

Abstract

This thesis deals with the use of the counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq in 2007 and 2014. In the first part the author defines key concepts like insurgency, legitimacy and COIN doctrine. The part dealing with COIN is extended by two modifications of the US army's field manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 from 2007 and 2014 which, in fact, applies COIN principles on the specific Iraqi environment. Followed by two case studies, which describe the particular strategy in Iraq in 2007 and 2014. At the end of each case study empirical data are examined. For text continuity the first case study is extended by a chapter which describes interim between 2010 and 2014 and points out possible causes of the emergence of ISIS. The final chapter provides a comparison of the two examined case studies and the author tries to evaluate the success of each of them. Eventually the author provides recommendations which should prevent the re-emergence of groups like ISIS or AQI. Another outcome of this thesis is a prediction of possible development in Iraq.