 2011: 34). I believe that funding and prioritization of program through such assessment may create sense of suspicion in communities, to which more funds were allocated. However, flawed and with possible negative effects, I believe that it is still better than before, as it used to be based on the size of Muslim population, when areas with the biggest Muslim populations got the most funding (HM, 2011: 34). Unfortunately, Danish deradicalization documents do not elaborate if some communities receive more funding than others.

Micro level

Micro level of analysis addresses the policy responses which could be linked to theoretical approaches of staircase to terrorism metaphor (and others similar metaphors), rational choice application towards radicalization process, and the issue of social identity and self-categorization.

The Staircase to Terrorism Metaphors – Exit Programs

The staircase to terrorism is a metaphor of radicalization which views radicalization as a process, as bottom-up trajectory. In the process of “walking up the stairs” it considers socio-cultural factors; e.g. perceptions of fairness and just treatment, and feelings of relative deprivation, perceived possibilities of social mobility and perceptions of procedural justice. Additionally, recruiters, or individuals who encourage individuals to channel their anger towards perceived enemies are considered important (Keys-Turner, 2011: 30; Moghaddam, 2005: 161-162). As shown above, both countries agree with the theory that radicalization is a process. Moreover, both countries assume, that as radicalization is a process, it could be halted and final steps on the staircase could be prevented.

British approach identifies people on the path of radicalization or people vulnerable to it and wants them to provide support through the Channel program. It is built around several screenings of the individual, to establish if intervention is really needed, and if yes, which kind. Every individual gets a mentor providing personal guidance and helping with addressing extremist ideology; development of life skills such as how to deal with peer pressure; formal or informal anger management sessions; cognitive or behavioral therapies working on attitudes and behaviors; supervised constructive leisure activities; development of education and skills; help with search for employment; help build personal relationship and strengthen family relationships, including parenting programs; address any physical and mental health issues;

address living arrangements; substance misuse interventions. Theological or ideological support is provided by a special mentor¹⁰⁵ (HM, 2011: 64, 65; HM, 2015a: 5, 15-17).

Denmark has added program Deradicalization – Targeted Intervention aimed to prevent radicalization into already built structure of cooperation between agencies for crime prevention and child care. The approach is aimed at people already involved in extremist activities, but also at people who are susceptible to extremism and are expressing sympathy towards extremist groups. The approach includes very similar principles and intervention tools as British one, such as mentoring with specific mentor and building trustful relationship, dialogue, long-term support with all aspects of life; especially for people already involved in extremist circles it helps them to make new friends, find a job and place to stay. When the project was developed, its main goal was to change the behavior of mentees. However, it has been showed that often change in behavior resulted in changes in attitude. The program does not want to provide ideological alternatives, but the individual’s ideology is challenged through reconsidering the stereotypes (Hemmingsen, 2015: 19; Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2010: 25-26; The Danish gov., 2014: 11, 14; DWTA: 12).

In the both cases individuals are being “screened” by multiagency panel, to best assess if they really need the intervention and which type should be the best. I believe, that both programs are relatively flexible, as they allow for tailoring of the policies for the individual’s needs. Both programs have very similar intervention methods, such as dialogue and support in daily and practical tasks. However, British approach adds, when necessary, ideological or theological mentoring, which Danish approach does not want to address. Lindekinde supports this view as he sees the focus of Danish approach in the “*practical consequences of involvement with extremism here and now, and not on extremist or intolerant ideas as potential, future challenges*” (2015b: 229).

Additionally, the process of referring the individuals into the program is also very similar, as it is often done by state employees directly working with public and especially with young people. In the both cases state employees, especially teachers have a duty to report students showing signs of radicalization. In the British case it is institutionalized through “Prevent Duty”, in place since 2015 (HM, 2015a: 17). In the Danish case in the same way how teachers have duty to

¹⁰⁵ Approved by the Home Office, they come from variety of backgrounds – such as imams, ex-fighters and speak variety of languages (RAN, 2016b: 4).

report on children if they seem to be neglected, they also have to report signs of extremism and/or radicalization (Ravn, 2009: 1).

Prevent Duty has been heavily criticized for creating a culture of fear and uncertainty for teachers. Even though, Denmark also requires teachers to report signs of radicalization the criticism has not been there. RAN suggests that it might be because the obligation of referring is not based in counter-terrorism agenda, as Danish teachers have obligation to report any signs of illbeing and it is not perceived by teachers as forced upon (RAN, 2016b: 5). However, I believe that this topic deserves to be researched more, as it could bring more insight into why some policies are perceived well in different settings or would could be practically done to be better received.

The participation in both intervention programs is voluntary (HM, 2018: 6, Lindekilde, 2015b: 231). In the British case it has been made public that between 2015-2016 17 percent of people deemed suitable for help from Channel withdrew from the process (some of them changed the support program or kept receiving support through different programs (Travis, 2017: 1). However, I was not able to find stories of people who would refuse the program, how it works, and if maybe they are considered as security risks. I believe that it would very interesting research into the “voluntarily” of the programs.

The factors, which influence the assessment process of Channel program have been made public. In the second chapter the factors are presented in detail, which shows the variety of aspects the British program takes into an account. Many of the factors show considerations of various different theoretical backgrounds. However, Danish authorities have not made these criteria public, so it is not possible to compare the two.

Rational Choice

As shown in the first chapter there is a strand in academia which suggests that terrorist acts might be result of rational choice. Therefore, to prevent people from committing these acts basic prevention tactics would not be sufficient. Punishment and deterrence by denial would be more suitable. In this part anti-terrorism legislation will be shortly presented in two parts: punishment which will be focused on what constitutes criminal offences and deterrence where will be surveillance and different limits of freedoms considered.

In Denmark, denial of terrorist acts could be differentiated in several categories. Firstly, considering online presence, a terrorist suspect can be officially watched, and wire tapped (with

a valid warrant) (The Danish gov., 2016: 29). Secondly, considering the foreign fighters issue there is a possibility to limit their freedom of movement through travel bans and revoking/not issuing passports. More broadly, deterrence could be considered also as increased focus on police work, e.g. the number of police officers in the street and their capabilities. This fits with Danish case, as after the terrorist attacks in 2015 they increased funding, relocating staffing and increased class sizes in police academy (Country report, 2016: 1).

British denial measures online lie in possibility of police and intelligence services to collect communication data and metadata. When necessary intrusive interception measures can be used¹⁰⁶. Internet Service Providers are required to keep more data about their users especially that for matching PC with an IP address. Similarly to Denmark, the United Kingdom has also measures on restricting of freedom of movement of wannabe foreign fighters— authorities have power to seize or not issue a passport. Additionally, Britain has the power to temporarily ban someone from entering the UK¹⁰⁷. Measures limiting freedom of movements are Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures which are aimed primarily at foreign nationals impossible to deport, because of concerns about treatment they would receive in their home countries but these will be discussed in more detail in the section about foreign fighters. Additionally, British deterrence measures include pre-charge detention (as this is not a punishment per se) which now is 14 days long (throughout the 2000s it has fluctuated – until 2004 it was only seven days, however, between 2006-2011 it was 28 days with government trying to prolong it to 90 days) (Burke, 2017: 1).

Considering mass surveillance through CCTV cameras, in Denmark there is approximately 500 000 of them. YouGov carried a survey, asking people if there should be more of them and six out of ten Danes would like to see an increase in the number of CCTV cameras and only 15 percent thought that the amount should be decreased. 60 percent of Danes agree on this with the nationalist Danish People's Party, which has been calling for more surveillance. However, against this is the Liberal Alliance party, currently in the coalition government which said that there is a need to balance protection and privacy (The Local, 2017b: 1). With this “need” goes together new installment of hundred CCTV cameras in Copenhagen, in part of an anti-gang

¹⁰⁶ The warrant must be double-checked and approved by both Secretary of State and the judiciary.

¹⁰⁷ Temporary Exclusion Order can “temporarily disrupt a British citizen suspected of involvement in terrorist activity abroad from returning to the UK”. The government argues that as it is temporarily, it is just to ensure to control of returning process (HM, 2015b: 1).

initiative (Ritzau/ The Local, 2018: 1) (it was not presented as helping counter radicalization in any way).

In the United Kingdom there was approximately 1.85 million CCTV cameras in 2011, majority of which is operated by private companies (Lewis, 2011: 1), which is actually per person less than in Denmark (considering 5,7 million inhabitants in Denmark and half a million of CCTV cameras versus 65 million inhabitants in Britain and 1.85 million of cameras). However, there has been reports with much higher numbers – 5.9 million (the maximum estimate, conservative estimate being 4.9 million) including 750 000 in sensitive locations, such as schools, hospitals and care homes (Barrett, 2013: 1). One of the biggest “projects” of using CCTV cameras in the UK was installation of more than 200 of them in the Muslim suburb in Birmingham as a part of secret counter-terrorism operation. The project Champion’s aim was presented to community as for combating vehicle crime and antisocial behavior. However, later was found out that it was actually run by police’s counter-terrorism unit, with consent of MI5. The area for CCTV cameras was identified as having a high proportion of people suspected for terrorism. The project was implemented without consultation, oversight, regard for the law and compliance with national CCTV regulation. The project operated from 2007 up until 2011 when was dismantled and officers were found guilty of deliberately misleading councilors over the purpose of the project (Lewis, 2010: 1).

From the description of deterrence measures it is clear that the United Kingdom has several more available for use. Specifically, its pre-charge detention sparked a wide controversy, mainly after the government’s plan to prolong it to 90 days (which was rejected by the parliament). Moreover, what stands above Danish measures are Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures. However, both countries have similar measures restricting possible travel to places of conflict as wannabe foreign fighter. Moreover, considering the use of surveillance, it is difficult to establish the real numbers of CCTVs cameras, and how many of them are operated by state. However, the failure of project Champion might have hampered trust and trust building initiatives between city and community.

The Danish Penal code includes series of sections on counter-terrorism: terrorism acts, terrorism-like-offences, financing and support, recruiting, training, facilitation, incitement. Expressions of sympathy in relation to terrorism activity has been criminalized. Expression of sympathy or promoting of terrorism are considered to be criminal offences through extended

complicity rule and are punishable by six years in prison¹⁰⁸. Training and recruiting someone are punishable by ten years in prison, financing and support are punishable by six years. Moreover, the maximum penalty possible for terrorist acts is imprisonment for life (according to the Section 14 Penalty Code). Additionally, passive recruitment is also punishable, meaning it is forbidden to let yourself to be recruited or trained (Vestergaard, 2013: 8-10).

Under Terrorism Act (2000) seeking or providing training in wide range of weapons became punishable, also collecting or recording of information likely to be useful for committing or preparing a terrorism act is punishable by up to ten years in prison. Terrorism Act (2006) introduced new criminal offences such as the so-called glorification offence¹⁰⁹ which covers offences of any form of praising or celebrating a terrorist act; the maximum imprisonment is seven years. Additionally, any form of dissemination of terrorist publications, including possession has been criminalized. Moreover, providing and/or receiving of training has been criminalized as well. Preparation or assisting in preparation of (attempts) acts of terrorism could be punishable by life sentence. Additionally, other common offences are: membership or supporting proscribed organization¹¹⁰, wearing a uniform, finance and money laundering in relation to terrorism, possession of an article for terrorist purposes, attendance at a place for terrorist training (Parliament, 2006: sec. 2, 5, 6; Burke, 2017: 1; The Crown...: 1).

Considering the punishment side, both countries can apply life imprisonment for grave terrorist offences (Burke, 2017:1; Vestergaard, 2013: 7). The biggest difference between the two is punishing the possession of extremist material, which is not punishable in Denmark.

British counter-terrorism laws have been criticized by Amnesty International as the “*most Orwellian in Europe*”. The most worrisome measures were mass surveillance, use of diplomatic assurance when a person is deemed to be deported but there is a risk of torture, removing the nationality, pre-charge detention, and controlling movement of some people (Bowcott, 2017:

¹⁰⁸ The very first case in which the rule was applied was Said Mansour case. He was found guilty of public incitement to crime and hate speech. He produced and spread materials calling for militant jihad, celebrating the killing of innocent hostages and suicide bombings. He has been given three years and six months in prison (Vestergaard, 2013: 14).

¹⁰⁹ This measure was attempting to halt the activities of “radical preachers”, seen as an important factor in radicalization in general, and radicalization of 7/7 bombers. However, it created a major challenge for the government, as it is legally difficult to define what does it really mean. At some point, there was even an idea to make a list of specific events, which cannot be glorified. The problem also presented people once thought as terrorists, but now not (e.g. Nelson Mandela) (Pantucci, 2010: 261).

¹¹⁰ Pantucci notes that proscribing groups (often religious ones) is a dangerous space for secular British government and he asks question “*who in the British government is suited or qualified to define which religious groups are dangerous, if they are not actually carrying out criminal actions?*” (Pantucci, 2010: 262).

1). Denmark has been criticized for vaguely defining terrorism, which might result in abuses (Amnesty International, 2017: 24).

Self-categorization & Social Identity

Search for an identity is seen by the Danish government as one of the factors making militant Islamist messages to more resonate, together with social marginalization, and search for status. The Danish Action Plan claims that the mentoring scheme should be focused on “*young people and identity issues*” as mentor is someone who should be able assist young person in “*finding a more constructive direction in life*”. Additionally, the government would like to strengthen development of identity, sense of belonging, responsibility and civic citizenship through civic centers. Identity should be also discussed through peer-to-peer youth dialogues. State employees and NGOs actively present in the local communities should show and offer inclusive alternatives to the sense of identity provided by the extremist groups (The Danish gov., 2009: 12, 20; The Danish gov., 2016: 10, 22, 32).

The British government refers to academic work suggesting that “*radicalization occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community*”, even more strikingly among second and third generation Muslims in Europe (HM, 2011: 17), as French sociology suggests and organizations working on Prevent have also found evidence for the support of such argument. Furthermore, the 2010 Citizenship Survey found that people who see “*conflict between being British and their own cultural identity*” are more likely to support violent extremism more than others (HM, 2011:18). According to the strategy to address the issues of identity, there has been more targeted work focused on issues of alienation, identity and belonging and providing education to youth offenders (HM, 2011: 90-91). The strategy wants, in general, to promote a “*positive alternative showing that it is entirely possible to reconcile your faith identity and national identity*” as majority of people already do so, it wants to provide sense of belonging, pride and self-worth (HM, 2015c: 24).

However, the underlying question is if liberal democracy should address this question and develop a deradicalization program considering it. In my opinion, the goal of government policies (not only in deradicalization, but in general) should focus on not having a negative consequences on Muslim identity construction.

Meso level

Meso level addresses policies towards certain groups, or policies in certain places, such as prison, schools and the Internet. On the meso level are policies addressing foreign fighters phenomenon, grievances on group level, and the importance of religion or ideology

Addressing the Online Extremist Propaganda

As discussed in the first chapter, internet enlarges opportunities to radicalize people, as distribution of the propaganda is easier, and people have an easy access to validation on their extreme ideas by likeminded peers (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 970). The academic viewpoint is in agreement with both governmental policies. The British government sees the Internet predominantly just as a source of material and a tool for foreign radicalizers and does not consider the Internet as sufficient sole factor behind radicalization (HM, 2011: 74). Denmark considers online extremism as a gateway to offline engagement (Warrington, 2018: 134), online exposure to extremist propaganda is only one of the factors contributing to radicalization (The Danish gov., 2014: 12).

The British policies regarding online space could be divided into two groups: active and passive, meaning the are prohibiting something. The active ones try to empower people to challenge online extremists, and the second ones want to ensure that extremist do not have open access to their services. The British government with cooperation with industry and the police aims to remove terrorist and extremist material from online space. For this purpose, it has created Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. Its activities are on the rise, as when it was created in 2010 it received around 60 items a month, in 2015 it was receing 4000 referrals a month. The active parts of the strategy aim to empowering people in challenging the extremism through supporting a group of credible commentators challenging extremism and putting mainstream views online; training a variety of civil society groups to keep compelling online presence and uploading mainstream content (HM, 2015c: 24-25).

Denmark has also initiatives in both categories. It aims to block access to webpages with propaganda of terror organizations and, similarly to the United Kingdom, it wants to create a group for identifying and in some cases removing the extremist content. Moreover, PET wants to build up the knowledge base of best practices of interacting on social media and creating best alternative narratives (Warrington, 2018: 132; The Local, 2017a: 1). The proactive measures of Danish government include establishment of alternative discussion forums co-owned by youth and for youth to foster debate. Moreover, the government wants to establish “corps of digital

voices of reason”, driven by people from civil society (The Danish gov., 2009: 20; The Danish gov., 2016: 29). Additionally, Danish schools should pay more attention to teaching critical approach to digital media, strengthening online critical thinking of young people and lastly, run hackathons of sharing positive messages (Warrington, 2018: 134-136). In this online debate should not be involved the state, but mainly relevant members of civil society, family members of radicalized people, and former extremists (The Danish gov., 2016: 29).

I believe, that even though the approach of countering online propaganda seems quite similar, the main difference is that Denmark involves civil society, and additionally, it gives it freer hand than the United Kingdom. Just to allow or support the debate by the state might be better than run or control it, as it might be perceived as disseminating of state propaganda (even though it could be messages about democracy). Danish Institute for International Studies paid attention to the question of who the sender of counter messages/narratives should be¹¹¹, because when it is associated with authority it might strengthen the opposition and act counterproductively (DIIS, 2016: 2). Additionally, it might be between because some groups of people might lack confidence towards a state (The Danish gov., 2016: 29).

In comparison, in the British press there has been reports about “*UK's covert propaganda bid to stop Muslims joining Isis*”. The Guardian has reported about “*series of clandestine propaganda campaigns*” to achieve “*attitudinal and behavioral change*”. The operation is marked “*discreet multimillion pound counter-messaging*”. Behind the operation is Research and Communication Unit, cooperating with community groups, but it is unclear how much can they influence the end product of cooperation. According to the human rights lawyer Imran Khan such “deceptive” conduct lowers the trust towards the government (Cobain et al., 2016: 1; Mortimer, 2016: 1).

Moreover, both approaches could be criticized, as Juha Saarinen condemns the overall focus on countering online behaviors, as he believes that the effect of online extremist content is often exaggerated by the European governments and that networks with already existing social relationships have a far greater impact on recruitment to extremism (Sheikh, 2016a: 1). Additional concern over removing the extremist materials or any hard measures against them is that the material will hide in underground encrypted forums (which are harder to find, control, and dismantle), as happened when Twitter started blocking profiles (approximately 125 000

¹¹¹ DIIS advises when a government’s goal is to discourage people from travelling to a war zone, it is the best to use someone who was there, e.g. returned foreign fighter (DIIS, 2016: 3).

profiles), but ISIL moved into using Telegram (Sheikh, 2016b: 1). Danish Institute for International Studies has published a report in which it warns that by exaggerating the significance and influence of jihadist propaganda the Western media and governments merely help boost jihadism's counterpower potential (DIIS, 2016: 2).

Programs in Prisons

Research suggests that prisons could serve as facilitator of radicalization for its hostile environment, gang culture and stronger need to belong somewhere. Both countries share similar viewpoint as according to the United Kingdom prisons provide “*an atmosphere where individuals are particularly vulnerable to extremist ideological messages*” (HM, 2015c: 28) and Denmark sees prisons as “*having a significant impact on the increased risk of radicalization*” (The Danish Department..., 2014: 4).

The British prison program is built on tightened security measures and targeted counter-radicalization and deradicalization interventions. One of the most important security measures is separation of imprisoned Muslim extremists into separate, special, units (DW, 2016: 1). This is similar, but also slightly different to Danish approach. Denmark also wants to isolate radicalized inmates, but it does not want to keep them together but to disperse among inmates deemed resilient towards radicalization (AFP/ The Local, 2015: 1).

However, segregation and isolation of prisoners bring several disadvantages. According to the French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar there are several problems: radicalized inmates could build up their own networks as they are more closely in touch with each other. There is risk further radicalization of inmates who are “not so radical” and lastly, efficiency of “spies among inmates” is hampered because it is very difficult to have spies in such an environment (NPR, 2016: 1). Therefore, the segregation might be proven as counter-productive. Moreover, it might be useful to further research British and Danish experience with segregation attempts, and if they would have different experience and results.

Imams play a significant role in radicalization but also de- and counter-radicalization in prisons (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 46). Both countries have realized this and have strengthened their role. In the United Kingdom the role of the prison imams became quite institutionalized and professionalized. To be appointed, they must fulfil language requirement, present evidence of religious competence, and undergo ongoing training exercises. Additionally, a state-funded role

of Islamic Prison Chaplaincies has been created (Neumann, 2010: 34). Since 2008¹¹², all Danish prisons and detention houses must have imams, to ensure that all religious groups are offered equal opportunities to practice their faith. Imams can help to counter-radicalization of Muslim inmates (Politiken, 2008: 1). Prison preachers also must undergo an approval scheme, to determine if they are responsible and qualified (The Danish gov., 2009: 23), the approval scheme includes background checks and expert panel examination on religious topics. Additionally, the prison sermons should be served in Danish and religious chaplains have a duty to report serious crimes (Christiansen, 2017: 25). Despite these efforts, it might be possible to accuse both countries, as British approach was in the second chapter, that through institutionalization of the prison imams (and in Danish case, even requesting to held sermons in Danish), they are introducing a state-sanctioned version of Islam.

Considering the corrective nature of prisons, Denmark has developed a mentoring scheme “*to make each individual inmate better at handling everyday situation, problems and conflicts*”, to pursue a positive change, and to leave criminal and extremist groups for good. The program aims to include inmate’s family and outside-of-prison social networks. The mentoring program lasts also during pre-release and post-release period, helping with specific challenges like accommodation, training, looking for a job and it wants to support ex-inmate in identifying alternative social networks (The Danish dep..., 2014: 4, 9). In comparison to Denmark, British deradicalization program is “*one of the less developed elements of Prevent*”. However, a new program focusing on suspected terrorist offenders, or already in prison or on probation is being developed. The intervention will be mandatory, and it will include enhancing reintegration, theological mentoring, family support and it might include financial support for practical assistance (RAN, 2016b: 7). Additionally, Britain has developed “*Tarbiyah*”, a course helping prisoner to understand Islam better. But more generally, The National Offender Management Service tackles extremist behavior through “*targeted disruptive activity and interventions; and through standard and dedicated offending behavior programs*” (HM, 2015c: 17).

When comparing the two approaches, similar thought backgrounds could be seen. Mainly both countries consider prison as a place with stronger possibility of radicalization. Both countries view imams (and religious chaplains in general) as an important factor in (de)radicalization.

¹¹² Up until then, prison could choose if they would hire an imam (Politiken, 2006: 1).

Both countries have developed separation/segregation methods. These methods may be linked to the notion that social networks in prison are even more important than in “real life”¹¹³.

Programs in Schools

As suggested in the throughout the thesis, younger people may be more susceptible to radicalization because of their search for identity, especially if they are from second and third generation of immigrants. They might feel that they have two identities which are in media presented as opposite, creating double sense of non-belonging (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 797, 800). Danish approach goes along with the above viewpoint and claims that young people are searching for identity and therefore they are more vulnerable to radicalization (The Danish gov., 2009: 8-9). According to Citizenship Survey in the United Kingdom, younger people in general support violent extremism more than others, therefore it is essential to engage fully and variously with schools and other providers of education (HM, 2011: 64).

As illustrated in respective chapters, both countries have had experience with teenagers being radicalized and planning an attack. Additionally, people leaving for Syria and Iraq were relatively the same (young) age in both countries which follows the general trend in other countries. Therefore, both countries view young people as especially susceptible to radicalization and pay a special attention to programs in schools.

According to Prevent strategy schools should, as best possible place, enable young people to explore and discuss issues such as terrorism and use of violence while facilitating understanding of wider issues (HM, 2011: 70). It aims to build resiliency against radicalization through promoting active citizenship, fundamental British values, pupil’s voice, encouraging safe debate of controversial issues etc. (DCSF, 2009: 21-24). In doing so, the schools are being inspected by Ofsted¹¹⁴ on how well they promote fundamental British values and prevent radicalization in schools (HM, 2015d: 26). However, it might be doubtful to assume that schools can provide safe environment for discussion of such topics, as students might feel monitored through Prevent Duty¹¹⁵.

Denmark similarly focuses on strengthening pupils’ sense of citizenship (however, without mentioning teaching “fundamental Danish values”), community, democracy, and abilities of

¹¹³ See for example Veldhuis and Staun (2009)).

¹¹⁴ Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills

¹¹⁵ Employees of various government organizations working with the public have a duty to prevent people from radicalizing (HM, 2015: 13), meaning that teachers and school staff is obliged to identify children at being risk of radicalization and refer them Channel program (DfE, 2015: 5).

critical thinking and overall resilience to extremist views (The Danish gov., 2016: 21, 32). Moreover, Denmark wants to empower young people to take charge through peer-to-peer dialogues and a nationwide dialogue corps (The Danish gov., 2014: 11; The Danish gov., 2016: 22). Additionally, similarly to Britain, Danish teachers also serve as a frontline in countering radicalization, as they may be one of the first people to spot some signs. Danish government has produced training materials for teachers and has created courses and open phone counseling where they can get concrete counseling (The Danish gov., 2016: 21; Jyllands-Posten, 2009: 1). They report suspicious behavior locally and if there are a particular risk police will be involved (Christiansen, 2009: 1). What is facilitating this process is for long time established SSP cooperation network. SSP network is established locally on different levels from the political/strategic level of mayors and highest ranks of police to the implementing level of local professionals. These local professionals meet on a regular basis and coordinate the practical preventive actions. These networks were at first established for crime prevention purposes among the youth, and just later radicalization concerns were added. (The Danish gov., 2014: 6, The Danish gov., 2016: 12).

Additionally, the Aarhus model has developed workshops in schools to teach kids about violent radicalization and its signs (Bertelsen, 2015: 243), which is now being similarly implemented all over Denmark. Oldest students of elementary schools and students of high schools will be taught about extremism and radicalization. The case of Kundby¹¹⁶ girl is used in the teaching material and for key illustrative points. The teaching materials will teach students about the concepts of radicalization and extremism and it should give them an understanding how to stand against them. The lectures should help them to distinguish myths and misunderstandings of radicalization in the public debate. The underlying principle under the idea, is that if civil society should succeed in countering radicalization, it requires the society to talk about radicalization (Dandanell, 2018: 1). Personal, Social, and Health Education has also developed lessons on factors leading to extremism, teaching skills of critically evaluating the media, charismatic leaders and groups. In addition, they focus on empathy and respect for others with aim to build resilience towards extremist measures (PSHE, 2018: 1).

The two approaches are very similar in nature, as both aim to strengthen kids' resilience, critical thinking and teach them about democracy and citizenship. However, there are few differences, as mentioned above, Denmark does not aim to teach kids "fundamental Danish values". This is

¹¹⁶ For more detail read chapter on Danish deradicalization efforts.

considered very controversial, as many believe that it resembles colonial practices (Awan & Guru, 2017: 30).

What is very interesting are different reactions on very similar things. In both countries teachers have duty to prevent radicalization and report signs of radicalization and general wellbeing of children. In the United Kingdom this policy has sparked a wave of criticism¹¹⁷ among teachers and among academia for surveilling children. Big part of it might be the role of feeling that that Prevent duty is forced upon employees from top (RAN, 2016b: 5). However, this reaction has not been found in Denmark. One might assume that the reason behind it, is for a long time institutionalized control and cooperation between police and schools in crime prevention, to which radicalization signs were just added.

Addressing the Foreign Fighters

Around 150 people have left from Denmark to Syria and Iraq since 2012. Which is around 27 people per million citizens (Lister, 2015: 3). Majority of them were Danish citizens, with diverse ethnic backgrounds (including ethnic Danes) and around ten percent of Danish foreign fighters were women. The group mostly consists of young Sunny Muslim men, including converts. Comparing the group with people who have left for Afghanistan or Somalia, it is more diverse and younger. People who have left were mostly connected to city Islamist circles (in Copenhagen, Aarhus or Odense). Reportedly, from one mosque in Aarhus (Grimhøjvej mosque) came 22 foreign fighters (PET, 2013 in Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016: 29). The Grimhøjvej mosque is quite known, as it has not denounced ISIL, its former preacher was put on US list of suspected terrorists because of his travels to Syria and when in Berlin, one of the mosque's imams was recorder praying to Allah to destroy the "Zionist Jews"¹¹⁸, which he described as "*the strongest war machine, criminals, slayers of prophets, those who kill children, those who turn women into widows*" (Haaretz, 2014: 1; Wheeler, 2015: 1).

The Danish approach could be characterized as a combination of coercive and preventive measures. Considering the later, passports can be refused to issue or can be revoked by police if an individual is deemed to present risk to the country. This decision can be supplemented with decision of travel ban (also done by police). Additionally, aliens staying in Denmark can

¹¹⁷ See for example Adams, 2016 for the Guardian „Teachers back motion calling for Prevent strategy to be scrapped” or Ratcliffe, 2016 for the Guardian „Legal duty to refer students under Prevent strategy divides teachers”; Taylor and Soni, 2017; Blackwood et al., 2016.

¹¹⁸ He said “*Count them and kill them to the very last one. Don't spare a single one of them. Shake the ground beneath their feet. Make them suffer terribly*” (Wheeler, 2015: 1).

lose their residence permits or right of residency if there is a risk their participation abroad in activity threatening to the Danish security, public order or other states' security. Additionally, people convicted of terrorism can lose citizenship (if they have another citizenship – they cannot become stateless). These laws were already put into practice, as at least one man has had his passport seized and one woman has lost her passport (Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016: 30, Annex 3: 16). But, Denmark is particularly seen as a country engaging, rehabilitating, and reintegrating the returnees. Especially project in Aarhus is seen as an example of this approach, being an inspiration in other countries such as France (Hellmuth, 2015: 35). Those returnees not proven with the involvement in terrorism are helped with housing, employment, education, psychological counseling; but “*non-violent conservative Islamic beliefs remain unchallenged*” (Lister, 2015: 9).

From the United Kingdom have left at least 760 people to fight in Iraq or Syria, which is around 11 people per million citizens (Lister, 2015: 3). People who have left are predominantly British citizens, relatively young – between 18 and 30 years of age (with average age reducing), Muslim men. Many are of South-Asian origin attending higher education with links to groups with international connections (Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016: 40).

To prevent people from travelling, British police can refuse to issue a passport or cancel one, when considering public interests. The travel abroad can be also banned, and the police can hold travel documents also temporarily in ports and airports. Additionally, under Security Act 2015 it is possible to issue Temporary Exclusion Order – which means that British citizen suspected of terrorism activity abroad can be banned from return to the UK (Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016: 40; Annex 3: 52).

Returned British foreign fighters (without terrorism charges) are all candidates for Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM)¹¹⁹. These are aimed at people who cannot be yet charged or deported for lack of evidence. The measures include electronic tagging, regular reporting to the police, exclusion from particular places, prohibition of travel overseas, restriction on the use of computers and telephones, financial restriction and a duty to live at home and stay there overnight. For TPIMs to be used, there must be confirmation between the Home Secretary, police and judiciary that there is evidence to take a criminal law approach while the evidence is insufficient for criminal prosecution. The use of TPIMs has been quite limited – between 2011-2016 it was used against six people (Lister, 2015: 5-6; Wittendrop et

¹¹⁹ They also could be used to prevent people from travelling (Wittendrop et al., 2017: 54).

al., 2017: 54). Moreover, Britain can make people stateless under Section 66 of the 2014 Immigration Act under two conditions: proven serious prejudicial activities and reasonable belief that they could obtain another citizenship (Lister, 2015: 5). Considering the “soft” measures, the returnees who cannot be criminally prosecuted will be specially referred to the Channel program and should receive specialized mentoring. Additionally, Home Affairs Committee recommended creation of second specialized program, comparable to Channel, just for returnees (Wittendrop et al., 2017: 61).

Hard policies might undermine credibility of local councils working with communities as was suggested by The Economist that the Prevent program “*has poisoned relations between central government and the city councils*” and that “*councils are being strong-armed into carrying out community programs that are really thinly disguised police and intelligence work*” (The Economist, 2009: 1). Additionally, repressive policies reduce likelihood of cooperation between family members of foreign fighters and local councils and police (Lister, 2015: 5).

Networks

Networks are mentioned throughout the government policies as a factor¹²⁰, but there is hardly any focus on them as radicalization is, in both cases, seen as individual process. So, for example, the Danish approach addresses the issue of networks in the deradicalization program in prison, as after the release it “*helps identify alternative social networks*” The Danish Department..., 2014: 4). Workshop for Raising Awareness of Prevent sees in the radicalization process of young people important factors of role of groups and peer pressure (Blackwood, Hopkins & Reichen, 2016: 598- 602).

Grievances on Group Level

Among grievances on the group level research list grievances against governments, uneven economic opportunities, perceived erosion of fundamental values, and alienation from society (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 61). However, as important as it is to address these grievances, research has found that “*good intentions behind addressing the issues of discrimination, dialogue and inclusions were clouded by the fact that the issues were framed and addressed as causal factors of radicalization*”. Therefore, to avoid skepticism over mixing security and integration/social cohesion objectives together it might be better to pursue the later in different

¹²⁰ For example, the United Kingdom refers to social network theory, emphasizing group bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination and through evidence from classified Government reporting agrees with it (HM, 2011: 17).

fields than security. Lindekilde by building on Elster's (1983) notion of "essential by-products" suggests that radicalization should not be prevented through integration and social cohesion building directly, but rather thanks to developed (and separated) programs of integration and social cohesion, radicalization will be prevented (Lindekilde, 2012b: 399).

It seems that the both governments are noting the animosity towards mixing these two agendas together. The British government decoupled security objectives from integrational/social cohesion objectives. The security objectives are addressed in Prevent and in charge of social cohesion objectives is the Department for Communities and Local Government (HM, 2011: 30). The decoupling in the Danish case could be seen in a similar institutional expression – the Ministry for Integration, Immigration and Refugees was in charge of the implementation of the national counter-radicalization plan. However, since 2011 the Ministry of Social Affairs is in charge of radicalization prevention (Lindekilde, 2012b: 399).

Addressing the Role of Ideology

As shown in the previous chapter, Denmark does not pay a specific attention to countering any ideology and in its strategic documents does not mention it. Moreover, I was not able to find any Danish programs for using and building counter-narratives and as mentioned its stated goals are to facilitate society run dialogue (The Danish gov., 2016: 22, 29). However, according to Hemmingsen & Castro, these projects, including support in providing professional assistance to civil-society actors wanting to develop campaign against extremism and radicalization are considered to be creating counter-narratives, respectively "counter-propaganda initiatives". They criticize Danish "counter-propaganda initiatives" for having exclusionary effects because they propagate certain attitudes which are highlighted as normal to the Danish society. Because they focus on "normality" they risk marginalizing those who do not recognize themselves with it. Moreover, more generally, they criticize broad counter-narrative initiatives for making the problem bigger than it actually is. Another problem they see is in campaign involving religion as these risks being construed as partisan, discriminatory and being symptom of double standards (Hemmingsen & Castro, 2017: 28-29). It is important to note, that the above criticisms could be easily applicable towards the British approach as well.

Additionally, Denmark wants to create a blacklist of "anti-democratic" religious leaders who would be denied visa if they would have wanted to come to Denmark. A reason to get on the list would be "*encouraging terrorism or anti-democratic attitudes*". Integration Minister Inger Støjberg said that "*some Muslim communities that bring in people who preach hatred and a*

direct showdown against the foundations of Danish freedom". The list applies not only to Islam faith, but the minister said, *"to be honest this is primarily about Islam"* (Chadwick, 2016: 1). The list is similar to blacklist already used in Britain. The idea of creating the list was criticized by Danish think tank focusing in legal issues, that it could violate free speech rights. Such an entry ban should be limited to people *"who are considered to pose a threat to national security or who have encouraged terrorism or violence against groups of people"* (The Daily Star, 2016: 1). This has been criticized also by Flemming Rose as breaking *"with 70 years of fighting extreme ideologies without curtailing civil liberties"*. Moreover, he highlights the irony that the debate which has surrounded the cartoon crisis has been turned on its head (Rose, 2016: 1).

In the British view, ideology is the central factor in the radicalization process and it is essential to counter. Research and Communication Unit has a specific task of countering ISIL propaganda, mainly through discreet campaign without any acknowledgment of UK government support on YouTube, Twitter and Facebook (HM, 2011: 61, 64; Cobain et al., 2016: 1). Moreover, British approach in school promotes fundamental British values could be seen as countering specific *"anti-British"* ideology of violence. I believe, that promotion of these values is in line with theory of motivational framing. Wiktorowicz (2004 in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 801-803) used framing theory for explaining how one start sympathizing with a group or social movement which resembles the British approach as they would like to make people *"frame align"* with their values.

As mentioned earlier, Denmark does not address ideology even during deradicalization process (as the United Kingdom does). To precisely establish how much is Denmark involved in creating narratives, through for example corps of digital voices of reason their detailed work and decision-making tree would have to be public. However, I believe that this Danish initiative deserves more research.

Macro level

The macro level of analysis is the least developed in the deradicalization efforts of both countries. Even though both countries work internationally, in collaboration with other countries, to develop measures and approaches, it is not considered as part of the deradicalization program per se. In the first chapter, several macro level causes of radicalization have been identified. However, it would not be useful to talk about all of them, as some of them are completely omitted from the approaches. None of the governments addresses the issue of globalization and modernization as causes of radicalization and the issue of poverty

(economical-social issues) has been suggested to be omitted from the direct deradicalization efforts. Therefore, the only identified macro level reason behind radicalization addressed by the governments is the perception of foreign relations or foreign policy. Additionally, considering the possible policy measures coming from the understanding of radicalization through French sociology lenses, it has been suggested they should be also omitted from the direct deradicalization measures.

International Relations and Foreign Policy

International relations' relevance for process of radicalization lies on an assumption that they create specific group grievances, meaning that foreign policy of Denmark and the United Kingdom is perceived as harming. I assume that the perception of foreign policy as "bad" or unjustified towards foreign countries is not only relevant for people with ethnic background from those countries. The western foreign policy is by the radicalizing rhetoric presented as threatening Islam and its values (BBC, 2002: 1). Criticized is western involvement in military operations in the Middle East and support for repressive regimes in the region (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 32). That is why, from countering radicalization point of view, should be important to address these issues, for example by explaining the foreign policy and addressing the misconceptions.

British government included better communication of its foreign policies in its strategy (HM, 2011: 43), but has not developed any concrete initiatives and therefore, I consider only Denmark to at least partially addressing this issue. One example is program where Foreign Ministry officials visit high schools (Vidino, 2013: 2). The second is PET's Dialogue Forum¹²¹ has been used to help "*explain Danish foreign and development policy, issues raised by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Arab Spring*". In general, the forum has improved the knowledge about Danish foreign policy's objectives and results (Brett, 2012: 3-5).

Approaches of French sociology

Similarly to theoretical approaches linking poverty to radicalization, or grievances on the group level, reasons of radicalization perceived by French sociology are not addressed directly in the deradicalization policies. As according to scholars "*radicalization occurs as individuals seek to reconstruct a lost identity on a perceived hostile and confusing world*". Younger generations

¹²¹ Regular series of meeting involving PET and individuals from different parts of the Danish Muslim community to discuss issues related to terrorism and extremism

feel discrimination and different disadvantages which alienate them from western society (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 797-800).

The government policies possibly addressing these issues could be anti-discriminatory laws, positive and welcoming public discourse about Muslims or Islam, addressing Islamophobia, addressing hate crimes and hate speech towards Muslims, social cohesion. Unfortunately, many government policies could also worsen the feelings of alienation. Apart from public discourse and general attitudes in society (as shown for example by voting preferences), there could be identified several examples throughout the chapters describing the policies. For example, British project Champion failure could be seen as over policing and general distrust towards Muslims. The focus on ideology and teaching British values could be seen as prescribing an identity. Additionally, focus of both policies on young people could be understood (by them) as a general distrust and doubt about their abilities.

Conclusion

The conclusion of comparison is visualized into a table¹²², summarizing theoretical approaches towards radicalization and respective policy responses linked to them.

	Theoretical approaches towards radicalization/Perceived reasons behind the radicalization / Relevance for radicalization	UK	Denmark
Self-categorization & Social Identity	Damaged self-esteem, Feelings of frustration, Alienation	Strengthen communities' resilience to terrorist ideology by building stronger sense of belonging and citizenship	Peer-to-peer dialogue initiative

¹²² The theoretical approaches and their concrete reasons behind the process of radicalization are based on the first chapter.

Rational Choice	Cost and benefit analysis	Deterrence and punishment ¹²³ Seize the passports Travel bans Pre-charge detention Ban on entering the UK Limiting of freedom of movements in the UK Possession of extremist material is offence	Deterrence and punishment ¹²⁴ Seize the passports Travel bans
Staircase to Terrorism	Relative deprivation, Lack of social mobility, Procedural justice	To stop the process: referrals to Channel It addresses extremist ideology and offers more practical help (how to deal with peer pressure; development of education and skills; search for jobs	To stop the process: “Deradicalization – Targeted Intervention” Mentoring, long-term support with all aspects of life (new friends, job, accommodation NO ideological or theological mentoring
Internet	Spread of propaganda, Easy contact with recruiters and other same minded people	Deleting the extremist pages and content Supporting a group of credible commentators challenging extremism RICU spread of counter-narratives	Blocking and deleting extremist pages “Corps of digital voices of reason” Creation of special forums Teaching of online critical thinking
Prisons	Hostile environment facilitates group creation, Promoting of extremist ideas	Separation/segregation Vetting of rel. chaplains Control of rel. materials Mentoring program Theological mentoring Tarbiyah course	Separation/segregation Vetting of rel. chaplains Services only in Danish Mentoring program

¹²³ Punishable offences are: weapons training, directing terrorist organization, possession of article for terrorist purposes, inciting terrorism overseas, preparation of terrorist acts etc. (Coroners and Justice Act 2009: Section 138).

¹²⁴ Punishable offences are: terrorism acts, terrorism-like-offences, financing and support, recruiting, training, facilitation, incitement. Expressions of sympathy or promotion in relation to terrorism activity, or letting to be recruited (Vestergaard, 2013: 8).

Schools	Special focus on youth as more susceptible towards radicalization	Build resiliency promoting active citizenship Teaching British values Teaching about radicalization Reporting signs of radicalization	Build resiliency strengthening pupils' sense of citizenship Teaching about radicalization Reporting signs of radicalization
Foreign fighters	Combination of push and pull factors	Seize the passports Travel bans Ban on entering the UK TPIM Removing citizenship	Seize the passports Travel bans Removing citizenship (if two) If proven innocent: rehabilitation/reintegration
Networks	Peer pressure, Group think, Influence of friends, Charismatic leadership	Channel offers help with dealing with peer pressure	After prison release help with establishment of new social networks
Grievance on the group level	Discontent with gov. policies, Erosion of values, Economic disparity, Desire to belong; Experience of Islamophobia	Building stronger sense of belonging and citizenship	Providing alternative ways how to address these grievances
Religion; Salafi-Jihadi ideology	Ideology	Propagation of British values (framing theory); Counter-narratives, Ideology as central factor of radicalization	Focus on "Danishness" is included in immigration policies and in process of gaining citizenship Behavior as central factor
International relations	Interventions in the MENA; victimization of Muslims		Explaining Danish foreign policy on high schools, and PET-communities dialogue
Poverty	Deprivation	Separation of social projects and counter/deradicalization	Separation of social projects and counter/deradicalization
Globalization and Modernization	Cultural alienation, Economic stagnation		
Approaches of French sociology	Double sense of not belonging, Search for identity		
Micro level			
Meso level			
Macro level			

Conclusion

The thesis worked with several prominent theoretical approaches and explanations of radicalization in order to better understand two countries' deradicalization policies. The selected countries were the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Denmark. The deradicalization and counter radicalization policies of both countries belong to the oldest and most developed among the European states, which are at the same time considered different. The aim of the thesis was to show and understand these differences, from where they might come, but also, to explore similarities between the approaches. Comparison, unlike single case study, with its focus on similarities, or differences should be able to bring some degree of perspective into the examined topic. Moreover, it allows for better examinations of different political approaches and possibilities.

In general, the countries are focused mostly on individual level of radicalization and then on specific sites where radicalization can happen, e.g. prisons, schools, and the Internet as it is easier to formulate policies on this levels/places than to single-handedly address macro-level issues. All three sites are examples of both active and passive policies, meaning that the state is proactive in creating and promoting certain activities, and also forbidding certain activities.

The theoretical approaches towards radicalization explored in the first chapter served as a framework for comparison, but more importantly, also as a tool for better understanding if governments' approaches are based on any of the approaches and theoretical backgrounds. Because governments' understanding and definitions of radicalization should, inevitably, shape their political responses in a form of policy.

In the respective definitions there could be identified both similarities and differences. Both countries view radicalization as a process, which fits with majority of academic research. The process in both countries is understood as *individual* subscribing to/coming to support *extremist ideologies*. Social network theory's importance of groups of people you know is mentioned throughout the policies but is not prominent as seen in definitions. Moreover, the definition of extremism varies, which I believe results in slightly different overall approaches of the two countries. As discussed in the first chapter, radicalization and extremism can be both cognitive and behavioral. These different understandings are seen in the two countries' definitions of extremism, when the UK is focused more on the former, and Denmark on the latter.

As both countries consider radicalization as a process, it is obvious that both work with an assumption that it can be halted, or how would staircase to terrorism metaphor would suggest,

stop climbing to higher floors (Moghaddam, 2005: 161). Both countries have developed relatively similar mentoring programs, during which individuals are screened if they really need the program and if yes are assigned a mentor who through psychology and practical steps helps them to revert from a path to radicalization. However, what is the difference is that the United Kingdom offers ideological and theological mentoring, which Denmark does not. This difference mirrors the influence of different definitions of extremism. Moreover, both countries are predominantly focused on young people as specifically vulnerable to radicalization, which is again in line with general research on decreasing age of radicals.

Coming from the different understandings of extremism, the biggest difference, in my opinion, is in policies' approach towards ideology. The UK is actively using framing theory approach to counter-act the Islamist ideology, which it sees as one the most prominent factors behind radicalization. In schools it actively promotes what are called "fundamental British values". This is nowhere to be found in the Danish approach, however, Denmark has been slowly changing its immigration laws, making them stricter and with stronger focus on what could be perceived as "Danishness"¹²⁵.

As mentioned, Denmark and the United Kingdom have been chosen for analysis for their relative differences. However, the analysis has showed that in some areas they might be closer than expected. The most prominent example is in their approach towards foreign fighters. Many news articles compared the two deradicalization policies and explored their differences. Denmark was described as a pioneer in the rehabilitation, mainly through program developed in Aarhus, and Britain was considered as having punitive hard measures. And even though it is still true, I believe that both countries came closer together with their measures on this issue. As shown in the table, Denmark also introduced travel ban and restrictions on issuing of passports (which were not in place back in 2015). Danes who join a terrorist group/organization abroad can be charged of treason and ten years in prison (under grave circumstances it could be life imprisonment) (The Danish gov., 2016: 19). The United Kingdom can charge their foreign fighters for belonging to a proscribed terrorist organization, and those on the way to Syria can be arrested on suspicion of "*acting in preparation of terrorist offence*" (Wittendrop, 2017: 23, 29-30). Moreover, if British citizens, similarly to Danish, have not committed any criminal

¹²⁵ Through requirement to pass course and test on Danish culture and history to acquire Danish citizenship, Denmark manufactures Danishness and according to Stokes-DuPass, depicts a stereotypical and rigid understanding of being a Dane (Stokes-DuPass. 2015 in Gundelach, 2016: 2442).

offence are offered help through Channel program. Through this example, I do not want to suggest that the approaches are the same, but I would like to show, especially on the case of foreign fighters, that the policies have come closer.

Moreover, very similar policy with different result is Prevent Duty in Britain and the role of teachers in Denmark. Prevent Duty is basically a duty for teachers to report signs of radicalization in their pupils. Denmark has similar rule, as teachers must care about wellbeing of their pupils. However, Prevent Duty has been severely criticized, as shown in the British chapter and comparison chapter. I believe that the different reactions on the policy are because of their different designs. Danish schools have cooperated with police for a very long time, therefore their relationship should be trustful. Together with social service they have been working on preventing drug abuse and gang crime. To this structure, concerns over radicalization were just added. Together, with very local nature of the governmental policies (e.g. many of currently national projects had been developed locally) it has contributed to better reception of the policy. Moreover, I believe that this topic deserves more attention of further research as it could have practical implication on the reception of further (deradicalization) policies in other countries.

As governments use amalgam of theoretical approaches and policies, it is important to strike balance among them, meaning that it is important to secure that one policy's objection is not hampering objective of another's policy. Rytter and Pederson call it an "unresolved paradox", which happens "*while the nation state intends to secure the citizens of the country, the interventions that it makes entail that certain groups of the population actually feel far less secure*". So, for example, it means that it is important that part of deradicalization work aiming at countering narratives should not worsen feelings of not belonging, or work in schools should not produce fear of discussions and expressing your ideas, because when "*approach risks becoming exclusionary, thus possibly exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address*" (Pantucci. 2010: 266). Moreover, some suggest that true value in deradicalization policies is in what it signals to marginalized population, because "*seeing wayward members treated compassionately could reduce feelings of persecution*" (Koerner, 2017: 1).

Radicalization and deradicalization are relatively new topics in academia and its policies are rapidly developing, with changing objectives and reactions to new threats. As states are creating policies without much needed understanding of radicalization and its research they come up with unique ways how to address it. Without particularly referring to certain theories or

approaches, several of them could be found in both of the policies. For the practical purposes, this comparison aimed at helping to better understand two of deradicalization policies and linked them with theoretical approaches. The further research should definitely try more to overcome the methodological challenges of assessing the effectiveness of the policies and not only their objectives, but in their entirety. Moreover, as definition of extremism has been one of the biggest influencers of the policies, further research on how these definitions had been established, by whom and how would be useful for better understanding of the policies.

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PROJEKT DIPLOMOVEJ PRÁCE

Univerzita Karlova v Praze

Fakulta sociálních věd

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Předpokladaný názov práce: Vládní přístupy v boji proti násilnému extrémismu a radikalizácii, komparatívna analýza Spojeného kráľovstva a Dánskeho kráľovstva

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Voľba témy

V posledných rokoch Európou otriasajú čoraz častejšie teroristické útoky, ktoré vzbudzujú otázky o tom kto sú títo útočníci a prečo útočia tak ďaleko od zón konfliktu. Častokrát sú títo ľudia občania krajín, kde tieto útoky vykonávajú alebo majú k nim blízke spojenie. Pri takejto situácii je nesmierne dôležité pochopiť prečo sa rozhodli pre násilie. Pri predpoklade, že bezpečnostná hrozba teroristických útokov v budúcnosti môže ešte narastať, je táto potreba pochopenia radikalizácie a ako na ňu reagovať ešte naliehavejšia. Okrem toho, do kontextu radikalizácie súvisí aj fenomén zahraničných bojovníkov v konfliktoch v Iraku a Sýrii. Tí, ktorí sa do Európy vrátia budú mať nebezpečné know-how, ktoré môžu šíriť ďalej. Preto je dôležité nielen radikalizácii predchádzať ale aj pochopiť, ktoré de-radikalizačné modely sú v konkrétnych kontextoch najvhodnejšie.

V tomto kontexte bezpečnostného vývoja v Európe narastá potreba pochopenia radikalizácie, čo to presne je, ako prebieha a aké sú najlepšie protiopatrenia. Európske štáty vyvinuli rôznorodé odpovede a riešenia tejto výzvy. Tieto odpovede sa skladajú z rozmanitého mixu protiteroristických zákonov, zvýšenia bezpečnostného dozoru¹²⁶, ale aj opatrení zameriavajúcich sa na prevenciu a boj proti samotnej radikalizácii a náboru nových členov extrémistických skupín, zlepšovanie odolnosti ohrozených komunit a jednotlivcov, diskreditáciu extrémistického naratívu cez vytváranie proti-diškurzu a v neposlednom rade modelovanie programov disengagement-u (Gielen, 2017: 1).

Hoci neexistuje presná definícia extrémizmu a ani radikalizácie, v širšom zmysle sa dá povedať, že radikalizácia je proces alebo séria procesov, cez ktoré jednotlivci alebo skupiny začnú odporovať status quo. Na druhej strane, extrémizmus je ideologická orientácia, ktorá je proti prevládajúcim sociálnym, politickým a ekonomickým podmienkam v spoločnosti. Spojenie medzi radikalizáciou a extrémizmom je také, že práve radikalizácia vedie k extrémizmu, ktorý potom vedie k násilným činnostom (Arshad-Ayaz a Naseem, 2017: 6). Keďže de-radikalizačné politiky vznikajú v kontexte konkrétneho štátu, je pochopiteľné, že sa bude líšiť ich prístup k problematike. Práve vďaka tomu je možné ich skúmať a porovnávať z rôznych hľadísk. Kvôli tomu som v tejto práci zvolila komparatívnu analýzu dvoch modelov prístupu k de-radikalizácii a boju proti extrémizmu. Dva vybrané modely budú britský a dánsky. Tieto dva prístupy boli zvolené na základe ich relatívnej odlišnosti, vďaka ktorej bude možné vybudovať jasný kontrast medzi jednotlivými politikami. Vďaka tomu, že bol

¹²⁶ V anglickom origináli security surveillance.

zvolený prístup skúmania odlišných prípadov bude možné jednotlivé prípady lepšie zaradiť do kontextu a malo by byť možné lepšie vidieť jedinečné stránky prípadov.

Spojené kráľovstvo vyvinulo stratégiu CONTEST (v skratke counter-terrorism), ktorá zahŕňa široké spektrum vládnych organizácií a skladá sa štyroch P – 4xP – Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare. Časť stratégie, ktorá bude porovnávaná v tejto analýze bude práve Prevent, ktorá by mala byť práve tá inovatívnejšia časť celého prístupu a zaoberá sa (ako názov naznačuje) prevenciu a predchádzaniu radikalizácie a násilným aktivitám. Táto časť britskej stratégie ale vzbudila značnú kontroverziu, pretože ju mnohí obviňovali z inštitucionalizovania domácej špionáže a označenia celej moslimskej komunity ako „podozrivej“ (Innes, Roberts a Lowe, 2017: 253, 257).

Dánsky prístup je postavený na dvoch agendách: ochrana štátu a spoločnosti pred teroristickými útokmi a zodpovednosť štátu za blahobyť jednotlivca, čo štát zaväzuje ochraňovať ho pred sebapoškodzujúcim správaním. Kombinácia týchto agend dáva dôraz na to, že represívne opatrenia nie sú dostatočné a treba ich aplikovať ako na národnej, tak aj na lokálnej úrovni. Najznámejším príkladom dánskeho prístupu je tzv. Aarhus model, ktorí bol vyvinutý v roku 2013 medzi mestom Aarhus a oblastnou políciou z Jutlandu. Tento model mal okrem iného za úlohu zastaviť jednotlivcov pred cestou do Sýrie alebo Iraku a ponúknuť im široké spektrum pomoci. Tento model sa v roku 2014 začal aplikovať celonárodne. Aarhus model je častokrát dávaný ako príklad klasicky mäksieho škandinávského prístupu voči radikalizácii a extrémizmu (Hemmingsen, 2015: 15,18), a preto bol vybraný do tejto komparatívnej analýzy.

Výskumná otázka a metodológia

Ako bolo načrtnuté vyššie bude sa jednať o komparatívnu analýzu, ktorej hlavným cieľom bude určiť hlavné rozdiely medzi týmito prístupmi a pokúsiť sa určiť výhody a nevýhody jednotlivých prístupov. Myslím si, že takýto prístup môže mať prínos najmä z praktického hľadiska a z hľadiska budúceho politického rozhodovania ohľadne modelov v boji proti radikalizácii. Výskumná otázka vychádza zo samotnej komparatívnej štúdie – a to, aké sú hlavné rozdiely a podobnosti v prístupe Spojeného a Dánskeho kráľovstva v boji proti radikalizácii a extrémizmu.

V samotnej analýze budú tieto prístupy predstavené bližšie a budem sa venovať niekoľkým vopred vytýčeným oblastiam. Dôležité pre komparatívnu analýzu bude určiť či, a ak áno v akom zmysle sa národné definície terorizmu, radikalizácie a de-radikalizácie medzi Spojením kráľovstvom a Dánskym kráľovstvom líšia. Sú tieto definície flexibilné alebo presne dané? A ako to následne vplýva na výsledné vládne politiky¹²⁷. Okrem toho bude dôležité určiť či tieto vládne prístupy vychádzajú z určitej teórie, resp. či majú za sebou určité teoretické odôvodnenia.

Pred tým, ako je možné rozdielne politiky týchto dvoch krajín skúmať a porovnávať je nutné popísať v akom historickom kontexte vznikali, aké skúsenosti mala krajina s terorizmom a proti akým konkrétnym typom hrozieb sa vymedzili. Historický kontext je dôležitý, pretože ten ovplyvňuje ako obyvatelia a tvorcovia politik vnímajú hrozby a práve toto vnímanie hrozby má ďalej vplyv na utváranie celkovej politiky proti terorizmu a radikalizácii. Okrem toho to môže vplývať aj na intra-národnú kooperáciu medzi inštitúciami a aký typ kooperácie medzi sebou zvolia (Foley, 2013 v Shaffer, 2016: 390-391). Práve preto táto spolupráca medzi jednotlivými zložkami štátu bude jedným z predmetov mojej analýzy. V porovnávaní inštitucionálnej kooperácie bude nesmierne dôležité sa zamerať aj na školy a na to, ako je školský systém zapojený do celkového programu prevencie, pretože práve školy sú považované za dôležitý priestor na zvyšovanie odolnosti mladých ľudí. Avšak hoci panuje širší konsenzus, že úloha škôl je dôležitá, nie je presne jasné aká metóda zapojenia škôl je najvhodnejšia (Gielen, 2017: 10). Okrem toho ma bude zaujímať či a ako spolupracujú školy a iné štátne inštitúcie s rodinami a na koľko je táto spolupráca považovaná za úspešnú a prínosnú.

Okrem toho, ma bude v analýze zaujímať aj spolupráca štátneho a súkromného sektora, a to najmä s občianskou spoločnosťou a rôznymi neziskovými organizáciami. Predmetom analýzy bude na koľko je občianska spoločnosť do týchto politik zapojená, aký to môže mať prínos a či sa jej úlohy prekrývajú s úlohami štátu, alebo sa jedná o doplnkovú činnosť.

Ďalej sa komparatívna analýza bude venovať tomu, nakoľko sa vládne politiky zameriavajú na samotný zdroj vnímaných krívd a sťažností, ktoré vedú k radikalizácii. Táto časť analýzy bude čerpať prevažne zo sekundárnej literatúry ale aj z analýzy samotných vládnych dokumentov a programov a ako sa tieto venujú príčinám ako napr. rôznym politickým,

¹²⁷ Alebo napríklad ako to vplýva na justičný systém.

ekonomickým a kultúrnym problémom, osobným faktorom, rôznym spúšťačom radikalizácie a následne sa pokúsim určiť, či tieto programy sú dostatočne obsiahle.

V dnešnom čoraz viac digitalizovanom svete je nevyhnutné aby sa táto analýza venovala prístupu vlád k online extrémistickým materiálom. Zamieram sa primárne na to, aký prístup vlády zvolili – či sa jedná a skôr jednoduchšiu cestu len blokovania extrémistických materiálov, alebo aj proaktívnejšiu politiku promovania pozitívnych správ a podporovania online komunit na sebe-reguláciu a nahlasovanie nevhodného obsahu. Bude ma zaujímať aký mix pozitívnych a negatívnych praktík si krajiny zvolili. Ďalej ma bude zaujímať či sa vlády rozhodli ísť cestou šírenia vlastných správ, aký presný spôsob tohto šírenia zvolili a aký to malo ohlas. Napríklad, Spojené kráľovstvo má iniciatívu od Institute for Strategic Dialogue, v ktorej bývalí členovia extrémistických hnutí sa snažia spojiť s jedincami, ktorí boli vyhodnotení ako pravdepodobne ľahko ovplyvniteľní týmito skupinami (Szmania a Fincher, 2017: 120).

Zaujímavé bude aj sledovať akú odozvu mali tieto programy v národnej a medzinárodnej akademickej sfére a v sfére politickej. Najmä ma bude zaujímať akú odozvu mali na domácej scéne a ak to bude dohľadateľné, bude určite zaujímavé určiť akú odozvu mali tieto programy medzi samotnou časťou populácie na ktorú sú namierené.

Pre kompletnosť analýzy je potreba sa venovať aj tzv. exit stratégiám, ktoré sa pohybujú od prevencie ďalšej radikalizácie, po rehabilitácie a poradenstvo pre tých, ktorí už boli zradikalizovaní až po skupinové snahy o de-radikalizáciu v alebo mimo väzenia (Gielen, 2017: 12).

Predpokladaná osnova

1. Úvod
2. Radikalizácia, de-radikalizácia a extrémizmus - prehľad akademickej literatúry
3. Britský model de-radikalizácie a boja proti extrémizmu
4. Dánsky model de-radikalizácie a boja proti extrémizmu
5. Komparatívna analýza
6. Záver

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