

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**

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Department of Sociology

**Intersubjectivity of economic knowledge:**

**Ukraine and Czechia**

Master's thesis

Author: Maksym Kolomoiets

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Supervisor: Doc. Martin Hájek, PhD.

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## **Declaration**

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## **Reference**

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## **Abstract**

Topic of work is an intersubjectivity of economic knowledge. Work is describing the process, how is intersubjective economic knowledge may be manifested and legitimized in speech by lay individuals. In general, knowledge is presented as created, redacted and legitimized during the process of speech as an ongoing activity, intersubjective symbols are used as tools to proclaim itself. In the theoretical part, broad overview of sociological theories of knowledge are presented, and the research question was conceptualized by the terms of constructivist approach of Berger and Luckmann. Lay knowledge was manifested as mix of referring four modes of reasoning: economical rationality, societal rationality, habitual and doxic knowledge, discourses. Overemphasizing one of the mods leads to reducing the legitimacy of manifestation, the process of balancing between modes is described. In addition, paper proposes suggestion of differences in intersubjective knowledge between Ukraine and Czechs, and discuss the possibilities of further research.

## **Abstrakt**

Tématem práce je intersubjekta ekonomického vědění. Práce popisuje proces, jak intersubjektivní ekonomické vědění může být zformulováno a legitimizováno ve vypovědích laických lidí. Obecně, vědění je prezentováno a vytvářeno, upravováno a legitimizováno v řeči jako trvající činnost, když intersubjektivní symboly jsou využívány jako prostředky pro prohlášení vědění. V teoretické části je představen široký přehled sociologických teorií vědění, a výzkumná otázka byla conceptualizována pomocí termínů konstruktivistického přístupu Bergera a Luckmanna. Laické vědění bylo vyjadřováno jako směs vztahující ke čtyřem modem uvažování: ekonomická racionalita, sociální racionalita, habituální a doxické vědění, dikurzy. Příliš velký důraz na pouze jeden modus snižoval legitimacy vyjádření, proces balancování mezi mody je popsán. Na závěr, v práci jsou diskutovány odlišnosti intersubjektivního vědění mezi Ukrajinou a Českou Republikou, a také návrhovány možné směry dalšího výzkumu.

## **Keywords**

Knowledge, economy, intersubjective knowledge, lay economic knowledge, rationality, constructivism, pragmatism

## **Klíčová slova**

Vědění, ekonomika, intersubjektivita vědění, laické ekonomické vědění, racionalita, konstruktivismus, pragmatismus.

## **Název práce**

Intersubjektivita ekonomického vědění: Ukrajina i Česko

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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Institute of Sociological Studies</b> <b>Master's degree thesis proposal</b></p>
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Intersubjectivity of economic knowledge: Ukraine and Czechia

**Context of a topic: What is cultural memory?**

Cultural memory or intersubjective cultural experience contains in itself some important patterns with which members of society approach to some problems, indirectly experienced by someone other. In this work we shall study how exactly cultural events in the past make influence on individual? Which information channels translate it? How does it happen that some event became an important beacon, on which people are oriented now?

Discourse of communism contained ideological contradictory approach to Western (neo)liberal economy. After the years of transition to democracy in 1989-1991, processes of privatization, liberalization had huge impact on every citizen of countries where transition occurred. Highlighting of those processes in media, personal experiences of people have long-term effect on individual's economic behavior in these states until now. One of signs of it is a low level of trust to neoliberal economic institutions, such as banks, debt and bankruptcy – which makes a significant difference to Western societies.

**Theoretical approaches to tacit knowledge**

Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu proposed concept “doxa” as field of undisputable meanings. It is something taken-for-granted, unreflected elements of culture, which shape and determine people's approach to the reality. Through actions and symbols, which provide reproduction and continuity of cultural world, doxa forms predisposition of human in relation to the world. (Bourdieu 1977: 165-168)

Concept of “shared practical knowledge” of sociologist Anthony Giddens presents more dynamical production of knowledge, which is produced and reformulated by both actions of individuals and “how-to-do” discourse. In comparison to doxa, shared practical knowledge may be an object of a discussion, but also contains some unreflected elements with categories of life experience and common sense. (Giddens: 1997, 252)

Linguistic and semantic theories offers some tools for conversation analysis, where we can differentiate “intuitive” meanings - denotations which are indisputable and connotations of them which are an object of discussion and different between individuals. Notions of denotation and

connotation were developed by structuralism linguists Ferdinand Saussure and Louis Hjelmslev and post-structuralist semiotician Roland Barthes.

### **Applying theory to research: Why use these concepts?**

Phenomenon of speculating (including moral marking and negative-positive symbolic) about fields of economy with which individuals have little or no direct experiences assumes a certain intersubjective knowledge of these fields, which would be object of our study.

Using of presented theoretical concept is dedicated to identify a tacit intersubjective knowledge of “common sense”, differentiate it from explicit knowledge of individuals and locate its place in particular cultural field. In order to find the sources of influence on these knowledge we should consider political stands of respondents (assessments about socialism and neoliberalism); impact of economic processes of economy liberalization in 90’s as well as economy crisis in 2008; preferred media sources; personal experiences of respondents or people they know personally.

### **Research question**

Main research question is: *How the intersubjective tacit knowledge about economy field is constructed in post-communist countries?*

Main research question, stated partially:

1. What are sources of economic intersubjective tacit knowledge?
2. Does tacit knowledge is unite or has distinct elements? If so, how they interact between? May they be in contradiction?
3. How we can conceptualize the intersubjective tacit knowledge using sociological/linguistic theory?

Research goal is to identify and explore the field of tacit in economic discourse in post-communist countries, conceptualize it using sociological/linguistic theory and propose a graphical model of elements and sources of production of intersubjective knowledge.

### **Methodology**

Basic empirical data which made to us possible to see a problem of tacit knowledge were gathered during the research of economic literacy in post-communist countries. Data have a form of record of a game similar to “Memories”. Respondents during the game connected cards different economic notions and their possible description, and then argued whether it is correct description or not. Discussion provides material about explicit elements of economic discourse as well as implicit undisputable elements. Data were collected in Czech Republic and Ukraine.

Main sources of data would be in-depth interviews with some of respondents of the Memories game and other respondents will be made and analyzed in order to explain features of tacit knowledge, draw the field of it and find some sources of influence of this knowledge. Interviews would contain an indirect questions about people experiences and memories about periods of economic instability. Data would be also collected in Czech Republic and Ukraine.

Other part of analyze will be discourse study of how the economy was presented in communist times and in media which have now an influence to respondents – in order to know the role of media in translation of meanings to the people.

Comparison of data collected from both countries will provide us with information of possible similar processes in all post-communist countries and unique for separate countries.

### **Main literature**

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## Introduction

As Pierre Bayard notes in his book „How to Talk About Books You Haven't Read“, people often refer to numerous books without the direct knowledge of their content, i.e. not reading them. Instead of reading, the „true reader“ is able to place book X in a system with other books, to „be able to reflect on“. Bayard emphasizes, that knowing the entire content of books that one person has read is impossible; more of that is unnecessary, since it reduces the creativity of „debatants“ over books in order to create their own meanings – as a result, debates about books not read become literally an argument about nothing. (Bayard, 2009)

However, this case is in the field of understanding economics. As it appeared in the study of Doc. Martin Hájek, PhD. „Šetrnost a hospodárnost v časech krize: ekonomické chování v rodinném a veřejném diskurzu v dnešní české společnosti“, people are able to discuss every area of the economy even with little or abstract knowledge, and their own reflection should have an impact on their further activity as economic actors. But a sophisticated approach to notions as „bank“ or „inflation“ was not merely subjective creativity of participants of discussion. In order to be objective, respondents referred to the similar stereotypes, which helped them to „filter“ their view on economic realities. They could refer to their own, or mediated from known people's shared experience. Often these worldviews are particularly strong, even though they are abstract or biased, because a person considers this as his or her own opinion.

But is it so in reality? Through common stereotypes, analytics' eyes can see some repeated patterns, which introduces intersubjective meanings of economic notions. It is possible to consider this phenomenon (according to study „Šetrnost a hospodárnost v časech krize: ekonomické chování v rodinném a veřejném diskurzu v dnešní české společnosti“) as influence of certain cultural patterns or historical events, related to the economy. This approach shifts the work into the field of sociology of knowledge, at the same time using some aspects from so-called cultural studies.

It would be misleading to try to explain people's „common sense“ merely in terms of cultural impact. People are alive beings, capable to create their own meanings and be a subject to their own reality. So what are the bricks for the construction of an intersubjective knowledge about economics, and who is the architect? The standpoints of population can be produced and translated symbolically by: (family) tradition, (political) ideology and media, or an individual's lived experience. In the latter, empirical understanding of economics, process of interaction with institutions, or suffering from macro-economic shocks may be much more important in creating own meanings of these institutions in processes (similarly with “empirical shift” in creating the political knowledge by individuals, described in Cramer & Toff, 2017). Official discourse in that way may be in conflict with “common

meanings". Part of this work will be dedicated to the standpoints of people considering expert knowledge and how is it important to them.

In this work was described an intersubjectivity of economic knowledge. Work is describing the process, how is intersubjective economic knowledge may be manifested and legitimized in speech by lay individuals. In general, knowledge is presented as created, redacted and legitimized during the process of speech as an ongoing activity, intersubjective symbols are used as tools to proclaim itself. In the theoretical part, broad overview of sociological theories of knowledge are presented, and the research question was conceptualized by the terms of constructivist approach of Berger and Luckmann. Lay knowledge was manifested as mix of referring four modes of reasoning: economical rationality, societal rationality, habitual and doxic knowledge, discourses. Overemphasizing one of the mods leads to reducing the legitimacy of manifestation, the process of balancing between modes is described. In addition, paper proposes suggestion of differences in intersubjective knowledge between Ukrainians and Czechs, and discuss the possibilities of further research.

# 1. Sociology of knowledge

## 1.1 Definition of knowledge

The classical definition of knowledge, given by Plato, states that knowledge is “*justified true belief*”. This definition was sufficient for sciences through thousands of years. Various sources define knowledge by following: knowledge is a familiarity, awareness, or understanding of someone or something - such as facts, information, descriptions, or skills which are acquired through experience or education by perceiving, discovering, or learning (Wikipedia); K is the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject (Oxford Dictionary); and that is either in a person’s mind or possessed by people generally (Cambridge Dictionary). The difference between “knowledge” and “belief” is nothing more than in the degree of certainty. (The Law Dictionary).

Wittgenstein (1953) was among the first scholars who attempted to deconstruct the notion of knowledge in terms of his linguistic philosophy, which will be later associated with the “linguistic turn”. He tried to show that one notion of, for example, knowledge, can stand for the family of things, which while having a series of similarities may not have a single common feature among them. Following his idea of family resemblance, knowledge is a cluster concept, which contains many cases but is impossible to define adequately. (Gottschalk-Mazouz, 2008).

Modern philosopher Chrosholm (1957) decomposes Plato’s definition on formal logical entities: “a knows that p” contains three necessary parts: 1) a accepts p; 2) a has adequate evidence for p; 3) p is true (Hilpinen 1970). This definition, however, was challenged in the second half of XX century in the field of formal logic. The so-called Gettier problem (1963) refers to the fact that some belief may be correct on all three stages, but may not be a real knowledge because of a misconception which turned to be true just by merely luck.

While pointing here on limits of the definition of knowledge, in this work the basic definition of knowledge will be used. An alternative name for the subject of this work could be beliefs of the people about the economy instead of intersubjective knowledge, especially concerning postmodern rejection of the common definition of truth (Sokal, 1996: 93; Barrow, 1999; Kuntz, 2012; Caputo et al, 2015). However, knowledge will be a more suitable notion because it is more acknowledged, predominant and widespread concept in sociology in comparison to the concept of belief. In sociology, knowledge under interpretative view is seen as a multidimensional concept that can be simultaneously situated, personally and socially constructed (Wenger, 1998; Vince, Sutcliffe & Olivera, 2002; Orlikowski, 2002; Sole & Edmondson, 2002; Tsoukas, 2005; Guzman 2009).

The theoretical background of the sociological theory of knowledge is very rich. Émile Durkheim is often named as the first sociologist, who developed the sociology of knowledge in his work, although

never mentioned the term by itself. The sociology of Durkheim provides essential basis to the subject, developed later by numerous social scientists: it distinguishes categories of knowledge apart from an individual's mind, which theoretically can lead to two types of knowledge: categories of knowledge as social fact, which meant to be "objective knowledge" at least in the realm of one society, and an individual's knowledge, which nevertheless naturally strives to be close to the former.

Durkheim argued that knowledge is naturally produced and shaped by social entities. For example, Kantian a priori categories of space and time are not equally perceived by all human beings. There are vice-versa of these categories, and it depends on each separate society, how they are perceived by its members as the social fact (Durkheim, 1912: 14-17).

A result of collective aspirations, ideas, sentiments and symbols is the social world of its own, of which human mind should transcend (Shaub 1920). As Durkheim in his *Sociology of Religious life* stated, there are no wrong religions: all of them are in their basis true: each one with its own way reacts on particular conditions of human existence (Durkheim, 1912: 10). Religion was establishing the way of mind, which knowledge was developed on. He pointed that the basic categories of thinking are necessarily interlinked with the conditions of society's living, therefore they have social origin (ibid.: 16-17). He supposes that human nature is dual: individual, limited by reach of human body and social, which stands for intellectual and moral ideals. Durkheim calls agreement on logic categories in society as "logical conformism", in order to connect people better. As we can see, Durkheim operates with knowledge as a social fact, the superior reality to individual's mind, to which he is determined to refer. We can remember a similar point of Bertrand Russell, who stated in his *History of Western Philosophy* (1945), that Kantian a priori notion of space could come to the mind of an inhabitant of the Baltic plains; it would be unimaginable to a Swiss peasant to call space as absolute and boundless receptacle of given things.

Durkheim calls knowledge as a social fact the collective representation, and the most important of it is language – because other collective representations are in fact language statement as well. So language as a primal social fact has an important impact of what knowledge is; his point received its continuation in Berger and Luckmann's work.

## **1.2 Social constructivism of Berger and Luckmann**

One of the main works in the sociology of knowledge is the classical work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann "Social construction of the Reality" (1966). They aspired to expand on Schutz's interpretation of knowledge, which states that structuration of common knowledge is decisive for, apart of the other, social transfer of knowledge, its relativity and relevance for concrete social space of concrete group in concrete historical situation. Institutions are vital for the everyday life of

individuals, since they are routinizing (habitualizing) people's living and, from a point of view of children, precede the individual and constitute the objective reality. However, this reality only exists in human minds (so it is right to call it *intersubjective* reality), and their thoughts are crucial on what these institutions are.

That means that in a way of studying intersubjective reality of economic institutions, operations and processes, we study directly this reality in its natural way of existence. It's "a primary knowledge about the institutions on a pre-theoretical level... sum of "what everybody knows" about a social world" (ibid.: 68) Theoretical systems are providing institutions with legitimation indeed, but in a small and not so relevant part for most of society. The expert discourse and the common should be different, so theoretical legitimization of economics for the ordinary people may be rather problematic. Therefore the common economical knowledge is internalized as objective truth (ibid.: 69).

For my work, the process of legitimization of institutions (particularly economical) should be observed in Berger and Luckmann's theory. Legitimization explains institutional order by crediting objective meanings with cognitive value (ibid.: 94). For them, four levels of gradual increasing complexity represent the process of legitimization:

- 1) Pre-theoretical level of transferring knowledge by language. It is taken-for-granted knowledge and traditional one, which goes with the most basic explanations of parents to their children.
- 2) Elementary forms of theoretical knowledge. It is implied, among other, in proverbs and constitute the setup of basic practical how-to-do ways.
- 3) Explicit theories, which legitimize certain institutional spheres with more differentiated set of knowledge. They constitute fields of specialist work, who make formalized descriptions and prescriptions.
- 4) Complex set of theories from different symbolical worlds, interconnected. On this level, all the institutions are linked in one generalizing scheme of meanings. Institutional order is represented here in the whole complexity. (ibid.: 95-96)

Symbolic worlds are meant by Berger and Luckmann as a matrix of all social objectivized and subjective real meanings. The symbolic world provides connection between particular situation of everyday life and the global set of values.(ibid.: 97)

Intersubjective symbolic world helps to connect everyday situations to social routine, on the opinion of Berger and Luckmann, to fight with the fear of loneliness.(ibid.: 102) They are aspiring on Arnold Gehlen's anthropology, who pointed that routinization of behavior (including routinization, provided by social institutions) is a way to escape constant anxiety of loneliness in an individual's life. Institutions are the way to escape chaos; it is a long story in social science and literature. As Hobbes

wrote, human beings made a social contract in order to achieve security; his point was supported by Freud in *Civilization and its Discontents*, who stated that reduced (or sublimated) human instincts take a crucial part in constituting a social order which asks for conformity and therefore compensates anxiety of indeterminacy (Bielik-Robson, 2012: 191).

The symbolical world is explaining everyday life, a knowledge of the past and the future. Therefore, “*all members of a society can perceive themselves as people, who belong to meaningful world*” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 103). This symbolic world, however is not necessarily stable. It clashes with the same chaos as a life of an individual. “The future is uncertain, and the end is always near” way of existence demands institutions to constantly legitimize themselves. The point of my work is to show the situation of conflict when people’s own basic knowledge is contradictory to legitimation discourse of the economic institutions. I am going to describe in this work how this is happening and what might be among the causes of it.

The important thing is that knowledge to individuals, explaining the reality, is necessary and moreover constantly flourishes from their everyday life. Human beings in all societies are exploring the world partially due to mere curiosity, but also in order to control things, and to fight fear of the unknown. For example, Spengler (1922) pointed to a way to deal with primal fear of the unknown in primordial societies – to give some unknown thing a name. With naming a thing, an individual obtained power upon it with capturing the “spirit” of a thing. So even about precisely unknown fields of knowledge people may have their own classifications and standpoints. As a result, people should have non-expert knowledge about the economical field, because it is still an important part of survival in a modern society, and not merely about the routine practices, but naturally explaining the whole field of economics as a particular symbolical field.

While Berger and Luckmann’s work remains a base for this paper, we need to observe further important theories of knowledge, which will be useful in presenting the important context of a problem and prosper to more precise operationalization of a research question. In the next part, I am going to present the theories considering practical knowledge of lifeworld, a further part will be dedicated to discourses and ideology, and a final theoretical part has expert knowledge as its subject.

### **1.3 Lifeworld knowledge and habitus**

Recent studies of practical knowledge insist that it implies two elements: practice reflected in people’s minds and practice residing in action, or cognitive and active (Guzman 2009). Practice is organized around shared practical understanding (Schatzki, 2001:2). Embodied practice, which depends on shared skills, is mediated mainly by material non-human (artifacts) and natural objects (Guzman 2009: 7). Also practical knowledge may be applied in new conditions using the previous experiences

and previously adapted more universal skills (Smith 1988: 2-3). Two authors observed in this section are Alfred Schütz and Pierre Bourdieu, who in my opinion represent these two separate approaches (cognitive and habitual respectively), have well developed theories to analyze the data and suit needs of the paper.

Schütz was the first thinker who distinguished this kind of knowledge in sociology by applying Husserl's phenomenology and American pragmatism to the social theory. According to him, a social actor is not interested in scientific kind of knowledge about his social world, but rather systemizes knowledge in reference to his actions. His knowledge is mainly concentrated on those things which are relevant to him. Schütz typified knowledge of different degrees: the explicit knowledge *of* the matter, the halo knowledge *about* surrounding the subject of knowledge, some areas of unclear knowledge where some beliefs and aspirations can be, and finally some of complete absence of knowledge (Schutz, 1944: 500). This reasoning has its continuation in ethnomethodology – Garfinkel states that scientific knowledge can be applied only as ineffective ideal in everyday life, and scientific (or expert) rationality is inadequate for daily routine (Garfinkel, 1967: 283). Therefore, common knowledge has the higher position in an individual's knowledge hierarchy.

Schütz shows well that individual knowledge is only partial and is mainly about how to perform his routine tasks without questioning the nature of things. An individual's thoughts are often inconsistent and embrace contradictory statements as holding multiple social roles at the same time, roles like father, member of a church, working person or market actor. Culture, tradition, and social institutions propose him ready-made recipes of how the things should be done in social world, and is normally unquestioned. This so-called *stock of knowledge* may significantly vary from culture to culture, which becomes obvious when an individual is transferred into conditions of one to another. (Schutz, 1944). Stock of knowledge is forming during person's biography and thus it is what makes an individual's personality unique among others (Cox, 1978).

The notion of *intersubjectivity* is important to Schütz's sociology, as well as for this work. The question of how the communication between people with different stocks of knowledge (or rather being in another biographical situation) is possible, is resolved by embracing the axiom of reciprocity of perspectives. This means that two communicative actors assume that things in an outer world appear to them similarly. The life world of people therefore is "*an intersubjective world in which people both create social reality and are constrained by the preexisting social and cultural structures created by their predecessors*" (Ritzer, 2011).

The trend which is quite prominent in nowadays sociology, is a shift from pure knowledge to practices, which also implies tacit and embodied knowledge-in-act. One of the main theorists, who provided the foundation of future "practice turn" in sociology is Pierre Bourdieu (Schatzki, 2001). In

contradiction to many social scientists, his works are well empirically grounded and his theoretical concepts flourish from “field studies” of Algerian and French society.

The triad of main concepts considering the knowledge/practice of individuals in Bourdieu’s theory are doxa, habitus and the field. Famous formula of Bourdieu contains notions of capital and practices as well ( $[(habitus) \times (capital)] + field = practices$ ) (Navarro, 2006); however since the main goal of my study is to describe the developing of intersubjective economic knowledge with which actors are entering and behaving in the economic field, not all of these notions will play an important part. Field from this theory is naturally a “game” space of economic capital. As an influential part of real practices is the concept of habitus, which I am going to pay particular attention.

*Habitus* comprises not only the initial circumstances of individual or objective world, but connects the structure of the social world and individual’s action, because it describes a set of practices. Habitus is a mediating notion that revokes the common sense duality between the individual and the social by capturing ‘*the internalisation of externality and the externalisation of internality*’ (in the famous expression of Bourdieu), that is, the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel, and act in determinate ways (Wacquant, 2005: 316).

Habitus allows us to analyze common patterns of economic how-to-do practical knowledge as a result of influence of the social group and a product of institutional settings. What is particularly interesting to us in that case is a “subjective reality” of economy and possible intersubjective influences that shape the perception of individuals. Parallel with Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Schütz’ stock of knowledge is also visible – we can distinguish them by unreflected character of habitus’ notion, while stock of knowledge could be possibly more explicit.

*“Bourdieu, for instance, conceives practices as selforganizing and - propagating manifolds of activity... And therewith habitus (practical understanding) becomes the ideal determining phenomenon, sufficiently psychological to avoid physical determinism, sufficiently nonpsychological to be embodied, and adequately supple to account for much if not all human activity. Practice theory’s embrace of embodied understanding is rooted in the realization that the body is the meeting points both of mind and activity and of individual activity and social manifold”* (Schatzki, 2001).

Social and mental structures are perceived by individuals in Bourdieu’s sociology as *doxa*. By the words of the author, it is “universe of undisputed, of negatively constituted through the construction of field of opinion, the class of which is taken for granted, naïve adherence to the world” (Bourdieu, 1977). It is the primary experience of social world, which is unreflected and undoubted. Doxa orders inseparably both the real world and a thought world, and this relation is considered as self-evident, it is a primary perception of the social world (Bourdieu, 1984:171).

Author insists that “universe of spoken” is regulated by authorities (because all that is said brings certain appeal on legitimacy to be recognized by others). The higher classes transform doxa into orthodoxy, which is not embodied but explicit, where “attributions, powers, capacities, privileges” became official and legitimate. Heterodoxy represents the case when members of one social class try to behave in norms of doxa of other class (ibid.:323).

## 1.4 Ideology and discourse

The leftist theory of knowledge dedicated itself mostly to reveal the political actors behind the taken-for-granted knowledge. Karl Mannheim, who coined the term “sociology of knowledge”, proclaims “totality of ideology”: everyone’s beliefs are a product of the context they were created in (Sagarin & Kelly, 1969). Social class, generation and location are vital for resulting knowledge. (Longhurst, 1989). The truth is irrelevant to Mannheim’s sociology, as well as in this work – vital is the mode of thinking and social foundation of thought. His theory was built on by Louis Althusser, who calls as ideology the terms people perceive their everyday conditions. The resulting knowledge appears undoubted and objective from an ideological point of view, but from an outside perspective it is evident that ideology shapes and distort things. (Althusser, 1970)

The idea of Althusser’s thesis - *“This means that we are all subjects of ideology, created by ideology, and fundamentally inside it – how we experience ourselves is an effect of ideology”* (Robinson, 2011) - looks similar to Foucault’s notion of power. It is not a coincidence, since Foucault was highly influenced by Althusser’s work. Works of Althusser and Foucault are representatives of so-called “Death of Man” in post-structuralism, as they tend to exclude free will from the subject and observe individual as mostly a result of outer forces.

Foucault replaces mere conditions of existence, which knowledge strives from, by power. “power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault 1979: 93) or *“a general matrix”* (ibid.: 94). Foucault constitutes “the omnipresence of power”, it “strives from everywhere” (ibid.: 93). Production of discourses, within which knowledge is categorized, is a result of power relations. Foucault proposes a relation of knowledge-power, which points at a continual reciprocal change of both (ibid.: 99). The discourse is where power and knowledge are connected together – however it is neither uniform nor stable (ibid.: 100). Discourses are multiple; there are not dominated or repressed ones, but the distribution which mirrors the power relationships. “Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.” (ibid.: 101). For Foucault, there are two elements which describe knowledge-power relationship in discourse: first is its tactical productivity (how it builds a power-

knowledge relationship) and its strategic integration (which force make the using of discourse necessary in a particular situation).

In his *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault deals with actual meaning of statements. According to him, it is a discourse which makes knowledge signifying, and syntax or semantics are basically irrelevant (Foucault, 1969: 108, 113–14, 118–19, 134). Certain statement can have a meaning only in frame of a certain discourse – in other case, it would be discursively meaningless and therefore useless in knowledge-power relationship. He sees statements as not merely speech acts but also discursive events. Statements make a function of constituting network of rules, and are organized in discursive formation – the dispersion of statements with unified rules, and determined by knowledge-power.

Production of discourse, therefore, in every society is “controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of producers whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (Foucault, 1981: 52). Further in this work Foucault explains that discourse is “*a violence which we do to things*” (ibid.: 67), or at least a certain practice which we do to them. Therefore speaking about “truth”, we are in conditions of one of the multiple discourses of truth which are regulating our knowledge (ibid.: 54). Crucial for all the discourses, however, is will to truth, upon which the legitimation of discourse is constituting – but at the stake in will to truth is a desire and power (ibid.: 56).

Bourdieu in some way agrees on this point with Foucault, but has accent on violent nature of dominant, or expert, discourse. Official position, which is “senseless” legitimate view on economic processes to Bourdieu represents a *symbolic violence*, when authorities are imposing the meanings of symbols. Following Mauss (1925), Bourdieu tries to capture the “social alchemy” of knowledge transmitted into symbolic power and resulting in violence, domination of official discourse (Bourdieu, 1977).

## **1.5 Expert knowledge theories**

Anthony Giddens became a famous sociologist mainly due to his theory of modernization. He attempts to make a polemics with poststructuralists on the point that modernity era still prevails, and even if we can spot something called postmodernity, it is quite different than what poststructuralists imagine (Giddens, 1990: 3). Main feature of modernity to Giddens is the separation of time and space, on the first hand from each other, on the second from the outside context. In a pre-modern cultures “when” was almost every time connected to “where” or identified with other additional circumstances. Invention and spread of mechanical clock “emptied” time and prospered to shaping a working day. Then came standardizing a clock time among with the calendar across regions and, finally, countries, therefore completely universalizing time and releasing from space embeddedness.

Same process was occurring with space. In pre-modern societies, space and the place were hardly distinguished. Modernity brings the “absent others” in social life, which are influencing everyday interaction without being directly present face-to-face. Giddens argue that standardization of space and time brought next distinctive features to modernity: process of disembedding, which allows social institutions extend their agency out of their local context; rationalization of organizations, and finally radical historicity, which apparently forced the nationalism and was used as “history to make history” (ibid.: 17-21, 50).

Particular interest for this work holds the Giddens’ concept of expert systems. Giddens argues, that the expert knowledge infiltrates the everyday life of each modern individual. “*Simply by sitting in my house, I am involved in an expert system, or a series of such systems, in which I place my reliance... I know very little about the codes of knowledge used by the architect and the builder in the design and construction of the home, but I nonetheless have "faith" in what they have done.*” (ibid.: 27-28). Without the expert systems of knowledge, modernity could hardly exist because lay knowledge is vague and insufficient to hold the order of things. Instead it is “trust” in these expert systems. Lay actors, argues Giddens, are confident in technical things surrounding them because it flows from their pragmatism, because everything works as it should. These “*expert systems*” are parts of disembedding process, because they replace social relations with a trust to abstraction. (ibid.: 28-29).

It appears that main thing why lay actors rely on expert knowledge is their natural rationality which to Giddens is a) the same, homogenous, “disembedded” rationality for all social classes and societies as the natural feature of modernity itself and b) their assurance (which flourish, among other, from their own experience) that the things are working as they should, which then results into modern “faith”. Regarding economic lay knowledge, Giddens stands on a position that superiority of expert knowledge affects the economic life of individuals, and therefore became inarguable reality: “*Concepts like "capital," "investment," "markets," "industry," .... could not, and did not, remain separated from the activities and events to which they related. They have become integral to what "modern economic life" actually is and inseparable from it. Modern economic activity would not be as it is were it not for the fact that all members of the population have mastered these concepts and an indefinite variety of others.*”

Giddens demonstrates the relation of lay practical knowledge and expert systems in the next passage: “*The lay individual cannot necessarily provide formal definitions of terms like "capital" or "investment," but everyone who, say, uses a savings account in a bank demonstrates an implicit and practical mastery of those notions. Concepts such as these, and the theories and empirical information linked to them, are not merely handy devices whereby agents are somehow more clearly able to understand their behaviour than they could do otherwise. They actively constitute what that*

*behaviour is and inform the reasons for which it is undertaken. There cannot be a clear insulation between literature available to economists and that which is either read or filters through in other ways to interested parties in the population: business leaders, government officials, and members of the public. The economic environment is constantly being altered in the light of these inputs, thus creating a situation of continual mutual involvement between economic discourse and the activities to which it refers.*” To sum up, expert systems provide a field where individual action takes place; and what economists perceive as an explicit knowledge (orthodoxic) and what actors recognize as a result of their tacit practices (doxic) are, naturally, the same thing.

Regarding knowledge of an individual, Giddens differentiates three types of it. Among mentioned practical knowledge, which is tacit and not expressed, unless somehow challenged, and discursive knowledge, which is reflected type of it and provides explanations and rationalizations, possibly in discussion, there is third type – mutual. Mutual knowledge, connects two previous types and provides a sense for a social life, because all the members of community mutually share it. (Giddens 1984: 374-376, Giddens 1987 :65).

Sociologist Ulrich Beck in some way confronts Giddens’ studies of modernity. During the “*reflexive modernization*”, scientific or expert knowledge holds particular importance because the possible environmental hazards “induce systematic and often irreversible harm, generally remain invisible, are based on causal interpretations, and thus initially only exist in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them.” (Beck, 1992: 22–3). According to Beck, modern institutions are ‘self-refuting’ because they are not capable with dealing the hazards they created by themselves (Beck 1992). The trust in expert knowledge should be at least questioned, however for the lay public it is rather difficult task: “The immediacy of personally and socially experienced misery contrasts today with the intangibility of threats from civilization, which only come to consciousness in scientized thought, and cannot be directly related to primary experience. These are the hazards that employ the language of chemical formulas, biological contexts and medical diagnostic concepts.” (Beck, 1992: 52). On the contrary of the expert discourse, there is emotional discourse constituted of ‘voices, faces, ears and tears’ of those who suffered from unexpected consequences of expert of elite minority actions. (Beck, 1992: 61).

What is important for this paper are not environmental issues, but the nature of the expert knowledge. Beck arises the problem that expert knowledge is not perfect and not necessarily is inerrable. Giddens takes trust in the expert systems as an axiom, because people using them and they are grounded in everyday practice. Nevertheless, hazardous externalities may put this idealistic vision of the expertise into doubt.

Following Beck, Scott Lash argues that it will be a mistake to look on the lay public in the “reflexive modernity” as purely free of tradition and culture. Instead, both of them influence “reflexivity of community” and way of evaluating expert knowledge and agency. (Lash, 1994: 202). In terms of Giddens’ sociology, democratic institutes of “reflexive modernism” and public sphere are open to discuss the problems, so the expert systems preserve their legitimacy and validate their knowledge one more time. However authors considering the risks which modern society faces and dealing with them (Giddens, 1990, 1991; Bauman, 1991; Beck 1992) are giving the main role in social transformations to experts, whereas their openness to lay public criticism remains questioned.

Expert systems in Giddens’ understanding were criticized also by Brian Wynne (1987, 1992, 1998). First of all, according to him, science knowledge is not pure from cultural and social conditions, from which it strives. Important here is that cultural/hermeneutical dimensions of science, which are overlooked by Giddens, Beck and Lash, may have a legitimate response in a cultural/hermeneutical lay criticism. Elements of tradition, commitment to authority and ‘mechanical solidarity’ are natural to scientific culture, as it has been observed by Kuhn (1962) and Polanyi (1958). Therefore, the concept of expertise shouldn’t be so certain.

Mutual and undoubted trust in expert systems also remains questioned. The contestation of expert knowledge is hardly done in the terms of rational choice in a lay public, as Giddens supposed. Wynne points that “trust” in Giddens’ system is an example of a widespread confusion between unreflexive trust, and reflexive dependency and private ambivalence (“Lack of overt public dissent or opposition towards expert systems is taken too easily for public trust” (Wynne 1998)). In nuclear industry, for example, even before start of environmentalism movement, public was actively challenging the offered expertise as authority, expressed mistrust and opposition (Welsh, 1993, 1995; McKechnie and Welsh, 1994). So Wynne doesn’t accept either Beck’s point, that mistrust in expert systems starts with occurring problems – it is there from the beginning. People are aware of their dependency, and lack of agency – and awareness of this asymmetry results in anxiety, sense of risk and interest in evidences supporting or refuting their unavoidable trust to experts (Michael, 1992; Wynne, 1992, 1994, 1998; Irwin and Wynne, 1995).

Wynne sums up his point in next passage: “*Lay relationships with expertise are thus routinely (if informally) more sceptical, more ambivalent and more alienated from expert institutions than is recognized in Giddens's schema. It also follows from this that he is mistaken to treat the reflexive processes (of deliberately judged and allocated trust) as brought about only by expert contestation, which then generates critical distance on the part of the lay public. It seems that there has always been more reflexive public ambivalence than this. Therefore the basis of the supposedly categorical historical transformation from simple to reflexive modernity is thrown into question.*”

As it is seen in Wynne's criticism, expert system are grounded in a same cultural and material conditions with the lay public, therefore neither side is purely in the field of rational choice. Public anticipates not some certain group of experts, when preferring to trust to one group over another (as Giddens supposes) or as a result of sudden crisis (as Beck argues). Public and expert relations are from the beginning asymmetric, unbalanced and from some point in opposition against each other.

## **2. Research design**

### **2.1 Conceptualization and operationalization of research question**

From observation the broadness of theory and variety of approaches by different sociology schools, it can be resumed that economical intersubjective knowledge is influenced by numerous social factors. In the conceptualization and formulation of the research question I made an attempt to synergize the studies across various fields of sociology.

Main question of my thesis is: How intersubjective economic knowledge may be constructed in Czechia and Ukraine?

In order to operationalize the question, it was divided on four parts:

1. How is expert economic discourse (3<sup>rd</sup> level of legitimation) perceived by participants?
2. How do habits and doxa as unreflected patterns of reasoning from one side, and shared experience of economic practice on the other (2<sup>nd</sup> level of legitimation) influence intersubjective knowledge of economy of participants?
3. Is expert economic discourse (3<sup>rd</sup> level of legitimation) in statements of respondents challenged by other expert discourses (4<sup>th</sup> level of legitimation)?
4. How differences between discourses and doxa may result in different intersubjective knowledge between two distinct nation-states, Ukraine and Czechia?

### **2.2 Field of work**

To understand the differences between two distinct fields of research, Ukraine and Czechia, in this section a brief economic history of two states after fall of Soviet Union is presented, with regard to differences and similarities in their post-transformational period.

#### **2.2.1 Story of Czech economic success**

Before the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, Czechoslovakia was one of the most industrialized European countries (Myant 2007), had traditions of rule of law and democratic institutions. However after the year of 1948 and joining the „socialist camp“ economic structure of country became rather ineffective, enterprises were energetically demanding and oriented mainly on export of military production (to Soviet Union). After the Velvet Revolution, the main proclaimed goal was reformatting the economy in a liberal way. Main author of the reforms of 90's was minister of finances Václav Klaus. His program of radical liberalization or so-called “shock therapy” was leaned on an invisible hand of the market and minimization of state involvement into economics. During the 90's the privatization was

done in major part, during the “coupon privatization” the big part of citizens became the stakeholders of what previously were state companies. Whereas before the Velvet Revolution private ownership weren't constituting any significant part, in the end of year 1993 already 50% of HDP was a private sector. (Pehe, 2010).

Czech transformation, although is considered smooth and well performed in comparison to another post-socialist counties (Frait, 2000; Myant, 2007), haven't avoid controversies. From a good side, in Czech Republic, on contrary to other post-communist countries didn't occurred a rapid inflation and there weren't radical changes in the value of national currency. Also effective government's policy helped to dealt with a problem of unemployment and soften the course of small recession of years 1996-1999. These performance of Czech economy was supported with liberal rhetoric of Klaus, but maintained with some non-liberal strategies. Developing of effective law system were overrun by progressing economic reforms, and this policy enabled para-legal economic activities grow (Hoff & Stiglitz 2002: 39), as well as enabled informal economy to emerge. Investment funds were supported by continuous flow of bank donations, but often served for enrichment of their owners at the expense of contributors. This scheme was labeled as “tunneling” (Altshuler 2001) and thus privatization was perceived by people as unfair process, connected with illegal activities (Wallace et Latcheva 2006: 98). Inconsistent state policy of providing “unclean” credits by state banks and factual hampering liberalization by Klaus after 1994, despite of his liberal rhetoric (Macháček, 1999) received a name of “bank socialism”. Despite the deserved critics, transformation of Czech Republic is widely evaluated as succesful (Pehe, 2010).

From recent controversies in Czech economy can be mentioned a cause of National Bank policy, which “frozen” the price of Czech currency in the year of 2013, which weaken the Czech Crown. It evoked different opinions among the economists as well as in the population, among which only 12% supported National Bank's intervention (Ďurd'ovič, 2014). This policy was ended in a 2017 and since the date, Czech Crown is growing in stable trend.

### **2.2.2 Ukraine's ongoing economical transformation**

After the fall of USSR in the year of 1991, Ukraine became an independent country. Like highly industrialized state with big surface and 50-million population, huge tradition of agriculture and plenty of mineral resources, Ukrainian economy had a potential to become one of the strongest economies in Central and Eastern Europe. However except certain progress in the field of human rights and freedom among with creating the basic democratic institutions (Havrylyshyn 2016), majority of macroeconomical indicators point on deep economical failure in comparison to other post-socialistic states of Central and Eastern Europe. (Hartwell 2014). Academicians point on reasons of this low economic performance as late privatization (Elborgh-Woytek & Lewis, 2002), slow tempo

of economic reforms and their non-radical, compromise character (Aslund & De Menil, 2000; Polese, 2009; Grigoryev, Buryak, Golyashev 2014; Havrylyshyn, 2016). Absence of remarkable changes in the first years of independence let grow newly emerged class of so-called oligarchs, for which stand entrepreneurs with privileged contacts with state administration, and who thus changed their social capital on economic one. Symbiosis of state bureaucracy and entrepreneur elites is maintaining status-quo of state regulation of the market and prevents from further liberalization and increasing of competition (Havrylyshyn, 2016; Dabrowski, 2017).

From the closer point of view is obvious that changes in Ukrainian economy are connected with changes of Ukrainian sociopolitical situation. First president Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) more or less left extensive soviet economic system without any change, which resulted in economic collapse and hyperinflation. Next president Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) with a group of co-administrators (V. Pinzenyk, R. Schpek, V. Jushchenko and others) attempted to make liberalization market reform. Privatization and new nation currency (hryvna) in the year of 1996 stopped the fall of GDP (on 55% of value from year of 1990) and enabled economical growth. Nevertheless, in the pre-reform time newly emerged group of “oligarchs” successfully sabotaged finishing of the privatization of state enterprises, forcing the interests of newly emerged big entrepreneurs. Privatization influenced by these interest groups remained in the consciousness of Ukrainians as clientelistic and fraudulent process (Snelbecker, 1995). The weakness of government enabled creation of informal economy (Polese, 2009), and bureaucracy preferred the politics of “rule-of-telephone” instead of “rule-of-law” (Havrylyshyn, 2016). Despite the continuing economic growth, sociopolitical space wasn't attractive for foreign investments because of unfair conditions of concurrence. Two next governments of Victor Jushchenko (2004-2008) and Victor Janukovich (2008-2014) did not bring a remarkable economic reforms. More of that World Finance Crisis of the year of 2008 hit heavily Ukrainian economy, and hryvna devaluated on 38%.

Modern economical state of Ukraine is a consequence of the old problems as well as of the new ones. Revolution (so-called Euromaidan) of years of 2013-2014 was accompanied of nearly astronomical inflation, which just in two years of 2014-2015 doubled its indicator (minfin.com). In the year of 2015 GDP was 91,03 billions USD, which is approximately half for the year 2013 (183,31 billions USD). Russian annexation of Crimea and military operation against separatists on the east of Ukraine weaken the national economical production and resulted in outflow of foreign investments, and lost of state actives on the occupied territories also played its role in the crisis. It is worth to mention decrease in trade between Ukraine and Russia, which was before the main export partner of Ukrainian enterprises. Among the sustaining problems of Ukrainian economy there are plenty of ineffective and still state-owned companies, huge state expenditures (e.g. on the solidary pension system),

moratorium on trade with agricultural land and poor performance of state administration (Grigoryev et al., 2014; Havrylyshyn, 2016).

## 2.3 Dataset

In this work will be used some data from the previous study, which author participated - „Šetrnost a hospodárnost v časech krize: ekonomické chování v rodinném a veřejném diskurzu v dnešní české společnosti“. Head of a project was Doc. Martin Hájek, PhD., and other research colleagues were Ing. Kristián Šrám and Bc. Ivan Cuker. One of the sets of data, gathered for this study, was gathered in process of game similar to “Memories” (each game was recorded according to the agreement with all players). Respondents were playing in groups, mostly in families. Participants were supposed to choose a pair of cards from two sets (cards were turned on their rub side so no one could see the meaning, two sets were differentiated by color). First one was presenting some important economic terms, including the institutions or financial operations. Second one contained the possible definition of this term. Respondents were choosing cards in order to make a correct pair. Then they supposed to persuade others that their notion-definition pair is correct and thus receiving a point in the game.

During every game was present moderator (sometimes his functions had one of players). Moderator was supposed to ensure fair game and that players will provide the researchers with realistic information. Moderator also was supposed to take the final decision over some controversial pair of cards, when players couldn't agree on its validity.

This quasiexperimental method was chosen due to show the possible contradictions in definitions of seemingly clear terms (at least to economists) and to show the process of reasoning over the notions from economic field among the ordinary people. In the process of game occurred some conversations over either basic and contradictory definitions, and for the analysis would be not less important the situations where discussions weren't present at all, which must be “*ça va sans dire*” case, or the examples of some humor, irony, which points on possible double meaning.

Notions are presenting economic actors, institutions, financial operations and certain situations. Definitions were chosen as negative, neutral or positive interpretations and match the broad set of notions. Translation of the set of notion and definitions is following:

Notion	Definition	Notion	Definition
<b>Bank</b>	<i>a noose around neck</i>	<b>Inflation</b>	<i>object of trade</i>
<b>Bankrupt</b>	<i>a plague</i>	<b>Investition</b>	<i>parasite</i>
<b>Being a debtor</b>	<i>a scourge</i>	<b>Investment fund</b>	<i>price increase</i>
<b>Being a financial consultant</b>	<i>almost everything depends on it</i>	<b>Loan</b>	<i>quick money</i>
<b>Being a millionaire</b>	<i>being in poor situation</i>	<b>Market</b>	<i>result of bad decisions</i>
<b>Being a renter</b>	<i>being sure in future</i>	<b>Money</b>	<i>risk, which won't necessarily payoff</i>

<b>Bond</b>	<i>decides about fates of people</i>	<b>Mortgage</b>	<i>saving money</i>
<b>Central Bank</b>	<i>dependency on others</i>	<b>Payment card</b>	<i>shortage of money</i>
<b>Charity contribution</b>	<i>giving money away</i>	<b>Percent</b>	<i>stable income</i>
<b>Contributory pension</b>	<i>good invention</i>	<b>Renting your apartment</b>	<i>stable profit</i>
<b>Credit</b>	<i>hard mathematics</i>	<b>Social benefits or support</b>	<i>takes (almost) everything</i>
<b>Crisis</b>	<i>increase of savings</i>	<b>Speculation</b>	<i>to be independent</i>
<b>Debt</b>	<i>living at the expense of others</i>	<b>State</b>	<i>unfair institution</i>
<b>Execution</b>	<i>living with worries</i>	<b>Stock</b>	<i>way to prosperity</i>
<b>Frugality</b>	<i>lose of certainty</i>	<b>Stock market</b>	<i>way to certain future</i>
<b>Gift</b>	<i>manifestation of responsibility</i>	<b>Taxes</b>	<i>well spent money</i>

There was no sure pairs of definitions and notions for the researchers. Respondents were supposed to make sense in it by themselves. From the beginning of the game, the choice was more or less random; further, respondents with memorizing the position of cards were able to make connections that are more precise.

Respondents were chosen using the snowball sampling (Goodman, 1961), as most of them were people which researchers knew personally or indirectly. Criteria to be a participant of the study were maturity (above 18) and experience in dealing with financial issues. It is not a representative sample, however it will be enough to fulfill a research goal which is to show the examples, not the ultimate method, of how intersubjective economic knowledge may be constructed in Czechia and Ukraine.

We used respondents of both genders, all over the age categories, different in education and profession. Research was conducted in both Czechia (7 games, 22 participants) and Ukraine (5 games, 16 participants). Respondents were mainly representatives of middle class, Czech data were gathered in city of Prague and the suburban area; Ukrainian – in Kiev with the exception of one game realized in village in Western Ukraine. Author of this paper has ability to understand Ukrainian, Russian and Czech, so translation was unproblematic. Games were played mostly in family circle sometimes including some friends (from 2 to 5 participants), players from different generations were present at the same game. All the data were transcribed and analyzed using RQDA – R-based Qualitative Data Analysis package, which is a free of charge program of open source. In the section of analysis, players will be identified by gender, age and actual profession in format age-education-profession M stands for moderator, who is not participant of the game. Different games would be differentiated by date and initials of author ('mk' initials stands for games with Ukrainian respondents, 'ic' and 'ks' – for games with Czech respondents) in format author-year-month-day.

## 2.4 Methodology

The methodology used to analyze the data is based on Grounded Theory which describes the procedure of inductive process of reasoning during the analysis (Glasser & Strauss, 1967). As the result of its implication, four main categories of intersubjective knowledge among people were differentiated, which was a result of gathering the corresponding codes, used to have insight of the data. Thus, analysis section is divided on four parts. First two parts present the two types of rationalizations actors are using in reasoning. Economical rationalization is developed in terms of loses and profits, and in extreme cases is connected with necessity of survival as a living being. Societal rationalization emphasizes non-egoistic behavior, and in this dimension it is rational for actor not to be an object of social blame, fulfilling the functions of a “good” member of society, as helping the family, friends or those in noose. I would call these two rational modes of reasoning as the tactical modes, since they in an ideal case present possible outcomes from some situation in a rational way. Actor’s suggested actions strives from the logic of the situation and cannot be guided by a solid strategy; situation under noose or crisis is different from situation of prosperity, and therefore requires different solutions. Although both of these rationalities rely on more general rational laws and referring to the broader notions of economical or societal responsibility, I consider them as acquired not from symbols but reflected and shared with symbols: as the way of individual’s perception of lived reality and interactions with it in first order as a living and a social being (social here refers to animal sociality as well).

Other two modes or patterns of reasoning are connected with habits and discourses, therefore influenced by external conditions. Doxa, or unreflected cultural patterns, shapes the perception of reality in a particular way. It is common how-it-is-doing knowledge, particular to some certain society, set of beliefs or “myths” presented in intersubjective knowledge, which people take for granted. The last dimension are discourses, expert and lay ones, of economic and other fields of human knowledge. They are explicit and may be manifested as an authority, used in conversation, or be in contradiction with the common knowledge or with themselves. I would label these two patterns as the strategic modes, because they present long lasting predispositions to action, acquired first of all in individual’s life in some particular culture, shaped and given by cultural practices and symbols. These two modes are not so variable in behavior according to some concrete situation. Instead, they propose a universal program of action, through either social habits or ideological discourses. In an ideal case strategic patterns propose less variable solutions to each situations, but usually give “right” decision in a many situations despite the circumstances: adherent of vegetarian ecological discourse avoids meet food even when there are no specialized shops of vegetarian food (for example during a travel to a developing countries). If he will allow himself to eat meat, he ‘betrays’ the vegetarian discourse as his predisposition of behavior, although that would be more rational behavior in a

situation. I consider habits and various discourses as acquired in individual's life as a cultural being and his perception of social reality through shared practices and symbols.

Methodology based on data is not aiming directly to observe the information about the economic notions, which people have saved in their stock of knowledge. Moreover, I consider this kind of research impossible to conduct. On contrary, the framework of the research supposes that people won't just reveal explicitly their economic knowledge – instead they were put in the situation of the game, where more or less random choice of pair of notions forced them to create their own meanings and explanations, which they maybe never considered or thought about before. In conditions of the game, players might defend some non-intuitive linkages between economic notions with a smart perspective in order to win, or express doubts about apparently natural pairs of notions, taken by other player, as a game strategy.

Resulting manifested knowledge was thus changed and shaped by other players, and therefore was not given but constructed as an ongoing activity in terms of pragmatism. Two theories will be relevant here to frame the data: pragmatism of John Dewey and activity theory influenced by Soviet psychology school. Mastering of knowledge as an ongoing activity is occurring in response to a situation: *[human activity] is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation*" (Dewey, 1922 [1988]: 31). Habits which people use in response to the situation are understood as predispositions to act: *"the essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response"* (Dewey, 1922 [1988]: 32). This approach holds its popularity in sociological theory and used to analyze to a broad range of knowledge-related phenomena such as scientific practice (Perdomo, 2014), knowledge translation (Nowell, 2015), education (Stuckart 2018), intercultural communication (Jia, 2005). Dataset also resonates well with so-called activity theory, which has roots in Soviet psychological school and often named as Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (Foot, 2001). It presents symbols as tools, which *"condense human sociocultural-historical knowledge, the higher mental functions are infused with the culture, institutional and historical contexts used to generate mental tools"* (Wang, 2013). Process of reasoning is therefore shaped by socio-historical development (Hjørland, 2004). Two theories of knowledge-activity mentioned above characterizes well how knowledge was presented in dataset: created, redacted and legitimized during the process of speech as an ongoing activity; intersubjective symbols are used as tools to proclaim itself.

In a reality of a game situation arguments of player should be recognized as legitimate by other players or moderator in case of disagreement. Only in case of own legitimate discursive performance the player would be given a point. Conceptualization of Berger and Luckmann's theory is helpful in that point. Doxic knowledge and habits are on the second level of legitimacy, and various discourses are higher: specialized expert economic discourse is on a third level while other expert discourses as

political, environmental are on a fourth level of legitimation, representing a symbolic world in all of its richness. Two kinds of rationalizations are more difficult to conceptualize in terms of Berger and Luckmann's theory of legitimation. They may hardly be considered as the first level of legitimation since rationality is usually more sophisticated than pre-theoretical affirmations. Also Berger and Luckmann are building their theory of knowledge on language-mediated knowledge, and both modes of rationalization as tools of my analysis have both language and practical character. I need to make elaboration of my usage of notion of rationality at this point. According to Ritzer (2008), there are four features of rationality: efficiency, calculability, predictability and control. By labelling certain mode of reasoning, demonstrated by players as economic or societal 'rationality', I don't mean that players propose their assumptions pursuing the maximal efficient decision based on counting and quantifiable data. The reasoning even in mode of economic rationalization was not like that and especially in societal mode. Nevertheless, their economic rationality was depending on matter of losses and profits, considering the abstract situation rather in terms of logic and the ability of person to ensure its well-being and in extreme cases survival – 'rational' avoiding of harm. Societal rationality is not quantifiable at all; this mode labels people's struggle to survive as a members of society, to be egalitarian to some extent and thus ensure the continuous survival of the social group – from the members of their family to the population of the entire state. The harm in case of not following this kind of rationality would be possibly social blame and anticipation as society's protective mechanism. Therefore rationality in presented meaning is rather need to survive as economical and social being – which, in its turn, forces people to make rational decisions.

Although rationality wasn't included in a legitimation model, which was used to represent the results of a research, all the levels of legitimation contain seeds of both societal and economical rationalities in different extents. But as the analysis was structured, these two modes of reasoning grasp the necessary dimension of reason where discourses and shared habits/beliefs are absent and what in some case precedes them. In the analysis section there will be shown, how all modes of reasoning interact between themselves and creating knowledge as an ongoing activity, referring to shared intersubjective symbols and meanings.

### 3. Analysis

#### 3.1 Economical rationality

Economical rationalization was often present in the data. It is basic mode of thinking about economical issues.

m-40-pensioner: **Being a millionaire = manifestation of responsibility**, does everyone agree?

M: Why?

m-40-pensioner: One can philosophize, if you became a millionaire in one day, accidentally won a lottery, and spent it next day, this is not a manifestation of responsibility, we're assuming the situation in general. *(mk-2016-11-13)*

Manifestations of economical rationalization are generally perceived as the responsible behavior. Money are the resource a person should use with a cold mind, and even if someone received them as granted, they should be treated responsibly. This holds also for more risky financial operations, which are supposed to be approached wisely:

f-40-manager: Well you should approach it responsibly before buying stocks. I agree with this set of cards. You are risking by your money, hey. You bear the responsibility to take the risks!  
*(mk-2016-11-13-2)*

Responsibilization in economical sense to Giesler and Veresiu (2014) was connected with personalization – understanding that person is responsible for own welfare (and often of his family) despite the general economic situation, and even use the unpleasant circumstances as the possibility to profit. If the person goes bankrupt, it is perceived as a personal failure, a result of objective circumstances:

f-29-photographer: **Bancruptcy = unfair institution?** I don't think so. Bankruptcy is still a fault of individual. *(mk-2016-11-22)*

However responsibilization in this personalized sense was sometimes refused with implying that the person may be a victim of some outer uncontrolled forces. Therefore, being economically rational will not always guarantee the success; the actor should consider other unpredictable situations (e.g. political) and in case of failure, has a right to blame them instead of himself:

m-31-unemployed: Why should I suffer because there a coup in a country have been made and dollar [price] raised. Therefore it is not fair. Those morons were making money, turning everything upside down, and I go bankrupt because of it. *(mk-2016-11-22)*

Sometimes defining what is economically rational behavior was problematic to respondents, for example in the case of frugality. Seemingly obvious responsible as not falling to money overspent in words of some respondents may become a rather harmful habit:

m-31 -unemployed: **Frugality = being sure in future.** Agree.

f-29-photographer: But I think that frugality is leads our mind to being just as we are!

m-40-pensioner: No, frugality is poverty! (...) This is how grandmums and grandpaps lost money on bonds. They were economizing and made a certain future for themselves.

m-31-unemployed: But this is not correct way to treat money! They should put those money in a circulation, buy property, cars, something else. (*mk-2016-11-22*)

This is a great example in which ways economical knowledge may be manifested and legitimized among lay actors. In terms of sociological theory, participant-photographer points that frugality is an economical habit of lower class and continues itself in other economical agenda, habitual to lower class. Next player appeals on the experience of other person, which suits as an ironic “bad example” of overeconomising. Frugality may be a challenge by itself but it does not necessarily lead to economical prosperity, and should be made for some purpose, like some familiar person who bought a car due to rationalizing his spending. Then 31-year old participant appeal to the neoliberal expert discourse and points to a fallacy of keeping savings ‘under the pillow’ – and according to this discourse, truly rational behavior are investments to some property, which cannot be such easy victim of inflation in a result of sudden economical crisis. This is a rather rare example when economic rationality supported by expert mode of reasoning overcomes the doxic one in a creation of knowledge by lay participants.

### **3.2 Societal rationality**

Societal rationalization was often in struggle with economical one, especially in Ukraine, where social bonds and conformism are significantly stronger than in more individualistic Czech Republic (Hetmanchuk et al., 2012). This kind of responsibilization was connected with commitment to the family, and performing economical operations with regards to its effect on a society as a whole.

m-40-pensioner: Well part of the family, head of family, makes money, he spends it on a family?

f-42-unemployed: he works and earns money for his own needs. He applies for job for what reason – in first case to secure himself. (*mk-2016-11-13*)

We can see the example of balance of two rationalizations. The ‘head of a family’ in a traditional sense should not behave radically individualistic, but has social obligations on him such as a prosperity of the family, which is a very strong social duty. Which is also a part of his individual

interest, but as we can see it is not lying merely in economic dimension but also social. However family is not the only social entity which actor should respect in order to be societally rational (responsible). Social blame to the respondents was a legal tool to prevent others from socially irresponsible individualistic behavior, which in shown cases might be harmful for other people.

f-40-manager: If I can't manage to sell the goods, which I bought, I will have nothing to eat!

m-63-carpenter: Not at all! You bought it cheap so sell cheap. And there won't be any inflation. (*mk-2016-11-13-2*)

This argue of two participants is a good example of how economical rational behavior may confront the societal one in regard to a society. Participant-manager sees no problem in speculation as increasing individual profit, and as usually presents it in a responsible manner. When the older participant points on a harmful consequences for the whole society, and challenging therefore the liberalism's principle of equaling individualism to common good. This emphasis on economic solidarity is particularly strong due to recent crisis in Ukraine and a huge inflation in the aftermath – we can conclude that in hard times the societal responsibility between lay actors becomes very important, while considering only individual profit even in local level may lead to dangerous and destructive consequences on general economic level, which in the end affects everybody. This is an example of manifestation of egalitarian values, which may be possibly more strong in post-USSR societies due to developing a collective mentality under the communist rule (Hetmanchuk et al., 2012).

Institutions are also objects of social blame. Data shows cases of anticipation of a wide range of economic institutions, which are seen as too commercial and unfair. In particular, participants had distrust to banks. The main objection was that they seem not fulfilling societal needs and does not care for ordinary people:

m-55-teacher: **Unfair institution = Bank.** Yes! Those are unfair institutions, because they never tell you everything. They tell you that you should buy one of their products, but they never think about your well-being, whatever they say, they are thinking about themselves and are pretending that they are thinking about you.

f-49-psychologist: On the other hand, you don't have to give them that money, you can keep it home in a drawer.

m-55-teacher: Yes, well, we are not talking about that, are we? We are talking about how they, the professionals, understand something but don't tell you, they lie to your face; that's an unfair institution. They have to know that you can't understand everything, you have your own work that you have to understand. I never lie to anyone at work. (*ic-2016-11-05*)

The pure economic rationality just cannot be evaluated neutrally in a post-communist societies. In the following example participant, who was engaging in the game as competent in economic issues and capable to treat economic terms as emotionally neutral, express strong anticipation of the politic of Ukrainian Central Bank. Its politic was rational and prevent the whole economy of collapse. But respondent takes other side of reasoning, and points on suffering of ordinary people which lost their jobs. Appeal on concrete economic actor makes this statement stronger:

m-53-pensioner: The head of Central Bank Hontareva did such things in bank sphere – that bank sphere is falling into pieces, so many people lost their jobs! Head of Central Bank by taking wrong decisions dooms people to unemployment, to lost of financial stability so they can't find a job anymore. (*mk-2016-11-14*)

As a societally irresponsible behavior both in Czech Republic and Ukraine was marked receiving state benefits, when person doesn't really need them. Charity contributions is truly societally responsible behavior for Czechia, and meets no objection from the other levels of discourse legitimation:

M: **Charity contribution = manifestation of responsibility.** Well I would assume, that it can match.

m-55-teacher: Yep, I would recognize it.

M: That you are feeling responsible for that charity.

m-55-teacher: Or rather for the society. (*ic-2016-11-05*)

In Ukraine, though, charity is apparently not a societally responsible behavior. It can be assumed that the reasons are crisis and war, but in a dataset there's a lack of evidence of it. Participants shown a distrust to this institution and pointed on cases of fraud connected to charity, as well as pointing on abusive tactics of charity agents, which ask money on the street or in public transport. It shows a difference in societal responsabilization in two societies: while in Czechia charity is socially praised, in post-crisis Ukraine more societally rational behavior is to help your family, those who you know personally who are in need, or helping to resolve the problems to which everybody are detached to like war in the Eastern Ukraine. Impersonal good, propagated by NGO's and expert discourses in some manifestations is regarded as 'not good at all':

m-40-pensioner: Now everybody are being persuaded to economize. If you are not, like my relatives in Canada, they are being socially blamed. That they waste energetic resource. And they say to them: fuck you. We want to live like that and we will. That's the story. (*mk-2016-11-21*)

This passage shows the interesting clash of two modes of societal rationality. The Ukrainian immigrants in Canada meet social blame for not being ecologically responsible. They just don't appreciate the Western ecological discourse as legit to guide their behavior. Even at the expense of their own cost, being economically irrational, immigrants behave really individualistic in order to

achieve sort of comfort. For them, genuine societally ethical behavior is to help the ones they know, make an impact to some particular case; so the expert discourse of ecology is not relevant enough to change their habitual (irrational) pattern of taking decisions.

### 3.3 Habitual and cultural impact

Briefly observed in the previous sections, the cultural patterns conceptualized by Bourdieu as doxa, or taken for granted perception of reality, influence strongly the economic knowledge. It was connected to particular economic notions, which were not reflected by participants but perceived as natural order of things. More among those were present negative perceptions of such notions as debt, inflation or credit. Further there are presented the most obvious manifestations, which can be conceptualized as doxic knowledge:

m-20-student: **Debt = live with worries.** Those things mutually define themselves because when you are indebted, you live with worries.

m-46-IT: Yeah, yeah, it goes without saying

f-50-dispatcher: Clearly, when you have debts, those are really horrible worries. (*ic-2016-11-09*)

...

f-29-photographer: **Inflation = lose of certainty.** (One hundred percents!) (*mk-2016-11-21*)

...

f-21-student: I know this [investment fund] just simply like something negative, but don't know any details. (*ic-2016-11-01*)

Doxic knowledge “goes without saying”, it doesn't evoke any objections because it appears as the natural order of things. In the latter example, doxic knowledge may be characterized as not precise mode of thinking about some rather negative matter. The negative perception of funds might be connected with intersubjective critical perception of the transformation processes in 90's. Investment funds during mentioned period were connected with money-laundering and unfair enrichment, as it was explained in the section with economical history of Czech Republic. That was obviously presented in the media, in a common discourse and therefore shaped the individual way of reasoning, becoming deep, unreflected pattern. In the following example, we can see the case of attempt to criticize the doxic knowledge using the neutral economic expert discourse. This attempt failed and weren't recognized as legitimate by other players:

m-36-IT: Here, **inflation = a scourge.**

m-63-carpenter: Yeah this is possible.

f-40-manager: But it is useful, when you have inflation...

f-37-housewife: But this *is* a scourge! (*mk-2016-11-13-2*)

Doxic knowledge is hard to contest with an expert discourse. Lay individuals feel the discomfort and refuse to be reasonable on something so negative which affected the whole society. For an expert economic discourse, inflation instead should lose the emotional connotations, to present inflation as the pure instrument of regulation, therefore turning doxa into orthodoxy. But it is not easy to throw out the reality of life and think in abstract terms for the ordinary members of post-crisis society. This axiomatic mindset therefore overweight the economic rationalization as well as discourses in the lay economic knowledge.

Other manifestation of doxa, particularly in Ukraine, was connected to the state, which is mutually suppose to support people and be responsible for their well-being. As modern Ukrainian government rather fails in this task, there was developed kind of ideal image of successful, prosperous state, where everybody are happy. In all the cases comparison with ideal and reality is not in a favor of the modern state of affairs. This paternalistic stereotype of thinking (Hetmanchuk et al., 2012) strives from the communist past, where state was in charge of everything. It is present among all the groups of players, even those with high income. Often the modern Ukrainian state was an object of irony, which shows that government's underperformance is recognized in the society and became an intersubjective stereotype. I would like to present the interesting example of 'heterodoxy', when person express the duty to be responsible for own life:

f-27-housewife: **Crisis = dependency on others.** In our country it is like when one doesn't have money and expects money transfers from other states. But if taken personally, I am not agree, because during the crisis you need to rely only on yourself. (*mk-2016-11-20*)

And later appeals on responsibility of a state for its citizens, and the situation when it is not the case is presented as abnormal.

f-27-housewife: maybe it means that state ensures support to everybody who doesn't work, young mothers, and this is a responsibility of state of doing this. But it's like that not in every country. For example, in India when person goes into retirement, nobody will pay you pension if you didn't save part of your capital during your life.

f-52-barber: You didn't work anywhere and you don't receive pension?

m-55-installer: There is some minimum.

f-27-housewife: But over there is not like this. So I think, it matches. State should have some responsibility for people. (*mk-2016-11-20*)

As the rhetoric argument, participants could also appeal not on doxa, but on the economic history explicitly, which is also a strong valid argument. In the following case, player explains intersubjective negative perception of bond appealing on USSR's bond politics:

m-53-pensioner: **Bond = a noose around neck.** Actually yes. During Soviet times people were stimulated to buy bond of state loan. And people instead of salaries were forced to buy these papers and to survive without money somehow, because they couldn't pay for even products. (*mk-2016-11-14*)

More concrete experience of practices can be shared on microsocial level, from individual to individual. Sometimes lay participants were appealing on own or someone else's experience, which served as an argument to support common stereotypes. I will provide you with two contradictory examples from a same game:

f-29-photographer: Hold on. Example of my friends, they took money from the bank on their business. They didn't failed, so far thank god their business is developing. If you take money and go bankrupt... well it's 50/50.

f-42-unemployed: Let's take another situation. What about godmother? They took money for business under the deposit of apartment, it didn't worked, the apartment has been taken so it's not a certain future at all. (*mk-2016-11-21*)

Avoiding of risk-taking, which is a part of habitus rooted in socio-cultural conditions (Crawshaw 2004, Zinn 2017) was a barrier in that case to link "bank" with "being sure in future". When thinking over two opposite examples, players chose the "bankruptcy" as more probable outcome of lending out of bank. It shows well how shared experience supports habitus and possible agenda of economic actors. Because of doxa, which associate free market as a place of risks and uncertainty, negative example serves stronger as the argument than the positive one. Losing an apartment also is manifested as negative, presupposing societal rationality, since economic actor apparently holds responsibility for the whole family.

### **3.4 Discourses**

Participants did not perceive the economical notions, presented of cards merely in economical discourse, which was rather anticipated in the examples above. They were able to master the multiple meanings of notions, use their knowledge from other fields, explaining notions like "crisis", "object of trade", "execution" or "investment" as matters of personal life, politic situation or just broad notions with rather vague meaning.

An expert discourse is widely present and associated with economical rationalization. It occurred more often in Czech data, and this discourse obtained neoliberal character in some speeches. It is connected

with some kind of ‘neoliberal dream’ of achieving prosperity and careless life after engaging on a free market. In this particular case, economic success as it is presented in neoliberal discourse was legitimized in terms also of societal rationality and responsibility:

m-28-plumber: When I those money won’t waste in vain, but would start for example invest them, when I will have more of those money, more then I needed. After those money start to earn new money and person is later getting to this interesting circulation, when while he won’t get mad from those money, he will ensure such a future, that he shouldn’t even bother to make money, but those money will be making further profits without any involvement. And this private time, which he at the beginning invested to this he can invest to other activities or for example to his close people. (*ks-2016-11-23*)

The pure economical understanding of notions was not often the case. People had tendency to understand economy in a connection to a political situation and/or were making sense of it through a prism of their personal life stories. In the more broad generalization, they appeal on historical narratives of Ukraine as a country with comparison to the past:

f-27-housewife: **Market = a noose around neck.** No, when capitalist market started, I think it is better than in USSR. It all was shared between individuals, but no one could fing something for himself. So I think that market is good, when it substituted the common moneybox. (*mk-2016-11-20*)

Or remembering the ‘good old days’ under the previous communist regime:

f-74-pensioner: In a socialistic state it could be named a certain future, but this what we have now... (*mk-2016-11-13*)

As we can notice, the both sentences of younger and older participant are appraisal. They, of course, are responding to rather emotive definitions written on cards – but since there is no any objection, it seems that it is normal mode of thinking over these notions. What is symptomatic, that evaluation of economy seems in that case for them important in context of political standpoints, bringing additional discursive field in their statements.

Some of notions, like inflation, were often not taken abstractly but were directly linked to the group of people who may be responsible for some negative phenomena considering doxic intersubjective stereotypes in the present days in Ukraine. This links the political discourse to societal responsibilities:

f-52-hairdresser: **Inflation = giving money away.**

f-27-housewife: It is when upper politicians making the situation in a country, evoking the inflation and making money on it. (*mk-2016-11-20*)

...

m-25-manager: **Crisis = unfair institution.** Crisis can be unfair while it has been done artificially. In that case those cards can match. (*mk-2016-11-14*)

Lay discourse is targeted on uncovering the ideology behind the economical processes. There are often present some particular actors, or processes behind concrete economic situations. In those cases, as it is supported by theory (Wynne, 1992, 1994, 1996) lay discourse is opposed to expert economy. And of course, the emotions are present there, as economic processes intervene real life of people and using them for their own sake. In a next excerpt, participant criticizing the capitalist system as harassing people, using the rhetoric of consumer society criticism:

m-27-student: But this market setting is constantly evoking a feeling, that you need something in order to functionate. People should have some needs. And there should be the demand, so there could be an offer or the whole system is collapsing. So this market creating a feeling of need and this feeling is as a result a scourge. (*ic-2016-11-15*)

Different discourses though can also be misleading in understanding economical discourse and be a reason of some kind of economical ignorance. Lack of economical knowledge person can replace with ideology, explaining the doxic anticipation of debt with lags in world finance system:

m-40-pensioner: Percent – is a financial percent? Therefore, a noose around neck. Because when percent for loan was invented, it became a noose around neck of economy through the centuries, which brings the financial system to collapse. (*mk-2016-11-21*)

This is a criticism common to left wing politics, the fact that respondent is supporter of leftist ideology is obvious from a next excerpt of the same participant:

m-40-pensioner: During the Soviet Union it was undoubted and ideal model! (*mk-2016-11-21*)

Therefore, at least on the level of manifestations, to some people political ideology will be more important than economic expert discourse. Player believes that economic model of Soviet Union is ‘undoubted and ideal’, despite it didn’t make it into 21<sup>st</sup> century. It might be considered as a result of fallacy in judgments and overemphasizing the particular ideological mindset. A person might be able to uncover hidden actors behind the spreading of capitalism to developing countries (e.g. Soros (*mk-2016-11-21*)), but doesn’t reflect how his own knowledge is affected and shaped by external discourses.

## Conclusion and discussion

During the process of the game, knowledge wasn't present itself as solid, precise body of information which individual has. The game reality demanded players to manifest their stock of knowledge ad hoc, to create new knowledge in response to some more or less random pair of notion and definition. Knowledge became practical knowledge in response to situation of the game. Actors were supposed not only to demonstrate their knowledge in speech as a pure information, but to apply it in situation of a game, support it with arguments such as referring to personal experience or common stereotypes, and possibly change their speech in order to obtain legitimacy among other players. Sociologist cannot observe internal knowledge as it is 'stocked' into a mind of individual – instead she can observe ability of actors to create their knowledge, using information they have as a resource in creating knowledge as ongoing activity.

Analysis was divided by four general modes of reasoning, which are parts of individuals 'stock of knowledge', as they were used by participants as tools to legitimate their created knowledge: economical rationality, societal rationality, habits and discourses. The resulted manifestation metapattern was presented itself to find a right balance between those modes. In the end of each section, dedicated to those modes, I tried to provide a reader on the end of each section with example of how overemphasizing of one of those modes can be regarded as a 'failure' in reasoning process, when one of aspects is imbalanced in regard to others. There were examples of overemphasizing economical rationality in criticism of agenda of economical institutions; societal rationality was criticized as anticipation of those who live on a state benefits or just refused to accept environmental responsibility; habit of economizing was perceived as irrational behavior; and economic discourse as detached from life reality, while overemphasized political discourse could be a barrier to be reasonable. We can conclude that research question "How intersubjective economic knowledge may be constructed in Czechia and Ukraine?" was answered by proposed model of four different modes of reasoning (economical rationality, societal rationality, habits and discourses), used by participants of the game separately or altogether as a mutually reinforced ways to legitimate their created knowledge or as a sources to doubt other's speech from different positions. Further in this section we will discuss the general relationship between those modes.

Doxic knowledge was perhaps the most stable and undoubted intersubjective pattern of reasoning in the speeches. The reason is because it is taken-for-granted and is difficult to challenge as we saw in examples. As part of practical shared knowledge, some participants appealed on their mostly negative experience with some economic matters such as mortgage, which gave the conversational in emotional-evaluative character, typical for lay discourse manifestations, exploiting now by populist politics. Expert economic discourse was a common mode of playing, especially in Czech Republic,

however it was challenged by personal standpoints on economic notions, more often in post-crisis Ukraine. It didn't avoid a critics from the left, as well as people were able to define concrete actors which are responsible for implying the economic politics in real world, which prospered in the first case to their own interest. Mixing the four modes of reasoning was particularly visible in a kind of heterodoxy, which occurred as contradictory statements of participant from Ukraine 27-vs-housewife (*mk-2016-11-20*), who firstly emphasizes the individualism and then the necessity of state benefits.

Some modes were mutually reinforcing, particularly across tactical and strategical modes of reasoning. Economic rationalization was supported by neoliberal discourse with opposing habitus of lower classes. Societal rationalization for Czech respondents was naturally interconnected with the charity discourse and providing help to the poor people or people in a bad situation, for Ukrainians it matched with the state's responsibility to provide a social security for all the population and being in charge of economic situation in the country. Particularly societal responsabilisation's understanding among people, although situational, may be influenced by strategical discourses and differ from one society to another.

Interesting dimension of research constituted observed differences between two nation-states. The most stunning difference was in difference of doxic knowledge, which was visible in two aspects. First is connected with a paternalist stereotype of 'caring state' in Ukraine, where constant critics of government "invaded" the economical game. Ukrainian state was perceived critically, ironically, as too particular example of state for abstract economic game – and on contrary of it was a stereotype of an ideal state, where are the economic prosperity and well-functioning state institutes. In search for this state, some of respondents turned to European states, some – to previous communist regime. Other aspect were differences in societal rationality. To Czech participants, charity contributions were undoubtedly socially prosperous, while in Ukraine charity itself was perceived more controversially, especially with referring to real functioning of charity institutions.

Theoretical importance of this research implies by showing the modes of reasoning, which people use to legitimize their knowledge. This work also shows the process of creating economic knowledge as ongoing activity, which contributes to practice and activity theories in sociology. For sociology it is particularly important due to observed topic of lay economic knowledge, which wasn't explored much by sociologists before, and some works dedicated to that field tend to treat lay economic knowledge as subjective and biased (Tverdova, 2011). This paper observes the process how economic knowledge among lay individuals may be constructed, which is its main theoretical contribution.

Possible ways of further researches might be various. From a side of cultural studies, to the sociological theory might be prosperous to study deeper occurring cultural differences between two

countries, particularly the topic of different societal responsibility. Observed mixed patterns of reasoning in speech practice can be implied in other studies in a field of practice/activity theory.

## Summary

Diploma thesis present analysis of intersubjective economic knowledge in Czechia and Ukraine. Observed data were received in process of card game, where participants were supposed to match economic notions and definitions, and support their choice by arguments. Due to limitations of sample and qualitative form of research, conducting similar research may bring different results. Four modes of reasoning, used by participants, were economic and societal rationality, habitual and doxic knowledge and various discourses (mostly economical and political). On the beginning of study, following research questions was stated, in terms of Berger and Luckmann's constructivist theory of knowledge: How intersubjective economic knowledge may be constructed in Czechia and Ukraine? It was answered according to provided operationalization:

1. Expert economic discourse (3<sup>rd</sup> level of legitimation) was perceived as natural mode of reasoning over the economic notions.
2. Habits and doxa as unreflected patterns of reasoning from one side, and shared experience of economic practice on the other (2<sup>nd</sup> level of legitimation) significantly influenced the process of reasoning of participants, and this mode of reasoning was in most cases preferred to neutral expert reasoning, because of involving emotional and taken-for-granted aspects of intersubjective knowledge.
3. Expert economic discourse (3<sup>rd</sup> level of legitimation) in statements of respondents was doubted from a positions of other expert discourses (4<sup>th</sup> level of legitimation), such as criticism of consumer society of capitalism. Political discourse played a significant role in some of manifestations.
4. Differences between discourses and doxa were visible, which resulted in different intersubjective knowledge between two distinct nation-states, Ukraine and Czechia. Prevalence of taking into account political situation in a post-crisis society, stereotype of 'caring state' in Ukraine and general more positive perception of charity, as well as bigger emphasis on expert discursive mode of reasoning in Czechia are the most notable differences.

Intersubjective knowledge in a dataset was manifested as created, redacted and legitimized during the process of speech as an ongoing activity; using intersubjective symbols as tools to proclaim itself. Distinguished patterns of individuals' stock of knowledge were used by participants as tools to legitimate their speech. Manifestations of knowledge were performed as ongoing activity of mixing patterns of economical rationality, societal rationality, habits and discourses. As patterns were

mutually supportive, manifestation was more legitimate to other players, while occurred contradictions between those patterns decreased the legitimacy of manifested knowledge.

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