

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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TOWARDS THE NEW WORLD ORDER?
A GEOPOLITICAL STUDY
OF
NEO-EURASIANISM AND MERIDIONALISM

Ph.D. Thesis



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DECLARATIONS

Littera foundationis Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis 7 Aprilis 1348

“. . . Sane ut tam salubris et laudabilis animi pareat concepcio fructus dignos, regni ipsius fastigia tripudialibus novitatis volentes primiciis augmentari, in nostra Pragensi metropolitana et amenissima civitate, quam terrene fertilitatis fecunditas et plenitudine rerum amenitas localis reddunt utiliter tanto negotio congruentem, instituendum, ordinandum et de novo creandum consulta utique deliberacione previa duximus studium generale, in quo siquidem studio doctores, magistri et scolares erunt in qualibet facultate, quibus bona magna promittimus et eis, quos dignos viderimus, regalia donaria conferemus, omnes et singulos doctores, magistros et scolares in profecione et qualibet facultate ac undecunque venerint, veniendo, morando et redeundo sub nostre maiestatis speciali protectione et salva gardia retinentes, firmam singulis fiduciam oblaturi, quod privilegia, immunitates et libertates omnes, quibus tam in Parisiensi, quam Bononiensi studiis doctores et scolares auctoritate regia uti et gaudere sunt soliti, omnibus et singulis illuc accedere volentibus liberaliter impertimur et faciemus ab omnibus et singulis inviolabiliter observari . . . ”

Karolus, Dei gracia Romanorum rex semper augustus et Boemie rex.

Ad perpetuam rei memoriam.

“Quite often, people act as if the universal values upon which our modern society was built over the centuries and upon which it still stands ... exist no more, and as if it were possible to relativize almost anything. Universities are here to remind them that it is not so – that such values still exist and are worth fighting for.”

Prague Declaration

**Published on the occasion of the 700th anniversary of the birth of King of Bohemia and Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV, founder of Charles University in Prague.
Prague, 13th May 2016**

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

NUNO MORGADO

Date

ABSTRACT

To answer the research question *Are Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism somehow related to a New World Order?* from the geopolitical studies' angle, was the center of gravity of this thesis. In that context, the main goal was to analyze and compare Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism, characterizing them as ideologies. In the same line, it was also explained how those ideologies aim to shape a New World Order. Therefore, Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism were characterized as strategic plans as well.

The theoretical approach included assumptions from the realist theoretical tradition of International Relations, but the priority was given to the geopolitical studies' approach *tout court*. The thesis is eminently a qualitative study, and the system of methods and techniques includes the phenomenological method, case study (comparative and single), process tracing and political personality profiling.

In respect to the structure, after having contextualized and explained both the geopolitical studies' framework and the neoclassical geopolitics' model in PART I, the study described and analyzed Neo-Eurasianist ideology and strategic plan in PART II. Whereas PART III was devoted to describe and to analyze Brazilian School of Geopolitics and Meridionalism as ideology and strategic plan, PART IV focused on the geopolitical analysis of Brazil, having measured the possibilities of success of Meridionalism and Neo-Eurasianism, namely in Latin America. PART V ended the study by assessing the power dynamics in the current world order, analyzing the debate between Dugin and Carvalho and testing some of its arguments.

Some of the major findings of this thesis include: (i) confirmation that both Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism are both an ideology and strategic plan; (ii) refusal of the idea that Neo-Eurasianism aims to create a multipolar world; (iii) confirmation that Meridionalism tends to be an instrument of Neo-Eurasianism; (iv) confirmation that Neo-Eurasianism is integrated in the modalities of action of the revolutionary movement, which is co-driven by the Russian intelligence community.

Concerning other results it should also be pointed out: (i) the effort for systematization of new and progressive theoretical framework for geopolitical studies; (ii) systematizing and reinforcing neoclassical realism as theory and as a complement to the neoclassical geopolitics' model; (iii) the creation of the new concepts: geoconjunctive (processes) and geomisguidance; (iv) verification of a correlation between *continentalization* as Brazilian School of Geopolitics' conception, and the South American integration maneuver; (v) identification of ideological and strategic connections between Meridionalism, Neo-Eurasianism and São Paulo Forum.

KEYWORDS

Territoriality, Geopolitical Studies or Neoclassical Geopolitics, Neo-Eurasianism, Meridionalism, New World Order, State, Foreign Policy

ABSTRAKT V ČEŠTINĚ

Odpověď na zkoumanou otázku: “Souvisí Neo-Eurasianism a Meridionalism nějak s Novým světovým řádem?” z pohledu geopolitické studie, byla těžištěm této práce. V této souvislosti bylo hlavním cílem analyzovat a porovnat Neo-Eurasianism a Meridionalism, přičemž je charakterizují jako ideologie. V téže linii bylo také vysvětleno, jak mají tyto ideologie za cíl formovat Nový světový řád (proto také byly klasifikovány jako strategické plány).

Teoretický přístup zahrnoval předpoklady z teoretické realistické tradice mezinárodních vztahů, ale byla dána přednost geopolitické studii tout court. Tato práce je plně kvalitativním výzkumem, systém metod a technik zahrnuje fenomenologickou metodu, případovou studii (srovnávací a jednotlivou), sledování procesů (process tracing) a profilování politické osobnosti.

Pokud jde o strukturu, tak v části i byly contextualizovány a vysvětleny rámce geopolitické studie a modelu neoklasické geopolitiky, kdežto v části ii byla popsána a analyzována Neo-Eurasistická ideologie a strategický plán. Část iii byla věnována popsání a analýze brazilské geopolitické školy a Meridionalismu jako ideologie a strategického plánu, část iv pak byla zaměřena na geopolitickou analýzu Brazílie, která posouzela možnosti úspěchu Meridionalismu a Neo-Eurasianismu, zejména v Latinské Americe. Část v dovršila studii posouzením síly dynamiky v současném světovém řádu, analyzujíc debatu mezi Duginem a Carvalho.

Některé z hlavních závěrů této práce zahrnují: (i) potvrzení, že Neo-Eurasianism je ideologií a strategickým plánem; (ii) potvrzení, že Meridionalism má tendenci být pouhým nástrojem Neo-Eurasianismu; (iii) potvrzení, že Neo-Eurasianism je integrován v modalities of actoin revolučního hnutí, koordinovaném ruskou zpravodajskou sítí.

Pokud jde o další výsledky, je třeba rovněž poukázat na: (i) snahu o systemizaci nového a progresivního teoretického základu pro geopolitické studie; (ii) systemizaci a posílení neoklasického realismu jako teorie a jako složky modelu geopolitické studie; (iii) vytvoření nových konceptů: *geoconjunctive* (procesy) a *geomisguidance*; (iv) ověření korelace mezi continentalizací, jako pojetím brazilské geopolitické školy, a integračním procesem v Latinské Americe; (v) identifikaci ideologického a strategického spojení Meridionalismu a Neo-Eurasianismu se São Paulo Forumem.

KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA

Teritorialita, Geopolitické Studie nebo neoklasická Geopolitika, Neo-Eurasianismus, Meridionalismus, Nový světový řád, stát, zahraniční politika

RESUMO EM PORTUGUÊS

O centro de gravidade desta tese doutoral materializou-se na tentativa de responder à questão: *estarão o Neo-Eurasianismo e o Meridionalismo de alguma forma relacionados com a Nova Ordem Mundial?* sob o ângulo estrito dos estudos geopolíticos. Nesse contexto, o principal objectivo foi analisar e comparar o Neo-Eurasianismo e o Meridionalismo, caracterizando-os como ideologias. Nessa linha, foi também explicado como essas ideologias tencionam moldar a Nova Ordem Mundial. Por conseguinte, foram classificadas também como planos estratégicos.

A abordagem teórica incluiu suposições da tradição teórica realista das Relações Internacionais, embora a prioridade tenha sido atribuída à abordagem dos estudos geopolíticos *tout court*. A tese é eminentemente um estudo qualitativo e o sistema de métodos e técnicas inclui o método fenomenológico, estudo de caso (comparativo e único), rastreamento dos procedimentos e perfil da personalidade política.

No que respeitou à estrutura, depois de ter contextualizado e explicado, quer o quadro mental dos estudos geopolíticos, quer o modelo da geopolítica neoclássica, na PARTE I, o estudo descreveu e analisou a ideologia e o plano estratégico do Neo-Eurasianismo na PARTE II. Enquanto a PARTE III foi dedicada à descrição e à análise da Escola Brasileira de Geopolítica e do Meridionalismo enquanto ideologia e plano estratégico, a PARTE IV aplicou a análise geopolítica ao Brasil, tendo medido as possibilidades de sucesso do Meridionalismo e do Neo-Eurasianismo, nomeadamente na América Latina. A PARTE V encerrou o estudo, tendo examinado com detalhe as dinâmicas de poder na ordem mundial dos nossos dias, através da análise do debate entre Dugin e Carvalho, testando alguns dos argumentos ali apresentados.

Entre as conclusões mais relevantes desta tese incluem-se: (i) a confirmação de que o Neo-Eurasianismo e o Meridionalismo são simultaneamente uma ideologia e um plano estratégico; (ii) a recusa da ideia de que o Neo-Eurasianismo está empenhado na construção de um mundo multipolar; (iii) a confirmação de que o Meridionalismo releva uma tendência para se tornar um instrumento do Neo-Eurasianismo; (iv) a confirmação de que o Neo-Eurasianismo se encontra integrado nas modalidades de acção do movimento revolucionário, este último co-dirigido pelos serviços de *intelligence* da Rússia.

Outros resultados devem, de igual modo, ser listados: (i) o esforço para a sistematização de um novo e progressivo quadro teórico para estudos geopolíticos; (ii) a sistematização e reforço da teoria do realismo neoclássico, enquanto complemento, no modelo dos estudos geopolíticos; (iii) a criação de novos conceitos: *geoconjunctive (processes)* [processos geoconjunctivos] e *geomisguidance* [geo-desorientação]; (iv) a verificação de correlação entre “continentalização” como concepção da Escola Brasileira de Geopolítica e a manobra de integração da América Latina; (v) a identificação de ligações ideológicas e estratégicas entre o Meridionalismo, o Neo-Eurasianismo e o Foro de São Paulo.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Territorialidade, Estudos Geopolíticos ou a Geopolítica Neoclássica, Neo-Eurasianismo, Meridionalismo, Nova Ordem Mundial, Estado, Política Externa

A. M. D. G.



*I dedicate this thesis to my mother, to my brother,
and to the memory of my father, who passed away in 2013;
and also to Hana Mouchová and her family,
who received me in their home
when I arrived to Prague.*

ama nesciri et pro nihilo reputari ¹

¹ Thomas von Kempen, *De imitatione Christi*, Chap. II, 3.

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INTRODUCTION

This theoretical and empirical study is located in the field of geopolitical studies. Essentially devoted to the academic community – as in the majority of times a scientific work is – the following research piece aims to analyze and to compare Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism, to characterize them as *ideologies*, and to explain their roles in the current state-of-things of the world affairs, *i.e.* to explain how these ideologies aim to shape a New World Order, hence, defining them as *strategic plans*.

In order to pursue that goal, the main research question can be formulated in these terms: ***are Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism somehow related to a New World Order?***

As it will be stated in the section of the literature review [cf. INTRODUCTION, State of the art], the majority of the studies about Neo-Eurasianism have been neglecting the subject of a possible causal relation between the Neo-Eurasianist project and the power dynamics on the international arena from the geopolitical studies' viewpoint. In fact, the preferences of the researchers have been mainly falling in historical roots or pure ideological concerns, often regarding internal politics. As for studies about Meridionalism, they are very few only, and none of them adopted the geopolitical approach.

After the irruption of the Ukrainian crisis in November 2013, several scholars and journalists started to pay more attention to Neo-Eurasianism, and its main proponent Aleksandr Dugin. Hence, they started to refer to problems that are comprised by the object of geopolitical studies. However, many of those approaches have often revealed conceptual confusions and even sarcasm that does not help in understanding

what is at stake. Therefore, the literature has remained pulverized, and lacked a systematic geopolitical approach.

Consequently, a logical-scientific analysis of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism as self-named “GEOPOLITICAL DOCTRINES”, and also of their academic and political connections still remains a necessity in the academia.

The author’s ‘curiosity, fascination and indignation’² about the current state of things related to Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism stimulated the problematization of the object, once it was verified that the rules pointed out by Eco were respected³.

In order to achieve logical solidity, this study intends to present a coherent text full of internal references. In addition, the most important technical concepts will have a particular reference in CAPITAL LETTERS, and they can be found duly defined at the final glossary [cf. APPENDIX 2] or in the body of text, for a better understanding of the whole study⁴.

Problem

An accurate formulation of the problem with the view of achieving a careful delimitation of the object of this study is required. This thesis aims to be a monograph and not a ‘panoramic’ work⁵. In these terms, a “problem” means a logical inconsistency that it is proposed to identify, to analyze and to explain.

Neo-Eurasianism claims that the “Western Civilization”⁶ – and the U.S.A. in the quality of its most powerful representative – is imposing a “unipolar world” and “global liberal hegemony” all over the globe. It does so through spreading values such as: “free

² Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles – Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 28.

³ Vide Umberto Eco, *Como se faz uma Tese em Ciências Humanas*, trans. Ana Falcão Bastos e Luís Leitão (Barcarena: Editorial Presença, 2007), 33.

⁴ The existence of a glossary in this study is considered as absolutely imperative. In fact, ‘... social phenomena are concept-dependent’ (Andrew Sayer, *Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 20), thus concepts need a precise definition in their use.

⁵ Umberto Eco, *Como se faz uma Tese em Ciências Humanas*, trans. Ana Falcão Bastos e Luís Leitão (Barcarena: Editorial Presença, 2007), 35.

⁶ For example: Aleksandr Dugin, ‘The Multipolar World and the Postmodern,’ last modified May 2014, *Journal of Eurasian Affairs*, <http://www.eurasianaffairs.net/the-multipolar-world-and-the-postmodern/> or Aleksandr Dugin, ‘The USA and the New World Order,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

market economy”, “political democracy” and “human rights ideology”⁷. Meridionalism agrees with this *analysis of the environment*.

However, through a preliminary empirical observation of international arena, identifying certain facts (*e.g.* mutations in the democratic systems, shift in moral standards, confusing models of education, the frame of radical ecological concerns), it seems that the world is far from being “unipolar” in Dugin’s terms⁸ and that the U.S.A. has not been imposing any “global liberal hegemony”. In fact, if there is a “hegemony” that is neither global nor liberal.

Besides, also contradicting the Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist claims, the U.S. (and Israeli) national sovereignty canons seem to have been, at least from some perspective⁹, the most important obstacles against the establishment of a “world hegemony”, a WORLD GOVERNMENT [cf. APPENDIX 2].

Consequently, logical inconsistencies between Neo-Eurasianist (and Meridionalist) descriptions of world politics and the current real global circumstances can be pointed out. The problem is identified and then requires analysis and explanation. Strictly focused on Neo-Eurasianism and on Meridionalism, the problem is to be analyzed from the angle of geopolitical studies exclusively.

Therefore, a panoramic thesis, such as «The New World Order in the Future», although a contemporary issue too, does not constitute an objective of this study. In the same way, problems concerned with Security Studies, or Political Theory *stricto sensu*, even if connected with the object, are not included in the primordial goal of this thesis.

Contextualization

As it was affirmed, the thesis is a monograph. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the context should be neglected¹⁰.

The end of the Cold War brought the U.S.A. to the position of World superpower. The communist bloc – as visible institutional structure – was formally dissolved in 1989-1991, *i.e.* at that period took place a changing process in the

⁷ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 101.

⁸ The definition of “unipolar world” by Dugin is different from the realist definition of “unipolar world” [cf. APPENDIX 2 and Section 4.2.3].

⁹ Namely: Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Nacionalismo americano – I,’ *Olavo de Carvalho’s website*, March 22, 2011, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/110322dc.html>

¹⁰ Umberto Eco, *Como se faz uma Tese em Ciências Humanas*, trans. Ana Falcão Bastos e Luís Leitão (Barcarena: Editorial Presença, 2007), 39.

international relations¹¹. Additionally, after 9/11, that dynamics of transition seemed to have suffered a velocity increase (*e.g.* financial crisis and Russian war against Georgia in 2008, instability in Ukraine since 2013, Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014).

This study is inserted in this environment of modification of powers' *status quo* at both the levels of (i) the international system (*e.g.* globalization, transnational issues) and (ii) states' foreign policy decision-making and outcomes (*e.g.* Brazil and Russia). In fact, the center of gravity of the study is the comparative analysis of two ideologies that target to alter the international *status quo*, through both changes on the international system and shaping foreign policy outcomes.

Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism demand for a radical change on the international chessboard, which structural core lines remain since the end of World War II (*e.g.* U.N. Security Council, end of hegemony of European countries, emergence of the Third World, growth of multinational institutions). These structural lines persist, despite the mentioned changes of the transitional period.

This thesis brings Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism to the academic debate, dealing with them through the innovative way of the neoclassical geopolitics' approach pointing out incoherences and, at the same time, covering gaps in the literature.

One of the fundamental purposes of the study is to link Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism to politics, revealing their real impact and their potential impact, in the context of NEW WORLD ORDER projects.

The research focuses on the period from 1991 (which corresponds to the collapse of USSR and the resurgence of Russian "geopolitics") until the present (2016). In spite of such time delimitation, the analysis requires historical elements (revisiting aspects until roughly the 15th century), in order to, for example, explain the roots of Neo-Eurasianism or to better understand Brazilian School of Geopolitics' roots.

State of the art

At this point, the next task consists of summarizing synthetically and critically the findings of the literature about Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism, through a homogeneous literature review in the line of King¹².

¹¹ 'We are in a period of profound change in international relations and foreign policy.' Charles Herman, 'Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,' *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 34, no 1 (Mar 1990): 3.

The bodies of documentation were skimmed in this order of importance: (1) articles in refereed, international journals; (2) books or chapters in edited books; (3) articles in refereed, national journals; (4) conference papers; (5) PhD thesis and Masters dissertations, plus scholarly papers; (6) websites; (7) articles in non-refereed journals.

The literature review will start with Neo-Eurasianism firstly.

Previous research about Neo-Eurasianism

As mentioned, this study agrees with the classification of Neo-Eurasianism as *ideology*. This classification, extensively covered by the literature (as it will be verified), leads to the conclusion that Neo-Eurasianism cannot be understood as a geopolitical study. In fact, and as the arguments in the Subchapter 1.2 will sustain, in the domain of neoclassical geopolitics, ideological submission is incompatible with the geopolitical approach. This issue will receive great attention [cf. Section 4.2.4.].

At this level, one of this thesis' most important assignments is to delimit and to define clearly the concepts (*e.g.* GEOPOLITICAL DOCTRINE, IDEOLOGY) [cf. APPENDIX 2].

On studies about (Neo-)Eurasianism, Laruelle, as well as Umland and Shekhovtsov, are perhaps the greatest authorities. They remain on the top of the list by the amount of scientific analysis about the matter, at least.

Laruelle has been underlining that Neo-Eurasianism is presented to the *élites* of former-USSR countries, Turks, and even to the Chinese *élites*, as a “geopolitical alternative” between East and West¹³. The methodology used by that author goes through philosophical, historical, sociological, cultural studies, but can hardly be included in the strict geopolitical scholarship. For example, in another of Laruelle's work¹⁴, once again, philosophical, historicist, cultural and linguistic (– concerning Trubetzkoj's contribution –) vectors can be easily identified. Although it is not aimed to affirm that the *geopolitical object* (geopolitical factors, *élites'* perceptions, etc.) is totally absent in this particular book¹⁵, the fact is that Laruelle has been focusing mainly

¹² Gary King, ‘Publication, Publication,’ *PSOnline*, (2006): 122-123.

¹³ Marlène Laruelle, ‘The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism’ *Nationalities Papers* vol. 32, no. 1 (March 2004).

Marlène Laruelle, ‘Le néo-urasisme russe: L'empire après l'empire?’ *Cahiers du monde russe* vol. 42, no. 1 (January 2007).

¹⁴ Marlène Laruelle, *L'Idéologie Eurasiste Russe - Ou Comment penser l'Empire* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1999).

¹⁵ In fact, by the end of that book, facts or ideas with geopolitical significance can be found in a more substantial manner (*e.g.* territorial issues, and Russian foreign policy purposes against the West); or even

on the 20s *classical* Eurasianism, its philosophical roots, and historic-political views concerning Russia¹⁶. Thus, Laruelle's work is not about applying the geopolitical studies' approach and its tools.

Nevertheless, Laruelle has not been focusing exclusively on historical discussions. She has been calling the attention to the fact that Neo-Eurasianism has been spreading in many spheres, and it has been welcomed in the post-soviet space particularly (*e.g.* Kazakhstan, or in the areas of Tatarstan). In this context, Laruelle devoted one entire section of one of her books to the topic 'geopolitical theories of Dugin'¹⁷. The connections between Islam and Neo-Eurasianism were also extensively covered in that book too [about this topic: cf. Subchapter 9.2.].

This said the work of Laruelle is essential in providing a basic set of ideas for a geopolitical study of Neo-Eurasianism, in spite that she does not belong to *neoclassical geopolitics* approach.

Bassin also focused on the philosophical pillars of Eurasianism¹⁸. However, he produced a core reading for the definition of concepts of Neo-Eurasianism (*e.g.* West, Eurasia) afterward¹⁹. Still, the framework of geopolitical analysis is inexistent in Bassin's approach too.

From a historical point of view, working with the "westernization" and "eurasianization" approaches on Russian politics, Ferrari made use of the terminology 'forest' and 'steppe,' which are keywords of Neo-Eurasianism²⁰. However, this book is far from an analysis of the Neo-Eurasianist phenomenon. It is rather a broad cultural study on "Russia" since even esoteric characteristics of the Russian sphere (*e.g.* Elena Blavatsky) are included there.

Using discourse analysis debating Foucauldian approach – yet, providing an excellent contextualization – Höllwerth analyzed the coherence of Dugin's

other papers that Laruelle was author or co-author of comprised some ties with the geopolitical analysis – *e.g.* Marlène Laruelle, and Sébastien Peyrouse, 'Recomposition géopolitique sur le vieux continent? L'Organisation de coopération de Shanghai,' *Revue internationale et stratégique* vol. 4, no. 72 (2008).

¹⁶ Marlène Laruelle, 'Les idéologies de la «troisième voie» dans les années 1920: le mouvement eurasiiste russe,' *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire* vol. 10, no. 70 (2001).

¹⁷ Marlène Laruelle, *La quête d'une identité impériale. Le néo-eurasisme dans la Russie contemporaine* (Paris: Petra, 2007)

¹⁸ Mark Bassin, 'Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space,' *Slavic Review* vol. 50, no. 1 (Spring 1991).

¹⁹ Mark Bassin, 'Eurasianism "Classical" and "Neo": The Lines of Continuity' in *Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context*, ed. Tetsuo Mochizuki (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2008).

²⁰ Aldo Ferrari, *La foresta e la steppa. Il mito del'eurasia nella cultura russa* (Milano: Mimesis, 2012).

Weltanschauung in detail²¹. Still, also here the methods are far from those used by a geopolitical study, although Höllwerth skimmed practically all geopolitical concepts used in the Neo-Eurasianist rhetoric (e.g. TELLUROCRACY, THALASSOCRACY, SPACE, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, Axis).

Despite the catch eye title, Simons' book emphasized less Neo-Eurasianism as ideology, than policy prescriptions and suggestions for U.S. foreign policy on the subject: "how to deal with Russia?"²².

Neo-Eurasianism as Ideology I

If it is not a geopolitical approach – as it claims to be – what is Neo-Eurasianism then? Shekhovtsov and Umland categorized Neo-Eurasianism as a '...vague ideology...' ²³. Explicitly, Umland *et al.*²⁴ included Neo-Eurasianism in the category of an ultra-nationalist [*sic*] movement, structured by right-wing extremist purposes, with a clear impact on Russian politics. Besides, they also discussed the increasing relevance of Dugin within the spheres of Russian *élites*. This matter will be taken back right below.

Umland, in one of his many conference papers on the topic, synthesized Dugin's main ideological influences²⁵. Umland's perspective that Neo-Eurasianism is a 'radical right-wing ideology' was then restated.

The academic debate between Umland and Gregor, whether Dugin is a fascist (Umland conclusion) or not a fascist (Gregor's claim), situates the problem in the same field: no matter the inclination, Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism remains an ideology indeed²⁶.

²¹ Alexander Höllwerth, *Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse zum postsowjetischen russischen Rechtsextremismus* (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2007).

²² Thomas Simons, Jr., *Eurasia's New Frontiers: Young States, Old Societies, Open Futures* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008).

²³ Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland, 'Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionalist? "Neo-Eurasianism" and Perennial Philosophy,' *Russian Review* Vol. 68, no. 4 (October 2009): 662.

²⁴ Andreas Umland, Roger D. Griffin, Michael Minkenberg, Michael Hagemeister, Robert L. Paarlberg, Robert C. Otto, 'Toward an Uncivil Society? Contextualizing the Recent Decline of Extremely Right-wing Parties in Russia' *Demokratizatsiya The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* Vol. 10, no. 3 (April 2002).

²⁵ Andreas Umland, 'Ideology or Strategy? The Role of "Neo-Eurasianism" in Aleksandr Dugin's Quest for Cultural Hegemony,' Conference: Panel XII.17 "Eurasianism Then and Now: A Comparison of Classical and Post-Soviet Eurasianism", VIII World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies, Stockholm, Sweden, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255971336_Ideology_or_Strategy_The_Role_of_Neo-Eurasianism_in_Aleksandr_Dugins_Quest_for_Cultural_Hegemony

²⁶ Andreas Umland and A. James Gregor, 'Dugin Not a Fascist? A Debate with A. James Gregor (6 texts),' *Erwägen-Wissen-Ethics* vol. 16, no. 4 (2005) http://www.academia.edu/174269/Dugin_Not_a_Fascist_A_Debate_with_A._James_Gregor_6_texts_

Finally, in his book Ivanov²⁷ conjectured about the mutations that Dugin makes concerning new forms of ‘fascism’ [*Neue Rechts*]. That conjecture will be connected to the revolutionary dialectic [cf. Subchapter 4.2. & Subchapter 9.2.]. Based on the idea of the international connections of Neo-Eurasianism, Ivanov also speculated about the possible consequences of Neo-Eurasianism in Russian politics.

Neo-Eurasianist and Dugin's influence on Politics

In addition to (a) the already mentioned “recurrent historical description” of roots of Eurasianism, and (b) the rise of Neo-Eurasianism during the 90s, the topic of the impact of Neo-Eurasianist ideas on politics constitutes a huge debate in the literature. There is already research that provided a detailed explanation of Dugin's direct influence (past and present) on certain politicians (G. Ziuganov, V. Zhirinovskiy and A. Rutskiy²⁸; Sokolov, Torshin, Aslakhanov²⁹)³⁰.

As an expert in this domain, Laruelle could not ignore the impact of Neo-Eurasianism on politics. Thus she also investigated about the engagement of Neo-Eurasianist leaders within the Russian political system³¹.

Dugin's biography concerning his career (growing influence and establishing himself into the Russian mainstream) constitutes an essential element to understanding the whole dimension of Neo-Eurasianism as well³².

²⁷ Vladimir Ivanov, *Alexander Dugin und die rechtsextremen Netzwerke. Fakten und Hypothesen zu den internationalen Verflechtungen der russischen Neuen Rechten* (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2007).

²⁸ Marlène Laruelle, ‘The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism’ *Nationalities Papers* vol. 32, no. 1 (March 2004).

²⁹ Andreas Umland, ‘The Strange Alliance between Ukrainian "Progressive Socialism" and Russian "Neo-Eurasianism",’ *History News Network* [George Mason University] April 17, 2006, <http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/23821>

³⁰ An extensive list of politicians may be found on: Andreas Umland, ‘Fascist Tendencies in Russia's Political Establishment: The Rise of the International Eurasian Movement,’ *Russian Analytical Digest* no. 60 (May 2009): 14-15.

³¹ Marlène Laruelle, ‘(Neo-)Eurasianists and Politics: "Penetration" of State Structures and Indifference to Public Opinion?’ *Russian Politics and Laws* vol. 47, no. 1 (2009): 90-101.

³² For example:

Andreas Umland, Roger D. Griffin, Michael Minkenberg, Michael Hagemeister, Robert L. Paarlberg, Robert C. Otto, ‘Toward an Uncivil Society? Contextualizing the Recent Decline of Extremely Right-wing Parties in Russia’ *Demokratizatsiya The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* Vol. 10, no. 3 (April 2002).

Andreas Umland, ‘Alexander Dugin, the Issue of Post-Soviet Fascism, and Russian Political Discourse Today,’ *Russian Analytical Digest*, no. 14 (February 2007).

Andreas Umland, ‘Aleksandr Dugin's transformation from a lunatic fringe figure into a mainstream political publicist, 1980–1998: A case study in the rise of late and post-Soviet Russian fascism,’ *Journal of Eurasian Studies* vol. 1, no. 2 (January 2010).

Anton Shekhovtsov, ‘Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe’, *Religion Compass*, vol. 3, no. 4 (2009).

In that vein, Umland has been reporting copiously and continuously about Dugin's life. However, Umland did not make use of the geopolitical approach yet. That means that Umland rarely contended, for example, about the major arguments of Neo-Eurasianism that use geopolitical concepts (e.g. Heartland, Pan-regions, Civilization). One of Umland's main aims indeed has been to identify Neo-Eurasianism as "[proto-]fascist" phenomenon³³.

Neo-Eurasianism as Ideology II

Regarding the ideological facet again, Shekhovtsov detected that there are many contradictions in Dugin's writings³⁴. It is not surprising to identify such aspect, once the conclusion that Dugin is a revolutionary proponent is validated. Dugin applies the hegelian synthesis of rectifiable contradictions, a characteristic of the 'dialectic-revolutionary' mentality, to use Carvalho's classification [cf. Section 9.2.3.].

In this way, it follows logically the premise that neither Neo-Eurasianism, nor Dugin as the Neo-Eurasianist main proponent, fit into any *traditionalist* or *conservative* category.

In addition to describing the rise of Dugin too, Heiser converged somehow his perspective with Sedgwick's, considering Neo-Eurasianism as traditionalist phenomenon³⁵. In these circumstances, it seems that Heiser ignored the fact that Sedgwick has already been criticized, mostly because of his main point that Neo-

Charles Clover, 'Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Re-emergence of Geopolitics,' *Foreign Affairs* vol. 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999).

John B. Dunlop, 'Aleksandr Dugin's 'Neo-Eurasian' Textbook and Dmitrii Trenin's Ambivalent Response,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* vol. 25, no. 1/2 (Spring 2001).

Markus Mathyl, 'The National- Bolshevik Party and Arctogaia. Two neo-fascist groupuscules in the post-soviet political space,' *Patterns of Prejudice* vol. 36, no.3 (2002).

Marlène Laruelle, 'The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism' *Nationalities Papers* vol. 32, no. 1 (March 2004).

Marlène Laruelle, 'Aleksandr Dugin. A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?' *Kennan Institute Occasional Papers* no. 294 (2006).

Marlène Laruelle, '(Neo-)Eurasianists and Politics: "Penetration" of State Structures and Indifference to Public Opinion?' *Russian Politics and Law* vol. 47, no. 1 (2009): 90-101.

Valerii Senderov, 'Neo-Eurasianism: Realities, Dangers, Prospects,' *Russian Politics and Law* vol. 47, no. 1 (January-February 2009).

Vladimir Ivanov, *Alexander Dugin und die rechtsextremen Netzwerke. Fakten und Hypothesen zu den internationalen Verflechtungen der russischen Neuen Rechten* (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2007).

³³ Andreas Umland, 'Pathological Tendencies in Russian "Neo-Eurasianism". The Significance of the Rise of Aleksandr Dugin for the Interpretation of Public Life in Contemporary Russia,' *Russian Politics and Law* vol.47, no. 1 (January-February 2009).

³⁴ Anton Shekhovtsov, 'The Palingenic Thrust of Russian Neo-Eurasianism: Ideas of Rebirth in Aleksandr Dugin's Worldview,' *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* vol. 9, no. 4 (2008).

³⁵ James D. Heiser, *'The American Empire Should Be Destroyed': Alexander Dugin and the Perils of Immanentized Eschatology* (Malone: Repristination Press, 2014).

Eurasianism could be seen as a traditionalist case³⁶. Also Shekhovtsov and Umland covered this aspect³⁷.

In the same way, Dugin's religious – or pseudo-religious views as Umland put it³⁸ – are logically incompatible with the patent revolutionary dialectic that gives life to Neo-Eurasianism. Within this context, mysticism serves Dugin's purposes well, but it should not muddy the analysis³⁹.

Also, apropos of the revolutionary dialectics and synthesis of contradictions, several authors (e.g. Laruelle, Umland⁴⁰) accurately considered that, although Dugin's ideas are anti-West, Dugin's reasoning is based on western authors from the beginning (roots, influences, inspiration) to the end (conclusions, results, prescriptions).

Above and beyond the systematization of ideas about *classical* Eurasianism (in which the literature is abundant as said) in a scholarly paper, Matern declared that Neo-Eurasianism '...may represent the beginning of a normalized conservative stand in Russia...' ⁴¹. This kind of statement conflicts directly with H₂ (partially) and H₄ (totally) formulated below. In fact, those hypotheses will sustain the idea that the revolutionary dialectic gives the substance of Neo-Eurasianism. This assumption is historically supported by a massively big list of contacts of both Neo-Eurasianist movement and Dugin personally with Russian revolutionary organizations, namely the Russian communist mainstream. Shlapentokh⁴² and Tchantouridze⁴³ contended about that reality. Moreover, Mathyl gave precise hints about this subject too, explaining how

³⁶ Mark Sedgwick, *Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

³⁷ Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland, 'Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionalist? "Neo-Eurasianism" and Perennial Philosophy,' *Russian Review* Vol. 68, no. 4 (October 2009): 673.

³⁸ Andreas Umland, 'Der "Neoeurasismus" des Aleksandr Dugin: Zur Rolle des integralen Traditionalismus und der Orthodoxie für die russische "Neue Rechte,"' in *Macht — Religion — Politik: Zur Renaissance religiöser Praktiken und Mentalitäten*, ed. Margarete Jäger and Jürgen Link (Münster, 2006), 144.

³⁹ Vide, for example: Mark Sedgwick, 'Alexander Dugin's Apocalyptic Traditionalism', Session A19-26: New Religious Movements Group, American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, November 18-21, 2006.

⁴⁰ Andreas Umland, 'The Strange Alliance between Ukrainian "Progressive Socialism" and Russian "Neo-Eurasianism",' *History News Network* [George Mason University] April 17, 2006, <http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/23821>

⁴¹ Frederick Matern, 'The Discourse of Civilization in the Works of Russia's New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev and Alexander Panarin,' YCISS Post-Communist Studies Programme (Research Paper Series no. 2, York University, February 2007): 31, <http://yciss.info.yorku.ca/files/2012/06/PCSPPaper002.pdf>

⁴² Dmitry Shlapentokh, 'Eurasianism: Past and Present,' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2 (June 1997).

⁴³ Lasha Tchantouridze, 'After Marxism-Leninism: Eurasianism and Geopolitics in Russia,' in *Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns*, ed. Lasha Tchantouridze (Winnipeg: Centre for Defense and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, 2004).

Russian far-right and far-left can join forces, within the same old common revolutionary dialectic, which must be highlighted to understanding the problem⁴⁴.

Accordingly, it does not make sense opposing Neo-Eurasianism to communist tendencies [cf. Subchapter 4.2. and Section 9.2.3.]. So, it seems that Umland might have missed the point when he superficially claimed that the ‘alliance’ between Ukrainian socialism and Neo-Eurasianism was strange⁴⁵. Again, the test of H₄ will validate that such alliance is full of sense.

Matern’s expression of Neo-Eurasianism as ‘«Putin’s Loyal Opposition»’⁴⁶ is then considered a precise description.

If Neo-Eurasianism is perceived as an ideology indeed, it cannot be considered a geopolitical approach

That idea should be accepted as a logical conclusion from the premises. As it will be formulated [cf. Subchapter 1.2.] ‘geopolitical studies’ (or neoclassical geopolitics’) framework does not admit any ideological compliance. In this context, the distinction between, *Classical*, *Critical* and *Neoclassical* geopolitics will be accomplished [cf. Subchapter 1.2].

In the initial part of his article, Clover mentioned ‘geopolitics’ with no major concern about distinctions or delimitations, something that can justify his sarcastic tone that geopolitics is some mystical knowledge that grants victory to states⁴⁷. It is true that Neo-Eurasianism includes this sort of statements. Hence, this is another evidence to support one of the main arguments put forward in this thesis, *i.e.* that Neo-Eurasianism *is not* a geopolitical study. The crucial point to be emphasized here is that to use geopolitical concepts for ideological purposes is completely opposed to using the scientific method for the purpose of producing an ethical and innovative geopolitical study [cf. fig. 1].

⁴⁴ Markus Mathyl, ‘The National- Bolshevik Party and Arctogaia. Two neo-fascist groupuscules in the post-soviet political space,’ *Patterns of Prejudice* vol. 36, no.3 (2002).

⁴⁵ Andreas Umland, ‘The Strange Alliance between Ukrainian "Progressive Socialism" and Russian "Neo-Eurasianism",’ *History News Network* [George Mason University] April 17, 2006, <http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/23821>

⁴⁶ Frederick Matern, ‘The Discourse of Civilization in the Works of Russia’s New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev and Alexander Panarin,’ YCISS Post-Communist Studies Programme (Research Paper Series no. 2, York University, February 2007): 31, <http://yciss.info.yorku.ca/files/2012/06/PCSPPaper002.pdf>

⁴⁷ Charles Clover, ‘Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Re-emergence of Geopolitics,’ *Foreign Affairs* vol. 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999): 9.

Dunlop mentioned that *Foundations of Geopolitics* is, perhaps, the most influential book for the Russian military and the foreign policy decision-makers since the collapse of the Soviet Union⁴⁸. Providing full details, Dunlop accomplished a good *résumé* of the ideological goals of Neo-Eurasianism about the re-organization of the post-soviet space⁴⁹. In this context, and insisting on the point, Neo-Eurasianism cannot be, therefore, considered a geopolitical approach because of the engagement to political (and strategic) objectives; rather than that Neo-Eurasianism can be classified as ‘...quasi-geopolitical theory [*sic*]...’⁵⁰.

In fact, once Neo-Eurasianism is considered a geopolitical study, then *critical geopolitics* is entirely right in its assumptions that geopolitics is nothing but an imperialistic discourse⁵¹.

Several analyses of Neo-Eurasianism that come near to the geopolitical studies’ approach

Several authors have tried to approach the Neo-Eurasianist ideology with ‘geopolitical studies’ approach.

In 1995, Kerr produced an interesting analysis about Russian foreign policy, putting light on the competition among westernizers and new Eurasianists in 90s Russia⁵².

More recently, Zapolskis accomplished an analysis that approached the geopolitical framework. Nevertheless, affirming, in 2007, that ‘Neo-Eurasian tendencies have become the major guideline of the Russian foreign policy’ seems to be an overstatement⁵³.

⁴⁸ Dunlop, John. ‘Aleksandr Dugin’s ‘Neo-Eurasian’ Textbook and Dmitrii Trenin’s Ambivalent Response.’ *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* vol. 25, no. 1/2 (Spring 2001): 91.

⁴⁹ Dunlop, John. ‘Aleksandr Dugin’s ‘Neo-Eurasian’ Textbook and Dmitrii Trenin’s Ambivalent Response.’ *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* vol. 25, no. 1/2 (Spring 2001).

⁵⁰ Anton Shekhovtsov, ‘Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe’, *Religion Compass*, vol. 3, no. 4 (2009): 697.

⁵¹ Alan Ingram, ‘Alexander Dugin: geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia,’ *Political Geography* vol. 20, no. 8 (2001).

⁵² Kerr, David, ‘The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia’s Foreign Policy,’ *Europe-Asia Studies* vol. 47, no. 6 (September 1995).

⁵³ Martynas Zapolskis, ‘Russian geopolitics: between Atlantism and Neo-Eurasianism’ last modified January, 2007, Geopolitika, <http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=36>

Although Carvalho does not belong to the geopolitical scholarship, he managed to dismantle the Neo-Eurasianist weaknesses as “geopolitical doctrine” in his debate with Dugin⁵⁴. That debate will be the object of detailed analysis [cf. Subchapter 9.2.].

Barbashin and Thoburn claimed that Dugin is nothing but Putin’s brain⁵⁵. If on the one hand, it is true that sometimes political outputs meet with pre-existent ideological goals that does not necessarily mean a mechanism of causality (also Zubrin contended about that⁵⁶). On the other hand, the influence of Neo-Eurasianism on Russian politics is duly supported by the quoted literature.

Schmidt (who resumed ideas about *classical* Eurasianism as well) disagreed with the latter point. He stressed that Putin would hardly implement Neo-Eurasianist policy prescriptions⁵⁷.

Although from a postmodernist approach, *i.e. critical* geopolitics, Sengupta elaborated a study about the impact of geopolitical ideas on foreign policy, focusing on various interpretations of Mackinder’s *Heartland* (one of the most important concepts to Dugin)⁵⁸.

In the line of what has been affirmed, the majority of the most recent studies about Neo-Eurasianism do not encompass the framework of geopolitical analysis. Some of those studies (*e.g.* Heiser⁵⁹) have avoided the geopolitical angle. That is not surprising, since geopolitical studies’ approach, regarding both theory and methodology, has been requiring a careful systematization [cf. Subchapter 1.2.].

Nevertheless, there have been a few exceptions. For example, Papava has been coming up with excellent papers from the geopolitical standpoint, emphasizing the idea

⁵⁴ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘The USA and the New World Order,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s blog*, August 2, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/index-english.html>

⁵⁵ Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, ‘Putin’s Brain. Alexander Dugin and the Philosophy Behind Putin’s Invasion of Crimea,’ last modified March, 2014, *Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putins-brain>

⁵⁶ Robert Zubrin, ‘The Eurasianist Threat. Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine,’ last modified March 2014, *National Review Online*, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372353/eurasianist-threat-robert-zubrin>

⁵⁷ Matthew Schmidt, ‘Is Putin Pursuing a Policy of Eurasianism?’ *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 2005).

⁵⁸ Anita Sengupta, *Heartlands of Eurasia: The Geopolitics of Political Space* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009).

⁵⁹ James D. Heiser, ‘*The American Empire Should Be Destroyed*’: *Alexander Dugin and the Perils of Immanentized Eschatology* (Malone: Repristination Press, 2014).

that, to Neo-Eurasianism, it is not possible to have ‘Russia’ separated from the idea of ‘empire’⁶⁰ [cf. Section 4.2.2. and Section 9.2.3.].

Previous research about Meridionalism

Concerning the literature review about Brazilian School of Geopolitics – as a root of Meridionalism – it can be argued that Tambs is possibly the most senior and most known non-Brazilian scholar on the topic of Brazilian School of Geopolitics⁶¹.

Tambs was followed chronologically by Kelly, who resumed five topics in Mattos’ work⁶²: (1) geopolitical factors: political planning, space, position, natural resources and technology, vitality and cohesion of population [psychosocial], and creativity of leadership; (2) the U.S.A is Brazil’s privileged ally; (3) Brazil’s security depends on the South Atlantic (Brazilian Northeast, Africa and Antarctica); (4) development of the Amazon river basin; (5) Brazil as potential great power.

Despite Kelly argued that this set of thoughts is original, the truth is that all those topics were already covered in either Travassos’, Couto e Silva’s or Castro’s books and papers. The exception is the idea of “Brazil as great power” – at least with the emphasis that Mattos put into that goal.

Kelly was, in the limits of this literature review, the Anglosphere’s scholar that produced the largest amount of works about Brazilian School of Geopolitics until now⁶³.

In the realm of the French language, Thual devoted the 5th part of one of his books to ‘*La puissance brésilienne*’⁶⁴. Some of his conclusions were: (i) the tension with Argentina was Brazil’s 19th-century main geopolitical problem; (ii) Chile has been

⁶⁰ Vladimer Papava, ‘The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of “Central Caucaso-Asia”’, *Russian Politics and Law* vol. 51, no. 6 (November–December 2013) (this one has an extensive bibliography on Dugin’s papers and works)

Vladimer Papava, ‘Central Caucaso-Asia: from Imperial to Democratic Geopolitics,’ *Bulletin of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences* vol. 4, no. 1, (2010).

⁶¹ Lewis Tambs, ‘Latin American geopolitics: a basic bibliography,’ *Revista Geográfica* no.73 (1970).

Lewis Tambs, ‘Fatores em America Latina,’ in *Antologia Geopolitica en Bolívia*, ed. Mariano B. Gumucio and Agustín S. Weise (Cochabamba: Ed. Los Amigos del Libro, 1978).

⁶² Philip Kelly, ‘*O Pensamento Geopolítico do General Meira Mattos*,’ in *O General Meira Mattos e a Escola Superior de Guerra*, ed. Escola Superior de Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 2007) 34-35.

⁶³ For example:

Philip Kelly, *Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: the geopolitics of South America* (Austin: Texas University Press, 1997).

Philip Kelly, ‘*Traditional Themes of Brazilian Geopolitics*,’ in: *Geopolitics of the Southern cone and Antarctica*, ed. Philip Kelly and Jack Child (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988).

⁶⁴ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996).

cultivating good relations with Brazil due to the existence of a common hostile power to both of them [Argentina]⁶⁵; (iii) currently Brazil may be considered stable with respect to the territory; (iv) Brazil's primary goal is to influence the region, *i.e.* to become regionally hegemon⁶⁶; (v) Brazil holds interests in Africa, not only in terms of culture, but also regarding raw materials; (vi) it predominates in Brazil a preoccupation with the South Atlantic and with Antarctica⁶⁷; (vii) nuclear revindications of Brazil will endure⁶⁸ (evidence that sustains Mearshmeier's approach [cf. Subchapter 2.1.]).

In addition to another of Thual's book devoted to South America as a whole⁶⁹, Thual (together with Chauprade) added new results or insisted in some ideas concerning his research about Brazilian geopolitical dynamics: (i) the geopolitical cycles in Brazil were: (1) to obstruct the creation of a coalition of Hispanic states against Brazil (lead by Argentina), and (2) to increase its territory (territorial growth of 940 000 sq km); (ii) Vargas was affiliated to an anti-American ideology, yet Brazil joined the U.S.A. as a pure geostrategic decision⁷⁰; (iii) after World War II it emerged a new geopolitical cycle, based on the alliance with the U.S.A. (nuclear, aeronautic, special, ballistic); (iv) Brazil approached Africa (culturally and economically) after the Portuguese territorial dismantlement in the 70s; (v) Brazil aims to guarantee the security on the South Atlantic, so relations with South Africa are very important⁷¹; (vi) from 1990 onwards, a new geopolitical cycle may be identified: (1) the end of antagonism with Argentina, and creation of MERCOSUL; (2) orientation towards the Pacific Ocean through MERCOSUL, completing the orientation towards the Atlantic Ocean (to the North: the U.S.A. and Europe; and to the South: South Africa); (3) special attention to Antarctica.

On the topic of studies about Meridionalism, the state of the art shows that the literature seems to be extremely scarce⁷². Perhaps the fact that all works of Meridionalism were written in the Portuguese language justifies such state of things. In

⁶⁵ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l'actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996), 111.

⁶⁶ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l'actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996), 112.

⁶⁷ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l'actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996), 114.

⁶⁸ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l'actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996), 115.

⁶⁹ François Thual, *La géopolitique de l'Amérique Latine* (Paris: Economica 1996).

⁷⁰ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 70.

⁷¹ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 71.

⁷² One of the few examples is: Edu Silvestre de Albuquerque, 'A teoria geopolítica meridionalista de André Martin,' *Revista de Geopolítica* vol. 5, no. 2 (December 2014).

fact, a couple of Ph.D. thesis about Meridionalism will soon be presented in Brazil, but again in the Portuguese language⁷³. In the limits of this research, that has been all that could be found.

Gaps in the literature that this thesis aims to fill

As it was demonstrated, Neo-Eurasianism has been mostly studied through philosophical, *Weltanschauung*, historical, and ideological perspectives. Consequently, it is certain that currently there is no lack of western studies about Neo-Eurasianism (as it happened in the past⁷⁴).

In this way, the main gap in the literature can then be found is a lack of western studies from the realist and neoclassical geopolitics angle(s). The approaches to Neo-Eurasianism can be organized in several groups: liberal (Laruelle), idealist/deconstructionist – even in some sense normativist (Umland) – interpretativist (Höllwert). So, once again, there is a lack of studies in regard to the perspective of this thesis: realist and from the neoclassical geopolitics systematized standpoint.

Dugin is not rehabilitating geopolitics by any means. On the contrary, he has been contributing for the continual discredit and devastation of the geopolitical approach. It will be through a carefully designed theoretical and methodological framework for neoclassical geopolitics [cf. PART I] that this argument will be underpinned. At the same time, that task will also cover a gap in the literature, both in the sense that (i) the geopolitical object will be delimited, and (ii) several research pieces about the geopolitical approach, from different languages, will be unified into a single approach [cf. APPENDIX 3].

The empirical tests to the relevance of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism on the international arena against empirical data (from the mentioned perspective) are also a novelty in the literature.

Regarding the geopolitical studies in (and about) Brazil, in addition to the fact that literature about that object in English language is not copious, so far no effort has

⁷³ E.g. Dídimo Matos, 'Eurasianismo e Meridionalismo - O lugar do Brasil em um mundo multipolar' at Universidade de São Paulo.

⁷⁴ Marlène Laruelle, 'The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism' *Nationalities Papers* vol. 32, no. 1 (March 2004): 115.

been accomplished trying to connect Neo-Eurasianism to Brazilian School of Geopolitics⁷⁵ and Meridionalism [cf. PART III].

Due to the lack of literature about Meridionalism, the importance of this thesis gets reinforced. Furthermore, a point to keep in mind is that alike Neo-Eurasianism, also Meridionalism in the quality of *ideology*, is incompatible with the geopolitical approach [cf. Subchapter 7.2].

Finally, this thesis also aims to contribute to the set of explanations of the NEW WORLD ORDER dynamics, putting the light on the real contributions (*i.e.* strategic plans) of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism in that respect. In this context, the debate Dugin vs. Carvalho analyzed in PART V will acquire a major importance.

Structure & Objectives

Once the overall goal was already mentioned – to analyze and to compare Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism, characterizing them as ideologies, therefore, explaining how those ideologies aim to shape a *New World Order* (as strategic plans) – a goal that derives from the main research question – “*Are Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism somehow related to a New World Order?*” – it is now required to elaborate on the research design of the thesis, emphasizing the structure and the objectives. To accomplish that it is needed to break down the main research question in a set of sub-research questions.

PART I attempts to answer: “what is a geopolitical study?” Thus, the first objective is the:

- A. Development and systematization of an advanced theoretical and methodological framework for geopolitical analysis and the study of foreign policy.

⁷⁵ Among the authors of Brazilian School of Geopolitics are: Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935); Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980); Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980); Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999). For a good introductory reading to the topic *vide*: Jorge Manuel Costa Freitas, *A Escola Geopolítica Brasileira*. (Lisboa: Instituto de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 1999).

PART II essentially focus on “what is Neo-Eurasianism?” and “which kind of world order directives does Neo-Eurasianism propose?” The second objective is then:

- B. Explanation of Neo-Eurasianist historical roots, ideological and strategic aims on the level of the international affairs.

PART III mirrors PART II to a certain degree since the first subquestions at stake are “what is Meridionalism?” and “which kind of world order directives does Meridionalism propose?” However, the comparative method is applied with more prominence in PART III answering the subquestions “are there any shared ideas or objectives between Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism?” and “if there are any, what connections can be identified?” Therefore the third objective is:

- C. Investigation of historical roots and assumptions of Brazilian School of Geopolitics as background, to analyze and to explain Meridionalism, its directives, and goals concerning the international chessboard.

PART IV is devoted to the following empirical subquestions: “what is the position of Brazil concerning the international alignment?”, “in which extent can Brazilian *élites* be considered *geomisguided*?”, “what is the role of São Paulo Forum in Brazil’s foreign policy conduct?”, “is there any influence of Meridionalism on Brazilian politics (especially foreign policy)?” and “what are the bonds between Brazilian foreign policy outcomes, São Paulo Forum, Meridionalism and Neo-Eurasianism?” So, the fourth objective is:

- D. Demonstration of empirical evidence to sustain the significance of Brazil’s Meridionalism, and the Latin America regional integration maneuver, to the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan as a whole.

PART V finishes the thesis, working under the following subquestions: “which are the main projects that work for a GLOBAL GOVERNMENT?”[cf. APPENDIX 2], “is there any relation between those globalist projects and Neo-Eurasianism/Meridionalism?” and “from the set of the globalist projects’ agents, which agents could be identified pro- or against the Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist objectives and modalities of action?” So the last objective is to:

- E. Provide explanations about the connections between Neo-Eurasianism (and Meridionalism) and the [New] World Order, assessing the debate between Dugin and Carvalho.

Justification of the thesis' pertinence

Although “Eurasianist” ideas are not the utmost pivotal factor in the Russian foreign policy decision-making process⁷⁶, the fact is that Russia, besides pragmatism⁷⁷, has been traditionally making its foreign policy based on dynamics of *Realpolitik* (something that has been increasingly absent in the Western nation-state’s politics in the last decades). Russia has been putting into practice the realist purposes of seeking power and assertive persecution of its goals⁷⁸.

Even if weak while compared to the former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation remains a great power [cf. Section 4.2.3]: the world largest territory, the wealthiest mineral reserve in the World, the 10th biggest economy in 2014, 144 million people. Russia was ranked, in 2016, as the 2nd strongest military power in the World. The country has been pursuing, as mentioned, a ‘self-assured foreign policy’, both bilateral and multilateral⁷⁹. Furthermore, as a victorious power of World War II, Russia received from the Soviet Union the seat at the U.N. Security Council.

The Neo-Eurasianist *ideology* and *strategic plan* is much aware of Russia’s relative material potential [cf. APPENDIX 2, (STATE) POTENTIAL]. Committed to the Russian tradition – interpreted by Brzezinski as the option for ‘empire’ rather than a ‘democratic state’⁸⁰ – Neo-Eurasianism fights for a great Russia indeed, since Russia is the country “naturally predisposed to rule over Eurasia” for the Neo-Eurasianist view.

Neo-Eurasianist ideas have received a wide welcome from part of the Russian politicians⁸¹ and also from part of the Russian military high structure⁸² (as it was already covered in the state of the art). In addition, some other national authorities have

⁷⁶ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian foreign policy – The return of Great Power Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 82.

Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 8.

⁷⁷ Dimitri Trenin and Bob Lo, *The landscape of Russian foreign policy decision-making* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

⁷⁸ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian foreign policy – The return of Great Power Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 13.

⁷⁹ Dimitri Trenin, *Getting Russia Right* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).

⁸⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘The premature partnership,’ *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no 2, (1994).

⁸¹ Marlène Laruelle, ‘Neo-Eurasianist Alexander Dugin on the Russia-Georgia conflict,’ *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, March 9, 2008, <http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4928>

⁸² Namely: Col-General Leonid Ivashov, Lt-General Nikolai Klokov, Lt-General Nikolai Pishchev, and Mj-General Vladislav Iminov.

Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian foreign policy – The return of Great Power Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 70.

John Dunlop, ‘Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics,’ last modified February, 2013, *The Fourth Political Theory*, <http://www.4pt.su/sr/node/445>

been making politics inspired by the Eurasianist dimension too. For example: Eduard Kokoity in South Ossetia⁸³, Doğu Perinçek in Turkey⁸⁴, or especially Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan⁸⁵.

The return of Putin as President of Russia in 2012, promising to restore Russia as a 'World power' in short-term stage, proclaiming:

'We are entering in new stage in our national development, we will have to address tasks that are totally different level and scale; the next few years will define the future of Russia for decades ahead...'⁸⁶

moreover, the accusation of some of the most influential individuals in Central Europe that: 'Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods'⁸⁷ are also signs of endurance of Russian foreign policy, converging to goals and modalities of action proposed by Neo-Eurasianism.

Recent events in Ukraine and Crimea confirm this perspective as well and reinforce the motivation to continue doing research on the topic.

Therefore, the argument that Neo-Eurasianist ideas, goals, tactics/ modalities of action have a correlation with international politics may be intuited. That constitutes an important contemporary challenge, which once problematized, can justify the existence of a doctoral thesis conceived to analyze the matter.

Besides the mentioned gaps in the literature review, there are also other gaps that this study aims to cover. One of them concerns to the connections between Neo-Eurasianism and Brazil.

⁸³ Marlène Laruelle, 'Neo-Eurasianist Alexander Dugin on the Russia-Georgia conflict,' *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, March 9, 2008, <http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4928>

⁸⁴ Faruk Akkan and Yaşar Niyazbaev, '“I support neo-Eurasianism, not Ergenekon,” says Dugin,' *Today's Zaman*, October 29, 2008, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-157238-i-support-neo-eurasianism-not-ergenekon-says-dugin.html>

⁸⁵ Sergey V. Biryukov, 'Eurasian Doctrine of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev: "Thinking space",' *News, analysis and forecasting on Geopolitics*, January 24, 2013, http://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/eurasian-doctrine-kazakh-president-nursultan-nazarbayev-thinking-space#.Uw8xP_1_v2M

⁸⁶ Russian TV, 'Full Video: Vladimir Putin's presidential inauguration ceremony in Kremlin,' last modified May, 2012, YouTube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNiWnSOsAnE&feature=plcp>

⁸⁷ Adamkus, et al, 'An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe,' *Gazeta*, July 15, 2009, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.htm

Dugin's opponent in the academic debate that will constitute the core document for the analysis in PART V is precisely a Brazilian author⁸⁸: Olavo de Carvalho. That debate has remained an untreated source concerning geopolitical studies.

It is also intended to analyze the position of Brazil from two apparently different possibilities: either Brazil would comply with a 'globalist project' (e.g. making part of BRICS), or Brazil would establish itself as an independent strategic center, within a multipolar dimension. The study will demonstrate that these two viewpoints are one since the independence or sovereignty of Brazil, from the Neo-Eurasianist and the Latin American regional integration (and Meridionalist by extension) standpoints, must be liquefied. The test of hypotheses, especially H₃ and H₄ will help in the explanation of this point.

One of the goals of this thesis is to formulate a possible scenario about what kind of role is being planned for Brazil in the upcoming New World Order, from the Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist points of view [PART IV].

From the academic perspective, this project constitutes a significant contribution to the progress of the scientific knowledge, with ambitious objectives, yet achievable. It is innovative and accurate, matching justified objectives with a logical structure. Such kind of analysis is highly relevant, mainly because of the unpredictability of many alternatives of development in international politics⁸⁹. Its pertinence can also be justified by the period of changing that the World is now passing through. Every scenario of power politics should be studied, and Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism have been a neglected topic. So now this thesis focus on describing, analyzing and explaining Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist goals and modalities of action towards a New World Order.

Philosophical Worldview

At this point, it is desirable to state several words about metatheoretical assumptions⁹⁰ or '...pre-theoretical *assumptions*...'⁹¹.

⁸⁸ Olavo de Carvalho and Aleksandr Dugin, 'The USA and the New World Oder', *Giuliano Morais and Ricardo Almeida's blog*, August 2, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.pt/>

⁸⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 363.

⁹⁰ Christian Reus-Smit, 'Beyond Metatheory?' *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2013).

The ground zero of this thesis is the Western-Christian culture. Among other consequences, this means that the traditional ontological and epistemological roots (i) “a single reality exists outside the human mind” and, furthermore, (ii) “it is possible to approach that objective reality” are accepted⁹². These assumptions match, to some extent, to the neoclassical realist worldview as well⁹³.

The author clarified elsewhere that his works are based on that ‘philosophical worldview’⁹⁴, *i.e.* ontological and epistemological axioms⁹⁵.

The perception of “science” that is assumed in this thesis sustains that, contrary to the 19th-century hard positivist perspective, the reality cannot be any longer considered as a machine full of quantifiable and mechanic laws towards a mathematical and unfailing prediction⁹⁶.

Science can be perceived, instead, as a human activity which the main particularity is, almost certainly, the strict regulation by methods. Those methods (which compose a systematized approach) allow a reliable knowledge yet provisory, *i.e.* an approach to the essence of the reality that remains temporary. For that, a dedication to rigor and seriousness is preconized. The practice of the scientific method can never be separated from *logics* (*i.e.* the expression of the unity of the essence of the reality). It

⁹¹ Alexander Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,’ *International Organization* Vol. 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 343.

⁹² In philosophical terms, the author’s ontological position is highly based on Eric Voegelin’s ontological conceptions – *Dictionary of Voegelinian Terminology*, s.v. ‘reality’, accessed June 17, 2013, <http://watershade.net/ev/ev-dictionary.html#reality>

In terms of the epistemological position, it is accepted the assumptions of Husserl’s phenomenology – Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book – General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology* transl. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983).

⁹³ Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 153.

Brian Rathbun, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,’ *Security Studies* vol. 17, no. 2 (May 2008): 314.

The latter discussed the positions of liberalism, constructivism and neoclassical realism at ontological, epistemological, theoretical and methodological levels.

⁹⁴ The expression is taken from John Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009), 5-11.

⁹⁵ Nuno Morgado, ‘Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism. A New Look at an Old Problem,’ *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 223-225.

⁹⁶ *Vide*, for example, Smith’s book on philosophy of science – Wolfgang Smith, *The Quantum Enigma. Finding the hidden key* (San Rafael: Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2011). This book is particularly relevant for keeping a study away of 19th century hard positivist approach. Besides, that approach has already been discredited due to the progresses in Physics during the 20th century (*e.g.* Planck, Heisenberg).

is rejected the pretension of an absolute truth (which does not exist in science⁹⁷), although the essence of the reality can neither be ignored on purpose nor relativized⁹⁸.

In this sense, this thesis will be ‘problem-centered’, ‘pluralistic’ and ‘interdisciplinary’, consequently ‘real-world oriented’⁹⁹.

Antecedent conditions will be considered, nonetheless the actual situation, its consequences, and scenarios will receive a major attention.

Within this *Weltanschauung*, the Dialectic – understood in its both Aristotelian and Scholastic dimension – will be put in practice¹⁰⁰.

Husserl’s phenomenology is a main reference in this philosophical worldview outline¹⁰¹. The intentionality of consciousness – consciousness *towards something* (an object (not necessarily material)), *i.e.* the idea that subject and object (in terms of knowledge-relations) are interdependent – is a crucial epistemological idea assumed in this study. That idea will have methodological consequences [cf. Subchapters 1.2 and 2.2]. Still about the phenomenological approach, one of the main points is also the notion that the observer cannot move out of the reality to observe it (as an outsider). Thus, it is acknowledged that observation is accomplished from and within the reality.

Introducing the geopolitical studies framework, it is important to state that this thesis is primarily affiliated to Thual and Chauprade’s phenomenological background, which will be debated below [cf. Section 1.2.3].

⁹⁷ Andrew Sayer, *Method in Social Science – a realist approach* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 46.

Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 500.

⁹⁸ Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 5.

Pope Benedict XVI also lectured about the rejection of relativism, since relativism ‘generates inevitably violence’ – Pope Benedict XVI, ‘Discurso do Papa Bento XVI aos Participantes na Assembleia Plenária da Comissão Teológica Internacional,’ *Libreria Editrice Vaticana*, December 7, 2012, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2012/december/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20121207_cti_po.html

⁹⁹ John Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009), 6.

¹⁰⁰ In this way, the *dialectic* is understood as confrontation of ideas in order to test hypotheses, and not the dialectic taken, for instance, under the hegelian conception of *Aufhebung* and linked to the “work of the negative”. The rejection of determinism and mechanism is a key issue. In the same vein of rejection of Hegel’s philosophical elements (now concerning the notion of *Zeitgeist*) it is contended that, on the path of history, the development of the International Order does not mean mechanically, neither evolution, nor progress – António Marques Bessa, *O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos* (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 26.

¹⁰¹ For an introductory reading about Phenomenology in Geography *vide*: Pauline Couper, *A Student’s Introduction to Geographical Thought – theories, philosophies, methodologies* (London: SAGE, 2015), 85-105.

Finalities

First things first: (i) to search for the essence of the reality, (ii) to propose a solution for the problem answering the research question and achieving the objectives, and (iii) to cover the mentioned gaps in the literature constitute the primary finalities of this study. Besides, there is the author's goal of receiving a Doctoral Degree in International Relations.

Limitations

Naturally, the number of flaws of this thesis will be larger than it is desirable. First of all, limitations are caused by language restrictions. This study should be considered mostly ignorant about sources in non-western languages, plus Finno-Ugric, Slavic and Northern-European languages that do not include, at least, an abstract in the languages that the author familiar with (Portuguese, English, Spanish, French, German, Italian, Romanian). Furthermore, the author's knowledge of Russian and Czech languages is limited. Similarly, sources in the mentioned languages, but either absent from the internet and references in technical/academic literature may be ignored. It should also be kept in mind that the collection of data is not accomplished beyond June 2016 that means that this thesis does not include posterior events to that date.

PART I

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND FOR GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS

Key points

Space, Man, and Territoriality. Geopolitical studies as *neoclassical geopolitics* – a scientific approach to the study of international politics. Dismissing critical geopolitics. The role of strategic studies within geopolitical studies. The compatibility between the realist theoretical tradition and geopolitical studies. State's foreign policy decision-making and outcomes as object of geopolitical studies. Theoretical and methodological discussion on how the neoclassical realist theory can be merged with geopolitical studies (the neoclassical geopolitics' systematized model). Methodological guidelines of the thesis.

Chapter 1

The meaning of Geopolitical Studies as scientific approach

‘Generatio præterit, et generatio advenit:
terra autem in æternum stat.’¹⁰²

Book of Ecclesiastes

1.1. Man and Territoriality: the role of Human Ethology and Geography before and within geopolitical studies¹⁰³

This subchapter focus on the concept of TERRITORIALITY [cf. APPENDIX 2] and its role in geopolitical studies, with the purpose of answering the sub-research question “*what is a geopolitical study?*” Thus, this subchapter contributes to achieving the objective A. [cf. INTRODUCTION, Structure & Objectives].

In this context, the following questions constitute the structure of the subchapter: *1.1.1. What is territoriality?* and *1.1.2. Why is territoriality important for geopolitical studies?* After that, a section about *Geography as geopolitical studies’ bedrock* is elaborated.

1.1.1. What is territoriality?

The science of ETHOLOGY [cf. Ap APPENDIX 2] has been sustaining that, similarly to the behavior of other primates, the human behavior is also conditioned by ‘instinctual forces’¹⁰⁴.

Contributions by Lorenz¹⁰⁵, Tinbergen¹⁰⁶, Eibl-Eibesfeldt¹⁰⁷, Morris¹⁰⁸, Knipe and Maclay¹⁰⁹, Ardrey¹¹⁰ brought to the Academia arguments that claim that genetics

¹⁰² transl. ‘A generation goes, a generation comes, yet the earth stands firm forever.’ – Book of Ecclesiastes 1:4

¹⁰³ This subchapter resulted from a research stay devoted to ‘Human Ethology and classical Geopolitics’ at Universidade de Lisboa. Special thanks to the Grant Agency of Charles University in Prague for the financial support.

¹⁰⁴ António Marques Bessa, *Ensaio sobre o fim da nossa Idade* (Lisboa: Edições do Tempo, 1978), 22.

¹⁰⁵ Konrad Lorenz, *Os Oito Pecados Mortais da Civilização* (Lisboa: Moraes, 1974).

¹⁰⁶ Niko Tinbergen, *The Study of Instinct* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951).

¹⁰⁷ Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *El Hombre Preprogramado* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1977).

Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Human Ethology* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989).

¹⁰⁸ Desmond Morris, *The Naked Ape* (London: Corgy Books, 1969).

¹⁰⁹ Humphry Knipe and George Maclay, *The Dominant Man* (London: Fontana, 1972).

and instincts do matter when studying Man, and by doing this, they made natural and social sciences come closer. That kind of approach has certain consequences. In fact, while acknowledging those arguments, not only the idea that humans are ‘tabula rasa’ has to be rejected, but also the argument that human individuals have a psychogenetic ‘program *a priori*’ takes shape, consolidates and must be accepted¹¹¹. It follows that the total reformulation of the human being in accordance with any political or social structure is simply regarded as hopeless. Furthermore, the discipline re-introduced or rediscovered concepts such as: “aggressiveness”, “competitiveness”, “hierarchy”, and “dominance”, after the long romanticist age of darkness, in which Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Karl Marx (1818-1883) could be pointed out as ultimate masters. The study will come back to this issue below.

The assumption of “immutability” of Man in this domain is not strange to the scientific community, despite the provisional aspect of the scientific knowledge *per se*. Otherwise, Mendel and his discovery of the laws of inheritance would still be refused (as they were in the past) and, therefore, they could not constitute part of classical genetics as they do¹¹². The crucial point is then to acknowledge the idea of the perpetuation of certain characteristics, which turns down the notion of “dialectic contradictions” in that domain¹¹³. Hence, it is considered definite that genetic inheritance assures a perpetual inequality among Man.

Bessa, the main spreader of Human Ethology in Portugal, systematized these ideas¹¹⁴ and reinforced the assumption that society is nothing, but ‘natural’¹¹⁵, in the

¹¹⁰ Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative* (Oxford: Atheneum, 1966) <http://mail.solargeneral.com/library/territorial-imperative-robert-ardrey.pdf>

¹¹¹ Konrad Lorenz, *La Outra Cara del Espejo* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1974).

¹¹² Peter J. Bowler, *The Mendelian Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

It is opportune to emphasize that the principle of genetic inheritance is incompatible with dialectical materialism, as the failure of Lysenko (1898-1976) demonstrated – Stefano de Luca, ‘La Scienza Ideologica - Trofim Denisovic Lysenko e la biologia soviética,’ *InStoria – rivista online di storia & informazione*, February, 2006, http://www.instoria.it/home/La_scienza_ideologica.htm

¹¹³ Paul Leyhausen and Konrad Lorenz, *Biologia del Comportamiento – raíces instintivas de la agresión, el miedo y la libertad* (Ciudad de México: siglo veintiuno editores Mexico, 1985), 10.

Explore also: The Genetic Atlas, ‘World Y-DNA frequencies,’ April 1, 2014, http://www.thegeneticatlas.com/World_Y-DNA.htm

¹¹⁴ António Marques Bessa, *O Trabalho das Ideias* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 1997), 30.

António Marques Bessa, *Quem Governa? Uma Análise Histórico-Política do Tema da Elite* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 1993), 489, 501.

António Marques Bessa, ‘Uma Análise do Fenómeno Territorial,’ *Terceiro Milénio Temas de Ciência e Tecnologia* no. 2 (January-March 1982).

¹¹⁵ António Marques Bessa, *Ensaio sobre o fim da nossa Idade* (Lisboa: Edições do Tempo, 1978), 47.

sense of basic ‘animal organization’¹¹⁶. Moreover, an ‘animal organization’ that is not independent of hierarchies, as Lorenz insisted too¹¹⁷. In fact, the human society, as a complex structure, endorses a natural necessity for a minority of individuals that rules over a majority. That key idea was already largely debated in political science literature¹¹⁸. On the other hand, it also touches the matter of the territory, since humans (as said organized in societies) have not been able to disengage themselves from the physical space.

Taking into account that he resumed the key findings of Ethology, it is useful to quote Bessa once again: (i) like other vertebrates, humans are also territorial animals that control and defend their space; (ii) in human societies, similar to other animal societies, a natural hierarchy can be noticed, establishing leaders and subjects; (iii) human aggressiveness is not directly caused by an external environment, but is part of instinct instead; (iv) understood as structure, society may be perceived as an animal accomplishment, rather than a product of any social contract, even less a rousseauian one based on the *bon sauvage* myth¹¹⁹.

As it was introduced above (and for the sake of coherence) there are theoretical implications while accepting the conclusions of Ethology. Some of them include putting an end to romanticist Marxist and Freudian explanations of the behavior of Man, looking for more logical and consistent explanations. Concerning Marxism in particular, one must keep in mind that, not only Marxist ideas about private property (and the state as its guarantor) as a human inventions¹²⁰, but also the dismissal of instinctual forces

¹¹⁶ António Marques Bessa, *Quem Governa? Uma Análise Histórico-Política do Tema da Elite* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 1993), 488.

¹¹⁷ Konrad Lorenz, *Sobre la Agressión el Pretendido Mal* (Madrid: siglo veintiuno editores, 1972), 89ff.

¹¹⁸ For instance: Vilfredo Pareto, *Trattato Di Sociologia Generale* (Charleston: Nabu Press, 2010); Gaetano Mosca, *Elementi di Scienza Politica* (Torino: Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1923); Robert Michels, *Para uma Sociologia dos Partidos Políticos na Democracia Moderna*, trans. José M. Justo (Lisboa: Antígona, 2001); Wright C. Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); James Burnham, *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Publications, 1987); Jose Ortega y Gasset, *La Rebelion De Las Masas* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1943); António Marques Bessa, *Quem Governa? Uma Análise Histórico-Política do Tema da Elite* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 1993).

¹¹⁹ António Marques Bessa, *Introdução à Etologia – a nova imagem do Homem* (Lisboa: Edições do Tempo, 1978).

António Marques Bessa, *Ensaio sobre o fim da nossa Idade* (Lisboa: Edições do Tempo, 1978), 48-50.

¹²⁰ Inspired in Marx’s ideas *vide* Friedrich Engels, ‘Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,’ last modified March 25, 2014, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/origin_family.pdf

and the hope in the possibility of a continuing process of human perfecting (shared by Liberals and Idealists too), are directly contradicted by Ethology's studies¹²¹.

Among the concepts that Human Ethology works with, the just mentioned concept of TERRITORIALITY is certainly one of the most important in the field of this thesis: geopolitical studies.

As seen in Bessa's resume (point (i)) the science of Ethology has been sustaining the argument that Man possesses a natural tendency to conquer, to manage, to control and to defend his territories. Besides, some of the Ethology's scholars insisted on adding to that argument the assumption of a natural sense of hierarchy among Man¹²².

1.1.2. Why is territoriality important for geopolitical studies?

The main idea of this subchapter 1.1., which is devoted to the place of Ethology as ground zero of geopolitical studies, can be articulated in one phrase only:

‘poucas sociedades animais escap[av]am às leis da territorialidade’¹²³.

So, the central idea here is the condition of *constraining* of Man by the territory. This idea is the fundament of this research piece as a whole. Hence it is not a question of ‘configuration of territorial space’¹²⁴, but accepting TERRITORIALITY as a material human reality instead¹²⁵.

¹²¹ António Marques Bessa, ‘Uma Revolução Silenciosa,’ *Política* II série, no 7 (September 1972): 12-13.

António Marques Bessa, ‘Estado e Realismo Científico,’ *Política* II série, no 7 (September 1972): 7- 8.

¹²² Paul Leyhausen and Konrad Lorenz, *Biología del Comportamiento – raíces instintivas de la agresión, el miedo y la libertad* (Ciudad de México: siglo veintiuno editores Mexico, 1985), 120.

¹²³ transl. ‘only few animal societies escape from the laws of territoriality’ – António Marques Bessa, *O Trabalho das Ideias* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 1997), 27.

¹²⁴ John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,’ *International Organization* Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993): 144, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706885?seq=1>

¹²⁵ Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative* (Oxford: Atheneum, 1966) <http://mail.solargeneral.com/library/territorial-imperative-robert-ardrey.pdf>

Erik Cohen, ‘Environmental Orientations: A Multidimensional Approach to Social Ecology,’ *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 17, No. 1, (March 1976): 50, 53, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2741584.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true>

Rada Dyson-Hudson and Eric Alden Smith, ‘Human Territoriality: An Ecological Reassessment,’ *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 80, (1), (Mar 1978): 22, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/673509.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true>

Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin B. Scott, ‘Territoriality: a neglected sociological dimension,’ *Social Problems* Vol. 15, No. 2 (1967-8): 236.

At this point, one finds the reason why geopolitical studies are so relevant in the domain of Political Science. If human societies cannot escape from the laws of territoriality (and either part of instinct or not¹²⁶) – and no matter how great information and digital revolutions are at present, or even can be in the future one can predict – then territory does matter. Consequently, studies about territory do find their continuing relevance too. Among them, one finds geopolitical studies as a scientific approach¹²⁷.

If to geography one adds identity, as Chauprade and Thual did¹²⁸, one obtains the outline of the majority of the geopolitical factors [cf. APPENDIX 3].

1.1.3. Geography as geopolitical studies' bedrock

Disregarding the discussion about either instinct, culture, or whatever the cause of territoriality might be, the fact under the light and one of the most important points of this subchapter is that the Human Being is rooted in 'space', *i.e.* in the territory. Not only Man cannot release himself from the physical territory, but Man also embraces the need to possess and occupy a certain territory, transforming it under his intentions¹²⁹. Those premises would have universal validity.

Ralph B. Taylor, *Human Territorial Functioning – an empirical, evolutionary perspective on individual and small group territorial cognitions, behaviors, and consequences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

David Sloan Wilson, and Edward O. Wilson, 'Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology,' *Quarterly Review of Biology* 82, (4) (December 2007): 333.

¹²⁶ Julian J. Edney, 'Human territoriality,' *Psychological Bulletin* Vol. 81(12) (Dec 1974).

Robert David Sack, 'Human territoriality: a Theory,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol.73, No. 1 (1983).

Robert David Sack, *Human territoriality – Its theory and history* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1.

¹²⁷ Vide also:

António Marques Bessa and Carlos Mendes Dias, *O Salto do Tigre – Geopolítica Aplicada* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2007), 75-79.

Carlos Mendes Dias, *Geopolítica – velhas mas novas aproximações e o contrário* (Aveiro: Mare Liberum, 2012), 203.

¹²⁸ '...le besoin de territoire, la "libido territoriale", nourrie par l'imagination identitaire, constitue l'une des bases de la géopolitique' – Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs* (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 568. Transl. "... the need for territory, the "territorial libido", nourished by the identity imagination, constitutes one of the bases of geopolitics".

¹²⁹ "«Nature imposes, man disposes»" – British geographer W. Gordon East quoted by Kaplan ((Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography – What the Map tells us about coming conflicts and the battle against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2012), 29.)

(In spite of being a Marxist) Kevin Cox, *Political Geography – Territory, State and Society* (Malden: Blackwell, 2002), 1.

In this way, follows logically that Marx and Engels' claim that property land would somehow be artificial – consequently it must be abolished in the future, together with the rights of inheritance that perpetuate private property – needs to be rejected (Marxists Internet Archive, "Chapter II. Proletarians and

TERRITORIALITY is, consequently, the first concept to bear in mind:

‘Territoriality is a primary geographical expression of social power. It is the means by which space and society are interrelated.’¹³⁰

Once again, the relevance of geopolitical studies with its supreme goal – to study and to explain the impact of the geographical setting on human political activity at the international level – follows logically.

Although the preliminary definition of geopolitical studies has just been given, it is required to revisit the [theoretical and methodological] context of core disciplines (Geography and Political Geography) linked to the geopolitical studies’ field before making further considerations.

i. Geography

It is useful reminding that GEOGRAPHY [cf. APPENDIX 2] is a very ancient human activity, indeed. At the year 450 BC, Hellenic historian Herodotus (484-425 BC), the “Father of History”, compiled a map of the world that was known at the time. It is interesting to remark that it was a historian who drew the first “World-map”. In fact, as the text will discuss below, geopolitical studies’ methodological guidelines are nothing but based on the dynamic interconnections between geography and history [cf. Section 1.2.3.].

Eratosthenes (276-194 BC), the Hellenic citizen who tried to determine the circumference of the earth in 240 BC – at a time in which there was no empirical proof that the Earth is a globe¹³¹ – is considered the “Father of Geography”.

Communists,” last modified 2004, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch02.htm>). Beyond this source, it should be also kept in mind that the pretention that “land has no owners” is one of the most basic communist assumptions – *vide*, among other sources, the refrain in the lyrics of *The Internationale*, both Portuguese and Brazilian versions, and the second stanza of *The Internationale*’s lyrics in the version of the Portuguese Communist Party’s anthem.

¹³⁰ Robert David Sack, *Human territoriality – Its theory and history* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 5.

¹³¹ Fernão de Magalhães (Ferdinand Magellan), the Portuguese explorer, was the first to prove that the Earth is, in fact, a globe, having started the adventure for circumnavigation of the Earth in 1519. Yet, such enterprise was not an isolated event, but a consequence from the scientific developments from Portugal at that period.

In fact, in 1417 Infante D. Henrique (Prince Henry the Navigator) established the School of Sagres. In spite of the existence of a debate in historiography that does not matter for this study (stating that School of Sagres was not a research institute in the modern sense), what matters for now is that the ‘School of Sagres’ constituted a cluster of navigators, cartographers, wide range of people with naval experience, who produced world-impact knowledge, which granted to Portugal a place among the main contributors for scientific developments at the period of Renaissance, a milestone of Western Civilization [cf. Suchapter 8.1.].

Moving from those classical references to the 19th century, the year of 1817 was a crucial year for Geography as a modern discipline, since the first volume of Carl Ritter's (1779-1859) *Die Erkunde* was published. In 1820, the teaching of Geography was declared compulsory in the German Confederation¹³², and the first Chairs in Geography at Universities, as well as the first Geographical Societies, were founded around Europe continuously during the 19th century.

Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) is also a major name in the endeavor to improve geographical studies, having elaborated on the principle of causality and developed the methodological technique of direct observation.

In terms of subdivisions, Geography may be essentially divided into (1) Physical Geography (*e.g.* Geodesy, Topography (Orography), Geomorphology, Hydrology and Hydrography (Oceanography, Glaciology), Geomatics); and (2) Human Geography (*e.g.* political geography (*e.g.* electoral geography, military geography, geopolitical studies), cultural geography (*e.g.* geography of religions, geography of language – yet, if dimensions like religion or language are projected at the international level, they will naturally fall also on the geopolitical studies' field), historical geography, economic geography, health geography, geography of populations / demography, anthropogeography, development geography)¹³³.

Although Geography is, in fact, a wide multidisciplinary science as such (using findings from geology, chemistry, mathematics, history, physics, astronomy, biology, ecology among others), Geography embraces, however, a methodological nucleus, which provides unity¹³⁴. The system of methods, unlike the object or the finality, is considered the most precious nucleus of Science.

In this context, the unity of Geography is also provided by certain principles¹³⁵: (a) the principle of Extension, formulated by Ratzel, requires establishing phenomena's location, simultaneously circumscribing its impact; (b) the principle of Comparison,

¹³² Pascal Lorot, *Histoire de la Géopolitique* (Paris: Economica, 1995), 8.

¹³³ As modern science, Geography studies the surface of the Earth, which comprises four dimensions: (i) Lithosphere (studies the crust and the portion of the upper mantle of the Earth); (ii) Hydrosphere (studies the mass of the water); (iii) Atmosphere (studies gases surrounding the Earth); and (iv) Biosphere (studies global flora and fauna patterns). A fifth dimension (v) Pedosphere deals with the interconnection of the fourth previous ones. From this systematization, is possible to infer that Geography constitutes a vast scientific domain, in which physical, biological and human elements interact permanently. This reality will have direct impact on the making of the geopolitical studies diagram [cf. APPENDIX 3].

¹³⁴ *Vide* for example: David T. Herbert and John A. Matthews, eds., *Unifying Geography: Common Heritage, Shared Future* (Oxford: Routledge, 2004).

¹³⁵ Manoel Pio Alves Júnior, 'Princípios da Geografia – Descrição dos princípios metodológicos da Geografia,' last modified March, 2012, Dr. José Ferreira Blogs, <http://www.joseferreira.com.br/blogs/geografia/2012/marco/principios-da-geografia/>

promoted by Ritter and Vidal de la Blache, among others (a method common in social sciences) aims to establish similarities and differences in respect to certain phenomena, also providing a sense of proportion; (c) the principle of Causation finds a major proponent in Humboldt – the principle sustains the quest for unveiling causes and determining consequences concerning phenomena under study; (d) the principle of Interaction – Brunhes was interested in this principle – calls the attention to the fact that no phenomenon exists on its own, it is not isolated, but it is integrated into a net of relations with other phenomena and/or actors instead, that need to be pointed out; (e) the principle of Activity – again Brunhes – established the necessity of a dynamic approach towards phenomena, supporting historical analysis in order to (1) understand the past developments of phenomena, and (2) gain some perspectives concerning their future evolution.

In general, there are four permanent objectives in geographical studies¹³⁶: (i) to locate geographical phenomena (namely on a map); (ii) to describe geographical phenomena; (iii) to explain/ to contextualize geographical phenomena; (iv) to establish the relations of the geographical phenomena.

Research trips for direct observation and description, as well as statistics, make part of the group of techniques used in Geography. Furthermore, maps, along with representations of the terrestrial globe, are some of the most important instruments for expression of results¹³⁷.

Geographic information system (which had a tremendous impact on cartography), remote sensing, geostatistics, other qualitative geographical methods (*e.g.* ethnography) may be pointed out as other methods and techniques in Geography too.

Finally, concerning scale, there is a great variety in geographical studies: the researcher may focus from the entire Globe to a small location, depending on the object under study.

ii. Narrowing the domain: Political Geography

Political geography, as a branch of human geography, is devoted to the study of the relations between geography and politics. In other words, it is not only the study of

¹³⁶ *Enciclopédia Delta Universal*, s.v. 'Geografia.'

¹³⁷ For example, Travassos mentioned constantly the study and examination of maps as primary procedure of inquiry – Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935).

spatial distribution of political processes but also how such processes suffer the impact of the geographical setting (*e.g.* position [geopolitical factor #2]).

This research piece suggests that a conception that identifies three different levels within Political Geography is perhaps the key issue in the delimitation of the field: (1) Intrastate level (local), *e.g.* ‘The city as spatial phenomenon’ in Ratzel’s *Political Geography*¹³⁸; (2) State-level (national) *e.g.* Siegfried’s studies on electoral studies¹³⁹; and (3) Inter-state (international), *i.e.* geopolitical studies, *e.g.* Sicker’s study on the relations between geography and foreign policy¹⁴⁰.

In this way, Political Geography – in accordance with the circumstances, assisted or not by strategic studies (it will depend on the research objectives) – may deal with following issues: (a) relocation of the capital (if there are no foreign direct implications); (b) spatial effective occupation of the territory; (c) antagonist areas within borders; (d) internal migrations.

Summing up, Political Geography *includes* Geopolitical Studies, but Geopolitical Studies may be considered a free domain, in the sense that comprises a specific theoretical and methodological framework (within Political Science¹⁴¹), necessarily different from the one used in other levels of analysis in Political Geography.

‘Dynamism’ as characteristic of geopolitical studies¹⁴² will be below recaptured as an attribute that helps to differentiate, conclusively, geopolitical studies from political geography.

¹³⁸ Friedrich Ratzel, *Géographie Politique*, trans. Pierre Rusch (Paris: Éditions Régionales Européennes S.A., 1988), 298-299.

¹³⁹ André Siegfried, *Tableau politique de la France de l’ouest sous la troisième république* (Bruxelles: Université de Bruxelles, 2010).

¹⁴⁰ Martin Sicker, *Geography and Politics among Nations – an Introduction to Geopolitics* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010).

¹⁴¹ Everardo Backheuser, ‘Geopolítica e Geografia Política,’ *Revista Brasileira de Geografia* (January-March 1942): 23.

¹⁴² Pointed out, among many others, by Ugarte – Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, *Geopolítica* (Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello, 1974), 41- 42.

‘...[E]ine international... Geopolitik
eines der besten Mittel zur Vermeidung künftiger
Weltkatastrophen sein würde.’¹⁴³

Karl Haushofer

1.2. Geopolitical studies or neoclassical geopolitics

In the past, the author wrote a paper with the goal of systematizing several preliminary assumptions about the theoretical and methodological framework of geopolitical studies¹⁴⁴. This study will recapture the findings of that paper and push forward other arguments and theoretical formulations. Thus, to understand the current study is highly recommendable to get in touch with that paper.

If it is aimed to locate ‘*geopolitics*’ – which currently is often nothing but a fancy word – in the scientific sphere, then the field must be demarcated and submitted to the demands of the scientific method. So, with the view to operationalizing those two tasks, it is required to go through the history of the discipline of *Geopolitics*, examining the limitations of both *classical* [cf. Section 1.2.1.] and *critical* geopolitics [cf. 1.2.2] from the scientific point of view, putting the light on *neoclassical* geopolitics as an operable alternative [cf. 1.2.3.].

1.2.1. Classical geopolitics

It may be truthfully considered that ‘Geopolitics’ started as a discipline with the appearance of the term ‘*Geopolitik*’ (coined by Rudolf Kjellén exactly in 1899) in the transition from the 19th century to 20th century. In that period Mackinder, in his *The*

¹⁴³ transl. ‘...[A]n international geopolitics...could become one of the best means to prevent future world catastrophes’ Karl Haushofer, “*Apologie der deutschen Geopolitik*,” in *Wahre anstatt falsche Geopolitik für Deutschland*, ed. Edmund A. Walsh (Frankfurt/Main: Verlag G. Schulte-Bulmke, 1946), 27.

¹⁴⁴ Nuno Morgado, ‘Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism – A New Look at an Old Problem,’ *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014).

*Geographical Pivot of History*¹⁴⁵, truly came up with a perspective that looked at international relations through the lens of geography.

Due to the spatial restrictions of this thesis and, and most of all, its object, it is materially impossible to describe, to theorize, and to analyze all the authors and schools from the so-called *classical geopolitics*¹⁴⁶. Above all, it would be extremely immodest to consider that the main ideas of classical geopolitics could be covered in 10-15 pages – even in a very synthetic way. Consequently, the study will start by assuming that the main ideas, theories, and methodological weaknesses from classical geopolitics are already known by the reader¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴⁵ Halford Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History,' *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, no. 4, (1904)

<http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/Articles/1904%20HEARTLAND%20THEORY%20HALFORD%20MACKINDER.pdf>

¹⁴⁶ In this study, the category of *Classical Geopolitics* includes not only a timecentric approach concerning geopolitical doctrines roughly in the first half of 20th century: Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, but mainly a label that comprises geopolitical formulations with series of flaws that were previously identified elsewhere (Nuno Morgado, 'Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism. A New Look at an Old Problem,' *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 241), and others such as the 'homogeneization of the spatial' as *Critical Geopolitics* pointed out (Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 21-55).

¹⁴⁷ The literature about classical geopolitics is vast. For introductory readings about schools (German, Anglo-Saxon, French Schools etc.) or a short research about authors (Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, Spykman, etc.) *vide*:

Ayméric Chauprade and François Thuail, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs* (Paris: Ellipses, 1998)

Ayméric Chauprade, *Introduction à l'analyse géopolitique* (Paris: Ellipses, 1999)

Carlos Mendes Dias, *Geopolítica: Teorização Clássica e Ensinos* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2005)

Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, ed., *The geopolitics reader* (London: Routledge, 2006)

Jacques Soppelsa, *Géopolitique de 1945 à nos jours* (Paris: Editions Dalloz – Sirey, 1993)

Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972)

José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes, 'A Geopolítica Clássica revisitada,' *Nação E Defesa*, no. 105 (Summer 2003)

Ladis K. D. Kristof, 'The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics,' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 4, no 1 (March 1960)

Martin Glassner, and Chuck Fahrner, *Political Geography* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004)

Martin Sicker, *Geography and Politics among Nations – an Introduction to Geopolitics* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010)

Pascal Lorot, *Histoire de la Géopolitique* (Paris: Economica, 1995)

Paul Claval, *Géopolitique et géostratégie: la pensée politique, l'espace et le territoire au XXe siècle* (Paris: Nathan, 1996)

Philippe Moreau Defarges, *Introdução à Geopolítica*, trans. José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes (Lisboa: Gradiva, 2012)

Políbio Valente de Almeida, *Do Poder do Pequeno Estado (Enquadramento geopolítico da hierarquia das potências)* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 2012)

Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers, 2009)

Štefan Volner, *Geopolitika. Klasická, Nová, EÚ – geopolitický aktér 21. Storočia* (Praha: Iris, 2012)

Yves Lacoste ed., *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique* (Paris: Flammarion, 1993).

The central aspect to underline concerning classical geopolitics is that classical geopolitics *are not* what geopolitical studies are about, either regarding some of the theoretical assumptions or methodological procedures¹⁴⁸. In other words, classical geopolitics has then missing links to the scientific method and puts a focus on political prescriptions, commitment with political power, etc.

In spite of those deficiencies, the majority of the concepts that geopolitical studies work with were in fact *created* by authors of classical geopolitics, and their validity remains as isolated tools, for both logical reasoning and empirical tests.

In these circumstances, it is now opportune to introduce that the expression *Neoclassical Geopolitics* corresponds, for this study, to the denomination of *Geopolitical Studies*. In one phrase only, this means that *geopolitical studies* as scientific approach are synonymous with *neoclassical geopolitics*. The subject will be revisited in the next sections.

1.2.2. Critical geopolitics

A debate under the title ‘*critical versus neoclassical geopolitics*’ constitutes certainly a topic worthy of an entirely new Ph.D. thesis and a bunch of papers and books. Despite that, for the sake of contextualization of the theoretical and methodological approach, one is forced to give some brief comments about critical geopolitics, which will necessarily remain insufficient. Thus the discussion is to be continued in other works.

Elsewhere it was accomplished by the author an introductory study of *critical geopolitics* from the neoclassical geopolitics perspective¹⁴⁹. There, the credibility of that approach from the scientific point of view was assessed, particularly taking into account the positioning of the majority of critical geopolitics’ authors themselves as ‘anti-

¹⁴⁸ The purpose of justifying territorial claims in French School of Geopolitics, *e.g.* French ‘natural borders’ thesis’ that claimed territorial stretch till river Rhine, clearly with absorption of Elsaß-Lothringen as geostrategic goal as Brill pointed out (Heinz Brill, *Geopolitik Heute – Deutschlands Chance?* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1994), 83-88, 102ff) is an example of theoretical and methodological problems in classical geopolitics.

¹⁴⁹ Nuno Morgado, ‘In Vindication of Neoclassical Geopolitics. Rediscovering German School of Geopolitics – overcoming Postmodernism,’ in: Conference SVV (Specifický Vysokoškolský Výzkum), *Transformační tendence současných politických systémů*, Prague, Czech Republic, 26th September 2013. Nuno Morgado, ‘Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism – A New Look at an Old Problem,’ *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 189 – 191.

science'¹⁵⁰. If neoclassical geopolitics aims to be contained within the scientific sphere, one finds the first logical incompatibility between critical and neoclassical geopolitics.

Secondly, whereas neoclassical geopolitics asserts that (i) in ontological terms a social reality exists independently of the human mind, and (ii) in epistemological terms considers possible an approach to that reality¹⁵¹, critical geopolitics is located at the antipodes of such positions, claiming that 'political discourses', as constructed elements, are the key object to be deconstructed and de-legitimized¹⁵², *i.e.* the geographical setting and identity, realities *per se*, fall automatically into the place of secondary objects or even ignored¹⁵³. The study will develop this topic, demonstrating that to neoclassical geopolitics geographical setting and identity are top-level causal factors *per se* [Section 1.2.3 and Chapter 2] (consequently not mere "constructions", as critical geopolitics contends).

The third incompatibility between critical and neoclassical geopolitics is methodological. Whereas neoclassical geopolitics fully accepts the scientific method and tries to work with all its instruments (*e.g.* hypotheses, variables, verification, empirical tests, prediction) and theoretical perspectives (*e.g.* refusal of determinism, openness to verification, provisionally accepted) carefully, critical geopolitics, as said, looks at itself as an "anti-science" which implies methods such as 'genealogy' or 'deconstruction' that do not make part of the scientific sphere.

To better understand the incompatibilities between critical and neoclassical geopolitics it is opportune to bring some literature in. Within the limits of the literature review on this topic, the most recent and one of the best critiques that critical geopolitics received was accomplished in a paper by Haverluk *et al.*, from which can be

¹⁵⁰ This positioning demonstrates direct influence of Foucault and his 'genealogy as an "anti-science" fighting against the *power-effects* characteristics of any discourse that is regarded as scientific...' upon critical geopolitics – Giorgio Shani, 'De-colonizing Foucault,' *International Political Sociology* vol. 4, no. 2 (June 2010): 210.

¹⁵¹ The relevance of the phenomenological attitude is particularly important at this instance.

¹⁵² '...critical geopolitics connected political geography to the developments of human geography that, under the broad influence of postmodernism, had taken a "cultural turn" in which landscapes, media and everyday behavior were deconstructed and read to uncover power relations' – Colin Flint and Peter Taylor, *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality* (Essex: Pearson Education, 2007), 42. Or the idea that geography is an 'argument' only or primarily – Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minneapolis: Borderlines, 1996), 52.

¹⁵³ *Vide*, among others, this sources:

Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, eds., *A Companion to Political Geography* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).

Simon Dalby and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, eds., *Rethinking Geopolitics* (London: Routledge, 1998).

deduced an exhortation for the establishment of neoclassical geopolitics¹⁵⁴. Not only those authors put under the light the aims of critical geopolitics on changing ‘state power structures’¹⁵⁵ and its refusal of working with maps¹⁵⁶, the authors also analyzed critical geopolitics’ anti-environmental aspect¹⁵⁷.

In addition to critical geopolitics’ refusal to look at facts or material reality (‘common sense’)¹⁵⁸, Haverluk *et al.* insisted in the peculiar characteristic of critical geopolitics of ‘. . .«utopian wishful thinking» of the radical left. . .’¹⁵⁹. This point is particularly important. In fact, on the ideological engagement of critical geopolitics, it is interesting to note that Owens also mentioned that:

‘Marxists and adherents of “critical geopolitics”
dismiss classical geopolitics. . .’¹⁶⁰

The engagement of critical geopolitics with the radical left must be an object of earnest reasoning since the radical left (and particularly the streams attached to the marxist-leninist international movement) comprises the inescapable obligation of the transformation of the political structures. Marx himself proclaimed:

‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world,
in various ways; the point is to change it.’¹⁶¹

In this vein, whereas the engagement of critical geopolitics in the ideological realm of the radical left that aims to transform reality and its political structures (speech

¹⁵⁴ Terrence W. Haverluk, Kevin M. Beauchemin, Brandon A. Mueller, ‘The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2014).

¹⁵⁵ Terrence W. Haverluk, Kevin M. Beauchemin, Brandon A. Mueller, ‘The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2014): 21-23.

¹⁵⁶ Terrence W. Haverluk, Kevin M. Beauchemin, Brandon A. Mueller, ‘The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2014): 23-25.

As it will be contended, maps are crucial instruments in geopolitical studies.

¹⁵⁷ Terrence W. Haverluk, Kevin M. Beauchemin, Brandon A. Mueller, ‘The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2014): 25-32.

¹⁵⁸ Terrence W. Haverluk, Kevin M. Beauchemin, Brandon A. Mueller, ‘The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2014): 20. Glassner and Fahrner identified that very same problem of lack of empirical tests too: ‘difficulty in building a theoretical base’ and ‘approaches [which] tend to ignore reality’ – Martin Glassner and Chuck Fahrner, *Political Geograph* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004), 284. *Vide* also: Martin Glassner, *Political Geography* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996), 336.

Therefore, unlike critical geopolitics, neoclassical geopolitics intends testing hypotheses against empirical data, working with empirical puzzles, etc. [*vide* Part IV of this study].

¹⁵⁹ Terrence W. Haverluk, Kevin M. Beauchemin, Brandon A. Mueller, ‘The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2014): 20

¹⁶⁰ Mackubin Thomas Owens, “In Defense of Classical Geopolitics,” last modified November 21, 2014, <http://www.badgleyb.net/geopolitics/docs/theory/defenseofclassicalgeop.htm>

¹⁶¹ Karl Marx, ‘Theses On Feuerbach,’ last modified February, 2005, Marx/Engels Internet Archive, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm>

of the agent) cannot be, for that reason, compatibilized with the scientific activity; on the other hand, neoclassical geopolitics, which abdicates of causing any political effects and is committed exclusively with the attempts of approaching reality can be offered as a substitute of critical geopolitics as a scientific activity *tout court* (speech of the scientist)¹⁶². The key point at stake here is that there is an irresolvable incompatibility of critical geopolitics' ideological positioning with the scientific activity¹⁶³. The speech of the agent *is not* and *cannot be* the speech of the scientist [cf. Section 1.2.3., Subsection ii.]. For that reason, as it will be listed below, one of the rules that Chauprade put forth for the establishment of geopolitical studies as a scientific activity is, precisely, the most explicit refusal of any ideological submission¹⁶⁴.

The real importance of geopolitical factors as causes shaping states' behavior is an argument to be decomposed and explained in the next sections of the text. In this way, the terms of neoclassical geopolitics are neither about geography being the single cause able to explain the "whole reality", nor about geography being a mere representation that "creates" or "constructs" a reality that constitutes then the "principle" to be followed or obeyed. Therefore, neoclassical geopolitics or geopolitical studies cannot be reduced to a 'science of representations'¹⁶⁵, as critical geopolitics intended to do, despite the fact that ideas and representations will find their place in the theoretical and methodological framework of neoclassical geopolitics. In the next section and subchapter it will be explained in detail how is that so. For now, the study merely introduces the issue.

¹⁶² In this way, the accusation that *geopolitics* is focused on 'writing' instead of 'describing' loses its basis – Joe Painter and Alex Jeffrey, *Political Geography* (London: SAGE, 2009), 206.

¹⁶³ Contini contended that critical geopolitics is not only based on Foucauldian postmodernism but also on Gramsci's concepts – Alaerte A. M. Contini, 'Da Geopolítica Clássica à Geopolítica Crítica', last modified April 2017, *Âmbito Jurídico*, http://www.ambito-juridico.com.br/site/index.php?n_link=revista_artigos_leitura&artigo_id=9954&revista_caderno=15

Regarding this topic, it is noteworthy that Gramsci is one of the most important authorities of cultural [neo-]Marxism with the purpose of denouncing «oppressive ideological instruments» in the path to the socialist society – Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del carcere* (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1977). Available online at: [http://www.inventati.org/thinklab/archivio/gramsci/Gramsci%20-%20Quaderni%20del%20carcere%20vol%201%20\(I-V\).pdf](http://www.inventati.org/thinklab/archivio/gramsci/Gramsci%20-%20Quaderni%20del%20carcere%20vol%201%20(I-V).pdf)

Ramifying the argument, Antonsich, by its side, underlined that Marxist influence on Ó Tuathail remains unclear – Marco Antonsich, 'Dis-placing or re-placing hegemonic geopolitical discourse? Reading/writing Gearóid Ó Tuathail's 'critical geopolitics'', last modified April 2017, Academia.edu, http://www.academia.edu/2286337/Dis-placing_or_re-placing_hegemonic_geopolitical_discourse_Reading_writing_Gear%C3%B3id_%C3%93_Tuathail_s_critical_geopolitics_, 28.

¹⁶⁴ With the refusal of ideological engagement, neoclassical geopolitics avoids the accusation of "obeying to power structures", as classical geopolitics was accused of – Joe Painter and Alex Jeffrey, *Political Geography* (London: SAGE, 2009), 203.

¹⁶⁵ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 495.

So, the framework of neoclassical geopolitics integrates that aspect of critical geopolitics in methodological terms. As Guzzini put it :

‘...the role of geographic factors driven by the understandings actors have about them.’¹⁶⁶

In the understanding of neoclassical geopolitics in this research piece, that quotation means *élites*’ perceptions, which together with *élites*’ capacities, will be formulated as variables and included into the theoretical and methodological framework of neoclassical geopolitics [cf. Subchapter 2.1.]¹⁶⁷.

A final comment is due to Mamadouh’s paper, from which the expression *neoclassical geopolitics* was taken¹⁶⁸. There can be pointed out four inconsistent points between Mamadouh’s perspective and neoclassical geopolitics, as it is formulated in this thesis: (i) the science of neoclassical geopolitics is not ‘applied’ but it intends to be purely academic, (ii) its methodology and objectives are isolated from those of geostrategy, (iii) to neoclassical geopolitics the state does not remain a *black box*, and (iv) consequently there is no ‘sharp distinction’ between domestic politics and foreign policy. All these points will be underpinned until the end of PART I.

Despite that, Mamadouh was accurate while describing the purpose of neoclassical geopolitics :

‘. . .it is about the effects of geographical location and other geographical features on the foreign policy of a state and its relations with other states. It is also concerned with the strategic value of geographical factors (resources, access to the sea, etc.).’¹⁶⁹

For all the mentioned reasons, although critical geopolitics had the merit to put light on the weaknesses of classical geopolitics, and brought considerations that can be accepted in the scientific work¹⁷⁰, Kelly’s proposal of bringing [neo]classical

¹⁶⁶ Stefano Guzzini, ed., *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 14.

¹⁶⁷ In spite of taking into account, as object of study, a system of ideas and representations (that can be operationalized and studied with some accuracy), neoclassical geopolitics does not use concepts such as ‘geographical imagination’ or ‘geopolitical visions’ that are certainly expressions attached to radical perspectivism that is rejected by the field [cf. Subchapter 2.1.].

¹⁶⁸ V. D. Mamadouh, ‘Geopolitics in the nineties: one flag, many meanings,’ *GeoJournal* no. 46 (1998).

¹⁶⁹ V. D. Mamadouh, ‘Geopolitics in the nineties: one flag, many meanings,’ *GeoJournal* no. 46 (1998): 238.

¹⁷⁰ Such as: the mentioned point of *élites*’ perceptions or avoiding the creation of a ‘homogeneous order of the spatial’ – Geróid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minneapolis: Borderlines, 1996), 42.

geopolitics and critical geopolitics ‘closer together’ is considered with skepticism¹⁷¹. Exposing or stating (not ‘unmasking’¹⁷²) these assumptions can help in the development of a new scientific approach that can compete or perhaps even substitute critical geopolitics, which has been dominating geopolitical scholarship in the United States of America¹⁷³, and is predominant in the European countries as well.

If the goal is “to develop” it is then inferred that someone already started the procedures for the foundation¹⁷⁴. For this study, the main references in neoclassical

¹⁷¹ Phil Kelly, ‘A Critique of Critical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 11, no. 1 (August 2006).

¹⁷² Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 56

¹⁷³ Terrence W. Haverluk, Kevin M. Beauchemin, Brandon A. Mueller, ‘The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2014): 19.

¹⁷⁴ There are authors who gave or still give major contributions to geopolitical studies’ framework [neoclassical geopolitics]. Among other names: J. Vicens Vives, Saul Cohen, Heinz Brill whose works will be quoted over and over again, as well as the mentioned Terrence W. Haverluk, Kevin M. Beauchemin and Brandon A. Mueller. It can also be enumerated: Everett Dolman (Everett C. Dolman, *Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2002)), Gyula Csurgai, (Gyula Csurgai, ed., *Geopolitics: Schools of Thought, Method of Analysis and Case Studies*. Geneva: Edition de Penthes, 2009), Robert D. Kaplan (Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography – What the Map tells us about coming conflicts and the battle against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2012)), Philip Kelly (Philip Kelly, ‘A Critique of Critical Geopolitics,’ *Geopolitics* vol. 11, no. 1 (August 2006)). In the Portuguese language: P. Valente de Almeida (Políbio Valente de Almeida, *Do Poder do Pequeno Estado (Enquadramento geopolítico da hierarquia das potências)* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 2012)), J. Borges de Macedo (Jorge Borges de Macedo, *História Diplomática Portuguesa – Constantes e Linhas de Força* (Lisboa: Instituto de Defesa Nacional, 2006)), A. Marques Bessa e C. Mendes Dias (António Marques Bessa and Carlos Mendes Dias, *O Salto do Tigre – Geopolítica Aplicada* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2007)), José F. Nogueira (José M. Freire Nogueira, *O Método Geopolítico Alargado – Persistências e Contingências em Portugal e no Mundo* (Lisboa: Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares, 2011)) and José P. Ferreira Teixeira (José P. Ferreira Teixeira published a couple of articles about geopolitics in *Nação e Defesa* Journal, and he translated Defarges’ quoted book to Portuguese language).

At the Charles University in Prague, particularly, a group of lecturers [*vide* at the end of this footnote] has been resisting, maintaining and developing geopolitical studies as a science under the realist theoretical tradition. That is something scarce in our days taking into account that, as it was mentioned, the majority of the Academia devoted to geopolitics (teaching, journals editing) is mainly ruled by critical geopolitics’ proponents.

Michal Romancov, ‘Quo vadis, Russia? Current Russian position between Asia and Europe,’ in *Contemporary security dilemmas: reflections on security in East Asia and Central Europe*, ed. Ladislav Cabada and Šárka Waisová (Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, 2006).

Martin Riegl, ‘Language and identity in Cyprus,’ *The Annual of Language & Politics and Politics of Identity* no. 2 (2008).

Jan Kofroň, ‘Possibilities of Neoclassical Geopolitics: a Systemic Approach’ (Abstract & Introduction Ph.D. thesis, Charles University in Prague, 2012).

Takashi Hosoda, ‘The Senkaku Islands and Japan,’ in *Strategic Regions in 21st Century Power Politics*, ed. by Martin Riegl, Jakub Landovský and Irina Valko (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014).

Irina Valko, ‘Differentiating Arctic Provinces: A Cluster Analysis of Geographic and Geopolitical Indicators,’ *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014).

Bohumil Doboš, ‘The Indian Ocean: The Neomedieval Analysis,’ in *Strategic Regions in 21st Century Power Politics*, ed. by Martin Riegl, Jakub Landovský and Irina Valko (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014).

The author of this thesis (*vide* also the papers quoted).

geopolitics are Chauprade and Thual. Their contributions will be intensively dissected and explained in the next section.

Concluding this section, Chauprade's rules of geopolitical studies put definitely forth the impossibility of making critical and neoclassical geopolitics fully compatible and underline the clear preference of this study for the latter¹⁷⁵. The rules are: (a) to refuse a single cause to explain problems (matching with the realist theoretical tradition¹⁷⁶); (b) to refuse submission to any ideology, but to include ideology as element to be itself analyzed; (c) to delimit what exactly geopolitical studies are about; (d) to clearly separate geopolitical studies from any nationalist purposes; (e) to test hypotheses against several factors; (f) to insist in the duality continuous/discontinuous; (g) to choose the state as unit of analysis; (h) to test the strength of geopolitical factors in the course of history; (i) to clearly state the influences received.

1.2.3. Delimitation of geopolitical studies (or neoclassical geopolitics) as scientific field

Geopolitics, as a discipline, started *badly* – that statement is conspicuously admitted. A deterministic approach to geopolitical phenomena, mechanic and absolutist biased theorizations concerning geography, promiscuity between the discipline and politics were some of the problems in classical geopolitics. Concerning German School of Geopolitics in particular, misguided interpretations of Ratzel by his disciples (especially Kjellén), even some mysticism, and of course ultimate distortion of German School of Geopolitics' concepts by the Nazi regime (once again, chaotic or non-existent delimitation between science and politics) were other problems that could be added to the former ones¹⁷⁷.

Consequently, to look at classical geopolitics with scorn would be considered the immediate reaction to take. That response – assumed by the vast majority of the

¹⁷⁵ Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l'histoire* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 2007), 7-23.

¹⁷⁶ Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)', *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 174.

¹⁷⁷ About this matter *vide*: Nuno Morgado, 'Новое открытие теллурукратической геополитики в Центральной Европе (К постановке проблемы научного подхода к немецкой школе геополитики)', *Political Science* (INION – Russian Academy of Sciences), no. 2 (Summer-Autumn 2014).

literature and virtually by all literature of critical geopolitics – would also be the easiest one in terms of common sense. However, science is not about common sense¹⁷⁸.

Therefore, being acknowledged that classical geopolitics may be compared to a city in ruins, result from combats from the past, the position here held – in the line of the author’s previous contributions – will not be looking with disdain over every classical geopolitics’ formulation, but rather to traipse slowly among the ruins, with the objective of carefully verifying which are the “belongings” that survived more or less intact (*e.g.* LAGE, RAUM) or even which “belongings” are still under the stones, able to be re-framed (*e.g.* elastic conception of borders, Pan-ideas) and used in geopolitical studies.

This said, and keeping in mind the task – reframing “belongings” (*i.e.* concepts) in a scientific theoretical and methodological approach – the upcoming delimitation of geopolitical studies as scientific approach will be accomplished in the six following steps: (i) definition of geopolitical studies; (ii) relations between geopolitical studies, political outputs, and ideologies; (iii) affinities of geopolitical studies with other fields (*e.g.* Geohistory, Geostrategy); (iv) theoretical fundamentals in geopolitical studies; (v) concepts and theories in geopolitical studies; (vi) methodological guidelines in geopolitical studies.

i. Definition of geopolitical studies

The general definition of geopolitical studies as *a science that studies the relations between political activity and space* needs supplementary considerations¹⁷⁹.

To the acceptance of that definition, it is vital to add that the object under study respects to the international level [cf. Section 1.1.3], *i.e.* to the International Relations (IR) in general, and to states’ foreign policies in particular.

In other words, this kind of branch of social sciences aims to study international relations emphasizing, since the very first moment, the STATE [cf. APPENDIX 2]

¹⁷⁸ Retaking the platonic gnoseological dualism, the true knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is located at the antipodes of common sense (δόξα), since commitment and passion for searching for the essence of the reality, and hard work too, are compulsory for a researcher.

¹⁷⁹ Vives stated: ‘... sentar las bases generales de una comprensión correcta del factor geográfico en el proceso histórico de las comunidades humanas.’ (Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 10). So, a purpose of geopolitics would be (transl.): ‘...to settle general bases in order to correctly understand the influence of the geographical factor on the historical process of human communities.’

(understood as the most relevant IR actor) as ‘geographically located’ entity¹⁸⁰. Therefore, the approach is particularly dedicated to analyzing correlations and causalities between the geographical setting and both states’ foreign policy outcomes and the international system as a whole¹⁸¹.

In this context (as it will be demonstrated below) the political consequences that derive from the geographical LAGE (LOCATION) is simply one phenomenon studied by geopolitical studies. In fact, there are other geopolitical factors to be put under the light.

Cohen defined geopolitics as the study about

‘the relation of international political power to the geographical setting’¹⁸².

This is a formulation that may be accepted, keeping in mind what was affirmed above¹⁸³. In this way, having geography as its bedrock, geopolitical studies are also interactive and dynamic, trying to answer questions as those conveyed by Defarges¹⁸⁴: ‘how does geographical setting influence *politics*?’ and ‘how do *élites* use space [at the international level]?’

Summing up, geopolitical studies are then defined as a descriptive-analytical approach that aims to explain the impact of the geographical setting on foreign policy and, by extension, on international politics. Later [cf. Chapter 2.1] an argument will be made to assert that *élites*’ perceptions and capacities (identity) filter geographical setting’s impact, therefore, completing the definition.

¹⁸⁰ António Marques Bessa, *O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos* (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 25.

António Marques Bessa and Carlos Mendes Dias, *O Salto do Tigre – Geopolítica Aplicada* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2007), 48.

Or ‘spatial phenomena’ – Geoffrey Parker, *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1985), 1.

¹⁸¹ This perspective matches with Sicker, since ‘geopolitical thinking’ is the idea that unifies his book – Martin Sicker, *Geography and Politics among Nations – an Introduction to Geopolitics* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010).

¹⁸² Saul B. Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a World Divided* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 29. Cohen gave more details on his definition of geopolitics in a later book – Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers, 2009), 12 – which are compatible with neoclassical geopolitics approach.

By their side, Haushofer, Obst, Lautensach and Maul stated: ‘*Die Geopolitik ist die Lehre von der Erdgebundenheit der politischen Vorgänge*’, in which no reference to IR can be noted – *Bausteine für Geopolitik*, S.27.

¹⁸³ That geography is a vast science, in which physical, biological and human components interact permanently [cf. Section 1.1.3.].

¹⁸⁴ Philippe Moreau Defarges, *Introdução à Geopolítica*, trans. José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes (Lisboa: Gradiva, 2012), 13.

Hence, geopolitical studies constitute an approach to the international relations¹⁸⁵, so geopolitical studies are not synonymous with international relations – a mistake intensively repeated in mass media, for example. As a matter of fact, numerous topics of international relations' studies (*e.g.* sociology of International Organizations, International Law *stricto sensu*) have weak links or are completely non-important to geopolitical studies.

On the other hand, although the laboratory of geopolitical studies is the international chessboard, geopolitical studies cannot be properly perceived as a Theory of International Relations, in the sense that geopolitical studies do not ambition to explain *grandly, abstractly* and *purely theoretically* international political relations around the globe. It is also true that geopolitical studies are much more than a simple regionalist approach since the research in the field makes an effort to connect the phenomenon under study with the international system.

Finally, geopolitical studies are not troubled about world hegemony or regional hegemony through a normative lens (that concerns to Geostrategy to some extent). Geopolitical studies are guided by the goal of analyzing the state-of-things instead, producing descriptions, explanations (causality and correlation) and predictions.

At this point, Weigert's observations about the existence of various 'geopolitics' – confusing geopolitics with GRAND STRATEGY [cf. APPENDIX 2] or even with geostrategy – may be considered, in this aspect, outdated¹⁸⁶.


Still in the topic of the definition of geopolitical studies, 'geopolitical studies' as a scientific approach must be separated from 'applied geopolitics'. The latter can be defined as a governmental technique of state's administration based on the geographical setting¹⁸⁷. The connection among these two domains (one scientific and the other political *tout court*) takes shape either by the investigation that geopolitical studies carry out about applied geopolitics as an object or the results from geopolitical studies that applied geopolitics may consider pertinent to be included in the political activity. Nevertheless, the domains exist ontologically independent (Fig. 1).

¹⁸⁵ Martin Sicker, *Geography and Politics among Nations – an Introduction to Geopolitics* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010).

¹⁸⁶ Hans Weigert, *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 22-23.

¹⁸⁷ For example, the definition of geopolitics that Couto e Silva provided is alien to "geopolitical studies", but accurate in defining "applied geopolitics" – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 64.

Figure 1 Geopolitical studies vs. applied geopolitics



Therefore, geopolitical studies cannot be understood in terms of a “theory of living organism” or a “conscience of state”, but a scientific branch, consequently committed to the scientific method. One will insist in this matter in the next subsection.

ii. *Relations between geopolitical studies, political outputs, and ideologies*

The relations between geopolitical studies and politics are one of the most significant problems in the field. Consequently, this study will promptly devote some more attention to this matter.

The demolishing criticism from *critical* geopolitics to “geopolitics” is based on the already mentioned “denunciation” that this sort of approach is nothing but a cloak to undercover imperialistic goals¹⁸⁸.

As it was already argued, such criticism cannot be any longer sustained if one takes neoclassical geopolitics’ guidelines into account¹⁸⁹. As a scientific approach, geopolitical studies make use of the scientific method to ‘[c]omprender, no justificar’¹⁹⁰ political goals and outputs¹⁹¹.

Dias affirmed that geopolitics could assist politics¹⁹². In fact, geopolitical studies may have a role in the dynamics of states’ political outcomes in the context of the international arena (thus influencing applied geopolitics). However, at the academic level, geopolitical studies should not be concerned about giving “advice to the Prince”,

¹⁸⁸ Vide for example: Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

¹⁸⁹ Nuno Morgado, ‘Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism. A New Look at an Old Problem,’ *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 239.

¹⁹⁰ Transl. ‘to understand, not to justify’ – Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 8.

¹⁹¹ Chauprade and Thual also expressed that neutral explanations in geopolitical studies are possible – Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 485.

¹⁹² Carlos Mendes Dias, *Geopolítica: Teorização Clássica e Ensinos* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2005), 59.

but only to carry out a study subordinated to the scientific method¹⁹³. Thual added that geopolitical studies aim nothing but to answer their own questions¹⁹⁴. This means that if geopolitical studies do not subsist isolated from practical politics – both because (1) Politics are its own object of study, and also because (2) results from geopolitical studies may be used in the context of political activities, especially in the conduct of foreign policies – it does not follow, however, that geopolitical studies exist to be vassal of political objectives.

In this way, one can bring back the categorization of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism as ideologies *tout court*, i.e. not as schools of thought that use the scientific method to analyze reality and to contribute to the progress of knowledge and the search for the essence of the reality, as a regular geopolitical study should target. Unlike that, although created from an amalgam of geopolitical concepts, ideas, theories, and principles – into a confusing and contradictory synthesis as it will be analyzed – Neo-Eurasianism targets simply to assist, or to provide the basis, so that a specific great power may (re-)emerge on the international arena. The same is valid for Meridionalism on supporting the Latin American regional integration maneuver¹⁹⁵. Whether this positioning is acceptable or not in terms of political MODALITIES OF ACTION [cf. APPENDIX 2] that concerns to a normative perspective that this study will avoid¹⁹⁶. The true problem, from the point of the scientific knowledge, is that such *modus operandi* is in no way acceptable. That is one of the reasons that justify the existence of this thesis about this object [cf. APPENDIX 2: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND IDEOLOGY].

¹⁹³ In truth, geopolitical studies are not normative and prescriptive, its essence is rather explanatory - António Marques Bessa and Carlos Mendes Dias, *O Salto do Tigre – Geopolítica Aplicada* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2007), 24-25.

¹⁹⁴ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l'actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996), 4.

¹⁹⁵ This sort of initiative is frequent in *classical* geopolitics, in which there is no systematized effort to distinguish Geopolitics from Geostrategy – as this thesis tries to do. One of the main questions for classical geopolitics would be: which part/region of the world must be controlled in order to grant control over the globe? *Choke points*, *Heartland*, *Mitteleuropa* and Eastern Europe, *Rimland*, the answers succeeded. Consequently, the works on *classical geopolitics* included often policy prescriptions, territorial justifications, etc. (issues that belong to the geostrategic domain). For example, even Vidal de la Blache, the creator of the possibilist theoretical fundament, produced a study about Alsace-Lorraine/Elsaß-Lothringen, justifying why that region should be considered a French region (Paul Vidal de la Blache, *La France de l'Est* (Paris: La Découverte, 1994)). Apparently, these facts might give reason to the “denunciation” done by *critical geopolitics*. Still, geopolitical studies or *neoclassical geopolitics* (as already stated) and its theoretical and methodological guidelines are aliens to the accusations of *critical geopolitics*. In *résumé*: because of the mistakes of the discipline at its first phase, the whole condemnation of the scientific field does not logically follow.

¹⁹⁶ Toma and Gorman classified geopolitical approach precisely as a non-normative approach to international relations (Peter Toma and Robert Gorman *International Relations. Understanding Global Issues* (Pacific Grove: Brooks Cole, 1991), 57.

There is still more to be stated in this discussion about the relations between geopolitical studies and political outcomes.

The findings of geopolitical studies can certainly be useful for accurate political action *a posteriori*. Their relevance is far superior to other factors (ideology, for instance). Two examples of World War II may serve as empirical evidence. The first example was the alliance between Germany and Russia as an essential step for the consolidation of German power and global changing of the *status quo*. German School of Geopolitics had been clear about this point¹⁹⁷. The prescription was translated into a treaty signed in 1939 by what seemed to be ideological and totalitarian rivals: the Nazi and the Communist regimes. In 1941, Hitler took his ideological principles to the level of violation of the treaty, launching the military invasion of the Soviet Union that inevitably led to the defeat, humiliation and division of Germany. Ideology overcame the geoconjunctive maneuver.

The Portugal from the 30s can offer a second example. At that time, in ideological terms, Portugal had more to do with the Italian regime, rather than with the U.S. or the U.K. democracies. Nevertheless, Portugal chose to become closer to the Allies. Geopolitical studies' approach can provide the explanation of that political outcome. The territorial configuration of the state – *Portugal Ultramarino* [Portuguese Provinces Overseas] [cf. Chapter 5] – demanded the circulation on the Atlantic Ocean, an area under the control of the British and the U.S. navies. In this case, ideology was pushed down by applied geopolitics, taking into consideration geostrategic maneuvers.

At last, what does ideology *per se* have to deal with accurate states' GRAND STRATEGY [cf. APPENDIX 2] as object studied by geopolitical studies? '*La géopolitique l'emporte l'idéologie*'¹⁹⁸ or political interests with geopolitical relevance prevail over ideological arguments, as Chauprade and Thual affirmed. In the words of Karl Haushofer:

'En tout état de cause une connaissance réelle et scientifique de la géopolitique doit nécessairement échapper à toute considération partisane et doit être

¹⁹⁷ Nuno Morgado, 'Новое открытие теллуократической геополитики в Центральной Европе (К постановке проблемы научного подхода к немецкой школе геополитики),' *Political Science* (INION – Russian Academy of Sciences), no. 2 (Summer-Autumn 2014): 212.

¹⁹⁸ transl. 'Geopolitics overcomes ideology'- Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 320.

également vraie pour l'extrême gauche comme pour l'extrême droite...' ¹⁹⁹

In these circumstances of the primary relevance of geopolitical studies's findings, it is common to observe the same geostrategic goal defended by distinct ideologies, and despite dissimilar modalities of action. The Russian Empire was neither the Bolchevique Russia, nor Russian Neo-Eurasianism. However, Russian interest in Ukraine and Crimea subsisted in 1783 and in 1921-2, as it stands today in 2016. Therefore, the spotlight is on space, not on time.

Moreover, the ideological debate denies the possibility of considering the search for the essence of the reality. Naturally, that attitude is widely admissible in regard to Politics, in which the struggle for power is the principal mechanism and the occupation of power positions is the utmost goal. However, the ideological perspective is by no means admissible in the scientific approach, in which the consideration of all facts, data, information is vital for the confirmation or refusal of hypotheses, under the search for the essence of reality as the highest purpose. The validity of Aristotle's classical argument – and Max Weber's posterior reformulation²⁰⁰ – still endures: there is the 'speech of the agent' (politician, politics, applied geopolitics), and there is the 'speech of the researcher' (scientist, science, geopolitical studies).

iii. Affinities of geopolitical studies with other fields (e.g. Geohistory, Geostrategy)

After having defined geopolitical studies and made considerations about the relations between geopolitical studies and politics and ideologies, the affinity and discrepancy among geopolitical studies and other scientific domains should also be ascertained.

Political Geography was above-cited and the hierarchy (intrastate/ state/ international relations) was formulated, to the end of including geopolitical studies at the international stage [cf. Section 1.1.3.]. Yet, the literature is not consensual about this argument. Soppelsa²⁰¹, Couto e Silva²⁰², Chauprade²⁰³, Thual²⁰⁴, Dias²⁰⁵, Martin²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁹ retransl. 'no matter the conditions, a real and scientific knowledge in geopolitics must escape from any influence from political parties, and it must remain true in the same way to both far-left and far-right. . .'
– Karl Haushofer, *De la Géopolitique*, trans. André Meyer (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 101.

²⁰⁰ Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946).

²⁰¹ Jacques Soppelsa, *Géopolitique de 1945 à nos jours* (Paris: Editions Dalloz – Sirey, 1993), 1.

among others, defended the opposite argument of the existence of an “internal geopolitics”. This research piece, however, insists that geopolitical studies have to be essentially delimited to the international level. Although the interpenetration among levels subsists [cf. Subchapter 2.1.], it is believed that this delimitation is essential to explain what the discipline is primarily about. Therefore, regarding intra-state and state-level impact of geography on domestic politics, those objects can be studied by political geography and specific sub-fields. Certainly, the conclusions, findings, and results by the disciplines are shared, but the objects should be strictly allocated.

Moreover, it is not only a problem of allocation of objects but also a problem of methodological approaches. Political geography is static and synchronic²⁰⁷, while geopolitical studies are dynamic and diachronic (identification of power dynamics, GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES or ‘*forces profondes*’²⁰⁸). Historical Geography (as political geography) is a static discipline too, studying relations between Man and geographical setting exclusively in the past²⁰⁹.

Although Geohistory – understanding the reference to the geohistorical method – comprises the dynamism typical of geopolitical studies, whereas geopolitical studies focus on the present, geohistory focuses naturally on the past. The point to bear in mind is that geopolitical studies need the geohistorical method as an instrument. This idea will be discussed below [cf. Section 1.2.3. Subsection vi].

The most complex relation that geopolitical studies may face is, perhaps, the relation with GEOSTRATEGY. Currently, in the mass media – and sometimes even in the literature at the Academia – the use of both terms “geopolitics” and “geostrategy” with

²⁰² Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 61

²⁰³ Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l’histoire* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 2007).
Aymeric Chauprade and François Thuau, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1998).

²⁰⁴ François Thuau, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996).

²⁰⁵ Carlos Mendes Dias, *Geopolítica: Teorização Clássica e Ensinaamentos* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2005).

²⁰⁶ André Roberto Martin, ‘As fronteiras internas e a “questão regional” do Brasil,’ (Ph.D. thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 1993).

²⁰⁷ Carlos Mendes Dias, *Geopolítica: Teorização Clássica e Ensinaamentos* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2005), 64.

²⁰⁸ Transl. ‘profound forces’ is an expression used by Renouvin and Duroselle to characterize geopolitical factors (geography, demography, economy and finance, identity, feelings [and perceptions]) that influence Diplomacy – Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Introduction à l’Histoire des Relations Internationales* (Paris: Armand Collin, 1991): 1-2.

As for GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES, *vide*: APPENDICES 2 and 3 and Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l’histoire* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 2007), 211-596 and Aymeric Chauprade, ‘Che cos’è la geopolitica?’ *Geopolitica*, Vol. 1, No.3 (Autumn 2012): 15.

²⁰⁹ Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 76.

no peculiarities, with no attention to the definition of concepts, is very common. In this way, it seems more than urgent to define and delimit concepts. Narrower than “geopolitics” (considering that geostrategy converges exclusively on non-cooperative modalities of action), geostrategy can link geopolitical studies’ findings to political activity at an *a posteriori* level. The definition of geostrategy given by Brzezinski: ‘the strategic management of geopolitical interests’ converges with this argument²¹⁰.

Therefore, geostrategy would not be taken as a scientific field such as geopolitical studies, but a practical domain of politics (applied geopolitics), in which results from geopolitical studies may be pursued. For this reason, geostrategy is also very close to military geography.

It follows logically that geopolitical studies observe and analyze how the geostrategic management is executed, while geostrategy can work with results of geopolitical studies, pointing out a way for action. Therefore, the contrary cannot be accepted. The reason is simple: while geostrategy is committed to power interests, geopolitical studies, as a scientific activity, have to persevere independent.

Geostrategy may be then understood as applied political activity, *i.e.* not located within the scientific context *strictu senso*, but within the political environment of the struggle for power – *Realpolitik*. So, geostrategy would not be concerned with the search for the essence of the reality under the scientific method, but interested mainly or exclusively in achieving goals that may, or may not, have been established by prescriptions directly or indirectly deduced from geopolitical studies. In one phrase only: there could be no efficient geostrategy without results of exact geopolitical studies²¹¹. Such clear delimitation of fields, consequently, represents an evolution, considering past erratic titles of articles by the author²¹².

At this point, Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism can be identified not only as ideologies but also as geostrategies.

On the other hand, geostrategy is a daughter of Strategic Studies. At this level, the debate is endless [cf. Section 1.2.3. Subsection vi]. For now, it is central to keep in

²¹⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard – American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (USA: Basic Books, 1997), xiv.

²¹¹ This idea was also accepted by Célérier – Pierre Célérier, *Géopolitique et Géostratégie* (Paris: PUF, 1961), 84 – although the symbiosis among geopolitics and geostrategy pursued by him is rejected in this thesis.

²¹² Nuno Morgado, ‘Japan and Russia: alternative *geopolitics* within a multipolar international context,’ *Geopolitica* vol. 2, no. 2/3 (Summer-Autumn 2013). and Nuno Morgado, Portugal, Russia and a conceivable Lusophone bloc – a *geopolitical* opportunity’ *Maria Scientia* no. 6 (Summer 2013).

mind only that it is in the Strategic Potential Analysis' field that the selection and analysis of data for posterior geopolitical studies occur²¹³. All the same, while considering both multidisciplinary and the further continuation in terms of strategic action (*i.e.* Strategic Planning), Strategic Studies are much broader than geopolitical studies.

Table 1
Applied geopolitics' maneuvers

"APPLIED GEOPOLITICS"

Geoconjunctive maneuvers
- Cooperation -

Geostrategic maneuvers
- No cooperation -

iv. Theoretical fundamentals in geopolitical studies

Hacking argued that due to the constructionist pleading that 'things are not what they seem,' Plato's ontological dualism between "reality" and "appearance" was dug up, something 'very old-fashioned' he added²¹⁴. *Critical* geopolitics walk in those ways, but geopolitical studies offer a different path.

The relevance of empirical facts, of documents as sources, not only allow honest research under strict ethical rules but also assist in correcting theories and in discarding radical perspectivism. Although this point of view (the scientific one) is traditional, it must be however stated, taking into account that, as Wight reminded, some postmodernist claims '... that the historical record plays no role'²¹⁵ may cause confusion, pushing science away from its methods, in the sense that everything could be laid into a "narrative"²¹⁶.

The point is now asking: how to *deal* with, and how to *look* at *facts*? Geopolitical studies come then in, comprising a group of theoretical fundamentals that constitute the lens through which facts are observed and studied.

²¹³ E.g. Abel Cabral Couto, *Elementos de Estratégia*. Vol I. (Lisboa: Instituto Altos Estudos Militares, 1988), 257-281.

²¹⁴ Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 49.

²¹⁵ Colin Wight, 'MetaCampbell: the epistemological problematics of perspectivism,' *Review of International Studies* Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 1999): 313.

²¹⁶ With respect to methods and techniques, Bennet and Checkel (eds) admitted that the danger to reduce all narratives to '...story telling' is inherent to '...radical or post-modern views...' particularly (although the authors acknowledged the compatibility between that technique and post-structuralist approaches) – Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing – From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 15.

As it happened with the section devoted to classical geopolitics, once again comes the problem of lack of space in this research piece. Therefore, the fundamentals will be simply listed²¹⁷: (i) Geography remains the bedrock of geopolitical studies; (ii) Possibilism; (iii) Multidisciplinarity; (iv) GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES; (v) Potential for conflict (TERRITORIALITY); (vi) Predictions; (vii) State as unit of analysis; (viii) epistemology in geopolitical studies [cf. APPENDIX 2 & 3].

Therefore, the conception of the state as a living organism, determinism, mechanism, single causes, all may be listed as refused theoretical cores in geopolitical studies.

Respecting this group of theoretical fundamentals would guarantee that geopolitical studies, differing of *classical* geopolitics, would avoid a set of mistakes.

The last issue concerning theoretical fundamentals concerns to the compatibility between geopolitical studies and the realist theoretical tradition, but that will be an object of the subchapter 2.1.

v. *Concepts and theories in geopolitical studies*

A short note about concepts and theories will serve to remind that the majority of them used in geopolitical studies are seized from *classical geopolitics*' doctrines (e.g. Mackinder, Haushofer, Spykman). They can be found and defined in the literature of those classics, together with other references such as: Chauprade, Thual²¹⁸, and Kelly²¹⁹. The most relevant geopolitical concepts mentioned directly in this thesis can be found in the APPENDIX 2 – Glossary duly defined.

vi. *Methodological guidelines in geopolitical studies*

The last step in the task of delimiting geopolitical studies as scientific field concerns to the fundamentals of science: the methodology. Since geopolitical studies are located in the sphere of social sciences, it is opportune to keep in mind three key methodological topics of social sciences.

²¹⁷ The author explained the meaning and the implications of those theoretical fundamentals, and quoted basic literature in: Nuno Morgado, 'Neoclassical Geopolitics answers: how can the influence of states' geographical setting on international relations be studied?' in: RAYS (Romanian Association of Young Scholars) *International Interdisciplinary Doctoral Conference*, Bucharest, Romania, 25th September 2015. A paper including the findings of that conference paper should be published soon.

²¹⁸ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998).

²¹⁹ Philip Kelly, 'Quarantatre teorie e concetti per un modelo geopolítico,' *Geopolitica* vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 19-34.

Firstly, all the six rules of qualitative research must be fully respected in a geopolitical study²²⁰. The rule no. 3 (impossibility of full understanding of phenomenon) and the rule no. 5 (to refuse the single cause) are particularly significant in the light of what has been affirmed. Secondly, comparison²²¹ and causation²²², as procedures of inquiry, are decisive axes to achieve the explanation and understanding of geopolitical phenomena. Thirdly, the usefulness of case studies²²³ and process tracing²²⁴ for geopolitical studies is also assured.

At this level, the main question on methodological guidelines arises: *what kind of steps should a geopolitical study follow, that means, what is the specific methodological path that a geopolitical study should follow to make a scientific contribution?*²²⁵

A. Guidelines for the assessment of the relative state potential

Theoretical formulations about the wide domain of strategic studies (*e.g.* theory of strategy, *grand* strategy, strategic planning) are easy to find in the extensive amount of literature about the object²²⁶. For this thesis, strategic studies are important in the specific intersection of the theoretical fundament of MULTIDISCIPLINARITY [cf. APPENDIX 3]. That is then the point in which strategic studies impact on geopolitical studies, therefore, it is the point in which the former assists in the methodological

²²⁰ To get acquainted with all rules *vide*: David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data – Methods for analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction* (London: SAGE, 2000), 196-211.

²²¹ R. Murray Thomas, *Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations* (London: Corwin Press, 2003), 84-86.

²²² R. Murray Thomas, *Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations* (London: Corwin Press, 2003), 86-89.

²²³ ‘... when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its context’ and requires ‘...multiple sources of evidence’ – Robert Yin, *Application of Case Study Research* (London: SAGE, 2003), 4.

²²⁴ Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed., *Process Tracing – From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

²²⁵ In fact, Sicker insisted that geopolitics is primarily a ‘methodological approach’ – Martin Sicker, *Geography and Politics among Nations – an Introduction to Geopolitics* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010), 7.

²²⁶ Among others *vide*:

André Beaufre, *An introduction to strategy: with particular reference to problems of defense, politics, economics, and diplomacy in the nuclear age* trans. R.H. Barry (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

António Silva Ribeiro, *Teoria Geral da Estratégia* (Lisboa: Almedina, 2009).

Bernard Brodie, ‘Strategy as a Science,’ *World Politics* vol.1, no.4, (1949): 467- 488.

Hedley Bull, ‘Strategic Studies and Its Critics,’ *World Politics* vol.20, no.4 (1968): 593-605.

J. Boone Bartholomees, ed., *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).

Richard K Betts, ‘Should Strategic Studies Survive?’ *World Politics* vol. 50, no.1 (1997): 7-33.

Also author’s elsewhere contribution: Nuno Morgado, ‘Imigração Ilegal: enquadramento do problema da Nova Ameaça na Estratégia. O caso da Alemanha,’ *Finis Mundi, Journal of metapolitics, history & culture*, no. 7 (Autumn 2013): 14-33.

approach of the latter. The synchronization of the problem can then be resumed in the questions: *what* from strategic studies is to be included in geopolitical studies and what is to be excluded? And which are the justifications for those choices? Consequently, the problem is both theoretical and methodological.

The answer can be broken down into three levels: (i) Chauprade's variables in geopolitical studies help in making methodological choices [cf. APPENDIX 3]²²⁷, (ii) the concrete ways on *how* to proceed can be assisted by intelligence techniques²²⁸, and (iii) the assignment of state's potential analysis will provide comprehensive methodological steps. The latter aspect is, for this thesis, the crucial contribution of strategic studies to geopolitical studies (fig. 2).

In spite of its complexities and limitations, state's potential analysis has the objective of listing and assessing the capabilities, means and resources owned by a state²²⁹. Those capabilities, means, resources constitute the basis for any political action.


²²⁷ Chauprade contended that geopolitical studies can be decomposed in three variables, which remain stable ('geopolitical determinisms'): 1- Geographical reality (*e.g.* location, geographical features); 2- Identity reality (*e.g.* ethnicity, nation, language, religion, pan-ideas, minorities, socio-economic categories, civilizations, demography (number of population)); and 3- Struggle for resources (*e.g.* sea, routes, water, oil). Adding those stable variables, there are other variables that can rapidly change: 4- Geographical revolutions (*e.g.* cataclysms, human action *changing* geography); 5- Technological revolutions (*e.g.* sea, industry, air, airspace, nuclear, military affairs); 6- Transnational problems (*e.g.* international crime, mundialization, regionalization) – Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l'histoire* (Paris: Éditions de la Pléiade, 2007).

²²⁸ Intelligence analysis, as approach, is particularly useful to geopolitical studies reminding that the information of some sources can be deliberately wrong. False/wrong or incorrect data and information have the finality of leading to invalid conclusions – Department of the Army – Headquarters, *Intelligence Officer's Handbook* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 2010), 23. In addition, STRATFOR, a geopolitical analysis corporation, systematized the intelligence procedures in three basic methodological phases: to monitor and to filter data, posterior analysis, and final distribution – STRATFOR, 'Methodology,' March 15, 2014, <http://www.stratfor.com/about/methodology>. As a matter of fact, intelligence cycle has several similarities with the scientific method: (a) planning; (b) collection; (c) evaluation, interpretation and analysis/ fictional scenarios generation; (d) dissemination and reporting – *vide* for example Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'Intelligence Analysts,' March 15, 2014, <https://www.fbi.gov/121.asp> or Don McDowell, *Strategic Intelligence – A handbook for Practitioners, Managers and Users* (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 2009), 18, 20.

As for intelligence specific methodological tools – '...techniques for structuring information, challenging assumptions, and exploring alternative interpretations' (Jack Davis, 'Improving Intelligence Analysis at CIA: Dick Heuer's Contribution to Intelligence Analysis,' January 2, 2016, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/psych-intel/art3.html#rft1>) – useful to geopolitical studies could be pointed out: (1) 'evaluation and interpretation' of mass of information (John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy – Principles and Practice* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1974), 12), (2) 'analytic penetration' (Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence – From Secrets to Policy* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2015), 175), (3) Richard Heuer's contribution of 'Analysis of Competing Hypotheses' (Jack Davis, 'Improving Intelligence Analysis at CIA: Dick Heuer's Contribution to Intelligence Analysis,' January 2, 2016, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/psych-intel/art3.html#rft1>), and (4) 'reliable chronology' and 'chart hierarchy of organizations' (Loch K. Johnson, ed., *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (London: Routledge, 2007), 24).

²²⁹ Models or analysis of state's potential are many and diverse. Among others *vide*: Abel Cabral Couto, *Elementos de Estratégia*. Vol I. (Lisboa: Instituto Altos Estudos Militares, 1988).

Figure 2
Diagram of strategic studies and geopolitical studies



Rationality as pattern, by its side, determines that the state should not act beyond those capabilities, means, resources. In this way, it is possible to infer the usefulness of this exercise to geopolitical studies, since the findings of state potential analysis will report about the *status* of the state (and that will have direct relations with the foreign policy [cf. Subchapter 2.1.]), without which geopolitical studies are impossible.

Still, the fields remain distinct due to theoretical issues and to finalities. In fact, whereas geopolitical studies are mainly focused on investigating inter-state relations (and once again those are impossible to examine without the assessment of states' "force" (*i.e.* potential)), strategic studies are prone to include political guidelines or prescriptions²³⁰. This topic was already discussed above²³¹.

Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980).

Ray S. Cline, *World power assessment: A calculus of strategic drift* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977).

Wilhelm Fucks, *Formeln zur Macht – Prognosen über Völker, Wirtschaft, Pontentiale* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965).

²³⁰ Beaufre defined Strategy in fact as '...the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute' – André Beaufre, *An introduction to strategy: with particular reference to problems of defense, politics, economics, and diplomacy in the nuclear age* trans. R.H. Barry (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 22.

²³¹ All the same, it is acknowledged that for the sake of its success a strategic planning applied to IR cannot ignore geopolitical studies' results. *Vide*: António Marques Bessa and Carlos Mendes Dias, *O Salto do Tigre – Geopolítica Aplicada* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2007), 23; and also 'La géopolitique est clairement en amont de la stratégie' – Aymeric Chauprade, *Introduction à l'analyse géopolitique* (Paris: Ellipses, 1999), 7.

Summing up, strategic potential analysis, which is located at the beginning of strategic planning (politics and strategy), is able to offer certain steps to geopolitical studies, if *strategic* potential analysis is understood as *state's* potential analysis.

The *relative material state potential* becomes the first independent variable in geopolitical studies (table 3). Once that finding is stated, the matter now is how to operationalize its analysis in geopolitical studies?

Making use of Cabral Couto's model, the following factors are expected to be covered: (i) physical factor (PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY as Chauprade's 1st stable variable); (ii) human factor (IDENTITY as the 2nd stable variable); (iii) resources and communications factor (struggle for RESOURCES as the 3rd stable variable); (iv) historical factor (as core of the *geohistorical method*); (v) economic factor (connected to RESOURCES and the basis for military power, a key factor in Offensive Realism); (vi) societal and cultural factor (IDENTITY as the 2nd stable variable); (vii) scientific-technological factor (technological revolutions as the 2nd unstable variable); (viii) political and administrative factor (*e.g.* foreign policy as state's outcomes in IR); and (ix) military factor (the ultimate state's power in IR and key factor in Offensive Realism, added to nuclear superiority).

Despite being pertinent, Cabral Couto's classification seems however too confusing to deal with in the operationalization of a geopolitical study. Hence, it is proposed a new typology of methodological procedures based on six topics, *i.e.* on six geopolitical factors. The objective, once again, is to assess the state's relative material potential: 1. geographical space (RAUM), 2. geographical position (LAGE), 3. circulation, 4. RESOURCES, 5. psychosocial projection on the territory, 6. politico-military structures. Due to space constraints *vide* APPENDIX 3 for an extensive description of this step in the geopolitical studies' model.

B. Guidelines for the examination of systemic constraints

Systemic constraints would be the second independent variable in geopolitical studies (table 3). For investigating them, reclaiming the principles and permanent objectives of Geography²³² [cf. Section 1.1.3.] would definitely help in consolidating the methodological structure of geopolitical studies [cf. APPENDIX 3]. However, since

²³² Recapturing: (i) to locate the phenomena geographically (*where?*); (ii) to describe the phenomena (*what? who? with what? which intentions?*); (iii) to explain and to contextualize the phenomena (*how? how so?*); and (iv) to establish the relations of the phenomena, *i.e.* long-term perspective (*which connections? which advantages?*).

Geography is an eminently descriptive science, it is required to add a more dynamic approach. The contribution of Brill turns out to be critical.

In spite of the book's subtitle (which may confuse the reader by thinking that the work is devoted to geostrategy), Brill accomplished an excellent geopolitical study²³³. Brill's concern with scenarios analysis in security terms establishes, furthermore, connections with intelligence analysis. The methodological hints given by Brill in the mentioned book, together with the successful systematization in its appendix 3, make a convincing case for including this author in neoclassical geopolitics²³⁴. However, it is not ignored that Brill positioned himself in the geostrategic field²³⁵. That positioning is unsurprising if taken into account the fact that Brill started by defining *geopolitics* in accordance to Kjellén. Understandably, nothing better than to have created a distance between his work and the Swedish author's.

En résumé, Brill's methodological procedures in geopolitical studies were²³⁶: (1) identification of the position of the country (in concrete terms of Space-Power-Constellation); (2) verification of geopolitical [*i.e. geostrategic or geoconjunctive*] position as political causation in the decision-making process; (3) assessment of international conflicts; (4) criticism to unique cause and determinism [cf. APPENDIX 3].

Consequently, there is a full logical compatibility between such methodological procedures and concepts, and methods across the board from other authors in the geopolitical studies' domain (*e.g.* refusal of mechanism, determinism and single cause, existence of POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT, SPHERES OF INFLUENCE).

At this point, methodological guidelines start to give a tangible mental scheme for operationalizing geopolitical studies. The *relative material state potential* together with *systemic constraints* would constitute the independent variables in geopolitical studies. As for the intervening variables (taken from the neoclassical realist theory) they will be examined in the next subchapter [cf. 2.1.]. Thus the study will now move forward to identifying two methodological cores in geopolitical studies.

²³³ Heinz Brill, *Geopolitik Heute – Deutschlands Chance?* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1994).

²³⁴ It is believed that Brill shrinks excessively the field of geopolitical studies, in detriment of geostrategy's enlargement (in the whole work). Particularly: 'Damit ist die geopolitische bzw. geostrategische Lage in der konkreten Raum-Mächte-Konstellation angesprochen' – Heinz Brill, *Geopolitische Analysen – Beiträge zur deutschen und internationalen Sicherheitspolitik 1974-2008* (Bissendorf: Biblio, 2008), 42.

²³⁵ Heinz Brill, *Geopolitik Heute – Deutschlands Chance?* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1994), 180.

²³⁶ Heinz Brill, *Geopolitik Heute – Deutschlands Chance?* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1994), 179.

C. Guidelines for the identification of the Geopolitical Design and the Sense of Space (RAUMSINN)²³⁷

A core task in the operationalization of a geopolitical study would also be an accurate investigation about: (1) the GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN; and (2) the RAUMSINN or “sense of space” [cf. APPENDIX 2].

The characterization of a states’ ‘GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN’²³⁸ consists in the identification of both (1.1.) the group of geopolitical goals and (1.2.) its hierarchy, proceeding, therefore, from real intentions to appearances²³⁹. The means how to unveil such fundamental information rely on the analysis of diplomatic, military and intelligence and secret services’ documentation²⁴⁰.

As for the RAUMSINN²⁴¹, the point is to study the conscience, or the sense, or the perception of space that *élites* have concerning their own country, *i.e.* how far can the *élites* discern or ignore the implication of the geographical setting’s incentives in the foreign policy conduct; *ergo*, the relevance of neoclassical realist theory to geopolitical studies, a topic to be investigated below [cf. Subchapter 2.1.]. In this context, as it will be formulated, geopolitical studies’ approach should also be based on the hypothesized causal relation that *élites*’ perceptions and capacities are fundamental in explaining states’ international successes or failures. It is believed that those successes or failures are dependent on the attention or lack of attention to geopolitical studies’ findings, which can demonstrate how geography may impact on foreign policy.

The study of the RAUMSINN starts by the geohistorical approach examining the past, and the geopolitical design studying the present and the future scenario, using the comparative method to refine the conclusions. These are the geopolitical studies’ findings. Then, while observing empirical foreign policy outcomes (their successes or

²³⁷ This topic was discussed in the conference paper: Nuno Morgado, ‘Geopolitical Design and the ‘Sense of Space’ – methodological cores in Geopolitical Studies,’ in *3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences & Arts*, SGEM Vienna Hofburg, 6th – 9th April 2016, Book 2 Political Sciences, Law, Finance, Economics & Tourism, Volume I Political Science (Sofia: SGEM International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences & Arts, 2016).

²³⁸ ‘dispositif géopolitique’ – François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité* (Paris: Éditions, 1996).

²³⁹ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité* (Paris: Éditions, 1996), 20. Thual is also attached to the phenomenological attitude, searching for “the essence of things as they appear” as a first step of the method.


²⁴⁰ *Vide* also: Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Éditions, 1998), 486-487.

²⁴¹ The concept was originally formulated by Ratzel with ambiguities and subjective somehow – Friedrich Ratzel, *Géographie Politique*, trans. Pierre Rusch (Paris: Éditions Régionales Européennes S.A., 1988), 290. In geopolitical studies, the concept of RAUMSINN assumes a precise, empirical, thus falsifiable definition.

failures), the researcher can finally evaluate the RAUMSINN, in the sense that if the researcher is analyzing a successful foreign policy, most likely no GEOMISGUIDANCE²⁴² [cf. APPENDIX 2] is to be identified. That means that the *élites* perceive well and are capable of dealing with the geographical setting's incentives.

Summing up, the assessment of the RAUMSINN respects to which extent the geographical setting's incentives with impact on foreign policy are being explored (*i.e.* accurately perceived) or neglected (*i.e.* GEOMISGUIDANCE/incapacities) by the foreign policy executive.

Figure 3
Analyzing the *Raumsinn*



Notwithstanding the relevance of everything discussed thus far, it may be logically inferred that the assessment of “location” [LAGE] is not enough for a geopolitical study in its totality. That is a solid conclusion until now. Therefore, geopolitical studies cannot merely be reduced to the analysis of implications of “location”. SPACE (*e.g.* extension, shape, BORDERS), CIRCULATION (*e.g.* ROUTES), RESOURCES (*e.g.* oil, gas water), psychosocial projection on the territory (*e.g.*

²⁴² This concept was created by the author and presented by the first time at: Nuno Morgado, ‘Neoclassical Geopolitics answers: how can the influence of states’ geographical setting on international relations be studied?’ in: RAYS (Romanian Association of Young Scholars) *International Interdisciplinary Doctoral Conference*, Bucharest, Romania, 25th September 2015.

demography, welfare, IDENTITY), politico-military structures are also crucial factors to be analyzed in a geopolitical study [cf. APPENDIX 3]

D. Guidelines in terms of a particular approach

There is still more to be stated about how to operationalize geopolitical studies and the role of historical analysis in the field.

Vives' geohistorical method, a mental procedure resulting from the interconnection among History and Geography, is considered an accurate and extremely valid tool to deal with both disciplines²⁴³, pointing out GEOHISTORICAL DEDUCTIONS²⁴⁴, and making use of maps with arrow icons intensively, among other techniques. Concerning History in particular²⁴⁵, its use as an auxiliary field to understand problems is indispensable for geopolitical studies, since intentions and goals investigated by geopolitical studies are identifiable via a long-term perspective²⁴⁶. COORDINATED APPREHENSION gives a hand here too [cf. APPENDIX 2]²⁴⁷.

To better operationalize both the geohistorical method and geopolitical studies as a whole, Chauprade and Thual advanced further methodological steps, comprised in the outline of states' territorial morphogenesis divided into two phases²⁴⁸: (i) territorial appraisal: steps of territorial foundation, identification of core/s of impulse [GEOHISTORICAL NUCLEUS], consolidated expansion areas, gained/lost areas, definitely lost areas; (ii) threats to territorial integrity: claims, secessionism, their motivations,

²⁴³ Methodological guidelines based on the interconnection of historical and geographical analysis has been a constant since the very foundation of the discipline of *geopolitics*.

Among many others *vide*:

Heinz Brill, *Geopolitik Heute – Deutschlands Chance?* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1994), 149

Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 25-27

Karl Haushofer, *An English Translation and Analysis of Major General Karl Ernst Haushofer's – Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: Studies on the Relationship between Geography and History* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).

²⁴⁴ Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 13, 27.

²⁴⁵ The discipline that studies facts from the past taken in the sense that Ranke gave to it – *vide* for example: Leopold von Ranke, *History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations 1494-1514* (London: George Bell & Sons, 1909). Ranke helped out in the foundation of a scientific discipline based on documents (primary sources) and *objective* interpretation of facts, therefore, distant from any mechanic dynamics towards a [hegelian, marxist, or other] final stage of perfection and/or progress.

²⁴⁶ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l'actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996), 22.

²⁴⁷ Bringing the phenomenological attitude back, a valid knowledge crossing time and space is preconized.

²⁴⁸ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 567.

ambitions²⁴⁹; and further observations concerning questions of IDENTITY (MINORITIES, religion, language).

E. Guidelines on area studies.

It is noteworthy that qualitative methodology is applicable in geopolitical studies through a “regional approach” – Area Studies. In this way, one may disagree with Brill, who attached geopolitical studies to the context of *Weltpolitik* [World politics], rather than to regional contexts²⁵⁰. Area studies and regional approaches are extremely important instruments, although they must be ultimately integrated into the World System (systemic constraints) – the ‘microscope’ and ‘telescope’ as Chauprade put it²⁵¹.

From the strategic studies’ point of view, area studies are an ideal approach concerning multidisciplinary. Area studies are also more than appropriate in the frame of traditionalist methodology, as they avoid the problem of rational-choice models as the determinant explanation of political behavior, living space for ‘plastic control’ as Almond and Genco suggested²⁵². In this vein, the Italian-Chinese review on geopolitics, *Heartland*, wisely observed that ‘specific cases, not theories’ constitute the core of geopolitical reasoning²⁵³. Naturally, that does not mean that the theoretical cores, concepts, etc. formulated above and below are irrelevant. Clearly, they are not irrelevant since geopolitical studies use theories and concepts extensively. Instead, the point is that geopolitical studies, although a non-experimental science (like Astronomy), are an empirical science, thus deeply connected to the material reality in a case-to-case study²⁵⁴.

From this point on, making use of this group of guidelines, geopolitical studies may be strengthened in terms of structure. Despite that, it must be reminded that reality

²⁴⁹ Also Cohen took these problems in his studies - Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers, 2009), 153.

²⁵⁰ Heinz Brill, *Geopolitik Heute – Deutschlands Chance?* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1994).

²⁵¹ Aymeric Chauprade, *Introduction à l’analyse géopolitique* (Paris: Ellipses, 1999), 284.

²⁵² Gabriel Almond and Stephen J. Genco, ‘Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,’ *World Politics* Vol. 29, No. 4 (July 1977): 501.

²⁵³ Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso Spa, ‘Who we are,’ last modified 11th May 2009, *Heartland*, <http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartland/who-we-are/1194>

²⁵⁴ Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l’histoire* (Paris: Éllipses, 2007), 500.

does not fit perfectly inside any formula, model, equation. The text insists that geopolitical studies constitute an empirical science that studies complex realities.

Alongside this, the debate about methodology in the study of International Relations has been radical, namely from the side of Reflectivist approaches, as Fernandes noticed²⁵⁵. This thesis aimed to be very careful on methodological guidelines, so that in the future facts may not be ignored in favor of “narratives”. Thus the *criterion of verification through facts*, i.e. the relevance of empirical tests should always prevail, and for their accomplishment, the evaluation of data and sources, as well as the refusal of single causes should be always kept in mind.

²⁵⁵ José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes, *Teorias das Relações Internacionais. Da abordagem clássica ao debate pós-positivista* (Lisboa: Almedina, 2009).

Chapter 2

The significance of International Relations and Foreign Policy Theories for Geopolitical Studies

‘In short, the real world
remains a realist world’,²⁵⁶

John J. Mearsheimer

2.1. Man and Identity: neoclassical realism and geopolitical studies

As Chauprade and Thual asserted, geopolitical studies’ object is constituted by ‘territorial and identity dynamics’²⁵⁷. In this way, if the Subchapter 1.1 of this thesis was primarily dedicated to TERRITORIALITY²⁵⁸, subchapter 2.1 will examine the aspect of IDENTITY in geopolitical studies. Therefore, one achieves objective A. [cf. INTRODUCTION, Structure & Objectives] by characterizing in detail the dual basis of the geopolitical approach.

The purpose of this subchapter is, therefore, eminently theoretical and methodological. It will discuss one of the study’s most innovative results, demonstrating in detail how can *élites*’ perceptions and *élites*’ capacities as neoclassical realist variables fit into both geopolitical studies’ theoretical background and methodological guidelines. Thus, this subchapter develops the theoretical framework for further methodological operationalization [cf. Subchapter 2.2. & PARTS II, III, IV].

The scholarship in geopolitical studies is more or less consensual about the idea that geopolitics blots out the role of individual decision-makers²⁵⁹. The main argument of this subchapter challenges this view, contending that the behavior of the state is understood as nothing but a result of flesh and blood decision-makers’ choices. Those

²⁵⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 361.

²⁵⁷ ‘Elle [la géopolitique] doit être centrée en permanence sur les dynamiques territoriales et identitaires qui constituent son objet premier’ – Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs* (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 496. Transl. “Geopolitics should focus permanently on territorial and identity dynamics, which constitute its main object”.

²⁵⁸ Territoriality is a relevant variable or factor in foreign policy and international relations – David Criekemans, ‘Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A Concise Overview from 1890 Till 2015 and Beyond’ in *Geopolitics: Schools of Thought, Method of Analysis and Case Studies*, ed. by Gyula Csurgai (Geneva: Editions de Penthes & International Centre for Geopolitical Studies, 2009). *Vide* also: Martin Sicker, *Geography and Politics among Nations – an Introduction to Geopolitics* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010).

²⁵⁹ For example, Rodger Baker, ‘Accounting for Inertia in Geopolitical Forecasting,’ last modified November 20, 2015, STRATFOR, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/accounting-inertia-geopolitical-forecasting?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Gweekly&utm_campaign=20150602&utm_content=readmoretext&mc_cid=7ee6dda5e3&mc_eid=fc781e1ea6

choices are dependent on certain perceptions and capacities of the decision-makers, which provide a valuable contribution to the explanation of political outcomes that are included in the geopolitical studies' object²⁶⁰.

In terms of the sequential order of this PART I, after having previously emphasized concepts, theoretical fundamentals, and the methodological approach *tout court* of geopolitical studies, it is now opportune to observe some of the Theories of International Relations through the specific lens of geopolitical studies. Not only geopolitical studies materialize a *sui generis* approach to International Relations, but geopolitical studies also embrace a specific theoretic-methodological framework that was highlighted at the very beginning of this study. Consequently, the inferences about Theories of International Relations must be compatible with the previous theoretic-methodological framework of geopolitical studies – and not vice versa.

With regard to the delimitation of the object, this subchapter does not aim to cover a literature review about the theoretical tradition of realism, or even less presumes to discuss the historical and current debates in International Relations' scholarship²⁶¹. In fact, such task would be considered an absurd in a study that established the main research question devoted to describe and explain the connections between Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism with a New World Order under the geopolitical approach.

While entering into the sphere of Theories of International Relations and capturing the core ideas of the realist theoretical tradition (a particular attention is given to Offensive Realism), the key point is to explore the domain of neoclassical realism as theory, and to demonstrate that neoclassical realism is able to offer a more profound contribution to sharpening geopolitical studies than other streams of the realist

²⁶⁰ Kissinger called the attention to the inaccuracy of studying mere 'impersonal forces' only – Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: a Biography* (New York: Faber & Faber 1992), 13.

For an example of *élites'* perceptions study *vide*: Vladislav M. Zubok, 'Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Different Perspectives on the Historical Personality,' in *Cold War – Endgame. Oral History, Analysis, Debates*, ed. William C. Wohlforth (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).

²⁶¹ Among a huge number of sources about debates in Theories of International Relations, *vide*:

Scott Burchill, *et al.*, *Theories of International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).

Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994).

Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

Ole Wæver, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,' *International Organization* vol. 52, no.4 (Autumn 1998).

Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations. Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

theoretical school. This contribution is to be achieved through the inclusion of two intervening variables.

Moreover, this subchapter also forges a connection between those variables and the innovative concept of GEOMISGUIDANCE [cf. APPENDIX 2] presented above [cf. Section 1.2.3. and fig.2], *i.e.* one of the three possible characterizations of *élites*' sense of space [RAUMSINN].

In order to strengthen a theory guided research study, it is pivotal to elaborate ideas under the following questions: 2.1.1) *Why is the realist theoretical tradition chosen in detriment of others?* 2.1.2) *Which are the main ideas of neoclassical realism?* and 2.1.3) *How can neoclassical realism contribute to answering the research question?*

But before anything else, what is a THEORY [cf. APPENDIX 2]?

The definition of theory provided by Dunne *et al.* highlights “abstractions” and “generalizations” as fundamental ideas for its classification²⁶² (together with Waltz’s aphorism that theories are not collections of laws but statements that explain those laws instead²⁶³) lead to determine that not only theory precedes reality²⁶⁴, but also (and consequently) that theory affects observation²⁶⁵.

Nevertheless, the argument that reality still exists independently of any theoretical framework is reaffirmed. Therefore, it is not an ontological problem at stake, but rather an epistemological one. This is the reason why it is sustained that with the use of certain theories in detriment of others, the approach to the essence of the reality may resoundingly fail or to acquire *real* validity. Yet, the reality remains *per se*.

2.1.1. Why is the realist theoretical tradition chosen in detriment of others?²⁶⁶

²⁶² ‘... as abstractions from a complex reality and ... attempt to provide generalizations about the phenomena under study’ – Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, ‘The End of International Relations Theory?’ *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 407.

²⁶³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Teoria das Relações Internacionais*, trans. Maria Luísa Felgueiras Gayo (Lisboa: Gradiva Publicações, 2002), 18.

²⁶⁴ Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, ‘The End of International Relations Theory?’ *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 410, 415.

²⁶⁵ Andrew Sayer, *Method in Social Science – a realist approach* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 31. António Marques Bessa, *Ensaio sobre o fim da nossa Idade* (Lisboa: Edições do Tempo, 1978), 55.

²⁶⁶ The term “paradigm” is avoided because it is considered too poor to be applied in social sciences in general, and in theories of international relations in particular. In this way, Hellman’s fortunate suggestion of ‘theoretical tradition’ is preferable, since it also avoids the compulsion to accept “clash of paradigms” argument - Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a

The realist theoretical tradition is, perhaps, the only school of thought truly suitable for geopolitical analysis²⁶⁷. This argument is supported by the fact that the set of realist assumptions – anarchy, focus on the concept of power, state as primary actor on the international arena, existence of a sense of mistrust among states, states' survival as their principal goal, conception of rationality as a pattern of states' behavior²⁶⁸ and existence of offensive capabilities with the purpose to threaten and/or to use force against other states²⁶⁹ – create the finest theoretical background, in which the geopolitical analyst can operate, and accomplish his studies of the influence of the geographical setting on foreign policy and, by extension, on international politics²⁷⁰. As Toft reminded, '... geopolitical analysis is far from alien to realism.'²⁷¹

Geopolitical studies combines with realism in the refusal of: economic interdependence, transnationalism, institutions, democracy (democratic peace), normative ideas, discourse and narratives, class (struggle), colonialism, identities, gender, ecology, as primary objects that the analysis should focus on. For example,

Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),' *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 173.

As a matter of fact, there are many problems with the argument of "clash of paradigms". For instance, in the domain of social biology, Sloan sustained that the idea of "clash" between Multilevel Selection Theory and Inclusive Fitness Theory is prejudicial for the advance of scientific knowledge (David Sloan Wilson, 'Clash of Paradigms: Why Proponents of Multilevel Selection Theory and Inclusive Fitness Theory Sometimes (But Not Always) Misunderstand Each Other,' *Social Evolution Forum*, July 13, 2012, <http://socialevolutionforum.com/2012/07/13/david-sloan-wilson-clash-of-paradigms-why-proponents-of-multilevel-selection-theory-and-inclusive-fitness-theory-sometimes-but-not-always-misunderstand-each-other/>).

²⁶⁷ Ashworth investigated Mackinder's doctrine, concluding that not only Mackinder fits in the realist school, but also that Mackinder is even a predecessor of '...Carr's later realist-utopian dichotomy'. That conclusion did not ignore the posterior attacks of post-World War II realist proponents to geopolitics, Morgenthau particularly, due to the different roots of two realist approaches (human nature *versus* natural environment). Yet, both are realist approaches, what strengthens the argument of compatibility between realism and geopolitics. *Vide*: Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Realism and the spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, geopolitics and the reality of the League of Nations' *European Journal of International Relations* vol. 17, no. 2 (2010): 280-281, 293-295.

²⁶⁸ So, rationality not understood as "fixed instrument" (Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),' *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 179-180).

²⁶⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 3, 30-32, 361ff.

²⁷⁰ Drulák acknowledged too that geopolitics 'is a part of the realist tradition of international thinking' – Petr Drulák, 'Between Geopolitics and Anti-Geopolitics: Czech Political Thought,' *Geopolitics* vol. 11, no. 3 (2006): 421.

²⁷¹ Peter Toft, 'John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power,' *Journal of International Relations and Development* Vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2005) <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/journal/v8/n4/full/1800065a.html> or Peter Toft, 'John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics & Power,' *Institut for Statskundskab Arbejdsrapport* 2003/1 (2003), http://polsci.ku.dk/arbejdsrapporter/2003/ap_2003_01.pdf/

despite acknowledging the role of International Law, both geopolitical studies and realism do not look at it as key ‘social reality’²⁷² *per se*, but as states’ instrument, just as, in general, international institutions themselves²⁷³.

In this way, as it could be already deduced at this point, many theories of international relations become unworkable, due to their more than obvious lack of compatibility with geopolitical studies.

In this kind of context, radical perspectivism (*e.g.* postmodernism) is hardly useful. Dunne *et al.* wisely interrogated whether it is possible to change perspectives so radically, as argued by some post-positivist authors²⁷⁴. In the domain of postmodernist theory, for instance, Wight assessed some of its incoherent ideas in detail (cognitive relativism, methodological confusion, reductionism, fragile theoretical framework)²⁷⁵ [cf. Subchapter 1.2]. Although theory affects observation, facts do have a role in correcting theories²⁷⁶. It follows logically that theories cannot ignore the set of facts of the reality. Otherwise theories cannot be corrected. Consequently, theoretical choices in the domain of geopolitical studies should be placed far from any radical perspectivism.

Convincing and logically compact, the choice of the realist school stands on a solid ground. Still, there is more to be argued. Acknowledging the fact that ‘our era is less violent, less cruel and more peaceful than any previous period of human existence’²⁷⁷ cannot be mistaken with the idea that the human being cannot set back and enter into a period of violence again. The argument here is to assert that, analogically,

²⁷² Hedley Bull, *The Anarchic Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002), 123.

²⁷³ Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation’ *International Security* Vol. 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 43.

Nevertheless, the subchapter 9.2 will make a reference to the U.N., which is considered an exception in the realm of international organizations due to its autonomous agenda and its particular transnational strategies that have become visible in the last decades.

²⁷⁴ Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, ‘The End of International Relations Theory?’ *European Journal of International Relations* vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 412.

²⁷⁵ Colin Wight, ‘MetaCampbell: the epistemological problematics of perspectivism,’ *Review of International Studies* vol. 25, No. 2 (April 1999): 311-316.

²⁷⁶ Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 153.

António Marques Bessa, *O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos* (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 8, 12.

²⁷⁷ Peter Singer, ‘Is Violence History? A Review Essay of ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’ By Stephen Pinker,’ *The New York Times Sunday Book Review*, October 6, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/books/review/the-better-angels-of-our-nature-by-steven-pinker-book-review.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar&r=0>

the historical development of the international system implies mathematically neither evolution nor progress²⁷⁸ (thus, challenging some Liberal and Marxist perspectives).

In this context, offensive realism provides a useful insight.

i. Useful Offensive Realist ideas for geopolitical studies

Mearsheimer, the leading offensive realist, stated a bright set of notions and explanations that have deep logical compatibility with geopolitical studies²⁷⁹. At this juncture, one will mention some of the most relevant of them that matter for this study.

Firstly, Mearsheimer argued about the weight of geography, together with the distribution of power and cost-benefit calculus²⁸⁰ as variables that influence and explain the choice of ‘strategies for gaining power’ or of ‘strategies for checking aggressors’²⁸¹.

Secondly, Mearsheimer specified that, despite the adoption of liberal democracy as the political regime, all great powers behave aggressively and fear each other²⁸². Mearsheimer contended that, within that context of fear and mistrust, maximization of security by great powers (*i.e.* maximization of their relative power) resumes their primary goal, since it is impossible to define when security level is already

²⁷⁸ António Marques Bessa, *O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos* (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 26.

²⁷⁹ For synthetic resume/review of Mearsheimer’s ideas *vide*: Glenn H. Snyder, ‘Mearsheimer’s World – Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security – A Review Essay,’ *International Security* Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002): pp. 149–173 and Peter Toft, ‘John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics & Power,’ *Institut for Statskundskab Arbejdsrapport* 2003/1 (2003), http://polsci.ku.dk/arbejdsrapporter/2003/ap_2003_01.pdf/

or Peter Toft, ‘John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power,’ *Journal of International Relations and Development* Vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2005) <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/journal/v8/n4/full/1800065a.html>

²⁸⁰ Peter Toft, ‘John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics & Power,’ *Institut for Statskundskab Arbejdsrapport* 2003/1 (2003), http://polsci.ku.dk/arbejdsrapporter/2003/ap_2003_01.pdf/

or Peter Toft, ‘John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power,’ *Journal of International Relations and Development* Vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2005) <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/journal/v8/n4/full/1800065a.html>

²⁸¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 147-162.

²⁸² John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 32.

Obviously, Democratic Peace Theory (*e.g.* see Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997)) is lessened in the discussion. In fact, its limitations find valid explanations given by the realist theoretical tradition in general, and by offensive realism in particular (in this stream designated as ‘peace-loving democracies theory’ – John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future,’ *International Security* Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990): 29-30) (John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 367 – 368). Also Brill alerted about the dangers of a ‘...kosmopolitischer Euphoria...’ coming from both ideological principles or international organizations (Heinz Brill, *Geopolitik Heute – Deutschlands Chance?* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1994), 31).

satisfactory²⁸³. ‘Regional hegemony’ constitutes the best strategy for the survival of great powers in the international system, because world hegemony is implausible in terms of security maximization²⁸⁴.

Thirdly, in the process of operationalization of that maximization of security, great powers need: to build up a great army, to stimulate a powerful economy, and to gain nuclear superiority, that means material power as the key element²⁸⁵.

Fourthly, Mearsheimer expressed his doubts about “perpetual peace”, since to him great powers’ goal of becoming hegemon in the international system creates a perpetual competition for power²⁸⁶, both as “objective” and “instrument”, as it was understood by classical realism²⁸⁷. Mearsheimer rejected the existence of a “status quo power” unless it has the objective to ‘maintain its dominating position’²⁸⁸. In this way, the conclusion that cyclic wars, caused by power maximization, persist in the international system is evident²⁸⁹.

In sum, in Mearsheimer’s view (a) geography is vital to explain state’s behavior; (b) great powers are explained as revisionist states (a conception that matches neoclassical realism partially) aiming to change the state of things in international arena (accordingly democratic peace theory may claim undersized value in this context, since it persists an enlightenment in the conception of “perpetual competition for power extension”); and (c) regional approach is essential in terms of level of analysis. Finally, (d) recognizing the existence of ‘misguided states’²⁹⁰, Mearsheimer’s theory converges

²⁸³ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 34-35.

²⁸⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 3, 140-143.

²⁸⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), chapters three and four. Resumed on pages 143-147.

²⁸⁶ Subsequently, ‘... alliances are only temporary...’ (John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 33) and, agreeing with general realist assumption, it remains a particular skepticism about the eventual role that international institutions would have promoting world peace (John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 364).

²⁸⁷ Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty year’s crisis: 1919-1939* (London : Papermac, 1991).

²⁸⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 1ff.

²⁸⁹ In the same way, just because ‘... expansion and conquest are no longer a legitimate option for advancing a state’s security interest’ (Shiping Tang, ‘From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,’ in *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Fen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 157) it cannot be deduced – even less predicted – that, in the future, such framework will endure.

²⁹⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 35.

with the geopolitical approach proposed in this thesis, especially with the concept of GEOMISGUIDANCE [cf. Section 1.2.3].

ii. Limitations of Offensive Realism from the geopolitical studies' point of view

Mearsheimer claimed that World hegemony is virtually impossible due to 'the stopping power of water'²⁹¹. Mearsheimer's position is logical since he adopted a tellurocratic approach to assess world politics on the level of great powers and from a strict *geostrategic* point of view²⁹² [cf. table 1]. In that context, Mearsheimer emphasized that 'only land power has the potential to win a major war by itself'²⁹³, so neither airpower nor naval power is capable of such victory.

In this context, the thalassocratic role of a small/medium-power in other perspectives, *i.e.* perspectives outside the *geostrategic* sphere, are absent in Mearsheimer's approach. That gap can be covered by geopolitical studies²⁹⁴. In fact, in the quality of an effort of systematization of geopolitical studies, this thesis aims to clarify that aspect, since it is neither intended to study great powers only (*i.e.* Brazil [cf. Subchapter 8.1]) nor from the *geostrategic* perspective austerely (*i.e.* GEOCONJUNCTIVE processes [cf. Subchapter 8.2]). Furthermore, this thesis also intends to examine the equilibrium and/or turmoil that a state (regardless great power or not) might cause on the international arena, concerning the control of SEA LANES and CHOKE POINTS with military relevance and economic profit [cf. Chapters 5, 6 and 7]²⁹⁵.

Therefore, is a small/medium power 'condemned' to be unable of expanding over the oceans and acquiring such "regional hegemony" due to its limitations (*i.e.* because it is not a great power based on land power)? From Mearsheimer's ideas – and within the limits of his field of research – that might be inferred so. However, accepting such perspective, determinism would triumph, since the eventual possibility

²⁹¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 114-128.

²⁹² Although Mearsheimer sustained, at some point, that 'states can cooperate' (John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 51), in what concerns to his treatment of the oceans as geographical factor, he places himself in the *geostrategic* domain solely, in which cooperation among states is not possible (*i.e.* 'stopping power of water').

²⁹³ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 86.

²⁹⁴ Geopolitical studies comprise both cooperative and non-cooperative maneuvers as the object of study [cf. fig. 1 and table 1]. Realism in general, by its side, does not defend that cooperation among states is impossible – Robert Jervis, 'Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation' *International Security* Vol. 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 44.

²⁹⁵ As taught by Mahan – Alfred Mahan, *The influence of sea power upon History 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890) [cf. THALASSOPOLITICS, APPENDIX 2].

(POSSIBILISM) of a small/medium power rising as thalassocratic power in the international system would have to be totally rejected. A historical example was the 15th century-Portugal that was able to maintain hegemony on the seas from Latin America to Japan²⁹⁶, based on the fundamentals of CHOKE POINTS and thin coastal areas' control [cf. Chapter 5]²⁹⁷.

The second and final argument regarding the limitations of Offensive Realism from the perspective of geopolitical studies, concerns Mearsheimer's wise yet insufficient preference with respect to the role of geography. Mearsheimer referred to LOCATION only, whereas for example both (i) the analysis of concepts in geopolitical studies [cf. Section 1.2.3. and APPENDIX 2] and (ii) models for strategic potential analysis (e.g. Couto's model²⁹⁸, Morgenthau's approach²⁹⁹, Spykman's perspective³⁰⁰) enumerate series of geographical factors, beyond location, that have influence on states' outcomes at the international level, for example: space (e.g. configuration, size, physical features), circulation, resources [cf. APPENDIX 3]. In addition, there are other concepts in geopolitical studies which, although going beyond strict geographical factors, are also essential for geopolitical analysis (e.g. RAUMSINN).

In conclusion, Offensive Realism provides an excellent basis to start thinking about international relations. Yet, from the angle of geopolitical studies, much in Offensive Realism remains insufficient. In these circumstances, at both the levels of analysis of foreign policy and international politics, something else should be added to

²⁹⁶ At that time, Portugal had smaller territory than today, since its islands were still to be colonized. Moreover, population was drastically smaller (roughly 1 million people) too. This means a weak relative material state potential. Nevertheless, Portugal was able to fight and to win several naval battles (e.g. Battle in Gambia River in 1455), among which the Battle of Diu in 1509 was the most important, granting exclusive navigation on the Indian Ocean for next decades to come.

²⁹⁷ Naturally, the question does not ignore Mearsheimer's claims that in the 'age of sail' – period between 1500-1850 – mobility of ships was far superior to the mobility of land armies (John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 115). Nonetheless, the validity of the mentioned question remains, since nobody is able to predict that technological advances in the future will ever grant some kind of advantage to naval forces overcoming land forces, as Mearsheimer recognized it happened already in the past.

²⁹⁸ Abel Cabral Couto, *Elementos de Estratégia*. Vol I. (Lisboa: Instituto Altos Estudos Militares, 1988), 257-281.

²⁹⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations. The struggle for power and peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 80-122.

³⁰⁰ Nicholas J. Spykman, 'Geography and Foreign Policy' *The American Political Science Review* vol. 32, no. 1, (February 1938).

states' '... capabilities and [its] external environment...' ³⁰¹. Here, neoclassical realism enters on stage with *élites*' perceptions and *élites*' capacities as variables ³⁰².

2.1.2. Which are the main ideas of Neoclassical Realism?

Neoclassical realism begins with the ontological ground zero that '...objective reality of relative power...' does exist ³⁰³. Then, it cautiously proceeds to the epistemological formulation, claiming that states do not '...necessarily apprehend that reality accurately on a day-to-day basis,' ³⁰⁴ since international anarchy is '... murky and difficult to read' ³⁰⁵. These are more than reasonable premises to start with [cf. INTRODUCTION, Philosophical Worldview].

Before analyzing neoclassical realism it is noteworthy that the argument that neoclassical realism jeopardizes the realist theoretical tradition is to be disregarded ³⁰⁶. In fact, both 'domestic politics' and 'nonmaterial factors' (e.g. 'pride' in Thucydides, 'will' in Cline, 'moral qualities' in Clausewitz, 'nonmaterial factors' (e.g. 'national character', 'national morale') and 'domestic determinants' in Morgenthau, generally) have been present, for a long time, in the realist theoretical tradition ³⁰⁷. Concerning "domestic issues", the crucial point is then to examine the premise of the state as a black box.

i. Should the state be considered a black box?

Even Waltz was clear:

³⁰¹ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 149.

³⁰² There are, however, approaches that asserted that offensive realism is 'suitable' for neoclassical geopolitics. For example Jan Kofroň, 'Possibilities of Neoclassical Geopolitics: a Systemic Approach' (Abstract & Introduction Ph.D. thesis, Charles University in Prague, 2012), 4.

³⁰³ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 153.

³⁰⁴ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 153.

³⁰⁵ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 152.

³⁰⁶ Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Is Anybody Still a Realist?' *International Security* Vol.24, no. 2 (Autumn 1999): 5-55.

³⁰⁷ For a short resume *vide*: Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),' *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 166-169.

‘neither realists nor anyone else believe that unit-level factors can be excluded from foreign-policy analysis’³⁰⁸.

In this vein, the arguments presented by neoclassical realism encompass a ‘two-level approach,’ ‘reconciling domestic and international imperatives.’ This topic will be analyzed in detail in the next subsection. Neoclassical realism is then able to offer a continuation of Putman’s path, for example³⁰⁹.

Within the two-level approach, it is important to note that neoclassical realism does not logically oppose structural realism. As it was already stated by Rathbun:

‘Neoclassical realism without structural realism is just a mix of liberalism and constructivism.’³¹⁰

So, keeping the analysis of the international structure, neoclassical realism also provides contributions to the theory of state³¹¹, facing the challenge specified by Wendt³¹². The theory under examination searches then for the answers in domestic politics that structural realism is, in a certain way, unable to give. Within the domestic level, an urgent task is to point out what is to be included and excluded³¹³. At this point, the role of *élites* as double intervening variables is at the core of the problem. In fact, the role of top decision-making *individuals* in international relations can in no way be ignored or underestimated, since ‘individuals play a central role in shaping International Relations...’³¹⁴. In order to operationalize the influence of individuals, the connection between ‘ideas’ and ‘guidelines’ for political action must be identified [cf. Chapter 8]³¹⁵. The priority is then placed on *élites*’ perceptions, not on *ideas* autonomously³¹⁶.

³⁰⁸ Kenneth Waltz, ‘International Politics is Not Foreign Policy,’ *Security Studies* Vol. 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 56.

³⁰⁹ Robert Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game,’ *International Organization* Vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 460.

³¹⁰ Brian Rathbun, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,’ *Security Studies* vol. 17, no. 2 (May 2008): 312.

³¹¹ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,’ *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 468.

³¹² Alexander Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,’ *International Organization* Vol. 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 342.

³¹³ As it was clarified by Fearon – James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,’ *Annual Review of Political Science* Vol. 1, no. 2 (1998): 306.

The point is also to avoid critiques such as: ‘multicausality without a rigorous underlying structure [that] only muddies the waters...’ – Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’ *International Security* Vol.24, no. 2 (Autumn 1999): 50.

³¹⁴ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,’ *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 114.

³¹⁵ Alexander George, ‘The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,’ *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 13, no. 2 (June 1969): 191. In another perspective, but also focusing on analysis of influence of human decision-makers on foreign policy:

Consequently, the importance of studying the *élites* remains a benchmark for geopolitical studies, and it will reveal its usefulness below [cf. PARTS IV & V].

As it was mentioned in Mearsheimer's approach, the premise that great powers seek to control and to shape the international system is also accepted by neoclassical realism³¹⁷. Yet, the differences among states need to be examined, and those are certainly dependent on the role played by *élites*' perceptions and capacities. Schweller argued about the distinction between 'revisionist' and 'status quo' powers³¹⁸, based on Morgenthau's distinction of 'the policy of imperialism' ('power maximizers') and 'the policy of the status quo' ('security maximizers')³¹⁹. This premise is vital for geopolitical studies since the state is no longer seen as a *black box*, but an entity with clear 'preferences, aims, interests, or motivations' gushing from *élites*' perceptions and capacities.

In this equation, the level of state's ambitions, together with the amount of material POTENTIAL are eventually causal³²⁰. Bringing the problem of 'misguided states' quoted from Mearsheimer, one may find a suggestion to test state's ambitions in Taliaferro, *i.e.* to try to explain its causes or its extent: 'a lack of nationalist sentiment or an anti-statist ideology held by the public or elites...'³²¹, since both may severely damage state's ambitions and/or good performance.

Although those characteristics would not be easy to expose³²², they are not impossible to be identified through a process of translation of ideas into material

Valerie M. Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,' *Foreign Policy Analysis* Vol. 1, no. 1 (2005).

³¹⁶ Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),' *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 181.

Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,' *World Politics* Vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 181-183.

³¹⁷ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 152.

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 464.

³¹⁸ Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),' *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 176-177.

³¹⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations. The struggle for power and peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 21-49.

³²⁰ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 152, 167.

³²¹ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 467.

³²² Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 495.

outcomes. For that, a broad knowledge about the nation under research is absolutely essential³²³.

Moving forward on the trail of influence of domestic variables on foreign policy, geopolitical studies may give a major assistance to neoclassical realism too. Although it is acknowledged that power is volatile across time and space – *mobilis in mobile* – it is rather unlikely that ‘social evolutionary approach’³²⁴ (with some sense of “path towards evolution”) may be generally applied to geopolitical analysis³²⁵. In this vein, the argument that rejects social evolutionary approach is not only sustained by ‘historical or cultural legacy approach,’³²⁶ since even cultures may suffer a process of mutation³²⁷, but supported mainly by the existence of GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES instead [cf. APPENDICES 2 and 3]. In fact, the struggle of the Russian state to get access to warm seas, for example, has been a permanent goal. Once that goal is achieved, it would be incorrect to consider it an “evolution”, but rather an accomplishment of that geostrategic objective. Therefore, the mutation that would occur would be a change from “conquest” to “maintenance” merely [a GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITY].

ii. Combining two-level foreign policy variables

As a theory of foreign policy, originally, neoclassical realism has been trying to explain *what* is pursued in terms of states’ objectives and *when*³²⁸. These purposes match largely with geopolitical studies.

After acknowledging that foreign policy depends on both internal and external variables as it was mentioned³²⁹, it is appropriate to systematize the variables of the study.

³²³ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 248.

³²⁴ Shiping Tang, ‘From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,’ in *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Fen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 143-144.

³²⁵ Yet, that theory splendidly accommodates the inferred conclusion, at the same time political prescription, that states should engage with China, rather than to contain its aspirations in becoming a regional hegemon power in Far East Asia (Shiping Tang, ‘From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,’ in *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Fen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 151).


³²⁶ Shiping Tang, ‘From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,’ in *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Fen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 143.

³²⁷ Gabriel Almond and Stephen J. Genco, ‘Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,’ *World Politics* Vol. 29, No. 4 (July 1977): 493.

³²⁸ Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 145.

The (I) domestic variables include: (1) the relative material power [*sic*] of the state (in which geography is included), and the role of both (2) *élites*' perceptions and (3) *élites*' capacities. The (II) the external variable concerns to the place of the state within the context of international anarchic forces (as said, murky and difficult to assess to), *i.e.* systemic constraints. The latter is critical, since systemic constraints is a milestone of Realism, as explained. In this schema, while the relative material state potential and systemic constraints are considered independent variables (IV), *élites*' perceptions and *élites*' capacities are both placed as intervening variables (IntV) [cf. table 3 and fig. 4]

Figure 4
Systematization of variables in neoclassical realist theory from the geopolitical studies' standpoint



Source: adapted from Taliaferro³³⁰

The text will now elaborate on each variable individually.

The first independent variable (IV) of neoclassical realism is the state relative material potential or STATE POTENTIAL [cf. APPENDIX 2]. This variable was already introduced above [cf. Section 1.2.3.] and further considerations will be added.

Connected to state's internal structure, Schweller noted that it is important to assess the relations between society and *élites*, since in general conditions, when society and *élites* form a homogeneous mass, the state will more likely come in the form of a

³²⁹ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 145-146.

³³⁰ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 486.

unitary actor ('coherent actor'), in the sense that structural realism attributes it³³¹. Those relations are also included in Taliaferro's methodological guidelines to assess statist ideology and state-sponsored nationalism, as it has been already mentioned³³². Therefore, the '...unique structural characteristics of society and government that constitute constraints and opportunities for these actors [*élites*]...', located at the basis of the relative material potential, are able to assist in the explanation of differences in state's behavior on the international arena³³³.

The "national power" [*sic*] consists of material factors (geographical setting, population, the number of armed forces, economy), and the administration («administrative capacity and the political structure of state...»)³³⁴. In the same line, speaking about the U.S.A., Taliaferro argued that that state is the first great power in history to be preponderant in all factors of national power: military, economy, technology, geography³³⁵. The conversion of POTENTIAL into POWER is what Taliaferro defined appropriately as 'state power': 'the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources as determined by the institutions of the state'³³⁶ [cf. APPENDIX 2, STATE POWER]. The differences between the concepts of POWER and POTENTIAL will be investigated below.

In the end, the key ideas are that (i) the relative state potential is the foundation of foreign policy³³⁷, and (ii) that state's ambitions 'to control and to shape external environment' depend on the relative state potential³³⁸. Yet, 'relative power' [*sic*] influences foreign policy indirectly merely³³⁹ – once again determinism does not dwell.

³³¹ And that means 'to balance' – Randall L. Schweller, 'Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,' *International Security* vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 160-161.

³³² Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 486.

³³³ Randall L. Schweller, 'Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,' *International Security* vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 168.

³³⁴ Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 13.

³³⁵ WGBHForum, 'US Foreign Policy: What in the World Should We Do?' last modified November 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jF7xWoZRR6w>

³³⁶ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 486.

³³⁷ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 151, 155.

³³⁸ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 152.

³³⁹ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 157, 165.

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 485.

In this logic, *élites*' perceptions and capacities shape (1) the process of extraction and management of states' relative potential, and (2) the assessment of systemic constraints.

In doing the evaluation of state's potential, the analysis of the international system, raking the state within a hierarchy of powers, appears as the other IV³⁴⁰. Coming from the old realist tradition of distribution of power, the assessment of systemic constraints³⁴¹ includes: international anarchy as 'permissive condition' (not as 'causal force'³⁴²), alliances (political, military), regional integration, the net of great powers and their objectives³⁴³, and of course, comparison of capabilities³⁴⁴. Security is always understood as relative and never ending foreign policy finality.

Brill gave an extraordinarily usefull assistance at this stage [cf. Section 1.2.3.]. In this milieu, it is easy to understand how geopolitical studies and neoclassical realism can easily find converging points. Geopolitical studies show full compatibility with the assessment of the international system: SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, CHOKE POINTS, BORDERS, CIRCULATION, GEOHISTORICAL NUCLEUS, LOCATIONS, RESOURCES, PAN-IDEAS among others concepts make part of an accurate calculation of the distribution of power.

At the second-level intervening variables (IntV), *élites*' perceptions find their place. But why are individuals or small groups of decision-makers so important in the study of foreign policy, and international politics, by extension? The methodological steps systematized in this PART I, and later applied in PARTS IV & V, will help to answer that interrogation with other questions formulated by political science itself (and intelligence too) [cf. Subchapter 2.2.]. Those questions are too concrete to be answered exclusively by general impersonal forces or by abstract structures. Therefore, to track back real *élites*' actions is the procedure to follow³⁴⁵. In those terms, Carvalho sustained:

³⁴⁰ The waltzian perspective of anarchy, in which hierarchy is perennial – Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 96. Cf. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Teoria das Relações Internacionais*, trans. Maria Luísa Felgueiras Gayo (Lisboa: Gradiva Publicações, 2002), 159-162.

³⁴¹ The 'place of state in the international system' – Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 146.

³⁴² Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7.

³⁴³ António Marques Bessa, *O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos* (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 135.

³⁴⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Teoria das Relações Internacionais*, trans. Maria Luísa Felgueiras Gayo (Lisboa: Gradiva Publicações, 2002), 138.

³⁴⁵ Olavo de Carvalho, 'Problemas de método nas ciências humanas,' Apostilha do Seminário de Filosofia, in Curso de Filosofia Política, Colonial Heights, VA, 26th April de 2008: 4.

‘Estados, nações, governos e continentes não mandam. Quem manda são os indivíduos e grupos que os controlam’³⁴⁶.

Something that matches entirely with the perspective defended by Wohlforth:

‘if power influences the courses of international politics, it must do so largely through the perceptions of the people who make decision on behalf of states’³⁴⁷.

Two more questions should be posed in this context: (i) *who* are those individuals? and (ii) *what* exactly are the *élites*’ perceptions about? Regarding the first question, the ‘foreign policy executive’ and their staff seems to synthesize the *agent* properly³⁴⁸, whereas the latter certainly refers to perceptions of the relative material state potential (that includes domestic constraints), and also of systemic constraints (perceptions about capabilities and intentions among decision-makers: belief systems, images of adversaries, etc.)³⁴⁹. Testing *élites*’ perceptions specifically, Kitchen made those converge into ‘the role of strategic ideas’, but other possibilities remain³⁵⁰. Dueck’s research on the U.S. grand strategy shown that foreign policy decision-making was more influenced by *élites*’ perceptions of what the national interest was, than by any other ‘domestic political reasons’³⁵¹.

The national interest deserves a special reference. The national interest is deeply linked to *élites*’ perceptions, since the national interest *is* what *élites* interpret it to be. Thual gives a hand so the researcher may deduce what the national interests are through inferences from the series of political objectives [cf. Section 1.2.3.]. Couto e Silva also

³⁴⁶ transl. ‘States, nations, governments and continents do not rule. Individuals and groups are those who rule, since they control them’ – Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Quem manda no mundo?’ last modified November 7, 2012, Diário do Comércio, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/121107dc.html>

³⁴⁷ William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 2.

³⁴⁸ Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 280-281.

³⁴⁹ Thomas J. Christensen and Jack L. Snyder, ‘Multipolarity, Perceptions, and the Tragedy of 1914,’ *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 55, no. 2 (May 2011): 306.

³⁵⁰ Nicholas Kitchen, ‘Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation,’ *Review of International Studies* vol. 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 119.

³⁵¹ Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 167. Consequently, the public support in foreign policy goals is lessened in the discussion.

The main drive of a state’s foreign policy is then to conquer and exert power in the international chessboard, therefore, constraining other states to do what it wishes [cf. Appendix 2, State Power]. A crucial issue is then grand strategy as supreme outcome, and foreign policy as one of its instruments – Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 10.

remarked that the agents in charge of translating “interests or aspirations from nation’s soul into national objectives” are the *élites* – the “sagacious ruling minority”³⁵².

In the best traditions of political science, the focus is put on *élites* as agents instead of the masses [cf. Subchapter 1.1.]³⁵³. However, in order to understand *élites*’ perceptions, attention must be paid to the nation’s identity (something that fits in Chauprade’s 2nd stable geopolitical variable and in Schweller’s and Taliaferro’s methodological guidelines).

The examination of *élites*’ identity will positively include their ideology, since that aspect will also influence *élites*’ capacities in extracting resources. Bessa contended that *élites*’ “personal and psychological parameters” are very important, since those features condition political decisions³⁵⁴. Furthermore, the net of relations is important too, since *élites*’ perceptions are generally shaped by consultation with businessmen, the military, parliamentary commissions, etc.³⁵⁵. A lack of information, false information, misguided predictions, inaccurate evaluation of potential, among other factors, also affect directly *élites*’ perceptions. The importance of their staff is to be bore in mind³⁵⁶.

Dissertating about non-representational theories, Couper stated that ‘places and identities are experience...’³⁵⁷. This is another point to *élites*’ perceptions, an eminently geopolitical one, since it is connected to the RAUMSINN and the new concept of GEOMISGUIDANCE [cf. fig. 3].

Regarding the concrete study of *élites*’ perceptions, it is worthy to make an incursion in the field of psychology. Viktor Frankl (the creator of Logotherapy)

³⁵² Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 11.

³⁵³ Bringing a reference from the Portuguese literature: ‘É unicamente pela acção, lenta mas definitiva, da influência das *élites* sobre a obtusidade das massas que tais transformações se realizam’ – transl. ‘It is only through slow, but definitive, influence of *élites* over the obtuseness of the masses that [civilizational] transformations occur’ – José Duarte Ramalho Ortigão, *Farpas Escolhidas* (Lisboa: Verbo, 1971), 164.

³⁵⁴ Bessa extended the scope beyond this thesis’ monographic guideline, giving examples of: sickness, old age, pusillanimity or cowardice, bravery. For now, the thesis focuses mainly on the possibilities of misunderstanding of the relative material state potential or misunderstanding of what is really at stake (objectives and systemic constraints) – António Marques Bessa, *O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos* (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 118-119.

³⁵⁵ António Marques Bessa, *O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos* (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 106. This topic is worthy of a new research.

³⁵⁶ The net of political connections falls in the category. For example the relations of the *Workers’ Party* with criminal organizations [cf. Subchapter 8.2.] or the relations of Neo-Eurasianist proponents with the Russian intelligence community [cf. Subchapter 9.2.].

³⁵⁷ Pauline Couper, *A Student’s Introduction to Geographical Thought – theories, philosophies, methodologies* (London: SAGE, 2015), 98.

designated an ‘intuitive understanding’ that can give a precious contribution³⁵⁸. In fact, within neoclassical realism, Taliaferro endeavored to connect realism with psychology, focusing on *élites*’ perceptions, in his ‘balance-of-risk’ theory³⁵⁹. As for this thesis, the methodological procedures at this level cannot go beyond a general study of biographies, speeches, behavior and foreign policy outcomes, with the objective to deduce perceptions of Brazilian *élites*, providing an empirical ground³⁶⁰.

In this matter, what seems to be important from Schweller’s approach, taking the risk of oversimplifying³⁶¹, is that *élites*’ concrete preferences and perceptions concerning both the international system and the national interests (linked to the relative state potential³⁶²) (*i.e.* ‘willingness’ stated in political discourse) and ‘ability’ (*i.e.* capacities for action) can in fact be inferred from empirical data³⁶³.

Under that label of “ability”, *élites*’ capacities on how to manage the country’s resources would be a second IntV.

The researcher keeps in mind that resources allocated to foreign policy depend on *élites*’ perceptions, *élites*’ proper abilities, and state’s structure as well³⁶⁴.

³⁵⁸ For a short resume of Viktor Frankl’s ideas *vide*: Viktor Frankl, ‘Personality Theories – Viktor Frankl,’ last modified November, 2015, Dr. C. George Boeree, Shippensburg University, <http://webpace.ship.edu/cgboer/frankl.html>

The formal constraints of this thesis with respect to its size do not allow going deep into this subject. So nothing is left but to open a line of research to improve techniques (*e.g.* in psychology), so that the study of *élites*’ perceptions in foreign policy analysis may be perfected. *Vide*:

Andrew G. Hodges, *The Obama Confession: Secret Fear. Secret Fury* (Birmingham AL: Village House, 2012).

Andrew M. Lobaczewski, *Political Ponerology* (Grande Prairie: Red Pill Press, 2012).

Lyle H. Rossiter Jr., *The Liberal Mind: The Psychological Causes of Political Madness* (St. Charles IL: Free World Books, 2006).

Robert Langs, *Fundamentals of Adaptive Psychotherapy and Counseling* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004).

³⁵⁹ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks – Great Power Intervention in the Periphery* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

³⁶⁰ The technique of political personality profiling that gives coordinates for the assessment of the psychobiography is extremely useful [cf. Subchapter 2.2].

³⁶¹ The study disregards ‘*élites* consensus, cohesion and fragmentation’ due to the fact that foreign policy is designed by a very small group of influential individuals who, in *efficient* states, is assumed, are able to achieve consensus in foreign policy formulation – *vide*: António Marques Bessa, *O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos* (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 73 and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,’ *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 487.

In this way, that small group of individuals is what this study identifies as *élites* [cf. APPENDIX 2, ÉLITES].

³⁶² De Almeida versed about this issue too – Políbio Valente de Almeida, *Do Poder do Pequeno Estado (Enquadramento geopolítico da hierarquia das potências)* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 2012), 243-245.

³⁶³ Schweller stated four variables instead, *vide*: Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,’ *International Security* vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 169 ff.

³⁶⁴ ‘...states’ extractive and mobilization capacity’ affected by: ‘institutions’, ‘ideational factors’ (ideology and nationalism) – Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 38.

In this way, foreign policy outcomes depend, in a causal chain, on *élites'* abilities to manage resources³⁶⁵. Two notes should be stated on this level: (a) regarding security policy domain, Christensen contended that the 'national political power'³⁶⁶ depends on *élites'* capacities [cf. APPENDIX 2, STATE POWER and STATE POTENTIAL]; and (b) the relation between *élites* and the nation must be recaptured (once again Taliaferro's methodological hint on statism and nationalism). In fact, democratic regimes, generally, do not allow so much freedom to the *élites*, due to the required democratic accountability to the people.

Regardless the range of differences within neoclassical realism, the body of theory is unified by the common basis of a two-level approach that is more coherent than is argued by its critics³⁶⁷. This thesis tries to systematize, reinforce and develop neoclassical realism as theory, mainly based on Taliaferro and Schweller, within the geopolitical studies' framework. Still, neoclassical realism *per se* endures and prospers as applied theory in international relations' scholarship³⁶⁸.

2.1.3. How can Neoclassical Realism contribute to answering the research question?

It is positive that the logical consistency of a theory is vital to deduce prediction from it, *i.e.* only a theory that is flawlessly articulated can enforce formulations, allowing tests of hypotheses with evidence from the empirical reality. The idea of wide

'...capabilities shape intentions, but it recognizes that state structure limits the availability of national power' – Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 9.

'...those leaders and elites do not always have complete freedom to extract and direct national resources as they might wish...' – Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 167.

³⁶⁵ Zakaria's book verses extensively about U.S. government's ability (that was developed at the end of 19th century) to extract resources – Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

³⁶⁶ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 11.

³⁶⁷ Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 280.

³⁶⁸ Mark Purdon, 'Neoclassical realism and international climate change politics: moral imperative and political constraint in international climate finance,' *Journal of International Relations and Development* vol. 17, no. 3 (July 2014).

Michiel Foulon, 'Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities,' *International Studies Review* vol. 17, no. 4 (December 2015).

Nicholas Kitchen, 'Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation,' *Review of International Studies* vol. 36, no. 1 (January 2010).

logical compatibility between geopolitical studies and neoclassical realism has been sustained in this thesis. It is sustained by the fact that the variable of state's relative material potential includes geographical elements, and also by the fact of theoretical compatibility between geopolitical studies and neoclassical realism in explaining reality, *i.e.* the impact of geography, mediated by *élites'* perceptions and capacities, on foreign policy outcomes.

The identification of domestic and international variables affecting states' foreign policy will be a key methodological guideline to test hypotheses, analyzing Brazil's foreign policy [cf. PART IV] and the World Order with respect to Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism [cf. PART V]. Neoclassical realism is concerned with the explanation of how systemic constraints affect foreign policies³⁶⁹. This thesis' main research question deals with nothing but that, *i.e.* the study of the structure of the World Order and its future developments for the 21st century [cf. Subchapter 9.2.], and the role of Brazil within it [cf. Chapter 8]; all comprised by the analytical context of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism [cf. Subchapter 4.2 and 7].

*i. On the importance of élites' perceptions and capacities for geopolitical studies*³⁷⁰

Neoclassical realism is enthusiastic about the role of *élites*: '... their perceptions of relative power...', their capacities to extract and to manage state's resources, within the context of total amount of resources; these two domestic variables (added to systemic pressures³⁷¹) would then be able to explain foreign policies' goals and timings. In short, the system provides incentives and the cited domestic variables confine states' responses to those incentives³⁷².

³⁶⁹ Peter Toft, 'John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics & Power,' *Institut for Statskundskab Arbejdsrapport* 2003/1 (2003), http://polsci.ku.dk/arbejdsrapporter/2003/ap_2003_01.pdf/ or Peter Toft, 'John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power,' *Journal of International Relations and Development* Vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2005) <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/journal/v8/n4/full/1800065a.html>

³⁷⁰ This topic was presented elsewhere: Nuno Morgado, 'Geographical setting, élites' perceptions and capacities, and foreign policy,' in: *The European Consortium for Political Research 2016 Graduate Student Conference*, University of Tartu, Estonia, 12th July 2016.

³⁷¹ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 147.

³⁷² Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 466, 486.

It is argued that states' goals³⁷³, states' mobilization capacity, *élites* perceptions, all of them fluctuate³⁷⁴, and these variables are no less valuable in the analysis of foreign policy – and of the international system by extension – than systemic constraints.

The realist theoretical tradition – as it was observed in Mearsheimer's approach too – argues that military capabilities are located at the 'very foundation of security'³⁷⁵. The following cycle explains the making and the role of such military capabilities: the relative material potential is accumulated internally (above all economy and military), then conversion into power that grants projection on the international system occurs, and those circumstances either change (in the case of accumulation of relative material potential that goes beyond what is allowed by other units) or maintain (in the case of the accumulation taking place within the previous limits) the distribution of power. Rose underlined that tendencies (thus not inexorable laws) in the international system are developed in this way³⁷⁶. An interesting point to be highlighted is that contrary to the liberal theoretical school, the argument of accumulation of wealth should not be seen as an idealistic aspiration to the world's path for peace and prosperity, but as the foundation of the military strength instead. The entire process is permeated by *élites*' perceptions (or preferences³⁷⁷) (nationalism and/or statism³⁷⁸) and *élites*' capacities/abilities to extract resources, logically attached to the structure of the state³⁷⁹, in the setting of international distribution of power. A 'theoretical richness', as

³⁷³ Also Robert Gilpin sagaciously contended about the (in)existence of fully rational, utilitarian, organized, eternal, hierarchical list of state's goals (Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 18-25).

³⁷⁴ Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),' *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 175.

³⁷⁵ Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories - Discipline and Diversity*. (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2007), 56.

³⁷⁶ Gideon Rose, 'Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,' *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 171.

³⁷⁷ E.g. Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

³⁷⁸ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,' *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006).

'State' vs 'Nation' – Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

³⁷⁹ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Schweller well pointed out, endures³⁸⁰. This theoretical richness, at the same time, confronts a strict systemic approach (*e.g.* Offensive Realism) and allows answering the research question from a broader angle.

It is true that several theories dissertated about the role of ‘ideas’ in international politics³⁸¹. However, they do not hold the monopoly of the subject, and neoclassical realism also focuses on ideas attached to the *élites*³⁸².

This systematization is logically compatible with the assumptions of Ethology [cf. Subchapter 1.1.]. At this point, one finds perhaps the main contribution from neoclassical realism, both in its condition of foreign policy theory and as a theoretical framework (within the sphere of geopolitical studies) which helps to answer the main research question of this study.

In the same vein, the key point is that ideas are important, not because they are shared, but precisely because they contend within international *élites*’ decision-making environment³⁸³.

Accepting the facts that (i) ideas command the material world, and not vice versa, (ii) refusing exclusive materialist explanations and advocating both material and ideational factors as determinants of behavior of human decision-makers³⁸⁴, (iii) acknowledging that ideas are not eternal³⁸⁵, but also (iv) recognizing that ideas, by their own, are not capable of winning states’ disputes; it is opportune to admit that we do live in a material world, and science is about materiality too. So as Sayer affirmed:

³⁸⁰ Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),’ *International Security* Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 174.

³⁸¹ Although under the liberal approach, Goldstein and Keohane (Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework*, in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)), or Tannenwald under constructivist perspective (Nina Tannenwald, ‘Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda,’ *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 2005)) called for attention to the role of ideas in the context of foreign policy decision-making. Neoclassical realism includes ‘ideas’ in the variable of *élites*’ perceptions.

³⁸² Among others, contributions by Schweller – the ‘...focus on elite risk-taking propensity...’ – Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’ *International Security* vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 161 (on page 169, Schweller elaborate with detail about *élites*’ perceptions); and by Taliaferro (the resource-extraction model) – Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,’ *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 486

³⁸³ Against this argument *vide*: Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,’ *International Organization* Vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 401.

³⁸⁴ Although from other theoretical tradition, *vide*: Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,’ *Foreign Policy Analysis* Vol. 1, no. 1 (2005): 3.

³⁸⁵ transl. ‘ideas are neither eternal, nor resistant to social erosion,’ António Marques Bessa, *O Trabalho das Ideias* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 1997), 11.

‘[A]lthough systems of meanings and beliefs are not themselves material, they usually require some material mode of objectivation...’³⁸⁶.

In this way, a statement endorsing the relevance of a complementarity among ideas and materialism finishes this matter.

As it was analyzed [cf. Subchapter 1.2.], the geographical setting constitutes *per se* a powerful ‘incentive’ or ‘limitation’ to politics³⁸⁷ – to foreign policy and, by extension, international politics.

The premise that the state cannot be seen as a *black box* is reaffirmed since domestic-level factors can offer explanations about changes in state’s behavior³⁸⁸. In the same way, a systemic or structural approach alone is unable to give answers in what is seen as incomplete mono-causal perspectives.

It is acknowledged that *geography* cannot *dictate* foreign policy, since geography is one among many other factors that contribute to the explanation of foreign policy outcomes. However, foreign policy decision-making *should* be shaped by geopolitical factors (LAGE, RAUM, CIRCULATION, RESOURCES, IDENTITY, etc.), because in that case it would naturally comply with the pattern of rationality and the pursuit of national interest, since the foreign policy would then be supported by the relative material state potential.

However, outlining the possibility of a full understanding or misunderstanding of geography’s incentives (since the limits are practically impossible to be ignored³⁸⁹) by the *élites* creates a puzzle [cf. PART IV].

Therefore, the argument that incentives presented by the geographical setting may not have a direct mechanism of translation on politics is supported [cf. Subchapter

³⁸⁶ Andrew Sayer, *Method in Social Science – a realist approach* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 23.

In this context, Sayer gave the example of feminism, which needs to departure from the starting point of acceptance of material reality that “womankind/female sex” does exist, and it is necessarily different from material “male sex”. The preference for using now the term “sex”, instead of “gender” is conscientious, since “gender” is a term already used by some social theories (“gender studies”) in order to plead that, although a human is born with male sex or female sex, his/her identity in terms of gender may be distinct and independent from that material reality; obviously, a post-positivist/reflectivist claiming to turn exceptional and sensitive cases into a general rule.

³⁸⁷ José M. Freire Nogueira, *O Método Geopolítico Alargado – Persistências e Contingências em Portugal e no Mundo* (Lisboa: Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares, 2011), 483.

³⁸⁸ Both domestic and foreign policy ‘... may be the critical variable [*sic*] in the geopolitics of nations at any particular point in history...’ – Martin Sicker, *Geography and Politics among Nations – an Introduction to Geopolitics* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010), 15.

³⁸⁹ Example: if a state is geographically an island, insularity constitutes its geopolitical condition – Aymeric Chauprade, *Introduction à l’analyse géopolitique* (Paris: Ellipses, 1999), 89.

1.2. and APPENDIX 2 POSSIBILISM]³⁹⁰. As far as the literature does not offer a concept to designate the misunderstanding of geographical setting's incentives in the foreign policy conduct by the *élites*, the concept of GEOMISGUIDANCE was created. GEOMISGUIDANCE, as it was formulated above, would constitute one of two possible distinct conditions, in a necessarily poor black-and-white schematic way required only in terms of the RAUMSINN theorization. Consequently, the RAUMSINN could then be "accurate", "geomisguided" or something in-between [cf. fig. 3]. In other words, the foreign policy executive's perception of space would be considered misguided in case of ignorance or misunderstanding of the geographical setting's incentives.

Here one finds a very strong unity between *élites'* perceptions and the RAUMSINN as a geopolitical concept, together with the geohistorical method that works with both that variable and concept. GEOMISGUIDANCE may be even linked to Schweller's 'underbalancing' thesis³⁹¹, since geomisguidance may contribute to it³⁹².

Approaching the problem from another side, using a phenomenological approach, Yi-Fu Tuan tried to conceptualize the meaning of individual's experience of things³⁹³, which for this study matters only applied to the experience that *élites* of each country have concerning the geographical setting's incentives of their states. Even before Tuan, the contribution of Merleau-Ponty's *embodiment*³⁹⁴ was extremely relevant in helping to strengthen the methodological path of assessing the concept of GEOMISGUIDANCE and coming up with results.

Among the unit-level characteristics:

‘the extractive and mobilization capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of elite societal cohesion’³⁹⁵

³⁹⁰ Once again these ideas match, at some extent, the phenomenological perspective. In concrete terms, the existence of a material reality is acknowledged, but how does this material reality impact on political activity will depend on *élites'* perceptions, *i.e.* the (intentional) consciousness of those individuals.

³⁹¹ For extensive reading *vide*: Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

³⁹² On the topic of misguided states *vide* for example:

Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 337–45.

John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 291.

³⁹³ Yi-Fu Tuan, *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values* (London: Prentice-Hall International, 1974).

³⁹⁴ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).

³⁹⁵ Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

it seems that the first and the second are the crucial ones, *i.e.* *élites'* capacities and perceptions, without which explanations in geopolitical studies remain incomplete, since the logic of causality would be lost in the fog³⁹⁶. It is affirmed so, because in accordance with fig. 4 it is sustained that structural dimensions might not have a direct impact on foreign policy outcomes³⁹⁷.

Marrying geopolitical studies with neoclassical realism would result in the systematization of relative material state potential and systemic constraints into geopolitical studies' theoretical framework, whilst *élites'* perceptions and capacities will remain as the specific contribution from neoclassical realism [cf. table 2].

Table 2
Joint complementary approach: Geopolitical Studies and Neoclassical Realist variables

GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES

1. Relative material state potential	3. <i>Élites'</i> perceptions
2. Systemic constraints	4. <i>Élites'</i> capacities

Geopolitical design
Raumsinn

The offensive realist premise that great powers are revisionist powers is accepted, in the sense that great powers want to enlarge their power, but *élites'* perceptions and capacities are the variables that will establish *when, how and in which terms* that power enlargement will be accomplished. For example, China and Russia within the revolutionary movement's dynamics (H₄), as it will be discussed below [PART V].

³⁹⁶ Vide: Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed., *Process Tracing – From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

³⁹⁷ Also Sicker argued about '...territory perceived by decision-makers...' – Martin Sicker, *Geography and Politics among Nations – an Introduction to Geopolitics* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2010), 76.

ii. Set of problems in neoclassical realism

It is now pertinent to investigate the internal structure of neoclassical realism to identify the three following theoretical weaknesses or difficulties: (1) problems of the state-centric approach; (2) Power and Potential; (3) state's structure as independent, not intervening variable.

1. Problems of the state-centric approach

Until the first decades of 20th century, in the particular case of the European region, the argument of states considered as a *black box* (somehow into accordance with classical realism or assuredly with neorealist structuralism) might have had full sense. In fact, till that time, states were ruled by explicit historical agents (*i.e.* 'royal and noble dynasties'³⁹⁸) with the conquest or perpetuation of political power of "their states" on the international arena as substantial everlasting interest.

However, when the moment of states' radical change in terms of domestic structure came – namely into democratic mechanisms that do not allow the same continuity or fidelity to perennial interests as other political systems do – so came the necessity of paying attention to domestic developments. To put it at its simplest, those domestic developments had an impact on the external behavior of state. Among many other possibilities, for example, a submission to parallel interests to the state (a case easily identifiable by an analysis of the state's traditional cores in terms of foreign policy) became a potential scenario, once much less common. Accordingly, the proposition stated by Meyer *et al.* is highly pertinent³⁹⁹ [cf. Subchapter 9.2.]. Neoclassical realist state-centric point of view faces difficulties then. If it is true that states persist as main actors on the international arena, under hypothesis (H₄) at least some states can be perceived, to some extent, as instruments of GLOBALIST FORCES [cf. Subchapter 9.2.]. Consequently the conception of state would have to be merely instrumental [cf. APPENDIX 2, STATE]. On the other hand, under hypothesis (H₂), states' interests (as the *élites* perceive them) would be powerful enough to create or influence an (international) ideology and/or geostrategy, in a manner to strengthen its support.

³⁹⁸ Olavo de Carvalho, 'The USA and the New World Order,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's blog*, August 2, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/index-english.html>

³⁹⁹ 'Many features of the contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated through global cultural and associational processes' – John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and Nation State," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 103, No. 1 (July 1997): 144-145. Once accepted this idea, the test of H₄ may take shape.

Both Vives and Carvalho rejected the perspective that grasps the “states” as [the main or even] historical agents⁴⁰⁰. Carvalho’s perspective was already stated in the previous section [cf. 2.1.2]. Vives identified ‘cultural society’ as the unit of analysis⁴⁰¹.

How to solve difficulties of a state-centric viewpoint?

A two level- approach analysis would solve the problem: on the one hand, states remain as formal units in IR terms, but on the other hand, historical agents may be taken into consideration as agents with impact on the international affairs in long-term [historical] perspective, through influence upon states⁴⁰². Hence, a ‘macro’ level of analysis, yet neither structural nor systemic. The assumption is that, even though other agents have influence, international arena is, in the end, based on force, and states are those agents who still own the “monopoly of legitimate use of physical force” under Max Weber’s (1864-1920) adage.

The discussion between state-centric perspective “versus” perspective that defends the existence of historical agents (which can influence the state towards their interests) is provisionally settled, in regard to the definition of instruments for analysis. In the end, the state persists as a unit of analysis for geopolitical studies, since the instruments used to print changes on international politics are directly or indirectly attached to states. Furthermore, even considering the existence of GLOBALIST PROJECTS, their agents will occupy positions inside states’ structure, or they will have an impact on state’s officials. Then state-centric perspective remains to some extent [cf. APPENDIX 2, STATE].

Finally, this study is not concerned primarily with the distribution of power in the international system *esse in*, but it aims instead to analyze two ideologies that pursue the defense of specific interests (national and/or international). Doing so, the thesis will also be devoted to the analysis of foreign policy of a country directly or indirectly

⁴⁰⁰ Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 72.

‘... designated by names of nations, States and governments, to depict their interactions as a dispute among nations or national interests is a residual habit of the old geopolitics that does not help us at all to understand the present situation’ – Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Olavo – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>

⁴⁰¹ Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 77.

This unit of analysis matches Ratzel’s concept of *Großlebensformen* to some extent – Friedrich Ratzel, *Géographie Politique*, trans. Pierre Rusch (Paris: Éditions Régionales Européennes S.A., 1988).

⁴⁰² Carvalho listed a number of possible historical agents – Olavo de Carvalho, ‘[R2] Olavo,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r2-olavo-de-carvalho.html>

targeted by such ideologies (Brazil), so that correlations between those foreign policy outcomes and the ideologies may be assessed. Foreign policy is obviously a state-structure's outcome.

2. Power and Potential

A misguided delimitation of domains and definition of concepts is a second problem in neoclassical realism. The literature (e.g. Taliaferro, Schweller, Rose) continuously refers to “states’ *power*”, whereas “states’ *potential*” should be the most suitable concept⁴⁰³. Difficulties pointed out by Wohlforth are likely understandable in that context of confusion⁴⁰⁴. Rigor while using concepts is essential [cf. APPENDIX 2: STATE POWER and STATE POTENTIAL].

3. State's structure as independent, not intervening variable

The third and the last problem in neoclassical realism that this study aims to cover, particularly in Taliaferro's model, is state's structure as an intervening variable.

In fact, on the analysis of state's potential in this thesis, the structure of state should be regarded as an independent variable (along with the inclusion of geography) [cf. table 3, fig. 4 and APPENDIX 3].

Therefore, the goal of introducing refinements and contributing to the development of the neoclassical realist theory is accomplished: the issue of state-centrism, the terminology of states' POTENTIAL instead of states' POWER, hints concerning the complex operationalization in transforming potential into power (that Taliaferro also covered⁴⁰⁵), and structure included not as an intervening variable⁴⁰⁶ but as an independent variable.

iii. Methodological benchmarks

Making considerations about methodology, and although great attention is paid to Taliaferro's model, this thesis presumes that models are not capable of a holistic

⁴⁰³ With respect to the distinction among concepts of ‘power’ and ‘potential’, among others, *vide*: Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 156.

⁴⁰⁴ William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1-17.

⁴⁰⁵ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,’ *Security Studies* Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 473.

⁴⁰⁶ Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 166.

explanation of international political phenomena (e.g. ‘...game-theoretic modeling...’⁴⁰⁷). Models are, therefore, perceived as limited tools. In fact, the multi-method approach explained in the next subchapter tries to overcome the model’s limitations. Once again, structure, mechanical laws, determinism are rejected social approaches *as a whole*. That matches Christensen’s remarks that studies on foreign policy involve

‘... a great deal of knowledge about the nation in question...’⁴⁰⁸

Neoclassical realism, located in the theoretical tradition of Realism, highlighting notions such as state-centrism, relative material POTENTIAL, and clash between entities, embraces, at the same time, new considerations such as motivations and ideologies combined in the variables of *élites*’ perceptions and capacities.

For all the mentioned issues, neoclassical realism seems to be the most useful branch of Realism to marry with geopolitical studies⁴⁰⁹ in order to forge the theoretical background in which the answer to the main research question – *Are Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism somehow related to a New World Order?* – will be accomplished.

⁴⁰⁷ Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ *World Politics* Vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 166.

⁴⁰⁸ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 248.

⁴⁰⁹ One of the most important finalities of the past subchapters is to forge a universal theoretical background so that it may be avoided that geopolitical studies ‘break into separated national schools’ as Kofroň alerted for – Jan Kofroň, ‘Possibilities of Neoclassical Geopolitics: a Systemic Approach’ (Abstract & Introduction Ph.D. thesis, Charles University in Prague, 2012), 23.

‘Das Maß der Unabhängigkeit gibt einem Staate
seine Stellung in der Welt;
es legt ihm zugleich die Notwendigkeit auf,
alle inneren Verhältnisse zu dem Zwecke einzurichten,
sich zu behaupten.
Dies ist sein oberstes Gesetz.’⁴¹⁰

Leopold von Ranke

2.2. Methodological guidelines of the thesis

Having outlined the problem, structure & objectives, and the philosophical worldview of this thesis in the Introduction; in the sequence of the detailed explanation of the theoretical background and the methodological approach of geopolitical studies (the theory of *neoclassical geopolitics*) [cf. Chapter 1 and Subchapter 2.1], this subchapter is now going to focus on the research design and methodological guidelines of this thesis in particular.

It is pertinent to remind that the investigation is conditioned by the purpose of geopolitical studies of studying and explaining the impact of the geographical setting, filtrated by *élites*’ perceptions and capacities, on human political activity at the international level (foreign policy and, by extension, international politics).

Hypotheses

The formulation of hypotheses turns into a crucial step of this thesis’ research design⁴¹¹.

As it was mentioned in the subchapter 1.2, the author already tested a hypothesis elsewhere on the simple assumption that the geographical setting tends to influence

⁴¹⁰ transl. ‘The degree of state’s independence gives the state’s position in the World; therefore, the necessity of organization of all state’s internal resources in order to guarantee its self-preservation remains. That is the state’s supreme law’ – Leopold von Ranke, ‘Politisches Gespräch,’ kapitel 1, 1836, last modified November 27, 2015, Spiegel, <http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/-3012/1>

Von Ranke was the precursor of the expression *Primat der Außenpolitik* [Primacy of Foreign Affairs].

⁴¹¹ *Vide* for example: Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 201.

foreign policy (and international politics by extension)⁴¹². That constituted a preliminary exercise before the systematization of the neoclassical geopolitics' framework that took place on the former subchapters. Therefore, that test (which confirmed the hypothesis) is accepted by this thesis, constituting the starting point for the study.

In this way, with the aim of providing contingent solutions to the mentioned problem, reacting to the research question directly, and starting with the premise of the influence of IV (i) systemic constraints and (ii) the relative state material potential, the following hypotheses are formulated:

Hypothesis (H₁)

THE NEO-EURASIANIST PLAN, THROUGH THE INFLUENCE UPON RUSSIAN *ÉLITES'* PERCEPTIONS AND CAPACITIES, AIMS TO CREATE A *MULTIPOLAR WORLD*.

Hypothesis (H₂)

NEO-EURASIANISM CONSTITUTES BOTH AN IDEOLOGY AND A STRATEGIC PLAN WITH THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF REACHING RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS – AS THEY HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED BY THE RUSSIAN *ÉLITES* – ON THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.

Hypothesis (H₃)

DESPITE SOME ORIGINALITY, THERE IS A TREND SO THAT MERIDIONALISM, AS BRAZILIAN 'GEO-IDEOLOGY', BECOMES AN INSTRUMENT OF NEO-EURASIANISM, THE LATTER UNDERSTOOD AS THE SET OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE WORLD.

Hypothesis (H₄)

THE EURASIAN BLOC, AS GLOBALIST PROJECT⁴¹³, IS DRIVEN BY THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, AND THE RUSSIAN *ÉLITES* ARE ONE OF ITS AGENTS. THIS GLOBALIST PROJECT COMPRISES THE NEO-EURASIANIST AND THE MERIDIONALIST IDEOLOGIES AND STRATEGIC PLANS.

⁴¹² The premises were: (i) the 'influence of geographical features on foreign policy' and (ii) the 'possibility to predict, at some extent, foreign policy based in geographical features' – Nuno Morgado, 'Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism. A New Look at an Old Problem,' *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 233.

⁴¹³ The 'GLOBALIST PROJECTS' [cf. APPENDIX 2] hypothesis has been developed by Carvalho: Olavo de Carvalho, 'Os Donos do Mundo,' *Olavo de Carvalho's website*, October 18, 2013, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/110221dc.html> or <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>; or Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 541-543. Certainly inspired by Chandler – Robert Chandler, *Shadow World - Resurgent Russia, The Global New Left, and Radical Islam* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2008).

Carvalho argued about the existence of three globalist projects: 'the Syndicate,' 'the Islamic' and the 'Eurasian bloc'. Taking into account that the complexity of this hypothesis is incompatible with the monographic guideline of this study, it is essential to achieve a precise delimitation of the object. In this way, the 'Syndicate' and the 'Islamic bloc' as GLOBALIST PROJECTS receive a mere reference, thus they are excluded from the final test of the hypothesis.

In this context, it is suggested further research about that topic.

Table 3
Hypotheses and variables

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES		INTERVENING VARIABLES		DEPENDENT VARIABLES
- Relative material state potential - Systemic constraints	$\Sigma \Rightarrow$	NEO-EURASIANIST PLAN INFLUENCES RUSSIAN <i>ÉLITES</i> ' PERCEPTIONS AND CAPACITIES	$\Sigma \Rightarrow$	MULTIPOLAR WORLD
- Relative material state potential - Systemic constraints	$\Sigma \Rightarrow$	RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS (PERCEIVED BY THE RUSSIAN <i>ÉLITES</i>)	$\Sigma \Rightarrow$	NEO-EURASIANIST IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY PLAN
- Relative material state potential - Systemic constraints	$\Sigma \Rightarrow$	NEO-EURASIANISM (AS SET OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE WORLD)	$\Sigma \Rightarrow$	MERIDIONALISM AS INSTRUMENT OF NEO-EURASIANISM (IN SOUTH AMERICA)
- Relative material state potential - Systemic constraints	$\Sigma \Rightarrow$	THE EURASIAN BLOC DRIVEN BY THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT UNDER RUSSIAN <i>ÉLITES</i> (INCLUDES NEO-EURASIANISM AND MERIDIONALISM)	$\Sigma \Rightarrow$	GLOBALIST PROJECT (GOAL: WORLD GOVERNMENT)

Preliminary methodological considerations

The scientific method, by its own, establishes the procedure of the research through following stages⁴¹⁴: (1) observation of the object and formulation of the research question; (2) collection of data, description/characterization; (3) formulation of hypotheses; (4) prediction; (5) experiments/ falsifiability; (6) conclusions and analysis of results; (7) publication of results. Those stages will be mirrored in the thesis. Broadly speaking, observation is a selected way to apply the theory⁴¹⁵.

The research piece will be mainly deductive, testing hypotheses, starting from a coherent theoretical set of ideas and concepts (already explained) towards facts and the material reality (description and explanation of facts). Facts will not be neglected in the name of a preference for certain narratives [cf. Section 1.2.2 and 2.1.1]. Since the theory is not disregarded, the thesis aims to be a proper theory application and a theory-development research piece⁴¹⁶.

⁴¹⁴ David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 23.

R. Murray Thomas, *Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations* (London: Corwin Press, 2003), 15.

⁴¹⁵ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 27 – 30.

⁴¹⁶ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4.

This study intends not to be dogmatic and deterministic⁴¹⁷, considering scientific knowledge temporary and perennially corrected⁴¹⁸. Verification or arguments providing a solid framework to sustain a specific idea (*i.e.* confirming tests⁴¹⁹) will predominate over Popper's falsification⁴²⁰.

The thesis is crossed by a vertical state-centric axis, but also by a horizontal axis based on sectoral issues, in order to capture, for example, the connections between organized crime and politics in Brazil [cf. Subchapter 8.2.].

In summary, it is possible to verify that the presented model of neoclassical geopolitics is multilevel, covering: (a) unit level (individuals, *e.g.* members of Brazilian foreign policy executive), (b) domestic level (institutions, *e.g.* state structure) and (c) international level (international system). Thus, this thesis mirrors the waltzian *man, state and war* pyramid, using a 'macro' level of analysis neither structural nor systemic⁴²¹.

Overall system of methods and techniques

Concerning procedures of inquiry, the thesis is eminently a qualitative study, as Chauprade and Thual characterized geopolitical studies in general⁴²². Despite that the danger of 'a single method' is avoided⁴²³. In this way: (i) the phenomenological method; (ii) political personality profiling; (iii) case study (comparative and single); and (iv) process tracing will be used all together.

Firstly, this thesis is inscribed in the phenomenological tradition already introduced above [cf. INTRODUCTION]. This inscription places the study in the research line with Thual and Chauprade, geopolitical scholars that work in the phenomenological

⁴¹⁷ David A. de Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research* (London: SAGE, 2001), 5.

⁴¹⁸ David A. de Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research* (London: SAGE, 2001), 11.

Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, 'The End of International Relations Theory?' *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 405- 406.

António Marques Bessa, *Quem Governa? Uma Análise Histórico-Política do Tema da Elite* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 1993), 37.

⁴¹⁹ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 43-44.

⁴²⁰ Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Routledge, 2002), 18.

⁴²¹ For a reading about a systemic approach *vide*: Gérard Dussouy, 'Geopolitics Roundtable – Systemic Geopolitics: A Global Interpretation Method of the World,' *Geopolitics* vol. 15, no. 1 (February 2010).

⁴²² "...elle [la géopolitique] est donc fondamentalement une science qualitative" – Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 500-1.

⁴²³ Nick Moore, *How to do research – a practical guide to designing and managing research projects* (London: Facet Publishing, 2006), 12.

context. This kind of way of thinking is not restricted to the observation of facts or appearances, but its core is to ‘penetrate their meanings and contexts with increasing refinement and prediction’, *i.e.* to search for the essence of facts⁴²⁴. In order to accomplish that search, the scholar needs to perceive the elements of international politics as phenomena. These phenomena are characterized by *intentionality* (*i.e.* action requires intention) [cf. APPENDIX 3], consequently the key ambiance is then the individual’s consciousness (hence the pertinence of élites’ perceptions for geopolitical studies, as analyzed in the subchapter 2.1)⁴²⁵. The phenomenological method helps in the understanding of how “facts” are processed in the intentional consciousness and also to identify what remains unchanged (invariant)⁴²⁶. The operation is integrated in *epoché* [ἐποχή] a suspension of judgments. In this manner, therefore, subjectivity is mitigated. Key terms are then: intuition/ interpretation/ hermeneutics of the essence of facts in the development of comprehension⁴²⁷. This procedure will be applied to assess individuals’ perceptions (Dugin and Putin [cf. Subchapters 4.2 and 9.2], Lula da Silva [cf. PART IV], Carvalho [cf. Subchapter 9.2]), pointing out their intentionality towards *something* (*i.e.* objectives)⁴²⁸ [APPENDIX 3]. It is opportune to remind that the phenomenological method is located far from the post-modernist radical perspectivism. That is so because of mainly two reasons: (a) at the first place, the existence of an objective reality outside the human mind is acknowledged; and (b) the procedures and the impact of knowledge are different in phenomenology and in the radical perspectivism.

Secondly, still at the level of assessing individual’s perceptions, political personality profiling will be useful for the characterization of the revolutionary mentality [cf. Subchapter 9.2.]⁴²⁹.

Thirdly, the purpose of choosing case study (comparative and single) is justified by the objective of explaining in detail ‘a case of intrinsic importance’ for this

⁴²⁴ Medard Boss, ‘Modo-de-ser Esquizofrênico à Luz de uma Fenomenologia Daseinanalítica’ *Daseinanalyse* no. 3 (1977): 3-4.

⁴²⁵ ‘... without consciousness there are no sense data’; ‘«Phenomena» are everything we are conscious of...’; and ‘consciousness and phenomena are inseparable...’ – Pauline Couper, *A Student’s Introduction to Geographical Thought – theories, philosophies, methodologies* (London: SAGE, 2015), 88, 89.

⁴²⁶ At this point, it can be established a direct link to GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES.

⁴²⁷ Introspection and intuition are very useful mental actions in the hermeneutic procedure – Andrew Sayer, *Method in Social Science – a realist approach* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 24-25.

⁴²⁸ François Thual, *Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité* (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 1996), 20.

⁴²⁹ Jerrold Post has an interesting chapter introducing this technique - Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, ed., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A Pluralist Guide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 131-150.

research⁴³⁰. Comparative case study is then the most appropriate method to apply in PARTS II and III since the center of gravity of the research is the analysis and the comparison of two ideologies and strategic plans⁴³¹ which, although their remote geographic origins, may share much in common in terms of “analysis of the environment” and “formulation”. Due to the identical nature of those objects they can be analyzed and put side by side through the comparative method (controlled comparison⁴³²). In this context, the comparative case study requires assistance of strategic studies, since it will be operationalized in the strategic planning laboratory making use of its two initial phases⁴³³: (phase 1) the analysis of the environment (1.1) an internal analysis (identifying strengths and weaknesses) and (1.2) an external analysis (naming the opportunities and threats); (phase 2) the formulation of the plan, which includes: (2.1) the definition of the mission, (2.2) the enumeration of objectives, (2.3) setting up modalities of action, and (2.4) linking the plan to specific sectoral policies.

On the other hand, the technique of single-case study is also chosen and applied to Brazil taking into account that such technique is suitable to be operationalized by the geopolitical studies’ model: the assessment of the relative material state potential of the country and systemic constraints [cf. Section 8.1.1], analysis of Brazilian *élites*’ perceptions and capacities [cf. Section 8.1.2], and analysis of Brazil’s Geopolitical Design [cf. Section 8.1.3]. Single-case study also allows exploring in depth: the socio-political context of Brazil (antecedent conditions) [cf. 8.2.1], the relations between São Paulo Forum and Brazilian foreign policy outcomes [cf. 8.2.2], and the bonds between Brazil’s foreign policy outcomes, Meridionalism, São Paulo Forum & Neo-Eurasianism [cf. 8.2.3].

⁴³⁰ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 55.

Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, ed., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A Pluralist Guide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 43-58.

⁴³¹ So it is their classification for this study’s purposes.

⁴³² Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 56-58.

⁴³³ Elsewhere the author explained with detail strategic planning’s phases, also providing an application of that model on the empirical reality – Nuno Morgado, ‘Desvelando o planeamento estratégico de Otto von Bismarck – A fundação do II Reich e a Unificação Alemã de uma perspectiva da Estratégia,’ *Finis Mundi Journal of metapolitics, history & culture*, no. 9 (December 2015).

About the selection of Brazil as a case *of something*⁴³⁴, the realist theoretical school claims that national *élites* will most of the time comply with the national interest. However, cases in which that compliance does not occur can be in fact observed. How can that incongruence be explained? The answer suggested by this thesis is certainly given by the IntVs of neoclassical realism. The selected case in which those circumstances can be observed is then Brazil in our days (2003-2016), so the test of the concept of GEOMISGUIDANCE may take place [cf. Part IV]⁴³⁵.

Fourthly, together with the use of the mentioned methods and techniques, process tracing will be used to make the study stronger (particularly in PART IV)⁴³⁶. That means that process tracing will put light on the relations between the independent, intervening and dependent variables, also helping in observing political outcomes by retroactively decomposing the context and the development of phases which caused those political outcomes and, naturally, provide evidence to support the arguments [cf. Subchapters 8.2 and 9.2]. As a combination of structural approach (systemic constraints / distribution of power) with individual agency (*élites*' perceptions and capacities), this thesis is fully eligible to use process tracing⁴³⁷.

PART V focus on 'explaining case'⁴³⁸. In fact, Carvalho's hypotheses can be included in what Evera designated as: 'specific explanations'⁴³⁹, since Carvalho's 'explanation for specific cases': (1) exemplifies 'a valid covering law', (2) 'covering law's causal phenomenon' are included in the research, (3) 'covering law's antecedent conditions' were duly described, and (4) 'covering law's intervening phenomena' can be observed in the research. In the mentioned part, a contribution from intelligence in the set of questions systematized in Lowenthal's book will be given, which are also the basic questions of political science: *who* wants *what*? *How*, *when*, and by *which means*

⁴³⁴ Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, ed., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A Pluralist Guide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 43.

⁴³⁵ Taking into account that the Russian foreign policy executive is not assessed as geomisguided, it was excluded an empirical study of Russia in this thesis.

⁴³⁶ Process tracing is an excellent tool to work within the case study – Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing – From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4, 13, 126.

⁴³⁷ Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing – From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 5.

⁴³⁸ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 74-75.

⁴³⁹ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 40.

is the agent pursuing his action?⁴⁴⁰ This approach will, among other uses, provide the structure of the entire Subchapter 9.2.

Not only it is believed that these methods and techniques allow stronger tests, but before anything else, (1) the bulk of data to be analyzed requires them. In addition: (2) the philosophical worldview, (3) the way how the problem was formulated, (4) the objectives, (5) the structure of the thesis, (6) the hypotheses, and (7) the finalities of the thesis reinforce the choice of the mentioned methodological system.

Therefore, methods and techniques such as: (i) large-*n* (cannot be used because there is no large number of cases to be explored), (ii) counterfactual analysis (which conflicts with the author's preference for a research supported by empirical data⁴⁴¹), or (iii) discourse analysis/narratives (are not appropriated due to ontological, epistemological and methodological incompatibilities with geopolitical studies as they are perceived in this study) are consequently rejected. The rational choice is also disregarded by the study⁴⁴², whereas area studies acquire a full place as a technique that helps in the understanding of the particularities of the regions under study (*e.g.* South America)⁴⁴³.

It bears repeating that models do not depict the entire reality. Models are nothing but an incomplete technique that assists the scientific method to apprehend the essence of the reality (*e.g.* neoclassical geopolitics' systematized model (fig. 4)). For this reason the complex system of methods and techniques described above was elaborated.

⁴⁴⁰ *Vide e.g.* Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence – From Secrets to Policy* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2015).

⁴⁴¹ 'Without explicitly incorporating counterfactuals to facilitate cross- and within-case comparisons, theory-testing process tracing can lead to mistaken causal inferences about the robustness of a presumed relationship between an independent variable and outcomes' – Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing – From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 207. Since this thesis does not aim to test theory but, as said above, it is merely theory-application and theory-development the mentioned problem remains marginal.

⁴⁴² In the line of some neoclassical realist authors too – Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 289.

About rational choice *vide* Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles – Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 175-211.

⁴⁴³ The teachings about Area Studies were assimilated along the author's research path. Concerning Central Asia – which received elsewhere attention as a region under the Russian sphere of influence – the teachings of Horák were duly assimilated: 'it is impossible to approach Central Asian countries with theories of political science, because power is tribal and informal, with particularities that could not be defined by determined rules' (Slavomír Horák, 'Formal and Informal Institutions in Central Asia – political systems vs traditional social structures in Central Asian politics, opposition to authoritarian regimes. The road to authoritarianism, local leaders,' JMM361 Nation and State Building in Eurasia (class lecture, Charles University in Prague, November 22, 2011)). There are similarities with South America.

Techniques for data collection and data analysis

As for the specific procedures for data collection and analysis, all techniques available and useful to provide the answer to the research question were considered.

What Moore called ‘desk research’⁴⁴⁴ certainly starts with the literature review, in other words, with assessment of the *status quaestionis* familiarizing with the findings of previous studies. The analysis of documents, content analysis⁴⁴⁵ or hermeneutic⁴⁴⁶, although far more time-consuming and laborious than other techniques, are the most significant ones⁴⁴⁷. These techniques, duly attached to the analytical capacities of the researcher, require readings, resumes or reading records, and precise understanding of texts, extracting the exact meaning.

Techniques like gathering information in fieldwork⁴⁴⁸ and direct observation⁴⁴⁹, taken directly from geography, were used in the research stay at Universidade de São Paulo, and its findings are mostly concentrated in PART IV. A geographical technique, mapping (cartographic representation) was not forgotten in the text either.

⁴⁴⁴ Nick Moore, *How to do research – a practical guide to designing and managing research projects* (London: Facet Publishing, 2006), 106-111.

⁴⁴⁵ For readings about content analysis *vide*:

R. Murray Thomas, *Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations* (London: Corwin Press, 2003), 57-60.

Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, ed., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A Pluralist Guide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 151-167.

David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data – Methods for analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction* (London: SAGE, 2000), 59.

⁴⁴⁶ Mortimer Adler and Charles Van Doren, *How to Read a Book: A Guide to Reading the Great Books* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972).

⁴⁴⁷ In geopolitical studies, these techniques include the production of bibliographic lists organized either by topics (*e.g.* choke points, natural resources, routes, sea lanes) or world’s geographic areas (*e.g.* Europe, Central Asia, South America), and naturally reading resumes of sources (*e.g.* books, scientific papers) that might include the researcher’s ideas and conclusions about the object.

⁴⁴⁸ David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data – Methods for analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction* (London: SAGE, 2000), 36-47.

⁴⁴⁹ R. Murray Thomas, *Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations* (London: Corwin Press, 2003), 60-63.

‘«Geography is an empirical science, guided by observation»’ Antonio Carlos R. Moraes, *Geografia – Pequena História Crítica*, last modified February 2014, Scribd: 7, <http://pt.scribd.com/doc/4526372/Moraes-Carlos-R-GEOGRAFIA-PEQUENA-HISTORIA-CRITICA-PORTUGUES>

Phenomenology stresses ‘...conscious experience is awareness-of-experience’ – Pauline Couper, *A Student’s Introduction to Geographical Thought – theories, philosophies, methodologies* (London: SAGE, 2015), 89 – that means that the researcher’s experiences are important in the study.

In the course of data collection, not only the data itself but also the sources were evaluated⁴⁵⁰. The overwhelming majority of the ideas – with the exception of those that make the progressive and innovative part of this study – are based on the literature. In fact, this thesis is well documented (more than 800 sources), thus exhaustively supported by facts, applying the *criterion of verification through facts* (confirming tests). In this assignment of guaranteeing validity and reliability of the information⁴⁵¹, sources were previously evaluated (including, for example, the evaluation of the author's credibility, and temporal pertinence of the information). Data from different sources were investigated, categorized, justified and compared. This is also a procedure of intelligence analysis⁴⁵² and helps to guarantee an exact and accurate work, in which some feasible objectivity will be assured⁴⁵³.

As it was affirmed, since this thesis is a monograph, the analysis of data and authors was accomplished from the austere point of view of Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist *ideologies* only – this is the last crucial aspect about data collection⁴⁵⁴.

Sources

Due to the methodological options and the scope of the study, the collection of data covered publicly available sources (OSINT⁴⁵⁵) only: academic articles in refereed both international and national journals, academic debates (among which Carvalho vs. Dugin is the most relevant), books and chapters of edited books, as well as PhD theses and Masters dissertations on historical, theoretical and geopolitical analysis; dictionaries and encyclopedias for definition of concepts; summaries, working papers, and notes from lectures (Bachelor, Master, Post-graduation and PhD degrees); conference papers and seminars' notes about geopolitics, foreign policies and the current World Order.

⁴⁵⁰ To assess the validity of sources is a *conditio sine qua non* for the scientific method – A. da Silva Rego, *Lições de Metodologia e Crítica Históricas* (Lisboa: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar – Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, 1963), 109-116.

⁴⁵¹ David A. de Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research* (London: SAGE, 2001), 29-31.

⁴⁵² Prospects, 'Intelligence Analyst', last modified December 2012, http://www.prospects.ac.uk/intelligence_analyst_job_description.htm

⁴⁵³ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 39.

⁴⁵⁴ Vide Umberto Eco, *Como se faz uma Tese em Ciências Humanas*, trans. Ana Falcão Bastos e Luís Leitão (Barcarena: Editorial Presença, 2007), 38.

⁴⁵⁵ Open-source intelligence (OSINT), *i.e.*, data from publicly available sources – concomitantly a demand of the scientific method itself.

Particular attention was paid to Portuguese and Brazilian literature in geopolitical studies to introduce it to the English-speaking Academia.

The research also used diplomatic, military and intelligence/secret services documentation (grey literature): white papers, state budgets, government reports and newsletters (including statistical data), diplomatic sources, and intelligence institutes or agencies (*e.g.* STRATFOR, Intelligence Online, RAND), websites of sectoral ministries (*e.g.* Foreign Policy Concepts and National Strategic Concepts), websites of Embassies and Research Centers, press conferences, original minutes of meetings (*e.g.* São Paulo Forum), *Workers' Party* own data, legal documents (laws, decrees), speeches, talks and interviews transcripts of diplomats and politicians (*élites*). Brazilian National Defense Policy [*Política Nacional de Defesa*], the National Defense Strategy [*Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*] and Brazilian White Book of Defense [*Livro Branco de Defesa*] received a major attention.

Media⁴⁵⁶ (newspapers, magazines, radio, internet, television), Web-based communities (YouTube and Blogs in which Dugin and Carvalho are very active) are the last group of sources to be included, since, for example, international meetings among world leaders, alliances or conflicts appear in the international mass and social media.

The categorization of sources respected the order of importance stated above [cf. INTRODUCTION, State of the art]. The thesis was essentially based on primary sources, and a particular effort to read authors in their original works was consummated. Therefore the quotations were made in the original languages and, when necessary, translated into English in the footnotes, trying to avoid (yet not totally excluding) anthologies, translations of works, or reviews by other authors.

Conclusion about the methodology

Summing up, this geopolitical descriptive-analytic study is not merely empirical, because it recognizes the significance of abstract representations, and deals with theorizations. As a matter of fact, concepts of International Relations are abstractions (*e.g.* international system, anarchy, alliance), in which the observation of its components is not possible. Since the exact definition of concepts is a necessity, all

⁴⁵⁶ Special attention will be paid to non-mainstream mass media – like also to other non-mainstream sources in terms of academic publications (*e.g.* Journal of Eurasian Studies).

technical concepts⁴⁵⁷ were stated in CAPITALIZED LETTERS (at least while mentioned for the first time) and duly defined either in the Glossary compiled in the APPENDIX 2 or in the body of the text.

In this way, with the finality of making a reliable contribution to knowledge, the system of methods was structured into two levels: (1) the conceptual-theoretical (logical validity) aiming to achieve objectives (A), (B), (C) and (E) (the last two partially); and (2) observational-empirical (empirical verification) to accomplish objectives (C), (D) and (E) (the latter partially). So, the objective (E) was divided 50-50 between theoretical formulations and empirical verification.

The above mentioned methods and techniques were guided by the laws of objectivity, intelligibility, and rationality. Honesty, accuracy and the other ethical values guided the procedures of intuition, introspection, and judgment of the researcher⁴⁵⁸. The respect for the ethical guidelines and quotation standards of the Faculty of Social Sciences also assured the honesty of the research⁴⁵⁹. Moral judgments or normative approaches are absent in the study.

The last note will be devoted to the writing style – it is very simple English indeed. About that, the statement that the Portuguese chronicler Fernão Lopes made about his own work could be borrowed: “in these pages, you will not find the beauty of the words, but the nakedness of facts”.

⁴⁵⁷ Umberto Eco, *Como se faz uma Tese em Ciências Humanas*, trans. Ana Falcão Bastos e Luís Leitão (Barcarena: Editorial Presença, 2007), 162, 169.

⁴⁵⁸ Virtue as disposition in the Aristotelian sense with respect to ethics – Aristotle, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

⁴⁵⁹ Institute of Political Studies, ‘IPS Quotation Standard’, March 17, 2014, <http://ips.fsv.cuni.cz/IPSENG-57.html>

PART II

NEO-EURASIANISM: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RUSSIA

Key points

Discussion of three conceptions of Russian History: Westernizers, Slavophiles and Eurasianists. A brief biography of Aleksandr Dugin. Identification of the roots of Neo-Eurasianism, and characterization of Neo-Eurasianism as (1) ideology and (2) strategic plan (mission, objectives, modalities of action, sectoral policies). The misuse of geopolitical concepts and theories by Neo-Eurasianism. Assessment of Neo-Eurasianism from the geopolitical studies' point of view.

Chapter 3

Historical traditions of ancient Eurasianism and the idea of Империи⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁶⁰ This Chapter is based on the author's results from two scholarly works: Nuno Morgado, 'Neo-Eurasianism: strategic conception of Russia, among History and Geopolitics,' in the 6th Russian Political Science Association's All-Russian Congress of Political Science: Russia in the Global World – Institutions and Strategies of Political Interaction, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 23rd November 2012; and Nuno Morgado, 'Portugal, Russia and a conceivable Lusophone block – a geopolitical opportunity,' *Maria Scientia*, no. 6 (Summer 2013).

‘C’est une conséquence naturelle
d’une culture toute d’importation et d’imitation.
Il n’y a point chez nous de développement intime,
de progrès naturel; les nouvelles idées balayent les anciennes...’⁴⁶¹

Petr Chaadaev

3.1. Two conceptions of Russian History: Westernizers and Slavophiles

The two chapters that make up the PART II of this study are concentrated on the purpose of dissecting Neo-Eurasianism. The sub-research questions to be answered now are, as stated above [cf. INTRODUCTION, Structure & Objectives]: “what is Neo-Eurasianism?” and “which kind of world order directives does Neo-Eurasianism propose?” The objective **B.** is then: to explain the historical roots of Neo-Eurasianist and its ideological and strategic aims on the level of the international affairs.

In this way, before describing the Neo-Eurasianist set of ideas with impact on the power structure of international relations [cf. Chapter 4], it is necessary to introduce the philosophical roots of Eurasianism briefly, and doing so, defining what *classical* Eurasianism is about. Chapter 3 accomplishes this step.

Eurasianism can be primarily perceived as a conception of Russian History, *i.e.* a perspective on the Russian military, diplomatic and cultural aspects in the line of time. For that reason, this PART II starts with a resume of the main conceptions of Russian history: Westernizers, Slavophiles, and Eurasianists. It is in the dialectic among those three conceptions, comparing them, that one can better understand their main points.

The purpose is far from describing Russian history. In other to get acquainted with that topic, several pieces of literature are recommended⁴⁶².

⁴⁶¹ transl. ‘That is a consequence of a totally imported and imitated-made culture. There is nothing in us of intimate development, natural progress; the new ideas wipe the old ones out ...’ – Petr Chaadaev, ‘Lettres sur la Philosophie de l’Histoire – Lettre Première,’ last modified January, 2016, La Bibliothèque Russe et Slave, http://bibliotheque-russe-et-slave.com/Livres/Tchaadaev%20-%20Lettres%20sur%20la%20philosophie%20de%20l%27histoire.htm#_ftn13

⁴⁶² Amon others, *vide*:

Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen and Anatoly Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire – Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007);

Martin Gilbert, *The Routledge Atlas of Russian History* (New York: Routledge, 2007);

Monika Greenleaf and Stephen Moeller-Sally, eds., *Russian Subjects – Empire, Nation and the Culture of the Golden Age* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998);

Russian historian Nikolay Karamzin (1766-1826) noted high points in Russian history (*i.e.* internal unity and external security) that he opposed to low points (of political and moral decline⁴⁶³). That turnover of high/low points was included, by its side, in the course of a dynamics that he systematized in three stages – Kievan period, Tatar period and Autocratic period. So, it culminated then into an autocracy based on the Tsarist form of government [самодержавие]⁴⁶⁴. To Karamzin, therefore, autocracy was a necessity for Russia⁴⁶⁵.

In effect, and despite Aleksandr I official historian has died in the early 19th century⁴⁶⁶, autocracy as a political system has been enduring in Russia till our days [cf. Section 9.2.3]. Thus, a *history of autocracy* would be the key to understanding the Russian history. Autocracy with all it brings, including intense periods of chaos, in which the fight to seize power matched countless times with blood, namely blood from comrades, partners, or the Tsar himself. It is a very ancient tradition, intense even in the Roman Empire.

Pyotr Chaadaev (1793-1856) would have been the first one who eventually created one of the conceptions of Russian history at stake⁴⁶⁷. To Chaadaev, Russia

Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia – People and Empire, 1552-1917* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997);

Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians – a History* (Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001);

Konstantin Von Grunwald, *História da Rússia – Pequena História de Grandes Nações* (Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 1979);

Nicholas Riasanovsky and Mark Steinberg, *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Maureen Perrie, Dominic Lieven and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *The Cambridge History of Russia Three Volumes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁴⁶³ To Chaadaev, Russian history was a path of emptiness, therefore, a Karamzin's "low point" totally.

⁴⁶⁴ Further explanations about самодержавие can be found in Alexander M. Yakovlev, *Striving for Law in a Lawless Land – Memoirs of a Russian Reformer* (London: M.E.Sharpe, 1996), 20- 26.

⁴⁶⁵ William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, eds., *A history of Russian thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 390.

⁴⁶⁶ To explore more about Karamzin's work *vide*:

Nicolai Karamzin, *Letters of a Russian traveler 1789-1790: an account of a young Russian gentleman's tour through Germany, Switzerland, France and England*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957)

Nicolai Karamzin, 'История государства Российского,' last modified July, 2001, <http://www.lib.ru/LITRA/KARAMZIN/karamz01.txt>

Nicholas Riasanovsky, *Russian Identities – A Historical Survey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), chapter 6.

⁴⁶⁷ To explore more about Chaadaev's work *vide*:

Petr Chaadaev, 'Lettres sur la Philosophie de l'Histoire – Lettre Première,' last modified January, 2016, La Bibliothèque Russe et Slave, http://bibliotheque-russe-et-slave.com/Livres/Tchaadaiev%20-%20Lettres%20sur%20la%20philosophie%20de%20l%27histoire.htm#_ftn13

Raymond T. McNally, ed., *The Major works of Peter Chaadaev* (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969)

Raymond T. McNally and Richard Tempest, eds., *Philosophical Works of Peter Chaadaev* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).

suffered from a lack of History in the sense that if Universal values and Universal path are considered, Russia had no contribution, no progressive thinking whatsoever. Furthermore, Russia lacked ‘moral personality’⁴⁶⁸. That could have been explained, among other reasons, by the fact that Russia had practically no *Renaissance* in the 15th and 16th centuries.

As a partial solution, Chaadaev advocated then a rapprochement of Russia with the West and with the Catholic Church in detriment of the Orthodox Church – this was a primary mission in his understanding. The West had a tradition of separation between the temporal and the spiritual power that Chaadaev viewed as essential to apply in Russia. All the same, it is substantially relevant underlining that the West that Chaadaev was praising to be attached with, was the West before the Protestant Reformation and also before the French Revolution, *i.e.* Chaadaev glorified the Christendom and the *Ancien Régime*.

In the same way that Eurasianists would later oppose this conception of Russian History, also Neo-Eurasianists would reject the Westernizers ideas concerning applied geopolitics⁴⁶⁹. This problem will be brought again below [cf. Section 4.2.3.].

A second conception of Russian history aggregates the Slavophiles. This group has been more heterogeneous than Westernizers and included diverse thinkers such as: Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856), Aleksey Khomiakov (1804-1860), Konstantin Aksakov (1817-1860), Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886) or Nikolay Danilevsky (1822-1885).

As common ideas covering transversely all those authors could be mentioned: (i) that the Westernizers have destroyed the Russian system (Peter *the Great* and Catherine *the Great* were accused to have injured Russian history); (ii) that the Tsar and the autocratic rule were the best choices in terms of political structure for Russia; and (iii) all Slavophiles exalted the “Russian rich culture”, the ties and heritage with and from Constantinople, connected naturally to what they called “the true faith” – the Orthodox Church [Православие]⁴⁷⁰.

It is true that the idea that Russia preserved, in the past, the legacy of the Emperor Justinian and the fusion between priesthood and imperial dignity may be

⁴⁶⁸ Raymond T. McNally and Richard Tempest, eds., *Philosophical Works of Peter Chaadaev* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 21-22.

⁴⁶⁹ Dugin called them *Atlantists* [cf. Section 4.2.3.].

⁴⁷⁰ For a basic reading about Slavophiles *vide*: Frederick Charles Copleston, *History of Philosophy – Russian Philosophy* Vol. 10 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003).

accepted – ‘two great gifts granted from God’⁴⁷¹. Nevertheless, currently, after the atheist Soviet Union, the only core that would matter with respect to that heritage from Constantinople to Moscow would truly be the importance that Bosphorus and Dardanelles have to Russian circulation on the Sea.

Among the Slavophiles, Danilevsky is particularly remarkable. He supported that Russian peaceful character (the purity and goodness of Russian soul [народность]) was incompatible with European aggressive character, thus defending the Pan-slavism materialized into a Slavic federation under the Russian supremacy. In a stimulating exercise, Danilevsky tried to articulate an historic-cultural division of Humankind in 10 types of civilizations, something that inevitably makes the researcher thinking about the thesis of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ by Huntington⁴⁷².

To Slavophiles, in the end, Autocracy [Самодержавие] and Orthodoxy [Православие] were the pillars of Russian history. Konstantin Leontiev (1831-1891), tried to approximate Russia and Greece in the logics of Orthodoxy, proposing at the same time a rejection of the identification of Russia as a European country⁴⁷³. This idea hovers positively in today’s Kremlin, but certainly caused by the influence of Neo-Eurasianism as a transfiguration of *classical* Eurasianism that will be described next.

⁴⁷¹ Irina Papkova, *The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁴⁷² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2011).

⁴⁷³ Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought –from the Enlightenment to Marxism* trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusieck (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), chapter 6.

‘[...] является неизбежным следствием исторической миссии России — государственной объединительницы Евразии, преемницы и наследницы Чингисхана.’⁴⁷⁴

Nikolai Trubetzkoy

3.2. A third conception of Russian History: Eurasianists

A third conception of Russian history would have been the Eurasianist one⁴⁷⁵.

Laruelle wrote an excellent book (already mentioned) about the historical and philosophical context of Eurasianism⁴⁷⁶. She described then Eurasianism as a reaction of Russian expats to the October Revolution of 1917, thus an intellectual product of a group of Russians that although living in the West, refused the idea that Russia was a product of Western influence⁴⁷⁷. Despite that idea, Laruelle assertively denounced Western influence on [Neo-]Eurasianism, namely through German philosophy⁴⁷⁸.

In this way, Eurasianism was originally a movement from a context of crisis, in which the disappointment with Russia was real but, at the same time, in which genuine expectations about the future of Russia persisted.

In terms of concrete historical approach, Eurasianism pursued a particular perspective to look at Russian history⁴⁷⁹: (i) until 976 attempts to unite forest with the steppe; (ii) from 976 till 1238 struggle between forest and steppe; (iii) from 1238 till

⁴⁷⁴ transl. ‘[...] is the inevitable consequence of the historic mission of Russia – a Eurasian unifying state, successor, and heir to Genghis Khan’ – Nikolai Trubetzkoy, *Наследие Чингисхана XIV*, last modified January, 2016, <http://www.e-reading.club/book.php?book=1018007>

⁴⁷⁵ For a basic reading about Eurasianism *vide*:

Dimitry Shlapentokh, *Russia between East and West – Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2007).

⁴⁷⁶ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2008).

⁴⁷⁷ About this topic *vide*:

Elena Chinyaeva, *Russians outside Russia – The Émigré Community in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938* (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 2001).

Ilya Vinkovetsky, ‘Eurasianism in Its Time: A Bibliography,’ in *Exodus to the East: Forebodings and Events. An Affirmation of the Eurasians*, ed. Ilya Vinkovetsky and Charles Schlacks (Idyllwild: Charles Schlacks Jr Pub, 1996).

⁴⁷⁸ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 31.

⁴⁷⁹ Marlène Laruelle, ‘The Eurasianist Ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the Natural Solution for the Post-Soviet Space?’ in the 6th Annual International Young Researchers Conference: Orienting the Russian Empire, Havighurst Center, Oxford-Miami University, Ohio, October 26th-28th 2006.

1452 victory of steppe over forest; (iv) from 1452 till 1696 victory of forest over steppe; (v) from 1696 till now unification of forest and steppe. The connection between Geography and History appeals to the roots of geopolitical reasoning [cf. Section 1.2.3].

Two of the most known names of Eurasianism were certainly Prince N. Trubetzkoy (1890-1938) and Petr Savitsky (1895-1968).

Trubetzkoy, in the line of non-Western approach⁴⁸⁰, criticized Peter *the Great*, Catherine *the Great*, and the 19th century-Russian *Intelligentsia*, accusing all of them of structuring ‘the artificial Russia’⁴⁸¹. Trubetzkoy’s preference fell on the Tatar influence that he identified as the vital element that shaped Russian character⁴⁸². In fact, Trubetzkoy was totally persuaded about the importance of Genghis Khan’s impact for Russia, in both cultural and (geo)political terms⁴⁸³. The point was that, to him, geographically and anthropologically, Eurasia represented an integral unity. Neo-Eurasianism would have continued directly in this line.

Petr Savitsky also agreed with those ideas. He created the notion of Russia as ‘specific geographic world’, based on the geographical homogeneity of the country (fauna, flora, etc.) together with the racial mixture within the peoples of Eurasia⁴⁸⁴.

Lev Gumilev (1912-1992) represented the link between *classical* Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism in chronological terms⁴⁸⁵. His ideas of (i) opposition between Russia and Europe; (ii) focus on Asian-Turkic peoples; (iii) determinism and darwinism; (iv) Eurasia as a “totality”; (v) refusal of seeing Russia as extension of Kievan Rus’; (vi) refusal of the universality of humankind, gave continuation to the cores of *classical* Eurasianism.

⁴⁸⁰ Martin A. Schwarz, ‘Da Gengis Khan all’ideocrazia. La Visione Eurasiatica di Nicolaj Trubeckoj,’ last modified December, 2012, Eurasia, <http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/da-gengis-khan-allideocrazia-la-visione-eurasiatica-di-nicolaj-trubeckoj/18219/>

⁴⁸¹ Nikolai Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Materials, 1991), 231.

⁴⁸² Therefore, he refused the idea that Russia was a continuation of Kievan Rus’ – Nikolai Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Materials, 1991), 162. [cf. Section 4.2.3.].

⁴⁸³ Nikolai Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Materials, 1991).

⁴⁸⁴ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 33-34.

⁴⁸⁵ For a basic reading about Gumilev vide: Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), chapter 2.

For further information vide: Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev, ‘Scientific heritage of Dr. Lev N. Gumilev,’ last modified January, 2009, <http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/English/>

Despite that, it is also true that Gumilev did not support all ideas of *classical* Eurasianism, since he focused on biological determinism, rather than on geography or territory strictly, also taking into account his condemnation of Islam.

Between (i) the fact that Gumilev enjoys the highest respect, thus a little chance to be discussed, in Russia⁴⁸⁶, and (ii) the fact of Neo-Eurasianist influence on Russian politics, vast effects of [Neo-]Eurasianist phenomenon in Russia (from philosophy and education to foreign policy conduct) may be deduced. If Gumilev paved the way to the Eurasianist influence into Russian politics, the idea that welds all that is certainly the idea of a *great space* as a single unit, an empire [Империя]. That idea is transversal to the Eurasianist conception as a whole, *i.e.* it is also comprised by the foundations of Neo-Eurasianism as ideology.

At this point, it seems that the research provided an adequate resume of Russian historical elements. So, the study can move to the analysis of Neo-Eurasianism *tout court*.

⁴⁸⁶ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 51.

Chapter 4

Neo-Eurasianism: from dismissing History to adulatory “Geopolitics”?

[Dugin is] ‘the ‘Cyril and Methodius’ of fascism, since he brought Faith and knowledge about it to our country from the West.’⁴⁸⁷

Eduard Limonov

4.1. Aleksandr Dugin – the head of Neo-Eurasianism

If there has been a variety of “Neo-Eurasianisms”⁴⁸⁸ why focusing exclusively in Aleksandr Dugin? For example, Aleksandr Panarin (1940-2003), Vitaly Y. Pashchenko or Fyodor Girenok were also thinkers on Neo-Eurasianism⁴⁸⁹. Nevertheless, only Aleksandr Dugin entered into politics. Since this thesis is about political power, the relevance of the other authors becomes blurred. Furthermore, entering into politics, Dugin managed to centralize Neo-Eurasianist ideology and mature it into a political party founded in 2002: the Eurasia Party.

In order to better understand the path how Dugin became the leading figure of Neo-Eurasianism, a short biographical statement about Dugin is then necessary.

Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin was born on the 7th January 1962. Descendant of three generation line’s family of intelligence officers [KGB/GRU]⁴⁹⁰, Dugin began his career in public life as a Pamyat activist, an anti-semitic organization⁴⁹¹. Maybe because of that activism, he was expelled from Moscow Aviation Institute in 1979⁴⁹². At that

⁴⁸⁷ *Apud* Marlène Laruelle, ‘Aleksandr Dugin. A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?’ *Kennan Institute Occasional Papers* no. 294 (2006): 2.

⁴⁸⁸ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 84.

⁴⁸⁹ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (UK: Arktos, 2014), 26. Walter Laqueur, *No End to War – Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Continuum, 2004), 154.

⁴⁹⁰ Some sources state the KGB and others the GRU, *vide*: Danielle Bleitrach, ‘Qui est Alexandre Douguine?’ last modified August, 2014, VOXNR, http://www.voxnr.com/cc/d_douguine/EupApuFVlyCzkBzWNk.shtml

Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris: Avatar, 2006), 11.

Ganna Grebennikova, ‘How to become Russia’s leading neo-Eurasianist: the case of Alexandr Dugin,’ (Substantive Essay no. 2, University of Cambridge, n.d.), 6 https://www.academia.edu/1539198/How_to_become_Russia_s_leading_neo-Eurasianist_the_case_of_Alexandr_Dugin

⁴⁹¹ Victor Yasmann, ‘Rise of the Eurasians,’ last modified April 30, 2001, *Radio Free Europe*, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1344707.html>

⁴⁹² Robert Zubrin, ‘The Eurasianist Threat. Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine,’ last modified March 2014, National Review Online, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372353/eurasianist-threat-robert-zubrin>

time Dugin gave a short interview quoting Lenin, something that should call the attention for the strategic revolutionary mentality that would have accompanied him till today⁴⁹³ [cf. Section 9.2.3]. The compatibility between such revolutionary methods and goals, and Dugin's claim of his Christian Orthodox faith (old believer) is then to be measured [cf. Section 4.2.2.].

At late 80s Dugin was close to conservative and monarchist circles, but condemned 'nostalgic monarchism' then; in fact, in the early 90s, he decided to approach the Communist Party of Russian Federation, after which he joined Eduard Limonov's fascist National Bolshevik Party (NBP) till 1998⁴⁹⁴. While a member of NBP, Dugin ran in 1995 elections having received less than 1% of the votes⁴⁹⁵.

It is also noteworthy to state that, for a long time, Dugin has been involved in mystic and esoteric groups. One of the individuals who had the greatest impact on the young Dugin was the Muslim azeri Geïdar Djemal⁴⁹⁶.

In 1997, Dugin published his *opus magnum* in STRATEGY [cf. APPENDIX 2] and applied geopolitics: *Foundations of Geopolitics - The Geopolitical Future of Russia*⁴⁹⁷.

According to Grebennikova, Dugin graduated in Economics and Management in 1999, received his Ph.D. in 2000, and produced a postdoc thesis in 2004⁴⁹⁸. It is interesting to note that, while checking his personal website, it is possible to infer that Dugin has been the rector of the "New University" since 1998, consequently even before his graduation⁴⁹⁹.

In 2000 Dugin approached Putin, and two years later Dugin created the Eurasia Party with the objective of giving full support to the new President of the Russian

⁴⁹³ Nova Direita Cultural, 'Entrevista com o jovem Aleksandr Dugin na década de 80 sobre o movimento Pamyat,' last modified May 28, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uOqiFNtD7k>

⁴⁹⁴ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 108-109.

⁴⁹⁵ Robert Zubrin, 'The Eurasianist Threat. Putin's ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine,' last modified March 2014, National Review Online, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372353/eurasianist-threat-robert-zubrin>

⁴⁹⁶ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 12.

⁴⁹⁷ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000).

⁴⁹⁸ Ganna Grebennikova, 'How to become Russia's leading neo-Eurasianist: the case of Alexandr Dugin,' (Substantive Essay no. 2, University of Cambridge, n.d.), 15 https://www.academia.edu/1539198/How_to_become_Russia_s_leading_neo-Eurasianist_the_case_of_Alexandr_Dugin

In the preface of the book it is affirmed that Dugin obtained a doctoral degree in history of science in 2001 and a second one in political science in 2004 – Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 7.

⁴⁹⁹ Aleksandr Dugin, 'О нас,' last modified 2010, Dugin TV, <http://dugin.tv/content/o-nas>

Federation⁵⁰⁰. Dugin would have later, in 2003, transferred his attention to the International Eurasian Movement⁵⁰¹.

In 2008, Dugin was appointed as a professor at Moscow State University⁵⁰² and in 2009 he founded the “Center for Conservative Studies” within the same University⁵⁰³. Until now, that was the top of his academic career.

For the past years, Dugin has been calling for war against Georgia, war against Ukraine, and supported the annexation of Crimea⁵⁰⁴. Because of his statements⁵⁰⁵, Dugin was eventually deprived of his academic chair and head of the Department of Sociology of International Relations at Moscow State University, in the sequence of a petition and through an administrative procedure⁵⁰⁶.

Since March 2015, Dugin has been included on the Specially Designated Nationals List of sanctions against Russian citizens framed in the Ukrainian conflict⁵⁰⁷.

The key and turning point in Dugin’s life, as Shekhovtsov also noted, happened after his double failure at becoming a politician (NBP and Eurasia Party), when Dugin gave up that goal to follow Gramsci’s prescription of influencing the super-structure: culture and ideas⁵⁰⁸. Although ‘Dugin is not the person who directly influences the

⁵⁰⁰ Eurasia, ‘The first congress of Russia’s Political Party «Eurasia»,’ last modified May, 2002, Eurasia, <http://www.eurasia.com.ru/english.html>

‘The Eurasia Party should be viewed not as an alternative to the other pro-presidential parties but as a political and ideological laboratory for the development of a national strategy and ideology for the new President’ – Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 165. Consequently this is an empirical evidence to support the argument of “Neo-Eurasianism as ideology and strategic plan”.

⁵⁰¹ International Eurasian Movement, ‘Home Page,’ last modified August, 2004, <http://med.org.ru/article/1915>

⁵⁰² Anton Shekhovtsov, ‘Aleksandr Dugin and the SYRIZA connection,’ *Anton Shekhovtsov’s blog*, January 28, 2015, <http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.cz/2015/01/aleksandr-dugin-and-syriza-connection.html>

⁵⁰³ Aleksandr Dugin, ‘O нас,’ last modified 2010, Dugin TV, <http://dugin.tv/content/o-nas>

⁵⁰⁴ Dina Newman, ‘Russian nationalist thinker Dugin sees war with Ukraine,’ *BBC News*, July 10, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28229785>

⁵⁰⁵ Particularly instructing: ‘...kill, kill and kill...’ in the context of Ukrainian conflict – Christian Neef, ‘Jeder Westlerist ein Rassist,’ last modified July, 2014, *Der Spiegel*, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-128101577.html>

⁵⁰⁶ Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, ‘Russia This Week: Dugin Dismissed from Moscow State University? (23-29 June),’ *The Interpreter*, June 27, 2014, <http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-what-will-be-tweets-fate-in-russia/>

⁵⁰⁷ U.S. Department of Treasury, ‘Resource Center – Ukraine-related Designations,’ last modified March, 2015, <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20150311.aspx>

⁵⁰⁸ Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del carcere* vol 1(Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1977). Available online at: [http://www.inventati.org/thinklab/archivio/gramsci/Gramsci%20-%20Quaderni%20del%20carcere%20vol%201%20\(I-V\).pdf](http://www.inventati.org/thinklab/archivio/gramsci/Gramsci%20-%20Quaderni%20del%20carcere%20vol%201%20(I-V).pdf)

decision-making process in Moscow,⁵⁰⁹ Dugin's spectrum and connections within Russian politics are real and strong. In fact, Dugin himself has shown that he perfectly understood the impact of the intellectuals' social group on power structures, while explaining the importance of Gramsci's ideas on *Дуцкырц* TV program 2012⁵¹⁰.

At this point, it is pertinent to recapture what was mentioned above concerning the impact of Dugin/ Neo-Eurasianism on politics [cf. INTRODUCTION, State of the Art]:

[Dugin] '...seems to exert real influence on certain military and political circles and part of the presidential administration.'⁵¹¹

Dugin's positions in Russian political structures, among others, were/are: (1) adviser to Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the State Duma from 1996 to 2003; (2) chairman of the Geopolitical Expertise Section of the Duma's Consultative National Security Council; (3) lecturer at the Military Academy of the General Staff; (4) his *Foundations of Geopolitics* is used as a textbook in many institutions of higher education, including the Academy of the General Staff; (5) Dugin has access to the Duma and has influence on Parliamentary groups⁵¹². Laruelle continued tracing Dugin's influence over⁵¹³ (6) Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), Gennady Ziuganov (Communist Party), and Aleksandr Rutskoii (Social Democratic Party); (7) over acting military officers, influential military of the Academy of the General Staff; and (8) over General Igor' Rodionov, Minister of Defense (1996-1997). More information about Dugin's political connections, with an exhaustive list of names of politicians may be found elsewhere⁵¹⁴.

Nevertheless, Laruelle insisted that:

⁵⁰⁹Anton Shekhovtsov, 'Aleksandr Dugin and the SYRIZA connection,' *Anton Shekhovtsov's blog*, January 28, 2015, <http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.cz/2015/01/aleksandr-dugin-and-syriza-connection.html>

⁵¹⁰ Nova Direita Cultural, 'Alexander Dugin - Hegemonia cultural, Gramsci e Alain de Benoist,' last modified January, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65vv20wtvsQ>

Gramsci's strategy was also successfully applied in Brazil [cf. Chapter 8.].

⁵¹¹ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 11.

⁵¹² Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 11.

⁵¹³ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 109-110.

⁵¹⁴ Andreas Umland, 'The Study and Reactions to It of the Russian Extreme Right,' last modified November 11, 2010, *Geopolitika*, <http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=4341>

‘it would be wrong to present Dugin as the ideological «guru» of the Putin regime, as some scholars and journalists have done’⁵¹⁵.

On the other hand, Laruelle acknowledged that Dugin enjoys a ‘quasi-monopoly’ on Russian ideological debate⁵¹⁶.

Dugin published – and he continues to do so – a massive number of books. He overspread even a higher number of articles on the web, was editor and publisher of countless journals or magazines, he created or participated, or continues to do so, in radio and television programs and held or hold positions as professor at the University, at the Academy of the General Staff, and at the Institute for Strategic Research in Moscow.

From all this, the conclusion: Dugin is influential on Russian politics⁵¹⁷, and he endures as the Head of Neo-Eurasianist movement.

⁵¹⁵ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 11.

⁵¹⁶ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 107.

⁵¹⁷ Stefano Guzzini, ed., *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.

‘Comrade Lenin has taught us that in order
to defeat our class enemy,
who is strong, who has many means and reserves at his disposal,
we must exploit every crack in his front
and we must use every possible ally,
even if he is uncertain, vacillating or provisional.’⁵¹⁸

Antonio Gramsci

4.2. “Eurasian destiny” – Neo-Eurasianism as a New World Order directive

Having outlined the historical roots of Eurasianism and the two other conceptions of Russian history [cf. Chapter 3], the research will now focus on Neo-Eurasianism.

What is *Neo-Eurasianism* exactly about? In fact, ‘Neo-Eurasianism’ can be used with multiple *endorsed* meanings: (i) as “Russian School of Geopolitics” (based on the opposition Land *vs.* Sea, and on the idea of Russia as Tellurocracy); (ii) as “Fourth Political Theory” (a ‘Global Revolutionary Alliance’ – ‘Dissatisfied all over the world, unite!’⁵¹⁹); (iii) as “Theory of the Multipolar World” (global trend against the ‘unipolar globalization’⁵²⁰); (iv) as “Philosophy” (structural analysis/hermeneutical tool)⁵²¹; and (v) as a totalitarian program of Government (configuration of the structures of the state, division (or concentration) of powers, economic and financial directives, social and religious aspects, etc.)⁵²², among other less important meanings.

From this point on, the profound complexity of the topic becomes evident. In order to analyze Neo-Eurasianism, *i.e.* to decompose it into smaller parts for better understanding, the strict classification and justification of why Neo-Eurasianism is seen

⁵¹⁸ Antonio Gramsci, ‘Maximalism and Extremism,’ last modified 2008, Antonio Gramsci Archive, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1925/07/maximalism.htm>

⁵¹⁹ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 129-165.

⁵²⁰ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 42-45.

⁵²¹ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 8-10.

⁵²² Alexander Dugin, ‘The Eurasist Vision – Basic principles of the eurasist doctrinal platform,’ last modified September, 2001, Евразия, <http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=244> Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 59-70.

as an ideology should be immediately accomplished. It will help at the next research steps.

4.2.1. Characterization of Neo-Eurasianism as ideology

As it was analyzed in the state-of-the-art [cf. INTRODUCTION], Neo-Eurasianism can be classified as *ideology*, in the technical definition of the concept [cf. APPENDIX 2, IDEOLOGY]. This inference is justified by the following reasons: (i) Neo-Eurasianism constitutes a set of ideas that aims to change the world directly favoring a “state”, *i.e.* Russian *élites* (normativism); (ii) Neo-Eurasianism dissimulates the reality hiding important elements for the understanding of political reality [cf. Subchapter 9.2.]; and (iii) the crucial ambition of Neo-Eurasianism is to gather the means of action to implement its ideas, in two words: to seize power.

Besides, Dugin himself used the expression ‘Eurasian ideology...’⁵²³ countless times or called up his followers for action: ‘...please join our Eurasian troops’⁵²⁴ leaving little space for doubts about this matter.

These facts help in perceiving Dugin as a political activist trying to shape politics, rather than a scientist. If that is so, Dugin can be seen as a sophist from the Aristotelian perspective. As to the Ancient Greek sophists, also to Dugin there is no essence of reality to be explored but only strategic objectives to be achieved. The way how to reach these objectives includes covering and mixing them with well established geopolitical concepts and theories, in a catch-ear list of symbolic and rhetoric connections that can impact the individual, persuading him and making him move to action.

While being accused by Carvalho, his opponent in the mentioned academic debate, of being a ‘political agent’, instead of a ‘scientific observer’⁵²⁵, Dugin called Marx in his defense, stating that ‘...ideology [is] the implicit basis for the science as

⁵²³ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 37-38, 137, 163. Even in the newly created 4th Political Theory that Dugin could have taken as a re-start on serious theoretical approach, Dugin insisted in ideology again – Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 283-285.

⁵²⁴ Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R3] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, April 24, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r3-dugin.html>

⁵²⁵ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘[R2] Olavo,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r2-olavo-de-carvalho.html>

such', adding that ideological neutrality is impossible⁵²⁶. That is the same claim that states that all human actions are political engaged – the Marxist “*praxis*”, which makes no sense from a scientific point of view.

Nevertheless, later in the debate, Dugin contradicted himself, affirming that at Moscow State University – when Dugin was still teaching there – he lectured impartially, thus not imposing his views on his students. How so, if ‘neutrality is impossible’?

What is the ideological nature of Neo-Eurasianism?

This question is worthy of another Ph.D. thesis. This research piece can only address the topic briefly since the answer is highly complex and the ideological nature of Neo-Eurasianism is not a priority for this study. The priority is rather simple: to classify Neo-Eurasianism as *ideology* to establish the incompatibility of Neo-Eurasianism with the geopolitical approach in the terms it was characterized [cf. Subchapters 1.2 and 2.1].

It seems that Laruelle correctly identified Neo-Eurasianism as an intellectual phenomenon attached to the fascist ideology⁵²⁷. However, the problem remains *a priori* to that perspective, since fascism is a left-wing phenomenon, not a right-wing one⁵²⁸. This problem continued in Umland, who has also been arguing that Dugin is a far-right extremist⁵²⁹. In truth, the idea of fascism as a “right-wing ideology” cannot survive a logical test⁵³⁰.

⁵²⁶ Alexandr Dugin, '[R3] Dugin,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, April 24, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r3-dugin.html>

⁵²⁷ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 132, 142.

⁵²⁸ Laruelle got to the point when she analyzed the position of Neo-Eurasianism with respect to the economy. There, Laruelle clearly pointed out that Dugin stands on the 'left' – Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 132.

⁵²⁹ Andreas Umland, 'Faschismus à la Dugin,' last modified December, 2007, *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, <https://www.blaetter.de/archiv/jahrgaenge/2007/dezember/faschismus-a-la-dugin>
Andreas Umland, 'Fascist Tendencies in Russia's Political Establishment: The Rise of the International Eurasian Movement,' *Russian Analytical Digest* no. 60 (May 2009).

Andreas Umland, 'The Study and Reactions to It of the Russian Extreme Right,' last modified November 11, 2010, *Geopolitika*, <http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=4341>

⁵³⁰ No matter where: revolution, statism, eradication of social classes (egalitarianism), collectivism, anti-religious perspectives, progress, creation of the perfect society, renovation of Man, totalitarianism or control of the individual in all aspects of his life (economy, culture, thinking, etc.), and in order to do so creating a big bureaucracy and multiplying statist institutions (*i.e.* concentration of power [cf. Subchapter 9.2]) are some of the characteristics of the left-wing, thus of fascism. *Vide* the classic readings: Giovanni Gentile and Benito Mussolini, 'La Dottrina del fascismo,' last modified March, 2016, *LiTgloss*, <http://litgloss.buffalo.edu/mussolini/text.shtml>; and Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Socialisme Fasciste* (Paris: Gallimard, 1934).

To keep the distance from the technical definition and classification, Dugin has been schematically talking about ‘political theories’ [*sic*], stating that fascism has disappeared as ideology⁵³¹. On the other hand, Dugin has been mixing up conservatism with fascism⁵³², something and that bogs the discussion – also Millerman pointed that out, yet accusing researchers on Dugin of doing it⁵³³. Furthermore, Dugin stated: ‘So we should strongly reject anticommunism as well as antifascism’⁵³⁴, what points out to the confirmation of H₄ by connecting fascism and communism as two ideologies comprised by the Revolutionary Movement [cf. Subchapter 9.2.].

Still insisting on the classification of fascism as left-wing ideology, one pays attention to Dugin’s socialist quotes:

‘Le prolétaire se réveillera. Se rebellera. Tuera. Ni la police ni le faux socialistes ne pourront le retenir. Sa mission dans l’Histoire n’est pas finie’⁵³⁵

‘In social politics, Eurasianism leans towards the Left, towards the socialist position. One can note Eurasianism’s kinship with socialism... I personally like socialism...’⁵³⁶

Although the complexities, incoherences, lack of unity cannot allow a strict identification of Dugin’s ideology with *socialism* and/or *fascism* – due to the mixture of

These directives are obviously located in the extreme opposite side of the right-wing ideologies: *e.g.* transcendent order, conservatism, tradition and custom, limited state, social independent organization, individual freedom, private property, defense of religious and patriotic values against any radical transformation. *Vide*, among many other sources: Joseph de Maistre, *Œuvres* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2007); Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2001); Roger Scruton, *A Political Philosophy: Arguments for Conservatism* (London: Continuum, 2006) and Roger Scruton, *How to be a Conservative* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

⁵³¹ Nova Direita Cultural, ‘Alexander Dugin - A Quarta Teoria Política - A crise das ideologias liberal, fascista e comunista,’ last modified October, 2012, Youtube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpRykFhRIIA>

⁵³² Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 309-310.

⁵³³ Michael Millerman, ‘Alexander Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism and the Eurasian Union Project: A Critique of Recent Scholarship and an Attempt at a New Beginning and Reorientation,’ last modified 2012, academy.edu, http://www.academia.edu/9504317/Alexander_Dugins_Neo-Eurasianism_and_the_Eurasian_Union_Project_A_Critique_of_Recent_Scholarship_and_an_Attempt_at_a_New_Beginning_and_Reorientation, 5

⁵³⁴ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin’s Conclusion,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, July 5, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/07/dugins-conclusion.html>

⁵³⁵ transl. ‘The proletariat will awake. It will rebel. It will kill. Neither the police nor the false socialists will be able to hold it back. His [the proletariat’s] mission in history is not over yet.’ – Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris: Avatar, 2006), 216.

⁵³⁶ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 178. Incoherently, in the following pages, Dugin contended again that he is included among conservative ideologies.

orthodox religion, Islam, communism, imperialism, esoterism, etc. – it is acceptable and plausible to locate Neo-Eurasianism as ideology on the leftist ideological domain.

[*Fourth Political Theory*] ‘the national-bolshevism that represents the socialism without materialism, atheism, progressism [*sic*] and Modernism and the Third way theories without racism and nationalism’⁵³⁷.

Once again, it is the purpose of seizing power that grants the unity to the Neo-Eurasianist project, whereas the ideological unity remains on a secondary level of relevance.

4.2.2. Roots of Neo-Eurasianism

As ideology (*i.e.* with the primary purpose of seizing and concentrating power), Neo-Eurasianism uses all the ideas that can help in such task, and by doing so, inevitably, intensifies the incoherence within its texts.

To understand Neo-Eurasianism holistically, it is required to cover a huge bibliography divided into many spheres: (1) Slavophilism (Kireevsky, Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov and Ivan Aksakov, Danilevsky); (2) classical Eurasianism (Trubetzkoy, Savitsky, Gumilev); (3) the idea of “mission of Russia” – these three aspects were already described for their pertinence in a geopolitical study [cf. Chapter 3]; (4) Traditionalism (René Guénon (1886-1951)); (5) Marxism-Leninism (Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Gramsci); (6) neo-paganism disguised as “Christianity”; (7) Islamism; (8) occultism and satanism; (9) “German conservative revolution” tied somehow with “Prussian socialism” (Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876 – 1925), Edgar Julius Jung (1894 –1934), Hermann Rauschning (1887 – 1982)); (10) geopolitical concepts and theories (Mackinder, Haushofer, Spykman, Huntington). Among other trends, all this comprises a broad, deep, complex system of connections that goes far beyond the monographic guideline of this thesis. This study aims to highlight only the geopolitical aspects, *i.e.* the phenomenon with direct consequences in terms of international politics, as the outlined delimitation of geopolitical studies’ field.

⁵³⁷ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin’s Conclusion,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, July 5, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/07/dugins-conclusion.html>

From all this massive amount of influences that Neo-Eurasianism received, what matters then for this thesis is what is directly connected to geopolitical studies: (i) the imperial tradition of Russia from the geohistorical point of view, regarding geopolitical factors #1, #2 and #6; (ii) the Orthodox Church and (iii) the “Revolution” in terms of geopolitical factors #5 and #6 (the latter aspect will be revisited in Subchapter 9.2.); (iv) the misuse of geopolitical concepts and theories, mainly attached to geopolitical factors #1, #2, #3, #4 and #5 [cf. APPENDIX 3]. After this assignment, the study can proceed to how exactly Neo-Eurasianism intends to change the World Order [cf. Section 4.2.3].

i. Imperial tradition of Russia (Империя)

From the geohistorical point of view, this core has two main implications: (1) territorial, and (2) political. Firstly, territorial because, in this context, the idea of Empire carries the purpose of geographical extension and mixture of peoples⁵³⁸ (praise of Orthodox Slavic and Muslim Turkic peoples⁵³⁹). Secondly, political because it is linked to the traditional autocratic organization of power in Russia⁵⁴⁰ [cf. Chapter 3]. It seems needless to insist that both ideas fully inspire Neo-Eurasianism, which aspires to restore/keep them as strong as possible.

Particularly in terms of territory, CIS countries, for example, are not considered by Neo-Eurasianism as sovereign states, since they are treated under the label of ‘internal politics’ of Russia, *i.e.* the Eurasian Union⁵⁴¹. Articulately, Neo-Eurasianism defends the existence of a unity of culture and a historical destiny shared by Russians and all peoples from post-soviet space, together with the glorification of national diversity yet with no chance of autonomy for the regions – an appropriated perspective to sustain geographical extension and autocratic form of government⁵⁴².

The idea of “mission of Russia” is linked to the tradition of the Empire. From the heritage of the Eastern Roman Empire [cf. Subchapter 3.1. & the next subsection],

⁵³⁸ In racial terms, Dugin’s Eurasia will result from mixture of ‘«whites»’ ‘«with yellows»’ – Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 129.

⁵³⁹ Something in dissonance with the current massive repression suffered by the Crimean Tatars undertaken by Russian authorities – Veronika Dorman, ‘Les Tatars de Crimée sous pression,’ last modified April, 2016, Libération, http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2016/04/14/les-tatars-de-crimee-sous-pression_1446112

⁵⁴⁰ It is pertinente to note that the idea of “empire” refers to the tradition in general, and not to the specific Russian Empire proclaimed by Peter the Great in 1721. In fact, the tsarist empire is somehow rejected by Neo-Eurasianism for its ‘Western ideology’.

⁵⁴¹ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 29.

⁵⁴² “Russia is inconceivable without an Empire” – Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 193-213 (whole chapter 3, part 4).

to the creation of Multipolarity and destruction of the West, Neo-Eurasianism claims that Russia has a mission to fulfill⁵⁴³. That would constitute part of the “uniqueness of Russia” – an idea yet difficult to support since regarding the influence of Theories and Philosophy, there is no “uniqueness of Russia” due to the fact that the ideas come mainly from the West, as pointed out above. With respect to crucial geopolitical concepts then, one cannot find anything produced by Russia.

That does not prevent Dugin from affirming that Eurasianists (Trubetzkoy, Savitsky and others) fought against ‘the West’⁵⁴⁴, a claim that would be hard to understand taking into account that those individuals chose, in fact, the West to live in, after Russia was taken over by the communists in 1917.

Nevertheless, Dugin has been insisting on the distinctiveness of Russian civilization⁵⁴⁵, *i.e.* promoting cultural relativism, and even crossing dangerous borders:

‘We are a divine nation. Even our Crime is incomparably superior to some other’s virtue.’⁵⁴⁶

Once again: a key point is the absolute rejection of the West, *i.e.* the proclamation of an eternal incompatibility between Russia and the West, although the vast majority of Neo-Eurasianist ideas (as well as technology in Russia) are imported from the West.

The relevance of influence from the south (LAGE) on Russian identity, and consequently on Neo-Eurasianism, is covered in the next subsection.

ii. The Russian Orthodox Church

Connecting the tradition of Imperial Russia (Империя) to the history of the Orthodox Church and the notion of a “heritage from the south” – that means from Byzantium-Constantinople as the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire – is the myth of the ‘Third Rome’⁵⁴⁷. Although this is a highly controversial topic (after all, why could not the *capital* of the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nations have received the *grace* of being the Third Rome?), this myth continues, even today, to fuel the eastern custom of amalgamation of the political with the spiritual sphere, an amalgamation that

⁵⁴³ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (UK: Arktos, 2014).

⁵⁴⁴ Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R3] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, April 24, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r3-dugin.html>

⁵⁴⁵ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris: Avatar, 2006), 45-46.

⁵⁴⁶ Alexander Dugin, ‘Dugin: Axe is the name of Mine,’ last modified November 2011, Open Revolt, <https://openrevolt.info/2011/11/03/dugin-axe-is-the-name-of-mine/>

⁵⁴⁷ Among many other sources, *vide*: Ken Parry *et al.*, eds, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001).

Neo-Eurasianism captures and twists for its purposes. In fact, Milhazes, a Portuguese journalist who is a specialist in Russian studies, has been talking about a fusion of Politics and the Orthodox Church in Russia, affirming that Patriarch Kirill is a hand of Putin's politics⁵⁴⁸.

While to Slavophiles [cf. Subchapter 3.1.], inspired by the "heritage from the south", the capital of Russia (Tzargrad) should be in Constantinople, as the singular Jewish prophecy also preached⁵⁴⁹, to Dugin the capital should be in Kazan instead, in line with classical Eurasianism and the direction towards the East⁵⁵⁰. However, in both cases of Slavophiles and (Neo-)Eurasianists there is the same inherent notion of a "mission of Russia"⁵⁵¹.

This "mission of Russia" is a true core for Neo-Eurasianism. Using esoteric and metaphysical dimensions and references, Dugin has been proclaiming that Russia holds a mission in liberating peoples from the tyranny of the materialist West, promoting religious freedom⁵⁵². The kind of "Christianity" that Dugin defends will be analyzed right below.

Before that, however, and due to his importance, Parvulesco – who was a friend of Dugin's and a strong collaborator on the Eurasian Project (he quoted Dugin repeatedly in his book to be skimmed below, and Dugin mentioned him several times in his

⁵⁴⁸ José Milhazes, 'Diálogo entre Católicos e Ortodoxos passa por Moscovo e não por Istambul,' last modified December, 2014, O Observador, <http://observador.pt/opiniao/dialogo-entre-catolicos-e-ortodoxos-passa-por-moscovo-e-nao-por-istambul/>

Besides, not only the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church with Russian politics *stricto sensu*, are a key topic while studying Russian geopolitics – *vide* also Castex comments on Dostoyevsky: Raoul Castex, *Théories Stratégiques. Tome V* (Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritimes et Coloniales, 1935), 129-130 – but also the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy and the Russian secret services. In this documentary, several scholars described and explained how the Russian Orthodox Church has been an instrument of the state since Stalin's time – and "the state" means here the NKVD-KGB – Antoine Arjakovsky, 'To understand and to forgive eng,' last modified April, 2015, Youtube <https://youtu.be/901UdlyyplU>

Carvalho has been also arguing that this state-of-this is extended to our days, *i.e.* the Russian Orthodox Church is still used as instrument by the Russian intelligence community [cf. Subchapter 9.2.].

⁵⁴⁹ "When you hear that the Russians have captured the city of Crimea, you should know that the times of the Messiah have started, that his steps are being heard. And when you hear that the Russians have reached the city of Constantinople, you should put on your Shabbat (Sabbath) clothes and don't take them off, because it means that the Messiah is about to come any minute." – Rivkah Lambert Adler, '200 Years Ago, War Between Turkey and Russia Prophesied as Sign of Redemption,' last modified November, 2015, Breaking Israel News, <http://www.breakingisraelnews.com/54943/200-years-ago-war-between-turkey-russia-prophesied-sign-redemption-jewish-world/#PADt2tuGrsKF8GeD.97>

⁵⁵⁰ Alexander Dugin, 'Oshym Oshym,' last modified May, 2016, Arctogaia, <http://arctogaia.com/public/eng/oshym.html>

⁵⁵¹ For a reading about how this notion influences Putin's Russia *vide* Joseph Brean, 'Vladimir Putin's heroes: Russian president motivated by writers' messianic view of country's destiny,' last modified March, 2014, National Post, <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/putins-heroes>

⁵⁵² The "Holy Russia" and the defense of Christian and family values. *Vide*: Cécile Vaissié, *Les Réseaux du Kremlin en France* (Paris: Les Petits Matins, 2016).

writings⁵⁵³) – had also a word to say on the topic of “mission of Russia”. To Parvulesco – who was aware of the matter of consecration of Russia to the Virgin Mary by the Pope with all the bishops⁵⁵⁴ as it was asked in Fatima in 1917 and later in Tuy – the Eurasianist project represents already the *Church of the End*, the *Kingdom of Mary*⁵⁵⁵. Therefore, it can be inferred from Parvulesco’s pages that the consecration is already accomplished, something that does not correspond to the facts⁵⁵⁶. In this context, Parvulesco’s misguided viewpoint that consecration is indeed accomplished appeared later in the book, with the objective of justifying Russia as reborn, risen from the dead, a miracle, with a salvific mission⁵⁵⁷.

Making a bridge between Neo-Eurasianist statements and current Russian politics, President Putin has been making use of these ideas as propaganda – the successor of Byzantium and protector of Christendom⁵⁵⁸, together with allusions to Crimea as ‘orthodox land’ in order to legitimize Crimea’s annexation by his regime in 2014⁵⁵⁹. Still, Putin’s behavior is extremely complex and could lead to another comprehensive research, taking into account that, besides ‘Orthodox country’, Putin

⁵⁵³ Dugin admitted a friendship relation with Parvulesco for example here: Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 140; and devoted a full section of *Foundations of Geopolitics*’ chapter 5, Part 2, to Parvulesco.

⁵⁵⁴ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 183-184.

⁵⁵⁵ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 191-192.

⁵⁵⁶ About the request for the consecration of Russia to the Immaculate Heart of Mary *vide*: ‘Text on the Request for the Consecration of Russia’ – Irmã Lúcia, *Memórias da Irmã Lúcia I* (Fátima: Secretariado dos Pastorinhos, 2007), 195-196.

The consecration of Russia is not accomplished yet, Catholic authorities have been insisting. Among other sources *vide*:

Bro. Peter Dimond, O.S.B., ‘The Whole Truth about the Consecration and Conversion of Russia and the impostor Sr. Lucy,’ last modified 2006, Most Holy Family Monastery, <http://www.mostholymonastery.com/catholicchurch/consecration-russia-fatima-lucy/#.Vs7yqpwrLIU>

Father Paul Kramer, ‘The Third Secret Predicts: World War III and Worse?’ last modified 2001, The Fatima Crusader, <http://www.fatimacrusader.com/cr82/cr82pg11.asp>

Fr. Jim Anderson, ‘The Consecration of Russia and full Revelation of the 3rd part of the Secret of Fatima are not done,’ last modified March, 2013, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MvUWG0h-0XY>
TheCRB, ‘Exorcista Padre Gabriele faz revelações surpreendentes sobre as Aparições de Fátima,’ last modified May, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3NGXuRQank>

⁵⁵⁷ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 201.

⁵⁵⁸ Nina Khrushcheva, ‘Putin’s new ‘values pact,’ last modified March, 2014, Reuters, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/03/26/putins-new-values-pact/>

⁵⁵⁹ Pat Buchanan, ‘Whose Side Is God on Now?’ last modified April, 2014, Townhall, <http://townhall.com/columnists/patbuchanan/2014/04/04/whose-side-is-god-on-now-n1818499/page/full>

also stated that Russia is a ‘secular state’ – while preparing the inauguration of a huge mosque in Moscow⁵⁶⁰ – or even declared on another occasion:

‘We support Islam and will continue to do so’⁵⁶¹.

Coming back to Neo-Eurasianism, it seems pertinent to dissect how Dugin looks at Christianity, in order to provide another empirical evidence for sustaining that Neo-Eurasianism is an ideology *de facto*.

Dugin illustrated: the Cross, together with the Sickle and the Hammer, ‘all crowned with the Eternal Swastika’⁵⁶². It is then legitimate to ask, what kind of Christianity joins the Communist symbol and a symbol used by the Nazis with the Cross of Jesus Christ. Dugin has been criticizing [*Modern and*] *Post-modern* West, but contradictory appeals to [post-]structuralism⁵⁶³, a stream that includes postmodernism. It is then legitimate to ask, what kind of Christianity can accept perspectives that completely refuse the ontological argument that the Reality was created by God. The conclusion is then inescapable: there can be no compatibility between Neo-Eurasianism and Christianity, *i.e.* the universal truth preached by the Christian doctrine.

Insisting on the matter of Dugin’s public defense of a false Christianity, one can quote some ideas from an Orthodox Church report on Dugin: (i) Dugin claims to be disciple of René Guénon, a converted to Islam, thus Dugin is much closer to islamist spheres than to the Orthodox Church; (ii) Dugin’s ideas of the *absolute* and *gnosticism* are visibly neo-pagan ideas, especially, while arguing that ‘christianization of Russia enforced the pre-Christian native faith’; (iii) Dugin’s comments to Nicean Credo made him fall in heresy; (iv) Dugin’s comments on the Holy Trinity made him a blasphemer;

⁵⁶⁰ ‘Russia is a secular state’ - Putin affirmed while preparing the inauguration of Europe’s largest mosque, accompanied by Turkish President Erdogan and Palestinian Leader Abbas - EFE Moscou, ‘Putin convida Erdogan e Rohani para inauguração da maior mesquita da Europa,’ last modified September, 2015, Agência EFE, <http://www.efe.com/efe/brasil/mundo/putin-convida-erdogan-e-rohani-para-inaugura-o-da-maior-mesquita-europa/50000243-2715931>; Sarkis Zeroninan, ‘Putin Slams Islamic State, Praises ‘Great Global Religion Of Islam’ At Opening Of ‘Europe’s Largest Mosque,’ last modified September, 2015, Breitbart London, <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/09/23/putin-slams-islamic-state-praises-great-global-religion-islam-opening-europes-largest-mosque/>

⁵⁶¹ Kremlin, ‘Answers to journalists’ questions following the crash of a Russian military plane in Syria,’ last modified November, 2015, Kremlin, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50777>

⁵⁶² Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 147.

⁵⁶³ Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R3] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, April 24, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r3-dugin.html>

(v) Dugin dismissed Aleister Crowley's satanism; (vi) at the end the document concludes that Dugin ignores Orthodox true doctrine⁵⁶⁴.

Hence, it is not surprising that Dugin even divided Christianity in 'atlanticist Christianity' (Catholics, Protestants) and in 'eurasian Christianity' (Orthodox). This perspective also demonstrated a total incapacity to understand the universal roots of Christianity. Furthermore, Dugin did the same to Islam: Eurasian shiits, sufists, Islamic traditionalists against the rest, the 'atlantist Islam'⁵⁶⁵. Hence, the submission of religions to strategic goals.

Following the line of the text, one proceeds to analyze that, Neo-Eurasianist protection of conservative values is as fake as its protection of "Christianity". Therefore, the only two right-wing flags that Dugin has been lifting can both be assessed in the utilitarian sense merely, in the line of Gramsci (*vide* the subchapter's epigraph).

iii. Conservatism vs. Revolution

The point in this subsection is to concisely expose Dugin's false conservatism – that matches logically with the argument of Dugin as a proponent of "fascism" (radical socialism). In this way, Dugin can be perceived as a revolutionary⁵⁶⁶. The relevance of this exercise for the whole thesis is justified by the fact that, not only the use of "conservatism" helps Dugin in shaping an ideology that will have a catch-eye face for the conservatives, in order to stimulate them to eventually support Dugin's movement⁵⁶⁷; but above all, Dugin's revolutionary approach impacts directly on the geopolitical studies' object, since Dugin presents a project with the goal of restructuring of all international chessboard [cf. next subsection & Section 4.2.3].

In ideological terms, Neo-Eurasianism is also revolutionary because it offers a totalitarian plan, that means it comprises a full programme for the administrative system (federative), for demography (increase of 'Eurasian population'), for education (indoctrination in Eurasianist principles), for information (total freedom of speech is

⁵⁶⁴ Миссионерский отдел Миссионерский отдел Московского Патриархата Русской Православной Церкви. Новые религиозные объединения России деструктивного и оккультного характера: справочник, available in integral version at: <http://danielchadaev.blogspot.cz/2011/10/1-2002-610-3-223.html>, and available with comments at: <http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/matter/Article31.htm>

⁵⁶⁵ For example: Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 39ff.

⁵⁶⁶ A footnote [cf. Section 4.2.1] explained briefly the dualism and incompatibility between a revolutionary and a conservative.

⁵⁶⁷ This strategy of gathering the support of conservatives has also being applied by President Putin, shaping the image of Russia as the "defendor of conservative values" – Brian Whitmore, 'Vladimir Putin, Conservative Icon,' last modified December, 2013, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/vladimir-putin-conservative-icon/282572/>

rejected), for the economy (socialism⁵⁶⁸), and of course, for the political system, which is above everything else, controls everything else. After analyzing all this, the promises of freedom for society, namely religious freedom (and Dugin's "Christianity" was already dissected above), seem, again, completely fake.

Besides, it is noteworthy to remind that National Bolshevism, which agglomerates the very foundations of Dugin's political proposals, is a revolutionary ideology too.

In his book, mentioned in the Introduction [cf. state of the art], Sedgwick tried to include Neo-Eurasianism within a 'traditionalist' approach, in the sense of being 'against the modernity'⁵⁶⁹. This exercise was, as skimmed, highly criticized by scholars. In fact, Dugin cannot be seen as a conservative, also because he admitted himself to be 'partly post-modern'⁵⁷⁰. Thus, it is difficult to infer any compatibility between conservatism and postmodernism.

Dugin correctly defined conservatism as '*a positive attitude towards historical tradition*'⁵⁷¹. However, which traditions does he defend? If it is the "revolutionary tradition" [cf. Subchapter 9.2.] Neo-Eurasianism definitely cannot be regarded as a part of conservatism.

Dugin has been insisting on the "Conservative Revolution"⁵⁷², but those terms compose a paradox since conservatism can never be revolutionary. In fact, that controversial label joins *de facto* socialists – as Werner Sombart or Ernst Niekisch – with anti-nazi conservative resisters – as Ernst Jünger and Friedrich Hielscher, consequently, something that does not seem serious, at the least. So far, one has been verifying that confusing and contradictory ideas make part of Neo-Eurasianist dialectics.

⁵⁶⁸ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 29-34.

⁵⁶⁹ Mark Sedgwick, *Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁵⁷⁰ Alexandr Dugin, 'Dugin's résumé,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, January 27, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/01/alexandr-dugin.html>

⁵⁷¹ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 145.

⁵⁷² A label that incorrectly tries to gather many and different authors such as the mentioned ones, plus Ernst Jünger (1895–1998), Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), Werner Sombart (1863–1941), Othmar Spann (1878–1950), Friedrich Hielscher (1902–1990), Ernst Niekisch (1889–1967).

For all the arguments presented until now, Millerman's recent research on Dugin being a conservative can then be considered misguided⁵⁷³.

As if this would not be enough, Dugin penetrated in the domains of esoterism, and mysticism⁵⁷⁴:

'...absolute revolt – spiritual (traditionalist) and social (socialist)',⁵⁷⁵

The influence of René Guénon is the key topic here, but there is no space to analyze that matter in this study.

What matters instead are the connections that Dugin elaborated between mysticism and his attempt of a "geopolitical approach":

'...our common victory over the Beast, american-atlantist-liberal-globalist-capitalist-Post-Modern Beast.'⁵⁷⁶

A comparison between geopolitical concepts with principles in religion⁵⁷⁷ ('sacred geography'⁵⁷⁸ – 'sacred North, sacred South'⁵⁷⁹), and the analysis of politics with mysticist tirades ('Putin: I renounce the Devil'⁵⁸⁰), are just some of the worse points to mention. This latter aspect received a major help from Parvulesco too ('transcendental geopolitics,' 'Vladimir Putin the predestined', even making analogies between Putin and Jesus Christ [*Christos Pantokrator*]⁵⁸¹).

Useless to say that these pieces of literature have toxic consequences, taking into account that they are obstacles to a thoughtful exercise for the delimitation of geopolitical studies as a scientific approach [cf. Subchapter 1.2.].

⁵⁷³ Michael Millerman, 'Alexander Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and the Eurasian Union Project: A Critique of Recent Scholarship and an Attempt at a New Beginning and Reorientation,' last modified 2012, academy.edu, http://www.academia.edu/9504317/Alexander_Dugins_Neo-Eurasianism_and_the_Eurasian_Union_Project_A_Critique_of_Recent_Scholarship_and_an_Attempt_at_a_New_Beginning_and_Reorientation,

⁵⁷⁴ Mysticist approaches were already rejected for their incompatibility with a serious scientific geopolitical study [cf. Subchapter 1.2.].

⁵⁷⁵ Alexandr Dugin, '[R3] Dugin,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, April 24, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r3-dugin.html>

⁵⁷⁶ Alexandr Dugin, '[R3] Dugin,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, April 24, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r3-dugin.html>

⁵⁷⁷ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 38.

⁵⁷⁸ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 105.

⁵⁷⁹ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 114.

⁵⁸⁰ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 130.

⁵⁸¹ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 10, 224, 433.

iv. (Mis)Using concepts of classical geopolitics

The fourth and last root of Neo-Eurasianism – and an essential one for this study’s scope – is the misuse of geopolitical concepts. This subsection will make a contribution to strengthening the argument of considering Neo-Eurasianism as ideology. In fact, Dugin claimed to be scientifically objective in his lectures at the University, but he dismissed the positivist approach and the scientific method as such⁵⁸². Naturally this also affected the way Dugin dealt with geopolitical studies’ tools, as it will be demonstrated.

Dugin traced the origin of the modern Russian school of geopolitics in the 80s⁵⁸³, but the “school”, *i.e.* Neo-Eurasianism – with roots in ‘the Slavophiles, Eurasianists...’ among other mentioned influences – was truly established only after 1991⁵⁸⁴, that means after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, it is believed that the simultaneity of these events was not a coincidence [cf. Sections 4.2.3 & 9.2.3].

In this way, it is not a coincidence either that Dugin compared the origins of Russian School of Geopolitics with German School of Geopolitics, both having appeared reacting on the power contractions of their states, politically engaged, and violating Aristotle’s dualism between the observer and the agent. Thus, from the very beginning, geopolitical studies are not understood by Dugin as a scientific approach.

Although one of Dugin’s geopolitical cores is that Russian geopolitics is impossible without the study of Russian society, of Russian government and of Russian territory⁵⁸⁵ (these are *de facto* geopolitical factors [cf. Section 1.2.3]), there is conflicting evidence, within the ideology, that all geopolitical concepts were imported from the West⁵⁸⁶, the same West that Dugin claims to resist against. Despite Dugin trying to link Neo-Eurasianism to classical Eurasianism as much as possible, the truth is that Neo-Eurasianism is more than anything else (in the Russian philosophical worldview) influenced by western ideas, with perhaps the exception of Petr Chaadaev [cf. subchapter 3.1.].

⁵⁸² Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R3] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, April 24, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r3-dugin.html>

⁵⁸³ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 24.

⁵⁸⁴ Alexander Dugin, *Last War of the World-Island – the Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (London: Arktos, 2015), 84-85.

⁵⁸⁵ Alexander Dugin, *Last War of the World-Island – the Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (London: Arktos, 2015), 1.

⁵⁸⁶ ‘We can accept them [Western geopolitical concepts] unreservedly’ – Alexander Dugin, *Last War of the World-Island – the Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (London: Arktos, 2015), 3.

From the perspective of a scientific study, that does not constitute a problem since science has a universal methodology (that Dugin paradoxically denies). The problem lies, once again, onto the ideological and strategic commands that distort science.

Summing up, Dugin has been using the following geopolitical concepts and ideas: (1) Heartland; (2) Thalassopolitics and Telluropolitics, *i.e.* a “clash Sea vs. Land” (3) Pan-Regions and Civilizations. The study will now go through those three subjects.

1. Heartland

Mackinder’s HEARTLAND concept [cf. APPENDIX 2] was comprised by a theory that formulated a clash between “Land” on the one side, and the “Sea” on the other⁵⁸⁷. Looking at history through the lens of geography, Mackinder divided World’s History into three epochs – (i) Pre-Colombian, (ii) Colombian; and (iii) Post-Colombian⁵⁸⁸ – and sustained that the ‘Geographical Pivot of History’ or ‘Pivot Area’, later named ‘Heartland’ – an area impossible to access from the sea – is the core to understanding World’s power dynamics⁵⁸⁹.

Map 1 Mackinder’s Heartland⁵⁹⁰



⁵⁸⁷ Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History,’ *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, no. 4, (1904).

⁵⁸⁸ This epoch characterized by transcontinental transport (*e.g.* transiberian railway, U.S. railway network) that Mackinder wrongly predicted could overcome maritime transport.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ecce* Mackinder’s famous aphorism:

*‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island (Eurasia);
Who rules the World-Island controls the World.’*

- Halford Mackinder, *Democratic ideals and reality - a study in the politics of reconstruction* (London: Constable and Company, 1919), 194.

⁵⁹⁰ Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History,’ *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, no. 4, (1904): 435.

Dugin decided that these formulations could not stay parallel to Russian applied geopolitics. So Dugin stated that the milestone of Neo-Eurasianism is:

‘...to acknowledge the essence of Russian history in the tellurocracy. The Russia is the Heartland, so Geopolitics-2 is the Russian cause. Thus were laid the foundations of modern neo-Eurasianism.’⁵⁹¹

Thus, Dugin established that Russia *is* the Heartland, Russia *is* a TELLUROCRACY [cf. APPENDIX 2], *i.e.* a ‘Civilization of Land’⁵⁹².

As Mackinder was a representative of that times’ sea power – the British Empire – worried with land power hegemony, Mackinder determined the necessity of creating a *cordon sanitaire* separating Germany from Russia, thus encouraging a proliferation of states from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. After World War I that proliferation of Eastern European states was achieved, appearing on the map as the mentioned buffer zone between communist Russia and Weimar’s Germany⁵⁹³.

Needless to say, that Dugin had to take the prescriptions all away around since the ideological objectives are now Russian’s and not British. Still, Mackinder has never offered a plan for World domination, as Dugin has been doing, but Mackinder looked instead for containing a Land power of becoming a Sea power too⁵⁹⁴.

While comparing this statement:

‘Pour nous l’Heartland, la «Terre du Milieu», c’est le cœur de notre Empire, le centre de notre Grande Nation, le bloc continental Eurasiatique qui s’étend de l’atlantique au pacifique.’⁵⁹⁵

and map 2 to the map 1, one infers that Dugin’s ideological goals distorts Mackinder’s Heartland geographical limits, demonstrating the clear expansionist purposes of Neo-Eurasianism.

⁵⁹¹ Alexander Dugin, ‘Existential geopolitics of Carlo Terracciano by Alexander Dugin,’ last modified September, 2012, Open Revolt, <https://openrevolt.info/2012/09/19/existential-geopolitics-of-carlo-terracciano-by-alexander-dugin/>

⁵⁹² An interesting topic of research is to investigate how is this assumption linked to the empirical evidence of Russian interest on the Arctic Ocean.

⁵⁹³ That buffer zone disappeared with the 1939 Molotov-Ribbetrop Pact.

⁵⁹⁴ In truth that was what the Theory of Midland Ocean was about, a colligation of states [NATO] in order to contain the continental [Soviet] bloc.

⁵⁹⁵ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 7.

Map 2 Dugin's Heartland⁵⁹⁶



On this level, if Mackinder correctly identified the problematic Land power's objective, while constituting an extensive coastline, of becoming Sea power, *ergo* Russian GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITY of "expanding" in order to get access to warm seas is a problem to be analyzed.

Castex devoted all Part V of this Tome V to the Russian struggle to get access to warm seas, identifying directions for that enterprise: Baltic Sea, Black Sea, through Persia, through India, and at the Far East⁵⁹⁷.

Map 3 Russian struggle for getting access to open Ocean



Source: Castex, Tome V, Annexes

⁵⁹⁶ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 17.

⁵⁹⁷ Raoul Castex, *Théories Stratégiques. Tome V* (Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1935), 555-732.

By now, one may face a deep contradiction: if the Land power seeks to become Sea power, is it not logically compulsory that the clash Land *versus* Sea is provisory only, that means, that the clash needs necessarily to disappear at the moment that Land power becomes a Sea power too?

2. Thalassopolitics and Telluropolitics, *i.e.* a “clash Sea *vs.* Land”⁵⁹⁸

A second set of concepts that Dugin takes from classical geopolitics to elaborate on his ideas is the opposition between Land and Sea, between TELLUROPOLITICS and THALASSOPOLITICS [cf. APPENDIX 2].

In fact, one cannot understand anything from Neo-Eurasianist dynamics if one ignores the *confrontation between maritime and territorial power* as a transversal notion of the entire Dugin’s proposal.

As mentioned above, after identifying Russia with Tellurocracy and with the Heartland, Dugin moved to another premise:

‘...Russia is doomed to conflict with the civilization of the Sea...’⁵⁹⁹

and the ‘civilization of the Sea’ means the U.S.A. and its allies.

Dugin distorted Mackinder, moving from an already controversial Land *versus* Sea opposition as geopolitical dynamics, to drawing an incompatibility among land and sea “civilizations”⁶⁰⁰.

Apart from the fact that this approach is overflowed with determinism, apart from the fact that all these arguments have ideological purposes, the approach itself is sometimes beyond logics and rationality, as, for example, Dugin’s strange interpretations of history based on the clash Land *vs.* Sea⁶⁰¹.

The Manichean dualism Land *vs.* Sea is used by Dugin to divide everything: geopolitics, political systems, and military alliances *stricto sensu*, societies and nations, even religions (as mentioned). Dugin took a hypothesis of looking at geography through

⁵⁹⁸ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), chapter 2.

⁵⁹⁹ Alexander Dugin, *Last War of the World-Island – the Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (London: Arktos, 2015), 10.

⁶⁰⁰ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 120.

⁶⁰¹ Alexander Dugin, ‘The Great War of Continents,’ last modified 2008, The Fourth Political Theory, <http://4pt.su/en/content/great-war-continents>

history, made it a universal truth, and then forced any aspect of the reality to fit in that dualism. Dugin went as far as calling that dualism ‘... the main geopolitical law...’⁶⁰².

Recapturing Mackinder’s Land *versus* Sea opposition, once again, Dugin made his argument labeling the West and the U.S.A. as ‘thalassocracy’, ‘atlantists’ (‘unipolarity-globalization-financial oligarchy-modernization-capitalism’) and Eurasia, represented by Russia and China, as ‘tellurocracy’ (militarism-sovereignty of state-traditional society-(crypto-socialism)).

While debating with Carvalho, Dugin had to face Carvalho’s hypothesis of a third globalist project – identified as the Islamic bloc. In geographical terms, that would fit in Spykman’s RIMLAND – ‘...from the Maghreb through the Middle East to the Central Asia and further to Islamic societies of the Pacific’. In order to adapt this new element raised by Carvalho to his dualism, Dugin stated that there is an inclination of the Islamic bloc towards Russia and China⁶⁰³. Conclusion: Dugin’s dualism needed to prevail.

Nevertheless, that idea of Islamic inclination towards Russia and China is extremely interesting taking into account (i) Carvalho’s three globalist projects [cf. Subchapter 9.2.], and (ii) the recent events of the Arab Spring, with the effort of President Obama’s administration to destabilize and radicalize the area, promoting regimes and governments against the U.S.A. and the West (*e.g.* Lybia).

In the middle of all these confusing arguments, the concept of RIMLAND [cf. APPENDIX 2] is merely instrumental, while should be on the first line of importance. Without the Rimland concept, Russia’s geopolitical continuity to get access to open oceans, the traditional interest of Russia in Constantinople⁶⁰⁴, the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and the events in eastern Ukraine remain incomplete.

3. Pan-Regions and Civilizations

In the mentioned group of geopolitical concepts and ideas, the third topic received a notorious influence from both Haushofer and Huntington.

⁶⁰² Alexander Dugin, ‘Existential geopolitics of Carlo Terracciano by Alexander Dugin,’ last modified September, 2012, Open Revolt, <https://openrevolt.info/2012/09/19/existential-geopolitics-of-carlo-terracciano-by-alexander-dugin/>

⁶⁰³ Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R1] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

⁶⁰⁴ Raoul Castex, *Théories Stratégiques. Tome V* (Paris: Societé d’Éditions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1935), 144-145.

Pan-regions – as well as the concept of *Großlebensformen* – were developed in the German School of Geopolitics. Dugin recaptured them with the “four great spaces” guideline.

However, perhaps the main prescription from Haushofer that Dugin seized for his purposes was an alliance between Germany and Russia, which not only eradicates Mackinder’s buffer zone in Eastern Europe but also makes the german *Drang nach Osten* meet its limits while touching the borders of the Russian lands.

Still, and coming back to the notion of *Großlebensformen*, Dugin contended:

‘Geopolitically, *Russia is something more than the Russian Federation in its current administrative borders [sic]*’⁶⁰⁵.

Thus, not only an imperialistic goal pursuing the inclusion of CIS countries is perfectly identifiable – once more, expansionism connected to the traditional idea of Imperial Russia – but also this purpose is covered by the use of some aspects of Huntington’s thesis⁶⁰⁶. Some aspects only, indeed, because while the concept of “civilization” – great spaces with common cultural and religious bonds⁶⁰⁷ – serves Dugin, the Western Civilization as Huntington mapped it would need to be broken in Dugin’s project, separating Europe, or at least part of Europe⁶⁰⁸ (and Latin America), from North America. Dugin works to achieve that goal. Nevertheless, it is not simple to achieve that goal. The study of civilizations reveals that great political transformations in terms of structure do not happen by chance, and they are preceded by values and a certain culture. Examples of this can be found in the Empire of Alexander the Great and ancient Greek Philosophy; in Feudalism and Papal supremacy; the solidification of European monarchies and the Renaissance movement (map 4); the French Revolution and *le siècle des Lumières*, etc.

⁶⁰⁵ Alexander Dugin, *Last War of the World-Island – the Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (London: Arkos, 2015), 11.

⁶⁰⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2011).

Brill paid large attention to Huntington under a perspective of geocultural analysis, to conclude with criticism about monocausal analysis – Heinz Brill, *Geopolitische Analysen – Beiträge zur deutschen und internationalen Sicherheitspolitik 1974-2008* (Bissendorf: Biblio, 2008), 307.

⁶⁰⁷ This definition includes elements from the geopolitical factor #5. It is noteworthy to remember that in this case the “state” is not the unit of analysis.

⁶⁰⁸ Corresponding to the borders between Europe and Orthodox Russia on the one hand, and Europe and the Ottoman Empire on the other hand, as roughly in the 15th century, *vide* map 4.

Map 4 Europe in 1400



Source: <http://www.euratlas.net/history/europe/1400/index.html>

Moving groups, peoples, civilizations, is part of Neo-Eurasianist modalities of action. If Huntington predicted correctly that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islam would become the biggest obstacle to the West, Huntington would have gotten it right in the sense that Dugin also wants to use the Islam against the West. Russian-Iranian relations in regard to the balance of powers and oil circulation in the region are particularly significant in this maneuver.

Map 5 The West as target by Dugin⁶⁰⁹



⁶⁰⁹ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 217.

Linking “civilization” with the previous topic, Dugin has seen Sea and Land as ‘geopolitical subjects’ projected respectively on the West and the East. West and East are less seen as geographical locations than as ‘blocs of civilizations’. In this way, whereas to Dugin the Land *is* hierarchy, order, masculine principle, tradition; the West *is* chaos, dissolution, feminine principle, and contemporaneity⁶¹⁰. The Land is the civilization of socialism and the Sea is the civilization of liberalism⁶¹¹.

It seems important to repeat that this kind of generalization is not only abusive, at the least, but it is also false. Dugin has been putting focus on geography, on the geographical centrality of Eurasian space, escaping from the historical examination, since either there is no “state history” (*vide* Chaadaev), or there are loads of blood in the history that is better to ignore for ideological reasons committed to the success of the project (*vide* Soviet History). So, this is when geography becomes an instrument of power in the worse traditions denounced by *critical* geopolitics.

4.2.3. Fundamental lines of Neo-Eurasianism as strategic plan (geostrategic and geoconjunctive)

After making the case building up the argument of Neo-Eurasianism as ideology, identifying its roots, providing evidence on how those roots have been distorted towards the primary goal of achieving power (a core of the definition of IDEOLOGY, one insists), the next research step will point out *what* does Neo-Eurasianism presents as “ideal” New World Order and *how* does Neo-Eurasianism intends to implement the changes in order to reach that “final stage”, *i.e.* which tactics have been designed.

Right from the beginning of this section, it will be demonstrated that the very first MODALITY OF ACTION [cf. APPENDIX 2] of Neo-Eurasianism, as a strategic plan, is to gather as much support as possible against the West and, most of all, against the U.S.A. [cf. map 5]. In this way, Neo-Eurasianism fits perfectly in the domain of politics/ “applied geopolitics” – not in the domain of science – since is characterized

⁶¹⁰ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 172-173.

⁶¹¹ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 176.

both as a geoconjunctive (because it aims to gather forces) and geostrategic (because it has a clearly defined enemy) plan⁶¹². This idea is essential for the confirmation of H₂.

Perceiving Neo-Eurasianism as a strategic plan, this study will be able to decompose two phases within Neo-Eurasianism with the assistance of strategic planning framework [cf. Subchapter 2.2]. The first phase of strategic planning requires (1) the analysis of the environment: (1.1) an internal analysis and (1.2) an external analysis. The second phase is constituted by (2) the formulation of the plan, which includes: (2.1) the definition of the mission, (2.2) the enumeration of objectives, (2.3) setting up modalities of action, and (2.4) linking the plan to specific sectoral policies. These two phases are covered by Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan, as the study will verify in detail⁶¹³.

Phase I - Analysis of the environment by Neo-Eurasianism

With respect to the analysis of the internal environment, Dugin has been laconic. Russia has, indeed, Great Power characteristics listed under the geopolitical factors: World largest territory, enormous energy power⁶¹⁴, relatively large number of population (roughly 144 million people), 10th largest economy in 2014⁶¹⁵. Russia has great mineral wealth, which allows the reactivation of its military structures. The country has been at the top (#2) in the ranking of weaponry suppliers⁶¹⁶, and it is ranked 2nd strongest military power in the World (special note to the nuclear weapons)⁶¹⁷. Concerning the political structure, although with highly corrupt individuals⁶¹⁸, Russian political structure is efficient with assertive foreign policy, particularly towards the

⁶¹² Cf. fig. 1 and table 1 to understand that the terms ‘strategic plan’ (title of PART II) comprise Neo-Eurasianism as “applied geopolitics”, a label that matches with Martin’s ‘geo-ideology’ term [cf. Chapter 7.].

⁶¹³ As said above, the other two phases of strategic planning ([iii] operationalization, and [iv] evaluation and control), as future events as a whole, will be for that reason put aside.

⁶¹⁴ Russia possesses the wealthiest mineral reserve in the World, including major deposits of oil, natural gas, coal, and other strategic minerals, reserves of rare earth elements, plus huge reserves of fresh water (e.g. Lake Baikal). Russia holds the world largest natural gas reserve, and the 8th largest crude oil reserve. Russia occupies also the 3rd position as World oil producer – The U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘International,’ last modified May, 2016, <http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/?fips=SU&trk=p2>

⁶¹⁵ World Bank, ‘Gross domestic product 2014,’ last modified May, 2016, World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>

⁶¹⁶ SIPRI, ‘TIV of arms exports from the top 50 largest exporters, 2015-2015,’ last modified May, 2016, SIPRI, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php

⁶¹⁷ Global Firepower, ‘Countries Ranked by Military Strength,’ last modified May, 2016, Global Firepower, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>

⁶¹⁸ Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,’ last modified May, 2016, Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table>

countries of former Soviet space (e.g. CIS, CSTO, SCO, EEC, etc.). In the World ranking index of national power [*sic*], Russia has been recently placed 5th⁶¹⁹. It is also noteworthy to remind that Russia holds a seat on the UN Security Council.

Dugin has not been analyzing or describing these strengths (and also the weaknesses) in much detail. Instead, the analysis of the external environment occupies much of Dugin's effort.

In general – and focused mainly on the international arena – Dugin has begun his books, articles, interviews, conferences, broadcasts devoted to explain his (and Neo-Eurasianist) *Weltanschauung* with the image that the U.S.A. – “the American Empire” – is collapsing and that the “unipolar world” will soon cease to exist. This “American Empire” or “unipolarism”, Dugin explained, comprises several dimensions: (1) as said, the World Order is unipolar and the U.S.A. is the core of the unipolarity; (2) this unipolarity is: (i) *geopolitical* – dominance of the Globe by the U.S. imperialism that established a ‘kind of *global dictatorship*’; (ii) *ideological* – ‘...based on the *Modernist and Post-Modernist values*...’; (iii) *spiritually* it is the ‘...the kingdom of the Antichrist’⁶²⁰. Consequently, Dugin labeled a ‘...USA-centric global geopolitical field...’ that holds impact on several domains: (a) historically – the U.S. conception of Western Civilization's climax; (b) politically and ideologically – the spread of liberal democracy throughout the World; (c) economically – the U.S.A. expands its economy worldwide, uses military invasions to assist in that process, and that expansion is only limited by the Chinese economic strength, and the monopoly of resources by Russia, Iran, Venezuela⁶²¹. In other source, Dugin criticized the West for: (i) anthropological individualism, (ii) belief in progress, (iii) technological development, (iv) euro-american centrism, (v) free market economy, (vi) democracy is the rule of minorities [*sic*], (vii) the middle class as the only really existing social actor and universal norm, (viii) one-world globalism (world citizenship)⁶²².

So all these claims have been organized into a compact bloc of ideas in order to denounce that the U.S.A. is pursuing ‘... the promotion of “universal” values reflecting

⁶¹⁹ Index of National Power, ‘Index Comparisons,’ last modified June, 2016, Index of National Power <http://www.nationalpower.info/index-of-national-power/comparing-nations-using-different-power-indecies/>

⁶²⁰ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin's Conclusion,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, July 5, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/07/dugins-conclusion.html>

⁶²¹ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

⁶²² Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 295.

the values of Western world (the liberal democracy, parliamentarism, free market, humans rights and so on)⁶²³, *la haute bourgeoisie* is the dominant class into a financial and industrial imperialism, imposing ‘...a kind of “global imperial network” operating on a planetary scale’⁶²⁴ and that the U.S. move towards “world domination” (this is a vital point) is accomplished at Russian expense⁶²⁵.

Therefore, one has now Dugin’s picture of the World Order and can summarize: the West rules under the U.S. command and rules over a multitude of states – including Russia – that can barely resist this supremacy. The situation is then unfair and should change as soon as possible, Dugin has concluded.

With the purpose of covering all this approach with more appropriate justification, comes the misuse of the geopolitical approach (as explained above). In the pure Manichean division, Russia and its allies are identified with reactionary telluropolitics and the U.S.A. and its allies, including NATO, are identified with imperialist thalassopolitics.

Nevertheless, the highest respectability comes with duginist moral standards: the West is the “evil” and Eurasia is the the “good”.

Using process tracing, it is possible to infer that Dugin’s analysis of the external environment and his ‘refusal on the West’⁶²⁶ is mainly based on the criticism of a single book: *The Open Society and Its Enemies* by Karl Popper⁶²⁷. Ignoring the fact that judging a whole Civilization from a book only is nothing but a dishonest approach, thus non-scientific, Dugin’s biased perspective is moreover revealed while recognizing an allegedly “American imperialism” (free world, crusade for democracy, Atlantic solidarity), but paying no attention to the opposing values that, being also part of the West, react against Dugin’s picture (*e.g.* aspects of Classic Greek philosophy, some Roman Law principles, Christianity itself; many political thinkers (*e.g.* de Maistre,

⁶²³ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

⁶²⁴ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

⁶²⁵ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 125.

⁶²⁶ ‘I am resolutely against the Western values...’ – Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin’s Conclusion,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, July 5, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/07/dugins-conclusion.html>

⁶²⁷ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 131-134.

Alexander Dugin, ‘The metaphysics of national-bolshevism,’ last modified April, 2016, Arctogaia, <http://arctogaia.com/public/eng-teor.htm>

Fortunato, Cortes, Kirk), generals, philosophers; values expressed in all cultural dimensions, from architecture to music, paintings, etc.).

One of the biggest problems in Dugin's approach lies in his definition of globalization. Dugin has been confusing definitions, taking into account that he does not use an academic definition of 'UNIPOLAR WORLD' [cf. APPENDIX 2], but Dugin has been using the "unipolar world" expression as unilateralism instead, in the sense that "the U.S. does everything it wants". Hence, the intentions in this attitude cannot be other than ideological.

Furthermore, with the view of advocating this hate towards the U.S.A. Dugin, in his debate with Carvalho, asked:

'But what about [the crimes of] CIA, Bilderberg, Pentagon, neocons, PNAC, "imperial grunts", Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the bombing of Serbia?'⁶²⁸

Carvalho just replied with statistics [geopolitical factor #5] and geographical location [geopolitical factor #1]: (i) 'statistics: between 1900 and 1987 the U.S.A. were directly or indirectly involved in 1 634 000 deaths (World Wars, Vietnam war, etc.), whilst between 1917 and 1987, 61 911 000 died in the USSR and between 1949 and 1987, 76 702 000 died in China'⁶²⁹; (ii) 'location: U.S. victims are spread over different military conflicts, while USSR and PRC murdered their own disarmed people'⁶³⁰.

Nevertheless, this section will not care about the analysis of this debate as a whole, since that will be postponed to PART V.

The point now is that, after stating the core lines of Dugin's Neo-Eurasianist analysis of the environment, follows *phase 2*.

Phase 2 - Formulation of strategic plan by Neo-Eurasianism

The formulation of the (2.1) mission guarantees the unity of the whole strategic plan. National survival, territorial integrity, people's welfare put together the mission of the regular and efficient state.

⁶²⁸ Alexandr Dugin, '[R1] Dugin,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

⁶²⁹ Data from Rudolph J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1994), updated on: <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/20TH.HTM>

⁶³⁰ Olavo de Carvalho, '[R2] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r2-olavo-de-carvalho.html>

As for the official mission of Neo-Eurasianism, its supreme command can be recognized on the destruction of the “unipolar world”. Hypothetically this mission should be accomplished through the creation of multipolarity – *i.e.* Russia is unable to create a unipolar order, not even able to sustain the old bipolar order, multipolarity is the only possible comfortable solution.

Having presented Dugin’s despise for the ‘Roman-German Civilization’ and its ‘universalism’⁶³¹, Western hegemony must then be exterminated. Dugin presented his “theses” interrelated with the mission though⁶³²: (a) the West needs to be saved; (b) Russia is a specific civilization that, not only needs to be saved too, but also developed (against Americanization); (c) strengthening of a Russian strategy (*e.g.* improving Russian economy).

The following doubt appears at this level: is the destruction of the “unipolar World” the true Neo-Eurasianist mission only, or does that mission embrace the destruction of the U.S.A. as a country too? KGB-trained scholar Panarin, also a proponent of a continental Eurasian bloc, formulated the hypothesis of U.S. dismantle, a prediction that was not confirmed by Panarin’s own deadline of 2010⁶³³. Yet, the project (or aspiration) has not vanished or repudiated⁶³⁴.

Another doubt within the delimitation of Neo-Eurasianist mission – crystallized in H₂ and H₄ – is the possibility that Neo-Eurasianism is chasing the goal of creating a gigantic New World Order that is not “multipolar” after all, but an oligarchic-global order. It would be an oligarchic-global order, indeed, because once the U.S.A. disappears from the rank of great powers, the Russian-Chinese military power truly rules the World. The expression “Empire of the End” (*‘Empire Eurasiatique de la Fin’*), which Parvulesco used countless times, may allow deducing that it is the scenario of “oligarchic-global order” that prevails as a true goal for Neo-Eurasianism [cf. Subchapter 9.2.]. Therefore, Neo-Eurasianism would aim to replace a supposed “imperialism” by a true imperialism. In the line of seeing Neo-Eurasianism as a globalist project, Laruelle also noted that whereas Dugin has been insisting on the distinctiveness of ‘Russian Civilization’, he has not been considering any incoherence

⁶³¹ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 18.

⁶³² Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris: Avatar, 2006), 55-59.

⁶³³ Daniele Scalea, ‘Panarin e la disintegrazione degli USA,’ last modified April, 2009, Eurasia, http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/cogit_content/articoli/EkFIZyylZypqtmvasE.shtml

⁶³⁴ The fact that Dugin has been keeping referring the U.S.A. as *Carthago* might lead to the conclusion that the aim is, in fact, the annihilation of the U.S.A., since Ancient Carthage was completely destroyed in 146 BC and its inhabitants were either killed or enslaved.

between that assumption and the tactic of exporting the model to other areas of the World⁶³⁵. Hence the model to resist “American New World Order” would rapidly become the “Eurasian New World Order”, since Neo-Eurasianism states that Eurasia’s concept corresponds to a global thought, consequently not only delimited to the Eurasian region [*vide* below the Dugin’s interest in Brazil].

Dugin agreed with the mainstream idea that we are living a period of transition⁶³⁶. But not all periods in history are transition periods? Still, this period, in particular, is favorable for Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist mission.

How is that mission divided? – Certainly into (2.2) a list of objectives: (i) the official creation of “multipolarity” or great spaces on the international arena, which this study – based on all above-mentioned arguments – considers fake; being inferred the true objective (ii) on establishing Russia as major great power with a very strong supremacy over the old Soviet space, to which is added series of strong alliances with several countries – the oligarchic-global order.

The systematization of the objective (i) follows the pattern of the official Neo-Eurasianist analysis of the environment, *i.e.* the foundations of the project lay on the rejection of Atlantism, NATO, and the U.S.-lead globalization. The main point is allegedly raising a multipolar world of “four great spaces” headed by four director-states: Russia, Germany, Japan, and the U.S.A. Naturally, Russia would have a role of hegemonic power, and it would hold concrete plans towards some countries (*e.g.* secession of Turkey, Azerbaijan or China and absorption of Finland by Russia).

The creation of Multipolarity is based on the rejection of Universalism. That rejection of Universalism is consummated under – once again – the ideological combat. While fighting for a “multipolar world” Dugin needs to assure that, hypothetically, those multipolar blocs will not have a superior moral authority over them. If, in doing so, Dugin needs to burn down the Ten Commandments (which in spite of having Jewish-Christian origin are claimed to have ethical universal validity above everything else (including modern Western states)), Dugin does it without the slightest preoccupation and with no bigger preoccupation [*vide* above the explanation about the understanding of Christianity by Dugin].

⁶³⁵ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 120.

⁶³⁶ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

Besides there is another major consequence since while rejecting universalism, Dugin also threw away scientific methodology, which is universally recognized by the Academia. How Dugin affirmed, at the same time, that he has been pursuing his research impartially and scientifically, remains another contradiction in his approach. Nonetheless, such contradictions do not disturb Dugin and he marches towards the non-universalist Neo-Eurasian 'land patriotism'⁶³⁷. The consequence of all these premises is evident: the focus falls less on creating the multipolar world than on a new post-soviet Eurasian bloc – oligarchic-global order⁶³⁸.

Whereas the mission and the objectives constitute the *what* is to be achieved, the (2.3) modalities of action compose the directives on *how* to accomplish the *what*.

It was already pointed out that gathering the greatest number of U.S. enemies and opponents is the Neo-Eurasianist main modality of action. Based on leninist-gramscian teachings, Dugin explained that he:

'...is radically against American hegemony and world domination. [He] [i]s against globalism and proposes the doctrine of multipolarity. [He] [i]s in favor of the common struggle of Russians, Muslims, Asians and Latins against the countries of Rich North'⁶³⁹.

Movements against the U.S. world-leadership: (1) Global Caliphate and the radical islam; (2) neo-socialism movement (e.g. Venezuela, Bolivia, [Brazil]); Eurasian project, *i.e.* multipolarity '... based on the principle of civilizations and great spaces'⁶⁴⁰.

'...*who challenge the present state of things*, the globalization and the American imperialism are virtually *friends and allies*. Let our ideals be different but we have in common one very strong thing: the present reality that we hate'⁶⁴¹.

⁶³⁷ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 19.

⁶³⁸ Dugin's own terms: 'Eurasia as a planet' – Alexander Dugin, 'The Eurasist Vision – Basic principles of the eurasist doctrinal platform,' last modified September, 2001, Евразия, <http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=244>

⁶³⁹ Alexandr Dugin, 'Dugin's résumé,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, January 27, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/01/alexandr-dugin.html>

⁶⁴⁰ Alexandr Dugin, 'Dugin – Introduction,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

⁶⁴¹ Alexandr Dugin, 'Dugin's Conclusion,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, July 5, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/07/dugins-conclusion.html>

Hence one has a high heterogeneity among numerous “allies”. The expression: Third Rome, Third Reich, Third International⁶⁴² may give a more precise idea about the incompatibility among the “allies” that are brought together solely on the grounds of the common hostility towards the U.S.A. and the West.

Dugin has been presenting modalities of action based on sophisticated techniques of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation masterminded by the Russian intelligence community [cf. Section 9.2.3]. In this sense, Dugin affirmed that only the army and the secret services possess a real sense of patriotism⁶⁴³, something that Dugin certainly knows very well, taking into account his family origins linked to *arcana imperii* for generations. However, in regard to the Armed Forces, military operations play relatively little role in the Neo-Eurasianist modalities of action, while the use of resources (geopolitical factor #4) (e.g. natural gas, oil) is seen as a vital weapon to pressure other states. In this respect, the modality of action should *in extremis* achieve the point of making all of Europe captive of Russian resources.

Hence an aggressive and radical foreign policy conducted by secret services is the issue at stake as a way to: (i) working for Eurasian integration; and (ii) encouraging the foundation of ‘great spaces’ and alliances between them and Russia.

(i) Working for Eurasian integration is based, before anything else, on Russia’s position [LAGE] in the middle of the Eurasian land mass⁶⁴⁴. Russia should make the unification of all “Russian territories”, and find its true dimension, Dugin assumed. It is interesting to note that the arguments for the Eurasian integration are almost exclusively based on geography, thus with an ‘ahistorical discourse’⁶⁴⁵. “Almost”, because of the revolutionary ideology present, this time, takes the chance to convoke the post-soviet space to cooperate with Russia, so that the U.S.A. and Capitalism, thalassocracy and the ‘civilization of the Sea’ may be destroyed. In this sense, Neo-Eurasianism is a post-Soviet Russian expansionist ideology.

⁶⁴² Alexander Dugin, ‘The metaphysics of national-bolshevism,’ last modified April, 2016, Arctogaia, <http://arctogaia.com/public/eng-teor.htm>

⁶⁴³ Alexander Dugin, ‘The Great War of Continents,’ last modified 2008, The Fourth Political Theory, <http://4pt.su/en/content/great-war-continents>

⁶⁴⁴ For a reading about Russia’s position from the geopolitical point of view *vide*: Michal Romancov, ‘Quo vadis, Russia? Current Russian position between Asia and Europe,’ in *Contemporary security dilemmas: reflections on security in East Asia and Central Europe*, ed. Ladislav Cabada and Šárka Waisová (Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, 2006).

⁶⁴⁵ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 142.

In fact, the *Empire* [Империя] is one of the goals for Neo-Eurasianism⁶⁴⁶ [cf. map 6]. In a subchapter called ‘The Three pillars of Putin,’ Dugin let the reader know that Neo-Eurasianism:

‘...is [about] the restoration of the Russian Empire and the USSR on new terms’⁶⁴⁷, that ‘The next necessary step is the abolition of the status of national republics’⁶⁴⁸ and that ‘Eurasianism contains answers to all questions: from housing and utilities reforms to healthcare’⁶⁴⁹ in clear totalitarian inclination, as explained.

As a result, there are no doubts left on this point; the objectives are clear, as well as the way to fulfill them.

Map 6 Dugin’s Eurasian Empire⁶⁵⁰



As Mahan taught, the economic strength of the naval powers is centered on their control of the oceans (SEA LANES and CHOKE POINTS). Replying with Mackinder, Dugin proposed an east-west and north-south land transport networks in Eurasia.

⁶⁴⁶ ‘An Empire in Place of a National State’ – Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 63-67.

⁶⁴⁷ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 176.

⁶⁴⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 176.

⁶⁴⁹ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 178.

⁶⁵⁰ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 415.

Eurasia is not only composed of the whole former Soviet bloc (the exceptions are the Kuril Islands and Kaliningrad, which should be returned to Japan and Germany respectively, Dugin defended), but expansion, Dugin added, should comprise Manchuria, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Mongolia, as well as Orthodox countries in the Balkans (e.g. integration of Moldova and Romania⁶⁵¹). Central Asian countries, Ukraine and Belarus should also be integrated into the bloc⁶⁵².

Map 7
The western border of Dugin's Eurasia⁶⁵³



The project has impacted Putin's policies and shows limits that go far beyond the post-soviet borders⁶⁵⁴.

The modality of action has been copying techniques of the European Union's integration process. However, and despite Dugin's statement that EU is an integration

⁶⁵¹ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 383-384.

⁶⁵² Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 51, 53.


⁶⁵³ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 227.

⁶⁵⁴ 'Putin y el euroasianismo radical – Putin proposes an Eurasian integration from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The Eurasian Economic Union entered into force in January 2015'. *Vide*: Manuel Florentín, 'Putin y el euroasianismo radical,' last modified March, 2014, El País, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/03/14/actualidad/1394812700_566485.html or Le Monde.fr, 'Poutine veut créer une "Union eurasiatique",' last modified October, 2011, Le Monde, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2011/10/04/poutine-veut-creer-une-union-eurasiatique_1581950_3214.html

success, Dugin did not present a Moscow-Brussels axis in Europe, but a Moscow-Berlin axis instead.

(ii) The foundation of ‘great spaces’ and bilateral alliances between them and Russia is another modality of action for Neo-Eurasianism. Against the logic that all peoples have their national interests, Dugin projected the construction of four ‘great spaces’ (as once four Haushofer’s pan-regions): (1.) the American Continent (Monroe doctrine lead by the U.S.A.); (2.) Euro-Africa (headed by “Central Europe”); (3.) Russian Central-Asian zone (headed by Russia); and (4.) the Pacific zone (headed by Japan)⁶⁵⁵.

Map 8
Dugin’s multipolar World Order (four zones)⁶⁵⁶



Although Dugin has been repeatedly referring to the Westphalian order, his idea of great spaces – borrowed from Ratzel, Haushofer and Schmitt – is the antinomy of the Westphalian order, the antinomy of 1848 nation-state principle that largely triumphed in Europe after World War I⁶⁵⁷.

To those four great spaces, Dugin added series of blocs: *e.g.* the European Union, Eurasian Union, Islamic Union, the South-American Union⁶⁵⁸, Chinese Union,

⁶⁵⁵ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 47 – 49.


⁶⁵⁶ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 235.

⁶⁵⁷ ‘Multipolarity does not coincide with the national model of world organization according to the logic of the Westphalian system’ – Alexander Dugin, ‘Multipolarity,’ last modified January, 2016, Global Revolutionary Alliance, <http://granews.info/1290-multipolarity-the-definition-and-the-differentiation-between-its-meanings.html>

⁶⁵⁸ *Foro de São Paulo* and South America integration represent that political process [cf. Chapter 8].

the Indian Union, Pan-Pacific Union, the North-American great space⁶⁵⁹, in which economic, military, political partnership should prevail⁶⁶⁰.

Map 9
Dugin's 'Multipolar World: Four Zones – Large Spaces'⁶⁶¹



Besides, another core of the modality of action under study is comprised by the idea of axes. Dugin presented three of them: the Moscow – Berlin Axis⁶⁶², the Moscow – Tokyo Axis⁶⁶³, and the Moscow – Teheran Axis⁶⁶⁴.

⁶⁵⁹ Alexandr Dugin, 'Dugin – Introduction,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

⁶⁶⁰ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 49.

⁶⁶¹ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 58.

⁶⁶² Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 220-229.

⁶⁶³ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 229-238.

⁶⁶⁴ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 238-246.

Map 10 Three Axes⁶⁶⁵



It is then evident that the movement towards the goal of getting access to warm waters endures. One of the greatest challenges to Russia is to make the alliance with the RIMLAND-states, or at least assure their absolute neutrality, in achieving enough strength to face and defeat the U.S.A., developing a powerful navy as well⁶⁶⁶.

There are still some notes to be made concerning Europe.

Firstly the true center of gravity in world politics, wrote Parvulesco in 2005, is located in Europe and relates to the revolutionary integration project between France and Germany [– out of the European Union frame, is almost useless to emphasize –] and its posterior liaison with Putin’s Russia. In a sentence: a continental axis Paris-Berlin-Moscow against the U.S.A.⁶⁶⁷, *i.e.* a stable structure that would consolidate the short-lived opposition of state leaders of France, Germany and Russia to the War in Iraq lead by the U.S.A.⁶⁶⁸.

Parvulesco assured that the whole project was already prepared to be implemented in 2005. The only remaining puzzle piece that has been missing is *the signal for the battle against the current élites* [the Syndicate] in order to seize power⁶⁶⁹.

Secondly, this Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis is to be a political, military, strategic, economic bloc. As mentioned many times, the project for continental bloc should be added to Latin America and Grand Japan, once again all against the U.S.A.⁶⁷⁰.

⁶⁶⁵ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 225.

⁶⁶⁶ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 167-169, 174-175.

⁶⁶⁷ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 5-6, 217.

⁶⁶⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Last War of the World-Island – the Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (London: Arktos, 2015), 109-111.

⁶⁶⁹ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 245.

Thirdly, Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis is, *de facto*, not absent from the political reality. While reading the *Front National* guidelines, one verifies that the axis is included in the party's foreign policy program⁶⁷¹. Thus it should not be surprising that the *Front National* had received roughly 9.4 million euros as a loan from a Kremlin-sponsored bank, as the mass media spread.

Nonetheless, a Paris-Berlin axis – an alliance with world impact, as quoted by Parvulesco⁶⁷² – did never happen in history. Paris dominating Berlin with Bonaparte's victory, or Berlin dominating Paris with Hitler's victory *hardly* could be seen as "alliance". Furthermore, Haushofer has never asserted a Paris-Berlin axis. The franco-german alliance started only with the project of the European Community (Paris-Bonn) that has been persisting until today (Paris-Berlin). Yet, why does the geopolitical approach matter for an ideology that distorts concepts and theories? What matters to Neo-Eurasianism is captivating Europe as a bloc to join Russia⁶⁷³. The scenario of the EU falling apart would damage the adhesion of Europe as a bloc to Russia.

Map 11 Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis⁶⁷⁴



⁶⁷⁰ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 204-208.

⁶⁷¹ Front National, 'Notre politique étrangère,' last modified May, 2016, Front National, <http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/politique-etrangere/notre-politique-etrangere/>

⁶⁷² Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 193-195.

⁶⁷³ As Dugin recently did in his show criticizing the U.S. general Breedlove and suggesting that it would be better for Europe to choose Russia instead of the USA. – Alexander Dugin, 'Dugin's guideline – Philip Breedloves,' last modified March, 2016, Katehon, <http://katehon.com/directives/dugins-guideline-philip-breedlove>

⁶⁷⁴ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 225.

Dugin's plans of both (i) the Eurasian integration and (ii) the foundation of 'great spaces' and bilateral alliances, include absorptions, disintegrations, and engagements. The paradigmatic absorption case is Finland, which Dugin aims to see integrated into Eurasia⁶⁷⁵. Furthermore, the countries between Germany and Russia would end to represent a *cordon sanitaire* between the two "empires"⁶⁷⁶. In respect to disintegration, Dugin expressed ideas about the 'geopolitical decomposition of Ukraine'⁶⁷⁷.

Observing the political reality, it is not surprising to confirm that former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer stated that 'Russia is highly militarily involved in Ukraine', that 'Russia wants [a strong] sphere of influence,' and that 'Russia does not want Ukrainian success in democratic reforms, due to the possible implications that may stimulate Russian public opinion to copy it'⁶⁷⁸. In regard to Ukraine, still, in philosophical terms, (Neo-)Eurasianism rejected the idea that Russia is the continuation of Kievan Rus' as a whole. It is interesting to infer then that the political consequence from the premise should be that Russia has little *philosophical legitimacy* to expand in the territory, even less on the western part. Yet, it is not this time that Neo-Eurasianist project will follow a coherent line.

Map 12 Ukraine's disintegration tendencies⁶⁷⁹



⁶⁷⁵ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 316-318.

⁶⁷⁶ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 369-371.

⁶⁷⁷ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 377-383.

⁶⁷⁸ Steven Pifer, 'Russia-Ukraine: What's Next,' public lecture by the Director of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, Prague Centre for Transatlantic Relations, 19th October 2015.

⁶⁷⁹ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 378.

On the disintegration pathway, China was also contemplated by Dugin's strategic plan. Dugin recognized a Chinese continental threat to Siberia⁶⁸⁰. With Russia's fragmentation, China would be in condition to occupy the Heartland, becoming a Land power and a Sea power, as Brazilian scholar Mello noted⁶⁸¹.

So, while stating that China has never been a threat to the U.S.A. on the Pacific Ocean (only Japan has been)⁶⁸², Parvulesco excluded China from the Eurasian project⁶⁸³. Like Dugin⁶⁸⁴, also Parvulesco admitted the fragmentation of the country; Parvulesco conceived a divisive line in two parts (the Northern one to be integrated into Eurasia⁶⁸⁵). Such ideas conflict with H₄, but the issue at this specific point is rhetoric and not material [cf. Subchapter 9.2.].

After Moscow-Teheran, Moscow-New Delhi axis is the most important axis of integration in the East, as Dugin informed. Nevertheless, that did not prevent Dugin from planning the fragmentation of India into a new confederation⁶⁸⁶ (mirroring the intentions towards China).

Finally, concerning the engagements, Afghanistan and Pakistan appear associated with the creation of an Islamic confederation loyal to Moscow and Teheran⁶⁸⁷. Shanghai Cooperation Organization plays a key role in this.

In the Islamic sphere, Moscow-Ankara axis comes next. Turkey should engage with Russia and Iran, Dugin argued⁶⁸⁸. Traditional Islam, Sufism, Shiism and Orthodox Christianity should join against Catholicism, Protestantism, and U.S.-sponsored radical Islamism⁶⁸⁹; *ergo* the importance of Iran and Syria for Russian foreign policy. In fact, if Dugin has been cautious dealing with islamic threats inside Russia, Dugin has not been having any problem supporting more aggressive islamist policies on the international chessboard – the revolutionary dialectics [cf. Subchapter 9.2.].

⁶⁸⁰ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris: Avatar, 2006), 27.

⁶⁸¹ Leonel Itaussu Almeida Mello, *Quem tem medo da Geopolítica?* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1999), 186-187.

⁶⁸² Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 37.

⁶⁸³ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 345-354.

⁶⁸⁴ Александр Дугин, *Основы Геополитики - Геополитическое будущее России* (Москва: Арктогея, 2000), 359-363.

⁶⁸⁵ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 352.

⁶⁸⁶ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 49-50.

⁶⁸⁷ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 49.

⁶⁸⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 50.

⁶⁸⁹ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 118.

The case of Dugin's support to Turkey, which has been pursuing dubious relations with the Islamic State, is paradigmatic:

Dugin 'supported rapprochement between Turkey and Russia and for that reason met with some of the Ergenekon suspects, Workers' Party (İP) leader Doğu Perinçek and other Turkish nationalists included -- because they supported the Eurasia idea and platform'. 'They had an anti-American stance,' Dugin affirmed.

'Anti-Americans want to ensure rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. In our meetings, they constantly mentioned their efforts to change the pro-Atlantic view prevalent in Turkey. Despite that, they did not have much information or knowledge about Russia. They simply wanted to secure support from countries other than the US. However, I have a broader vision of the Eurasian movement.'

'I think that Turkey should be the most important strategic partner of Russia in the Middle East,' Dugin noted⁶⁹⁰.

Therefore, Eurasian '...temporary allies (Islamists, Latin American anti-colonialists, neo-socialists and «independentistas» and so on)'⁶⁹¹ are notorious. Dugin revealed to neutralize those alliances later on – in the line of leninist-gramscian dialectic.

As for Third World countries, Russia should stimulate integration projects among them, under powers allied with Russia, Dugin clarified⁶⁹². Here comes the time to introduce Brazil, São Paulo Forum and Latin America integration in the topic.

⁶⁹⁰ Faruk Akkan and Yaşar Niyazbaev, 'I support neo-Eurasianism, not Ergenekon,' says Dugin,' *Today's Zaman*, October 29, 2008, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-157238-i-support-neo-eurasianism-not-ergenekon-says-dugin.html>

Furthermore, since the failed coup attempt on the 15th July 2016, Dugin has been even more strongly engaged with Turkish Eurasianists, supporting Erdogan's purges (which opened space to be filled by Eurasianista, probably) and urging Turkey to leave NATO and to approach Russia for military cooperation (Moscow-Ankara Axis controlling the Black Sea) – Molly McKew, 'Putin's Sinister Role in the Failed Turkish Coup,' last modified July, 2016, The Washington Free Beacon, <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/putins-sinister-role-failed-turkish-coup/> and Katehon Think Tank, 'Dugin's guideline: coup d' état in Turkey,' last modified July, 2016, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R-ovPBx5BU8>

⁶⁹¹ Alexandr Dugin, '[R1] Dugin,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

⁶⁹² Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l'eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 28.

So, what about the relevance of Brazil for the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan? In fact, this question constitutes a real gap in the literature that this thesis proposes to fulfill.

Before the debate between Dugin and Carvalho, which took place in 2011, one cannot find main references from Dugin, or from the Neo-Eurasianist movement in general, to Brazil or even to Latin America. Therefore, it might be argued that the incorporation of the region in the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan has been recent.

Nevertheless, Russia's – and before Russia the Soviet bloc's – interest in Brazil dates back in time, and this topic has not been properly analyzed in the literature as well.

Several former intelligence agents from the Soviet bloc exposed USSR's influence in Brazil.

Pacepa, a former *Securitate* three-star general [Romanian communist secret police], confessed that “*Teologia da Libertação*” [Liberation theology] was originated directly from Khrushchev's goal of attaining influence over Latin America. This means that for reaching that goal, the KGB elaborated the plan of “*Teologia da Libertação*” that pursued communist infiltration in Brazil's Catholic Church, destroying true Catholic doctrine in its way⁶⁹³.

Former StB operative [*Státní bezpečnosti* – Czechoslovak communist secret police] Ladislav Bittman⁶⁹⁴ – who like Pacepa, defected to the U.S.A. – admitted in his book that, in February 1964, StB was responsible for creating fake documents, released in Brazilian mass media, stating that the U.S.A. was preparing an intervention in Brazil, and for that many CIA, FBI, DOD agents were already displayed in the country⁶⁹⁵: pure disinformation.

⁶⁹³ Ion Mihai Pacepa, ‘Ex-espião da União Soviética: Nós criamos a Teologia da Libertação,’ last modified May, 2015, Acidigital, <http://www.acidigital.com/noticias/ex-espiao-da-uniao-sovietica-nos-criamos-a-teologia-da-libertacao-28919/>

⁶⁹⁴ Ladislav Bittman was the same agent who was involved in the 1964 disinformation operation [*Operation Neptune*], forging fake nazi documentation, planting that documentation on the bottom of Black and Devil's Lakes in southern Czechoslovakia, and then recovering it publically in order to harm the image of the West, particularly Federal Republic of Germany's, fomenting anti-nazi hysteria and creating internal problems in the free World. This operation even made some people, whose names were mentioned in the fake documents, to commit suicide – Bittman confessed these crimes on an interview: Fdfrankify, ‘Larry Bittman BBC Interview 1990,’ last modified December 2012, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sszmFjMGfws>

⁶⁹⁵ Ladislav Bittman, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation – An Insider's View* (Washington D.C.: Pergamon, 1985). Fdfrankify, ‘Larry Bittman Interview 2009,’ last modified December, 2012, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTPIgmFa6ys>

Mauro Abranches has been studying documentation at The Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes in Prague and uncovered that StB *TORO operation* launched in Brazil against the U.S. ambassador Thomas Clifton Mann (1912-1999) fabricated facts and falsified documents, spreading them into Brazilian mass media. Abranches proved from the documents that roughly 31 operations [*Aktivní Opatření*] were launched in Brazil by StB/KGB⁶⁹⁶, confirming Bittman's explanations. Nevertheless, until now and against all empirical data, the version that 1964 political disturbance in Brazil was caused by the U.S.A. remains solid in leftist Brazilian mass media and Academia [cf. Chapter 8].

Furthermore, in the documentary 'Soviet Subversion of the Free World Press', former KGB agent Yuri Bezmenov⁶⁹⁷ – who like Pacepa and Bittman also defected to North America (in his case to Canada) – explained in detail the techniques for ideological brainwashing used on foreign diplomats, journalists, poets, intellectuals, editors, resident or visiting Moscow⁶⁹⁸, thus providing even more support to the previous descriptions.

From this short raid, the researcher infers that Russia/USSR was perfectly aware of Brazil's potential as a target.

Coming back to the present and to Neo-Eurasianism, one can observe the continuation of the pattern of Russia's interest in Brazil.

In his debate with Carvalho, Dugin even compared Brazil with Russia as culturally mixed countries with a particular identity, "metaphorically both are Eurasian countries". The objective is then revealed – stimuli for increasing the degradation of relations between Brazil with the U.S.A., which Dugin called 'independence'⁶⁹⁹.

⁶⁹⁶ Leandro Magalhães, 'O Brasil nos Arquivos Soviéticos de Espionagem (áudio melhorado),' last modified June, 2014, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLIb0H_3ljU

For other StB operations in Brazil *vide*: Leandro Magalhães, 'O Brasil nos arquivos da STB "Dalibor, a louça e a amizade",' last modified October, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r9LpFNq3llc>

Vide also: Mauro Abranches and Vladimír Petrilák, 'Arquivos do Serviço Secreto do Bloco Soviético no Brasil,' last modified May, 2016, Cepol24 http://www.cepol24.pl/stb_bra.html

⁶⁹⁷ Morgan Freeman, 'A KGB revela como espionou o Brasil,' last modified April, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-YSbbiiCTk>

⁶⁹⁸ The same professional classes that have been influenced in Brazil [cf. Chapter 8.]. For example, among many, there is the case of a Brazilian journalist recruited by the KGB *vide*: ABI, 'Entrevista — Ancelmo Gois', last modified August, 2009, ABI, <http://www.abi.org.br/entrevista-ancelmo-gois/2/>

⁶⁹⁹ Alexandr Dugin, 'Dugin's Conclusion,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, July 5, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/07/dugins-conclusion.html>

From this premise, raises the question: if Brazil has a specific identity as Dugin (correctly) said, how can then be Brazil merged in a Latin American *Großraum* without damaging this identity, which Neo-Eurasianism states aiming to protect? The answer is obvious: the priority is certainly not Brazil's identity, but the construction of a South American 'greater space' that can be instrumentalized by the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan. The text will insist in this argument in the next chapters.

Dugin prepared a mental terrain for planting his seeds:

'As far as I understand, Brazilian society and Brazilian culture are not fully Western and individualistic. (...) the main features of Brazilian cultural (critical) attitude towards USA. (...) Being critical in front of USA and the Western civilization as a whole, I find a lot of very charming (Eurasian) features in the South and Central American societies.'

'It seems that Latin America is more and more inclined to choose the alternative approaching the Eurasian and Arab camps. (...)'⁷⁰⁰

Neo-Eurasianist think-tank Katehon declared that Brazil's 'geopolitical balance is 70% Eurasianist, and 30% Atlanticist'⁷⁰¹. Although there is no information about which methodology is used to get that result, all the quotes converge in the single mentioned modality of action: the unification of Latin America into a single bloc.

If doubts resist, one may confirm in other of Dugin's writings: he gave a direct advice for 'the integration of Latin American countries into Central and South American Great Spaces...' ⁷⁰², and identified Latin America in general as a *Großraum*, a *Greater Space* ⁷⁰³. Naturally, this is a mistake in terms of analysis in political science, since Brazil, contrary to the rest of Latin American countries, is a Portuguese-speaking country, thus with a different culture. However, to Dugin that is a non-important detail in the whole strategic plan.

⁷⁰⁰ Alexandr Dugin, '[R1] Dugin,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

⁷⁰¹ Katehon, 'Brazil,' last modified May, 2016, Katehon, <http://granews.info/state/brazil>

⁷⁰² Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 75.

⁷⁰³ Alexandr Dugin, 'The Long Path: An Interview With Alexander Dugin,' last modified May, 2016, Open Revolt, <https://openrevolt.info/2014/05/17/alexander-dugin-interview/>
Nicolas Laos, *The Metaphysics of World Order – a Synthesis of Philosophy, Theology, and Politics* (Eugene: Pickwick, 2015), 160.

Whereas, on the one hand, Dugin promised Latin America to U.S. control (Monroe doctrine) [cf. map 8], on the other hand, Dugin asserts that Brazilians should fight against the U.S.A. It is the revolutionary dialectics at work [cf. Section 9.2.3].

Bringing Parvulesco to the analysis, because he also formulated plans concerning the region under study, Latin America – Parvulesco called it, not incorrectly, *Roman America* – can be a GATEWAY [*tête de pont*] [cf. APPENDIX 2] to the Eurasian Project against the U.S.A., in the same way that China – said Parvulesco – is a GATEWAY to the *Great Eurasian continent* in favor of the U.S.A.⁷⁰⁴ In this way, the *use* (in the leninist-gramscian sense) of South America by the Eurasian project is highly favored by the Latin America integration – Parvulesco admitted it openly, revealing the unity in the Neo-Eurasianist modalities of action⁷⁰⁵.

If, in terms of political reality, Brazil has been buying military equipment from Russia – like aerospace defense equipment⁷⁰⁶ – under an agreement signed in 2008 (in Lula's time in office), and further political connections (BRICS, special talks, etc.) – that is not surprising as well.

‘So the national States lack the vision, and movements lack sufficient infrastructure to put their ideas in practice’ – Dugin prescribed⁷⁰⁷.

In Latin America, the integration process, which is so valuable to Neo-Eurasianism, has a directive body: *São Paulo Forum* [cf. Subchapter 8.2].

Summing up, Brazil has not been ignored by Neo-Eurasianism. On the contrary, since at least 2011, Dugin has been elaborating on the importance of Brazil and Latin America in his strategic plans. The role of Meridionalism [cf. Chapter 7] and the conduct of politics in South America are both two instruments that Neo-Eurasianism can use, in order to achieve its mission.

⁷⁰⁴ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 285.

⁷⁰⁵ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 286-288.

⁷⁰⁶ Lyuba Lulko, ‘Rússia criaria o sistema da defesa aeroespacial do Brasil,’ last modified February, 2013, Pravda, <http://port.pravda.ru/russa/05-02-2013/34261-sistemaaero-0/>
The matter can be also linked to the adhesion of Brazil to the Russian space-based satellite navigation system GLONASS – The Moscow Times, ‘Brazil and Russia Boost Space Cooperation With New Glonass Station,’ last modified September, 2015, <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/brazil-and-russia-boost-space-cooperation-with-new-glonass-station-49594>

⁷⁰⁷ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

The *Phase 2* is ended by (2.4) sectoral politics. Much could be explained at this level, but for the sake of shortness of the text, only two aspects must be highlighted, for their connection to geopolitical factors.

Firstly, Neo-Eurasianism, in the quality of a totalitarian ideology, provides a program for all human dimensions: from housing to health, passing by culture, religion, finance, and of course politics and economy.

Secondly, the subject of police/secret service state, the agent *par excellence* of Neo-Eurasianism, a topic that will be recaptured below [cf. Section 9.2.3]. Meantime, if doubts about the totalitarian and police-oppressive-state character of Neo-Eurasianism persist, Dugin's idea that the new Eurasian *élites* need to rotate from 'parallel hierarchies' an *Oprichnina* [опричнина] – that means to praise the formation of another secret service or a secret police body – may be bore in mind⁷⁰⁸.

4.2.4. Logical reasoning of Neo-Eurasianism as ideology and its incompatibility with geopolitical studies

It is believed that this PART II accomplished successfully the task of demonstrating Neo-Eurasianism as a non- scientific approach.

Despite the fact that Dugin elaborated his reasoning with concepts and techniques, sometimes even quoted accurate geopolitical studies' results, his approach has endured as non-scientific namely because: (a) Dugin is committed to political purposes through spreading ideological propaganda; (b) the mysticist and eschatological dimension is far from being verifiable by the scientific method.

Concerning the issue (a), as Laruelle noted, for Dugin geopolitics needs to 'serve the state in which it is elaborated'⁷⁰⁹. This is a major mistake in the context of geopolitical studies as a scientific discipline (Couto e Silva made the same confusion [cf. Chapter 6]). In order to characterize a work as a geopolitical study, there can be no intents for shaping politics: on the one hand, there is the analysis of political actions and, on the other hand, there is ideology and the propaganda speech with the objective of justifying political actions. Ideology is incompatible with science. Science cannot

⁷⁰⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 183 – 187.

⁷⁰⁹ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 116.

hide arguments, perverting the study of the reality in the name of interests to be pursued. As Solovyev noted, Russian geopolitics is more a vocation than a science⁷¹⁰.

On the issue (b) while dissertating about ‘geopolitics of the Sacred’ any text loses all scientific respectability⁷¹¹. Another most flagrant aspect that denounces Dugin’s anti-geopolitical approach is his mistake of preaching geography as a determinant, while geopolitical studies are grounded in possibilism. Furthermore, within a literary environment in arts or poetry, the terms ‘Eternal Rome’ ‘Eternal Carthago’ have their beauty. Manichean vision may in those contexts be admitted and appreciated. However, science does not admit this kind of abusive considerations. Even less an eschatological dimension in which the good and the evil fight. It is not even a matter whether is *true* or not, but the problem is, instead, the place and the milieu in which this sort of considerations are included in – certainly, not in the scientific domain.

Therefore, Dugin captured geopolitical concepts and theories, imposed them as a necessity, and created a strategic plan for achieving objectives. The enemy was identified – the U.S.A. and the West – and then the destruction of their *hegemony* in the World was crystallized as a mission. For Dugin, Russia’s security depends on the expansion of Russian borders towards the West and the South. So the main modality of action – a new global anti-U.S. [anti-West par extension] alliance – needs to help in that expansion too.

If:

‘While the USA has grown even more powerful since then, and is today the most powerful state in the system, it is not a global hegemon.’⁷¹²

to Dugin that does not matter. Dugin accused the Americans of building a New World Order⁷¹³, so it was his final analysis of the external environment. It is noteworthy to remind, however, that it is Dugin who designed a plan for a New World Order, meanwhile. To Dugin, that New World Order should impose ways of life, promote

⁷¹⁰ Eduard G. Solovyev, ‘Geopolitics in Russia – science or vocation?’ *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 37, no 1 (March 2004).

⁷¹¹ Alexander Dugin, ‘Existential geopolitics of Carlo Terracciano by Alexander Dugin,’ last modified September, 2012, Open Revolt, <https://openrevolt.info/2012/09/19/existential-geopolitics-of-carlo-terracciano-by-alexander-dugin/>

⁷¹² John Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism,’ last modified July, 2006, University of Chicago, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf>, 83

⁷¹³ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission – an Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 48.

oppressive control ending freedoms, and destroying countries. A typical totalitarian plan, as Man was already allowed to observe in the past, is back.

In his conclusion with the debate with Carvalho (that will be studied in PART V), Dugin did not discuss Carvalho's academic hypotheses and empirical tests. Dugin took his last chance (in that opportunity) to make an appeal for joining political forces against the U.S.A.

Insisting in that point raises the question: does Neo-Eurasianism have an impact on politics? Much empirical evidence was presented in this PART II, adding to the state of the art [cf. INTRODUCTION]. So the answer to the question is unambiguously positive. Hence, the question is not stated in terms: *how much does Neo-Eurasianism influence Russian politics?*⁷¹⁴ – but simpler than that. The impact of Neo-Eurasianism on Russian politics is observed in 'state bodies and intellectual life' as Laruelle argued⁷¹⁵. If

'Neo-Eurasianism has not become the Kremlin's main ideology, (but) it has found its place within the new patriotic doctrine...'⁷¹⁶

Already in 2001, journalist Yasmann has called the attention to Dugin's influence on Russian Politics, and Dugin's purpose of giving full support to Putin⁷¹⁷.

Consequently, if Dugin accused Putin of treason for not having supported (even more) the rebels in the eastern Ukraine⁷¹⁸, or if Dugin and his group 'felt let down' by the Kremlin⁷¹⁹, those events should be merely seen as the typical functioning of the revolutionary dialectics [cf. Subchapter 9.2.]. However, Dugin as 'Putin's brain'⁷²⁰,

⁷¹⁴ That question is launched as incentive for another research.

⁷¹⁵ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 6.

⁷¹⁶ Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 222.

⁷¹⁷ Victor Yasmann, 'Rise of the Eurasians,' last modified April 30, 2001, *Radio Free Europe*, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1344707.html>

⁷¹⁸ Kathrin Hille, 'Vladimir Putin balances patriotism with politics in Ukraine,' *Financial Times*, June 22, 2014.

⁷¹⁹ Paul Sonner, 'Russian Nationalists Feel Let Down by Kremlin, Again,' last modified July, 2014, *The Wall Street Journal*, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-nationalists-feel-let-down-by-kremlin-again-1404510139>

⁷²⁰ Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, 'Putin's Brain. Alexander Dugin and the Philosophy Behind Putin's Invasion of Crimea,' last modified March, 2014, *Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putins-brain>

‘Dugin as Russia’s chief ideological mastermind’⁷²¹, in the line of Laruelle, are overstatements, a hypothesis that cannot be confirmed for the moment.

Neo-Eurasianism also extends its influence outside the sphere of Russian politics. As the text mentioned above, Neo-Eurasianism has connections to the French *Front National* party, to the Hungarian *Fidesz*, Italian *Forza Nuova* party, and Greek far-left government officials⁷²². In this context, Czech Security Information Service stated that the Kremlin is pursuing *ipsis litteris* a new ‘Komintern’ of pro-Kremlin decision-makers in Europe, and that Neo-Eurasianism provides the ideological guideline for that project⁷²³. This fact does nothing less but strengthens a full justification for the pertinence of this study as a whole.

Dugin endures his political action. His current YouTube program – ‘Dugin’s guideline’ – serves the purposes of spreading Neo-Eurasianist ideological views, although Dugin is identified as “the [*sic*] political scientist, sociologist”⁷²⁴.

Concluding PART II, the rejection of H₁ and the confirmation of H₂ can be expressed. Moreover, PART II also provided convincing evidence for confirming H₄. In spite of this, H₄ will be ultimately tested in PART V.

Although so much about Neo-Eurasianism was left to analyze (Philosophy, Culture, History, etc.), under a monography guideline, only Neo-Eurasianist aspects interrelated to geopolitical studies’ factors were covered, with the ultimate goal of testing the hypotheses.

As for this thesis’ main research question – *Are Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism somehow related to a New World Order?* – it can now have a thoughtful contribution: Neo-Eurasianism does not constitute a geopolitical study that tries to explain political reality, but it seeks to spread an ideology instead that, while using geopolitical concepts and methods, targets indeed to shape a *New World Order*, which naturally would grant to Russia a position of a major power, if not the world power.

⁷²¹ The Agenda with Steve Paikin, ‘Michael Millerman: Who is Alexander Dugin?’ last modified December 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFI6fg8NITg>

⁷²² Meike Dülffer, Carsten Luther and Zacharias Zacharakis, ‘Caught in the web of the Russian ideologues,’ last modified February, 2015, Die Zeit Online, <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-02/russia-greece-connection-alexander-dugin-konstantin-malofeev-panos-kammeno>

⁷²³ Security Information Service (BIS), ‘Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2014,’ last modified September, 2015, Security Information Service (BIS), <https://www.bis.cz/vyrocnizpravaEN6c8d.html?ArticleID=1096>

Dmitry Babic, ‘Western-financed 'Revolution Ltd' is today's Comintern,’ last modified September, 2015, Strategic Culture Foundation, <https://www.sott.net/article/302537-Western-financed-Revolution-Ltd-is-todays-Comintern>

⁷²⁴ Example: Katehon Think Tank, ‘Dugin's Guideline - EU Summit,’ last modified February 2016, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyPmlc0BX8M>

PART III
BRAZILIAN SCHOOL OF GEOPOLITICS
AND MERIDIONALISM –
CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS AND
BRAZIL’S ‘GEO-IDEOLOGY’

Key points

Description of Brazil’s geohistorical roots. Discussion of the foundations of Brazilian School of Geopolitics and their assessment from the geopolitical studies’ point of view. The crucial debate Continentalization *versus* Maritimization. Characterization of Meridionalism as (1) ideology and (2) strategic plan (mission, objectives, modalities of action, sectoral policies). Assessment of Meridionalism from the geopolitical studies’ point of view. Introduction to the issue of the usefulness of Meridionalism to Neo-Eurasianism.

Chapter 5

The Lusosphere through the geohistorical method⁷²⁵

⁷²⁵ This chapter includes the findings of a research stay devoted to ‘the Lusophone sphere through the geohistorical method’ at several research institutes in Lisbon. Special thanks to the financial support of the Grant Agency of Charles University in Prague.

‘...[M]as quando olhos que sabem ver
perscrutam todas essas fracções de Nação,
encontram nas consciências, nas instituições,
nos hábitos de vida, no sentimento comum,
que ali é Portugal.’⁷²⁶

António de Oliveira Salazar

5.1. The geohistorical role of the Portuguese Territory

One of the biggest advantages in using the geopolitical approach to study International Relations is about going beyond appearances towards the essence of the reality [cf. Subchapter 1.2]. This thesis’ main research question put together two ideologies that are apparently disconnected. However, whilst using the geopolitical approach, many links between those two ideologies are discovered.

In this context, PART III mirrors PART II to a certain degree since the key subquestions at stake are “what is Meridionalism?” and “which kind of world order directives does Meridionalism propose?” The comparative method is then applied with more prominence in this PART to answer the subquestions “are there any shared ideas or objectives between Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism?” and “if there are any, what connections can be identified?” The objective C. is at stake [cf. INTRODUCTION, Structure & Objectives]: to investigate the historical roots and assumptions of Brazilian School of Geopolitics as background in order to analyze and explain Meridionalism (its directives, and goals concerning the international chessboard).

This PART III is then conceived like a pyramid: from a broad basis that describes the Lusosphere as a whole, its traditions on the historical path [cf. Chapter 5], to Meridionalism strictly delimited as Brazilian ‘geo-ideology’ [cf. Chapter 7]. In between, the analysis of Brazilian School of Geopolitics connects those two chapters [cf. Chapter 6]. In fact, the most significant contribution that connected Brazilian School of Geopolitics to the study of Portuguese traditions was Therezinha de Castro’s work, which also influenced Meridionalism.

⁷²⁶ transl. ‘but when mindful eyes examine all those parts of the Nation [overseas] they find out that in the consciences, in the institutions, in the ways of life, in the common sentiment, that over there is Portugal’ – António de Oliveira Salazar, speech at the *União Nacional* 4th Party Congress broadcasted by radio, 30th May 1956. Also available at: António de Oliveira Salazar, *Apontamento sobre a Situação Internacional* (Lisboa: Secretariado Nacional da Informação, 1956).

Although the main research question comprises Meridionalism, there is a set of questions that can be raised: what is exactly the point in involving *Brazil* into an analysis primarily devoted to Neo-Eurasianism? What does that South American country have to justify such attention in such research?

Primo, as it was pointed out [cf. Section 4.2.3.], Dugin has been trying to include Brazil within the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan – as once, during the Cold War, USSR did. The interest of Russia in Brazil is then very much alive, and Dugin traveled to Brazil to address in several conferences, reinforcing his strategic plan.

Secundo Dugin's opponent in the academic debate that will be analyzed in PART V is a Brazilian scholar. That created curiosity to answer some questions – which kind of geohistorical roots may one find in respect to Brazil? What was created in Brazil in terms of *geopolitical approach*? If there is something like a “Brazilian School of Geopolitics”, is it vanished already (like it happened in Germany after World War II)? Or if it is not vanished, what are its ideas? Is there any purpose, any dynamic or objectives that are actually linked to a possible ‘international revolutionary movement’ [cf. H₄]? This PART III will look for the answers to those questions.

The topic of this Chapter 5 is, *per se*, too broad indeed. It is not possible to cover its acceptability in terms of literature review. Therefore, at this point, the research will focus only on a single objective: to provide a fundamental set of ideas about the role of the roots of the Lusosphere concerning Brazil. To accomplish that, it is required to elaborate briefly on the history of Portugal.

In this way, three sections will be organized: the section 5.1.1. *Portugal and the role of its Maritime Tradition* is devoted to the historical tradition of the country in the maneuver of “*Expansão e Manutenção do Império*” [Expansion and Defense of the Empire] between the 15th and the 20th centuries, also explaining important notions for understanding the next chapters; the section 5.1.2. *Portugal Ultramarino* [an old Portuguese expression to designate its territories overseas]⁷²⁷ has the objective of explaining the application of the concept of pluricontinentalism (which was only eradicated in Portugal after the regime change with the 1974-marxist coup); and the section 5.1.3. *Lusotropicalism* focus on an anthropological theory with geographical

⁷²⁷ The expression was used in the constitutional reform of 1951– Diário da República, ‘Diário do Governo,’ last modified July, 2015, Diário da República, <https://dre.pt/application/dir/pdf1sdip/1951/06/11701/04070412.pdf>

implications formulated by Brazilian scholar Gilberto Freyre, who then tried to give a comprehensive explanation for the question: “why was the Portuguese colonization different from all the others?”

5.1.1. Portugal and the role of its Maritime Tradition

The *Expansão Ultramarina* [Portuguese discoveries] has started as a military training with the religious purpose of proselytizing foreign peoples to Christianity. If Zurara’s chronic explained it as such, back in the 15th century, current studies would confirm it⁷²⁸. Therefore, the Marxist single argument of “economic interests” or “commerce purposes” has been disproved. In fact, empirical facts from the history *per se* reinforce the military-religious argument. For example: after the conquest of Ceuta by the Portuguese in 1415, it turned out that the city was not a trading position any longer, and still the Portuguese maintained armed forces there and continued to supply, in order to not lose the control over that “*praça*” [military basis].

Among the facts: the geographical position [geopolitical factor #2], the lack of resources and space (considering the demographic evolution) [geopolitical factors #1 and #4], the cultural experience and know-how in respect to sailing, added to the noble’s eagerness for conquest of territory [geopolitical factors #5 and #6] one may find the variety of geopolitical studies’ factors, which go far beyond the poor Marxist explanation of the bourgeois interest in making money with trade.

Also considering the factors above-mentioned, the Portuguese Dominican friar Fernando Oliveira (1507-1581) was able to formulating, in the 16th century, geostrategic principles for the control of the sea lanes and the role of bases [geopolitical factor #3], highlighting the practice of naval [just] warfare, using the know-how of the Renaissance period⁷²⁹. That happened after the creation of the first Thalassocratic World Empire as GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN – which the Portuguese historian Saraiva designated as ‘the Atlantic solution’⁷³⁰ – in terms of applied geopolitics. It is noteworthy to remind that

⁷²⁸ José Hermano Saraiva, *História Concisa de Portugal* (Mem Martins: Europa-América, 2007), 126.

João José Brandão Ferreira, *Em Nome da Pátria – Portugal, o Ultramar e a Guerra Justa* (Alfragide: Livros d’Hoje, 2009), 322.

⁷²⁹ Pe. Fernando Oliveira, *Arte da Guerra do Mar – Estratégia e Guerra Naval no Tempo dos Descobrimentos* (Lisboa: Edições 70, 2008).

⁷³⁰ José Hermano Saraiva, *História Concisa de Portugal* (Mem Martins: Europa-América, 2007), 123-151.

that sea power took place long before Mahan systematized THALASSOPOLITICS in the late 19th century.

The concept of *pluricontinentalism* is linked to the idea of Portugal as SEA POWER (in the sense of *élites'* perceptions (RAUMSINN) and GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN). This concept describes the characteristic of a nation that is spread by many different areas or continents. Independently from the status that Salazar attributed to the concept in the 20th century, the reality is that Portugal expanded over Africa, Asia and America, having created, in the course of 500 years, a discontinued state concerning both the geographical location and space. Nonetheless, it constituted a unitary territory in political terms. In respect to tradition, consequently, it is important to underline that the Portuguese territory cannot be reduced to what it is today: the Portuguese mainland in the Iberian Peninsula, Açores and Madeira islands.

In fact, the political unity of the vast territory of the former Portuguese lands is easy to assess in the course of history. Several notes on this matter: (1) since the 16th century, the title of the King of Portugal comprised: *Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves d'Aquém e d'Além-Mar e Senhor da Guiné, da Conquista, Navegação, Comércio, da Etiópia, Arábia, Pérsia e Índia*⁷³¹; (2) in the 17th century, Padre António Vieira (1608-1697), a Portuguese priest who travelled frequently from the portuguese territory in America (Brazil) to continental Iberian Portugal wrote extensively about the Portuguese Kingdom as a Universal construction; (3) D. Luíz da Cunha (1662-1749), an 18th century-Portuguese diplomat and statesman, advised to move the capital of the Kingdom from Portugal to Brazil (to Rio de Janeiro)⁷³²; and (4) from 1807 onwards, in fact, due to the pressure caused by the French invasion in Iberian-continental Portugal by Bonaparte's troops, the creation of *Reino Unido de Portugal, Brasil e dos Algarves*⁷³³ occurred, together with the transfer of the *élites* to Brazil, and Rio de Janeiro became the capital of the Kingdom from that year until 1821.

Besides the concept of *pluricontinentalism*, it is possible to identify another geopolitical concept that was widely used in the Portuguese applied geopolitics through the centuries: the *elastic conception of borders*. Whereas the borders in the mainland Portugal have remained stable since Alcanizes Treaty in 1297, examples of flexibility of borders are countless in the Portuguese overseas: queens getting married and taking

⁷³¹ transl. 'King of Portugal and Algarves from this and the other side of the Sea, Lord of the Guinea and the Conquest, Navigation, and Commerce in Ethiopia, Arabian, Persia and India.'

⁷³² D. Luiz da Cunha, *Instruções Políticas* (Lisboa: Abílio Diniz Silva, 2001).

⁷³³ transl. 'United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarves.'

territory in their marriage portions (D. Catarina de Bragança took Tangier and Mumbai with her while getting married to Charles II of England); relocation of cities (Mazagão was transferred from the North of Africa to Brazil); or – more common – just accepting diplomatic agreements (the lost of *Sacramento* and *Ceuta*) or military defeat (the lost of *Ceilão* in Sri Lanka conquered by the Netherlands). On the other hand, wars and treaties allowed to expand other territories (e.g. Madrid Treaty in 1750 and the enlargement of Brazil).

Map 13 The Treaty of Tordesilhas⁷³⁴

Figura 1 - Tratado de Tordesilhas



Source: <https://geo06371.wordpress.com/2013/06/page/12/>

As it was sustained [cf. Section 1.2.3 and Subchapter 2.1], geopolitical studies do not comprise matters of territory only, but identity issues too. In this matter [geopolitical factor #5], the characterization of the Portuguese tradition cannot disregard the word *miscegenation*. In fact, tracing the roots of this feature, the Portuguese nation started the miscegenation back in the 16th century, when D. Afonso de Albuquerque, Duke of Goa (1453-1515), encouraged marriage between Portuguese people and local peoples. The result of this century-long procedure is a multiracial nation. Lusotropicalism also insisted in this subject, as the study will demonstrate below.

The last relevant aspect to be stressed in this section is that, chronologically, not all the parts of the Portuguese territory received the same focus uninterruptedly. In very general terms, Asia received the greatest power effort during the 16th century, America

⁷³⁴ With this treaty, Portugal and Spain divided the world in two parts. The oceans around Mackinder's *World Island* fell under the Portuguese control.

(Brazil) during the 18th century, and Africa during the 19th century (the latter certainly due to Brazil's independence in 1822)⁷³⁵.

Therefore, many particular characteristics allow creating the label of a 'specificity of Portuguese colonization'⁷³⁶, that produced a 500-years heritage that shapes geography, identity, and politics in the Portuguese speaking countries until today. In that line, also the 20th-century Salazar's Portugal had an important role.

5.1.2. Portugal Ultramarino⁷³⁷

António de Oliveira Salazar (1889-1970) was "*Presidente do Conselho*" of Portugal [equivalent to Prime-Minister] from 1932 till 1968, and embodied the heritage of Portugal as *pluricontinental* and *multiracial* state⁷³⁸.

The article 1 of 1933 Constitution⁷³⁹ – a document prepared under Salazar's direct supervision – described the territory of Portugal: (a) in Europe: Mainland, Açores and Madeira; (b) in Western Africa: Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, São João Baptista de Ajudá, Cabinda and Angola; (c) in Eastern Africa: Moçambique; (d) in Asia: State of India and Macau; (e) in Oceania: East Timor.

Therefore, until 1974, the Portuguese territory stretched throughout all the continents on the Globe, with the exceptions of America⁷⁴⁰ and Antarctica.

⁷³⁵ For more information, *vide* e.g. Manuel Múrias, *Brève Histoire de la Colonisation Portugaise* (Lisboa: Ática, 1941).

⁷³⁶ João José Brandão Ferreira, *Em Nome da Pátria – Portugal, o Ultramar e a Guerra Justa* (Alfragide: Livros d'Hoje, 2009), 321-330.

⁷³⁷ For a basic reading on this topic *vide* Vasco Silvério Marques and Aníbal Mesquita Borges, *Portugal – do Minho a Timor* (Lisboa: Nova Veja, 2008).

⁷³⁸ For readings about Salazar's ideas and policies *vide*:

Alberto Franco Nogueira, *Salazar* (Porto, Livraria Civilização, 1985);

Christine Garnier, *Vacances avec Salazar* (Paris: Grasset, 1952);

Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar – Biografia Política* (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 2010);

Jaime Nogueira Pinto, *António de Oliveira Salazar - O outro retrato* (Lisboa: A Esfera dos Livros, 2007);

Marcello Caetano, *Minhas memórias de Salazar* (Lisboa: Verbo, 1977).

⁷³⁹ Parlamento, 'Constituição de 1933,' last modified July, 2015, Parlamento, <http://www.parlamento.pt/Parlamento/Documents/CRP-1933.pdf>

⁷⁴⁰ Since Brazil was declared independent by the Portuguese Prince D. Pedro on the 7th September 1822.

Map 14 'Portugal is not a small country'



Source: <http://www.manuelbotelho.com/eng/index.php?work/2009--inventory--matchbox/>

The territorial integrity of Portugal was to be assured, not only because it is a basic state's principle, but also because to Salazar the survival and independence of the mainland were only possible to be sustained together with the preservation of the territorial unity⁷⁴¹. Posterior events confirmed Salazar's idea, since between the territorial fragmentation of Portugal in 1974-5 (with exception of Açores, Madeira, Macau and East Timor) and the request for becoming a member of the European Economic Community (on the 28th of March 1977) it was less than two years only. That means that the aggregation of Portugal to a "broader area" (in order to guarantee the survival of the state) was not extinguished, but merely substituted.

The rigid conception of borders that Salazar believed in was attached to the idea of territorial unity⁷⁴². As it was above-described, the tradition of Portuguese applied geopolitics is, however, the *elastic conception of borders*, which requires giving up what cannot be maintained against the systemic constraints and supported by the relative material state potential, to be granted other gains. Speculating on this matter, that misperception of Salazar might have been one of the leading causes so that the

⁷⁴¹ In 1933, Salazar stated that Portugal was a single legal and political unity and that economic union among the parts of the Empire should follow – António de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas (1928-1934) Vol. I*. (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1935), 235.

⁷⁴² '... we do not sell, we do not give up, we do not rent, we do not share our settlements...' – António de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas (1935-1937) Vol. II* (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1937), 264. And also: Constitution from 1933, Article 2 – Parlamento, 'Constituição de 1933,' last modified July, 2015, Parlamento, <http://www.parlamento.pt/Parlamento/Documents/CRP-1933.pdf>

process for the territorial desintegration of the country would have started later on (this constitutes a topic complex enough for another research)⁷⁴³.

As for the multiracial aspect, Salazar endured the tradition: Portugal was considered a multiracial nation, in which racial discrimination had no place⁷⁴⁴, based both on the ideas of (i) ‘*missão civilizadora*’⁷⁴⁵ and (ii) that Portuguese nationalism has been built up with ‘friendly cooperation with other peoples’⁷⁴⁶.

5.1.3. Lusotropicalism

Lusotropicalism constitutes a bond between Portugal and its former provinces overseas, a territorial integrity that lasted for 500 years. The bond is particularly special concerning Brazil, taking into account that the author of the mentioned thesis was the Brazilian scholar Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987).

Freyre made clear that Portugal occupies the core of his anthropological theory, which tries to explain Brazil’s origins and comprises findings that are linked to the geopolitical studies’ object too. *Lusotropicalism* sustains that, back in the 15th century, Portugal started in creating a ‘new kind of civilization’ [*sic*], in which was accomplished a symbiosis between the European culture and the tropical environment⁷⁴⁷. In that process – moved neither by economic nor political reasons, but by innate cultural capacities – racial and cultural assimilation were the key features, an argument that Freyre developed in his *opus magnum: Casa Grande & Senzala*⁷⁴⁸.

⁷⁴³ In 1961, the Republic of India attacked the Portuguese State of India. In the same year, *guerrilha* movement ecloded in Angola. Although the Portuguese Army was practically victorious in the War in Africa (*vide* João José Brandão Ferreira, *Em Nome da Pátria – Portugal, o Ultramar e a Guerra Justa* (Alfragide: Livros d’Hoje, 2009)) with the leftist military *coup d’état* on the 25th April 1974, the territorial integrity of Portugal was dissolved and the new regime granted, one by one, independence to all Portuguese provinces. The last province that was *de facto* separated from Portugal was Macau in 1999. East Timor is officially independent since 2002 but from Indonesian occupation.

⁷⁴⁴ António de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas (1943-1950) Vol. IV* (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1951), 283.

⁷⁴⁵ António de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas (1928-1934) Vol. I.* (Coimbra:Coimbra Editora, 1935), 237, 335.

Article 2 in *Acto Colonial* – Parlamento, ‘Constituição de 1933,’ last modified July, 2015, Parlamento, <http://www.parlamento.pt/Parlamento/Documents/CRP-1933.pdf>

⁷⁴⁶ António de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas (1928-1934) Vol. I.* (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1935), 334.

⁷⁴⁷ Gilberto Freyre, ‘Integração portuguesa nos trópicos,’ in *Uma política transnacional de cultura para o Brasil de hoje*, ed. Gilberto Freyre (Minas Gerais: Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1960), 69.

⁷⁴⁸ Gilberto Freyre, *Casa-Grande & Senzala* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1998).

If the word ‘civilization’ would seem exaggerated, when substituted by the word *culture*, the idea appears to correspond to the essence of the reality.

‘...[S]e politicamente Portugal é hoje uma nação separada do Brasil que é a sua projeção no Trópico americano, sob aspecto cultural os dois têm sido há mais de um século partes igualmente vivas da mesma realidade lusotropical, ainda em pleno desenvolvimento’⁷⁴⁹.

Within Brazilian School of Geopolitics, this *Lusotropicalist* approach connecting Portugal to Brazil was also studied by Castro:

‘... no Sul da América, a unidade centralizadora de Portugal criava o Brasil. Aqui a faixa litorânea de 2 800 000 km², delimitada por Tordesilhas, onde Salvador e Rio de Janeiro desempenharam, sucessivamente, o papel de capital, constitui-se o núcleo geohistórico brasileiro’⁷⁵⁰.

Yet, Castro did not confine her studies to Portuguese-Brazilian relations in the period of Portuguese expansion, in which Brazil was discovered. Castro moved forward, establishing an original association between the foundations of Portugal in terms of topology⁷⁵¹ (which occurred in the Middle Ages) with Brazil’s territorial appraisal:

‘Toda a origem, pois, do Estado Brasileiro, encontra suas raízes remotas no *Condado Portucalense*, entre o Douro e o Minho, núcleo geohistórico de Portugal, de onde partiram os cristãos dirigidos pela Dinastia de Borgonha, para a formação do Estado que se manteve atlântico, sem atingir o Mediterrâneo’⁷⁵².

⁷⁴⁹ transl. ‘If Portugal is currently a separated nation from Brazil in political terms – and Brazil is Portugal’s projection in the American Tropic – with respect to the cultural sphere, both Portugal and Brazil have been, for more than a century, two living equal parts of the same lusotropical reality, which is still developing’ – Gilberto Freyre, *O Luso e o Trópico* (Lisboa: Comissão Executiva das Comemorações do V Centenário da Morte do Infante D. Henrique, 1961), 88.

⁷⁵⁰ transl. ‘In South America, Portugal’s centralized power created Brazil. Here, on the territorial belt of 2 800 000 sq km between the coastline and the line delimited by the Treaty of Tordesilhas, in which Salvador [da Bahia] and Rio de Janeiro were once capitals, it is constituted Brazil’s geohistorical nucleus.’ – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 45. *Vide* map 13 (the yellow part).

⁷⁵¹ The foundation of Portugal as independent state (deeply rooted in the miracle of Ourique (*IHSV*)) took place in the beginning of the 12th century.

⁷⁵² transl. ‘The origin of the Brazilian state finds its remote roots in the County of Portugal, between Douro and Minho [rivers], the geohistorical nucleus of Portugal, from which Christians took off for the formation of the state under the dynasty of Borgonha, a state that remained an Atlantic one, without reaching the Mediterranean’ – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 45.

Through process tracing technique it is possible to infer that André Martin has been repeating that idea, claiming that Meridionalism too accepts the importance of the 12th-century origins of Portugal in the explanations of Brazil's geopolitical dynamics⁷⁵³. Naming such ancestor traditions of Portugal, and aiming to change the *status quo* of the South Hemisphere as 'zone of impotence' (thus ideologically motivated), Martin sustained that, if in the past peoples of the European periphery (Portuguese and Spanish peoples) started a new phasis in the World History in terms of balance of power; now peoples of World periphery (the Southern Hemisphere) should follow the example of the former and change the balance of powers again⁷⁵⁴.

However, before explaining Meridionalism, it is necessary (a) to briefly mention CPLP as the political heir of the former Portuguese territories overseas [cf. Subchapter 5.2]; and (b) to describe and analyze Brazilian School of Geopolitics' assumptions [cf. Chapter 6].

⁷⁵³ SimposioPolitica, '3º Simpósio Nacional de Geografia Política. Profº Dr. André Roberto Martin (USP),' last modified December, 2013, YouTube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dm8cVCtbObQ>
Alexandr Dugin, 'Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>
Millennivm, 'O Meridionalismo Geopolítico - Palestra do André Martin no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro,' last modified December, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oABdxQGLG0>

⁷⁵⁴ Alexandr Dugin, 'Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

‘Encarecer a progressiva afirmação internacional
do conjunto dos Países de Língua Portuguesa
que constituem um espaço geograficamente descontínuo
mas identificado pelo idioma comum’⁷⁵⁵

CPLP Constitutive Declaration

5.2. CPLP and the Lusosphere

After having examined briefly the geohistorical role of the Portuguese Territory this question follows logically: what is left from 500 years of territorial unity in terms of international politics and foreign policy? The answer is given by the creation of an international organization that has virtually no impact on the international politics.

The *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* [the Community of Portuguese Language Countries] was created in 1996 with political, diplomatic, business and cultural purposes, among others. With a series of institutions, from a Council of Heads of State and Government, Executive Secretary to a Council of Ministers, the results of such international organization have been minor until now.

Nonetheless, the potential does exist: 10 742 000 sq km of land spread in four continents: America, Europe, Africa and Asia, mainly located in the South Hemisphere⁷⁵⁶, which Meridionalism puts its tonic in [cf. Chapter 7.].

With respect to applied geopolitics, Freyre’s proposal of Brazil’s leadership of a ‘federation of Portuguese language countries’⁷⁵⁷, or even the constitution of a ‘Lusophone Bloc’⁷⁵⁸ seem to be only ideas with no political relevance.

Part of the reasons that explain such circumstances and options can certainly be found both in (i) the analysis of Brazilian School of Geopolitics’ ideas and prescriptions, among which “continentalization guideline” is one of the most relevant [cf. Chapter 6]; and (ii) in the analysis of Brazilian *élites*’ GEOMISGUIDANCE and Brazil’s GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN [cf. Chapter 8].

⁷⁵⁵ transl. ‘to enhance international projection of the group of Portuguese Language Countries that constitute a discontinued space in geographical terms, but identified by its common language’ – CPLP, ‘Declaração Constitutiva,’ last modified August 2015, CPLP, <http://www.cplp.org/id-3869.aspx>

⁷⁵⁶ CPLP, ‘Estados Membros,’ last modified August 2015, CPLP, <http://www.cplp.org/id-2597.aspx>

⁷⁵⁷ Gilberto Freyre, *Uma política transnacional de cultura para o Brasil de hoje* (Belo Horizonte, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1960), 59.

⁷⁵⁸ Nuno Morgado, ‘Portugal, Russia and a conceivable Lusophone block – a geopolitical opportunity’ *Maria Scientia* no. 6 (Summer 2013): 14-15.

Map 15 CPLP Member-states



<http://cplpescolas.com/images/themes-images/cplp/map.png>

Chapter 6

Brazilian School of Geopolitics⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁹ Both this chapter and the following one derive from the author's research stay at *Universidade de São Paulo*, Department of Geography. The author is grateful to Prof. André Martin for his time, to the staff of FFLCH library, to Danilo Rogério Sousa, and to the Charles University Mobility Fund's financial support.

‘The development of the vast potentialities of South America might have a decisive influence upon the system.’⁷⁶⁰

Halford Mackinder

6.1. Classic authors in Brazilian School of Geopolitics

During the 20th century – and still in the 21st century – Brazil, like Germany during the 20s and 30s, also welcomed theoretic-practical creations and formulations in the domain of geopolitics.

The aim of this chapter is to describe and to explain the premises of the main authors of Brazilian School of Geopolitics⁷⁶¹: Mário Travassos, Golbery do Couto e Silva, Carlos de Meira Mattos and Therezinha de Castro. The influences that they received will be also analyzed, together with their originality, goals, and inconsistencies – all this from the geopolitical studies’ point of view. Therefore, the approach is innovative, and it will bring new results to the Academia.

Although the literature about Brazilian School of Geopolitics remains relatively rare in other languages than Portuguese⁷⁶², perhaps the most significant result from this and the next subchapter is the analysis of the object from the geopolitical studies’ theoretical and methodological viewpoint indeed [cf. Section 1.2.3.]. That task aims to pave the way to Meridionalism as well, *i.e.* revealing the kind of ideas that existed *a priori* to that ideology and strategic plan, thus contextualizing it.

As for the organization of the body of text – and in a different way of the analysis of the roots of Neo-Eurasianism [cf. Section 4.2.2] – the structure of this chapter cannot be organized by geopolitical factors and topics [cf. Section 1.2.3] due to the existence of a multiplicity of authors that would complicate the understanding of

⁷⁶⁰ Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History,’ *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, no. 4, (1904): 436.

⁷⁶¹ Therefore, other less relevant names will remain marginal to the study. For example: Corrêa – Paulo Henrique da Rocha Corrêa, *O Brasil e as Guianas* (São Paulo: Cantanduva, 1965); his disciple Rodrigues – Lysias Rodrigues, *Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Militar, 1947); and Ricardo – Cassiano Ricardo, *Marcha para oeste: a influência da ‘bandeira’ na formação social e política do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1942

⁷⁶² *E.g.* Phillip Kelly, Lewis Tambs, Thual and Chauprade. Another contribution was given by Lundgren – Kenneth S. Lundgren ‘Brazil’s National Defense Strategy: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century’ (M.A. diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 1993).

premises. In this way, it was perceived to be more useful an approach by each author individually. Hence the geopolitical factors and themes are included transversely.

Predecessors

Before the analysis of the mentioned authors, however, two Brazilian great minds, which had deep impact on Brazilian School of Geopolitics as a whole, must be introduced: Everardo Backheuser and Delgado de Carvalho⁷⁶³.

Everardo Backheuser (1879-1951)

Backheuser, a German intellect, was a demanding scholar concerning method. He carefully delimited fields, even criticizing Haushofer's conceptions, due to what Backheuser called as a "too broad coverage". The problem in social sciences is exactly that the reality is too much integrated and interconnected. Consequently, making some separations can be extremely harmful. For example, on the contrary of neoclassical geopolitics that includes identity as a key factor [geopolitical factor # 5], Backheuser tried to isolate geopolitics from identity issues, moving them to 'sociopolitics' analysis⁷⁶⁴. The geopolitical scholar can then ask: how to study political territory ignoring or postponing the study about those who live/ have interest into a particular space [cf. Subchapters 1.1 & 2.1]?

Concerning the definition of geopolitics, and despite being considered that that definition is incorrect⁷⁶⁵, Backheuser's definition influenced practically all Brazilian School of Geopolitics' authors till Meira Mattos. Nevertheless, Backheuser formulated another definition that could be accepted in geopolitical studies:

'Geopolítica – estudo dos fenómenos políticos influenciados pelo solo, ou seja pelo país

⁷⁶³ Although this study does not ignore the existence of Elyseo de Carvalho's work – Elyseo de Carvalho, *O factor geográfico na política brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: S.A. Monitor Marcantil, 1921) – the short impact that Elyseo de Carvalho had on Brazilian School of Geopolitics justifies the non-inclusion of an analysis of his ideas in these pages.

⁷⁶⁴ Everardo Backheuser, *Curso de Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948), 40, 70. Economy was also to be excluded – Everardo Backheuser, 'Geopolítica e Geografia Política,' *Revista Brasileira de Geografia* (January-March 1942):30.

⁷⁶⁵ 'Geopolítica é a política feita em decorrência das condições geográficas'. Transl. 'Geopolitics is the conduct of politics taking into account the geographical conditions' – Everardo Backheuser, 'Geopolítica e Geografia Política,' *Revista Brasileira de Geografia* (January-March 1942): 22 or Uraci Castro Bonfim, 'Curso de Política, Estratégia e Alta Administração do Exército', *Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército* (2005): 24.

organizado (*Reich*), subdividida em: Topopolítica, Morfopolítica e Fisiopolítica,⁷⁶⁶

In this definition is only missing a direct reference to the vital aspect of “international relations”.

In the context of positive contributions, furthermore, Backheuser’s ideas about borders are extremely useful and interesting. His approach matched with the German School of Geopolitics’ conceptions of elastic borders, stating that borders reflect power pressures⁷⁶⁷.

For his high-level quality work, Backheuser was the only Brazilian scholar who published papers in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* headed by Haushofer in person.

Nevertheless, it is kept in mind that Backheuser was a strict disciple of Kjellén, considering the state as a living organism⁷⁶⁸ and incorporating Kjellén’s «States’ General Theory». Those theoretical positions were criticized elsewhere and rejected due to their non-scientific aspects⁷⁶⁹.

Finally, Backheuser also insisted in the topic ‘*marcha para oeste*’⁷⁷⁰, an expression quoted numerous times in Brazilian School of Geopolitics’ works. That expression became vastly related with “regional integration”, connected to what is considered as misguided applied geopolitics [cf. Subchapter 6.2].

Delgado de Carvalho (1884-1980)

Carlos Delgado de Carvalho focused on: position, the coefficient of pressure, space, borders and circulation, topics abundantly explored by Brazilian School of Geopolitics, as it will be explained.

⁷⁶⁶ transl. ‘Geopolitics – the study of political phenomena influenced by the soil, *i.e.* by the organized country (*Reich*), which is subdivided into: Topopolitics, Morphopolitics and Physiopolitics’ – Everardo Backheuser, *Curso de Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948), 39. In order to clarify what exactly *Reich* is about: ‘...political territory’, in which the central authority has control *de facto* – Everardo Backheuser, *Curso de Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948), 23.

⁷⁶⁷ Everardo Backheuser, *Curso de Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948), 121.

About the quotient of pressure *vide*: Everardo Backheuser, *Curso de Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948), 150- 155.

⁷⁶⁸ Everardo Backheuser, *Curso de Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948), 72 .

⁷⁶⁹ Nuno Morgado, ‘Новое открытие теллуократической геополитики в Центральной Европе (К постановке проблемы научного подхода к немецкой школе геополитики),’ *Political Science* (INION – Russian Academy of Sciences), no. 2 (Summer-Autumn 2014).

⁷⁷⁰ Transl. ‘march to the west’ – Everardo Backheuser, *Curso de Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948), 262.

With respect to methodology, Carvalho argued that the classification of a country (e.g. “maritimity”) cannot result only from a mathematical formula, but a qualitative analysis should be used: is the sea frozen? Are straits dominated by hostile powers? In the case of a large coastline is there sufficient access? Thus, several questions need to be raised, allowing valid conclusions⁷⁷¹. In terms of classification of Brazil, Carvalho was clear beyond any doubt, affirming that Brazil is essentially a maritime country⁷⁷². This assumption was ignored by many authors in Brazilian School of Geopolitics in general, and by Mattos in particular.

At last, concerning Brazil’s most important ally, Carvalho pointed out the U.S.A., something that was followed by the majority of Brazilian School of Geopolitics’ authors. In his book about diplomatic history, Carvalho remembered that, originally, the Monroe Doctrine was not conceived to promoting the U.S. hegemony in the region, but solely to guarantee the non-intervention of European countries in the area, thus a non-re-establishment of European colonies in America⁷⁷³.

6.1.1. Mário Travassos (1891 – 1973)

Marshal Travassos’ seminal work is primarily a book in Political Geography, giving also prescriptions in terms of states’ *GRAND STRATEGY* [cf. APPENDIX 2]⁷⁷⁴. Still, and because such prescriptions are not only located at the intra-state level – in fact the most relevant prescription was about an urgent need for establishing a continental system of transports controlled by Brazil – Travassos’ study entered definitely the sphere of geopolitical studies. In fact, one may consider *Projeção Continental do Brasil* as the first book on geopolitics in Brazil.

Travassos’ main argument speculated about the existence of two antagonisms in South America⁷⁷⁵: (1) Opposition of two continental sides: Atlantic vs. Pacific (continental dimension); (2) Opposition of two watersheds: Amazonas vs. Plata (Atlantic coastline dimension).

⁷⁷¹ Delgado de Carvalho, *Relações Internacionais* (São Paulo: Biblioteca do Exército, 1971), 26.

⁷⁷² Delgado de Carvalho, *Relações Internacionais* (São Paulo: Biblioteca do Exército, 1971), 88.

⁷⁷³ Delgado de Carvalho, *História Diplomática do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1959), 287.

⁷⁷⁴ Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935).

⁷⁷⁵ Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 19.

Map 16 Amazon and Plata's watersheds



Source: <http://aguasdobrasil.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/mapa02-763x1024.jpg>

With respect to the first opposition, Travassos vehemently stated that the Atlantic Ocean is the World's most intensive ocean in terms of maritime traffic⁷⁷⁶ (and currently concerning airlines too), whilst South America's coastline to the Pacific Ocean has no major river. In fact, whereas the Atlantic coastline of South America is characterized by rivers, beaches, dynamic commerce and tourism, the Pacific coastline offers practically high mountains only – inhospitable lands almost interrupted only by the Gulf of Guayaquil and Chaco Bay, with relatively large dimension⁷⁷⁷.

Concerning the second opposition, Travassos defended that whereas the mouth of the Amazon river is located right in front of the main lines of maritime traffic, the Plata river can only afford a mouth on second-level sea lanes⁷⁷⁸.

Therefore, in Travassos' approach, the Atlantic coastline and the Amazon river possess advantages over the Pacific coastline and the Plata river. In other words, Brazil is privileged in terms of space and position [geopolitical factors #1 & #2].

⁷⁷⁶ Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 20.

⁷⁷⁷ Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 20-23, 67, 147.

⁷⁷⁸ Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 24, 147-148.

In order to extract benefits from such geographical setting, Travassos devoted all chapter II from part I of his book to the analysis of the rail network in South America. He concluded that the continental railways were massively converging from La Paz, Asunción, and Valparaíso to Buenos Aires. Travassos alerted then that such situation would have to be reversed in favor of Brazil.

In chapter III, Travassos focused on something that would become a central topic for Brazilian School of Geopolitics: the Amazon Basin. While explaining the economic importance of triangle Cochamba⁷⁷⁹/Santa Cruz de la Sierra/Sucre, Travassos suggested strengthening connections between the Amazon basin and Bolivia, as an alternative to the railway from La Paz to Buenos Aires⁷⁸⁰.

In part II, Travassos introduced the concept of ‘*geographical instability*’.

‘Nada oferece maior soma de motivos geradores de inquietação política que a instabilidade geográfica, isto é, a oscilação de certos territórios entre determinadas características que os circundam’...
‘verdadeiros focos de perturbações políticas’⁷⁸¹.

Travassos gave examples of *geographical instability*: (i) Bolivia – located between the geological characteristics of Andes (Chile and Peru) and the watersheds of the Plate and Amazon rivers (Argentina and Brazil); (ii) the region of Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela – a region where the clash of economic and political interests predominates, especially on the Caribbean Sea and Panama Canal; (iii) Uruguay – oscillations between Brazil and Argentina due to Paleozoic formations and quaternary soils, plus the people of Uruguay are similar to “*gaúcho*” [people from southern Brazil], but Plate is the centripetal point, and Uruguay had strong trade relations with Brazil (agriculture and animal husbandry), but it has been depending on Argentine for military purposes⁷⁸².

Travassos analyzed Brazil’s international projection with detail in part III. After describing geographical data [geopolitical factor #1] – Brazil holds 2/3 of all South

⁷⁷⁹ It is pertinente to note that Cochabamba was the place chosen to build up the South American Parliament, one of UNASUL [*Union of South American Nations* in English] institutions.

⁷⁸⁰ Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 46.

⁷⁸¹ transl. ‘Nothing creates more causes for political inquietude than geographical instability, that means, the oscillation of certain territories between determined characteristics that compose their surrounding environments’...‘these are truly centers of political disturbance’ – Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 61.

⁷⁸² Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 62- 78.

America's coastline on the Atlantic, with 7.491 km – Travassos refused geographical determinism explaining that the lack of unity in terms of physical geography may be overcome. Thus, the unity of the country cannot be reduced to the point of view of physical geography exclusively. For that time, this was a very innovative conclusion in the geopolitical studies' terms.

Map 17

Regions of Brasil by Delgado de Carvalho: Amazonic Brazil, sub-equatorial Northeast, Plateaus' East area, and Plata's Brazil⁷⁸³



Despite Delgado de Carvalho's map of Brazil's four "natural regions", Travassos systematized the existence of two "Brazils" only: the '*Amazonic*' Brazil open to the Ocean through the Amazon river as natural waterway; and *Brazil 'Platino'* with artificial ports to guarantee the connection to the Ocean. The *Brasil Longitudinal* would connect both⁷⁸⁴ – an idea to be revisited in Couto e Silva's approach.

Notes on Travassos' study

In Travassos' time (the 1930s) Brazil had a distress with Argentina⁷⁸⁵ – that was Brazil's true opponent. The U.S.A. was considered an ally, as it was by Brazilian School of Geopolitics as a whole.

Circulation and infrastructures [geopolitical factors #3 and #4] constitute the cores in Travassos' studies.

⁷⁸³ Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 112.

⁷⁸⁴ Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 113-118.

⁷⁸⁵ Vide: Marcos A.F. Martins, 'Mário Travassos e Carlos Badia Malagrida: dois modelos geopolíticos sobre a América do Sul' (M.A. diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2011), 146.

As for the definition of “Geopolitics”, Travassos ideas harmonized with *possibilism* as geopolitical studies’ theoretical fundament:

‘Geopolítica é um processo interpretativo dos fatos geográficos, em seus aspectos negativos e positivos, de cuja soma algébrica deve resultar um juízo da situação de um país, no momento considerado, não como um julgamento definitivo fruto de uma predestinação de caráter determinista e, muito menos, de uma forma de selecção coletiva, visando a objetivos políticos nem sempre confessáveis’⁷⁸⁶.

6.1.2. Golbery do Couto e Silva (1911-1987)

General Couto e Silva was a strategist, a supporter of the realist theoretical school in the study of International Relations, and perhaps the member of Brazilian School of Geopolitics with the most exquisite and high-level culture, making abundant references to the roots of the Western Civilization in his texts. His works – written in a dense style, consequently difficult to read – comprised concepts and a methodological approach that are, to a certain extent, synchronized with geopolitical studies: (1) SPACE [RAUM – geopolitical factor #1] – extension, shape, natural regions and sub-regions, central and secondary nucleus, borders (borders of civilization), vital areas, critical areas, economic spaces, cultural, ethnic, linguistic regions⁷⁸⁷; (2) POSITION [LAGE – geopolitical factor #2] – accessibility, level of dependence concerning foreign commerce, proximity/distance of power centers, external pressures, litigation zones, continentality/maritimity, platforms for extension, spheres of influence⁷⁸⁸; and (3) established traffic/ CIRCULATION [geopolitical factor #3] as a feature linking namely space and position⁷⁸⁹.

⁷⁸⁶ transl. ‘Geopolitics is an interpretative method of geographical facts in their positive and negative aspects. From that method will result conclusions about the situation of the country at that particular time; thus, it is not at stake an eternal judgement attached to some deterministic predestination, and even less some way of collective selection, considering discreet political objectives’ – Travassos *apud* Uraci Castro Bonfim, ‘Curso de Política, Estratégia e Alta Administração do Exército’, *Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército* (2005): 24.

⁷⁸⁷ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 34.

⁷⁸⁸ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 35.

⁷⁸⁹ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 35.

Although this approach was very well designed, Couto e Silva was unable to distinguish ‘applied geopolitics’ from ‘geopolitical studies’. He, therefore, included himself on the *classical* geopolitics sphere:

A Geopolítica só vale para aplicação prática se se coaduna com os Objectivos Nacionais⁷⁹⁰;
‘Para nós, a Geopolítica nada mais é que a fundamentação geográfica de linhas de acção políticas, quando não, por iniciativa, a proposição de directrizes políticas formuladas à luz dos fatores geográficos, em particular de uma análise calcada, sobretudo, nos conceitos básicos de *espaço* e *posição*.’⁷⁹¹

These misguided definitions, from the geopolitical studies’ point of view, reveal a huge influence from Kjellén (through Backheuser). The problem is that, within those ideas, it becomes impossible to distinguish a scientific discipline (geopolitical studies) from the conduct of politics connected to the geographical setting (applied geopolitics) [cf. fig. 1]. Besides, from this misperceptions, Couto e Silva moved forward to conclude that “geopolitics” can only be national [*Geopolítica Nacional*] automatically denying the universality of the geopolitical approach. Therefore, Couto e Silva cannot be included as an author of geopolitical studies/ neoclassical geopolitics, since his definition of geopolitics is, in fact, the definition of applied geopolitics merely⁷⁹². Geopolitical studies can never be a “justification”, but only a serious examination committed to the search for the essence of the reality, an independent verification of data; thus with no links to any political or ideological purposes, whatever they may be.

Furthermore, even what Couto e Silva considered to be, in fact, ‘applied geopolitics’, is subject to be discussed as well. What he designated by ‘*manobra*

⁷⁹⁰ transl. ‘Geopolitics is only worthy to be applied if it is compatible with National Objectives’ – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 33.

⁷⁹¹ transl. ‘To us, Geopolitics is nothing but the geographical validation of political action, if it is not, by its own initiative, the suggestion of political guidelines formulated under the influence of geographical factors, which are formulated based on concepts of *space* and *position* before anything else’ – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 64.

⁷⁹² The systematization of diagrams about what Couto e Silva designated as ‘geopolitical analysis’ – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 36-38 – or the model that Couto e Silva himself created also for ‘geopolitical research’ – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 259-266 – are, in fact, contributions to Strategic Potential Analysis as first task within Strategic Planning. Thus they are not direct contributions to ‘geopolitical analysis’ *tout court*, because of their more than patent commitment to political objectives.

*geopolítica*⁷⁹³ [geopolitical maneuver] is, in fact, a state's territorial integration plan in the true meaning of the words:

- 1st 'articular o Nordeste ao Sul com o Centro'
- 2nd 'impulsionar a colonização do Nordeste pelo Centro'
- 3rd 'inundar de civilização a Amazônia',⁷⁹⁴;

It is obvious that, to have an impact and shaping International Relations, the state's relative material potential needs to be developed and accumulated [cf. Subchapters 1.2 & 2.1]. Still, such task does not respect to the geopolitical studies' finalities, since geopolitical studies are devoted to analyze relations among international actors, with the focus on precise [geopolitical] factors, so not on the states' *internal* procedures *per se*.

Being certain that Couto e Silva has mixed applied geopolitics, nationalism, bias, defense of national objectives⁷⁹⁵ – a Brazilian Haushofer he may be fairly called – that perspective had a direct impact on how Couto e Silva looked at the international chessboard.

The study will now proceed in rising, analyzing Couto e Silva's formulations of 'Brazilian geopolitical perspective' from (i) national, (ii) regional, and (iii) world level. (i) National: 'Brazilian «empire»'; (ii) regional: 'continental setting'; and (iii) world: 'threatening and tumultuous world overseas'⁷⁹⁶.

(i) Firstly, Couto e Silva – in a much more accurate analysis than General Mattos as one will verify – was capable of demonstrating that, in terms of continentality/maritimity, Brazil cannot be perceived mainly as a continental country. This assumption can be justified by the fact of Atlantic deep penetration in the territory secured by the Amazon river. The map 18 helps in understanding that reality.

⁷⁹³ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 46.

⁷⁹⁴ transl. 1st 'to articulate the Northeast with the South and with the Center

2nd 'to promote the colonization of the Northeast by the Center

3rd 'to inundate the Amazon area with civilization'

Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 47, 60-61, 92, 131-132; or even more detailed on pages: 137-138.

⁷⁹⁵ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 94-99.

⁷⁹⁶ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 108-131.

Map 18
Brazil's continentality by Couto e Silva⁷⁹⁷



The magnitude of such argument will both influence: (1) directly, Couto e Silva's idea concerning Brazil's position during the Cold War, and it will impact (2) indirectly, on Meridionalist guidelines with respect of urging for the development of naval forces in Brazil [cf. Chapter 7]. In fact, to Couto e Silva, the Ocean is the '*plataforma de manobra*'⁷⁹⁸ – a key idea to be revisited.

(ii) By Couto e Silva's standards, South America is also composed by a 'welding area' that puts the other parts together (number 4). This point recaptured Travassos' argument of '*Amazonic*' Brazil and Brazil '*Platino*'.

Map 19
'Geopolitical division of South America'⁷⁹⁹



⁷⁹⁷ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 48.

⁷⁹⁸ transl. 'platform for maneuver' – Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 92.

⁷⁹⁹ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 88.

(iii) It is at the level of the ‘threatening world’ problem that Couto e Silva laid out the strongest effort in exact geostrategic terms. At Cold War times, Couto e Silva systematized the existence of an ‘*Ocidente democrata e cristão*’ against an ‘*Oriente comunizado e materialista*’⁸⁰⁰. The consequence of such argument was obvious: an alliance – without any hints of subservience from the Brazilian side, Couto e Silva warned – between the U.S.A. and Brazil is essential for the defense of the West⁸⁰¹, attached to the projection of power by Brazil over the South Atlantic.

If it would be possible to resume in one phrase only Couto e Silva’s complex thought regarding Brazilian position in the international constellation of power that would certainly be:

‘O Brasil e a defesa do Ocidente’⁸⁰²;

Couto e Silva, a strategist at the level of classical schools of geopolitics, was familiar with Mackinder and Spykman⁸⁰³. In this way, Couto e Silva was perfectly aware of the ongoing Kennan’s containment strategy at that time.

Map 20

Couto e Silva’s perspective during Cold War Era: the West against the ‘materialist East’⁸⁰⁴



⁸⁰⁰ transl. ‘democratic and Christian West’ ‘communist and materialistic East’ – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 130.

⁸⁰¹ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 49-53, 93.

⁸⁰² transl. ‘Brazil and the defense of the West’ – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 219.

⁸⁰³ Marcos A.F. Martins, ‘Mário Travassos e Carlos Badia Malagrida: dois modelos geopolíticos sobre a América do Sul’ (M.A. diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2011), 16.

⁸⁰⁴ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 188.


Consequently, having alerted to the danger of the Moscow-Beijing axis⁸⁰⁵, – which under the confirmation of H₄ [cf. Chapter 9.2] is currently very strong – Couto e Silva explained (through his analysis based on the triad space/ position/ circulation) that Brazil should keep its strategy attached to the following ideas:

- 1 – ‘É indispensável um núcleo central no território brasileiro’;
- 2 – ‘Nordeste é altamente permeável à vulnerabilidade externa’;
- 3 – ‘no Sul até ao Matogrosso, também é área vulnerável a ataques regionais’;
- 4 – ‘o Atlântico Sul é indispensável à segurança e sobrevivência do Brasil’.⁸⁰⁶

In the same vein, Couto e Silva organized cartographically three interior areas: South and Central America, Africa and Antarctica.

Map 21

‘Interior Areas: South America, Africa and Antarctica’⁸⁰⁷



Couto e Silva stated furthermore that while Antarctica, the U.S.A., Mexico and Canada do not constitute threats to Brazil, Africa is a vulnerable area, and that affects Brazil, indeed⁸⁰⁸.

⁸⁰⁵ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 184.

⁸⁰⁶ transl. 1) a central nucleus within Brazilian territory is absolutely indispensable (for this contributed the foundation of Brasília in 1960);
2) the Northeast region is highly permeable to foreign influence;
3) the South of the territory till Matogrosso is also vulnerable, but to regional attacks;
4) South Atlantic is indispensable to Brazil’s security and survival.

– Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 58-59.

⁸⁰⁷ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 86.

Map 22 South and Central America and Interior and Outer Hemicycles⁸⁰⁹



Notes on Couto e Silva's studies

A solid realist thinker⁸¹⁰, Couto e Silva was powerless, though, to give a direct theoretical contribution to geopolitical studies – as it was given by his contemporary Vicens Vives, whose geohistorical method Couto e Silva used without quoting him properly⁸¹¹.

Not only that opportunity of giving a theoretical contribution to geopolitical studies was unexploited, but also Couto e Silva's support to the idea that a common market in South America demands open circulation on the region, and that Brazil should put effort in such project⁸¹² (– contradicting Couto e Silva's own idea (a *Permanent National Objective*) that Brazil should never, in no circumstances, restraint its sovereignty⁸¹³; plus contradicting Couto e Silva's conclusion that Brazil can be perceived as maritime country as well –) brings to the conclusion that Couto e Silva may be, for that reason, partially hold responsible for setting the bases of the

⁸⁰⁸ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 136.

⁸⁰⁹ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 81.

⁸¹⁰ For example: “Power vacuum attracts others’ greediness”; “states are the main actors in International Relations”; “Great Powers are those who really matter” – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 43, 10, 22.

⁸¹¹ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 65.

⁸¹² Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 135.

⁸¹³ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 74-75.

continentalization guideline that Brazil has been pursuing⁸¹⁴. The study will bring this argument back [cf. Subchapter 6.2.].

For now, General Meira Mattos would have insisted in the same continentalization prescription.

6.1.3. Carlos de Meira Mattos (1913-2007)

General Mattos was the member of Brazilian School of Geopolitics who produced the largest number of books about the subject (a total of six books). Although he is considered by many as the greatest name in regard to the study of geopolitics in South America⁸¹⁵, one can identify several inconsistencies or problems in Mattos' approach.

Despite denominating Haushofer as 'tenebrous'⁸¹⁶, the definition of geopolitics by Mattos is practically the same of German School of Geopolitics' one⁸¹⁷. Conceptually and theoretically this was a frustrating formulation. Still, in his most mature and perhaps best book, Mattos was close to defining *geopolitics* as science⁸¹⁸.

Furthermore, it is considered that Mattos was also misguided when he affirmed that Toynbee's *golden measure* falls neither in possibilism nor determinism⁸¹⁹. Previously [cf. Subchapter 1.2.], it was explained that Toynbee's notion lies on the very

⁸¹⁴ 'Geopolítica de *colaboração continental*' – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 137-138.

⁸¹⁵ Philip Kelly, 'O Pensamento Geopolítico do General Meira Mattos,' in *O General Meira Mattos e a Escola Superior de Guerra*, ed. Escola Superior de Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 2007) 17.

Even a Research Center with Mattos' name was created in Portugal: <http://www.cepen.org/web1/index.php/portal-cepen/pensamento-geo>

⁸¹⁶ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 3.

⁸¹⁷ 'A Geopolítica é a aplicação da política aos espaços geográficos'. Transl. 'geopolitics is applied politics to the geographical setting' – Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), V, 101.

Carlos de Meira Mattos, *A Geopolítica e as projeções do Poder* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1977), 17, 103.

Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 159.

Carlos de Meira Mattos, 'Geopolítica e Modernidade,' in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 151, 155.

⁸¹⁸ Basically stating that geopolitics is a 'systematic knowledge', a 'positive theory' [*sic*] – Carlos de Meira Mattos, 'Geopolítica e Modernidade,' in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 139.

⁸¹⁹ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 5.

substructure of POSSIBILISM as geopolitical studies' theoretical fundament, namely because of *élites*' (and people's) capacities – the foundation of both the geohistorical method, and neoclassical realist theory. Mattos was not bright enough either for clarifying his own theoretical position regarding possibilism and determinism, since while Mattos affirmed '«*geografia é destino*»'⁸²⁰ he then contradicted himself with the statements:

'A façanha humana no planeta é marcada pela luta'⁸²¹; and

'A geografia condiciona, dificulta, sugere, inspira, estimula, enfim apresenta o seu desafio; caberá ao homem responder a esses desafios. Ou responde e os supera, ou não responde e é derrotado'⁸²².

So, either a *destiny* or a *condition*, it is not possible to keep both of them. Eventually one can deduce his position from the idea that if '*homem brasílico*' may overcome difficulties of Brazilian geographical setting, then Mattos was a *possibilist*.

Another logical inconsistency in Mattos' writings respects to the conception of borders. The elastic conception of borders (theorized among others by German School of Geopolitics) was already mentioned, while attached to the realist formula of power struggle. Mattos accepted those ideas, but incoherently he criticized Haushofer's conception of elastic borders and the need of multidisciplinary background that the German General pointed out so that borders may be drawn⁸²³.

Beyond all these problems, maybe the most severe fall back in Brazilian School of Geopolitics that Mattos produced was connected to his conclusions about Brazil's "continentality".

Taking the ground zero, acknowledging that maritime or continental tendencies create interests for either one of the sides, which will inspire policies and strategies⁸²⁴,

⁸²⁰ transl. 'geography is destiny' – Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 6.

⁸²¹ transl. 'human feats in the planet are branded by fight' – Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 8.

⁸²² transl. 'geography offers conditions, difficulties, suggestions, inspirations, stimuli, it presents its challenge ultimately; upon man falls the task of responding to those challenges. Either Man responds and overcomes them, or Man does not respond and is beaten' – Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 12.

⁸²³ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 26.

⁸²⁴ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 144.

mentioning the idea of ‘*áreas interiores de intercâmbio internacional*’ that do not depend on ‘*conexões marítimas*’⁸²⁵, and applying Backheuser’s risky formula⁸²⁶:

$$\text{QC} = \frac{\text{extension of terrestrial borders}}{\text{extension of coastline}}$$

(quotient of
continentality)

Mattos concluded that, although it is a country of mixed continental-maritime type, continentality predominates in Brazil⁸²⁷. Such is the result of crushing history (disregarding the geohistorical method) with a mathematical abstract formula. It is a methodological problem since in the study in social sciences, formulas should only be an instrument among others, not the predominant, or even less the exclusive instrument.

Map 23

Brazilian continentality by Mattos⁸²⁸



For this aspect, Mattos represented a downturn in Brazilian School of Geopolitics, while compared to Couto e Silva, who was able to identify Sea penetration in the ‘*Amazonic*’ Brazil through the Amazon River [cf. map 18]. What Mattos himself called “anti-geopolitics” – politics ignoring the geographical setting – emerged then in his own conclusion⁸²⁹.

⁸²⁵ transl. ‘interior areas of international exchange’ ‘maritime connexions’ – Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 151.

⁸²⁶ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 161.

⁸²⁷ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 21.

⁸²⁸ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 143.


⁸²⁹ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 160.

Besides this misperceptions, the expression ‘*marcha para Oeste*’⁸³⁰, constantly repeated by Mattos, was originally focused on the historical period of Brazil’s territorial reconnaissance. Mattos transferred it into an applied geopolitics’ imperative.

Surprisingly, Mattos was far from ignoring his own country’s history. In his book about power projection⁸³¹, Mattos demonstrated a solid knowledge of the historical roots and the real dimension of maritime connections between Brazil, the [Atlantic] Ocean and Portugal. He expressed concerned about communication lines [geopolitical factor #3], foreign commerce [geopolitical factor #4], military implications [geopolitical factor #6], and the role of Antarctica within the Seapower affairs. Nevertheless, Mattos was incapable of incorporating such relevant and pertinent background in a strict geopolitical study.

Map 24

Geographical setting of Atlantic Ocean from Brazilian perspective⁸³²



In a phrase only, the superior challenge outlined by Mattos concerning the Atlantic⁸³³ was squashed by the political imperative of continentalization/ regional

⁸³⁰ transl. ‘march towards the West’ – Cassiano Ricardo, *Marcha para oeste: a influência da ‘bandeira’ na formação social e política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1942).

⁸³¹ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *A Geopolítica e as projecções do Poder* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1977), 18, 115-124.

Also: Carlos de Meira Mattos, ‘The Strategic Importance of the South Atlantic’, in *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica* ed. Philip Kelly and Jack Child (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988).

⁸³² Carlos de Meira Mattos, *A Geopolítica e as projecções do Poder* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1977), 118.

integration strategy⁸³⁴. That regional integration maneuver has also become the main objective for the socialist movement in South America, crystalized in São Paulo Forum, which is not marginal to Meridionalism too, as it will be explained in detail [cf. Chapter 8.].

While expressing such ideas, this study recognizes, however, the importance of (internal) territorial integration in all its meanings. The issue under the light is that this study perceives Brazil as a maritime country, thus the priority falls upon the relevance of the Sea. Mattos highly neglected these notions.

Making considerations about the Amazon area spread on Brasil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia (a region/ watershed of roughly 7 million sq km (called by Mattos as ‘Pan-Amazônia’)) Mattos contended that ‘continental forces’ (once again) would bring solutions and strategic plans to the region⁸³⁵. Mattos quoted *Marquês de Pombal*⁸³⁶ – the famous 18th-century Portuguese Minister of State (symbol of a thalassocratic empire) – to incoherently insist in the idea (at the same time geoconjunctive and prescriptive idea) of ‘regional integration’⁸³⁷ and ‘spirit of cooperation’⁸³⁸ among neighbor South American countries. Making the whole approach even less intelligible, Mattos added the term *strategy* to the matter⁸³⁹. STRATEGY means a domain in which no cooperation with one’s opponent is possible [cf. APPENDIX 2], the opposite that Mattos had claimed for.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Mattos gave accurate attention to a highly significant geostrategic objective (from which Therezinha de Castro was the main authority): the role of Antarctica and Brazilian claims in that territory. While analyzing Therezinha de Castro’s work, the study will focus on this object again.

⁸³³ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 103.

⁸³⁴ Carlos de Meira Mattos, ‘*Geopolítica e Modernidade*,’ in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 219.

⁸³⁵ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 161.

⁸³⁶ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 63.

⁸³⁷ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 120.

⁸³⁸ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 174.

⁸³⁹ ‘...estratégia continentalista...’ – Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), 174.

Map 25 American Antarctica⁸⁴⁰



Another positive aspect of Mattos' legacy is that, in the line of the best geopolitical studies' tradition, he also integrated his analysis of states' territory based on position [LAGE] [geopolitical factor #2]⁸⁴¹; and while concentrating the attention in the concept of borders, he recommended a particular observation of the 'shape', a feature of the space [RAUM] [geopolitical factor #1]⁸⁴². Mattos studied railways too, as Travassos did, integrating the geopolitical principle of 'traffic/ circulation' [geopolitical factor #3].

Mattos' theoretical basic assumption is, equally, shared with the geopolitical studies' one: independently of the circumstances, space still matters⁸⁴³.

In his last book⁸⁴⁴, Mattos identified that space is becoming artificial, that the speed of transports and that the virtual synchronization of communications would be events with impact on geopolitics⁸⁴⁵ – very wise conclusions valid until today.

⁸⁴⁰ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 68.

⁸⁴¹ - Latitude

- Proximity to the Sea

- Context concerning neighbor countries (pressures, spheres of influence)

- Altitude (mountain, plateau, plain)

Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 18.

⁸⁴² Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 16-18.

⁸⁴³ Carlos de Meira Mattos, 'Geopolítica e Modernidade,' in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 155.

⁸⁴⁴ Carlos de Meira Mattos, 'Geopolítica e Modernidade,' in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 134.

⁸⁴⁵ Mattos also named those factors as key Globalization aspects. Because of such premise, he even considered to designate his book with the title 'Geopolitics and Globalization' – Carlos de Meira Mattos, 'Geopolítica e Modernidade,' in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 135.

Like General Couto e Silva, also General Mattos looked at the Western Civilization knowing what was at stake. The alliance with the U.S.A. was defended as essential⁸⁴⁶. Concerning Russia, Mattos was able to understand the complex power-changing circumstances after the collapse of USSR, pointing out an ‘eurasian center of power’ under Putin’s presidency, moving Russia away from the European culture again⁸⁴⁷.

A patriot⁸⁴⁸ and a realist⁸⁴⁹, in the line of Couto e Silva, Mattos’ greatest contribution to his country – not to geopolitical studies as science – was certainly his promotion of the faith on “Brazil as a Great Power” as a goal to be soon achieved. In his own words:

‘O capitão de 1931 sonhou com um Brasil potência continental. Nós lhe pedimos licença para sonhar agora com um Brasil potência mundial’⁸⁵⁰.

Currently, Meridionalism assumed that goal, trying to prescribe how that purpose may be accomplished, as will be explained in the next chapter [cf. Chapter 7.].

Notes on Mattos’ studies

Summing up his entire perspective, Mattos stated⁸⁵¹: (i) Brazil has enough potential to become a Great Power; (ii) for that, it is required economic and social development⁸⁵²; (iii) within the Project of Development, Amazon is a priority area; (iv) the Project should respect the vocation of Brazilian people and a democratic public lifestyle; (v) Amazonic project should be conducted under international cooperation; (vi) national security cannot be neglected.

⁸⁴⁶ Philip Kelly, ‘*O Pensamento Geopolítico do General Meira Mattos*,’ in *O General Meira Mattos e a Escola Superior de Guerra*, ed. Escola Superior de Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 2007) 19.

⁸⁴⁷ Carlos de Meira Mattos, ‘*Geopolítica e Modernidade*,’ in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 148.

⁸⁴⁸ Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975), 77, 89.

⁸⁴⁹ In several aspects, Mattos may be considered a disciple of Morgenthau – Carlos de Meira Mattos, *A Geopolítica e as projecções do Poder* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1977), 59-63.

⁸⁵⁰ transl. ‘1931’s captain [Travassos] dreamed about Brazil as Regional Power. We now dream about Brazil as World Power’ - Carlos de Meira Mattos, ‘*Geopolítica e Modernidade*,’ in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 194.

⁸⁵¹ Carlos de Meira Mattos, ‘*Geopolítica e Modernidade*,’ in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 206.

⁸⁵² Particularly about modernization and development: Carlos de Meira Mattos, *A Geopolítica e as projecções do Poder* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1977), 53-56.

Thus, not a single word to the Atlantic Ocean in his *résumé* – the focus was the regional integration maneuver and the correspondent continentalization guideline. With Therezinha de Castro, however, the studies' conclusions were entirely different, and the idea of maritimization received a methodological validation.

6.1.4. Therezinha de Castro (1930-2000)

In a group constituted mainly by Armed Forces' officers, Therezinha de Castro was an exception in Brazilian School of Geopolitics, both by her civilian and female condition. Not only because of that, since Castro's work was bright enough to bring contributions for neoclassical geopolitics/geopolitical studies.

Although Castro stated '*... existem tantas geopolíticas quantos sistemas estatais subsistam em confronto*'⁸⁵³, and although she allegedly mentioned geopolitics as the 'geographical conscience of the state'⁸⁵⁴ – as German School of Geopolitics did – the truth is that Castro gave a definition of geopolitics fully compatible with neoclassical geopolitics:

'... a Geopolítica pode ser considerada como um estudo dos precedentes históricos em função dos ambientes geográficos; os resultados destes estudos levam a conclusões práticas, aplicáveis ou não à actualidade.'⁸⁵⁵

Regarding methods, Castro put the geohistorical method under the light, but she underlined that geopolitical studies '*... tem hoje que olhar para a frente e não tanto para trás e calcular o que irá acontecer e não tanto o que aconteceu*'⁸⁵⁶.

With respect to multidisciplinary as well, Castro approached neoclassical geopolitics, since whereas Backheuser defended the elimination of psychos-social or

⁸⁵³ transl. '... there are as many geopolitics [*sic*] as states' systems confronting one another' – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 105.

⁸⁵⁴ Uraci Castro Bonfim, 'Curso de Política, Estratégia e Alta Administração do Exército', *Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército* (2005): 25.

⁸⁵⁵ transl. '...geopolitics may be considered the study about the prior historical context associated with the geographical setting; results from these studies induce to practical conclusions that may be, or maybe not, applied to the current period' – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 23.

⁸⁵⁶ transl. 'must look forward and not so much backwards, they must calculate what is going to happen and not so that much in what already happened' – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 31.

identity issues in geopolitical analysis, Castro devoted two chapters of one of her books studying nation-building and political evolution processes⁸⁵⁷.

Concerning geostrategy, Castro mentioned *en passant* that the field is claimed exclusively by the military as its domain⁸⁵⁸, something that does not make sense, Castro contended, taking into account that even diplomacy may be strategic to isolate, neutralize or even destroy the *other*. Besides, Castro herself admitted that, in our days, the military and diplomats work already interconnected⁸⁵⁹.

In the theoretical realm, other concepts were introduced or cultivated by Castro: (i) the notion of LEBENSRAUM [cf. GLOSSARY] was claimed to be essential in the geohistorical analysis⁸⁶⁰; (ii) Castro distinguished Geopolitics from Political Geography; and (iii) she promoted the use of the concept of ‘GEOPOLITICALLY NEUTRAL AREAS’ [cf. GLOSSARY]⁸⁶¹. Part I of Castro’s book, especially, is an excellent synthesis of concepts of geopolitical studies⁸⁶².

Map 26 Geopolitically neutral area in Brazil⁸⁶³



⁸⁵⁷ Therezinha de Castro, *Nossa América: Geopolítica Comparada* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1994), 147-280.

⁸⁵⁸ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 22.

⁸⁵⁹ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 31.

⁸⁶⁰ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 21.

⁸⁶¹ Therezinha de Castro, *Nossa América: Geopolítica Comparada* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1994), 48.

⁸⁶² Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999).

⁸⁶³ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 55.

Therezinha de Castro explored strategic studies' domain too, since (1) she worried about the military aspects of 'weather war' (natural phenomena pushed against the enemy) and (2) she also presented a methodological list of requirements to characterize a state as a great or emerging power⁸⁶⁴.

Furthermore, Castro theorized about concepts of Strategic Potential, National Power and Security: '*... o conceito de Poder Nacional se relaciona com a própria sobrevivência, ou seja, aquilo que se convencionou definir englobadamente como Segurança*'⁸⁶⁵. Thus, Great Powers only are able to guarantee their own security.

Within her conception of geopolitics, Castro enumerated three kinds of power: 'Real Power', 'Latent Power' and 'Prestige Power'. Whereas 'Real Power' and 'Latent Power' may roughly correspond to the concepts of POWER and POTENTIAL [cf. APPENDIX 2], the concept of 'Prestige Power' is definitely linked to *Image* as foreign policy goal [cf. Subchapter 2.1].

Concerning the geopolitical scholarship about Brazil, Castro identified the strip of land (2 800 000 sq km) between the line of Tordesilhas Treaty and the Atlantic Ocean as Brazil's geohistorical nucleus⁸⁶⁶ [cf. map 13].

Applying the geohistorical method⁸⁶⁷, Castro was able to describe and to explain the historical connections between Portugal and Brazil, and she reached an understanding about their possible consequences in terms of applied geopolitics for the future. This approach puts Castro far above Mattos' misguided interpretations concerning Brazil's continentality.

Castro noticed that:

'com a implantação da capital em Madrid, a
Espanha foi perdendo as características de

⁸⁶⁴ 1 – the country's area must be above 5 million sq km;

2 – territorial continentality

3 – direct and wide access to ocean

4 – strategic natural resources

5 – country's population must be above 100 million inhabitants

6 – demographic density above 10 inhabitants/ sq km

7 – racial homogeneity

apud Uraci Castro Bonfim, 'Curso de Política, Estratégia e Alta Administração do Exército', *Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército* (2005): 77.

⁸⁶⁵ transl. '... the concept of National Power is connected with national survival, i.e. what is commonly accepted to be globally defined as *Security*' – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 29.

⁸⁶⁶ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 45.

⁸⁶⁷ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 45, 46, 53, 74.

*potência marítima, para transformar-se num império continental europeu*⁸⁶⁸.

That path has being roughly repeated in Brazil, not only because of the re-location of the capital in Brasília, but most of all because of the geoconjunctive maneuver of continentalization centralized in São Paulo Forum [cf. Subchapter 6.2. and Chapter 8]. In this respect, one can quote Meira Penna, who noticed that in history there has been no maritime power without a maritime capital⁸⁶⁹.

Despite paying attention to the idea of Pan-America⁸⁷⁰, Castro focused intensively on the Ocean, and she pointed out that Brazil's interests are not even projected on the Atlantic Ocean only, but also on the Indian and Pacific Oceans⁸⁷¹ as well. This constitutes another hint that unveils Castro's influence over Meridionalism [cf. Chapter 7].

In terms of applied geopolitics – therefore within the logic of giving prescriptions – one of the most important of Castro's flags was Brazil's presence in Antarctica. In a paper of 1958⁸⁷², Castro was already defending that Brazil should pay attention to that icy continent and to prepare a *Platz an der Sonne*. Several years later, a book about the same object was released by Castro, studying the confrontation between Brazil and Argentina concerning that area⁸⁷³. Castro sustained, from the very beginning, that the division of Antarctica was a geopolitical [*sic*] (geoconjunctive) and geostrategic problem⁸⁷⁴.

Not only Castro prescribed the foundation of a Brazilian research station in Antarctica, but she also pointed out the necessity of getting an aero-naval basis in Trindade and Martim Vaz archipelago, and – in the line of Brazilian School of Geopolitics – she alerted for the dangers of foreign interests in Amazon area too.

⁸⁶⁸ transl. 'with the implantation of Madrid as capital, Spain lost its seapower characteristics and became an European continental empire.' – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 65.

⁸⁶⁹ José Osvaldo de Meira Penna, *Quando mudam as Capitais* (Brasília: Senado Federal, 2002).

⁸⁷⁰ In this way, the argument that Castro was averse to the U.S.A. is considered rather weak. *Vide*: Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 49.


⁸⁷¹ Therezinha de Castro, *Nossa América: Geopolítica Comparada* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1994), 45.

⁸⁷² Therezinha de Castro, 'Antártica – Assunto do Momento' *Revista do Clube Militar* ano XXX, no. 146 (1958).

⁸⁷³ Therezinha de Castro, *Rumo à Antártica* (Rio de Janeiro: Freitas Bastos, 1976).

⁸⁷⁴ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 87.

Map 27 The position of Brazil at the Atlantic⁸⁷⁵



Notes on Castro's studies

Mattos tried to resume Castro's work in a few phrases⁸⁷⁶: the active presence of Brazil in the Atlantic and, in order to get that, to occupy Antarctica, promoting good relations with the Southern Cone countries. Yet, there is more to be stated.

Although Castro approached neoclassical geopolitics in several aspects, her analysis was heavily constrained by applied geopolitics, especially concerned with the protection of Brazil's national interests – a core line of classical geopolitics; and likewise nothing new in Brazilian School of Geopolitics.

Several flaws or mistakes in Castro's writings cannot be ignored: (i) the persistence in the theoretical analogy between state and living organism⁸⁷⁷ – a metaphor with some literary interest, but with short scientific relevance; (ii) the statement that Haushofer and his "disciples" dominated Hitler's mind⁸⁷⁸ – an idea disproved both by

⁸⁷⁵ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 180.

⁸⁷⁶ Carlos de Meira Mattos, 'Geopolítica e Modernidade,' in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 205.

⁸⁷⁷ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 22, 23, 58.

Therezinha de Castro, *Nossa América: Geopolítica Comparada* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1994), 39.

⁸⁷⁸ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 32.

the literature⁸⁷⁹ and the empirical historical facts; (iii) the statement that Germany provoked two world wars⁸⁸⁰ – when World War I has commenced in the Balkans due to an attack on the Austria-Hungarian Empire; (iv) and the statement that National-Socialism was right-wing and capitalist phenomenon⁸⁸¹ – a bizarre view since even ignoring the word ‘Socialism’, while studying Nazi economic policies the conclusion about the strong state-intervention in the economy is unavoidable, a key dissent feature in terms of capitalist or free market economy.

A last word is granted to possibilism. Whereas Castro pointed out Haushofer’s general determinism⁸⁸², she was fair enough to admit that to the German General, in applied geopolitics, there is 25% of determinism but 75% of heroism⁸⁸³, thus unveiling a link to the roots of the geohistorical method.

⁸⁷⁹ *Vide* references in: Nuno Morgado, ‘Новое открытие теллуократической геополитики в Центральной Европе (К постановке проблемы научного подхода к немецкой школе геополитики),’ *Political Science* (INION – Russian Academy of Sciences), no. 2 (Summer-Autumn 2014): 213.

⁸⁸⁰ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 90.

⁸⁸¹ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 138.

⁸⁸² Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 29.

⁸⁸³ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 36.

‘E só os Estados capacitados para garantir
sua segurança são considerados
grandes potências.’⁸⁸⁴

Therezinha de Castro

6.2. Considerations about Brazilian School of Geopolitics under the geopolitical studies’ framework

6.2.1. Influences

Brazilian School of Geopolitics received an extensive range of influences. Perhaps the greatest influence came from the German School of Geopolitics. Although all Brazilian School of Geopolitics’ members stressed *possibilism* as a crucial theoretical fundament, such influence is evident anyway. In fact, as it was just specified above, German School of Geopolitics, or at least Haushofer, was not fully deterministic either.

Besides that influence, there is multiple references to a large number of authors: Vidal de la Blache⁸⁸⁵, Toynbee⁸⁸⁶, Couto e Silva criticized Vives without quoting him⁸⁸⁷, Castro cited Clausewitz, Haushofer, Kjellén⁸⁸⁸; and naturally other classic authors of the discipline: Travassos was directly influenced by Mackinder⁸⁸⁹, and Couto e Silva was influenced by Spykman⁸⁹⁰.

⁸⁸⁴ transl. ‘ [and] Only the states able to guarantee their own security are considered great powers’ – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 29.

⁸⁸⁵ E.g. Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 9.

⁸⁸⁶ E.g. Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 10.

Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Brasil – Geopolítica e Destino* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1975).

Carlos de Meira Mattos, ‘*Geopolítica e Modernidade*,’ in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 164-166.

⁸⁸⁷ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 65.

⁸⁸⁸ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999).

⁸⁸⁹ Leonel Itaussu Mello, *A Geopolítica do Brasil e a Bacia do Prata* (Manaus: Editora da Universidade do Amazonas, 1997), 55-56.

⁸⁹⁰ Leonel Itaussu Mello, *A Geopolítica do Brasil e a Bacia do Prata* (Manaus: Editora da Universidade do Amazonas, 1997), 106.

In this way: POSSIBILISM⁸⁹¹, MULTIDISCIPLINARITY, POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT, state-centrism, GEOHISTORICAL NUCLEUS, GEOPOLITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY are theoretical fundamentals and concepts that, being part of neoclassical geopolitics, can already be found in Brazilian School of Geopolitics' writings.

In spite of that fact, and regarding the definition of geopolitics, as mentioned, only Backheuser, Travassos and Castro came near to the definition of geopolitical studies as a scientific discipline.

6.2.2. Debate about Brazil's continentalization vs maritimization⁸⁹²

The most interesting discussion in Brazilian School of Geopolitics is, perhaps, the debate with the objective to assess the country's condition as a maritime or a continental state. Outside the traditional clash land/sea, the true importance of such identification relies on its implications in the examination of the RAUMSINN – and here the prominence of this object comes out.

Whereas Castro, to some extent Couto e Silva (through the Amazon River), but most of all Delgado de Carvalho stated that Brazil is a maritime country, Travassos and Mattos emphasized Brazil mainly/only as a continental state.

Travassos, Couto e Silva, Meira Mattos, Castro all of them were, naturally, right in the sense that territorial integration (in Brazil) was – and still is – a vital political aspect. However, in terms of the theoretical domain, such topic *tout court* does not respect to geopolitical studies. That topic concerns specifically to the relative state potential as independent variable solely. What is directly connected to geopolitical studies are the following topics as it is considered in this thesis: (1) the evaluation of the international position of the country in the constellation of powers, (2) analysis of state relative material potential as final result and projected on the international arena, (3) analysis of *élites'* perceptions and (4) *élites'* capacities as intervening variables

⁸⁹¹ Among other authors, Travassos was crystal clear about *possibilism*, stating that Man can overcome some geographical difficulties, *e.g.* with communications' lines – Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 27.

⁸⁹² This topic was analyzed and it is published elsewhere: Nuno Morgado, 'Continentalization versus Maritimization – the debate within Brazilian School of Geopolitics and its political consequences,' in: *3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences & Arts*, SGEM Vienna Hofburg, Book 2 Political Sciences, Law, Finance, Economics & Tourism, Volume I Political Science (Sofia: SGEM International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences & Arts), 89-96.

mediating the two former variables with states' successes or failures on the international domain [cf. Subchapter 2.1]. Consequently, once again, to pay attention to the state's territorial integration makes sense to geopolitical studies only when projected to the international relations. In this context, the discussion of continentality vs maritimism finds its accurate place in geopolitical studies.

Continentalization or TELLUROPOLITICS is certainly an appropriated prescription to apply to Germany or Russia. Hence it was formulated in the past by German School of Geopolitics and is currently spread by Neo-Eurasianism – self-proclaimed as “Russian School of Geopolitics” [cf. Subchapter 4.2.]. Nevertheless, the argument put forward in this study sustains that telluropolitics would be misappropriated to characterize Brazil, in the line of Delgado de Carvalho and Castro. Moreover, even Ratzel, father and root of German School of Geopolitics, identified the Sea and one of the basilar stones for becoming a great power⁸⁹³. Therefore, investigating Brazil's history⁸⁹⁴, looking at Brazil's 7.491 km coastline, observing the presence of one of the largest and widest rivers in the World with a gigantic mouth on the Atlantic Ocean, verifying the geographical position of Brazil, and after these examinations, concluding, at last, that Brazil is a *continental* power would then be considered a misguided analysis.

6.2.3. Bilateral relations between Brazil and other countries

Although Brazil was, in fact, created by Portugal – e.g. Brazil's political and administrative structure, its racial miscegenation, partially its culture – it is rather atypical that Brazilian School of Geopolitics did not devote much attention to Portugal. As said, the exception was Therezinha de Castro.

As for the U.S.A., in spite of Travassos' satire concerning ‘the yankee influence’, all members of Brazilian School of Geopolitics took that North-American country as Brazil's preferential ally, especially in the context of the Cold War and the

⁸⁹³ Friedrich Ratzel, *Das Meer Als Quelle Der Völkergrösse: eine Politische-Geographische Studie* (Charleston: Nabu Press, 2010).

⁸⁹⁴ Perhaps with the exception of Therezinha de Castro, Brazilian School of Geopolitics' members did not pay much attention to the role of Portugal and to Brazilian geohistorical origins, which came from the Atlantic Ocean. Hence, once again, the origin of Brazil's dynamics came from the Ocean.

Communist threat by the Eastern bloc. In the same logic, that would be an alliance to be reaffirmed in the future, in order to face a Moscow-Beijing axis (under H₄).

Bolivia and Paraguay were considered by Travassos and Couto e Silva as centers of dispute between Brazil and Argentina. From that premise, consequently, comes out the importance of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul⁸⁹⁵. Travassos insisted in the point that Bolivia was a crucial country for Brazil, that in Bolivia was located the center of gravity of Brazil⁸⁹⁶ and, therefore, controlling Bolivia (and also Paraguay) would signify that Brazil would rule the South American subcontinent⁸⁹⁷.

Regarding Brazil's historical biggest opponent, at his time, Travassos contended that Argentina was promoting a railway system that was pushing Brazil into a secondary place. In fact, Argentinian rail network would remain as the most complete one in the whole South America, connecting cities in Chile, Bolivia, and Paraguay to Buenos Aires. In the line of Argentina's greatness: (i) Admiral Storni, following Mahan, praised the creation of a great navy (for War and Commerce) able to confront Chile and Brazil⁸⁹⁸; and (ii) Malagrida, following Ratzel and Schmitt's *Großlebensformen*, suggested the creation of a hispanic-american supnation [‘«supernación hispano-americana»’] merging, among others, Spain and Argentina⁸⁹⁹. Travassos, by its side, was influence by Malagrida, Martins sustained⁹⁰⁰.

6.2.4. Brazilian School of Geopolitics – core lines

Travassos' work – the first study in Brazil in the geopolitical sphere – can be systematized in three general postulates, still useful today in geopolitical studies: (1) states tend to control the entire area of a river basin as well as the mouth of the river; (2) states aim to have several accesses to the sea and when is possible to different seas; (3)

⁸⁹⁵ Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 92.

⁸⁹⁶ Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 80.

⁸⁹⁷ Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 70.

⁸⁹⁸ Segundo Rosa Storni, *Interesses Argentinos en el Mar* (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, 1963).

⁸⁹⁹ Carlos Badia Malagrida, *El factor geográfico en la política sudamericana*. Madrid: Instituto Editorial Reus, 1946.

⁹⁰⁰ Marcos A.F. Martins, ‘Mário Travassos e Carlos Badia Malagrida: dois modelos geopolíticos sobre a América do Sul’ (M.A. diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2011).

states tend to dominate “routes” that eventually can be used for state’s power projection. Travassos focused on infrastructures, communication lines, strategic planning and centralization.

Departing from that series of ideas, Brazilian School of Geopolitics concentrated on (i) territorial integration and defense of national territory, (ii) diplomatic cooperation with other south-american countries (especially in the southern cone), and (iii) prestige enlargement in continental terms.

Mattos, the latter classic author, resumed Brazilian School of Geopolitics in the following bullet points⁹⁰¹:

- the idea of empire, considering the dimension of the territory;
- necessity of territorial colonization/integration (state’s potential);
- development and defense of the Amazon region⁹⁰²;
- strategic position of Brazil in the South Atlantic;
- aeronautic development is essential to territorial integration;
- economic, social, scientific and technological development policies are imperative;
- Brazil has sufficient conditions to become a great power;
- Brazil needs strong armed forces in order to dissuade international ambitions;
- competent diplomacy is vital to pursue national aspirations and objectives.

Hence, those points could be systematized on the following objectives: (i) protection of the North; (ii) Brazilian presence in Antarctica; (iii) the idea of South Atlantic Pact⁹⁰³. The danger of an attack, foreign penetration in the Amazon area is recurrent as well⁹⁰⁴.

As for the most recent analysis of Brazilian School of Geopolitics by Brazilian scholars, one can make several comments. Those analyses are, in general, biased by (neo-) Marxist perspectives and did not contribute much to a scientific perspective over the School [*vide* Subchapter 8.2]. For example, Vesentini’s Marxist interpretations that

⁹⁰¹ Carlos de Meira Mattos, ‘*Geopolítica e Modernidade*,’ in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 208.

⁹⁰² It is noteworthy a recent study on this topic by the *Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República*: Gilberto Fernando Gheller, Selma Lúcia de Moura Gonzales, and Laerte Peotta de Mello, ed., *Amazônia e Atlântico Sul : desafios e perspectivas para a defesa no Brasil* (Brasília: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, 2015).

⁹⁰³ Shiguenoli Miyamoto, *Geopolítica e Política Externa Brasileira* (Marília: UNESP, 1987), 7.

⁹⁰⁴ Carlos de Meira Mattos, ‘*Geopolítica e Modernidade*,’ in *Geopolítica Vol. III*, ed. Biblioteca do Exército (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2011), 220.

Marcos A.F. Martins, ‘Mário Travassos e Carlos Badia Malagrida: dois modelos geopolíticos sobre a América do Sul’ (M.A. diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2011), 153.

“geopolitics is a product of the capitalist state” are nothing but intellectual nonsense that, consequently, brought no progress to science⁹⁰⁵. The attempt of this thesis in building up a theoretical and methodological framework of geopolitical studies has obviously nothing to deal with the “capitalist” economic system; neither did *classical* geopolitics.

Costa affirmed, by his side, that there was nothing original in Brazilian School of Geopolitics, only more or less rough adaptations⁹⁰⁶. That certainly does not correspond to the above-mentioned ideas, concepts and approaches [cf. Subchapter 6.1]. Furthermore, currently, Meridionalism contradicts Costa’s statement too.

Costa’s further remarks that Backheuser was confusing, a racist and a conservative⁹⁰⁷, that Travassos just adapted Mackinder, and that Golbery just adapted Spykman would constitute a very poor assessments of those authors’ contributions. Some of those contributions were original, indeed, *e.g.* Travassos concept of ‘geographical instability’ or Castro’s innovative approach. Costa also insisted that, in Brazilian School of Geopolitics, prevailed an obsession with territorial integration, national unity, and internal cohesion. Perhaps Costa was not aware of the relevance of those topics in the domain of states’ relative material potential variable *ergo*, by extension, their relevance in geopolitical analysis. That would be an acceptable justification to explain such harsh criticism.

Both Costa and Vesentini’s works provide an accurate picture that can help explain why the production of studies in the geopolitical sphere almost vanished in Brazil.

Although he was also a Marxist, Mello produced studies that are much more pertinent – studies that analyzed the School more objectively and rationally. He conducted his Ph.D. thesis sustaining the argument that Brazil’s hegemonic position on Plate river basin is also a core of Brazilian School of Geopolitics⁹⁰⁸. Moreover, Mello’s definition of geopolitics is highly relevant too:

‘A *geopolítica* é um ramo autônomo da ciência política que tem por objectivo de estudo as relações e as mútuas interações entre o estado e a

⁹⁰⁵ José William Vesentini, *A Capital da Geopolítica* (São Paulo: editora ática, 1986), 57.

⁹⁰⁶ Wanderlei Messias da Costa, *Geografia Política e Geopolítica – Discursos sobre o Território e o Poder* (São Paulo: Edusp, 1992), 186-187.

⁹⁰⁷ Wanderlei Messias da Costa, *Geografia Política e Geopolítica – Discursos sobre o Território e o Poder* (São Paulo: Edusp, 1992), 196.

⁹⁰⁸ Leonel Itaussu Mello, *A Geopolítica do Brasil e a Bacia do Prata* (Manaus: Editora da Universidade do Amazonas, 1997).

geografia. Esta disciplina possui um acervo de conhecimentos teóricos e empíricos que pode ser utilizado no planejamento da política de segurança de um país no tocante aos seus factores geográficos'⁹⁰⁹.

Although such definition assures the correct characterization of geopolitical studies, concerning the perspective presented by this study, it must be identified the absence of a more direct reference to the basic domain of 'international relations' (in fact it can be indirectly deduced from state's security policy only).

Like Mello, also Tosta provided useful comments and analysis. Tosta formulated a distinction between "theoretical geopolitics" (a branch of political sciences [geopolitical studies]) and "applied geopolitics" (state policies [politics]) that was already systematized in this study [cf. Section 1.2]⁹¹⁰. Furthermore, while reading Ratzel, Tosta sustained that the success of a state's strategy concerning space domination depends on *élites*' capacities and perceptions. This idea matches with neoclassical realist theory and also with people's adaptability and mobility [cf. Chapter 2]⁹¹¹.

Besides describing Mahan and Mackinder's assumptions connected to maritime and continental masses – associating ideological pleas that clearly remind of Neo-Eurasianism⁹¹² – Vieira, in his book, synthesized what he called the 'new Brazilian geopolitics'⁹¹³: (i) based on Travassos' model (land vs sea); (ii) focused on the Amazon area ("a possible conflict with the U.S.A. and France"); (iii) expressing the objective of an Antarctic Brazil; and (iv) since Bolivia and Paraguay are economically integrated with Brazil already, and since countries with Portuguese as official language are culturally aggregated already, Brazil must focus on (a) the Caribbean area (opponents: Colombia (U.S.A.) and Venezuela (Cuba)); and (b) Antarctica (opponents: Argentina [Chile] and the U.K. indirectly).

⁹⁰⁹ transl. 'Geopolitics constitutes an autonomous branch of political science that aims to study relations and interactions between the state and geography. This discipline encompasses a set of theoretical and empirical knowledge that may be applied into state's security policy with respect to its geographical setting' – Leonel Itaussu Almeida Mello, *Quem tem medo da Geopolítica?* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1999), 74.

⁹¹⁰ Octávio Tosta, *Teorias Geopolíticas* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1984), 27-29.

⁹¹¹ Octávio Tosta, *Teorias Geopolíticas* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1984), 10.

⁹¹² Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 67.

⁹¹³ Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 181 ff.

Vieira quoted Becker⁹¹⁴, Brigagão and Proença⁹¹⁵, Haesbaerth⁹¹⁶, Costa⁹¹⁷ to conclude merely with the old Travassos' prescriptions and ideas that: (i) Brazil should overcome the Andes mountain range and get access to the Pacific Ocean, and (ii) that Bolivia and Paraguay are the solution for the Amazon vs Plate antagonism.

Vieira stated – in the line of Haushofer's scientific effort – that the project of Brazil's hegemony in South America joins the left- and the right-wings⁹¹⁸. Quoting Carmona (a *Communist Party of Brazil* official), Vieira put also the emphasis on South America's integration as 'destiny' and 'strategic option', a rhetoric that reminds Meira Mattos⁹¹⁹.

Ending this section it is noteworthy to repeat that Brazilian School of Geopolitics fits, in general terms, in the "classical geopolitics" tag, in the sense that normative prescriptions were not only given, but they constitute the core of the main School's objectives. Even Vieira's book fits in that same line since the word "geopolitics" is used not as geopolitical studies, but as "political use of the territory", *i.e.* politics⁹²⁰.

After having accurately described, systematized and analyzed the ideas of classic authors of Brazilian School of Geopolitics, the study can move to the description and assessment of the current Brazilian geostrategy and its main proponent: André Martin's Meridionalism.

⁹¹⁴ Berta Becker, 'Geografia política e a gestão do território no limiar do século XXI. Uma representação a partir do Brasil,' *Revista Brasileira de Geografia* vol. 53, no. 3 (1991).

⁹¹⁵ Clóvis Brigagão e Domício Proença Jr, *Concertação múltipla, inserção internacional de segurança do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves/ Konrad Adenauer St., 2002).

⁹¹⁶ Rogério Haesbaerth, *O mito da desterritorialização. Do fim dos territórios à multi-territorialidade* (Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2004)

⁹¹⁷ Darc Costa and Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, *Mundo Latino e Mundialização* (Rio de Janeiro: Mauad, 2004).

⁹¹⁸ Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 196.

⁹¹⁹ Ronaldo Gomes Carmona, 'Geopolítica Clássica e Geopolítica Brasileira contemporânea: Mahan, Mackinder e a "grande estratégia" do Brasil para o século XXI' (MA diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2012).

⁹²⁰ Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008).

Chapter 7

Meridionalism – independent Brazil or South American regional integration maneuver

‘Brasil, um sonho intenso, um raio vívido
[...]
Gigante pela própria natureza,
És belo, és forte, impávido colosso,
E o teu futuro espelha essa grandeza.’⁹²¹

Excerpt of Brazil’s National Anthem

7.1. Meridionalism: Brazilian ‘geo-ideology’ and strategic plan

7.1.1. Classification of Meridionalism as ideology & identification of its roots

It is believed that André Martin, professor of Political Geography at the *Universidade de São Paulo*, is Brazil’s most visible person with respect to intellectual formulations in geopolitics.

Although André Martin does not enjoy the international notoriety that Aleksandr Dugin and Olavo de Carvalho achieved⁹²², Martin is an author whose ideas very much deserve an analysis. In fact, in the limits of the state of the art of this research, this study is the first one that introduces Meridionalism and analyzes it in the English language.

Martin asserted that his *Meridionalism* is a ‘geo-ideology’ – a term coined by Martin himself – to which the central target is to grant a special place to Brazil on the international chessboard⁹²³. For that, the structure of international power must, naturally, be changed, Martin contended.

Hence there is not much to add in terms of classification of Meridionalism as IDEOLOGY [cf. APPENDIX 2] since the proper author already categorized it as such.

As for the explanation of how the power shift on the international arena should occur, it is required to analyze Martin’s Meridionalism with the framework of strategic

⁹²¹ transl. ‘Brazil, an intense dream a lively ray
[...]
Made gigante by Nature
You’re beautiful, strong, and impavid colossus
And your future mirrors such greatness.’

⁹²² For this reason, the study excluded a biography about Martin, unlike the cases of Dugin and Carvalho.

⁹²³ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,’ last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

planning, as it was accomplished for Neo-Eurasianism [cf. Section 4.2.3.]. Before that task, however, the text will elaborate about the roots of Meridionalism.

Roots

In terms of ontology and epistemology, it is important to note that Martin is restricted by the Marxist mental structure. Even if Martin did not provide details about how Gramsci and Lukács influenced him, as he in any case did⁹²⁴, the existence of the Marxist apparatus (concepts (*e.g.* ideology of dominant class, class struggle), categories, approach, comments, etc.) in Martin's texts is more than patent⁹²⁵.

This Marxist apparatus had a direct impact on theories, methods, finalities, and conclusions of Martin's entire academic production. As it was already mentioned, Marx proclaimed the crucial importance of "changing the World" [cf. Subchapter 1.2]. So that becomes, necessarily, a substantial objective for Marxist disciples. That engagement shapes the study. In the case under examination, the tasks of (i) systematizing the ideas of Brazilian School of Geopolitics (which Martin does not recognize as such⁹²⁶), (ii) studying concepts of international politics, (iii) analyzing the international arena, all of them that make part of a international relations study are, in Martin's case, at all times ideologically engaged and deeply normative, insisting in giving prescriptions. In this line, Martin follows the theoretical waves of *classical* geopolitics in general, and for that reason, he located his work out of the geopolitical studies' framework. Nevertheless, Martin's writings are interesting and an excellent example of the pattern of Brazilian academic work [cf. Section 8.2.1].

⁹²⁴ André Roberto Martin, 'Qual é o nosso «Bloco»? O Brasil procura o seu lugar no mundo,' in *O Novo Mapa do Mundo – Globalização e Espaço Latino-Americano*, ed. Francisco C. Scarlato, Milton Santos, Maria A.A. de Souza, Monica Arroyo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994).

Alexandr Dugin, 'Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

André Roberto Martin, 'Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 116.

⁹²⁵ André Roberto Martin, 'Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), I, II, 3, 11, 12, 55, 115.

In this conference, with the purpose of favoring the international communist movement, Martin made apologia of the Cuban regime – Sinprosp, 'André Roberto Martin no SINPRO-SP,' last modified September, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyFaEGudVEY>

It is noteworthy that the Cuban regime is a criminal one that has been assassinating thousands of innocents (the numbers are from 35.000 to 141.000 people between 1959-1987 – The Issue of Genocide and Cuba, last modified September, 2015, http://www.cubaverdad.net/start_frames.htm), it has been arresting and torturing other thousands, and still keeps the Cuban people under oppression and misery.

⁹²⁶ André Roberto Martin, 'Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 48.

Using concepts of geopolitics

Devoted to the study of *geopolitics* – assumed by him as applied geopolitics exclusively (in the line of Couto e Silva) – Martin, in his Ph.D. thesis, tried to define the basic concepts of the field: ‘space’ and ‘power’, clarifying that whereas space is different from territory, power is nothing but a capacity⁹²⁷. Martin also wrote an entire and stimulating chapter about the concept of borders⁹²⁸.

Concerning other topics, however, it is considered that the definitions and distinctions of other concepts or fields of study that Martin formulated are primitive⁹²⁹. Martin mentioned the debate on the division between geopolitics and political geography that has remained extremely rudimental in Brazil⁹³⁰, and he insisted in his *livre-docência* thesis that political geography and geostrategy are synonymous⁹³¹. This thesis already tried to establish the limits of the concepts, in order to assist in a better perception of the reality [cf. Subchapter 1.2].

Meridionalism – Martin’s major innovative formulation – has become the center of his work. That “geo-ideology” has been taking shape for the last twenty years⁹³².

The ideology departs from the concept of *Meridionalidade* a concept that is characterized, Martin explained, not only by economic and military fragility but mainly by political and diplomatic limited relevance⁹³³. In terms of position [LAGE – geopolitical factor #2] the ideology focuses on the ‘south’ of the globe⁹³⁴. In fact, that is

⁹²⁷ André Roberto Martin, ‘As fronteiras internas e a “questão regional” do Brasil’ (Ph.D. thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 1993).

⁹²⁸ André Roberto Martin, ‘As fronteiras internas e a “questão regional” do Brasil’ (Ph.D. thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 1993), 75-94.

⁹²⁹ In fact, it continues to be the primitive until now. In an article of 2014, de Albuquerque (one of the few Brazilian scholars interested in geopolitics) used the terms “teory” and “ideology” to characterize Meridionalism, apparently without understanding that these concepts do not have the same meaning – Edu Silvestre de Albuquerque, ‘A teoria geopolítica meridionalista de André Martin,’ *Revista de Geopolítica* vol. 5, no. 2 (December 2014).

⁹³⁰ André Roberto Martin, ‘As fronteiras internas e a “questão regional” do Brasil’ (Ph.D. thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 1993), 30.

⁹³¹ André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 8, 15.

⁹³² André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), I.

Alexandr Dugin, ‘Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,’ last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

⁹³³ André Roberto Martin, ‘Qual é o nosso «Bloco»? O Brasil procura o seu lugar no mundo,’ in *O Novo Mapa do Mundo – Globalização e Espaço Latino-Americano*, ed. Francisco C. Scarlato, Milton Santos, Maria A.A. de Souza, Monica Arroyo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994), 113.

⁹³⁴ André Roberto Martin, ‘Qual é o nosso «Bloco»? O Brasil procura o seu lugar no mundo,’ in *O Novo Mapa do Mundo – Globalização e Espaço Latino-Americano*, ed. Francisco C. Scarlato, Milton Santos, Maria A.A. de Souza, Monica Arroyo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994), 114.

the essential condition at stake, since the origin of the name (Meridional/South) can then be traced here.

The main point to always keep in mind is that Meridionalism is an ideology, which stressing the condition of *Meridionalidade*, establishes the objective of pursuing ‘hemispheric cooperation’ and to ‘exercise international solidarity’, based on the Westphalian principle of equality among the states⁹³⁵. The rhetoric is characteristically a piece of Marxist speech with normative purposes that seems to be unable to describe the reality objectively, since the ‘international solidarity’ will necessarily destroy the Westphalian principle of national sovereignty [cf. Chapter 8.].

In addition, as ideology, Meridionalism is far from the richness of Neo-Eurasianism. As it was demonstrated [cf. Sections 4.2.2 & 4.2.3], Neo-Eurasianism has been trying to gather conservatives, Christians, Muslims, radical leftists and hard-line communists, fascists, revolutionaries, etc. with a catch-all objective: the destruction of the “U.S.A. hegemony”. As for Meridionalism, it is a plain leftist ideology based on the simple Marxist call that could be adapted to: “*oppressed from all the South Hemisphere, unite!*”

This said the study can now move forward to the analysis of Meridionalism as a strategic plan.

7.1.2. Fundamental lines of Meridionalism as strategic plan (geostrategic and geoconjunctive)

What does Meridionalism exactly aim? *How* does it propose to achieve it? These are central questions of this section.

Brazilian School of Geopolitics has previously formulated one of the principal objectives: Brazil should become a great power. Now, Meridionalism intends to become the ideology and the strategic plan that allegedly guides the maneuver towards such objective.

⁹³⁵ André Roberto Martin, ‘Qual é o nosso «Bloco»? O Brasil procura o seu lugar no mundo,’ in *O Novo Mapa do Mundo – Globalização e Espaço Latino-Americano*, ed. Francisco C. Scarlato, Milton Santos, Maria A.A. de Souza, Monica Arroyo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994), 117.

Phase 1 - Analysis of the environment by Meridionalism

To accomplish (1.1) the internal analysis of the environment of Brazil, Martin started by examining Brazil's geohistorical roots [cf. Chapter 5], focusing on the relevance of the Portuguese influence⁹³⁶. In fact, Martin contended that the roots of Meridionalism can be traced within the period of the foundation of Portugal as an independent state (12th century) – as it was already explained [cf. Subchapter 5.1]. Despite the fact that Portugal is both a product of and a contributor to the West, Martin defended the argument that Brazil is neither exclusively a country of the Western Civilization (Martin frequently quoted Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' hypothesis and its division of civilizations) nor a tropical country, but a meridional one⁹³⁷.

Martin's analysis of the environment also includes the following statements: (i) since the abandonment of Couto e Silva's plan, Brazil had no other strategic plan, and (ii) Brazilian *élites*' perceptions and capacities are too 'weak' while compared to the state's potential, the latter characterized by Martin as strong enough to overcome the limits of a mere regional hegemony in South America or even in Latin America⁹³⁸.

Within this context, a fundamental idea in Meridionalism is that peoples of World periphery – the Southern Hemisphere – should follow the example of the Portuguese and Spanish peoples and change the balance of powers again⁹³⁹.

At this point, it is evident that Brazil is given a particular role so that modifications in the structure of the international system may take place. What Martin identified as the 'zone of impotence' – the South Hemisphere ('warm, maritime, and scattered hemisphere') – is now identified as the part of the world that must rise ('against the North'), Martin claimed⁹⁴⁰.

⁹³⁶ Therefore, it is possible to trace a direct link between Martin and Therezinha de Castro [cf. Section 6.1.4.].

⁹³⁷ Martin has been relentlessly criticizing the (already weak) westernizer tendency in Brazilian people and *élites*, claiming that such propensity is not 'fair' towards African and native American influences – André Roberto Martin, '*Qual é o nosso «Bloco»? O Brasil procura o seu lugar no mundo,*' in *O Novo Mapa do Mundo – Globalização e Espaço Latino-Americano*, ed. Francisco C. Scarlato, Milton Santos, Maria A.A. de Souza, Monica Arroyo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994), 115.

André Roberto Martin, '*Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery*' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 113-114.

Alexandr Dugin, 'Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

⁹³⁸ Millennialm, 'O Meridionalismo Geopolítico - Palestra do André Martin no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro,' last modified December, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oABdxQGLG0>

⁹³⁹ Alexandr Dugin, 'Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

⁹⁴⁰ SimposioPolitica, '3º Simpósio Nacional de Geografia Política. Profº Dr. André Roberto Martin (USP),' last modified December, 2013, YouTube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dm8cVCtbObQ>

So, concerning the analysis of (1.2) the external environment, without any surprise, Martin adopted the grandiloquence of Neo-Eurasianism and he argued that, currently, there are only two geo-ideologies on the globe: *Atlantism* (with values of ‘individualism, commerce, democracy, human rights, the U.S.A. as main proponent’) and *Eurasinism* (‘that results from Bolshevism with Pan-Slavism’, with values attached to agriculture, farms, large territorial borders, collectivist, communitarist, non-individualist, and Russia as main proponent’)⁹⁴¹.

That dualism, attached to the Marxist structure of “struggle for liberation”, induced then Martin to conclude:

‘the South is in danger, it is necessary to defend it, and Brazil can defend it’⁹⁴².

Moreover, Martin also supported the idea of a superiority of the “East” over the “West” – something imprecise and that lacks convincing evidence⁹⁴³.

To Martin, again with no surprise, the U.S.A. is promoting plans for World domination⁹⁴⁴. Also, again that claim constitutes an imprecise argument with no major systematization⁹⁴⁵.

So, alike Neo-Eurasianism, Martin based his Meridionalism on the anti-U.S.A. ground. In fact, on a recension about *Bandeira’s* book devoted to the U.S.A., Martin expressed his anti-U.S. perspectives visibly⁹⁴⁶. Martin has been proposing an anti-U.S.

⁹⁴¹ Millennialm, ‘O Meridionalismo Geopolítico - Palestra do André Martin no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro,’ last modified December, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oABdxQGLG0>

SimposioPolitica, ‘3º Simpósio Nacional de Geografia Política. Profº Dr. André Roberto Martin (USP),’ last modified December, 2013, YouTube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dm8cVCtbObQ>

⁹⁴² Millennialm, ‘O Meridionalismo Geopolítico - Palestra do André Martin no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro,’ last modified December, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oABdxQGLG0>

⁹⁴³ Martin gave examples of “East” civilizing the “West” (e.g. Ancient Greece and Phoenicia), but other examples could be given in return (e.g. Constantinople was created after Rome and as the heir of Rome).

⁹⁴⁴ André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 113.

Alexandr Dugin, ‘Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,’ last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

⁹⁴⁵ However, the argument of the globalist project of the Western financial groups is consistent and has large empirical evidence in its favor [cf. Chapter 9.2]. Still, the Western financial groups are not the U.S.A.

⁹⁴⁶ André Roberto Martin, ‘Contra-ataque ao Império,’ *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* vol. 21, no 62 (October 2006) http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-69092006000300012&lng=pt&nrm=iso

supremacy front in the world, and he has been claiming that an ‘aero-naval conflict between Brazil and decadent Atlanticist powers’ remains a possibility⁹⁴⁷.

Phase 2 - Formulation of strategic plan by Meridionalism

In this way, (2.1) the mission of Meridionalism was already presented. It can be condensed in the following expression: to change the balance of powers in the World. That corresponds to the same mission of Neo-Eurasianism through other words: the destruction of the “unipolar world” [cf. Section 4.2.3].

In order to accomplish that, (2.2) Martin settled the main objective: Brazil needs to become a major power in the international arena. So, as Neo-Eurasianism established the objective of transforming Russia into a major (if not the most important) player on the international chessboard, so it allegedly does Meridionalism concerning Brazil. In a conference devoted to the topic ‘Brazil in the world scenario’, Martin sustained that ‘Brazil’s role is crucial for world peace’, and for having world peace ‘Brazil needs to have a great power plan clearly defined’. Going even beyond that gigantic objective, Martin affirmed:

‘only Brazil can save the World’⁹⁴⁸.

Concerning the (2.3) modalities of action, Martin suggested (i) the development of military forces and the projection of military power; and (ii) to spread an ‘ideological discourse beyond borders’. The Meridionalist ideology is naturally Martin’s proposal, taking into account that he added:

‘there is no projection of power without an international ideology’ (e.g. *Raison d’État* de Richelieu)⁹⁴⁹.

As for Brazil’s internal plan [state relative material potential], Martin proposed what he called the “anti-Golbery plan”: the creation of a great navy (in the line of

⁹⁴⁷ Conferência Nacional uma nova Política Externa, ‘17.07 Mesa 1: Política Externa Brasileira e Defesa,’ last modified August 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8I5xE2FVw8>

⁹⁴⁸ André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 96.

Simposio Política, ‘3º Simpósio Nacional de Geografia Política. Profº Dr. André Roberto Martin (USP),’ last modified December, 2013, YouTube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dm8cVCtbObQ>

⁹⁴⁹ Millennium, ‘O Meridionalismo Geopolítico - Palestra do André Martin no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro,’ last modified December, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oABdxQGLG0>

Mahan), and the construction of continental-size railways (in the line of Mackinder and Travassos)⁹⁵⁰.


The main ally of Brazil, Martin formulated, should be India. Those two states should cooperate and enter in the U.N. Security Council together⁹⁵¹.

On the other hand, Brazil also should transform IBAS into 'IBASA', *i.e.* bringing Australia into the group⁹⁵².

Other directions of Brazilian foreign policy should include Antarctica, Portugal, and South Africa.

Maps 28 and 29

Martin's geographical directions of his Meridionalist 'geo-ideology'⁹⁵³



⁹⁵⁰ André Roberto Martin, 'Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 116.

Millennivm, 'O Meridionalismo Geopolítico - Palestra do André Martin no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro,' last modified December, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oABdxQGLG0>

⁹⁵¹ André Roberto Martin, 'Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 112.

Alexandr Dugin, 'Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

⁹⁵² Alexandr Dugin, 'São Paulo A. Dugin/A. Martin,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78IHwoyxdO8>

Vide too: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 'Mecanismos Inter-Regionais IBAS – Fórum de Diálogo Índia, Brasil e África do Sul,' last modified June, 2015, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3673:forum-de-dialogo-india-brasil-e-africa-do-sul-ibas&catid=170:chamada-1&Itemid=436&lang=pt-BR

It is interesting to note the convergence with Cohen, who put both Brazil and Australia as 'high' second-order powers – Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers, 2009), 49.

⁹⁵³ André Roberto Martin, 'Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 112.



Source: <http://movimentobrasilgrande.blogspot.cz/2015/04/ainda-sobre-meridionalismo.html>

As for Russia and China, because they did never suffer colonialism, Martin contended, it is not believed that BRICS is a “geopolitical” project. So Martin characterized BRICS as a geoeconomic structure only⁹⁵⁴. It is considered that those premises are misguided, and the test of H₄ will bring some light on the topic [cf. Subchapter 9.2].

Bringing the objective back to the discussion, linking it with the modalities of action there is a major inconsistency in Martin’s project that needs to be emphasized. On the one hand, Martin made use of nationalist rhetoric praising a possible important role for Brazil in the future⁹⁵⁵, as it was above-mentioned. On the other hand, receiving the most misguided influence of continentalization “strategy” of Brazilian School of Geopolitics, Martin has been insisting on giving support to the maneuver of regional integration, which logically dissolves Brazil’s sovereignty in the region⁹⁵⁶.

As it was analyzed, in geostrategic terms, the regional integration of South America has been an obstacle for Brazil’s hegemony as a Sea power. Martin claimed that Brazil needs to become a Sea power, but at the same time, he praised the ‘Great

⁹⁵⁴ André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 111.

SimposioPolítica, ‘3º Simpósio Nacional de Geografia Política. Profº Dr. André Roberto Martin (USP),’ last modified December, 2013, YouTube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dm8cVCtbObQ>

⁹⁵⁵ In the line of Brazilian School of Geopolitics, and focusing on interests in Antarctica as well.

⁹⁵⁶ André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 118.

Bolivarian Fatherland'⁹⁵⁷, which means the destruction of Brazil as an independent state.

If it is true that Martin sustained that Meridionalism does not aim the 'integration of countries', but articulation of states⁹⁵⁸, it is also true that Martin seemed cheerful about the velocity of the South American integration maneuver until now. Martin noted that the idea of a common currency and common military forces in South America is an idea on the table. In this vein, Martin also affirmed:

'...all ideological forces are unanimous in the defense of that, so-called, common interest'⁹⁵⁹.

It seems that Martin disremembers, however, that Brazil does not have a representation of different ideological parties at the Parliament [cf. Subchapter 8.1], and certainly, a conservative force would not be willing to support measures of weakening the national sovereignty⁹⁶⁰.

All the same, Martin touched the core of the problem while commenting that, since Lula da Silva took charge in Brazil's Presidential Office, Caracas and Brasília joined positions⁹⁶¹. This is a direct empirical proof of the effectiveness of São Paulo Forum influence [cf. Subchapter 8.2].

Hence the logical inconsistency remains: either Brazil will be an independent state becoming a hegemonic power on the sea, or Brazil will be dissolved in South and Latin America within the regional integration project. The analysis insists at this point.

The project of Brazil as maritime power conflicts with the idea of regional integration, in the logics of opposition sea power vs. land power (an opposition accepted by Martin due to his use of Neo-Eurasianist rhetoric).

⁹⁵⁷ André Roberto Martin, 'Sopa de Letrinhas: ALBA, ALCA, MERCOSUL, UNASUL, CAN... para onde vai a integração Latino-Americana?' in *Argentina e Brasil: Possibilidades e obstáculos no processo de integração territorial*, ed. Mónica Arroyo and Perla Zusman (São Paulo: Humanitas, 2010), 37.

⁹⁵⁸ André Roberto Martin, 'Qual é o nosso «Bloco»? O Brasil procura o seu lugar no mundo,' in *O Novo Mapa do Mundo – Globalização e Espaço Latino-Americano*, ed. Francisco C. Scarlato, Milton Santos, Maria A.A. de Souza, Monica Arroyo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994), 119.

⁹⁵⁹ André Roberto Martin, 'Sopa de Letrinhas: ALBA, ALCA, MERCOSUL, UNASUL, CAN... para onde vai a integração Latino-Americana?' in *Argentina e Brasil: Possibilidades e obstáculos no processo de integração territorial*, ed. Mónica Arroyo and Perla Zusman (São Paulo: Humanitas, 2010), 49.

⁹⁶⁰ Vide the positions of the member of Brazilian Federal Congress Jair Bolsonaro – JP Madeira, 'Foro de São Paulo. Resistiremos? - Deputado Jair Bolsonaro,' last modified November, 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTdl06FfB-g>

⁹⁶¹ André Roberto Martin, 'Sopa de Letrinhas: ALBA, ALCA, MERCOSUL, UNASUL, CAN... para onde vai a integração Latino-Americana?' in *Argentina e Brasil: Possibilidades e obstáculos no processo de integração territorial*, ed. Mónica Arroyo and Perla Zusman (São Paulo: Humanitas, 2010), 50.

As quoted, the idea of Brazil as a maritime power had several supporters in Brazilian School of Geopolitics⁹⁶². Martin – although incoherently, because of the support that he gives to the South American regional integration – is another proponent of that goal. Martin proclaimed, indeed, Brazil's 'Atlantic vocation'⁹⁶³, apparently without realizing that another conflict of ideas was being created: if Brazil becomes a Sea power, Brazil cannot, at the same time, joining the Eurasianist "land project", otherwise Meridionalism would become a 'geo-ideology' of the seas, thus an *Atlantist* ideology.

So whereas Martin explained in detail his rejection of the U.S. hegemony and its *Atlantist* project, claiming that Brazil can join forces with the Eurasianist project, simultaneously, Martin contended that 'only naval powers can threaten Brazil's security, since regional integration is decreasing territorial threats'⁹⁶⁴. Thus, Brazil must rise as a Sea power in the name of its own defense⁹⁶⁵. Consequently the research can ask: what is the priority for Brazil from the Meridionalist perspective: land or sea?

In terms of (2.4) sectoral policies, Meridionalism did not provide much of information until now. In his project, Martin just detailed that it is essential using diplomatic and political instruments in order to apply the ideology of Meridionalism. The goal is then not only to spread the ideology regionally but like all ideologies to spread it all over the Globe and become universal⁹⁶⁶.

⁹⁶² Vide also: Mário César Flores (comp.), *Panorama Do Poder Marítimo Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação Geral da Marinha, 1972).

⁹⁶³ André Roberto Martin, 'Qual é o nosso «Bloco»? O Brasil procura o seu lugar no mundo,' in *O Novo Mapa do Mundo – Globalização e Espaço Latino-Americano*, ed. Francisco C. Scarlato, Milton Santos, Maria A.A. de Souza, Monica Arroyo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994), 115.

His main study about geopolitics opens with a quotation about the importance of the Sea – André Roberto Martin, 'Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007).

André Roberto Martin, 'Sopa de Letrinhas: ALBA, ALCA, MERCOSUL, UNASUL, CAN... para onde vai a integração Latino-Americana?' in *Argentina e Brasil: Possibilidades e obstáculos no processo de integração territorial*, ed. Mónica Arroyo and Perla Zusman (São Paulo: Humanitas, 2010), 45.

⁹⁶⁴ Millennialism, 'O Meridionalismo Geopolítico - Palestra do André Martin no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro,' last modified December, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oABdxQGLG0>

⁹⁶⁵ Meridionalism is, in fact, confusing in this issue, because it characterized Brazil as 'hybrid' power – André Roberto Martin, 'Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery' (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 116.

⁹⁶⁶ André Roberto Martin, 'Qual é o nosso «Bloco»? O Brasil procura o seu lugar no mundo,' in *O Novo Mapa do Mundo – Globalização e Espaço Latino-Americano*, ed. Francisco C. Scarlato, Milton Santos, Maria A.A. de Souza, Monica Arroyo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994), 118.

‘As possibilidades heurísticas contidas numa agenda marxista parecem assim ser mais promissoras, uma vez que devem integrar, num único modelo explicativo, a política de poder, a luta de classes, e o espaço geográfico.’⁹⁶⁷

André Martin

7.2. Considerations about Meridionalism under the geopolitical studies’ framework

Analyzing his writing style and his conclusions, there is no doubt that Martin tried to study international relations seriously. However, his Marxist mental structure (“Marxist Geopolitics”⁹⁶⁸) does not allow him to pursue an a-ideological approach, as a (scientific) geopolitical study must be. Martin’s normative style, his judgments of value, do not let the reader free to make an objective interpretation because there is no intention to be objective whatsoever since that possibility is denied by Martin. The Marxist structure – and the expression comprises, in this point, neo-Marxist, critical theory, etc. – is deeply committed to modifying the international system as a finality, instead of analyzing the international system on theoretical and abstract bases. The same exact problem was mentioned in the analysis of Neo-Eurasianism.

Martin insisted that ideology has a purpose on guiding foreign policy⁹⁶⁹, while it is exactly the opposite: state’s failures [cf. fig. 3] happen when foreign policy ignores geopolitical studies’ results in detriment of ideological principles⁹⁷⁰.

⁹⁶⁷ transl. ‘The heuristic possibilities contained in the Marxist agenda seem to be promising since they integrate power politics, the class struggle, and the geographical setting into a single explanatory model.’ – André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 11.

⁹⁶⁸ André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 12.

⁹⁶⁹ Millennialism, ‘O Meridionalismo Geopolítico - Palestra do André Martin no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro,’ last modified December, 2012, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oABdxQGLG0>

⁹⁷⁰ Vieira stated in his book that, despite discontinuities in Brazilian politics, Brazilian [applied] geopolitics is example of ‘...perenniality of state’s activity’ – Friederick Brum Vieira, *Modelo Travassiano – A geopolítica que guia o Brasil na ditadura e na democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Milênio, 2008), 16. Although that book has several fragilities, that theoretical point seems to be correct.

Still, Martin himself recognized at the end that, in international politics, geography counts more than ideology – André Roberto Martin, ‘Brasil, Geopolítica e Poder Mundial – o anti-Golbery’ (Livre-Docência thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), 10.

The text already identified other inconsistencies and flaws in Martin's Meridionalism: Brazil's priority falls upon regional [continental] integration *or* upon independent state and maritime power? Is Brazil perceived as a Land power *or* a Sea power? How can Brazil affirm an Atlantic vocation and become a Sea power and *at the same time* being an ally of the Eurasianist forces, fighting against Atlantism and against the main World Sea power, the U.S.A.? Ideology *versus* science: Meridionalism as a geo-ideology uses the geographical setting⁹⁷¹, but it is incompatible with the scientific activity, namely for the lack of will to look at all facts and data.

In conclusion, into an interview conducted by some of his students, Martin stated that Meridionalism constitutes the 'theory for the emancipation of the Southern Hemisphere's states, and he confirmed too that Meridionalism may join forces with Neo-Eurasianism⁹⁷².

Therefore, one of the research questions of this thesis: are there any shared ideas or objectives between those Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist ideologies? is answered.

As for the main research question – *Are Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism somehow related to a New World Order?* –, after sustaining that Neo-Eurasianism is committed to a project for a NEW WORLD ORDER [cf. PART II] the convincing evidence collected and explained, allow to sustain, at the end of this Part III, that also Meridionalism is dedicated to a similar project for a NEW WORLD ORDER, and that both projects have connections in both academic and strategic terms.

The main objective of the following PART IV will be to unveil and assess what are and how those academic and strategic connections operate in Brazil's political reality.

⁹⁷¹ Alexandr Dugin, 'Meridionalismo: geoideologia. Prof. Andre Martín,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfEs9M1KPCw>

⁹⁷² Dídimo Matos, 'Programa Conectado com Dídimo Matos entrevista André Roberto Martin,' last modified April, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hQr21W56M4>

PART IV
GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL
ASSESSING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MERIDIONALISM
AND NEO-EURASIANISM

Key points

Geopolitical study and foreign policy analysis of Brazil through the neoclassical geopolitics' approach [cf. PART I]. Brazil as a country ruled by geomisguided *élites*. São Paulo Forum as the “strategic command” of the South American integration maneuver. Connections between legal political parties and organized crime within São Paulo Forum. Identification of South America regional integration as common goal among: Brazilian foreign policy outcomes, São Paulo Forum directives, Meridionalist and Neo-Eurasianist objectives.

Chapter 8

Geopolitical analysis of Brazil: Meridionalism & Latin American integration now, for Neo-Eurasianism afterwards?

‘A integração sul-americana permanece
como objetivo estratégico
da política externa brasileira’⁹⁷³

Brazil’s White Book of National Defense

8.1. Geopolitical study and foreign policy analysis of Brazil

It was explained in PART III that the continentalization “strategy” [*sic*] was a prescription of Brazilian School of Geopolitics (*i.e.* Travassos, somehow Couto e Silva, but mainly Meira Mattos). PART IV will now measure the impact of that “strategy” on Brazilian politics, performing the ultimate empirical test of H₃. This means that the main point is then to gather, to present and to assess evidence with the purpose of sustaining the argument that the South American regional integration maneuver (a geoconjunctive process) – supported by Meridionalism – is highly useful to the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan. That assignment will accomplish the objective **D**. [cf. INTRODUCTION, Structure & Objectives].

In order to accomplish the mentioned objective, two subchapters will be organized. Subchapter 8.1. will be devoted to the geopolitical study and foreign policy analysis of Brazil, using the theoretical and methodological framework elaborated in PART I. It will also hold the purpose of introducing the notion that Brazil has been a geomisguided state, due to Brazilian *élites*’ geomisguided perceptions and incapacities. Subchapter 8.2. will comprise a single case study about São Paulo Forum. Among its main purposes are (i) demonstrating in which terms can that Forum be measured as the “strategic command” of South American integration maneuver, (ii) gathering and analyzing empirical data about how that organization has been affecting Brazilian foreign policy, and (iii) assessing what kind of connections may exist between São Paulo Forum, Meridionalism and Neo-Eurasianism.

Unfortunately, the formal limits imposed to this thesis do not allow an extensive analysis of Brazil’s independent variables as deep as the author would like. In this way, the study will only make reference to some of the most crucial aspects.

⁹⁷³ transl. ‘South American integration remains a strategic objective [*sic*] to Brazil’s foreign policy’ – Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), 37.

8.1.1. Analyzing Brazil through the independent variables

The higher methodological guideline of the research in this subchapter 8.1 is to apply the model for geopolitical analysis already systematized [cf. Section 1.2.3. and APPENDIX 3].

Nevertheless, due to the existence of subchapter 6.1, which described the main ideas of classic authors of Brazilian School of Geopolitics, the application of the model will not be as unified as it ideally should have been. This is also a consequence of a flexible qualitative approach that has been praised, and under which a geopolitical study should be accomplished.

In these circumstances, although territorial morphogenesis, geohistorical nucleus, geopolitical neutral areas, coastline, analysis of Brazil's thalassocratic aspects, geographical instability constitute aspects that respect to Brazil's geopolitical analysis, they were already covered in subchapter 6.1. So, for the sake of a light text, they will not be repeated.

Going back into the geopolitical model, focusing on the variable of relative material state potential, it is important to underline [SPACE – geopolitical factor #1] that Brazil is the 5th largest country in the world, occupying 45% of South American sub-continent. Slightly smaller than the U.S.A., Brazil has borders with all South American countries except with Ecuador and Chile, in a total of 16.145 km of land borders (much longer than Brazil's coastline). After Greenland, Brazil has the largest coastline on the Atlantic (more extensive than the U.S. east coastline) with 7.491 km⁹⁷⁴.

As Travassos noted, South America is divided in North/South by the Amazon forest around the Amazon River, and East/West by the Andean mountains. These two geographical features complicate the CIRCULATION in the region [geopolitical factor # 3], consequently turning regional integration hard to achieve in geographical terms.

If it is hard to connect the coast to the interior, it is likewise hard to connect Brazilian cities along the coastline due to specific geographical features (*e.g.* mountains).

The fact that South American integration has been pursued by ideological guidelines cannot eliminate these geographical difficulties.

⁹⁷⁴ CIA Factbook, 'Brazil,' last modified June, 2016, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>

Inside the Brazilian territory, the problem of territorial integration remains. There is a severe lack of internal territorial cohesion, so it is easily understandable why this was a key point for Brazilian School of Geopolitics [cf. Chapter 6]. In the Amazon basin, there is no relevant agriculture, no large human settlements, and the area is hard to control in military terms. Moreover, the creation of territorial reserves (mainly by the *Workers' Party* administration) – which is linked to transnational interests – have been worsening a critical risk of appearance of exclaves inside Brazil, jeopardizing the country's territorial integrity⁹⁷⁵.

On the other hand, Brazilian highlands on the coast – an area that corresponds to Brazil's geohistorical nucleus [cf. maps 13 and 26] – comprise the majority of the population and the country's richest areas (including the STATE'S ECUMENE [cf. APPENDIX 2]: the triangle Rio de Janeiro-São-Paulo-Belo Horizonte). Yet, as it was already pointed out, it is hard to circulate in this area too.

Concerning the POSITION [geopolitical factor #2] it assumes particular importance the city of Natal, (*e.g.* Rampa, Fernando de Noronha Island) since the air bases located there were essential to the U.S. Air Force in the defeat of Nazi forces in the North of Africa during World War II: the Natal-Dakar air route.

Brazil's archipelagos are essential for maritime power projection too.

In terms of regional context, while Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay constitute three buffer states around Brazil, Colombian FARC [*Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia*] with their activities of drug and arms trafficking, and an unstable Venezuela, represent threats in the neighborhood of Brazil.

With respect to RESOURCES [geopolitical factor #4] Brazil is a rich country, indeed. Brazil is the 9th biggest producer of oil, and its natural gas reserves were, in 2015, estimated at 16 trillion cubic feet⁹⁷⁶. After the U.S.A., Brazil is the second-largest producer and consumer of the biofuel ethanol⁹⁷⁷. The country has got two nuclear power plants⁹⁷⁸.

⁹⁷⁵ Concerning the method, this problem is covered by the step “state's territorial morphogenesis outline” [cf. APPENDIX 3].

⁹⁷⁶ The U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘International,’ last modified May, 2016, <http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/?fips=SU&trk=p2>

⁹⁷⁷ The U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘International,’ last modified May, 2016, <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=BRA>

⁹⁷⁸ Brazil signed a Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998.

Brazil possesses 8.233 cu km of fresh water reserves⁹⁷⁹. The Amazon rainforest provides rubber and extensive reserves of wood. As for metals, Brazil possesses the largest niobium reserve in the World and the second largest reserve of iron (after Australia). The country is self-sufficient in terms of food.

In 2014, Brazil had the 7th largest economy in the World⁹⁸⁰. Although the Chinese economic slowdown has been affecting Brazil – the Chinese market is currently not importing as many raw materials as in the past – the recession that Brazil is currently passing by (the worst in a century) is less caused by that factor than by the *Workers' Party* bribery moves (*Mensalão*, *Petrolão*, etc.), recently put on the light of day. Moreover, Brazil is highly dependent on foreign capital, and foreign trade. As for the economic freedom, Brazil is 'mostly unfree', located in the ranking behind Nigeria or Mali⁹⁸¹. This is a consequence of socialist procedures for the control over the economy.

Regarding the psychosocial projection on the territory [geopolitical factor #5] Brazil is the 5th most populated country in the world, with roughly 204 million people, predominantly young population⁹⁸². Despite that high number, the population density is very low, something that creates problems with territorial integration, once again. On the other hand, some cities are highly inhabited (Metropolitan areas: São Paulo 21 million, Rio de Janeiro 12 million, Belo Horizonte 5 millions). Almost 86% of Brazilian people was living in a city in 2015. In this way, on the national level, the cohesion of the population is low (*e.g.* existence of social disparities).

As for other characteristics of the Brazilian people, they are mostly Catholic and their peaceful character, in general, appears to be very tolerant and flexible. In this context, Brazilians are prone to accommodate controversial ideas or behaviors with respect to their own previous ideas and behavior⁹⁸³. Despite this flexibility and relaxed character, the blood-spattered *guerilha*, promoted by the communists from the 30s/60s until the 70s, should be remembered.

⁹⁷⁹ CIA Factbook, 'Brazil,' last modified June, 2016, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>

⁹⁸⁰ World Bank, 'Gross domestic product 2014,' last modified May, 2016, World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>

⁹⁸¹ The Heritage Foundation, '2016 Index of Economic Freedom,' last modified June, 2016, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking>

⁹⁸² CIA Factbook, 'Brazil,' last modified June, 2016, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>

⁹⁸³ That would be the reason why Brazilians have been voting for decades in socialist and communist parties, although they are mostly Christians. However, currently, the situation seems to be changing with the popular revolts against the regime [cf. Subchapter 8.2.].

The last geopolitical factor analyses the politico-military structures [geopolitical factor #6]. The political and judicial systems in Brazil, in general, are highly corrupt⁹⁸⁴. Although the Constitution has been formally respected and the institutions kept working in what seems to be the regular way, the *Workers' Party* has been infiltrating its agents, militants, supporters in the state's structure in politics, bureaucracy, judiciary system, education, public companies, cultivating sympathies even within the Armed Forces⁹⁸⁵ [cf. Section 8.2.1.]. The impeachment process that President Rousseff suffered did not change the situation so far. This point will be better explained with the study of the influence of São Paulo Forum in Brazil [cf. Subchapter 8.2.].

Ranked #24 in the soft power index⁹⁸⁶, together with the above-mentioned notions of “flexible character” and “friendly people”, Brazil is associated with images of “party”, “samba”, “carnival”, “football”, “sex-paradise”, “beaches and the sun”. These cultural foreign policy images contrast with an extremely high number of intentional homicides (more than 56.000 assault deaths in 2012, four times more than in the U.S.A.⁹⁸⁷), high levels of drug trafficking and drug consumption, extortion, kidnapping, corruption, diseases (e.g. Zika, Dengue). With the exception of the latter, all the rest seems having been stimulated or protected by the government itself, namely through protection or benevolent attitude towards crime⁹⁸⁸. That correlation of government and crime can be also identified due to the connections of *Workers' Party* with criminal organizations [cf. Section 8.2.2.]. The main idea to keep in mind here is that crime and social instability favors a revolutionary environment [cf. Section 9.2.3.], which is indispensable for the success of the *Workers' Party* policies in particular and the Brazilian radical left in general. Besides, that context of social instability mirrors the historical experience of the origins of the Soviet Union. In this way, the label “*narcoestado*” can be used, not in the sense that the state controls the trade, but in the

⁹⁸⁴ Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,’ last modified May, 2016, Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table>

⁹⁸⁵ For specific cases of placing *Workers' Party* members, supporters, militants in public structures *vide*: Nuno Morgado, ‘Geographical setting, élites’ perceptions and capacities, and foreign policy,’ in: *The European Consortium for Political Research 2016 Graduate Student Conference*, University of Tartu, Estonia, 12th July 2016.

⁹⁸⁶ The Soft Power 30, ‘Index Results,’ last modified June, 2016, The Soft Power 30, <http://softpower30.portland-communications.com/ranking/>

⁹⁸⁷ Homicide Monitor, ‘Brazil,’ last modified June, 2016, Homicide Monitor <http://homicide.igarape.org.br/>

⁹⁸⁸ The case of former State Secretary for Human Rights Maria do Rosário provides strong empirical support for this claim. For example, Rosário’s public defense of criminals – Syl Polanski, ‘Jovem fica tetraplégico após assalto e Maria do Rosário vai na TV defender o criminoso,’ last modified June, 2016, Blastingnews, <http://br.blastingnews.com/sociedade-opiniao/2016/06/jovem-fica-tetraplegico-apos-assalto-e-maria-do-rosario-vai-na-tv-defender-o-criminoso-00985933.html>

sense that the state is allied with forces that control the drug trade [cf. Subchapter 8.2.2.]. The relations between corruption / drug trafficking / social chaos / left crystallized in São Paulo Forum, will be analyzed in detail below [cf. Subchapter 8.2.]⁹⁸⁹.

Within this political and social chaos, Brazilian Armed Forces speculated about the possibility of terrorist actions as a reaction to the removal of Rousseff from the Presidential office, in May 2016⁹⁹⁰.

Regarding the leftist aspect of Brazilian political regime, it should be stressed that two of the biggest parties in the political system: *Workers' Party* (PT) and *Brazilian Social Democratic Party* (PSDB) were both created within CEBRAP [Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning], which was constituted in 1969 by leftist university scholars, and funded by the Ford Foundation⁹⁹¹. It is also noteworthy that both parties do not differ in the objectives, but in the modalities of action only. There are already studies devoted to the topic⁹⁹².

⁹⁸⁹ In regard to corruption, the same progressive left that constitutes the ideological spectrum of both São Paulo Forum and Meridionalism has been denounced in consecutive corruption scandals, in which thousands of millions of R\$ were either stolen by leftist state's officials, or spent in other São Paulo Forum fellow member, or other given to communist countries such as Angola. The events are integrated onto a thick net – Mídia livre FCS, 'Lava-Jato revela que dinheiro desviado da Petrobras também foi para Cuba, Argentina e outros,' last modified July, 2015, Mídia livre FCS, <http://folhacentrosul.com.br/post-politica/7443/lava-jato-revela-que-dinheiro-desviado-da-petrobras-tambem-foi-para-cuba-argentina-e-outros>

It should be also kept in mind that the progressive leftist representatives have been accusing "neoliberalism" of having caused economic problems in the 90s. However, it should be added that there was no capitalism in South America during that period, because "privatization" was not accompanied by "liberalization", since the agents who bought states' property remained attached to the state – in the same line of 90s' Russia. Therefore, the true crisis is coming now, clearly linked to corruption scandals fomented by leftist executive officials during the last decades.

⁹⁹⁰ DefesaNet, 'Crise – Exército teme ações terroristas,' last modified May, 2016, DefesaNet, <http://www.defesenet.com.br/crise/noticia/22346/CRISE---Exercito-teme-%E2%80%98acoes-terroristas%E2%80%99/>

⁹⁹¹ CEBRAP, 'Institucional,' last modified June, 2016, CEBRAP, <http://cebrap.org.br/v3/index.php?r=institucionais/index>

Gustavo Henrique Lopes Machado, 'PT versus PSDB: em que consiste o antagonismo?' last modified September, 2012, Diário da Liberdade, <http://www.diarioliberalidade.org/opiniom/opiniom-propia/31507-pt-versus-psdb-em-que-consiste-o-antagonismo.html>

UOL, 'O laboratório de FHC,' last modified August, 1999, UOL, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mais/fs15089914.htm>


⁹⁹² For example a study about the former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) characterizing him as a political agent in the marxist-gramscian line – Álvaro Bianchi, 'Dossiê «Gramsci e a Política» Apresentação,' *Revista de Sociologia Política* no. 29 (November 2007): 8.

Still on this topic, examining a primary source, Fernando Henrique Cardoso affirmed twice in a 2004 interview that "the dispute between his party (PSDB) and the *Workers' Party* is political and not ideological" – Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'A luta de PT e PSDB é política, não ideológica,' last modified November, 2004, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, <http://www.psdb.org.br/acompanhe/noticias/a-luta-de-pt-e-psdb-e-politica-nao-ideologica/>

The political situation of leftist hegemony in Brazil that is described still stands until the moment [cf. Section 8.2.1]. For example, recently, some of the most well-known names of Brazilian University, who have links to the political power, have gathered in a meeting at the *Universidade de São Paulo*'s Faculty of Law with the purpose of reaffirming the importance of continuing in the "historical path" towards "social justice" [communism] and "the dangers of a *bourgeois* victory that would destroy democracy"⁹⁹³.

Referring to the military sub-factor, Brazilian Armed Forces, which are the guarantor of the democratic order in accordance with the Constitution, have not interfered in this state-of-things so far. With 330.000 active military personnel in 2015, Brazil was assessed, in 2016, as the 15th strongest military power in the world (above Israel and below Indonesia)⁹⁹⁴. Still, the expenditure in defense has remained relatively low.

Figure 5
Military expenditure in Brazil as percentage of gross domestic product, 1995-2015



Source: SIPRI

As for allies, since 1995 till 2015, Brazil has been buying weaponry mostly from [in this order of importance]: France, Germany, United Kingdom and the U.S.A.; and it has been selling to mostly: Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and France⁹⁹⁵.

The military allies' network could be expressed in the diagram below [cf. figure 6].


⁹⁹³ Artur Scavone, 'Marilena Chauí no ato contra o golpe,' last modified December, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbTB51BS89A&spfreload=5>

⁹⁹⁴ Global Firepower, 'Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2016),' last modified June, 2016, Global Firepower, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>

⁹⁹⁵ SIPRI, 'Arms Trade,' last modified April, 2016, SIPRI, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php

Concluding this brief analysis of the relative material state potential variable, a reference to the hierarchy of the Composite Index of National Capability is made. Brazil was ranked at #6 position, thus above Germany and under Russia⁹⁹⁶.

Figure 6
Main treaties in the defense domain signed by Brazil (in action May 2016)



The variable of distribution of power (or systemic constraints) is strongly united with the variable just analyzed above.

With respect to the position of Brazil in concrete terms of Space-Power-Constellation, the country balances between (1) the fact that the U.S.A. remains as (in formal terms) Brazil's primary and strongest military ally, and (2) the ambitions and goals for Latin American regional integration.

In fact, the latter, among its many complex aspects, includes Brazilian active membership in the UNASUL, an organization that already encompasses a Council of

⁹⁹⁶ Index of National Power, 'Index Comparisons,' last modified June, 2016, Index of National Power <http://www.nationalpower.info/index-of-national-power/comparing-nations-using-different-power-indecies/>

It is also important to remind the Brazilian Alcantara Cyclone Space project.

South American Defense, which Presidency is exercised by the Pro Tempore President of UNASUL, who at the moment (May 2016) is Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro – one of the main antagonists of the U.S.A. Moreover, in 2010, it was created the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) with HQ in Caracas.

Through this analysis, the transitory (therefore, contradictory) aspect of the current situation can be observed.

In 2007, Brazilian President Lula da Silva has already stated that the strategic priority was:

‘...estabelecer uma estratégia de procedimento entre a esquerda da América Latina.’⁹⁹⁷

It is noteworthy that Lula da Silva made that statement not during a *Workers' Party* congress, not during a São Paulo Forum session, but during a MERCOSUL meeting. Hence the matter concerns directly systemic constraints. That empirical evidence confirms Brazilian diplomat Paulo de Almeida's evaluation that MERCOSUL has deviated from its original objective of a free-trade area in the South Cone to be transformed into a Bolivarian instrument⁹⁹⁸. That means that MERCOSUL has become, at least to a certain extent, a São Paulo Forum instrument⁹⁹⁹.

Consequently, sustained by such convincing evidence, it is possible to state, with a narrow mistake possibility, that the situation of Brazil's international alignment is in changing. That change seems to be distancing from the U.S.A. in detriment of both (i) Latin America regional integration, which (ii) has links to the Russian-Chinese axis¹⁰⁰⁰.

⁹⁹⁷ transl. – ‘to establish a leftist strategy for action in Latin America’ – Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no encerramento do Encontro de Governadores da Frente Norte do Mercosul,’ last modified December, 2007, Presidência da República, <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/20-mandato/2007/06-12-2007-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-no-encerramento-do-encontro-de-governadores-da-frente-norte-do-mercosul>, 2.

⁹⁹⁸ Paulo Roberto de Almeida, ‘Do lulopetismo diplomático a uma política externa profissional,’ last modified May, 2016, Academia.edu, https://www.academia.edu/25639710/Do_lulopetismo_diplomatico_a_uma_politica_externa_profissional, 5

⁹⁹⁹ That conclusion finds convergence with arguments supported by Malamud and Paula Castanho e Silva too. *Vide*:

Andres Malamud, ‘A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian foreign policy,’ *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol. 53, no. 3, (2011): 7. Bruno de Paula Castanho e Silva, ‘The São Paulo Forum and the Development of Latin American Regional Integration’ 22nd IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain, 2012. Available at: http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_11763.pdf

¹⁰⁰⁰ Chandler supports this same perspective too – Robert Chandler, *Shadow World - Resurgent Russia, The Global New Left, and Radical Islam* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2008).

8.1.2. Analyzing Brazil through the intervening variables

This section is intimately related to the next subchapter. In fact, it is hard to assess Brazilian *élites*' perceptions and capacities separately, before the single case study about São Paulo Forum. Still, doing so represents an effort to respect the compartmentalization of variables that was accomplished [cf. APPENDIX 3].

One single argument is put to test in this section: that the conduct of politics by Brazilian *élites* is moved by other objectives than the promotion of Brazil's national interests.

This argument – that there is no compliance of Brazilian *élites* to the country's national interests, and if there has been any, then, it was accidental or tactical – affects and is affected by Brazilian *élites*' perceptions and capacities. So, it is contended that Brazilian *élites*, particularly since 2003 till 2016 (*Workers' Party* administration), have not been showing any sense of acquiescence to the national interests in the conduction of politics. Bringing a literary reference in, it is the contrary of Amonasro in Verdi's *Aida*¹⁰⁰¹.

A comprehensive explanation of this “anathema” for the realist theoretical school will be achieved in the next subchapter. For now, it is flatly stated that several times, Lula da Silva's political outcomes were clearly made directly against Brazil's national interests. Several examples will be listed.

In 2005, President Lula da Silva produced a decree for the creation of the territorial reserve of *Raposa Serra do Sol*¹⁰⁰². The demarcation of 1 747 464 hectares of land inside Brazil (bordering with Venezuela) generates trends for territorial claims, secessionism and, consequently, jeopardizes the territorial integrity of the country. Besides, it damaged the production of rice too, since Brazilian rice farmers were displaced, and the roughly 20.000 autochthons, who now live there, do not produce rice in economically viable amounts. Finally, the infrastructures have been collapsing

¹⁰⁰¹ The “king of Ethiopia” in Verdi's *Aida* who proclaims:
«Se l'amor della patria è delitto
Siam rei tutti, siam pronti a morir!»
transl. 'If to love one's fatherland is a crime
Then we are all guilty, we are ready to die!'

Act II, scene II of *Aida* by Giuseppe Verdi, *versi* by Antonio Ghislanzoni.

¹⁰⁰² Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, 'Decreto de 15 de Abril de 2005,' last modified April, 2005, Presidência da República, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2005/Dnn/Dnn10495.htm

(mainly roads and bridges), and there are security problems as well – none of these problems existed before the displacement of the rice farms¹⁰⁰³.

In the same line of interpreting this fact as anti-national political outcome, in 2008, former Amazonian Military Commander, General Augusto Heleno, classified the governmental policies in this domain as “regrettable, to not say chaotic”,¹⁰⁰⁴.

However, *Raposa Serra do Sol* is not an isolated case. Until 2015, territorial reserves in Brazil have been as high as 13,17% of the territory of the whole country¹⁰⁰⁵. Therefore, an anti-national trend can be identified, concerning the territorial integrity. Yet, there is more to be added in other domains.

Applying Clark’s methodological guideline for analysis of statements of government leaders and their context¹⁰⁰⁶, for example, in 2006, Lula da Silva not only did nothing against Bolivia – which unilaterally brook up an international agreement invading Brazil’s public company *Petrobras*’ facilities with military forces, nationalizing them – but Lula da Silva himself confessed that he has previously endorsed Bolivian President Morales personally to do so¹⁰⁰⁷. The loss for Brazil was around R\$ 6 billion in investments. Yet, in 2013, Petrobras announced new investments in Bolivia again¹⁰⁰⁸.

The creation of the University for Latin American Integration (UFILA) by Lula da Silva in 2010 can be also included in the modalities of action with the purpose of dissolving national sovereignties, including Brazil’s¹⁰⁰⁹.

The dynamics of disregarding the national interests can be, therefore, inferred. In these circumstances, it can be contended that this idea is able to explain why Brazil has

¹⁰⁰³ Bruna Carvalho, ‘Raposa Serra do Sol: Índios vivem melhor em terra demarcada, mas Estado segue ausente,’ last modified December, 2013, <https://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/apos-4-anos-demarcacao-da-raposa-serra-do-sol-foi-positiva-mas-falta-presenca-do-estado-6230.html>

¹⁰⁰⁴ ‘lamentável, para não dizer caótica’ – Leandro Prazeres, ‘General que criticou política indígena deixa comando da Amazônia e evita falar sobre Raposa/Serra do Sol,’ last modified March, 2009, UOL, <https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/2009/03/23/ult5773u873.jhtm>

¹⁰⁰⁵ Portal Brasil, ‘Brasil demarca quase 14 milhões de hectares como terra indígena em 10 anos,’ last modified October, 2015, <http://www.brasil.gov.br/cidadania-e-justica/2015/10/brasil-demarca-quase-14-milhoes-de-hectares-como-terra-indigena-em-10-anos>

¹⁰⁰⁶ Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis – A Target-centric Approach* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013), 94.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Implicante, ‘Lula confessa ter dado aval para Evo Morales tomar para a Bolívia as refinarias da Petrobras,’ last modified October, 2015, Implicante, <http://www.implicante.org/blog/lula-confessa-ter-dado-aval-para-evo-morales-tomar-para-a-bolivia-as-refinarias-da-petrobras/>

¹⁰⁰⁸ Uol Economia, ‘Petrobras volta a investir na Bolívia 7 anos após 'perder' refinarias no país, diz jornal,’ last modified February, 2013, Uol Economia, <http://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2013/02/01/petrobras-volta-investir-na-bolivia-sete-anos-apos-estatizacao.htm>

¹⁰⁰⁹ Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Lei nº 12.189, de 12 de Janeiro de 2010,’ last modified January, 2010, Presidência da República, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2010/lei/L12189.htm

been accumulating states' failures; thus, the reason why Brazil has not been pursuing a sovereign foreign policy [cf. Section 8.2.2.].

Tracing the causes, it is believed that this anti-national phenomenon in Brazil has its origins in the prevailing constraint of the leftist internationalist solidarity [cf. Subchapter 8.2.]. If, on the one hand, Brazilian *élites* have been enjoying a leftist hegemony for decades, and more antiquity goes hand in hand with more power, on the other hand, within the same leftist hegemony, Brazilian influential individuals in society and culture have been, in the overwhelming majority, controlling the flow of information that the people have access to, at the same time that the political *élites* have been determining the (anti-national) objectives in the course of political action – more knowledge goes hand in hand with more power. The system is then extremely solid [cf. Subchapter 8.2.].

Lula da Silva admitted that his *Workers' Party* aims to transform South America into a bloc, *i.e.* to virtually erase Brazil's national sovereignty¹⁰¹⁰. Rousseff continued in the same direction. Rousseff was impeached and removed from office, but current Brazilian President Michel Temer (who is not even a *Workers' Party* member), referring to the UNASUL, already sustained that the Latin American regional integration maneuver must continue and that institutions (*i.e.* executive bodies, a South American parliament, a South American court), in which those integration procedures are based on, have to be multiplied and their power increased. A final mission of the Brazilian state, Temer proclaimed, is contributing to creating a "Latin American nation" [*sic*]¹⁰¹¹.

Therefore, it can be traced an anti-national GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITY in Brazil, which did not change with the end of the administration of the *Workers' Party*.

Revisiting Taliaferro's methodological steps [cf. Subchapter 2.2.] an anti-statist ideology can be pointed out since the interests of the state have not been pursued externally. On the other hand, the existence of a statist ideology remains but only in the sense of increasing the power of the state in the internal affairs, certainly with the purpose of enlarging the state's capacities for control making, consequently, an

¹⁰¹⁰ Instituto Lula, 'Lula reafirma importância das relações com América Latina e África,' last modified October, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRHrUrWW070>

¹⁰¹¹ Papo TV, 'Discurso de Michel Temer confirma que dará continuidade aos planos do Foro de São Paulo,' last modified March, 2016, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yPVyLEzGpjk&feature=youtu.be>

international engagement easier. The empirical analysis of Brazil's geopolitical design will assist in closing the topic.

8.1.3. Analyzing Brazil's Geopolitical Design

On the path of continuing to apply the theoretic-methodological framework for geopolitical analysis, the text comes to the task of assessing Brazil's GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN [APPENDIX 2], *i.e.* to unveil and to elaborate the list of the countries' interests/goals and its hierarchy.

The National Defense Policy [*Política Nacional de Defesa*] and the National Defense Strategy [*Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*] comprise crucial information for research about the GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN.

In those documents, Brazilian authorities expressed concern about a possible increase of tensions for: “the control of maritime areas, supremacy in the outer space, sources of fresh water, food and energy”¹⁰¹². It is needless to remind that all those are problems covered by geopolitical studies.

The documents established Brazil's priorities too in the following hierarchy¹⁰¹³:

1. Cooperation with South American countries;
2. Brazil's area of influence includes: South America, Western African Countries, Antarctica and Caribbean;
3. South American integration: MERCOSUL, UNASUL, *Organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica*, cooperation with CELAC, *Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul*;
4. Cooperation in the CPLP;
5. BRICS.

Furthermore, the mentioned documents contended about (i) possible threats to Amazonia¹⁰¹⁴, and (ii) underlined the relevance of stimulating the South American

¹⁰¹² Ministério da Defesa, *Política Nacional de Defesa & Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), 17.

¹⁰¹³ Ministério da Defesa, *Política Nacional de Defesa & Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), 21-27.

¹⁰¹⁴ Ministério da Defesa, *Política Nacional de Defesa & Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), 31, 54.

integration – ‘building up a south american unity [*sic*]’ with the Council of South American Defense¹⁰¹⁵.

Map 30

Mapping Brazil’s area of influence in the World as perceived by Brazilian *élites*



Those two topics were already studied in detail in the chapter devoted to Brazilian School of Geopolitics [cf. Chapter 6.]. On the latter topic, it corresponds in a straight line to Meira Mattos’ misguided prescription calling for the continentalization “strategy” particularly.

Map 31

Map of Pan-Amazonia in the White Book of Defense¹⁰¹⁶



Note: the area corresponds to Meira Mattos’ delimitation [cf. Section 6.2.3.]

In the White Book of Defense [*Livro Branco de Defesa*], the South American integration was again proclaimed as a “strategic objective” [*objetivo estratégico*’

¹⁰¹⁵ Ministério da Defesa, *Política Nacional de Defesa & Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), 58-59.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), 365.

[sic]] and the importance of UNASUL and the Council of South American Defense – in the sphere of defense cooperation – was reassured¹⁰¹⁷.

Taking into account the effort for the definition and accurate use of concepts in this thesis [cf. Subchapter 1.2. & APPENDIX 2], the expression “strategic objective” to characterize a *geoconjunctive* maneuver is considered a fail. Besides, how can the objective be strategic if the documents themselves affirm that, technically, there is no opponent to be identified?

It cannot be ignored too that, within the mentioned priorities established by the Brazilian highest defense and foreign policy decision-makers, the U.S.A. – which has been Brazil’s traditional ally and it is still a member of Rio Pact – was not named once. In this context, it seems very hard to understand the U.S. Department of State’s almost enthusiastic text, listing the main points of cooperation with Brazil¹⁰¹⁸. That cooperation has been massively reduced in the last years. That constitutes further evidence that helps to infer that Brazil’s international position is distancing from the U.S.A.

If on the one hand, the official documents under scrutiny stated that Brazil has no enemies on the international arena, on the other hand, it seems that Brazil’s foreign policy direction has been oriented, if not against the U.S.A. directly, it has been treating the relation with the “former” ally with irrelevance, to say the least. This thesis insists in the point that none of these geopolitical dynamics [cf. APPENDIX 2, GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITY] are independent of (i) the progressive leftist socio-political hegemony in the subcontinent, (ii) the Latin American integration maneuver, and (iii) the São Paulo Forum [cf. Subchapter 8.2.].

In this context of GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES, some facts can be explained in a more coherent manner. For example, although Rousseff was impeached and removed from office, the new President of Brazil, Michel Temer, appointed Raul Jungmann as Minister of Defense. Jungmann is a *Popular Socialist Party* member¹⁰¹⁹, which participates in São Paulo Forum¹⁰²⁰. There is a continuity, since the *Communist Party of Brazil*, which Aldo Rebelo (Jungman’s predecessor) is a member of, also participates in

¹⁰¹⁷ Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), 37-38.

¹⁰¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, ‘U.S. Relations With Brazil,’ last modified July, 2015, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm>

¹⁰¹⁹ Raul Jungmann, ‘Partido,’ last modified June, 2016, Raul Jungmann, <http://www.rauljungmann.com.br/>

¹⁰²⁰ Foro de São Paulo, ‘Partidos,’ last modified June, 2016, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/partidos/>

São Paulo Forum. Jaques Wagner, Rebelo's predecessor, is a member of the *Workers' Party*, which was one of the founding parties of São Paulo Forum back in 1990.

Putting a solid GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITY at the top, the facts fit in the puzzle of a logical explanation and support the crucial idea that, under a leftist ideological guideline, South (and Latin) American integration have constituted the priority in Brazilian foreign policy, in detriment of Brazil's national defense.

The particular way how the *foreign policy executive* perceives the world – and concretely the space (*i.e.* the territory) he is in charge of – shapes states' foreign policy outcomes.

One of the main contributions of this thesis is to put light on the *experience/perception* that Brazilian *élites* (*i.e.* the FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTIVE [cf. APPENDIX 2]), have concerning the geographical setting's incentives of their country – the latter included in the relative material state potential, added to the systemic constraints. This study assesses that that experience [RAUMSINN] has been *geomisguided*. The results of the research show that the strengthening of the South American regional integration maneuver has been the absolute priority to Brazilian *élites*.

In these circumstances, it was explained that, although the study demonstrated that the relative material state potential of Brazil has been fairly high and that the systemic constraints have been permissive to changes on the international chessboard, Brazilian *élites* have been pursuing a *geoconjunctive* maneuver that can be assessed as one against Brazil's national interests. The point is then the preference for *land power* (continentalization) over *sea power* (maritimization).

The transitory, therefore contradictory, aspect of the current situation includes the particular fact that the strongest of Brazil's formal allies still is the U.S.A. (Rio Pact, 1948), however, Brazil integrates the UNASUL and the Council of South American Defense, which consolidates the South American regional defense (excluding North America) and, furthermore, intends an approach to the Russian-Chinese axis.

It is believed that this state of things can be explained by the empirical existence of an internationalist-leftist agenda in South America, namely identifiable within the political structure of São Paulo Forum.

In this context, and because, as it was argued [cf. PART I], models are not enough in comprehensive geopolitical studies, the thesis will now move forward to a

single case study about São Paulo Forum with the view to: (1) make further arguments and present more empirical evidence in order to sustain the previous statements, and (2) pave the way for the characterization of the phenomenon that Carvalho designated as the ‘revolutionary movement’ [cf. Subchapter 9.2.].

‘Rechaçamos, por isso mesmo, toda pretensão de aproveitar a crise da Europa Oriental para incitar a restauração capitalista...’

‘[R]enovamos hoje nossos projetos de esquerda e socialistas, nossos compromissos são a conquista do pão, a beleza e a alegria...’¹⁰²¹

São Paulo’s Declaration (1990), *Foro de São Paulo*

8.2. São Paulo Forum: connecting the South American integration maneuver to Meridionalism and Neo-Eurasianism

In this subchapter, there is absolutely no unwise conviction of depleting São Paulo Forum as an object. In fact, São Paulo Forum constitutes a highly relevant topic worthy to be studied in many other research pieces and from different angles. The relevance of that political organization is not only assured due to the number of primary sources to be analyzed, but also due to the complexity of São Paulo Forum’s internal dynamics and its political outcomes¹⁰²².

¹⁰²¹ transl. ‘we repel, for those reasons, any pretension of plea to restore capitalism, using the current crisis in Eastern Europe...’ ‘we renovate today our leftist and socialist projects, our goals are to conquer bread, beauty and joy...’ – Compilação das Atas do Foro de São Paulo, ‘Atas do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified December, 2008, Mídia Sem Máscara, http://www.midiaseम्मascara.org/attachments/007_atas_foro_sao_paulo.pdf

¹⁰²² Anna Novichková is currently preparing, at Charles University in Prague, a M.A. dissertation devoted to explain what role São Paulo Forum plays in Brazilian foreign policy.

Among previous studies devoted to the topic of São Paulo Forum *vide*:

William I. Robinson, ‘The São Paulo Forum: Is There a New Latin American Left?’ *Monthly Review*, vol. 44, no.7 (December 1992).

Duncan Green, ‘Latin America: Neoliberal Failure and the Search for Alternatives,’ *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1996).

Michael Löwy, ‘Hasta la Victoria...’, *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 25, no. 6 (November 1998).

Michael Löwy ‘Toward an International of Resistance against Capitalist Globalization’, transl. Charlotte Stanley, *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 29, no. 6 (November 2002).

Paulo Diniz Zamboni, *Conspiração de Portas Abertas - Como o movimento revolucionário comunista ressurgiu da América Latina através do Foro de São Paulo* (São Paulo: É Realizações, 2008).

Bruno de Paula Castanho e Silva, ‘The São Paulo Forum and the Development of Latin American Regional Integration’ 22nd IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain, 2012. Available at: http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_11763.pdf

John D. French, ‘Understanding the Politics of Latin America’s Plural Lefts (Chávez/Lula): social democracy, populism and convergence on the path to a post-neoliberal world,’ *Third World Quarterly* vol. 30, no. 2 (2009).

Luis Fleischman, *Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States*. (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013).

In this context, the goal of this subchapter is delimited to an attempt of explaining in which terms São Paulo Forum can be measured as the “strategic command” of the South American integration maneuver. In order to accomplish that measurement, the first task of the research will be to characterize the ideological and political-strategic context in Brazil (antecedent conditions). After that, it will be clarified what São Paulo Forum is, what its objectives and modalities of action are, and also some notes about how the internal mechanisms of São Paulo Forum function will be given. That will include both inferences and empirical support about how São Paulo Forum has been impacting on Brazilian Foreign Policy. Finally, this subchapter will open the perspective and integrate São Paulo Forum, Meridionalism and Neo-Eurasianism into a wider network of common objectives.

Therefore, this single case study will also test H₃ ultimately, allowing a better understanding of the position of Brazil in the NEW WORLD ORDER in terms of strategic plans.

As a research piece in geopolitical studies, this thesis could not be devoted to Brazil ignoring São Paulo Forum. São Paulo Forum constitutes the largest political organization that ever existed in Latin America with both geostrategic and geoconjunctive purposes. Those facts, added to the above-mentioned methodological qualitative guideline, justify the pertinence of this subchapter.

8.2.1. The Military Regime, the hegemony of Brazil’s radical left & the Workers’ Party (PT)

The substantive issue at stake in this section is to make an argument stating that the foundation of São Paulo Forum in Latin America (the expression includes the Caribbean) has depended on the colossal leftist hegemony in the region, particularly in Brazil. In fact, the research is limited to Brazil¹⁰²³.

Graça Salgueiro, *O Foro de São Paulo: A Mais Perigosa Organização Revolucionária das Américas* (Recife: Observatório Latino, 2016).

¹⁰²³ As a basic reading about the attempts of communist/ radical leftist movements to seize power in Brazil since 1922 *vide*: Lício Maciel and José Conegundes do Nascimento, eds., *Orvil – Tentativas de Tomada do Poder* (São Paulo: Schoba, 2012).

It is then required to address the topic of the leftist hegemony in Brazil, tracing its evolution in the line of time. Culture and ideas are, all in all, situated upstream of politics.

General Couto e Silva, an influent officer of the Brazilian Military Regime (the same general analyzed in chapter 6), can to some degree be held accountable for the making of the leftist hegemony in Brazil. In accordance to Carvalho's keynote speech to the Military Club in 1999¹⁰²⁴, the origins of the leftist hegemony among Brazilian intellectual and political classes can be traced in the period of the Military Regime itself, in which Couto e Silva's "teoria da panela de pressão" was charted¹⁰²⁵. This "theory" – or "perspective" better said – was based on the analogy that society is similar to a pressure cooker that needs to have a leakage to avoid the explosion. In this way, bearing in mind that the Military Regime was fighting against the armed leftist branch (the *guerrilha* movement), the same regime provided space for the non-armed leftist branch at (i) the University, (ii) the mass media, (iii) publishing business, and other top-society positions, even in the Catholic Church¹⁰²⁶.

The result of this 40-years long growth was a massive acculturation of Brazilian society to the left, *i.e.* the victory of what Gramsci designated as the *Cultural Revolution*, in other words, dominating the superstructure¹⁰²⁷. In these circumstances,

¹⁰²⁴ Olavo de Carvalho, 'Reparando uma injustiça pessoal,' last modified March, 1999, Olavo de Carvalho's website, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/textos/reparando.htm>

¹⁰²⁵ *Vide* also: Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 304-305.

In his former weekly radio program, Carvalho gave further explanations about 'positivism' as ideology and its influence upon Brazilian Armed Forces (particularly upon general Couto e Silva), arguing that the leaders of the Military Regime failed their major political objective. In fact, 1964 Coup was accomplished to keeping the communists away from power. Yet, even during the Military Regime, the radical left militants were already influential in the society, and shortly after the end of the Military Regime, they started seizing political positions – Mídia Sem Máscara, 'True Outspcak - Olavo de Carvalho - 1 de agosto de 2012,' last modified August 3, 2012, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAPp7SvG514&index=274&list=PLM_ovO_tRDDA9DIMmNlk9ayoKwaCHVqYy

¹⁰²⁶ Addressing to the Washington Conclave for Democracy, Carvalho explained that during the Military Regime in Brazil the left was divided in two branches: (1) "the *guerrilha* left" (fights, assaults, robbing, kidnapping, bombs, etc.) and (2) "the 'gramscian' left" (study, occupation of top-positions in the society, etc.) – Dalmo Accorsini, 'Conclave de Washington,' last modified March, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoAXfTxBjcE&feature=youtu.be>

For more information on how exactly top-society positions were simply given to the radical left militants, who immediately started to promote their ideology and to boycott ideological opponents, *vide*: Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, 'Quem tem medo da filosofia brasileira?' last modified November, 2015, Universidade Federal de Juíz de Fora, <http://www.ecsbdefesa.com.br/defesa/fts/QTMFB.pdf>

¹⁰²⁷ To better understand this topic *vide* (chronologically):

Olavo de Carvalho, *A Nova Era e a Revolução Cultural* (São Paulo: Vide, 2014 [1994]).

José Fábrega, 'Gramsci e a Estratégia atual das esquerdas,' last modified August, 2015, Inconfidência, <http://www.grupoinconfidencia.org.br/sistema/acafe-saldanha-fabrega-loureiro/2108-gramsci-e-a-estrategia-atual-das-esquerdas>

the understanding of two particular facts turns out to be easier: (i) that during the 90s Gramsci was already the most quoted author in the production of Social Sciences at the Brazilian University¹⁰²⁸, and (ii) that the leftist mentality has been predominant over the overwhelming majority of Brazilian mass media¹⁰²⁹.

Bringing Couto e Silva back to the study again, he was certainly a democrat, a zealous proponent of engaging all ideological parties on politics (including communists)¹⁰³⁰. The problem, however, laid on the lack of a serious analysis of the supreme political goals and modalities of action of the Brazilian left.

About that problem, focusing even in the 50s, Therezinha de Castro has written:

‘De um modo geral, parece que para o Conselho de Segurança dos Estados Unidos nunca existiu o perigo de um ataque comunista a qualquer país latino-americano, a não ser num contexto de guerra geral. No entanto, reconhece esse Órgão que os comunistas tinham possibilidades de controle nos países latino-americanos através de métodos eleitorais, quando não conseguiam a participação direta na política nacional... No Relatório do Comitê de Coordenação e Operações (1958) chegasse mesmo a criticar a falta de interesse do governo em combater a infiltração comunista, muito embora fosse grande o crédito na área militar de tendência direitaista.’¹⁰³¹

Sérgio Augusto de Avellar Coutinho, *A Revolução Gramscista no Ocidente* (Rio de Janeiro: Estandarte, 2002).

Sérgio Augusto de Avellar Coutinho, *Cadernos da Liberdade - uma visão do mundo diferente do senso comum modificado* (Belo Horizonte: Grupo Inconfidência, 2003).

Heitor de Paola, *O Eixo do Mal Latino-americano – e a Nova Ordem Mundial* (São Paulo: É Realizações, 2008), 103-111.

In spite of the limitations of the method, during his fieldwork and research stay in Brazil, the author was able to confirm the existence of the leftist hegemony in the country through direct observation.

¹⁰²⁸ Lincoln Secco, *Gramsci e o Brasil – Recepção e difusão de suas ideias* (São Paulo: Cortez, 2002).

Dalmo Accorsini, ‘Conclave de Washington,’ last modified March, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoAXfTxBjcE&feature=youtu.be>

The interest in Gramsci’s ideas remains deeply rooted in Brazil. For example, in November 2015, another colloquium devoted to Gramsci was held at the *Universidade de São Paulo* <http://comunicacao.fflch.usp.br/sites/comunicacao.fflch.usp.br/files/gramsci.jpg>

The Laboratory on Marxist Studies of the *Universidade de São Paulo* has been keeping on this dynamics, not only promoting conferences on Gramsci, but also on classical Marxism, Frankfurt School (Lukács, Horkheimer), etc. – Laboratory on Marxist Studies of São Paulo University, ‘Início,’ last modified May, 2016, <https://lemarxus.wordpress.com/>

It is noteworthy that exists nothing of that kind devoted to center or right wing ideologies at the Brazilian University.

¹⁰²⁹ Moral Brasileira, ‘Comunismo no Brasil - Explicação de Olavo de Carvalho,’ last modified January, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdNAw-qYXxc>

¹⁰³⁰ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 9, 14, 21, 34.

¹⁰³¹ transl. ‘In general, it seems that to the U.S. National Security Council the danger of a communist attack in any Latin American country did never exist, if excluded the possibility of a general war.

Revisiting Castro's analysis reinforces the perspectives of Carvalho, Fábrega, Coutinho and Paola, who acknowledged and characterized the long-term goal of Brazilian radical left militants in seizing and concentrating political power.

This context of leftist hegemony in Brazil was essential so that the *Workers' Party* [*Partido dos Trabalhadores*] could have had the chance to be created in 1980 and flourished afterward.

Yet, the key question on this topic is: is the *Workers' Party* a communist party? There is a wide range of empirical facts that support the argument that *Workers' Party* is a communist party indeed¹⁰³².

Nevertheless, "communism" might currently have so many meanings that Carvalho's characterization of the *Workers' Party* as a 'gramscian-leninist' party (– consequently an outsider of the western democratic rules –) seems to capture the essence of the reality¹⁰³³.

In fact, there are interesting studies in this line, explaining with detail that Gramsci is the key author to understand the *Workers' Party*¹⁰³⁴. Thus, the [communism-]gramscian-leninist stream constitutes the core of the *Workers' Party*.

Nonetheless, more important than ideas, and rhetoric objectives and intentions – all of them together make part of the ideological justification merely – is to identify real political connections, compromises, and modalities of action, which are oriented to the real objectives of achieving power, remaining in power and concentrating power.

Those connections can then be unveiled through meticulous research.

In 2013, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, accompanied by a cortege of Ministers, attended the 13th Congress of the *Communist Party of Brazil*. With a huge picture of Lenin behind her, Rousseff sent her best regards to the audience, praised the

Nevertheless, that council acknowledged that, through electoral ways, if not through direct participation on politics, communists were able to control some Latin American countries... In the Coordination and Operations' Report (1958) it was even criticized the lack of interest of the U.S. administration in fighting against the communist infiltration, and that in spite of the right-wing's prestige in the military sphere.' – Therezinha de Castro, *Nossa América: Geopolítica Comparada* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1994), 349.

¹⁰³² Before anything else, it is necessary to go through the *Workers' Party* own communist rhetoric in the "List of Principles" and "Manifest":

Comissão Nacional Provisória, 'Carta de Princípios,' last modified August, 2015, Partido dos Trabalhadores, <http://www.pt.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/cartadepincipios.pdf>
Partido dos Trabalhadores, 'Manifesto,' last modified August, 2015, Partido dos Trabalhadores, <http://www.pt.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/manifestodefundacaopt.pdf>

¹⁰³³ Olavo de Carvalho, 'O cão, o lobo e o rato,' last modified May, 2015, Mídia Sem Máscara, <http://www.midiasesmascara.org/artigos/cultura/15819-2015-05-08-22-34-29.html>

¹⁰³⁴ For example: Lincoln Moraes de Souza, 'Crônica de um partido não anunciando: programa e governos do PT entre 1979-2000' (Ph.D. diss., Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2004). Available at: <http://www.bibliotecadigital.unicamp.br/document/?code=vtls000339324>

leadership of the *Communist Party of Brazil*, and gave a roughly one-hour speech, having talked about the compatibility (*i.e.* connections between power objectives and modalities of action) between the *Workers' Party* and the *Communist Party of Brazil*. The ultimate point, Rousseff clarified, is to cross together the path for the construction of the socialist society, some day in the future¹⁰³⁵ [cf. the topic of the 'revolutionary mentality' in the Section 9.2.3].

The association of Rousseff with the *Communist Party of Brazil* is not surprising if taken into account Rousseff's biography. Rousseff is a former terrorist, engaged in the radical left *guerrilha* movement and she was allegedly responsible for violently armed bank robbing. Moreover, the terrorist organization that she was a member of was involved in the murder of U.S. Captain Chandler with 14 machine-gun shots, a fact that was confessed by Rousseff in person in 1970, and later denied. Those facts are publically known in Brazil¹⁰³⁶.

Consequently, communist *clichés* used by the *Workers' Party* are nothing but rhetoric images¹⁰³⁷. Their importance is truly revealed while subordinated to the real modality of action of any radical socialist or communist party: the creation of the *nomenklatura* on the top of the state, a superior class that will necessarily merge political with economic power, in order to achieve "equality". In order to achieve "equality" it is justified (i) the concentration of as much power as possible and (ii) the maintenance of the oppression of the society since there is no other way to guarantee the same economic status for everyone (– except for the ruling class itself, which has remained rich, as the empirical study of historical facts easily demonstrate¹⁰³⁸). All these

¹⁰³⁵ Ives Lima, 'Presidenta Dilma no ato político do 13º Congresso do PC do B,' last modified November, 2013, You Tube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iR9mFvScJMc>

¹⁰³⁶ Eduardo Jorge Matins Alves Sobrinho, Fernando Paulo Nagle Gabeira, Vera Sílvia Araújo de Magalhães confessed with no margin for misinterpretations that the guerilla movement, which they were part of together with Rousseff, was fighting against the Military Regime in order 'to establish in Brazil the Dictatorship of the Proletariat', *i.e.* a communist regime – Rrhugo, 'Dilma lutou pela democracia?,' last modified December, 2014, You Tube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PUGKd7RLuE>

¹⁰³⁷ *E.g.*: "class struggle", "artificial division of the society: people vs bourgeoisie", "hate among races", "reformation of democracy", "anti-capitalism", "feminism", "gay rights", "sexual education for children", "drug liberalization", "disarmament", "social conquests" and "social equality", "internationalism", "progressive forces", "path to the new world" or "socialist paradise", "popular democracy" – or simply "democracy" because, as explained by the post-communist Argentinian author Laclau – Ernesto Laclau, '*Politics and the Limits of Modernity*,' in *Postmodernism: A Reader*, ed. Thomas Docherty (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 342-343; *vide* also: Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy – Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001) – democracy – 'empty signifier' word – may have a double sense: one sense for the masses (false meaning), and another sense for the party (the true meaning, which party members know what is about).

¹⁰³⁸ The author cannot name one single example of a communist party that once in power did not impoverished the people, in return of enriching the political class.

stages, history has shown (e.g. USSR, Cuba, Vietnam), are crossed by terrorism, criminality, and killings [cf. Section 8.2.2. connections between the *Workers' Party* and FARC].

This theoretic-historical portrait corresponds to the germinal political circumstances in Brazil¹⁰³⁹. Lech Walesa, former President of Poland with vast experience in ascertaining communist regimes, informed that Lula da Silva and his *Workers' Party* aim to implant a socialist system in Brazil, and that they prepared political connections for that to happen¹⁰⁴⁰.

In these circumstances, it is crucial to bear in mind that former President Lula da Silva, as a political agent, built up his career within the international communist movement. Accordingly, he has pursued the interests of the “Revolution” and not Brazil’s national interests. This background can then help in explaining what was above described concerning the weakening of Brazil’s relative material state potential [cf. Subchapter 8.1.]¹⁰⁴¹.

The concentration and abuse of power by the officials of the *Workers' Party* has been, gradually, more and more visible. In a judicial video in the Brazilian Congress, at the ‘*Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito – Crimes Cibernéticos*’ about the electoral procedures, a lawyer pointed out that (i) the voting machines SMARTMATIC can neither be monitored nor controlled, and (ii) that the final counting of the votes in the

¹⁰³⁹ Several alarming examples: (i) in a public talk, university full professor Marilena Chauí, under the audience’s enthusiastic applause, expressed “her hate for the middle class” right in front of a smiling former Brazilian President Lula da Silva – Fernando Frederico, ‘Marilena Chauí: “Eu odeio a classe média”,’ last modified October, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsvhFMrJLT8>; (ii) university professor Mauro Iasi gave speech at the CSP 2nd National Congress, quoting Brecht, promoting openly executions of conservative people, in the deepest traditions of the communist totalitarian style – Politicamente Incorreto, ‘Mauro Iasi (PCB) defende em público o assassinato de Conservadores,’ last modified November, 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dtHfl-ESP5g>; (iii) whilst the impeachment process of Rousseff was still running, Vagner Freitas de Moraes, the president of Brazilian communist trade-union (CUT), affirmed, before President Rousseff, that “the members of his trade union will create an army that will be ready to fight in the streets against the impeachment constitutional procedure promoted by the ‘bourgeoisie’” – Reaçonaria, ‘Presidente da CUT: “ir para as ruas entrincheirados com armas na mão” defender Dilma,’ last modified August, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgmbRCMYyyw>

¹⁰⁴⁰ KitKyre, “Vou implantar o Socialismo no Brasil”, diz Lula a Walesa,’ last modified September, 2008, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ub4Yvqn4m0I>

In fact, the *socialist system* in Brazil is at such advanced stage that the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business 2016 Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency’ report concluded that it is harder to do business in Brazil than in [communist] China – The World Bank, ‘Doing Business 2016 Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency,’ last modified December 7, 2015, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB16-Full-Report.pdf>, 5. Same information from another source: <http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking>

¹⁰⁴¹ These statements are the answer to the question: ‘what are the events and and experiences that helped shape the leader’s personality (psychogenesis)?’ posed by the technique of political personality profiling [cf. Subchapter 2.2.].

last Brazilian Presidential election (2014) was secretly accomplished by a small group of people only, supervised by a *Workers' Party* official¹⁰⁴². So it can be raised doubts about the legitimacy of 2014 Presidential elections.

The crucial point remains: political connections, real objectives, and modalities of action, not only ideas or rhetoric images, constitute the matter at stake. Making an analogy, this argument reassures the relevance of *systemic constraints* as independent variable (and that means its prevalence) before the entrance of *élites' perceptions* and *capacities* in the equation.

This said – having explained and sustained that it exists in Brazil a leftist hegemony in culture and politics and that Brazil's *Workers' Party* can be perceived as a communist party¹⁰⁴³ – the study is able to move forward to the analysis of São Paulo Forum as a *Workers' Party* international creation and, simultaneously, a systemic constraint in South America.

8.2.2. São Paulo Forum and Brazilian foreign policy outcomes

Once the antecedent conditions were explained, *i.e.* the hegemony of the radical left in Brazil was assessed and the creation of the *Workers' Party* as result of that context was explained too, this section will now be dedicated to characterizing how that ideological context of Brazil's radical left is internationally engaged in Latin America, and how does that international engagement impact on politics not only in Brazil, but also in other countries of the region. For that, the crucial object to be examined is São Paulo Forum.

The foundation of São Paulo Forum¹⁰⁴⁴ on the 1st – 4th July 1990 resulted from a shared project by the Brazilian *Workers' Party* leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the *Cuban Communist Party* leader Fidel Castro¹⁰⁴⁵.

¹⁰⁴² CPI – Crimes Cibernéticos, 'Vídeo: vejam provas de que as eleições são fraudadas no Brasil,' last modified April, 2016, <http://peloamordedeus.com/video-vejam-provas-de-que-as-eleicoes-sao-fraudadas-no-brasil/>

¹⁰⁴³ Or "revolutionary-marxist [*sic*] party" – Mobilização Patriota, 'O Socialismo Petista - 3º Congresso do Partido dos Trabalhadores,' last modified September, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OI8C-vKe6sw>

¹⁰⁴⁴ In Brazil, the main analyst on the topic of São Paulo Forum and its relevance on international politics has certainly been Olavo de Carvalho. In this subchapter, the majority of his works on this topic will be cited.

Through the way of action of unifying one single leftist *grand* strategy for all Latin America, the Forum has been counting with more than 100 members, which not only include leftist political parties¹⁰⁴⁶ (particularly from Brazil, not only *Workers' Party* participates, but also other 6 Communist/Marxist Brazilian parties¹⁰⁴⁷), but also criminal organizations¹⁰⁴⁸. In this way, São Paulo Forum gives continuation to the communist dynamics of association of politics with terrorism and organized crime. This issue will be revisited below [cf. Subchapter 9.2], and matters to geopolitical studies in the sense of both (i) Chauprade's variable #6 [cf. Section 1.2.3.] and (ii) organized crime as geopolitical concept¹⁰⁴⁹.

Nevertheless, *vide* also: Sérgio Augusto de Avellar Coutinho, *Cadernos da Liberdade - uma visão do mundo diferente do senso comum modificado* (Belo Horizonte: Grupo Inconfidência, 2003).

¹⁰⁴⁵ Foro de São Paulo, “‘É preciso acelerar a integração latino-americana”, diz secretário-executivo do Foro de São Paulo,” last modified July, 2013, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/e-preciso-acelerar-a-integracao-latino-americana-diz-secretario-executivo-do-foro-de-sao-paulo/>

The meeting was held at the ‘Hotel Danúbio’ once located in *Brigadeiro Luis Antônio Avenue*, São Paulo city.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Foro de São Paulo, ‘Partidos,’ last modified July, 2015, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/partidos/>

¹⁰⁴⁷ Foro de São Paulo, ‘Com Maduro, revolução está mais sólida, diz irmão de Chavez em SP,’ last modified August, 2013, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/com-maduro-revolucao-esta-mais-solida-diz-irmao-de-chavez-em-sp/>

¹⁰⁴⁸ Foro de São Paulo, ‘Declaração Final do Foro de SP defende luta pelo socialismo,’ last modified August, 2008, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/declaracao-final-do-foro-de-sp-defende-luta-pelo-socialismo/>

Jaimesledo, ‘Reunião do Foro de São Paulo – Veja,’ last modified November, 2010, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCEJ3ydG0H8>

Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 113.

Raúl Reyes, a Member of FARC Central High Command killed in 2008, was one of the agents making the bridge between FARC and São Paulo Forum, as São Paulo Forum’s newspaper *America Libre* informed – Claudia Korol, ‘El pueblo en armas, entrevista a Raúl Reyes, miembro del secretariado nacional de las FARC-EP,’ last modified August, 2015, <http://www.nodo50.org/americalibre/anteriores/10/>

Vide also:

The minutes of *Foro de São Paulo – Compilação das Atas do Foro de São Paulo*, ‘Atas do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified December, 2008, Mídia Sem Máscara, http://www.midiasemmascara.org/attachments/007_atas_foro_sao_paulo.pdf

Alejandro Peña Esclusa, ‘Carta de Alejandro Peña Esclusa ao candidato José Serra,’ last modified July 28, 2010, Forza Solidaria, <http://fuerzasolidaria.org/?p=3346>

To understand FARC’s quest for political legitimization and the role of *Workers' Party* in that process *vide*: Colonel Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, ‘A camarada e compatriota Dilma Rousseff é a tábua de salvação política das FARC,’ last modified July, 2015, Conflicto Colombiano e Historia de Colombia, <http://www.luisvillamarin.com/articulos/portugues/411-a-camarada-e-compatriota-dilma-rousseff-e-a-tabua-de-salvacao-politica-das-farc.html> and General Marco Antonio Felício da Silva, ‘O PT, as FARC e o crime organizado,’ last modified November 26, 2015, Inconfidência, http://www.grupoinconfidencia.org.br/sistema/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2222:o-pt-as-farc-e-o-crime-organizado&catid=284:marco-antonio-felicio-da-silva&Itemid=426

About other connections between the Russian Mafia and South America *vide* Subchapter 9.2.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thuail, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 484-486.

It is opportune to emphasize that, at the time of the end of the Cold War, while the West (with Fukuyama¹⁰⁵⁰) was thinking the game was over, while the USSR was collapsing and the deliveries of money and strong relations between the Soviet bloc and the communist parties in Latin America was meeting the twilight, simultaneously, in Latin America, a movement that currently gives political recommendations for the entire sub-continental units, the Latin American states, was discreetly founded.

The pivotal objective of São Paulo Forum can be resumed in these terms: ‘*«recuperar na América Latina o que foi perdido no Leste Europeu»*’,¹⁰⁵¹ [vide the epigraph of this subchapter too].

Therefore, it can be traced a clear geographical and ideological link between the Eastern Europe/ Soviet bloc and Latin America.

In the effort to explaining the dimension of São Paulo Forum’s pivotal objective, it may be added that the organization can be defined by the expressions (1) “strategic command of Latin America”¹⁰⁵² or (2) “the strategic coordination of communist revolutionary movement in Latin America”¹⁰⁵³.

With the view to avoid considering those expressions as overstatements, it is necessary to analyze empirical facts.

In 2005, acting Brazilian President Lula da Silva affirmed:

‘E graças a essa relação [no Foro de São Paulo] foi possível construirmos, com muitas divergências políticas, a consolidação do que aconteceu na Venezuela...’¹⁰⁵⁴

¹⁰⁵⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1998). First edition is from 1992.

¹⁰⁵¹ transl. ‘to regain in Latin America what was lost in the Eastern Europe’ – Graça Salgueiro, ‘27/04 - O Foro de São Paulo elege seu 10º Presidente na América Latina,’ last modified April, 2008, A Verdade Sufocada, <http://www.verdadesufocada.com/index.php/foro-de-so-paulo-especial-102/1072-2704-o-foro-de-so-paulo-elege-seu-10-presidente-na-amrica-latina>

¹⁰⁵² Tradutores de Direita, ‘O Triunfo do Marxismo Cultural - Olavo de Carvalho, Cliff Kincaid e Jerry Kenney,’ last modified March, 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1483&v=O4raFHTlyjU>

¹⁰⁵³ MoralBrasileira, ‘Comunismo no Brasil - Explicação de Olavo de Carvalho,’ last modified January, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdNAw-qYXxc>

Vide also one of Altman’s statements (Breno Altman is one of the São Paulo Forum’s highest officials): “the majority of the Latin American nations is ruled by São Paulo Forum member-parties” – Breno Altman, ‘Por que a direita odeia o Foro de São Paulo?,’ last modified July 31, 2013, Opera Mundi, <http://operamundi.uol.com.br/conteudo/opiniao/30342/por+que+a+direita+odeia+o+foro+de+sao+paulo.s.html>

¹⁰⁵⁴ transl. ‘and thanks to that relation [inside São Paulo Forum] it was possible to construct, in spite of many divergences, the consolidation of events in Venezuela...’ – Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no ato político de celebração aos 15 anos do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified June, 2015, Biblioteca da Presidência da República, <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/10->

What Lula da Silva referred as “the consolidation of events in Venezuela” was Hugo Chavez’s coming into power precisely. Lula da Silva continued:

‘Foi assim que nós pudemos atuar junto a outros países com os nossos companheiros do movimento social, dos partidos daqueles países, do movimento sindical, sempre utilizando a relação construída no Foro de São Paulo para que pudéssemos conversar sem que parecesse e sem que as pessoas entendessem qualquer interferência política.’¹⁰⁵⁵

This speech constitutes a pretty unique document in the discipline of Political Science, taking into account that it is offered a public revelation of violations of the principles of national sovereignty and national independence by the Brazilian President as political agent. In that same speech, Lula da Silva also listed the countries that São Paulo Forum directly or indirectly influenced: Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile¹⁰⁵⁶.

In another talk, Lula da Silva stated that it was due to the São Paulo Forum influence that so many leftist leaders came to power in their home countries and, furthermore, that the assistance provided by the Cuban communist *élites* was crucial in the whole procedure¹⁰⁵⁷.

Confirming Lula da Silva’s explanations, Zé Dirceu (currently under custody and once a high-ranking *Workers’ Party* official) stated that São Paulo Forum has been the engine for international coordination in Latin America with the objective of giving

mandato/2005/2o-semester/02-07-2005-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-na-reuniao-do-conselho-de-cupula-do-mercosul/view

¹⁰⁵⁵ transl. ‘It was in that way that we were able to act inside other countries, together with our social movement comrades, together with political parties of those countries, trade-unions, always making use of connections built up in the São Paulo Forum so that we may have talked without anyone noticing about that, thus without the people understanding any political interference’ – Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no ato político de celebração aos 15 anos do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified June, 2015, Biblioteca da Presidência da República, <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/1o-mandato/2005/2o-semester/02-07-2005-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-na-reuniao-do-conselho-de-cupula-do-mercosul/view>

¹⁰⁵⁶ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no ato político de celebração aos 15 anos do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified June, 2015, Biblioteca da Presidência da República, <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/1o-mandato/2005/2o-semester/02-07-2005-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-na-reuniao-do-conselho-de-cupula-do-mercosul/view>

Vide also: Foro de São Paulo, “‘Somos una alternativa victoriosa al neoliberalismo”,’ last modified July, 2012, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/somos-una-alternativa-victoriosa-al-neoliberalismo/>

¹⁰⁵⁷ Quero Abertura Política, ‘Lula explica a estratégia do Foro de São Paulo para chegar ao poder,’ last modified September, 2013, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzNiz64UHfo>

all kinds of support to left-wing politicians, so that they could get to the positions of head of states/government in their home countries¹⁰⁵⁸.

Naturally, this mutual interference of states in one another's internal affairs would have, sooner or later, impacted on Brazil itself. Loryel Rocha, the president of '*Instituto Mukharajj Brasilan*' explained, in May 2016, that the removal of Eduardo Cunha from the leadership of the National Congress Low Chamber by Supreme Federal Court Judges (who have previously been nominated by both Presidents Lula da Silva and Rousseff) – and the subsequent substitution of Cunha by a *Workers' Party* supporter – suggests a direct influence of São Paulo Forum directives on Brazilian political system¹⁰⁵⁹.

In his message to the 20th São Paulo Forum Congress, Lula da Silva insisted on the point, characterizing São Paulo Forum as the critical agency for Latin American regional integration¹⁰⁶⁰.

Continuing on the topic of the dynamics of continental coordination in Latin America (or mutual interference by the violation of national sovereignties), other facts can be listed: (i) the Brazilian state mobilized under President Lula da Silva so that Chavez could have been “re-elected” in Venezuela¹⁰⁶¹; (ii) Maduro's Venezuela admitted to interfere in Paraguay¹⁰⁶²; (iii) the *Communist Party of Brazil* denounced that *Workers' Party* has been intervening in others countries' politics, so that São Paulo Forum comrades could win elections¹⁰⁶³, and that was confirmed several times by the executive secretary of São Paulo Forum Valter Pomar in person¹⁰⁶⁴; (iv) Ortega's Nicaragua stated that São Paulo Forum will create a

¹⁰⁵⁸ Felipe Moura Brasil, 'Lula e José Dirceu - Uma longa história de cumplicidade,' last modified August, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbdiDajIFhk&feature=youtu.be>

¹⁰⁵⁹ Instituto Mukharajj Brasilan, 'Conselheiro Acácio: Teori Zavasky e a juristocracia do Foro de São Paulo,' last modified May, 2016, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pRPwq4DIOo>

¹⁰⁶⁰ Mobilização Patriota, 'Mensagem de Lula aos companheiros do Foro de São Paulo,' last modified September, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M5wTn4Q8wTU>

¹⁰⁶¹ Foro de São Paulo, 'Partidos e movimentos lançam campanha Brasil está com Chávez,' last modified July, 2012, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/partidos-e-movimentos-lancam-campanha-brasil-esta-com-chavez/>

¹⁰⁶² Foro de São Paulo, 'Esquerda latino-americana se reúne em São Paulo para debater seus rumos,' last modified July, 2013, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/esquerda-latino-americana-se-reune-em-sao-paulo-para-debater-seus-rumos/>

¹⁰⁶³ Foro de São Paulo, 'A institucionalização e a hegemonia reformista no Foro de São Paulo,' last modified August, 2013, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/a-institucionalizacao-e-a-hegemonia-reformista-no-foro-de-sao-paulo/>

¹⁰⁶⁴ Foro de São Paulo, 'Encontro em Manágua foi um dos mais representativos, diz Valter Pomar,' last modified May, 2011, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/foro-de-sao-paulo-encontro-em-managua-foi-um-dos-mais-representativos-diz-valter-pomar/>

Foro de São Paulo, 'Foro de São Paulo: “Sua grande qualidade é a diversidade e força política” – Entrevista com Valter Pomar,' last modified May, 2011, Foro de São Paulo,

‘... historical ruling for the whole continent
[sic]...’¹⁰⁶⁵.

From this set of facts, it is inevitable to infer that one is observing the expiration of the Westphalian order in Latin America since the interference of a state in one another’s internal affairs is openly confessed by the heads of state¹⁰⁶⁶.

Furthermore, the democratic system is also violated since governmental decisions have been taken place in secret or discreet meetings, parallel to the national-constitutional democratic institutions, which are supposed to monitor and to control the Executive *in name of the people*, as the constraints of the western division of powers force to.

From the geopolitical studies’ point of view, the greatest problem would certainly be the end of South American states’ sovereignty and independence. Because of that, and since the *Workers’ Party* is at the very origin of São Paulo Forum, Carvalho has come to the conclusion that the *Workers’ Party* should be declared an international organization, therefore an illegal political party in Brazil¹⁰⁶⁷.

In this vein, in April 2016, Brazil’s sovereignty was challenged again. President Rousseff, who was at that time under the impeachment procedure, suggested that MERCOSUL and UNASUL should ‘evaluate’ Brazil’s internal political events¹⁰⁶⁸. In other words, a head of state of a sovereign country called for international organizations to ‘evaluate’ the country’s own internal constitutional procedures. After the victory of the impeachment, the UNASUL secretary’s response was released, addressing support to Rousseff¹⁰⁶⁹.

<http://forodesaopaulo.org/foro-de-sao-paulo-sua-grande-qualidade-e-a-diversidade-e-forca-politica-entrevista-com-valter-pomar/>

Valter Pomar, *A Estrela na Janela – Ensaio sobre o PT e a situação internacional* (São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2014).

¹⁰⁶⁵ Foro de São Paulo, ‘Começa o 17º Encontro do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified May, 2011, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/comeca-o-17%C2%B0-foro-de-sao-paulo/>

¹⁰⁶⁶ Vide also: Foro de São Paulo, ‘Declaração final – Caracas – 2012,’ last modified November 21, 2015, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/declaracao-final-caracas-2012/>

¹⁰⁶⁷ Brasil Indomável, ‘PT deve ser fechado - Olavo de Carvalho,’ last modified August, 2011, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkWBUIbeSmUI>

¹⁰⁶⁸ Portugal digital, ‘Dilma apela ao Mercosul e à Unasul para impedir impeachment,’ last modified April, 2016, Portugal Digital, <http://www.portugaldigital.com.br/politica/ver/20102469-dilma-apela-em-nova-york-ao-mercopol-e-a-unasul-para-impedir-impeachment>

¹⁰⁶⁹ Agência Ansa, ‘Unasul diz que afastamento de Dilma abre precedente perigoso,’ last modified May, 2016, EBC Agência Brasil, <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/internacional/noticia/2016-05/unasul-diz-que-afastamento-de-dilma-abre-precedente-perigoso>

In spite of all São Paulo Forum's illegitimate modalities of action that were described and analyzed, perhaps the most terrifying aspect of São Paulo Forum, and by extension of the *Workers' Party*, is their connections to crime and criminal organizations.

Rousseff's ex-husband Carlos F. Paixão Araújo confessed that, in the past, he Rousseff and other radicals founded VAR, a Communist paramilitary unit, which was responsible for bank robbing and weapons robbing directly from military facilities¹⁰⁷⁰. That meant, in other words, collecting funding and weaponry to pursue terrorism, *guerrilha* and selective killings. This fact is vital to understand the revolutionary perceptions of the former Head of State of Brazil and also the kind of "environment" in which the majority of the leaders of the *Workers' Party* was trained in.

Until he was arrested by the Colombian Army, Luiz Fernando da Costa (Fernandinho Beira-Mar) was the representative of FARC in Brazil, having purchased cocaine from that criminal organization paying with cash or weapons. That illegal commerce took place during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidency (1995-2003) and already by that time Fernandinho Beira-Mar confessed to the authorities that "half of the country was involved"¹⁰⁷¹.

As it was mentioned, the FARC have been interrelated to São Paulo Forum¹⁰⁷². At the same time, Brazil has been transformed into a center of confluence and worldwide distribution of drugs (especially to the U.S.A. and to Europe), together with money laundry, murders, and kidnapping¹⁰⁷³.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Partido Conservador, 'Ex marido de Dilma Rouseff confessa crimes cometidos com a guerrilheira,' last modified March, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ancDbw4uec8>

¹⁰⁷¹ Agência Estado, 'Beira-Mar confessa que pagava US\$ 10 mi por mês às Farc,' last modified April, 2001, Estadão, <http://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,beira-mar-confessa-que-pagava-us-10-mi-por-mes-as-farc,20010423p24229>

¹⁰⁷² This fact is documented in the original São Paulo Forum minutes. The resolutions of the 10th São Paulo Forum congress in Havana constitute evidence of the support given by São Paulo Forum to FARC – Compilação das Atas do Foro de São Paulo, 'Atas do Foro de São Paulo,' last modified December, 2008, Mídia Sem Máscara, http://www.midiaseम्मascara.org/attachments/007_atas_foro_sao_paulo.pdf

In addition, there is another very important document on this matter, a letter sent by FARC to São Paulo Forum in 2007. In this document, among valuable data, it is noteworthy that: (i) FARC thanked the *Workers' Party* for having saved the communist movement in South America, and (ii) FARC claimed that the coming to power of leftist officials in South American countries was an outcome of São Paulo Forum influence – Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, 'Saludo Mesa directiva del Foro de Sao Paulo,' last modified January, 2007, FARC-EP, <http://web.archive.org/web/20070310215800/www.farcep.org/?node=2,2513,1>

¹⁰⁷³ Luis Esnal, 'Brasil, nuevo paraíso del narcotráfico,' last modified August, 2007, La Nación, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/933850-brasil-nuevo-paraiso-del-narcotrafico>

Still delimiting the network, the FARC – which not only controlled the majority of the illegal drug trade in Colombia already in 2013¹⁰⁷⁴, but in the course of time have also been creating a monopoly in the whole South America – have been training the MST [*Movimento dos Sem Terra*], which is financially supported by the Brazilian government inside of the country¹⁰⁷⁵.

Furthermore, the direct connections and compromises between the FARC and Brazil's *Workers' Party* were uncovered by the late FARC commander Raul Reyes, who into an interview depicted the relations between the FARC, the *Workers' Party* and the prominent Brazilian professor Emir Sader, once director of Political Science Department at *Universidade de São Paulo*¹⁰⁷⁶.

While writing about the relations between the *Workers' Party* and the FARC, a Brazilian journalist stated:

‘O objetivo declarado do Foro é debater estratégias para tornar o continente sul-americano socialista, o que é perfeitamente legal.’¹⁰⁷⁷

The problem lies less on the objective than on the modalities of action used *in* and *by* the São Paulo Forum members. Among those modalities of action are included relations to drug trafficking and all other sorts of crime – that is confirmed by the fact of the engagement of FARC in the São Paulo Forum¹⁰⁷⁸.

In that context of modalities of action for concentration of power and pursue of crime by the *Workers' Party*, the right-wing member of the Brazilian Congress Jair Bolsonaro has been insisting that the former Santo André mayor, Celso Daniel, was

¹⁰⁷⁴ Helen Murphy and Luís Jaime Acosta, ‘FARC controls 60 percent of drug trade - Colombia's police chief,’ last modified April, 2013, Reuters, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-colombia-rebels-police-idUKBRE93L18Y20130422>

¹⁰⁷⁵ Epoch Times, ‘FARC ensinam técnica de guerrilha a membros do MST, aponta jornalista,’ last modified October, 2014, Epoch Times, <https://www.epochtimes.com.br/farc-ensinam-tecnica-guerrilha-a-membros-mst-aponta-jornalista/#.V1f3kZF97IU>

¹⁰⁷⁶ Fabiano Maisonnave, ‘“As Farc têm todo o tempo do mundo”, diz comandante,’ last modified August, 2003, Folha de São Paulo, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/mundo/ult94u62119.shtml>

¹⁰⁷⁷ transl. ‘The proclaimed objective of [São Paulo] Forum is to debate strategies in order to make the South American continent [*sic*] into a socialist bloc, something that is perfectly legal’ – João Bosco Rabello, ‘PT e Farc, uma antiga relação ideológica que encontrou abrigo no governo brasileiro,’ last modified July, 2010, Estadão, <http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/joao-bosco/pt-e-farcs-uma-antiga-relacao-ideologica-que-encontrou-abrigo-no-governo-brasileiro/>


¹⁰⁷⁸ Besides that fact, São Paulo Forum's influence on South American politics will receive a new impulse with the success of the recent agreement between the Colombian government and FARC. This agreement is currently being prepared, mediated in and by Habana's communist authorities, between Colombian President Santos and FARC commander Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri. After the crimes that FARC committed for decades, FARC will be granted political participation (achieving its major objective), instead of fair punishment for their crimes, an insult to the victims, but a triumph for the radical left in Latin America.

kidnapped, tortured and assassinated in 2002 under a *Workers' Party* direct order, so that a judicial investigation about Lula da Silva's connection to corruption (who at the time was preparing his presidential run) could have been prevented¹⁰⁷⁹.

Nevertheless, above everything else, there is the fact that, for more than a decade, roughly 50.000 Brazilians are victims of intentional homicides every year (in 2014 it was 59.681) and the government did not take any measures to solve the problem. It is inferred that this fact results from the political context and, therefore, can be designated as a *democide* to use Rummel's word [cf. Subchapter 8.1].

Therefore, it can be inferred an accord between Latin American legal political parties and criminal organizations [cf. Figure 7]. "Fake" is then an essential category to be used in the analysis and explanation of Brazil's politics: the intellectual and political classes speak about democracy and legitimacy, but the real aim is to control and to restrict individual liberties and to implant a political system more and more powerful. Laclau's 'empty signifier' enlightens the whole context.

Figure 7
Diagram of relations between the *Workers' Party*, São Paulo Forum and FARC within the sphere of the radical left



¹⁰⁷⁹ Canal da direita, 'O vídeo do Bolsonaro que a imprensa escondeu,' last modified April, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SWjJG7Mmakg>

Several notes should be made to finishing the characterization of the pivotal objective and modalities of action of São Paulo Forum members.

The ‘articulation of leftist parties of South America’ with criminal organizations that takes place in São Paulo Forum aims to ‘construct a new internationalism’ with the final mission of “creating a new civilization”¹⁰⁸⁰. It seems that there is no overstatement in naming a ‘revolutionary alliance with continental [*sic*] dimensions: Lula-Castro-Chavez/Maduro’¹⁰⁸¹, which has been working to achieve the final objective of transforming “all South America into a Union of Socialist Republics”¹⁰⁸².

São Paulo Forum’s resolutions and the discreet meetings among government officials have been influencing the political outcomes of South American countries. When that influence is not openly confessed and described by the political agents (the sampling that the text analyzed constitutes an occasion in which that happened), it is hard to trace all steps and to measure the full dimension of that influence, due to a lack of documentation.

Even so, the nature itself of São Paulo Forum as a thick network of power relations remains an observable fact, taking into account the Forum’s size and the impact in absolute terms.

In conclusion about this point, São Paulo Forum is constituted as a leftist staff with no space for center and right-wing forces. Thus, in which democracy has no place¹⁰⁸³. Additionally, it has been associated with criminal organizations.

One of the most interesting phenomena in Brazilian politics has been the limited resistance of very few individuals of Brazilian top society positions against the massive plans of both the *Workers’ Party* and São Paulo Forum. The radical leftist and anti-democratic hegemony in the country can certainly justify that state-of-things. This means that that hegemony can explain the lack of organized political opposition to the huge GEOCONJUNCTIVE maneuver, which takes shape inside São Paulo Forum.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Mobilização Patriota, ‘O Socialismo Petista - 3º Congresso do Partido dos Trabalhadores,’ last modified September, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OI8C-vKe6sw>

¹⁰⁸¹ MoralBrasileira, ‘Comunismo no Brasil - Explicação de Olavo de Carvalho,’ last modified January, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdNAw-qYXxc>

¹⁰⁸² Blogdelinks, ‘Foro de São Paulo, KGB, Nova Ordem Mundial – Olavo de Carvalho,’ last modified August, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NzOSNKtHOek>

¹⁰⁸³ On the question of the anti-democratic aspect of São Paulo Forum, the connections between *Workers’ Party* with communism and *Cuba’s Communist Party* are the foundations themselves of São Paulo Forum – Foro de São Paulo, ‘La solidaridad es un pilar fundamental del socialismo,’ last modified December, 2011, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/la-solidaridad-es-un-pilar-fundamental-del-socialismo/>

Some of those few individuals will now be the object of study.

Olavo de Carvalho was the first individual who explained and publically exposed the Forum's objectives and modalities of action.

Brazilian Ambassador and former minister of foreign affairs, the late Luiz Felipe Lampreia contended that, in his view, the São Paulo Forum's directives have been directing Brazil's foreign policy outcomes. He also affirmed that since Lula da Silva came into Brazil's presidential office the country did not have "state's politics any longer, but only party politics"¹⁰⁸⁴.

Felicio da Silva, a Brazilian general, and Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a Brazilian diplomat and social scientist, have also been contending that São Paulo Forum and its leftist international guidelines 'command' Brazilian foreign policy¹⁰⁸⁵.

Brazilian Ambassador Roberto de Almeida questioned about what kind of agreement was signed with the Cuban dictatorship, so that Brazil has given to that country massive amounts of resources (food, investments, loans), and doing so without asking permission to the National Congress, as it is determined by the Constitution¹⁰⁸⁶. It is suggested that the answer is given by the agreements achieved within São Paulo Forum¹⁰⁸⁷.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Foraforo já, 'O problema é o Foro de São Paulo. Painel Globo News de 30/06/12 com Luiz Felipe Lampreia,' last modified July, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GMAYgY4ot8>
Confirming Lampreia's perspective, former guerrilha agent Fernando Gabeira stated that, in Brazil, the state no longer exists, 'it is only an extension of the *Workers' Party*' and that 'Brazil's foreign policy is shaped by party politics and not by state politics' – José Fucs, 'O Estado se tornou uma extensão do PT,' last modified September, 2013, *Época*, <http://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2013/09/bfernando-gabeirab-o-estado-se-tornou-uma-extensao-do-pt.html>

¹⁰⁸⁵ Carla Kreefft, "Estão atuando na busca da hegemonia do fracasso" – o general Marco Antônio Felicio da Silva explica, com detalhes, o que é o Foro de São Paulo e quais são as suas pretensões,' last modified July, 2013, *O Tempo*, <http://www.otempo.com.br/capa/pol%C3%ADtica/est%C3%A3o-atuando-na-busca-da-hegemonia-do-fracasso-1.686041>

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, '134º Podcast Mises Brasil - Paulo Roberto de Almeida,' last modified May, 2016, Instituto Ludwig von Mises – Brasil, <http://www.mises.org.br/FileUp.aspx?id=334>

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, 'Do lulopetismo diplomático a uma política externa profissional,' last modified May, 2016, Academia.edu, https://www.academia.edu/25639710/Do_lulopetismo_diplomatico_a_uma_politica_externa_profissional, 4.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Paulo Roberto de Almeida, 'Do lulopetismo diplomático a uma política externa profissional,' last modified May, 2016, Academia.edu, https://www.academia.edu/25639710/Do_lulopetismo_diplomatico_a_uma_politica_externa_profissional, 6.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Another example, in this sense of international *geoconjunctive* coordination, is the fact that Aldo Rebelo, a *Communist Party of Brazil* official, was appointed as Minister of Defense (2nd October 2015). Roughly one month after (7th November 2015), the Brazilian Army (3rd Infantry Battalion) welcomed a delegation of Venezuela's Bolivarian army officers and lectured that delegation on 'some of the new tactics applied by Infantry Brigade in the Jungle' – in order words, the Brazilian Army revealed to a potential enemy decisive tactical military information. *Vide*: Exército Brasileiro, last modified November 13, 2015, Twitter, <https://twitter.com/exercitooficial>

Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Abdenur contended that it has been promoted ideological leftist indoctrination within Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Itamaraty*), and that the progression in the diplomatic career is less due to personal capacities than due to ideological affinities. He also affirmed that Brazilian foreign policy has been ideological for years, favoring internationalist ties with socialism (e.g. relations with Cuba, China)¹⁰⁸⁸. Celso Lafer, Brazilian former minister of foreign affairs, confirmed Abdenur's statement, sustaining that a "brainwashing" has been taking place in the *Itamaraty*¹⁰⁸⁹.

Brazil's former minister for strategic affairs Mangabeira Unger, with a sense of strategy, has been criticizing the regional integration maneuver and claiming, in return, for a strong bilateral alliance between Brazil and the U.S.A.¹⁰⁹⁰. Nevertheless, the maneuver of regional integration under the ideological cooperation achieved inside São Paulo Forum has not been stopped, not even slowed down.

Thus, Lula da Silva's words from 2007 had then a dense meaning:

'O que aconteceu na América do Sul é um fenômeno político que, possivelmente, os sociólogos levarão um tempo para compreender por que aconteceu tão rápido a mudança que houve, uma mudança extremamente importante.'¹⁰⁹¹

¹⁰⁸⁸ Roberto Abdenur, 'Denúncia de Doutrinação Ideológica no Itamaraty,' last modified February, 2007, Escola sem Partido, <http://www.escolasempartido.org/midia-categoria/97-denuncia-de-doutrinacao-ideologica-no-itamaraty>

¹⁰⁸⁹ Celso Lafer, 'Denúncia de Abdenur é confirmada pelo ex-chanceler Celso Lafer, em reportagem de Gabriel Manzano Filho, publicada no jornal O Estado de São Paulo, de 07/02/2007,' last modified February, 2007, Escola sem Partido, <http://www.escolasempartido.org/midia-categoria/97-denuncia-de-doutrinacao-ideologica-no-itamaraty>

¹⁰⁹⁰ Eliane Oliveira, 'Mercosul é 'corpo sem espírito' e foco deve ser EUA, diz Mangabeira Unger,' last modified May, 2015, O Globo, <http://oglobo.globo.com/economia/mercosul-corpo-sem-espírito-foco-deve-ser-eua-diz-mangabeira-unger-16105668#ixzz3Zk0NnR7U>

¹⁰⁹¹ transl. 'What happened in South America is a political phenomenon that 'scholars' will possibly take their time to understand since everything changed too fast, the changing was extremely important' – Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, 'Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no encerramento do Encontro de Governadores da Frente Norte do Mercosul,' last modified December, 2007, Presidência da República, <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/2o-mandato/2007/06-12-2007-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-no-encerramento-do-encontro-de-governadores-da-frente-norte-do-mercosul, 2.>

8.2.3. Assessing bonds: Brazil's foreign policy outcomes, Meridionalism, São Paulo Forum & Neo-Eurasianism

The last section of PART IV will be devoted to studying the engagement of the Meridionalist-supported Latin American regional integration maneuver (and as argued deeply interconnected with the São Paulo Forum) into a yet greater global strategic plan. For that, it is required bringing Neo-Eurasianism back to the research again.

Deepening the reasoning, it is vital to understand that the political integration among Latin American countries – as said, a GEOCONJUNCTIVE leftist maneuver linked to criminal organizations which agents gather in São Paulo Forum – does not exist in a vacuum. That means that the text has not accomplished the representation of the entire map of influences and connections yet. Therefore, in a manner of analyzing the possible international bonds of São Paulo Forum to augment the angle is mandatory.

As it was copiously pointed out in this thesis, some of the Brazilian School of Geopolitics' authors prescribed a continentalization “strategy” or TELLUROPOLITICS for Brazil.

In this vein, it is true that Travassos suggested that Bolivia and Paraguay ought to fall under Brazil's sphere of influence¹⁰⁹². Nevertheless, that prescription differs from the goal of a homogeneously integrated South America, as the current course of regional integration has targeted. In fact, any goal that would involve the limitation of Brazil's national sovereignty would have directly clashed against the patriotic perceptions of Travassos as an army officer and, therefore, be rejected.

Couto e Silva, by his side, established that one of Brazil's “Permanent National Objectives” should be:

‘Manutenção do *status quo* na América do Sul contra tendências revisionistas ou formação de blocos regionais, políticos ou simplesmente económicos que possam vir a constituir ameaça à própria paz no continente’¹⁰⁹³;

¹⁰⁹² As Martins noted – Marcos A.F. Martins, ‘Mário Travassos e Carlos Badia Malagrida: dois modelos geopolíticos sobre a América do Sul’ (M.A. diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2011), 47.

¹⁰⁹³ transl. – ‘To maintain the *status quo* in South America against any revisionist tendencies or goals aiming to shape regional, political or even economic blocs that might constitute a threat to the peace in the continent [*sic*]’ – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 74-75.

Consequently, Couto e Silva pushed away any possibility of Brazil's membership in regional blocs since that membership would be against the country's national interests.

Opposed to these views, Martin's Meridionalism endorsed the maneuver for Latin American regional integration. Although Martin, in the limits of the literature review of this study, did never make a reference to São Paulo Forum in all his works¹⁰⁹⁴, Martin can be considered a supporter of the regional integration, taking into account his general affiliation to the revolutionary purposes [cf. Chapter 7], and his particular statement that the Latin American integration maneuver represents a '... *processo verdadeiramente revolucionário...*'¹⁰⁹⁵. Once the full regional integration of Latin America makes part of the pivotal objective for São Paulo Forum – Lula da Silva, in the quality of one of the founders of that organization, affirmed it numerous times and this point is already solid enough in the study¹⁰⁹⁶ – and since Martin supports Latin America regional integration maneuver, it logically follows that Martin's Meridionalism supports São Paulo Forum's objectives and, by extension, modalities of action.

Moving forward, one can ask: what kind of implications would this sub-continental integration have for the international system?

Firstly, the *Pátria Grande Bolivariana* [the Greater Bolivarian Fatherland, *i.e.* a unified South America] could pave the way for more Chinese penetration in the region, a project that might, *in extremis*, turn the region into agriculture fields with the final purpose of feeding soldiers of the Chinese army, Carvalho speculated¹⁰⁹⁷.

¹⁰⁹⁴ In spite of that, it is clear that Martin is totally aware of the fact that Latin American regional integration maneuver is promoted by leftist forces, which he praises in his texts (*vide* next footnote).

¹⁰⁹⁵ transl. '...truly revolutionary process...' – André Roberto Martin, 'Sopa de Letrinhas: ALBA, ALCA, MERCOSUL, UNASUL, CAN... para onde vai a integração Latino-Americana?' in *Argentina e Brasil: Possibilidades e obstáculos no processo de integração territorial*, ed. Mónica Arroyo and Perla Zusman (São Paulo: Humanitas, 2010), 51.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 'Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no ato político de celebração aos 15 anos do Foro de São Paulo,' last modified June, 2015, Biblioteca da Presidência da República, <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/1o-mandato/2005/2o-semester/02-07-2005-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-na-reuniao-do-conselho-de-cupula-do-mercosul/view>

Foro de São Paulo, "'É preciso acelerar a integração latino-americana", diz secretário-executivo do Foro de São Paulo,' last modified July, 2013, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/e-preciso-acelerar-a-integracao-latino-americana-diz-secretario-executivo-do-foro-de-sao-paulo/>

Foro de São Paulo, 'XIX Foro de São Paulo: Ato de Abertura,' last modified July, 2013, Foro de São Paulo, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/xix-foro-de-sao-paulo-ato-de-abertura/>

¹⁰⁹⁷ Interrogando a mente, 'Hangout Olavo de Carvalho Pátria Grande e comportamento do Papa,' last modified July, 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMh5KGwPDeo>

Olavo de Carvalho, 'Quando aprenderão?,' last modified June, 2015, Diário do Comércio, http://dcomercio.com.br/categoria/opiniao/quando_aprenderao

Secondly, as it was above explained [cf. Subchapter 4.2.3.], the Russian infiltration and influence in Latin America, and in Brazil, is not new whatsoever¹⁰⁹⁸. Latin American integration could also facilitate the Russian influence upon the region.

At this level, President Putin stated:

‘We are interested in strong, economically stable and politically independent, united Latin America that is becoming an important part of the emerging polycentric world order’¹⁰⁹⁹.

The matter includes, as expected, Russian military presence in Latin America that has already been negotiated since 2014¹¹⁰⁰.

Besides, MERCOSUL officials have been contending that the organization should approach Russia for closer cooperation¹¹⁰¹.

In Brazil, the consolidation of ties with Russia is not accomplished without multiple tactics. Whereas the *Workers’ Party* has been working for the regional integration in Latin America, Brazil’s Ambassador in Moscow asserted that the creation of a common currency in BRICS is a ‘... positive idea...’¹¹⁰². Although Martin argued that “BRICS have no bright future” [cf. Section 7.2.1], the project of a common currency between Brazil and Russia would be a great achievement for the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan against the USD. Thus, against the U.S. economy.

Thirdly, and in addition to the Latin American regional integration maneuver, there is another common aim (i) to Brazil’s foreign policy under the *Workers’ Party* administration, (ii) to São Paulo Forum and (iii) to Meridionalism. That aim has been the South-South cooperation with particular emphasis on relations with Africa¹¹⁰³.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Castro has already noted that Moscow always tried to infiltrate diplomatically, economically and military in the subcontinente – Therezinha de Castro, *Nossa América: Geopolítica Comparada* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1994), 351. [Cf. Subchapter 4.2.3.]

¹⁰⁹⁹ Vladimir Putin, ‘Interview to Prensa Latina and ITAR-TASS,’ last modified July, 2014, President of Russia, <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/22644>

¹¹⁰⁰ BBC, ‘Rússia negocia presença militar na América Latina,’ last modified February, 2014, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2014/02/140227_russia_militares_dg

¹¹⁰¹ Graça Salgueiro, ‘Ao comemorar 25 anos, o Mercosul mostra a quem serve,’ last modified April, 2016, Mídia Sem Máscara, <http://www.midiaseम्मascara.org/mediawatch/noticiasfaltantes/foro-de-sao-paulo/16489-ao-comemorar-25-anos-o-mercosul-mostra-a-quem-serve.html>

¹¹⁰² Antônio José Vallim Guerreiro, ‘Embaixador brasileiro na Rússia apoia moeda única dos BRICS,’ last modified June, 2015, Sputnik News, <http://br.sputniknews.com/mundo/20150629/1422660.html>

¹¹⁰³ Vide Lula da Silva’s speech: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no ato político de celebração aos 15 anos do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified June, 2015, Biblioteca da Presidência da República, <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/1o-mandato/2005/2o-semester/02-07-2005-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-na-reuniao-do-conselho-de-cupula-do-mercosul/view>

It is important to underline that the mentioned dynamics of the “South-South approach” (not only towards African countries but also towards India and within IBAS¹¹⁰⁴) constitutes evidence that the influence of Meridionalism on Brazilian foreign policy has been growing. In the same line, the *a priori* (1) anti-U.S. positioning of Brazilian foreign policy executive¹¹⁰⁵ and (2) the ideological leftist hegemony in culture and politics in Brazil must always be bore in mind, since they also created a wide openness to accept Neo-Eurasianist finalities.

One of those finalities – the penetration of Neo-Eurasianism in sub-Saharan African countries¹¹⁰⁶ – could, therefore, receive help of Meridionalism and a unified Latin America, since both projects focus on the purpose of projecting power in Africa.

With a view to ultimately achieving the research objective **D.** [cf. INTRODUCTION, Structure & Objectives] the results of the research confirm H₃, *i.e.* confirm that there is a strong tendency that, in the future, Meridionalism may constitute (or continue to constitute) an instrument of Neo-Eurasianism in Latin America.

In the line of History, it was identified that at least since the Cold War period Russia has been cultivating a particular interest in Brazil [cf. Section 4.2.3.].

In 2012, Dugin commented on Дижкыр TV program that the U.S. leading role in the World has been more and more criticized and rejected by the *intellectual and political classes* in Brazil and that that fact (logical political prescription) should stimulate Russia’s approach to Brazil massively (in politics, economy, culture, science). In that same TV program, Dugin also expressed his delight due to the strengthening of the *International Eurasian Movement* in Brazil and he called Martin ‘the greatest Brazilian geopolitician [*sic*]’¹¹⁰⁷. In these circumstances, it is not surprising to note that the interest of Brazilian scholars in Neo-Eurasianism has been rising¹¹⁰⁸ and that Dugin

¹¹⁰⁴ As noted Ambassador Abdenur – Roberto Abdenur, ‘Denúncia de Doutrinação Ideológica no Itamaraty,’ last modified February, 2007, Escola sem Partido, <http://www.escolasempartido.org/midia-categoria/97-denuncia-de-doutrinacao-ideologica-no-itamaraty>

¹¹⁰⁵ Vide also the CFR article: Kenneth R. Maxwell, ‘Anti-Americanism in Brazil,’ last modified Spring, 2002, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/americas/anti-americanism-brazil/p4468>

¹¹⁰⁶ The importance of sub-saharan African countries is complementary, since the Maghrebe is already included in the Muslim bloc, which for Neo-Eurasianism is an ally.

¹¹⁰⁷ Nova Direita Cultural, ‘Aleksandr Dugin - Sobre a identidade Brasileira,’ last modified July, 2013, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uIf2kQ1AdAU>

¹¹⁰⁸ Danilo Rogério de Sousa, ‘A nova geopolítica russa e o Eurasianismo,’ *Revista de Geopolítica* vol. 3, no. 2 (July 2012).

Dídimo Matos, ‘O neo-eurasianismo e o despertar russo,’ *Revista de Geopolítica* vol. 3, no. 2 (July 2012). Edson Carlos de Oliveira, ‘Lições do passado e o eurasianismo esotérico de Aleksandr Dugin,’ last modified June 5, 2014, *Instituto Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira*, <http://ipco.org.br/ipco/noticias/licoes-passado-e-o-eurasianismo-esoterico-de-aleksandr-dugin#.U61RffmSyf8>

has taken the chance to travel to Brazil twice, recently, having had the chance of meeting Martin [cf. Figures 8 and 9].

Figure 8
André Martin, Danilo Sousa and Aleksandr Dugin at the international conference ‘A Geopolítica do Eurasianismo’ in São Paulo 3rd September 2014



Source: Danilo Rogério de Sousa's private collection

Figure 9
André Martin and Aleksandr Dugin at the ‘IV Encontro Internacional Evoliano’ in São Paulo 10th-14th September 2014



Source: Danilo Rogério de Sousa's private collection

The links between Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism were analyzed on the level of ideologies and strategic plans [cf. Chapters 4 and 7]. Below, Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism will be examined again, at that instance included in the Revolutionary Movement, *i.e.* at the level of the real political network [cf. Subchapter 9.2].

Before that, however, some bullet points about São Paulo Forum need to be systematized. São Paulo Forum (i) associates legal leftist political parties with criminal organizations mixing, therefore, politics with crime, (ii) it has no financial transparency, *i.e.* the funding comes most likely from the drug trafficking¹¹⁰⁹, which is controlled by FARC, (iii) it promotes internal intervention in state's one another internal affairs

¹¹⁰⁹ This is a mere speculation since it is hard to provide empirical evidence to support the argument.

destroying national sovereignties; and (iv) it stimulates anti-democratic modalities of action since the control of the people upon governmental decisions is impossible, taking into account that the people do not even understand how such modalities of action are operationalized¹¹¹⁰.

In one of São Paulo Forum's resolutions was proclaimed that:

‘En el plano internacional, finalmente, el Foro declara que es necesario bregar por la construcción de un nuevo orden mundial...’¹¹¹¹

Dugin, by his side, affirmed:

‘We could include this Latin neosocialist trend approximately in the camp of the Eurasian militarism and Islamic fundamentalism.’¹¹¹²

In this way, it can be inferred that a common positioning and objectives between the Latin American regional integration maneuver lead by the ‘neosocialist’ left and Neo-Eurasianism exists *de facto*.

With respect to Brazil in particular, in terms of position [LAGE – geopolitical factor #2], it makes no sense thinking about the country as ‘Eurasian’ country. However, if the analytical context is the strategic one, then – with the eyes focused on the objective of confronting the U.S.A. – it makes full sense including Brazil in the Eurasianist alliance.

Therefore, while joining Neo-Eurasianism, Meridionalism and a unified Latin America the common maneuver to be illustrated on the map would be:


¹¹¹⁰ Another example was the donation of millions USD by the Brazilian government to Cuba – Cuba standard, ‘Brazil ties \$1 bln package for Cuba,’ last modified February, 2010, Cuba standard, <https://www.cubastandard.com/?p=433>

¹¹¹¹ transl. ‘on the international level, finally, the [São Paulo] Forum declares the need for struggling for the construction of a new world order’ – Compilação das Atas do Foro de São Paulo, ‘Atas do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified December, 2008, Mídia Sem Máscara, http://www.midiasemmascara.org/attachments/007_atas_foro_sao_paulo.pdf

¹¹¹² Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R1] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

Map 32

Cartographic representation of Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist joint maneuver of encircling the West and the U.S.A.



Popular revolt in Brazil

As it was asserted, São Paulo Forum and the Latin American integration maneuver, supported by Meridionalism, are projects that clash against Brazil's national interests.

The words by Pandiá Calogeras in the preface of Travassos' book seem now almost prophetic:

‘União [da América do Sul] para a qual não deve haver exclusivismo de métodos, sob pena de as despesas a enfrentar não serem compatíveis com as nossas posses, pelo menos num futuro mais próximo’¹¹¹³.

Whilst looking at the political “methods” for the Latin America integration, it was concluded that the “ideological method” gives the direction to the operation. In other words, Brazilian *élites* have been working for the Latin American integration under the leftist hegemony which jeopardizes the country's national interests.

In this respect Carvalho has contended:

‘Toda aspiração nacional de tornar-se “grande potência” com uma base cultural tão nula está condenada, de antemão, seja ao fracasso, seja a um sucesso que se tornará, caso alcançado, um flagelo para a humanidade, obrigada a curvar-se ante a força bruta de novos bárbaros que nem sequer têm

¹¹¹³ transl. ‘The Union [of South America] should not have an exclusive method, otherwise costs could be incompatible with our [Brazilian] capacities, at least in the near future.’ – Mário Travassos, *Projeção Continental do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), 8.

um senso próprio de orientação na história onde interferem cegamente'¹¹¹⁴.

Both Colageras' and Carvalho's quotations seem to react directly against Martin's motto:

'Only Brazil can save the World'.

In addition to this state-of-things, there is a new element to be included in the research: Brazilian people's extremely dynamic revolt.

In spite of the argument pushed forward by the leftist-dominated Brazilian mass media that the popular demonstrations in Brazil, in 2015 and 2016, were merely an anger against the greatest corruption scandals in Brazil's history, the evidence suggests that, in return, the revolt was clearly against the *Workers' Party*, against the leftist international network in Brazil, and against the supreme continental "strategic command" – São Paulo Forum¹¹¹⁵.

Figure 10 – Pictures of Brazilian people's demonstrations against corruption, communism and São Paulo Forum in 2015 and 2016



http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-vsF_izqyRyY/VPSboO9wVNI/AAAAAABY4Y/rCRROQPGwE/s1600/Partido%2Bdesonesto%2Be%2Bimoral.jpg



<http://s22.postimg.org/3rgw2pkjl/image.jpg>

¹¹¹⁴ transl. 'Due to a nonexistent cultural basis, all [Brazilian] national aspirations of becoming a great power are already condemned to fail or, in case of success, to become a scourge to humanity who will be compelled to make a bow to that brutal force of new barbarians, which do not even have a proper sense of historical orientation in their own actions' – Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 65.

¹¹¹⁵ Once again, the matter respects mainly to the modalities of action used: drug trafficking, crime, huge homicide rate, communist propaganda in the public education system, gender ideology, electoral fraud, among others.



<http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-mOLki9yX3oA/Vc8ujN1QR5I/AAAAAABDXg/xCxNCRinKUA/s1600/marcha3.jpg>



https://db1a6c8t4x22b.cloudfront.net/uploads/images/scaled_full_6bf8f8e5a1da476105bb.jpg



http://s32.postimg.org/v6r5dhwsl/manifestacao_foro_de_sp.jpg

In this way, Brazilian people is revolted against the political network of the *Workers' Party* and its allied parties (in Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, etc.), an alliance that, as sustained, takes shape in São Paulo Forum.

The very last words in this PART IV are devoted to the ultimate confirmation of H₃. Besides testing the innovative concept of *geomisguidance*, PART IV concluded that (i) in terms of applied geopolitics and foreign policy Brazil's priority has been the South American integration indeed, that (ii) in spite of the relative material state potential of Brazil has been fairly high and that the systemic constraints have been permissive to changes on the international chessboard, Brazil has not been able to increase its influence on the international arena, and that (iii) that is a result of Brazilian *élites'* anti-national politics which find operationalization in São Paulo Forum.

In this context, Chauprade's claim that "Brazil is affirming its sovereignty"¹¹¹⁶ cannot but be considered disappointing. The facts and the GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITY of concentration of power by São Paulo Forum sustain completely different findings.

Within the Neo-Eurasianist project, and in spite of its many problems, Brazil would be an essential ally for Russia. Martin's Meridionalism shoulders that alliance turning itself virtually into an instrument of a wider strategic plan.

The Latin American regional integration maneuver – and Meridionalist geo-ideology that supports such integration – is useful to the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan in the following dimensions: the elimination of borders and the attempt of homogenization of Latin American space, the promotion of crime, drug trafficking, sharing resources/ funding to sustain political projects, military cooperation, and common revolutionary ideologies oriented against the West and against the U.S.A.

Hence, other contributions were added to answer the main research question: *Are Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism somehow related to a New World Order?*

¹¹¹⁶ Aymeric Chauprade, *Chronique du choq des civilisations – du 11 septembre à la guerre de Syrie, actualité, analyses géopolitiques et cartes pour comprendre le monde d'aujourd'hui* (Paris: Éditions Chronique, 2013), 253.

PART V

ANALYSIS OF POWER DYNAMICS IN THE CURRENT WORLD ORDER: CARVALHO VS DUGIN

Key points

A brief biography of Olavo de Carvalho. Olavo de Carvalho's hypothesis of *three Globalist Projects*: the Syndicate as Globalist Project, the Islamic bloc as Globalist Project, and the Eurasian bloc as Globalist Project. The revolutionary mentality, the revolutionary movement, and Neo-Eurasianism. The fall of the Soviet Union and the permanence of the Russian intelligence community. Relations between Neo-Eurasianism and the New World Order.

Chapter 9

The debate ‘the U.S.A. and the New World Order’ between Olavo de Carvalho and Aleksandr Dugin

‘I have watched his [Carvalho’s] writings for a while now and I would say that he may be the only person alive who is extending what Eric Voegelin meant as ‘science’ – analysis of what happens with particular types of government and elites’ attitudes and practices.’¹¹¹⁷

Martin Pagnan

9.1. Olavo de Carvalho – philosopher and political scientist

Olavo de Carvalho’s large work constitutes a complex object that, consequently, can be studied from many angles. The inclusion of his particular hypothesis on three globalist projects in this thesis (once again devoted to analyzing Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism from the geopolitical studies’ approach) can be justified by the purpose of assessing the academic debate between Olavo de Carvalho and Aleksandr Dugin, which took place in 2011. The goal of that debate was to discuss the authors’ opposite views about the structure of the international system and the role of the U.S.A. in it.

This chapter aims to achieve objective **E**. [cf. INTRODUCTION, Structure & Objectives], providing further explanations about the connections between Neo-Eurasianism (and Meridionalism) and the [New] World Order. It will do so by assessing with detail the mentioned debate as the central source, allowing the test of H₄. Before that, mirroring subchapter 4.1., this chapter starts with a short biography about Carvalho.

Olavo Luiz Pimentel de Carvalho was born in Campinas, São Paulo state, on the 29th April 1947 in a middle-class family.

Professionally, he has been a journalist since 1967 in numerous newspapers and magazines¹¹¹⁸. In 1997 he founded the ‘Philosophy Seminar’, becoming its director and lecturer in the “Online Course of Philosophy” (COF). There, he also lectured many other courses (*e.g.* “Principles and Methods for self-education”, “Introduction to Eric Voegelin”, “Politics and Culture in Brazil”).

¹¹¹⁷ Martin Pagnan, a member of Eric Voegelin Institute – Martin Pagnan, ‘Eric Voegelin Institute,’ last modified September, 2015, Olavo de Carvalho, <https://olavodecarvalhofb.wordpress.com/2015/09/14/>

¹¹¹⁸ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Olavo’s resumé,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, January 27, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.pt/2011/01/olavo-de-carvalho.html>

In respect to his educational background, Carvalho studied philosophy, comparative religions, psychology, liberal arts and political science, among many other domains. Because Carvalho studied as an autodidact, he does not hold any degree (a fact that his adversaries keep repeating). In spite of that, Carvalho managed to lecture at several Universities since 1981 (e.g. *Universidade de São Paulo, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Catholic University of Paraná, Universidade Mackenzie*)¹¹¹⁹.

As it was affirmed, Carvalho's writings are large in number (more than 20 books and thousands of articles) and in multidisciplinaryity. He has been publishing his works and addressing in conferences since the 90s until now¹¹²⁰.

Carvalho's life-work can be resumed in the idea of

“defending human interiority against the tyranny of collective authority... To him there is an indissoluble bond between the objective knowledge and the autonomy of individual consciousness”¹¹²¹.

In the line of many other philosophers from the past, Carvalho has been trying to answer the question ‘what is philosophy?’ having given the following postulate as the answer: “the unity of knowledge in the unity of consciousness”. Hence Carvalho can be called a self-consciousness philosopher.

On the other hand, Carvalho is not only a philosopher. He can also claim the status of a political scientist. In fact, in some of his books and courses¹¹²², Carvalho demonstrated that he has been able to pursue accurate analysis of political reality based on the scientific method, thus using concepts and theoretical approaches that sometimes he developed or created (e.g. ‘*histérico*’, ‘*paralaxe cognitiva*’, ‘*pensamento metonímico*’, ‘*fanático*’, ‘*servidão hipnótica*’, ‘*mentalidade revolucionária*’, ‘*movimento revolucionário*’). Moreover, the majority of his publicly known political analysis and predictions have been very accurate (e.g. *Workers’ Party* is not a

¹¹¹⁹ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Olavo's resúme,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, January 27, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.pt/2011/01/olavo-de-carvalho.html>

¹¹²⁰ One of Carvalho's most recent participations was in the Washington Conclave for Democracy at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. in March, 2015. Available at: <http://www.press.org/events/washington-conclave-democracy>

¹¹²¹ Olavo de Carvalho, *O Jardim das Aflições. De Epicuro à ressurreição de César: ensaio sobre o Materialismo e a Religião Civil* (Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2015).

Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Dados Biográficos,’ last modified June, 2016, Olavo de Carvalho, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/bio.htm>

¹¹²² For example: (i) the academic debate with Dugin published in Portuguese – Alexandre Dugin e Olavo de Carvalho, *Os EUA e a Nova Ordem Mundial* (São Paulo: Vide Editorial, 2012), which is the central source of this chapter as said; (ii) the course “Politics and Culture in Brazil” available at: <http://www.seminariodefilosofia.org/politica-e-cultura-ao-vivo/>

democratic party in the western sense, the transformation of FARC into a legalized political force in Colombia, analysis of procedures for the concentration of political power)¹¹²³.

In this context of political analysis, Carvalho formulate a hypothesis to explain the power dynamics in the international arena – the hypothesis of three schemes of global power that will be described in the next subchapter.

As for his personal positions, Carvalho identifies himself as a conservative and a Catholic believer. In his youth, he collaborated with Brazil's communist party during a short period, an experience that he confessed several times that turned him expressively anti-communist and anti-revolutionary, due to the events that he testified.

Concerning his writing style about politics, Carvalho is accurate, synthetic, well-documented and persuasive. He has been defending his approach passionately, in the line of Latin American cultures, but, in spite of that, Carvalho's logical, coherent speech and the substantial empirical support give a very strong objectivity to his perspectives.

Furthermore, Carvalho has the advantage that he has never aimed, so far, to talk in the name of any ideology, *i.e.* with the eyes focused on political power. Contrary to Dugin, Carvalho has neither entered in politics nor founded any political movement or party nor established international political connections. Therefore, it can be sustained that Carvalho has been mainly attempting to analyze political circumstances, although not wasting any chance to denounce those who do have political goals (*e.g.* the debate with Dugin).

Since 2005, Carvalho has been living in the U.S.A. with his wife and some of his eight sons and daughters and their respective children.

¹¹²³Among many other sources, *vide*: Radio programs 'True outspoken' available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X27ROBXIIWs&list=PLM_ovO_tRDDA9DIMmNik9ayoKwaCHVqYy; and the course "Politics and Culture in Brazil" available at: <http://www.seminariodefilosofia.org/politica-e-cultura-ao-vivo/>

‘Οι ισχυροί θα πάρουν αυτά που μπορούν και
οι αδύναμοι θα υποφέρουν αυτά που πρέπει’¹¹²⁴

Thucydides

9.2. Carvalho’s hypothesis of *Three Globalist Projects*

As stated, this subchapter aims to accomplish the thesis’ objective **E**, *i.e.* to explain the role of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism in the New World Order. To do that, keeping in mind what Dugin and Carvalho discussed in their debate, the study attempts to answer the three following subquestions: “which are the main projects that work for a GLOBAL GOVERNMENT?” [cf. APPENDIX 2], “is there any relation between those globalist projects and Neo-Eurasianism/ Meridionalism?” and “from the set of the globalist projects’ agents, which agents could be identified pro- or against the Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist objectives and modalities of action?”

In his theory of the three globalist blocs¹¹²⁵, Carvalho stated that the Syndicate [cf. 9.2.1], the Islamic bloc [cf. 9.2.2] and the Eurasian bloc [cf. 9.2.3] constitute the three GLOBALIST PROJECTS [cf. APPENDIX 2]. It will be explained how Neo-Eurasianism – and Meridionalism (taking into account that H₃ was confirmed) – are integrated into the globalist project of the Eurasian bloc. That explanation (together with the analysis of the three globalist projects) is operationalized through the set of basic questions of political science systematized above [cf. Subchapter 2.2]: *who* wants *what*? *How*, *when*, and by *which means* is the agent pursuing his actions? In other words, the methodological steps include: (i) the identification of agents; (ii) the assessment of the final objectives; (iii) the characterization of means and modalities of action of each globalist force. Taking into account the topic of the thesis, the Eurasian bloc receives the biggest emphasis and it requires preliminary clarifications: (1) characterization of the features of the Revolutionary Mentality; (2) the Revolutionary Movement; (3) the fall of USSR and the role of the Russian intelligence community; (4) Neo-Eurasianism as a fresh ideology of the Revolutionary Movement; (5) the role of Russian élites:

¹¹²⁴ transl. ‘...the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’ – Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Book V, 5.69-[2] – available at: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0200:book=5:chapter=89:section=1>

¹¹²⁵ Olavo de Carvalho, *O Jardim das Aflições. De Epicuro à ressurreição de César: ensaio sobre o Materialismo e a Religião Civil* (Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2015), 411, 419.

wobbling between the Revolutionary Movement as whole and the Russian interests (Neo-Eurasianism) partly.

This subchapter is then focused on ‘explaining case’¹¹²⁶ and ‘specific explanations’¹¹²⁷, as asserted in the subchapter about methodological guidelines of the thesis [cf. Subchapter 2.2]. The role of *élites*’ perceptions and capacities reveal their importance in this subchapter too. So, not only the use of phenomenological method is essential to identify and explain the *intentions* of the agents, but process tracing technique is crucial to identify relations and causal chains too.

It can be noted that, on the contrary of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism, which could be examined as ideologies and strategic plans in controlled comparison and analyzed through the first two steps of the strategic planning, the globalist projects are too broad to be dissected through that framework. On the other hand, the methodological guidelines elaborated in PART I are too wide-ranging as well since it is not possible to adapt the analysis from a detailed state-centric approach to the globalist projects. Moreover, the limits of this thesis do not even allow sufficient space to try undertaking such exercise.

Carvalho’s hypothesis is considered valid since it was tested against empirical evidence. It also resisted to tests on its internal coherence and logical reasoning. For those reasons, it was considered that Carvalho’s hypothesis was worthy to be considered an object in this doctoral thesis and examined with full attention. Therefore, there is no space in this study for “conspiracy theory” as Dugin tried to label Carvalho’s approach¹¹²⁸. The study of agents, objectives, means and modalities of action is rooted in facts and the explanation is logical while tracing the historical action.

In this context, the confrontation of two opposed perspectives describing and explaining the status of the world order (and not the search for evidence to confirm only one of them) is put forth. One perspective will be considered more suitable to explain international politics, and that will affect the result of the test of H₄.

¹¹²⁶ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 74-75.

¹¹²⁷ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 40.

¹¹²⁸ Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R3] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, April 24, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r3-dugin.html>

Carvalho presented his three ‘globalist forces’¹¹²⁹, driven by particular agents, against Dugin’s argument of ‘U.S. unipolar world’. Carvalho stated:

‘...historic forces that today fight for power in the world are assembled into three projects of global dominance, which I will provisionally call the “Russian-Chinese,” the “Western” (sometimes mistakenly called “Anglo-American”) and the “Islamic” one.’¹¹³⁰

Previously, in his dense book *O Jardim das Aflições*¹¹³¹, Carvalho has elaborated on a ‘theory of empire’ and on the idea that political power tends to expand without limits. In that book, Carvalho also insisted on the above-mentioned idea [cf. 2.1.2] that the agent who truly holds power is not always the formal occupant of a certain position (e.g. in a state’s structure)¹¹³². This idea is essential to understand the agents of the globalist projects of the Syndicate and the Islamic bloc. In fact, the empirical evident used in this subchapter and in the test of H₄ induce to a theoretical contribution to geopolitical studies as approach [cf. Subchapter 2.1], pushing forward the idea that a state-centric approach cannot exclude transnational dynamics¹¹³³.

9.2.1. The Syndicate as Globalist Project

i. Agents

The small group of individuals of the Western Finance¹¹³⁴ (e.g. Bilderberg club¹¹³⁵, George Soros’ enterprises, Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, Trilateral

¹¹²⁹ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Conduzidos à força,’ last modified September 2012, Mídia sem Máscara, <http://www.midiasemmascara.org/artigos/globalismo/13440-conduzidos-a-forca.html>

¹¹³⁰ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Olavo – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>

¹¹³¹ Olavo de Carvalho, *O Jardim das Aflições. De Epicuro à ressurreição de César: ensaio sobre o Materialismo e a Religião Civil* (Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2015).

¹¹³² Olavo de Carvalho, *O Jardim das Aflições. De Epicuro à ressurreição de César: ensaio sobre o Materialismo e a Religião Civil* (Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2015), 249.

¹¹³³ Also Chauprade alerted for this problema with his variable # 6 [cf. Section 1.2.2.]

¹¹³⁴ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 183.

¹¹³⁵ About the Bilderberg club *vide*: Daniel Estulin, *The True Story of the Bilderberg Group* (Walterville: Trine Day 2007).

Commission, Council of Foreign Relations¹¹³⁶) which include the ‘anglo-american establishment’¹¹³⁷.

ii. *Objective*

The chief objective of this globalist force is the creation of a World Government under the command of the mentioned agent¹¹³⁸. An example of formulation of the objective could be:

‘To achieve coherence in global governance, all three dimensions of sustainable development – sustainable economic growth, social inclusion and protection of the environment and the global commons – need to be integrated at the global level.’¹¹³⁹

iii. *Means and modalities of action*

In accordance to Carvalho, in the past fifty years, two events that took place in international relations can be identified as most influential in shaping politics¹¹⁴⁰: (a) the rise of the above-mentioned agents, which have been aiming to build up a global government and an artificial world society disconnected from nationhood; (b) progresses in social sciences that provided to those agents exceptional mechanisms (*e.g.* education techniques, mass media concentration and control¹¹⁴¹) to achieve its goals.

¹¹³⁶ For more specific agents vide chapter 17 – Heitor de Paola, *O Eixo do Mal Latino-americano – e a Nova Ordem Mundial* (São Paulo: É Realizações, 2008.).

¹¹³⁷ The expression ‘anglo-american establishment’ was created by Carrol Quigley, a supporter of the World Government project (and one of former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s teachers), *vide*: Carroll Quigley, *The Anglo-American Establishment* (New York: Books in Focus, 1981); and Carroll Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time* (New York: the Macmillan company, 1966).

¹¹³⁸ *Vide* for example: Herbert G. Wells, *The Open Conspiracy - Blue Prints for a World Revolution* recently re-edited with the title: *The Open Conspiracy: What Are We To Do With Our Lives?* (New York: Orkos press, 2006). This book constitutes a preliminary reading on this issue.

¹¹³⁹ United Nations System Task Team, ‘Global governance and governance of the global commons in the global partnership for development beyond 2015,’ last modified January, 2013, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/thinkpieces/24_thinkpiece_global_governance.pdf, p. 8

About the role of the United Nations on the project of world government *vide*: G. Edward Griffin, *The Fearful Master – A Second Look at the United Nations* (Boston: Western Islands, 1964);

Cliff Kincaid, *Global Bondage – The U.N. Plan to rule the World* (Lafayette: Huntington House, 1995);

Cliff Kincaid, *Global Taxes for World Government* (Lafayette: Huntington House, 1997).

¹¹⁴⁰ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 175.

¹¹⁴¹ About this subject *vide*: Pascal Bernardin, *Machiavel pédagogue ou le ministère de la réforme psychologique* (Paris: Ed. Notre-Dame des Grâces, 2012).

Carvalho pushed forward his arguments, contending that the agents of the Syndicate have been, in some circumstances, enjoying the capacity of ruling over or against the national interests of Western countries¹¹⁴². This argument conflicts with the traditional realist approach. Thus, there is a necessity to examine that claim. To do so, the first test can be arranged through the analysis of ideology¹¹⁴³.

So, firstly, through collecting findings from historical research, it is possible to ascertain that there has been a very strong financial, economic and political involvement (or sometimes even clear alliance) between the agents of the Syndicate and the radical or revolutionary left, now and then high above the national interests (e.g. the U.S.A.)¹¹⁴⁴. Secondly, the agents of the Syndicate have been currently promoting social

¹¹⁴² Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 546.

¹¹⁴³ It is pertinent to keep in mind that the Syndicate, as a globalist force, does not proclaim one single ideology, although there are indistinct leftist ideological aspects in the Syndicate's actions that will be observed and described.

¹¹⁴⁴ There is a massive empirical support for this argument:

(i) Firstly, the life-time research of British-American historian Antony Sutton, who studied the help given by American businessmen to the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany:

Antony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development* Vol I, II & III (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1968/1971);

Antony C. Sutton, *National Suicide – Military Aid to the Soviet Union* (New York: Arlington House, 1973);

Antony C. Sutton, *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution – The remarkable true story of the American capitalists who financed the Russian communists* (New York: Clairview, 1974)

Available at: http://reformed-theology.org/html/books/bolshevik_revolution/index.html;

Antony C. Sutton, *Wall Street and FDR – the true story how Franklin D. Roosevelt colluded with corporate America* (New York: Clairview, 1975)

Available at: <http://www.reformation.org/wall-st-fdr.html>;

Antony C. Sutton, *Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler – the astonishing true story of the American financiers who bankrolled the Nazis* (New York: Clairview, 1976)

Available at: http://reformed-theology.org/html/books/wall_street/index.html;

Antony C. Sutton, *The Best Enemy Money Can Buy* (U.S.: Dauphin Publications, 1986);

(ii) During the Cold War while the Soviet Bloc was trying hard to destroy the West, the U.S.A. merely formulated Kennan's Containment Doctrine, i.e. no attempt to destroy the Soviet communist structures was made, but just stopping their expansion. In this regard of mere containment *vide* also: Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Super Power* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 42.

(iii) Wormser – René A. Wormser, *Foundations: Their Power and Influence* (Covenant House Books, 1993) – investigated about the conclusions of the 1954 Reese Committee Report in the American Congress, which identified, back in the 50s, the active collaboration of the major billionaire foundations with communist and anti-American movements.

(iv) After the Cold War, facing resistance of the Western influential individuals concerning the denunciation of communist crimes, Vladimir Bukovsky presented also convincing evidence that the western social-democratic mass media received funding and support from the Soviet Union – *vide*: Vladimir Bukovsky, *Jugement à Moscou* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995).

(v) The industrial blossoming of China since the 90s and China's transfiguration from poor country into the most powerful potential enemy of the U.S.A. would be unthinkable without the investments of the American businessmen, and consequently the planning of re-location of part of American industrial park to China and the Far East.

(vi) A last example was already given in the Subchapter 8.1.1.: the Ford Foundation provided funding to CEBRAP, which created both the *Workers' Party* and the *Brazilian Social-Democratic Party*.

causes totally compatible with those of the radical or revolutionary left¹¹⁴⁵. There can be identified, once again, a trend against the interest or well-being of the nation(-states).

The key point at this level remains ideological. It is possible to infer, using process tracing technique, that the action of the Syndicate's agents has been directed against the same target that the radical left elected: the (Western Civilization) Judeo-Christian tradition in general (politics, society, etc.), and against capitalism in particular (economy). It seems obvious that this issue is not marginal to Gramsci's and the Frankfurt School authors' conclusions that, to destroy capitalism, the Western civilizational foundations (individual freedom, free market economy, national borders¹¹⁴⁶, religious freedom, traditional moral standards, traditional family, traditional culture) must be destroyed. Unfortunately, the study cannot develop this theme but calls for further research about it.

What matters concerning this thesis' research question is that the Syndicate's agents have been aiming to change the values of the West, and it is known that they have been quite successful in that goal in the last decades. Therefore, it seems that the path to a New World Order is not independent of this dynamics.

On capitalism specifically, one can ask what sense does the hostility of the Syndicate's agents towards capitalism make, taking into account that it was thanks to capitalism that those agents grew as rich as they are today? Carvalho thought about this question and provided an answer¹¹⁴⁷. He sustained that after the Syndicate-members became billionaires, they did not want to continue to submit themselves to the rules of the capitalist system. Therefore, a change in their nature occurred. From that period on, the Syndicate's agents have been aiming to control the economic system, through three specific modalities of action: (1) control of the state's structure (including political *élites*) to implant oligopolies; (2) promotion of socialism and communism since these movements defend more state intervention; (3) stimulation of a large number of

¹¹⁴⁵ E.g. multiculturalism, fake pacifism, feminism, free abortion, homosexualist political movement, gender ideology (e.g. gender-neutral bathrooms), prohibition to keep and bear arms (Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 132), racial quotas, radical ecologism (about the topic on how the *narrative* of the 'global warming' assists in the project for the creation of a world government *vide*: (1) Pascal Bernardin, *L'empire écologique ou la subversion de l'écologie par le mondialisme* (Paris: Ed. Notre-Dame des Grâces, 1998), (2) Dom Bertrand de Orleans e Bragança, *Psicose Ambientalista – os bastidores do Ecoterrorismo para implantar uma “religião” ecológica, igualitária e anticristã* (São Paulo: Instituto Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira, 2012)), liberation of drugs, state control of religion, lower the legal age to have sexual relations (Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 181).

¹¹⁴⁶ “/Imagine there's no countries/” as John Lenon wrote already in 1971.

¹¹⁴⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 169-170.

intellectuals, so that the new transformations may be gladly accepted by the masses. In this procedure, economic freedom becomes instrumental, so that political processes may be financed. Capitalism as a system which provides well-fare and improves people's lives disappeared as key orientation¹¹⁴⁸.

Hence, these billionaires can no longer be called “capitalists”, but “meta-capitalists”, Carvalho classified. Their power remains now based on state's control, not on the economic forces any longer. In the end, the project of the Syndicate has constituted a new post-capitalist nobility, it could be compared.

The parallel becomes then unavoidable, in the same way that communists and socialists ambition to merge political and military power with economic power, the Syndicate's agents, controlling the economic power, ambition to get control (or at least influence) over the political and military power¹¹⁴⁹. There is a crystal clear convergence of objectives, what helps in understanding the conclusions from the quoted literature about the above-mentioned involvement of the Syndicate's agents with the radical or revolutionary left.

Plus, another empirical evidence of such collaboration can be found in Brazil, regarding the leftist hegemony analyzed and explained in Sections 8.1.1 and 8.2.1. In an interview with Kincaid, Carvalho contended that the existence of São Paulo Forum as political outcome was only possible due to (1) the cultural and political influence of the leftist Revolutionary Movement in the World on the one hand, and (2) the Fabian Socialist agenda of the Syndicate's agents on the other hand, more dynamic since the end of Cold War – once again, the moment in which the West allegedly won over the communist movement¹¹⁵⁰.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Vide*, for example, George Soros' books against capitalism:

Financial Turmoil in Europe and the United States: Essays (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012);

The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What it Means (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008);

Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001).

¹¹⁴⁹ “Bankers and communists have been living hand-on-hand for more than a century” – Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 482.

¹¹⁵⁰ Tradutores de Direita, ‘O Triunfo do Marxismo Cultural - Olavo de Carvalho, Cliff Kincaid e Jerry Kenney,’ last modified March, 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1483&v=O4raFHTlyjU>

Paola fits in the argument too, since he named *Foro de São Paulo* as the 4th communist offensive in Latin America – Heitor de Paola, *O Eixo do Mal Latino-americano – e a Nova Ordem Mundial* (São Paulo: É Realizações, 2008), 194-207.

Besides that, there was a meeting on March 1993 in Miami between the Inter-american Dialogue representatives, São Paulo Forum officials and the Brazilian President (1995-2003) Fernando Henrique Cardoso of PSDB. The event was reported by the Cuban edition of communist newspaper *Granma* – ‘cover page,’ *Granma*, May 5, 1993, national edition. That meeting sustains the argument that there is,

The second test to Carvalho's argument that the Syndicate's agents have been ruling over and against the national interests of Western countries will respect strictly to the modalities of action pursued by them. Among other modalities of action, Carvalho explained that the political mechanisms are mainly focused on the concentration of power. For example, in terms of conquest for "social rights", the dynamics follow, in general, the same path. It starts when (1) citizens demand for more "rights", so (2) a certain group is identified with a claim. Then, (3) while transformed in actual laws, those claims, which became "rights", will inevitably create: (4) a massive increase in the bureaucracy, more police and more judicial control. In the end, the state structure expands and gets more powerful, while the citizens, in the name of more "rights", remain less free¹¹⁵¹. Consequently, the power gets more and more concentrated. The NGOs may assist in this dynamics since they frequently pursue political agenda attached to the Syndicate's project¹¹⁵².

It is true that the nature of power *esse in* tends for concentration. In his book, back in 1945, de Jouvenel presented his argument that political power and state control have been growing on and on in the path of History for at least the last 400 years¹¹⁵³. Nevertheless, the velocity of the concentration of power has been largely increased in recent decades. So that is the point here at stake, regarding the actions of the Syndicate's agents.

Obviously, the process of concentration of power also affects democracy. In fact, it is not an overstatement to mention that the New World Order is bringing the twilight of democracy. The parliamentary control over the executive has been more and more reduced, thus a diminution of the role of democratic institutions, while the prevalence of technical committees (*e.g.* Eurogroup), discreet meetings (*e.g.* Bilderberg) and the 'increasing of informalization' as trend¹¹⁵⁴ can be perceived with naked-eye.

indeed, medium-term cooperation between the Syndicate's agents and the revolutionary left in Brazil, Carvalho contended.

¹¹⁵¹ Olavo de Carvalho, *O Jardim das Aflições. De Epicuro à ressurreição de César: ensaio sobre o Materialismo e a Religião Civil* (Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2015), 350.

Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 502.

¹¹⁵² On this topic, *vide* Geopolitical Futures' report: Geopolitical Futures, 'NGOs and the Fallacy of Civil Society,' last modified July, 2016, Geopolitical Futures, <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/ngos-and-the-fallacy-of-civil-society/>

¹¹⁵³ Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Du Pouvoir. Histoire naturelle de sa croissance* (Genève: Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1945).

¹¹⁵⁴ As systematized by Matthew Stephen, 'Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance,' research session, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, 12th November 2015.

Carvalho presented his views on this subject too¹¹⁵⁵. He claimed that old democracy is nothing more than a camouflage (in the line of Eric Voegelin) because of: (1) the complexity of states' administration, state's intervention, and control are supported by instruments developed by technology and social sciences' results and there is no control of Parliaments upon these processes, or even less public discussions about them¹¹⁵⁶, to what is added the transfer of power from states to international structures (e.g. European Union); (2) the progressive concentration of mass media into a very small group of corporations, which have strong connections with states: social control is the self-evident outcome; (3) the victory of Fabian Socialism and Gramsci's strategy over communist old formulas, namely promotion of the "social causes" named above, and the abandonment of the revolution in the barricades.

Therefore, while the state concentrates the power internally, it becomes weaker externally¹¹⁵⁷, making then easier to accept a global authority – the world government.

In this context, there is no space for conspiracy. There is no secret, the objectives are public, and the sources are available for verification and validation of the information.

Concerning the question *when?* the project of the Syndicate has not established a schedule. Its action is prolonged, there is a permanent adaptability of tactics, and the objectives are settled for long-term. The symbol of Fabian socialism is, at last, a turtle.

iv. *The Syndicate and the U.S.A.: Dugin versus Carvalho*

The U.S.A. has completely opposed national interests while compared to the goals of the Syndicate – that was one of Carvalho's main ideas in his debate with Dugin¹¹⁵⁸. Carvalho even went further and contended that the U.S. and Israeli national interests represent the last political resistance to the Syndicate's world government project, so that is the reason why, since the 90s, the world government project has been showing anti-American and anti-Israeli strategies¹¹⁵⁹.

¹¹⁵⁵ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 163.

¹¹⁵⁶ For a study about technocracy *vide*: Phillip Collins and Paul Collins, *The Ascendancy of the Scientific Dictatorship – An Examination of Epistemic Autocracy, From the 19th to the 21st Century* (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2004).

¹¹⁵⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 567.

¹¹⁵⁸ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 571.

¹¹⁵⁹ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 165-166.

Therefore, Carvalho insisted that the U.S.A. cannot be mistaken with the Syndicate, although the Syndicate's agents can use the U.S. structures (political, military) (and so have been in the past) even when the Syndicate's objectives were expressively against the U.S. national interests. Moreover, not only against the U.S. national interests but also against other Western countries' national interests, Carvalho inferred, giving the example of the financial assistance from the Syndicate's agents to the Nazi Germany and the USSR (a subject studied in the literature already quoted), to China and to the Muslim Brotherhood¹¹⁶⁰.

In this way, Carvalho affirmed already in 2004, the arguments that proclaim that the U.S.A. is imposing an "empire" have the objective of diverting the international attention from the true empires that are being built up [cf. GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES]: the Russian-Chinese or Eurasian bloc and the Islamic bloc¹¹⁶¹. Dugin's ideological fight fits in this framework perfectly, it can be concluded.

As mentioned, Dugin accused: (1) the U.S.A. of stimulating globalization in the world, promoting the American way of life; (2) the U.S.A. of interfering in internal affairs of several countries; (3) the U.S.A. of contaminating Russian society with individualism; (4) the U.S.A. of supporting anti-Russian regimes in the post-soviet sphere. Dugin finally determined that 'the USA is an absolute plague for the mankind'. Apart from the aggressive rhetoric and the hate, there is, however, an element that matters for this section: Dugin claimed that the U.S.A. is the 'globalist elite', which:

'is the absolute enemy of the Russia, China and Islamic countries...'¹¹⁶²

If the massive amount of literature quoted in this section sustains any argument, that argument contradicts and disproved *in limine* those statements of Dugin: the Syndicate has been assisting Russia, China and Islamic countries for decades, expressively against the U.S. national interests, once again.

"Half of the people in the U.S. is against the New World Order, which is seen as anti-christian, anti-american, socialist project" – Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 552.

¹¹⁶⁰ Vide details in: Olavo de Carvalho, '[R4] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, May 23, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/05/r4-olavo-eng.html>

¹¹⁶¹ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 166.

¹¹⁶² Alexandr Dugin, '[R1] Dugin,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

Despite that disapproval, Dugin correctly recognized that the “globalist élite” does not have a unique and consensual project¹¹⁶³. Furthermore, he was also able to identify the main lines of the project:

‘Promoting accelerated globalization with the creation of World Government and swift desovereignization of the National States in favor of creation of United States of the World ruled by the global elite on the legal terms (that is the CFR project represented by the strategy of George Soros and his foundations; the colored revolutions are viewed here as the most effective weapon destabilizing and finally destroying States).’¹¹⁶⁴

Therefore, Dugin acknowledged the relevance of the Western globalist group *tout court*¹¹⁶⁵. What remains inconsistent with the political reality in Dugin’s approach is: (a) the relation between the Syndicate and the globalist force that Dugin himself belong to (the Eurasian bloc) is unnoticed, and (b) the ideological characterization of the Syndicate (Dugin stated, for example, that Soros is ‘pure liberal’¹¹⁶⁶, while Soros’ books defend clearly the control of the economy). In regard to this last issue, as stated, the Syndicate’s project is not for ‘liberalism’, ‘free competition’, ‘capitalism’, but the Syndicate positions in favor of monopolies and state control, in the old-fashioned socialist way, as Carvalho asserted¹¹⁶⁷.

¹¹⁶³ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

¹¹⁶⁴ Alexandr Dugin, ‘Dugin – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html>

¹¹⁶⁵ Council of Foreign Relations and ‘[I]ts main theorists, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger...’ the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Club and their influence on American politics – Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 122, 263-270.

The Center for Geopolitical Expertise, Dugin stated, in the ‘equivalent of the Council of Foreign Relations, but, sadly, it operates on a much more modest scale...’ - Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 123.

¹¹⁶⁶ In the sense of ‘capitalist’ – Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 125.

¹¹⁶⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘[R4] Olavo,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, May 23, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/05/r4-olavo-eng.html> Carvalho supported his view on this topic with:

George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945* (Wilmington: The Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1996);

Lee Edwards, *The Conservative Revolution - The Movement that Remade America* (New York: The Free Press, 1999);

Mark C. Henrie, ed., *Arguing Conservatism. – Four Decades of the Intercollegiate Review* (Wilmington: The Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2008);

Robert M. Crunden, ed., *The Superfluous Men – Conservative Critics of the American Culture* (Wilmington: The Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1999);

Jeffrey Hart, *The Making of the American Conservative Mind - National Review and its Times* (Wilmington: The Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2005).

9.2.2. The Islamic bloc as Globalist Project

i. Agents

The Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic religious leaders and political *élites* of some Islamic countries are agents in the first line of importance in the Islamic bloc as a globalist project¹¹⁶⁸. The role of tariqas – thousands of esoteric organizations of small groups of people submitted to Islamic indoctrination through spiritual exercises, which can be traced to prophet Muhammad – is also essential, since these organizations, lead by a *Sheikh*, represent the religious and cultural unity of Islam above the national states¹¹⁶⁹.

ii. Objective

To win the “civilizational war” and install Islam all over the globe, thus maximization of the Islamization of the world, creating the World Caliphate¹¹⁷⁰.

iii. Means and modalities of action

In his lecture ‘The Islamic Totalitarianism,’ Carvalho presented the basic socio-political modalities of action within the Islamic bloc: (a) firstly, to extinguish a man’s relations (groups, religion, etc.) under the idea of ‘freedom’; (b) and, in a second moment, to integrate this man, as an independent and disconnected cell, into a system of high discipline and obedience that he will accept, although he will be much less free, while compared to his initial condition and his previous relations¹¹⁷¹. So, in this point, there is a manifest convergence with the modality of action of the ‘concentration of power’ from the previous globalist project analyzed above.

In this vein, Carvalho continued explaining that Islam corresponds, in fact, to a totalitarian system. In (i) economy, although Islam is not totally socialist because private property is assured, the economy is to be extremely controlled. Therefore, the economic life is subordinated to the *élites*, who also hold the political power and the religious authority. In (ii) culture, Islam is not a religion like Judaism or Christianity

¹¹⁶⁸ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Os Donos do Mundo,’ last modified October, 2013, Olavo de Carvalho’s website, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/110221dc.html>

¹¹⁶⁹ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘O segredo da invasão islâmica,’ last modified March, 2013, *Olavo de Carvalho’s website*, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/070312Adc.html>

¹¹⁷⁰ Blogdelinks, ‘Totalitarismo Islâmico, Comunismo, Nova Ordem Mundial – Olavo de Carvalho,’ last modified Semptember, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLOF2sTcls4>

¹¹⁷¹ Blogdelinks, ‘Totalitarismo Islâmico, Comunismo, Nova Ordem Mundial – Olavo de Carvalho,’ last modified Semptember, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLOF2sTcls4>

since it exists, besides the *Quran* and *Sharia*, thousands of *Hadith*, which are reports describing words and actions of prophet Muhammad that establish rigid control of all aspects of the private and public life of the individual (from the mosque until the way how to brush the teeth). Consequently, there is no Islamic religion without Islamic culture. This is the reason why that, wherever the Muslim is, the Muslim will participate in his Islamic culture instead of in the local culture. Thus, if the local culture contradicts its own culture, as a faithful Muslim, he will have to condemn the local culture and fight it back¹¹⁷². In (iii) politics, the basic Islamic idea on this topic is that “the government that exists is already rightful because if it exists, it does so by the will of Allah”. Naturally, this is a door open to political instability through coups and revolutions since once someone gets to the government, that someone is automatically rightful. Still, there is more to be added in regard to politics in Islam.

In the 20th century, Carvalho informed in that same lecture, Said Kutb, a pan-Islamist revolutionary and leader of Muslim Brotherhood, wrote a highly influential book in 30 volumes¹¹⁷³. Carvalho gave an example from that book, the definition of the tyrant as:

“the one who forbids what Allah allows and that allows what Allah forbids”

and explained that Kutb applied this definition to the meaning of *Jihad*, which then is also constituted by the fight against tyranny. The problem arises from the logical conclusion of these premises, Carvalho clarified:

“every Muslim who lives in a country which is not ruled by a Muslim government is obliged to fight against that government and remove it”.

That is so because the non-Muslim ruler can be, at any moment, considered a “tyrant”. In the task of fighting against the “tyrant”, terrorism can then be instrumental to disorganize society and the political system, driving the individual irrational and frightened, ready to accept a fully new order.

Therefore, Carvalho concluded:

¹¹⁷² For example, sexual options are free in the Western Civilization. The *Sharia* states, however, that ‘if two men (or two women) are guilty of lewdness, give them suitable punishment’ taking into account that homosexual acts ‘... are a crime’ – Islamic Sharia Law, Sexual Relations and Crimes, n°2, available at: http://www.islamic-laws.com/download/Islaamic_Sharia_Law_sunni.pdf . While praising the Islamic law in detriment of western legal systems, the Muslims, particularly those who live in the West, put their culture above the Western way of life.

¹¹⁷³ Said Kutb, *In the Shade of the Qur'an* – available at: <http://www.holybooks.com/shade-quran-dhilal-quran-sayyid-qutb/>

“Islam constitutes the final complement to the materialist socialist revolution”¹¹⁷⁴.

Terrorism, along with migrations are two modalities of action to bear in mind in the analysis of the Islamic bloc as a globalist project. Linking them to *Tariqas* it is important to understand that *Tariqas* do not give expressive orders, through a direct command, but they are places in which ideas are discussed. Those ideas may lead to political action¹¹⁷⁵, *i.e.* the cultural influence somehow similar to Gramscian action. Among the ideas, the modalities of action (*e.g.* massive Islamic immigration in the West, and terrorism (for propaganda)¹¹⁷⁶) are certainly discussed.

With respect to immigration, Faye dedicated his book to the perspective that, with the waves of Muslim migrations, Europe is at the risk of a massive Islamization. This Islamization depends on the extermination of European cultures and also on the physical annihilation of the European peoples¹¹⁷⁷. He eventually compared this context, in the line of History, stating that this is the greatest cataclysm in Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire.

As for terrorism, as the columnist Daniel Greenfield noted, Islam can be perceived as a ‘religion of oppressors’ since the violence exerted against the non-believers by Muslims is legitimated by the Islamic law with the goal of expanding (culturally, religiously, politically, military) Islam more and more¹¹⁷⁸.

The final objective of the Islamic bloc as globalist project follows logically from the modalities of action just described.

¹¹⁷⁴ Blogdelinks, ‘Totalitarismo Islâmico, Comunismo, Nova Ordem Mundial – Olavo de Carvalho,’ last modified September, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLOF2sTcls4>

¹¹⁷⁵ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘O segredo da invasão islâmica,’ last modified March, 2013, *Olavo de Carvalho’s website*, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/070312Adc.html>

¹¹⁷⁶ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘O segredo da invasão islâmica,’ last modified March, 2013, *Olavo de Carvalho’s website*, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/070312Adc.html>

Islamic terrorism is becoming part of the daily life in the Western countries, as the recent attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, etc. have been demonstrating. Still, in the Middle East the horrors have no limit, for example in the Islamic State a mother was obligated to put her hands in the blood of her four-years old daughter just killed by the state officials, and another mother was obligated to eat rice with parts of the body of her own son – Jarbas Aragão, ‘Estado Islâmico decapita menina e obriga mãe a molhar mãos com o sangue – Terror de grupo muçulmano parece não ter limites,’ last modified June, 2016, Gospel Prime, <https://noticias.gospelprime.com.br/estado-islamico-decapita-menina-mae-sangue/>

Therefore, robbing, raping, torturing, crucifixions, shooting, beheading are normal procedures in the Islamic state.

¹¹⁷⁷ Guillaume Faye, *La colonisation de l’Europe – Discours vrai sur l’immigration et l’islam* (Paris: L’Encre, 2000).

¹¹⁷⁸ Daniel Greenfield, ‘Why Islam is a Religion of War,’ last modified November, 2015, Breaking Israel News, http://www.breakingisraelnews.com/54224/why-islam-is-a-religion-of-war-opinion/?utm_source=Breaking+Israel+News&utm_campaign=4c809af004-BIN_oped_11_15&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b6d3627f72-4c809af004-86480797#Md1Cf9s7itI5PFwZ.97

The mainstream mass media has been insisting on a dualism between a “radical” and a “moderate” Islam while reporting almost daily cases of Islamic terrorism. Kedar, a specialist in Arabic studies, explained that there is neither a ‘false radical’ nor an ‘original moderate’ Islam, but only one Islam that includes both moderates and radicals, determining that all Muslims must obey to the *Sharia*, the Muslim law¹¹⁷⁹.

In fact, in the Islamic theological terms, the “Muslim” is that person who follows the five pillars¹¹⁸⁰. Therefore, no dualism or other artificial division matters – if the person follows the five pillars, he/she is a Muslim. The next consequence becomes evident – all Muslims should aim the expansion of Islam and the full respect of the *Sharia*.

Concerning the latter aspect, in 2013, the Pew Research Center ‘The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society’ report, based on face-to-face interviews with 38 thousands of Muslims from 39 countries, presented many interesting findings. One of them was that overwhelming percentages of Muslims in many countries (including Muslims living in Western countries) wanted Islamic law (the quoted *Sharia*, which includes cutting hands, whipping and stoning women) to become the legal system of the country they are living in¹¹⁸¹.

Such transnational legal system (*Sharia*) is another modality of action to achieve the chief objective of the globalist project under analysis. The Global Caliphate is not interested in national states in any way, but it looks only at the transnational Muslim community (*Ummah*), which represents a possible final suppression of nation-states.

iv. The Islamic bloc: Dugin versus Carvalho

As it was sustained in the subchapter 4.2., Neo-Eurasianism constitutes a totalitarian ideology. In this way, it seems reasonable to infer that the sympathy that Neo-Eurasianism devotes to the Islamic anti-Western forces is not only strategic

¹¹⁷⁹ Mordechai Kedar, ‘There is No “Radical Islam” and There is Also No “Moderate Islam”,’ last modified November, 2015, Israel National News, <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/17876#.Vkc4w3YrKM9>

¹¹⁸⁰ The Five Pillars of Islam are: (1) proclaim the Testimony of Faith – “*La ilaha illa Allah, Muhammadur rasoolu Allah*,” which means “There is no true god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is the Messenger (Prophet) of God”; (2) Prayer – Muslims perform five prayers a day; (3) giving *Zakat* – support of the needy; (4) Fasting the Month of Ramadan; (5) the Pilgrimage to *Makkah* – the annual pilgrimage (*Hajj*) to Makkah is an obligation once in a lifetime – Islam Guide, ‘What Are the Five Pillars of Islam?’, last modified August, 2016, Islam Guide, <https://www.islam-guide.com/ch3-16.htm>

¹¹⁸¹ Pew Research Center, ‘The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society,’ last modified April, 2013, Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/>

(joining two forces against a common enemy), but it is also ideological. As a matter of fact, both forces assume their totalitarian and oppressive aspects, although distinct in their content.

Dugin recognized the relevance of ‘mystical Islamic orders (*tariqas*)’¹¹⁸², and he has repeatedly affirmed the importance of using forces of the Islamic bloc against the West and the U.S.A.

Nevertheless, for ideological and strategic reasons, Dugin has remained in silence about a problem that Carvalho raised: in the same way that the Syndicate has been assisting the revolutionaries of the Eurasian bloc, it has also been helping Islamic forces. Carvalho accused that the European Union’s policies have been favoring Islam¹¹⁸³, and Parvulesco – a cited Eurasianist – also claimed that the Syndicate has been stimulating Radical Islam against the European nation-states¹¹⁸⁴.

In this context, Ibrahim, a specialist of the Middle East and Islam, contended in his book that there is a war on Christians going on. That war, Ibrahim asserted, has been silenced by the western media (which is largely controlled by the Syndicate’s agents, as mentioned) that has been stating that the Muslim violence is merely a reaction to the ‘American imperialism’ and the ‘Israeli aggressiveness’. Plus, that argument is still presented even if Muslim persecution of Christians takes place in locations where Christians constitute a persecuted minority, or in places where the U.S.A. had no military interference (*e.g.* Egipt, Lebanon). The conclusion seems to be that there is no defense of human rights when the subject comes to defend Christians of being exterminated by Muslims¹¹⁸⁵.

A conclusion comes then clear: the argument of “American imperialism” as justification for Islamic terrorism greatly contributes to the success of the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan.

¹¹⁸² Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 185.

¹¹⁸³ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 571.

¹¹⁸⁴ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 284-285.

Vide also: Alexandre del Valle, *L’Islamisme et les États Unis – une alliance contre l’Europe* (Lausanne: Age d’homme, 1997).

¹¹⁸⁵ Raymond Ibrahim, *Crucified Again: Exposing Islam’s New War on Christians* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2013).

9.2.3. The Eurasian bloc as Globalist Project

The third globalist project identified in Carvalho's hypothesis under examination is the one deeply connected to Neo-Eurasianism at first hand, and to Meridionalism at second hand. For this reason, the study should be more detailed, once the test of H₄ is also at stake. In this way, before providing the operationalized systematization with the methodological questions of political science (as it was accomplished for the previous globalist projects), this topic requires a preliminary analysis that covers: (1) the characterization of the features of the Revolutionary Mentality; (2) the Revolutionary Movement; (3) the fall of USSR and the role of the Russian intelligence community; (4) Neo-Eurasianism as a fresh ideology of the Revolutionary Movement; (5) the role of Russian élites: wobbling between the Revolutionary Movement as whole and the Russian interests (Neo-Eurasianism) partly.

0. Preliminary analysis:

1. Characterization of the features of the Revolutionary Mentality

The origins of the Revolutionary Movement, Carvalho contended, can be traced into a particular type of mentality or "structure of perception"¹¹⁸⁶ that has been enduring on the path of History. Thus, it can be identified as distinctive of a particular group of people. Carvalho designated that mentality as "the Revolutionary Mentality".

The revolutionary mentality, Carvalho explained, is "a spiritual and psychological phenomenon, which, however, shows its most prominent expression in politics"¹¹⁸⁷. One of the stronger expressions of this state-of-mind is

"the individual or collective belief that a person or a group of people are authorized to reshape the whole society (if not the human nature in general) through political action; and he or they also believe that he or they are agents acting in the name of a better future, that he or they are positioned above any judgement either from the Past or the Present, and finally that he or they will only be judged in the future by the «Court of History»".

¹¹⁸⁶ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 196.

¹¹⁸⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 186-187.

Summing up, in the line of Voegelin's analysis of 'gnosis' and 'do not immanentize the eschaton', the revolutionary mentality is characterized by¹¹⁸⁸: (a) a radical belief that an ideal better world is possible (e.g. «the communist paradise»)¹¹⁸⁹; (b) "a mechanism of retroactive justification"¹¹⁹⁰ («what I do now in my political actions, namely the concentration of power, I will unlikely justify in the uncertain future that no one knows about») in order to get to that "better world"; (c) duplicity or multiplicity of justifications and tactics¹¹⁹¹ for the concentration of power in order to get to that "better world" as well. In fact, falling in the label of 'narcissistic personality', the revolutionary mentality constantly asks: 'how can I use this situation to either preserve or enhance my own' power?¹¹⁹²

Ideologically, the aspects mentioned above correspond to leftist aspirations, in general [cf. Section 4.2.1]. Furthermore, concerning the analysis of the agents if those beliefs are sincere or merely mirrored will determine if the agent is a 'psycopath'¹¹⁹³ or a 'hysteric'¹¹⁹⁴. Either way, the modalities of action have been the concentration of power, radicalization, and frequently mass killings¹¹⁹⁵.

¹¹⁸⁸ The phenomenological method is essential for the characterization of the Revolutionary Mentality via identification of *intentions* [cf. Subchapter 2.2].

¹¹⁸⁹ The Last Judgment within the Eternity or Thomas More's *Utopia* may be given as examples of Perfection and Justice, although they are outsiders of the revolutionary mentality for patent reasons: the first is the action of God Himself, and the second did not fight for any political action, rather being executed by the King's order.

The idea of anticipating the Last Judgement with ideological purposes is, however, intensively present in Dugin's writings, and in Parvulesco too – Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 176ff.

¹¹⁹⁰ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 228.

¹¹⁹¹ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 236.

¹¹⁹² Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, ed., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A Pluralist Guide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 142.

¹¹⁹³ Vide: Andrew M. Lobaczewski, *Political Ponerology* (Grande Prairie: Red Pill Press, 2012).

¹¹⁹⁴ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 96.

¹¹⁹⁵ There are movies which can help understanding these dimensions of the revolutionary mentality. Two examples: (1) to the argument that the 'creation of a new world' does not justify mass murder, Mr. Stromberg replied: 'For that, Major, I will accept the judgment of Posterity', *The Spy Who Loved Me* 1977; (2) from Blofeld's (another of Bond's villains) words: '...to comprehend the crucial fact that a terrible event can lead to something wonderful' (*Spectre* 2015) is possible to infer Hegel's work of the negative – «you can destroy, because something good *might* come out of it» (also Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*).

The reality is not different from those examples taken from fiction. For example, Natalie Mistral and Tanja Nijmeijer confessed, very recently, in an interview that they became FARC warriors because they wanted: '... to help a people that have the chance of changing their political structure and their reality...' since 'Colombia can become a huge laboratory of social reconstruction' – (translation by the author) Rita Siza, 'Com um festival de Verão, as FARC celebram fim da clandestinidade,' *Público*, September 23, 2016, national edition. If those social experiments need to be accomplished through crime (kidnapping,

2. The Revolutionary Movement

So, the study has just demonstrated in point (1) that the revolutionary mentality constitutes a distortion of the notions of time and limited political action, creating a brutal and sometimes irrational, field for political action. Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, Pol Pot could easily be characterized as extreme examples, illustrating the previous description of the features of the revolutionary mentality.

That distortion has, however, another complex aspect. In order to understand that aspect, Carvalho invited us to trace the historical genesis of the revolutionary movement. Carvalho then claimed that the revolutionary mentality originated the revolutionary movement at late Middle Ages, when the idea of rushing the Last Judgement and establishing the Paradise on Earth started to take shape¹¹⁹⁶. Therefore, the revolutionary movement appeared, at the start, as a sub-product of Christianity. Thus it had, once again, a spiritual origin. Jan Comenius, Joachim of Fiore and Jan Huss are among the precursors of the revolutionary movement, thus they were also characterized (at least by that aspect) by the revolutionary mentality¹¹⁹⁷.

In the line of time, the revolutionary movement was strengthened from the 16th century onwards, in successive steps gushing from the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution to the October Revolution, Fascist and Anarchist movements, the Nazi party, May 68, communist *guerilhas* (e.g. FARC), São Paulo Forum, etc. In this way, it is extremely important to understand that the revolutionary movement is constituted by a unitary structure of perception, a “self-conscious continuous phenomenon with a unitary character”¹¹⁹⁸, rather than by any ideological rigid and unique nature. In fact, the ideological flexibility is a key characteristic of the revolutionary movement. Knowing that gives a great help in explaining the objectives, relations, modalities of action of the revolutionary movement of which Neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist strategic plans make a part.

In the same way that the revolutionary movement is independent from any ideological unique guideline, the revolutionary movement is also autonomous and is

drug trafficking, murderer, etc.) that is a price worthy to pay off – this is a conclusion of the revolutionary mentality [cf. Chapter 8.].

¹¹⁹⁶ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 154.

¹¹⁹⁷ The expression *Novos Ordo Seclorum* goes back to the radical reformist Comenius – Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 153-154.

¹¹⁹⁸ Olavo de Carvalho TV, ‘A Estrutura da Mentalidade Revolucionária,’ last modified August, 2016, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q7i4hulL-SQ>

independent of states. Nevertheless, the revolutionary movement is able to control states, or even to create them, such as the Soviet Union, for example [cf. next point (3)]. The Soviet Union has appeared in 1922, fifty eight years after the creation of the International Workingmen's Association in 1864 (in which Marx himself collaborated), the precursor of the Communist International movement, which continued to exist after the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, Carvalho sustained¹¹⁹⁹. This premise is compatible with Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro's recent book, in which they argued that international *institutions* are able to create an independent dynamics, sometimes even against the states¹²⁰⁰.

So the core of the revolutionary movement is primarily its *Weltanschauung*. Consequently, the revolutionary movement is probably the only political and cultural unitary movement at the world level, Carvalho speculated. In this context, the revolutionary movement members have then been able to identify themselves, making references to one another in the line of History, Carvalho added in another of his radio programs¹²⁰¹.

Hence, Carvalho's approach to the "revolution" is entirely different from Crane Brinton's studies¹²⁰². As this analysis assessed, Carvalho characterized the revolutionary movement by (a) the concentration of power (pursued by a political class) as mean for action, (b) aim to achieve a radical change in the society, (c) through cultural and political instruments. Those premises are inappropriate to characterize the 1688 "Glorious Revolution" in England and the "American Revolution", which were put forward exactly on the ideas of limitation of political power instead. Briton, in his study, joined those events to 1789 France and 1917 Russia, which are cases that Carvalho characterized as 'revolutionary' *tout court*.

¹¹⁹⁹ Mídia Sem Máscara, 'True Outspcak - Olavo de Carvalho - 18 de fevereiro de 2013,' last modified February, 2013, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0xO6qdXyWA&index=290&list=PLM_ovO_tRDDA9DIMmNik9ayoKwaCHVqYy

¹²⁰⁰ Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

¹²⁰¹ Francisco Barbosa, '010 2007-02-19 Olavo de Carvalho', last modified December, 2012, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDZrQjJffeY&spfreload=5>

¹²⁰² Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1965).

3. The fall of USSR and the role of the Russian intelligence community

After having described and explained the revolutionary mentality and the revolutionary movement, the study will move forward identifying an agent that corresponds to that mentality and that movement: the Russian intelligence community.

In this context, this point (3) has two goals: (a) to demonstrate that the fall of the USSR did not damage the Russian secret services, which currently continue operational and being in charge of the administration of the Russian Federation; (b) to introduce the topic that the Russian intelligence community can be characterized by the features of the revolutionary mentality and, therefore, that the Russian intelligence community constitute part of the leadership of the global revolutionary movement [cf. next point (4) and *iii. means of action* below].

The first goal is then to decompose Carvalho's argument that the "KGB is intact".

"The KGB, which was the supreme structure of power in the Soviet Union, remained unharmed after the end of the Cold War, and not only unharmed but increased its influence (...) the KGB-ruled Soviet Union was the perfect form of a Police-State, Nazi Germany was nothing compared to it" – Carvalho affirmed¹²⁰³.

Carvalho added that since the KGB was not dismantled after the Cold War, the traditional control of political power by the secret service endured in Russia¹²⁰⁴. Dugin lightened the perspective on this subject, stating that the KGB permitted the disintegration of USSR¹²⁰⁵. It seems that the KGB not only 'permitted', but was in charge of the process¹²⁰⁶. The argument that the KGB/Russian secret services as a whole did never totally lose the power in Russia can be sustained by the evidence that an ex-KGB officer (Vladimir Putin) came to power in 1999 and, together with his comrades,

¹²⁰³ Mídia Sem Máscara, 'True Outspcak - 29 de junho de 2011,' last modified June, 2011, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCJZ0ip8_mY&index=221&list=PLM_ovO_tRDDA9DIMmNlk9ayoKwaCHVqYy

¹²⁰⁴ After the dissolution of USSR, the KGB 'the greatest machine of espionage, secret police and state's terror that ever existed' has continued to operate like if nothing has happened – Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 123.

¹²⁰⁵ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 141.

¹²⁰⁶ The collapse of the Soviet Union cannot be explained by a theory that defines the state as a black box. If the center of gravity and the political agent of the country was the KGB as it is sustained, then it follows that the political agent positioned itself against the Soviet Union's primary interest – the state's survival – taking into account that the KGB made the decision of dismanteling the country. This is an example of anti-statist politics [cf. Subchapter 2.1].

controls the country's political, economic, cultural systems until today. Still, this subject requires more empirical evidence.

In 2005, Parvulesco, a specialist in Russian studies already mentioned, recognized too that the secret services rule Russia¹²⁰⁷. Vladimir Bukovsky, the well-known Russian dissident, also tackled the subject of how the KGB continued resilient and efficient in Russia after the disintegration of the USSR¹²⁰⁸. The testimony of former KGB agent Anatole Golitsyn (who defected to the U.S.A. in 1961) supports what was so far affirmed¹²⁰⁹. Golitsyn went even further, explaining that the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the USSR, the 'reformation' of the KGB were all carefully planned by the Soviet secret services, in order to favor the appearance, later on, of a worldwide anti-West and anti-U.S. movement. It can be inferred that that movement includes the Neo-Eurasianist (and Meridionalist) strategic plans. Golitsyn insisted on his arguments elsewhere, contending that the KGB endured untouched with the fall of the Soviet Union¹²¹⁰.

Vaissié, who is a Lecturer and the Director of the Department of Russian Studies at Rennes 2 University in France, noted in her book *'The Kremlin's networks in France'* (and in various interviews) that the majority of the Russian *élites* (here understood as comprehensive expression for *élites* in politics, economy, military, culture, etc.) comes from the KGB. Thus, a KGB-trained network is in charge of the Russian power structures¹²¹¹. Moreover, Vaissé explained that after studying the Soviet Union's methods for so many years, she is able to confirm that Putin is reviving the Soviet Union's means of action and networks, stimulating the rise of pro-Kremlin individuals in political positions abroad¹²¹².

The logic of the idea of continuity of Soviet-Russian secret services is even present at the highest level of the Russian Federation. In fact, President Putin

¹²⁰⁷ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européenne, 2005), 223ff.

¹²⁰⁸ Vladimir Bukovsky, *Jugement à Moscou* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995).

¹²⁰⁹ Anatole Golitsyn, *New Lies For Old* (New York: Gsg & Assoc, 1990), available at: <https://archive.org/stream/GolitsynAnatoleTheNewLiesForOldOnes/Golitsyn-NewLiesForOld-TheCommunistStrategyOfDeceptionAndDisinformation1984#page/n0/mode/2up>

¹²¹⁰ Anatole Golitsyn, *The Perestroika Deception* (New York: Edward Harle Limited, 1998), available at: <https://archive.org/details/AnatoliyGolitsyn>

¹²¹¹ Cécile Vaissié, *Les Réseaux du Kremlin en France* (Paris: Les Petits Matins, 2016).

France 24 English, 'Putin's friends in France: How the Kremlin buys influence,' last modified March, 2016, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2j01fX4GqVk>

¹²¹² France 24 English, 'Putin's friends in France: How the Kremlin buys influence,' last modified March, 2016, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2j01fX4GqVk>
TV5MONDE, 'Influences: Le krémlin, ses réseaux... et les "restes" du KGB,' last modified April, 2016, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cpTFsNN9qg>

recognized that the SVR has 95 years, placing its origins directly in the Soviet Union and acknowledging its continuity¹²¹³.

Hence, there is enough empirical data to consider Carvalho's argument that "KGB is intact" as a valid premise. In doing so, and recognizing both the dimension of the former KGB¹²¹⁴ and its vile techniques and *modus operandi*¹²¹⁵, the researcher is in possession of useful instruments to understand the means of action of the Russian intelligence community as a particular agent of the revolutionary movement, which constitutes the nucleus of the Eurasian bloc as a globalist project.

Summing up, the conclusion seems to be solid enough: the Russian intelligence community can be seen as the prolongation of the KGB with all that it represents – state service, a group of techniques and tactics, heritage in crime – and, consequently, it is in charge of Russian politics.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that it was not only the name that changed (from KGB to FSB). There were also other mutations from the Soviet intelligence system to the Russian one. One example of those mutations was that the post-Soviet Russian secret services created thousands of the so-called "orange companies" in the West and their officials have got immensely rich, as Carvalho explained¹²¹⁶. It is also known that, right after the collapse of the USSR, many millionaires appeared in Russia all the sudden. That can only be explained by the former existence of a vast capitalist economy rolling on the black market since the soviet economy was officially a state ruled one. Therefore, those Soviet-era oligarchs (KGB and or Communist party members) enlarged their wealth; they purchased the state-owned lands, factories,

¹²¹³ Vladimir Putin, 'Vladimir Putin attended gala reception to mark Security Agency Worker's Day,' last modified December, 2015, President of Russia, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50977>

¹²¹⁴ The KGB was '... probably larger than all Western intelligence agencies combined' – Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *Spy book – the Encyclopedia of Espionage* (New York: Random House, 2004), 355.

¹²¹⁵ On the KGB brutal history, techniques, tactics, crimes, atrocities and violence – 'Murder, kidnapping, and intimidation' – Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *Spy book – the Encyclopedia of Espionage* (New York: Random House, 2004), 355 – *vide*:

Vasiliy Mitrokhin, *KGB Lexicon – The Soviet Intelligence Officer's Handbook* (London: Routledge, 2004).

Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB – The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990).

¹²¹⁶ Mídia Sem Máscara, 'True Outspcak - Olavo de Carvalho - 18 de fevereiro de 2013,' last modified February, 2013, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0xO6qdXyWA&index=290&list=PLM_ovO_tRDDA9DIMmNik9ayoKwaCHVqYy

infrastructures, and some other new “businessmen” attached to that [communist] *nomenklatura* joined it – all of them prospering with the “orange companies”¹²¹⁷.

From these events:

‘...[M]urderers, torturers and perpetrators of genocide, or their children, came out on top and became both the new political elite and the wealthiest stratum of society’

in some of the post-communist countries, explained the columnist Szabo, justifying that that fact contributes to the ‘Western apathy towards victims of communism’¹²¹⁸. In this context of the continuity of that group of individuals in power, Bukovsky contended:

‘Having failed to finish off conclusively the communist system, we are now in danger of integrating the resulting monster into our world. It may not be called communism anymore, but it retained many of its dangerous characteristics. . . . Until the Nuremberg-style tribunal passes its judgement on all the crimes committed by communism, it is not dead and the war is not over.’¹²¹⁹

From this the conclusion is strengthened: although many communist symbols were abandoned and many institutions were closed, Russian *élites* remain largely the same from the Soviet era.

In these circumstances, the argument that the dissolution of the USSR was indeed part of a strategy that had the purpose of guaranteeing the continuity and welfare of the revolutionary movement and its agents (the explanation of self-preservation) fits in the puzzle. Plus it was also a triumph for the international political left.

“...the Communist movement created the USSR and destroyed it, and [that destruction] had the purpose of preserving the well-being of the Communist movement (...) because with the fall of USSR came also the structural re-shape of the

¹²¹⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘[R4] Olavo,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, May 23, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/05/r4-olavo-eng.html>

¹²¹⁸ Christopher Szabo, ‘Why are we so understanding towards the crimes of Communism?’ last modified July, 2015, Mercatornet, <http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/why-are-we-so-understanding-towards-the-crimes-of-communism/16545>

¹²¹⁹ Vladimir Bukovsky, ‘The Cold War and the War Against Terror,’ last modified July, 2002, Front Page Mag, <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/Printable.aspx?ArtId=23920>

In fact, as it was mentioned, the communist officials everywhere have not been punished for their crimes. For example, recently, former Czechoslovak communist premier Lubomir Strougal was not prosecuted for his crimes because they ‘expired in 1994’ – ČTK, ‘Communist premier not to be punished for Iron Curtain,’ last modified February, 2016, Prague Daily Monitor, <http://www.praguemonitor.com/2016/02/04/communist-premier-not-be-punished-iron-curtain>

Communist parties, from a vertical organization obeying to the Soviet Union to a [horizontal] flexible organization as network, much more efficient...”

– Carvalho said in a public talk. At that time, Carvalho also insisted that the collapse of the Soviet Union was an important step for the triumph of the international left and the revolutionary movement in many areas of the globe¹²²⁰.

In operational terms, the Russian intelligence community has been able to work more horizontally since the collapse of the USSR¹²²¹. The results of the analysis of chapter 4, chapter 7 and the whole PART IV of this study constitute empirical evidence supporting Carvalho’s premises.

Insisting on the point, it is pertinent to keep in mind that, in the USSR, the Communist Party bureaucrats were the most dangerous part of the power structure, as Bezmenov asserted¹²²². However, it is important to remind two facts: (i) some of those bureaucrats were members of the secret services too; and (ii) all the party bureaucrats and KGB-members were investigated by the (fellow) KGB officers any time. Therefore, quoting John J. Dziak’s old words, a KGB specialist:

‘The Soviet system can’t survive without it [the KGB]’¹²²³.

In this line, Parvulesco quoted Pierre de Villemarest’s analysis and explained that the KGB was an emanation of the Communist Party, while the GRU came out from the Red Army¹²²⁴. Therefore, whereas the attribution of the first was to protect a revolutionary ideology, the latter was committed to the defense of the state. What happened in 1991 was then the dismantlement of the state (the collapse of the Soviet Union), and the continuation of the revolutionary project. It does not seem incorrect to infer a victory of the KGB over GRU, since the sacrifice of the state was made in the name of the continuation of the revolutionary power scheme.

¹²²⁰ Agloqueflugesola, ‘A Estupidez Criminosa da Direita no Brasil,’ last modified September, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCArUuRuea0>

¹²²¹ In order to better understand the issue of the Russian intelligence community’s diffuse and horizontal line of command *vide* the study of RAND corporation applied to the Zapatista movement in Mexico – David Ronfeldt *et al.*, ‘The Zapatista "Social Netwar" in Mexico,’ last modified 1998, RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR994.html

¹²²² Morgan Freeman, ‘A KGB revela como espionou o Brasil,’ last modified April, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-YSbbiiCTk>

¹²²³ *Apud* Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *Spy book – the Encyclopedia of Espionage* (New York: Random House, 2004), 357.

¹²²⁴ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européenne, 2005), 90.

Not only these premises match with Carvalho's approach (he clarified that the communist [revolutionary] movement does not depend on states, but possesses a proper dynamics and autonomy instead¹²²⁵) but also they provide an empirical test of H₄ towards its confirmation.

On the matter of the left-wing political forces, Dugin has been complaining that the fall of USSR was preceded by a '...weakening of Soviet influence in the Global Leftist Movement'¹²²⁶. *De facto*, that is probably one of the strongest reasons why the Soviet intelligence community, which was leading both the revolutionary movement and in charge of the country, has decided to dissolve the Soviet Union, which was losing its influence everywhere and was exhausted of competing against the U.S.A. in economy, military, technology, etc. The empirical result has been the triumph of the political Left in numerous countries, as Revel explained¹²²⁷.

So far this point (3) has been focusing mainly on the end of the Cold War and the relevance of secret services at that time, an idea that is solidified, even in the common sense by the general public. However, before moving forward again to Neo-Eurasianism, it is vital to make a point about the key relevance of secret services for understanding 21st-century Russian politics.

The role of espionage has not vanished with the Cold War. In truth, the 2015 System of Internal Security (SIS – a Portuguese Intelligence Department) annual report, presented to the Portuguese Parliament, sustained that espionage activities on 'politics, economy and military' have been increasing¹²²⁸.

In this way, recent empirical evidence about how active Russian secret services are will be provided (chronologically). (I) In 2010 a FBI investigation (Operation *Ghost Stories*) resulted in the capture of several Russian officials, who have been gathering

¹²²⁵ Tradutores de Direita, 'O Triunfo do Marxismo Cultural - Olavo de Carvalho, Cliff Kincaid e Jerry Kenney,' last modified March, 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1483&v=O4raFHTlyjU>

¹²²⁶ Alexander Dugin, *Last War of the World-Island – the Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (London: Arktos, 2015), 68-71.

¹²²⁷ Jean-François Revel, *La grande parade – Essai sur la survie de l'utopie socialiste* (Paris: Plon, 2000).

¹²²⁸ Sistema de Segurança Interna, 'Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna – 2015,' last modified March, 2016, Parliament https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalheActividadeParlamentar.aspx?BID=101826&ACT_TP=RSI pp.: 76, 80.

intelligence for Moscow¹²²⁹, among them were: (a) Mikhail Semenko, who infiltrated at the Seton Hall, was trained by the foreign intelligence service (SVR), (b) the married couple Richard and Cynthia Murphy are charged with money laundering conspiracy linked to Bill and Hillary Clinton, and of course (c) Anna Chapman, to whom Putin devoted the highest attention. (II) In December 2015, former FSB officer *alias* Yevgeniy made extremely disturbing declarations on TV, confessing that Islamic terrorist groups have been trained in Moscow to pursue attacks in London, Paris, etc. and that Russian special forces are partly involved in the creation of ISIS¹²³⁰. (III) In January 2016, the British judicial system concluded that Putin and Nikolai Patrouchev, at the time the FSB leader, were ‘probably’ responsible for the order of assassination of Alexandre Litvinenko with poison, in 2006, and that FSB agents Andrei Lougovoï et Dmitri Kovtoun executed the operation¹²³¹. (IV) In May 2016, the British intelligence community hired former Russian secret service agents to better study Russian officials’ intentions¹²³². (V) Also in May 2016, it exploded a scandal of a pro-Russian mole in the Portuguese Intelligence system – the mole, Frederico Carvalhão Gil, was caught in Rome after having traded state secrets (classified information about the EU, NATO, CPLP) to Russian secret services; both Gil and his counterpart Russian spy, from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), were arrested in a joined Italian *Polizia del Stato* and Portuguese *Polícia Judiciária* operation on the 21st May 2016 in the city center of Rome¹²³³.

Alexander Vassiliev, a former KGB officer and a journalist, provided help describing the specific ways of action of these spies. Vassiliev has written extensively about Soviet bloc’s secret services infiltration in America, and he stated that the:

¹²²⁹ Star-Ledger Staff, ‘Russian spies arrested in FBI sting included Seton Hall graduate,’ last modified June, 2010, New Jersey News, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/russian_spy_network_included_s.html

¹²³⁰ Unian, ‘Ex-FSB officer to TSN.Tyzhden: Russia involved in London, Paris attacks, ISIS,’ last modified December, 2015, Unian, <http://www.unian.info/politics/1204376-ex-fsb-officer-in-tsntyzhden-russia-involved-in-london-paris-attacks-isis.html>

¹²³¹ Philippe Bernard and Isabelle Mandraud, ‘Affaire Litvinenko : Poutine en accusation, Londres veut éviter l’affrontement,’ last modified January, 2016, Le Monde, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2016/01/21/affaire-litvinenko-poutine-a-probablement-approuve-le-meurtre-de-l-oppo-sant-russe-selon-un-juge-britannique_4851120_3214.html

¹²³² Intelligence online, ‘Emergency measures on Russian analysis,’ last modified May, 2016, Intelligence online, [https://www.intelligenceonline.com/government-intelligence/2016/05/18/emergency-measures-on-russian-analysis,108150327-ART-SUM?did=107946333&eid=%3C_sena_i_id\\$_%3E](https://www.intelligenceonline.com/government-intelligence/2016/05/18/emergency-measures-on-russian-analysis,108150327-ART-SUM?did=107946333&eid=%3C_sena_i_id$_%3E)

¹²³³ Carlos Varela, ‘Espião português vende segredos de Estado aos russos,’ last modified May, 2016, Jornal de Notícias, <http://www.jn.pt/justica/interior/espiao-portugues-apanhado-a-vender-informacao-a-russo-5189539.html>

'illegals were supposed to act as talent spotters and scouts, identifying Americans in positions of power who might be recruited to spill secrets for financial reasons or through blackmail'

adding that the Russian intelligence community's ways of action are nothing but a prolongation of the 'Soviet-era habits'¹²³⁴. Thus, Vassiliev confirmed the arguments formulated above.

Moreover, at the time in which the pro-Russian mole in the Portuguese intelligence system was caught, an unidentified Portuguese intelligence officer explained:

'The issue cannot be restricted to documents only. The value of this kind of individuals [mole] to a foreign service is also constituted by his contacts, by the Intel he can provide about those foreign services' targets, in the procedure of gathering information about the allies' agents, etc. It is like an open door. Besides that, there is a whole immaterial dimension that must be analyzed, which also might damage the state'¹²³⁵.

The key role of the Russian intelligence community in Russian politics is then presented. In a recent public lecture in Prague, George Friedman claimed that 'the FSB is more than able to turn the Ukrainian government in chaos'¹²³⁶, giving an idea of the Russian intelligence community's influence and capacity. So, it is hardly surprising that Putin has recently reorganized Russian security and intelligence services, an action that can be seen as another contribution to understanding the importance of the secret services in the conduct of Russian politics¹²³⁷. Brzezinski words from 2001 can finish this point (3):

¹²³⁴ Associated Press, 'FBI releases papers on Russian spy ring that involved Anna Chapman,' last modified October, 2011, *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/31/fbi-russian-spy-ring-anna-chapman>

¹²³⁵ Translation by the author. Carlos Rodrigues Lima and Valentina Marcelino, 'Espião português pode ter tido "cúmplices" no SIS,' *Diário de Notícias*, May 25, 2016, national edition.

¹²³⁶ George Friedman, 'Public Lecture: Flashpoints – The Emerging Crisis in Europe', CEVRO Institute – School of Political Studies, 20th April 2016.

¹²³⁷ Jacob L. Shapiro, 'A Purge Is a Purge Is a Purge,' last modified August, 2016, *Geopolitical Futures*, <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/a-purge-is-a-purge-is-a-purge/>

In September 2016, after the parliamentary elections in Russia, it turned out that the reorganization of the Russian intelligence community will continue with the re-creation of the "State Security Ministry" (MGB – the same designation of Stalin's time), expected to be fully operational before 2018 – Marc Bennetts, 'Russia 'to revive the KGB' after Vladimir Putin wins biggest majority,' last modified September, 2016, *The Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/19/russia-to-reinstate-the-kgb-under-plan-to-combine-security-force/>

‘... the current Russian political elite is an alliance of the KGB-military leadership with former apparatchiki and criminalized oligarchs; all the current top Russian leaders could be serving in the Soviet government if the Soviet Union still existed’¹²³⁸.

4. Neo-Eurasianism as a fresh ideology of the Revolutionary Movement

The previous point (3) explained in relative depth the perspective of how the Russian intelligence community can be seen as the prolongation of the Soviet secret services and how Russian *élites* remain as soviet-trained officials (revolutionary mentality). Consequently, the features of the revolutionary mentality are still part of the psychological environment of the Russian *élites*, *i.e.* (a) the inversion of the notion of time («bring the paradise now, and being judged some day»); (b) the objective of radical transformation of the reality/society, specially through cultural transmutation of moral values and political action; (c) the dialectic duplicity or multiplicity of justifications and tactics; (d) the idea that the final goal will justify the means once used; and (e) specially the concentration of power (*e.g.* political, military, dictatorship) as a way to accomplish the objectives.

Furthermore, not only the characteristics of this mentality can be observed with the naked eye on Russian politics daily, but they can also be identified within Neo-Eurasianist ideology and strategic plan, so both are engaged in the revolutionary movement, it can be inferred.

As said, the revolutionary movement is not crystallized in any single ideology. Despite that, the revolutionary movement has its traditional Soviet roots in Communism. Communism constitutes more a political structure, a movement, an organized network, rather than an ideology since ideology and ideological flags have been varying in the last decades in the Communist discourse. Because of that ideological flexibility, Communism – understood as mainstream within the revolutionary movement – can make use of religion and conservative ideas with no major concern. Therefore, the assessment of the movement must also rely on real political connections in addition to beliefs and ideas [cf. Section 8.2.1.].

At this point, Neo-Eurasianism enters on stage. As a contradictory synthesis of (incompatible) ideologies (Communism, Conservatism, Islamism, Fascism, etc.) [cf.

¹²³⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Geostrategic Triad – Living with China, Europe and Russia* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), 63.

Section 4.2.1.], the unity of Neo-Eurasianism with its allies is simply guaranteed by the strategic goal of the destruction of both the West and the U.S.A. [cf. Section 4.2.3.]. The revolutionary movement uses Neo-Eurasianism in its maximum ideological flexibility, although the old-fashioned goal comes from the Soviet era.

The apocalyptic vision of Dugin serves the revolutionary movement well. As Carvalho discerned, giving the historical examples of France, Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, and Brazil:

‘«Salvation by destruction» is one of the most frequent *clichés* of the revolutionary discourse’¹²³⁹.

Thus, Carvalho inscribed Dugin and Neo-Eurasianism in the revolutionary movement, also because Dugin has been promising, as once USSR also promised, that the destruction of the West will be achieved, and that that event will bring a “better world”.

So, in the line of the conclusions of subchapter 4.2., there can be very little space to consider Dugin as a conservative, since the empirical evidence sustains the premise that Dugin *is* or *acts as* a revolutionary, engraved into a larger dynamics: the revolutionary movement¹²⁴⁰. In the same way, Putin and the Russian *élites* can be hardly seen as *conservatives*, their background, objectives, modalities of action and tactics match with the revolutionary movement’s characteristics. Consequently, they are far from any conservative movement.

What is still to be formulated, however, is the connection between the Russian intelligence community and Neo-Eurasianism.

Besides the fact that Dugin comes from a family that served in the Soviet secret services for generations, the projection that Neo-Eurasianism gets on the internet, on the editorial movement, in many languages, makes the researcher interrogate about if all that projection is only a product of interesting and seductive ideas or the direct result from actions of a very powerful agent. The evidence seems to confirm the latter perspective.

¹²³⁹ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘[R4] Olavo,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, May 23, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/05/r4-olavo-eng.html>

¹²⁴⁰ Therefore, Laruelle’s claim that Neo-Eurasianism is a conservative ideology needs to be rejected – Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism - An ideology of Empire* (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 1.

Carvalho did not hesitate in labeling Eurasianism as a KGB [*sic*] (*alias* Russian intelligence community's) strategy¹²⁴¹, adding that today's Russia is a 'police state'¹²⁴². In this regard, Dugin's writings can put light on the problem:

To 'The Soviet Union's KGB, just as in the present-day [to] FSB, the top priority was political issues, which are subsidiary in geopolitics'¹²⁴³.
'...the new Eurasian order – the solar, transcendental, continental KGB – would establish the positive values of Eurasia.'¹²⁴⁴

The previous quotations demonstrate that: (i) Dugin sees the FSB as the continuation of KGB, as this thesis contends [cf. previous point (3)]; (ii) that, to Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism depends on the Russian intelligence services as agent; (iii) and, lastly, they also sustain the importance of including the secret services (agents and intel) in the geopolitical analysis [cf. Section 1.2.3.].

So, due to the relevance of secret and (counter)intelligence agencies in Russia, it makes full sense that Putin institutionalized the celebration of the "Security Agency Worker's Day" on the 20th December every year.

In sum, this point (4) finishes the matter stressing that the Russian intelligence community constitutes the agent for operationalization of Neo-Eurasianist modalities of action [cf. Section 4.2.3]. Therefore, another of Carvalho's premise – that Neo-Eurasianism is linked to the Russian intelligence community – is validated.

5. The role of the Russian *élites*: wobbling between the Revolutionary Movement as whole and the Russian interests (Neo-Eurasianism) partly

Despite what was just sustained above – that the Russian intelligence community (which controls the Russian political system) is committed to the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan – it must be borne in mind the conclusion mentioned in PART II [cf. 4.2.4.] that the impact of Neo-Eurasianism on Russian politics is neither absolute nor direct. The full amount of reasons why is that so could create another Ph.D. thesis.

¹²⁴¹ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 544-545.

¹²⁴² Olavo de Carvalho, '[R4] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, May 23, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/05/r4-olavo-eng.html>

¹²⁴³ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 141.

¹²⁴⁴ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 24.

For this thesis what is noteworthy to remind at this level is that the revolutionary mentality (which characterizes Russian *élites*, once again) includes the duplicity or multiplicity of justifications and tactics. One example might help in the understanding of how does that work. While Trotsky and the 1917 red revolutionaries – Putin’s political ancestors¹²⁴⁵ – shot with no mercy the Russian Imperial Family, today in 2016 Putin holds a painting of Tsar Nikolay II on one of the walls of the Kremlin’s Presidential pressroom. This is an example of how the *revolutionary dialectics of contradiction* can operate in reality.

So, Neo-Eurasianism shapes Russian foreign policy, but Russian foreign policy is not constrained by the Neo-Eurasianist single strategic plan only. The duplicity or multiplicity of justifications and tactics from the revolutionary movement must be kept in mind, to understand Russian foreign policy outcomes.

In the same vein, on his radio program, Carvalho expressed his belief that the Russian ‘power scheme’ has currently huge compatibility with Neo-Eurasianism. However, Carvalho has curbed his statement while acknowledging that, in the future, the Russian *élites* might abandon the Neo-Eurasianist ideology, in the case that the power purposes will not be achieved¹²⁴⁶. This means that the objective of the revolutionary movement, once more, prevails over any other guideline. The concentration of power remains as the principle task in political action, as it will be explained [cf. *iii. means of action* below].

*

After such preliminary analysis, the text will now recapture the formal structure already used for the systematization of the globalist projects.

i. Agents:

The agents of the Eurasian bloc as Globalist Project are the top officials of Russia and China, especially those countries’ secret services¹²⁴⁷.

¹²⁴⁵ Recently Putin admitted: ‘I quite liked, and still do, the Communist and Socialist ideas’ – Damien Sharkov, ‘Russia’s Putin: I’ve always liked communist and socialist «ideas»,’ last modified January, 2016, Europe Newsweek, <http://europe.newsweek.com/russias-putin-says-he-always-liked-communist-socialist-ideas-419289>

¹²⁴⁶ Mídia Sem Máscara, ‘True Outspoke - Olavo de Carvalho - 14 de março de 2012,’ last modified March, 2012, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2D7K9Y16Wg&index=255&list=PLM_ovO_tRDDA9DIMmNlk9ayoKwaCHVqYy

¹²⁴⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Os Donos do Mundo,’ last modified October, 2013, Olavo de Carvalho’s website, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/110221dc.html>

ii. *Objective:*

Like the other previous globalist projects, also the Eurasian bloc aims to control the world through a global oligarchic order commanded by the mentioned agents. For that, the U.S.A. and the Western Civilization must be neutralized, at best.

In respect to Russia, Brzezinski stated that Russian *élites* already made clear that their ‘...central goal is the restoration of Russia’s power and not the democratic reform’,¹²⁴⁸.

iii. *Means and modalities of action:*

The main modality of action is (and because the Eurasian bloc is driven by the revolutionary movement) the cumulative concentration of power. *Power*, as *capacity*, needs to be expanded to its maximum to increase the number of possibilities. Therefore, the revolutionary mentality tends to favor totalitarian projects, dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, police-states, in which the chances of an organized political opposition are extremely low¹²⁴⁹. For that reason, Carvalho’s observation that “...for the revolutionary mentality, a totalitarian dictatorship is the regular way and not a distortion ...”¹²⁵⁰ can be considered correct since it corresponds to the empirical facts of communist regimes, for example. In the totalitarian context, the revolution will open the way to the control over education and culture, society and politics, health and religion. Below, more detailed explanations will be provided. The economy, however, which is impossible for the state to control fully (*i.e.* the communist economy is impossible), as Mises demonstrated¹²⁵¹, will be only half controlled as social democracy, socialism and fascism propose.

The objective of the revolutionary movement and the modality of action of the concentration of power, concerning Russia in particular, will not be independent of the idea of Империя [cf. Chapter 3 and Section 4.2.2.]. Even during the Cold War Bezmenov, the ex-KGB agent already quoted and an expert in Communism and Soviet

¹²⁴⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Geostategic Triad – Living with China, Europe and Russia* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), 63.

¹²⁴⁹ Throughout History, Russia has shown a long tendency for autocracy. Perhaps since Karamzin, at least, it can be traced, in the literature, an idea of *uniqueness of Russia* that is connected to autocracy as necessary form of government [cf. Chapter 3]. The Soviet Union manipulated well such conception.

¹²⁵⁰ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Duas épocas,’ last modified October, 2015, *Diário do Comércio*, http://dcomercio.com.br/categoria/opiniao/duas_epocas

¹²⁵¹ Ludwig von Mises, *Socialism - An Economic and Sociological Analysis*, trans. J Kahane (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

secret services' subversion strategies, named a 'World Communist System'¹²⁵² that was already planned for execution. The Cold War is over, the Soviet Union was dissolved, but it was already explained that the Russian intelligence community remained untouched and having dropped the name of "communist", the Empire and the World System endure as a goal¹²⁵³.

In spite of all Russia's structural problems (*e.g.* low economic growth), the Russian power structure is composed of a Soviet-trained highly self-confident political class. After all, as Dugin informed, Soviet ideology does not exist anymore. But Dugin said so after stating that, "sometimes, Russia – because of inertia – defends the same positions than in Soviet times"¹²⁵⁴. A world system under the Russian influence is definitely a goal pursued without any inertia but with full motivation and ambition, instead, taking into account that it has been sustained since the Soviet era until our days.

So how exactly have the Eurasian bloc's modalities of action been operationalized? The answer includes (a) cultural subversion, (b) drug trafficking and organized crime, and (c) killings (selective and mass).

The analysis will focus firstly on (a) *cultural subversion, modification of values* because under Gramsci's guidelines these are the most important ones. The Soviet and the Russian intelligence communities have a large experience in this field¹²⁵⁵. The modality of action concurs for the final objective of destroying Western values, thus finding full compatibility with the Neo-Eurasianist primary purpose.

In this study, much has already been written about the Russian intelligence community's cultural subversive techniques, and many pieces of literature on the subject were quoted as well. Furthermore, the already mentioned former KGB agent Bezmenov has given intensive public lectures on the Russian intelligence community's

¹²⁵² Morgan Freeman, 'A KGB revela como espionou o Brasil,' last modified April, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-YSbbiiCTk>

¹²⁵³ *Vide:*

Toby Westerman, *Lies, Terror and the Rise of the Neo-Communist Empire – Origins and Direction* (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2009)

Cliff Kincaid *et al.*, *Back from the Dead – The Return of the Evil Empire* (Owings: America's Survival, 2014).

¹²⁵⁴ Alexandr Dugin, 'São Paulo A. Dugin/A. Martin,' last modified September 2014, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78IHwoyxdO8>

¹²⁵⁵ *Vide:*

Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive - The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Westport: Greenwood press, 1960).

Stephen Koch, *Double Lives – Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas Against the West* (New York: Free Press, 1993).

subversive techniques¹²⁵⁶. Recently Vaissé, a specialist already quoted too, explained with detail on a radio program that Sputnik and Russia Today, added to some *Facebook* and *Twitter* pages, are Kremlin's propaganda agencies, and that the journalists working in those agencies received training based on old KGB techniques¹²⁵⁷.

As for other techniques, this modality of action has also been operationalized through infiltration in the enemy's family or his circles of friends in order to influence or force the enemy's behavior. The means normally include blackmailing, subversive control, etc.

Dugin, by his side, did not hesitate in advising Putin to not rely on hard power only, but to understand Gramsci's 'hegemony' concept of soft power; thus, to enforce the above-mentioned techniques¹²⁵⁸. Consequently, Carvalho was accurate when he sustained that Dugin has been using:

'... instruments of political propaganda: Manichean simplification, defamatory labeling, perfidious insinuation, the phoney indignation of a culprit pretending to be a saint and, last, not least, the construction of the great Sorelian myth – or self-fulfilling prophecy – which, while pretending to describe reality, builds in the air an agglutinating symbol in hopes that the false may become true by the massive adherence of the audience.'¹²⁵⁹

since those are traditional instruments from the modality of action under examination.

The cultural subversion as a modality of action is then well documented, so there is no surprise while noting that the 'Czech Ministry of the Interior is planning the establishment of a 30-member team to monitor foreign propaganda,' especially to assess the Russian influence in the country¹²⁶⁰.

There are three targets that should not be ignored in the modality of action of cultural subversion: (I) Christianity; (II) Conservatism; (III) Capitalism.

(I) Using Christianity against Christianity.

¹²⁵⁶ Zé Oswaldo, 'Yuri Bezmenov - Teoria da Subversão [PACOTE COMPLETO],' last modified August, 2014, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d0fTJqeRXCE>

¹²⁵⁷ Mediapart, 'Cécile Vaissé: les réseaux du Kremlin en France,' last modified April, 2016, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=endtJqrivXo&list=PL0H7ONNEUnnuH4skOxqE_JTvk5VuVGDnq&index=6

¹²⁵⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 257-259.

¹²⁵⁹ Olavo de Carvalho, '[R2] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r2-olavo-de-carvalho.html>

¹²⁶⁰ Ian Willoughby, 'Monitoring team created in response to perceived growth in Russian web presence,' last modified May, 2016, Radio Praha, <http://radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/monitoring-team-created-in-response-to-perceived-growth-in-russian-web-presence>

Besides the Russian intelligence community, Carvalho assessed that Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism constitutes a product of another historical agent: the Russian Orthodox Church's highest hierarchy and its religious and expansionist aims¹²⁶¹.

In fact, it is important to note a dualism within the Russian Orthodox Church: one the one hand (i) there is the true doctrine based on the teachings of Jesus Christ and their servants (who condemned Dugin [cf. Section 4.2.2.]); and, on the other hand, (ii) there is the top hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox church that, in its majority, is aligned with Putin's regime, as it once was aligned with the Soviet administration¹²⁶² (that group, which includes Russian Patriarch Kirill¹²⁶³, is naturally allied with Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism).

In regard to the alliance of the top hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church with Russia's political power, there is more to be dissected. Former KGB Colonel Konstantin Preobrazhensky also explained in his book that the Russian Orthodox Church has been an instrument of the FSB, as it was once a KGB's¹²⁶⁴.

In modern-day Russia there are then three points to be made in this regard: (i) Putin uses the Russian Orthodox Church as a mean of action since it allows the creation of the image of Russia as a defender of Christian faith and conservative values [cf. Section 4.2.2.]; (ii) Putin's Russia would be favored by the union of the Orthodox autocephalous Churches under the Patriarch of Moscow¹²⁶⁵ (that represents expansionism in both the spiritual and temporal spheres); and (iii) Putin's Russia would

¹²⁶¹ Olavo de Carvalho, '[R2] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r2-olavo-de-carvalho.html>

Vide also: Jacob L. Shapiro, 'The Geopolitics of the Orthodox Church – While the Soviets shunned religion, Putin has used the Russian Orthodox Church toward geopolitical ends,' last modified June, 2016, *Geopolitical Futures*, <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-geopolitics-of-the-orthodox-church/>

¹²⁶² "With an Orthodox Church headed by KGB agents..." – Olavo de Carvalho, '[R4] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, May 23, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/05/r4-olavo-eng.html>

¹²⁶³ Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', in 2015 and before the Russian Duma, called to recapture "the good things from the Soviet-era, like solidarity, in order to build up a modern Russia" – Nina Achmatova, 'Patriarca Kirill, por primera vez en la Duma: redescubrir la solidaridad de la era soviética,' last modified January, 2015, *Asia News*, <http://www.asianews.it/noticias-es/Patriarca-Kirill,-por-primera-vez-en-la-Duma:-redescubrir-la-solidaridad-de-la-era-sovi%C3%A9tica-33263.html>

¹²⁶⁴ Konstantin Preobrazhensky, *KGB/FSB's New Trojan Horse – Americans of Russian Descent* (North Billerica: Gerard Group Publishing, 2009).

¹²⁶⁵ Such union is difficult to achieve as, for example, the failure of the 'Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church' (which should have taken place in June 2016 in Crete) demonstrated – Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, 'On the situation caused by the refusal of several local orthodox churches to participate in the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church,' last modified June, 2016, *The Russian Orthodox Church*, <https://mospat.ru/en/2016/06/13/news132897/>

also be favored by the union of the Orthodox autocephalous Churches with the Catholic Church¹²⁶⁶ (“progressive-catholic” ecumenism).

In respect to the latter point, the prolongation of the fracture among the Catholic Church and the Orthodoxy is an instrument of the anti-continental strategy, Parvulesco contended¹²⁶⁷. Unsurprisingly, there has been a very recent effort for joining the two religions by the Russian Patriarch Kirill, who has taken advantage of Pope Francis’ willingness to accept any leftist proposal¹²⁶⁸. Furthermore, the fact that such effort between Orthodoxy and the Catholic Church has not been headed by the Patriarch Bartholomeus of Constantinople, who traditionally could be considered as the most prominent figure in the Orthodoxy, might be extremely significant. Recalling Parvulesco, he admitted that the reunification of the Orthodoxy with the Catholic Church is essential for the triumph of the Eurasian project¹²⁶⁹, something that can illustrate the primary interest of Russia in the matter.

In this way, the importance of religion for politics in Russia is crucial [cf. Chapter 3]. No surprise that Putin focuses on this issue so intensively – once more, Putin’s image of Christian and conservative leader is at stake – although it is interesting to note that, while talking about his Christian faith, Putin rarely mentions the name of Jesus Christ or the Virgin Mary¹²⁷⁰. Besides, it seems that, as false as the Neo-Eurasianist Christian rhetoric is [cf. 4.2.2.], Putin’s image of “defender of conservative and Christian values”, in the same line of Neo-Eurasianism once again, is deceitful as well¹²⁷¹.

¹²⁶⁶ Accepting the argument that «Russia is still not consecrated to the Immaculate Heart of Mary» [cf. 4.2.2.], Putin has allegedly asked personally to Pope Francis, at the official visit to the Vatican in November 2013, to accomplish the consecration – there is no written document about Putin’s request, just Father Gruner’s testimony: TheFatimaCenter, ‘Did Putin ask Pope Francis for Consecration?,’ last modified January, 2015, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zIEQ3XEhdB4>

¹²⁶⁷ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 164-165.

¹²⁶⁸ Kirill’s meeting with Francis was held in the communist Cuba: Vatican, ‘Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia,’ last modified February, 2016, Vatican’s website, https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2016/february/documents/papa-francesco_20160212_dichiarazione-comune-kirill.html

¹²⁶⁹ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 261-264.

¹²⁷⁰ For example: Marine1063, ‘Vladimir Putin's Christian Faith - in his own words,’ last modified May, 2012, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3d_yxJhmjk

¹²⁷¹ An empirical evidence of this argument was given by the Major Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, who affirmed that the Catholic Church is being persecuted in Crimea, and the Archbishop also contended that he is perfectly reminded about how well the KGB once used to manipulate Christian values for political finalities – Marta Petrosillo, ‘Ucraina, invasione non guerra civile,’ last modified February, 2015, La Nova Bussola Quotidiana, <http://www.lanuovabq.it/it/articoli-ucraina-invasione-non-guerra-civile-11895.htm>

Converging with that, Neo-Eurasianism also makes use of religion as power instrument [cf. Subchapter 4.2.]. As it was demonstrated by Sanahuja and by Penn¹²⁷², among others, the success of a global political project also depends on a plan for unification of religions; needless to point out that the religious amalgamation stirred by the Neo-Eurasianist plan fits perfectly in Sanahuja's and Penn's studies.

Nevertheless, to finish the topic on religion, it seems important to remind that the doctrine of the Catholic Church is opposed to a global political authority, *i.e.* to a world government¹²⁷³.

(II) Using Conservatism against Conservatism [cf. Section 4.2.2].

Adding to what was just described and analyzed, Carvalho elaborated his premises logically, concluding that Putin's image as "conservative" is nothing but fake¹²⁷⁴.

(III) Directly against capitalism.

There is an aggressive criticism towards capitalism from the Neo-Eurasianist proponents.

In a text entitled '«Financism»: the supreme stage of development of capitalism,'¹²⁷⁵ – a clear reference to Lenin's book about capitalism – Dugin formulated that, although classical Marxism is useless in economic analysis¹²⁷⁶, it is true that the international finance (*e.g.* stock markets) is 'evil' because it is separated from the productive sphere. That is a very fragile idea that Dugin did not explain in complete terms in his text. Despite that, the idea has got its ideological usefulness, taking into account that it suits in the justification that the revolution is needed, in order to fight against capitalism, affirming, on the other hand, that economy is not everything that is at stake, exhorting for a '...global philosophical paradigm of Final Revolution'.

¹²⁷² Juan Claudio Sanahuja, *Poder Global y Religión Universal* (Buenos Aires: Vórtice, 2010).

Lee Penn, *False Dawn – The United Religions Initiative, Globalism, and the Quest for a One-World Religion* (Hillsdale: Sophie Perennis, 2004). Available at: http://www.leepenn.org/FalseDawn_np.pdf

¹²⁷³ Saint Thomas Aquinas, a *Doctor of the Church*, wrote: 'If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one' – Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Article 6, Reply to Objection 2, available in English at: <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1103.htm#article5>

In other words, Saint Thomas Aquinas stated that if God does not govern the World directly, then there can be no possibility of claiming for a world government appealing to God.

It is interesting to note that this statement matches with Morgenthau's approach to the world government.

¹²⁷⁴ Olavo de Carvalho, 'Intimação,' last modified December, 2015, *Diário do Comércio*, <http://dcomercio.com.br/categoria/opiniao/intimacao>

¹²⁷⁵ Aleksandr Dugin, '«Financism» – the supreme stage of development of capitalism,' last modified September, 2015, *The Fourth Political Theory*, <http://www.4pt.su/en/content/%E2%80%9Dfinancism%E2%80%9D-supreme-stage-development-capitalism>

¹²⁷⁶ This study already explained this point with Mises' research, *vide* above.

To the cultural subversion and modification of values, it must be added criminal modalities of action. These include (b) drug trafficking and organized crime, and (c) killings (selective and mass).

In this regard, one must recall Gramsci's prescriptions [cf. 8.2.1.] intending to understand better how crime assists politics. As a matter of fact, the promotion of criminality (*e.g.* weak laws, restraint police law enforcement, control over the judiciary system forcing the release of bandits or defending them publicly) is essential for breaking the "bourgeois order" down, as Carvalho put it, revisiting the strategy of the radical left¹²⁷⁷. So, the association of the Eurasian bloc's agents with criminal organizations is crucial.

Tracing the problem in the past, Douglass, a U.S. national security analyst, sustained the argument that both drug trafficking and organized crime were stimulated by the Soviet Union since the 60s, with the final goal of undermining the West and the U.S.A. In fact, that was only possible through the corruption of U.S. officials for decades¹²⁷⁸. By her side, Sterling investigated how significant segments of the mafia in the world (*e.g.* the Sicilian and American Mafias, Colombian drug cartels, Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuza) were unified with the Russian mafia, under the Russian intelligence community's directives for a worldwide strategy of corruption, blackmail and crime¹²⁷⁹.

Having sustained the already validated argument that the dissolution of USSR was conducted by the secret services successfully towards a major goal, Blanc (a specialist in Slavic studies) innovated, detailing the connections between Putin's system, the Russian intelligence community, the oligarchs, the "orange companies", and the mafia¹²⁸⁰. Together with Lesnik, Blanc has previously devoted full attention to the latter aspect into another book, in which it was explained that five years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian mafia already controlled 80% of the country's resources, that the Russian mafia has eliminated its rivals (*e.g.* businessmen, journalists, politicians), and that the Russian mafia had many international connections namely with Colombian drug cartels¹²⁸¹. That last relation between USSR/Russia and

¹²⁷⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 524.

¹²⁷⁸ Joseph Douglass, *Red Cocaine – The Drugging of America and the West* (London: Harle, 1999).

¹²⁷⁹ Claire Sterling, *Thieves' World – The Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

¹²⁸⁰ Hélène Blanc, *KGB Connexion - Le système Poutine* (Paris: Hors Commerce, 2004).

¹²⁸¹ Hélène Blanc and Renata Lesnik, *L'empire de toutes les mafias* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1998).

drug trafficking in South America was mentioned in section 8.2.2. Thus, the argument gets even stronger: there are international connections between the Russian mafia and FARC (drug trafficking and the international leftist movement), consequently, relations between the Russian government officers and São Paulo Forum [cf. Subchapter 8.2.]. Carvalho came to the same conclusion, which he informed about in his writings and on radio programs¹²⁸².

Even more aggressive is the modality of action of (c) selective and mass killings.

An example of selective killing was given while citing the Alexander Litvinenko's case, which shows that this kind of modality of action is always on the decision-making table of the Russian *élites*.

As for mass killings – as Carvalho pointed out in his debate with Dugin – no other political movement in History murdered as many millions as the revolutionary movement (the core of the Eurasian bloc as a globalist project): the Communist regimes in Russia and China alone killed no less than 140 million people¹²⁸³ [cf. 4.2.3. and Rummel's research].

Killings as revolutionary movement's modality of action are by no means a novelty. In fact, once the revolutionary mentality's ultimate objective of creating a "better world" is settled (a paradise on Earth), all modalities of action are automatically justified. And that includes killings. "There is no problem doing it", the revolutionary mentality argues in its macabre discourse, "because the finality justifies the means" – Machiavelli read *in extremis*. It is in this context that the Che Guevara's speech at the United Nations, on the 9th December 1964, makes sense:

"Yes, we have been executing, and we will
continue to do so..."¹²⁸⁴

Vide also a more recent investigation: Hélène Blanc and Renata Lesnik, *Russia blues* (Paris: Ginko, 2012).

¹²⁸² Blogdelinks, 'Foro de São Paulo, KGB, Nova Ordem Mundial – Olavo de Carvalho,' last modified August, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NzOSNKtHOek>

¹²⁸³ Olavo de Carvalho, '[R2] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r2-olavo-de-carvalho.html>

Another example: Boris Karpichkov, a former KGB-agent, accused the Kremlin of blowing the Russian airplane on the 31st October 2015 for political purposes (namely breaking down Russian diplomatic isolation) – Andrew Malone, 'Did Putin plant the holiday jet bomb that killed 224 Russians? Ex-KGB agent claims this dossier proves the Kremlin orchestrated the atrocity to justify waging war on Syria,' last modified, December, 2015, Dailymail, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3374231/Did-Putin-plant-holiday-jet-bomb-killed-224-Russians-s-outrageous-theory-ex-KGB-agent-claims-dossier-proves-Kremlin-orchestrated-atrocity-justify-waging-war-Syria-decide-yourself.html>

¹²⁸⁴ Hatila alvares rocha, 'fuzilamos sim e vamos continuar fuzilando,' last modified March, 2012, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BE1IQaJb_Zc

As one of the revolutionary movement's *ideologies*, it cannot be put away the scenario that Neo-Eurasianism will propose to use this modality of action too. In fact, Carvalho denounced that the final triumph of Neo-Eurasianism will not be achieved without genocide and war¹²⁸⁵.

Finally, the comparative method demands to point out the similarities between Russia and Brazil on the issue of the connections between *élites* and organized crime. Furthermore, at the end of the analysis of the Eurasian bloc's means and modalities of action one conclusion became evident: there is a huge compatibility between those (specifically between the Russian ones) and the Neo-Eurasianist modalities of action. Thus, another test that confirms H₄ is completed.

iv. *The Eurasian bloc: Dugin versus Carvalho*

Still regarding the modality of action of organized crime, Carvalho combined even terrorism in his debate with Dugin, pushing forward the argument that Russia and China are the suppliers of weapons of many terrorist organizations throughout the world, as well as of the anti-West regimes (*e.g.* Iran and Venezuela)¹²⁸⁶. Moreover, reacting to Dugin's claim that "capitalism corrupted Russia during Ieltsin's era", Carvalho argued that Russia "has been a no-man's land dominated by bandits and corruption since the disintegration of the Soviet Union"¹²⁸⁷. And even before that event, there are studies analyzing how corrupt the Soviet Union already was¹²⁸⁸, thus tracing the roots of the problem. The premise that "Russian is corrupt" is sustained by empirical evidence since Russia was assessed by the Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 as one of the most corrupted states in the world. Only countries like Iran, Angola, Somalia and North Korea have worse levels of corruption than Russia¹²⁸⁹.

¹²⁸⁵ Olavo de Carvalho, 'Eurasianism and Genocide,' last modified June, 2014, The Inter-American Institute, <http://theinteramerican.org/eurasianism-and-genocide/>
Olavo de Carvalho, '[R4] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, May 23, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/05/r4-olavo-eng.html>

¹²⁸⁶ Olavo de Carvalho, 'Olavo – Introduction,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>

¹²⁸⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 160.

¹²⁸⁸ Konstantin Simis, *The Corrupt Society – The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism*, trans. Jacqueline Edwards and Mitchell Schneider (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

¹²⁸⁹ Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,' last modified May, 2016, Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/#results-table>

Linking this state-of-things of criminal modalities of action to Dugin, Carvalho stated:

‘Saying that Professor Dugin is at the center and pinnacle of power is a simple question of realism. In order to fulfill his plans, he counts on Vladimir Putin’s strong arm, the armies of Russia and China and every terrorist organization of the Middle East, not to mention practically every leftist, fascist and neo-Nazi movements which today place themselves under the banner of his “Eurasian” project.’¹²⁹⁰

There is nothing new, in fact, in the alliance of communism-fascism and crime, under geoconjunctive aims. While referring to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (the last historical moment in which the alliance between Germany and Russia was accomplished) Parvulesco affirmed that Stalin was seeking, indeed, a grand continental integration between the communist USSR and the nazi Third Reich¹²⁹¹. Digging deeper into the matter of Stalin-Hitler alliance, it is more likely to reject Parvulesco’s perspective and rather sustain the hypothesis that, at the time, Stalin was more likely using Hitler in order to destroy Europe and later be able to invade the region, or half of it at least, as a “liberator” – that is the old hypothesis formulated by the Austrian philosopher Topitsch¹²⁹². The historical events seem to confirm it. In that context, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitler would have naturally been a Stalin’s miscalculation but disturbed in nothing the ultimate outcome – the Iron Curtain descended over Europe anyway.

The predominance of the Russian intelligence community as part of the group of the Eurasian bloc’s agents constitutes another milestone to be revisited. As stated, Carvalho also defended this argument against Dugin’s “reborn Christian and conservative Russia” flag. As a matter of fact, considering what was explained about the revolutionary mentality and about the corruption that is spread in Russia, it is very easy to infer that the ideas of Russia as “the defender of Christianity and conservatism”

¹²⁹⁰ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Olavo – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>

¹²⁹¹ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005), 91.

¹²⁹² Ernst Topitsch, *Stalin’s War – A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War*, trans. A. and B. E. Taylor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987).

constitute an ideological fake¹²⁹³. In that way, it was already concluded that that flag would then be just a part of the Russian intelligence community's strategic plan with the purpose of gathering as much support as possible against the West, a modality of action totally compatible with Neo-Eurasianist one [cf. 4.2.3.]. As Carvalho stated:

‘...Eurasianism artificially builds a negative unity, based on sheer hatred of a supposed common enemy...’¹²⁹⁴

Chandler, a former U.S. official, has also supported this premise. He argued that there is an ongoing war of radical Islam, a resurgent Russia, and a virulent New Left (e.g. Latin America) against the U.S.A.¹²⁹⁵. Chandler also provided pieces of evidence to support this thesis' arguments that (i) the Russian intelligence community is the continuation of the Soviet secret services with the same goals and modalities of action; (ii) that the Left is enjoying the strongest hegemony ever in many places of the world, particularly in Latin America.

Closing the matter of the relations between the Russian intelligence community's strategy and Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan, one quotes Dugin's own words: ‘... he [Putin] is simply the best’¹²⁹⁶.

A major flaw in PART V of this thesis is certainly the total absence of research on the role of the top Chinese officials and the Chinese intelligence community as agents of the Eurasian bloc as globalist project. This absence can be justified by the preferences of the author of this thesis and the limitation in his background knowledge about China. On the other hand, the references to Russia and Brazil occupied the formal limits of the work, already. So, the researcher opens another line of research to investigate this topic.

Coming back to the debate, with the view of closing the topic of the collaboration of the Syndicate with the Islamic bloc and the revolutionary

¹²⁹³ “An ideology just tries to imitate a scientific theory” – Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 128. [cf. APPENDIX 2, IDEOLOGY] Furthermore, Carvalho characterized Dugin's reading of History as an ‘ideal narrative’ in the post-structuralist (therefore non-scientific) sense – Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Olavo's Conclusion,’ Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog, July 5, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/07/olavos-conclusion.html>

¹²⁹⁴ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘[R4] Olavo,’ Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog, May 23, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/05/r4-olavo-eng.html>

¹²⁹⁵ Robert Chandler, *Shadow World - Resurgent Russia, The Global New Left, and Radical Islam* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2008).

¹²⁹⁶ Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs Putin – Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right* (United Kingdom: Arktos, 2014), 289.

movement/Eurasian bloc (in the line of the literature quoted in this subchapter 9.2), Carvalho also discussed that the Syndicate has been favoring both the Islamic bloc and the Eurasian bloc's globalist projects¹²⁹⁷. Carvalho pointed out that if the U.S. government does not denounce Russia and China for supporting terrorist movements that is mainly due to the Syndicate's opposition¹²⁹⁸. Symbolically, it is the power of Money assisting the power of the Revolution and Islamism, through weaponry. Having accepted Carvalho's three projects for global power, Dugin commented:

'The actual globalization is essentially based on the economical order, it represent [*sic*] the future world as the global market where "the history has ended" (F.Fukuyama...). So, the struggle of "the Russian and Chinese militarism" and of the "Muslim Brotherhood" against the West, USA and the globalization is a good and just case that should be supported by all citizens in the world. That rejects the hypermaterialist empire of the frenetic consumption and of North American hegemony. The rule of the warriors and of the priests, for me personally, (and implicitly for the majority of Eurasian people) is much better than the order of merchants. More than that, I would suggest the alliance between the "Russian Chinese militarism" and "Muslim Brotherhood" in common struggle to overthrow the American World Order and to finish with the globalization and "American way of life"¹²⁹⁹.

Therefore, Dugin left no space for doubts about the ideological and strategic goals at stake. Furthermore, due to ideological reasons, Dugin has been hiding the collaboration cited right above. Insisting on this crucial collaboration, PART IV demonstrated its existence in Brazil too. São Paulo Forum is perfectly integrated into the dynamics of the revolutionary movement, thus in the project of the Eurasian bloc. There is also a massive compatibility between the Leftist hate-speech of Brazilian *élites* against the

¹²⁹⁷ Olavo de Carvalho, 'Olavo – Introduction,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>

¹²⁹⁸ Olavo de Carvalho, '[R2] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r2-olavo-de-carvalho.html>

¹²⁹⁹ Alexandr Dugin, '[R1] Dugin,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

West¹³⁰⁰ (which is Christian and capitalist in the Gramscian terms) and against the U.S.A., and the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan. Furthermore, Brazilian leftist *élites*' goal of creating "a new civilization" [cf. Section 8.2.2.] corresponds to the utmost goal of the revolutionary mentality, the engagement with the revolutionary movement that drives the Eurasian bloc project. To close the circle, in his debate with Dugin, Carvalho gave the example of Brazil to illustrate a case in which the ties between the global financial groups and the revolutionary movement comes hand-in-hand with anti-U.S. rhetoric¹³⁰¹.

The last point with importance for geopolitical studies in the debate is the forces against the globalist projects presented by Carvalho. He asserted that the defeat of the three globalist projects is only possible through the fortification of national sovereignties¹³⁰². Among them, the patriotic forces of the U.S.A. and Israel have been vital in opposition to the three projects for world government. So, Carvalho explained that the corruption of the U.S.A. and the West is fundamental¹³⁰³. It was so to the USSR, and it continues to be important now for the agents of the Eurasian bloc's globalist project and the sake of its victory¹³⁰⁴. This importance justifies the continuous effort for infiltrating in the U.S. power structure¹³⁰⁵. Carvalho is then convinced that:

¹³⁰⁰ *Vide*, for example, the proclamation signed by 150 people among Brazilian *élites* – Carta Maior, 'Manifesto defende reaglutinação de forças no Brasil para enfrentar crise mundial,' last modified November 2012, Carta Maior, <http://cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Politica/Manifesto-defende-reaglutinacao-de-forcas-no-Brasil-para-enfrentar-crise-mundial/4/26078>

¹³⁰¹ Olavo de Carvalho, '[R2] Olavo,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/04/r2-olavo-de-carvalho.html>

¹³⁰² For a study about the relevance of the nation-states as guarantor of democracy and the rule of law *vide* Thierry Henri Philippe Baudet, 'The significance of borders: why representative government and the rule of law require Nation States' (Ph.D. Thesis, Leiden University, 2012).

¹³⁰³ The intelligence services operate through different ways, namely putting a mole on the decision-making structure of the enemy state, leading that state to take decisions against the national interest (thus corrupting the structure). Among many others *vide*:

Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, *Philby: The Long Road to Moscow* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978).

Ronald Rychlak and Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism* (Washington: WND books, 2013).

Walter G. Krivitsky, *Mi5 Debriefing: and Other Documents on Soviet Intelligence* (Riverside, CA: Xenos Books, 2004).

A key research piece in this domain is certainly: Diana West, *American Betrayal – The Secret Assault on Our Nation's Character* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2013).

Furthermore, the mentioned cases of Anna Chapman or Andrei Bezrukov sustain the argument that espionage and infiltration on enemy-state's structure did not disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Russian secret services' purposes are as active as ever – a claim to be included in the test of H₄.

¹³⁰⁴ Olavo de Carvalho, 'Olavo – Introduction,' *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida's Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>

¹³⁰⁵ For example: David J. Kramer, 'U.S. invites a Russian fox into the chicken coop,' last modified February, 2015, The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-invites-a-russian->

‘American nationalism is a powerful Christian resistance to the globalist ambitions which have been trying to take over the country in order to destroy it as an autonomous power and use it as a tool for their essentially anti-national plans’¹³⁰⁶.

At this level, there is another opposition to Dugin’s perspective, who has refused to distinguish the U.S.A. from the Syndicate:

‘...should we accept the global financial elite transnational rule as something inevitable and resign from the struggle for any alternative only because we don’t like Eurasian or Islamic projects? If we could imagine some other doctrine as an alternative, it would be a good thing, but it is not so easy’¹³⁰⁷.

[the Western financial *élites*] ‘... headquarter of capitalism and North American imperialism. So we have real enemy in front of us that should be attacked’¹³⁰⁸

Dugin concluded¹³⁰⁹. In order to fight against that ‘global financial elite’, which was identified above with leftist ideologies, Dugin proposed even more socialism¹³¹⁰.

On the other hand, if the world is unipolar, as Dugin stated it is, if the U.S.A. imposes a strict order of democracy and human rights, how is it possible that there are so many conflicts in such allegedly strict order? The Islamic State, Islamic terrorist attacks in the West, civil war in Syria, etc. one must inquiry about where is the U.S. dictatorial hand? Carvalho seems to be right contending against Dugin’s perspective¹³¹¹. So seems Mearsheimer, who claimed that ‘neither world politics are currently unipolar

fox-into-the-chicken-coop/2015/02/19/3e9f9f86-b7b8-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html?utm_term=.9f9c2ade2f75

¹³⁰⁶ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Olavo – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>

¹³⁰⁷ Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R1] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

¹³⁰⁸ Alexandr Dugin, ‘[R1] Dugin,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/alexander-dugin-first-reply.html>

¹³⁰⁹ However, in a more recent video, Dugin revealed that he started to slightly change his views. Dugin stated that, on the one hand, it exists ‘America and its national interests’ and, on the other hand, it exists ‘the globalist elite’. Dugin then repeated the description of state-of-things of the U.S.A. that Carvalho gave in the debate. Dugin continued further, affirming that in the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, the first stream is represented by Donald Trump and the second by Hillary Clinton – Aleksandr Dugin, ‘The US establishment plans war to stop Trump,’ last modified June, 2016, Katehon, <http://katehon.com/directives/us-establishment-plans-war-stop-trump>

¹³¹⁰ Alexandre Douguine, *Le prophète de l’eurasisme* (Paris:Avatar, 2006), 99-104.

¹³¹¹ Carvalho explained that “unipolar power” does not have any “geopolitical center”, but the unipolar power exists only in the “area in which the three great globalist projects interact and cooperate” – Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 571.

nor the U.S.A. is global hegemon'¹³¹². In the dynamics of the Eurasian bloc's objectives, the U.S. engagement with China is then misguided and prejudicial to the U.S.A., though¹³¹³.

Still in the domain of forces against the globalist projects, if "civilization is religion" as Carvalho claimed, consequently, in order to survive, the West would need to reaffirm its Jewish and Christian roots, while spreading the traditional knowledge – the high-culture shared by the Civilization as a whole, from California to Jerusalem. But it must do so, Carvalho noted, in the principle of national sovereignties, because the fight against the globalist projects means the fight against unifying forces above the national states¹³¹⁴. The idea that to guarantee the endurance of individual freedom state's authority needs to be restricted (thus, a supra-state authority needs to be restricted even more, and the question is *how to do that?*) is a very reasonable idea that seems to have been forgotten¹³¹⁵.

Ending the analysis of the debate, Carvalho contended elsewhere that the short and medium-term future of international politics would depend on knowing if cooperation among the three globalist projects will prevail over conflict among them. In the first case, something like a global dictatorship would arise, in the second case, a world war would come¹³¹⁶. In fact, one of the most important points in this subchapter is the idea that the Eurasian bloc (driven by the Revolutionary Movement that includes Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism) is not the only globalist project on the international arena, thus it cooperates and tussles – depending on the timing, alliances, opportunities, threats – with the two other globalist forces, the Syndicate and the Islamic Bloc.

¹³¹² John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 381.


¹³¹³ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 402.

¹³¹⁴ Fabry defended the idea that there will be no sovereignty without a previous national identity – Mikulas Fabry, 'Unrecognized States and National Identity,' in the 5th Geopolitical Conference: Geopolitical importance of unrecognized states and territorial non-state actors (Causes and consequences of the border change in post-Cold War World), Charles University in Prague, 13th November 2015.

¹³¹⁵ Making an incursion in arts, in Puccini's *Tosca*, the Baron Vitellio Scarpia is a good representation of state's power that once embodied, contaminated by personal interests (in that case lust), abuses his authority in order to violate Tosca's values. Furthermore, one should note that, in the Baron's case, he still had some remaining traditional Christian morality, as he kneeled down before the Almighty, acknowledging that he must not forget about God. Currently, Christianity almost disappeared from the public space in the Western Civilization: the secularization of the state as an acceptable principle was followed by the secularization of the individuals.

¹³¹⁶ Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 571.

Figure 11
Diagram of Carvalho's hypothesis



The very last note before the conclusion reminds that a 2014 Czech counterintelligence report alerted about the formation of:

a new 'Komintern' '...based on Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism...'¹³¹⁷.

That quotation stresses the pertinence of this thesis not only to the Czech Republic and other European countries but virtually to all countries that the joint maneuver of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism branded as the enemy.

The conclusion will systematize the findings and close the study.

¹³¹⁷ Security Information Service (BIS), 'Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2014,' last modified September, 2015, Security Information Service (BIS), <https://www.bis.cz/vyrocnizpravaEN6c8d.html?ArticleID=1096>

Dmitry Babic, 'Western-financed 'Revolution Ltd' is today's Comintern,' last modified September, 2015, Strategic Culture Foundation, <https://www.sott.net/article/302537-Western-financed-Revolution-Ltd-is-todays-Comintern>

Civilizations die from suicide, not by murder.¹³¹⁸

Arnold Toynbee

‘... [N]o futuro que de nós se avizinha,
a sombra do grande Império Universal
em que se aniquilará, por fim, a Civilização Ocidental.’¹³¹⁹

Golbery do Couto e Silva

‘Et est datum illi bellum facere [...]
Et data est illi potestas in omnem tribum,
et populum, et linguam, et gentem.’¹³²⁰

Book of Revelation

¹³¹⁸ Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History - Volume IV* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 273.

¹³¹⁹ transl. ‘in the near future, the shadow of the great Universal Empire, in which the Western Civilization will be ultimately destroyed’ – Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 22.

¹³²⁰ transl. ‘It was allowed to make war [...] and given power over every race, people, language and nation;’ – Book of Revelation 13:7.

CONCLUSION

Neo-Eurasianism has shown an apocalyptic face that can be linked to the quotations on the previous page. In fact, expressions such as ‘*l’Empire Eurasiatique de la Fin*’ or ‘*Imperium Ultimum*’ are jargons repeated numerous times by Parvulesco (one of the greatest enthusiasts of the Eurasian project¹³²¹), as well as by the Neo-Eurasianist main proponent and leader Aleksandr Dugin. Although Meridionalism is somehow different of Neo-Eurasianism in this aspect, Meridionalism also urges for the creation of a “better world order” (*i.e.* a feature of the revolutionary mentality).

This thesis studied Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism through the geopolitical approach *tout court*. The theoretic-methodological framework of neoclassical geopolitics or geopolitical studies (territory and identity), which puts together all the different fields crossed in the text (Human Ethology, classical *Élites*’ Theory, Theories of International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geography, Strategic Studies, History, Religion, Identity, classical Geopolitics, etc.), is the bottom line that grants unity to the thesis. Thus, the researcher struggled for a well-organized study, with logically chained and interconnected ideas, with the view to answer the research question.

Within that context, the analysis of the object – Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism – took place. In doing so, the connections between the object and the dynamics towards a New World Order were assessed, and the hypotheses were tested. Some of the most important conclusions, together with the main innovative results, will be emphasized in the next paragraphs.

¹³²¹ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (France: Les Amis de la Culture Européene, 2005).

In PART I, the Offensive Realist framework was praised, but it was identified that, from the geopolitical studies' point of view, Mearsheimer's approach exhibits several difficulties. It was likewise concluded that geopolitical studies are not a 'discourse', and even less a 'discourse' connected to 'militarism' – as Ó Tuathail accused the twentieth-century geopolitical reasoning of having been¹³²². In the same vein the 'the metaphor of social construction'¹³²³ was rejected, along with determinism and mechanism. It is considered that Bonaparte was then not fully accurate when he wrote to the King of Prussia in 1804: '*La politique de toutes les puissances est dans leur géographie.*' This thesis explained with detail that politics (domestic and foreign) are shaped by systemic constraints, and the relative material state potential – the latter is broader than geography (although geography provides critical factors). *Élites'* perceptions and *élites'* capacities are also included in the equation. Rethinking and revisiting useful classical geopolitics' concepts and theories, within a strong theoretical and methodological framework, has brought new results: (1) discovery of connections between Human Ethology (basic assumptions) and political implications (geopolitical studies) via territoriality; (2) systematization of a new and progressive theoretical framework for geopolitical studies, including detailed methodological procedures that a geopolitical study might follow; (3) systematization and reinforcement of neoclassical realism as theory fitting it within the geopolitical studies' model (variables of *élites'* perceptions and capacities); (4) the creation of new concepts: Geoconjunctive (processes) and Geomisguidance; (5) theoretical development of old concepts: RAUMSINN, LAGE, RAUM.

In PART II, Neo-Eurasianism was identified as an ideology and a strategic plan, and analyzed as such. Therefore, Dugin was labeled as an "agent" (thus not as a "researcher" (Aristotelian dualism)), who has been making a misuse of geopolitical concepts and the geopolitical reasoning in general, for political purposes. To Dugin, the triumph of the directives of his strategic plan, designed against the West and the U.S.A., is what matters. Although Neo-Eurasianism does not *command* Russian politics, the research concluded that Dugin is very influential in Russian politics. Another new result of this study was accomplished while, within Dugin's project, (6) it was pointed out the relevance of Brazil, and of South American regional integration. In this context, and

¹³²² Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 255.

¹³²³ Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 35.

from documents recently unveiled, it was also traced that the Soviet Union has kept maneuvers in the country since, at least, the decades of 50 and 60.

In PART III, it was the turn of Meridionalism to be identified as ideology and strategic plan, through a careful analysis of its roots, goals, and modalities of action. Alike Dugin, also Martin was labeled as an “agent”. The text validated the conclusion that, not only Meridionalism is engaged with the international revolutionary movement, thus it is ideological and normative (consequently, an outsider of the geopolitical studies’ framework), but also that Meridionalism is influenced by Brazilian School of Geopolitics, which main ideas were described (a rare exercise in English language). In regard to new results, (7) it was traced an influence of Therezinha de Castro over Martin’s Meridionalism; (8) it was discovered a correlation between the continentalization “strategy” as Brazilian School of Geopolitics’ prescription and the South American regional integration maneuver (with the destruction of Brazil’s national sovereignty as step to build up the *Pátria Grande*); (9) it was pointed out a high compatibility between the rhetoric of Meridionalism and Neo-Eurasianism (analysis of the environment, mission, objectives, modalities of action); and finally (10) it was systematized a set of contradictions and inconsistencies within Meridionalism.

The study confirmed that Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism are ideologies *tout court*, *i.e.* not as schools of thought that use the scientific method to analyze reality and to contribute to the progress of knowledge and the search for the essence of the reality, as a regular geopolitical study should target. Unlike that, although created from an amalgam of geopolitical concepts, ideas, theories, and principles those ideologies target to assist, or to provide the basis, so that radical changes in the international chessboard might take place.

PART IV was mainly devoted to empirical analysis – geopolitical and foreign policy study applied to Brazil. It was observed that a leftist political class has been ruling Brazil, for the last decades, supported by a far-left intellectual class, and that those groups of individuals have had connections to international crime. The new results sustained that: (11) Brazilian *élites* are geomisguided, (South American regional integration is their priority); (12) South American regional integration maneuver (a geoconjunctive process), also supported by Meridionalism, is highly useful to the Neo-Eurasianist strategic plan; – thus it took place the empirical validation of the concepts of geomisguidance and geoconjunctive maneuver, the former accomplished with the case of Brazilian *élites* and the latter with the case of Latin America regional integration

maneuver –; (13) Meridionalism exerts influence upon Brazilian foreign policy via ideology; (14) the single case study devoted to São Paulo Forum unveiled relations between politics and crime in South America, also (15) confirmed a large ideological leftist hegemony upon Meridionalism, pointed out too that (16) São Paulo Forum shapes Brazilian foreign policy under the same ideological leftist guideline, and finally (17) characterized São Paulo Forum as the “strategic command for South American integration” .

It was not contended that the continentalization “strategy” *caused* São Paulo Forum – as a founder of São Paulo Forum, Lula da Silva has never read Travassos, Meira Mattos or Couto e Silva – but from the premises stated, the causes of São Paulo Forum are definitely ideological (radical left). The study aimed to demonstrate that there is a correlation between the past debate in Brazilian School of Geopolitics and the ideological guidelines of the present. That means that *Workers’ Party* officials’ decision of “turning the back to the Ocean and focus on the sub-continental inland” (as an ideological command) impacted on the level of political decision, which is connected to the geographical setting (continentalization result). Furthermore, this ideological guideline is linked to the articulation between Russian Neo-Eurasianist and Brazilian Meridionalist intellectuals and strategists. It is being perceived, and it leads to foreseen, a possible strong political and military alliance in the future between those countries/areas/blocs against the U.S.A. and the West. In addition, from the theoretical framework of geopolitical studies as systematized in this thesis, it is possible to predict that the scenario of deterioration of power projection of Brazil on the international arena will certainly continue, conceding that Brazilian *élites’* revolutionary (thus anti-national) perceptions will also continue shaping Brazil’s foreign policy. On the other hand, the influence of São Paulo Forum in Brazil’s politics is a powerful constraint which stimulates the endurance of those perceptions in Brazil, *i.e.* the maintenance of individuals linked to São Paulo Forum in positions of power in the Brazilian political system.

PART V sought to demonstrate that the Neo-Eurasianist ideology and strategic plan is definitely inscribed into a broader strategy, directed by old political agents. This helped in the understanding of those dynamics at the global scale. The crucial task was the assessment of the 2011 debate between Carvalho and Dugin. From a wide support in the literature and empirical evidence, it was confirmed that the Russian intelligence community controls Russian politics and that those agents remain largely the same

(concerning *e.g.* objectives and modalities of action) from the Soviet era (*i.e.* international revolutionary movement). Therefore, old objectives have endured: the destruction of the West and the U.S.A., finding a perfect overlap with the Neo-Eurasianist objectives. Therefore, Neo-Eurasianism can be seen as one of the revolutionary movement's ideologies. The Czech Security Information Service warned about the formation of 'a new Komintern' using the Neo-Eurasianist ideology. The Russian intelligence community was characterized by the features of the revolutionary mentality (which are the concentration of power as a modality of action, and the radical transformation of society as mission), thus were identified as an agent of the revolutionary movement. The Russian intelligence community was also (18) identified as the only possible agent for operationalization of the Neo-Eurasianist plan. Returning to the literature, it was reaffirmed that the disintegration of the Soviet Union represented an important (and planned) step for the triumph of the left in many areas of the globe. The Russian intelligence community continued active, operating widely in the international arena. PART V constitutes a first-hand demonstration of the connections of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism with the international revolutionary movement. A final idea, under the comparative method, is that, like in the Brazilian political system, also within the Russian political system can be found connections to international crime.


With respect to H_1 , its rejection was accomplished based on the analysis of Neo-Eurasianist goals as strategic plan, as well as on findings of correspondence between Russian *élites* and the Russian intelligence community.

In return, H_2 was confirmed because of the Neo-Eurasianist goals and modalities of action which target to put Russia leading a New World Order, which was measured as an oligarchic-global order (contradicting the idea of Multipolarity of H_1). Neo-Eurasianism has been offering a perspective against a global western government but constituted a *de facto* plan to control vast areas of the globe.

In a context of leftist hegemony, with the eyes gazing at South American regional integration maneuver, Meridionalism can be used as an instrument of Neo-Eurasianism; thus, the confirmation of H_3 .

Finally, Russian *élites*, *i.e.* the Russian intelligence community, has been using the Neo-Eurasianist ideology in order to construct and to strengthen the Eurasian bloc, which targets to expand its influence throughout the globe. It was the confirmation of H_4 .

Figure 12
Conclusive diagram of confirmed hypotheses: H₂ H₃ and H₄



Concerning topics for future research, among some of the issues directly mentioned, were: (a) how consultation with businessmen, the military, parliamentary commissions, etc. can shape *élites*' perceptions; (b) investigate about Frankl's psychology with respect to the study of *élites*' perceptions; (c) the ideological nature of Neo-Eurasianism; (d) Putin's perspective concerning Byzantium/Bosphorus and his religious views; (e) the influence of René Guénon in Dugin; (f) how much and how exactly does Neo-Eurasianism impact on Russian politics; (g) would the practice of *elastic conception of borders* in Portuguese politics (instead of Salazar's rigid conception) avoid the total disintegration of Portuguese territory?; (h) study São Paulo Forum in all its dimensions; (i) further tests about the 'Syndicate' and the 'Islamic bloc' as globalist projects; (j) tests about the Chinese intelligence community as an agent of the 'Eurasian bloc' as globalist project; (k) tests about the influence of Neo-Eurasianism in other countries than Brazil; (l) further research about how common is the goal of destroying the West to the 'Syndicate' and to the 'Eurasian bloc' as globalist projects.

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APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Apud</i>	in
cf.	<i>confer</i> – to confirm
<i>e.g.</i>	<i>exempli gratia</i> – for example
<i>ergo</i>	therefore
<i>et al.</i>	<i>et alii</i> – and others
etym.	etymology
ff.	following pages
<i>i.e.</i>	<i>id est</i> – that means
n.d.	no date
<i>primo/secondo/tertio</i>	firstly/ secondly/ thirdly
<i>sic</i>	<i>sic erat scriptum</i> – thus was it written
s.v.	<i>sub verbo</i> – under the word
transl.	translation
<i>vide</i>	instruction to read a particular book, page, etc. for more information

APPENDIX 2 – GLOSSARY

Definitions stated below are either based on *Encyclopedia Britannica*¹³²⁴ or on other literature duly quoted.

BORDER [GRENZEN] – as a line of states' delimitation, the border is a 'reality of tension'¹³²⁵. Thus, it is directly linked to the theoretical fundament of POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT. The German School of Geopolitics, among other schools, developed the elastic conception of border¹³²⁶. Those conclusions are still valid in the sense that borders do not depend on biogeographic mystical states' growth, but they actually depend on the states' power in the international relations¹³²⁷.

CHOKE POINTS – a geographical site with main strategic interest (e.g. Hormuz Strait, Panama Canal, Cape of Good Hope). Mahan theorized about choke points [cf. THALASSOPOLITICS].

CONTINENTAL DISTURBER – (theory) Admiral Raoul Castex formulated a 'theory of disturbance'¹³²⁸. He suggested that Europe is cyclically disturbed by a 'political group' [state] that aspires to become hegemonic. The project starts usually as LAND POWER that later on seeks to become SEA POWER¹³²⁹. This argument is historically sustained, since several states – Holy Roman Empire (e.g. Karl der Große, Otto der Große, Karl V.), France (Louis XIV, Napoleon Bonaparte), modern Germany (Wilhelm II., Hitler) – after having acquired a certain relative potential (e.g. resources, military forces, economic dynamism, political influence), and sometimes together with mysticism (e.g. religious, libertarian, intellectual/scientific, world revolution) looked for dominating the European region, and the most of the cases with the final goal of becoming a SEA POWER as well. The result has been a war with the objective of destroying such project. Interesting enough – in the line of Morgenthau and Schweller – also Castex contended about the existence of 'perturbateur «régulier»' and 'perturbateur «irrégulier»'¹³³⁰.

COORDINATED APPREHENSION – A coordinated apprehension of the geopolitical reality requires a differentiated apprehension in time and space. As Chauprade and Thual put it, "geopolitics considers the importance of the fact in relative terms and includes that fact in durable dynamics"¹³³¹ (i.e. GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES). That means that both spatial and time analyses need to be broken down; the former in local, regional, continental or intercontinental dimensions, and the latter in events, context, short term, medium term, long term perspectives.

DOCTRINE – constitutes an interpretation of [theoretical] ideas pursuing a circumstantial enforcement of those ideas.

ÉLITES – French term that, for the purposes of this study, instrumentally means the FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTIVE.

ETHOLOGY – Human Ethology studies the aspects of animal behavior in Man. Lorenz, Tinbergen, Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt are the some of the most relevant names in this science.

FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTIVE – corresponds to the definition of STATE and also includes groups of senior officials and (executive) experts in the field of foreign policy.

GATEWAY – term coined by Cohen¹³³² in geopolitical studies (and used in geostrategic management by Brzezinski) meaning bridge-countries or areas that facilitate the penetration of a certain country into a foreign country or area.

GEONONJUNCTIVE MANEUVER – innovative concept created by the author. It designates the cooperation among states in the domain of applied geopolitics.

GEOGRAPHY – etym. γεωγραφία *Geo* + *graphia*, i.e. 'earth description.' In this way, geography is defined as descriptive science about environments, places, spaces of Earth's surface and their interactions. In its method, geography uses maps (pictures, or similar) and includes both variables: Nature and Men. Distinct of TOPOGRAPHY.

GEOHISTORICAL DEDUCTIONS – 'deductions of geohistorical kind' as Vives put it¹³³³ are considered to be synonymous for 'geopolitical continuities' as theoretical fundament.

¹³²⁴ *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, <http://www.britannica.com/list/browse>

¹³²⁵ Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 155 ff.

António Marques Bessa and Carlos Mendes Dias, *O Salto do Tigre – Geopolítica Aplicada* (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2007), 67.

¹³²⁶ Which finds also support in the French School of Geopolitics – Jacques Ancel, *Geographie des Frontières* (Paris: Livrarie Gallimard, 1938).

¹³²⁷ *Vide*: Nuno Morgado, 'Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism. A New Look at an Old Problem,' *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 235.

¹³²⁸ Raoul Castex, *Théories Stratégiques. Tome V* (Paris: Societé d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1935), 116-192.

¹³²⁹ For this reason Admiral Castex stated: '«La marine est le thermomètre de la puissance d'un pays»' (Raoul Castex, *Théories Stratégiques. Tome V* (Paris: Societé d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1935), 143). Transl. 'the navy is the thermometer of a state's power'.

¹³³⁰ Raoul Castex, *Théories Stratégiques. Tome V* (Paris: Societé d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1935), 119.

¹³³¹ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 483.

¹³³² Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World System* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 49.

Also: Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers, 2009), 50-53.

¹³³³ Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 27.

GEOHISTORICAL NUCLEUS – ‘the natural space favored by the net of communications and circulation’s ROUTES from which, resulting from many human and social causes, emerges the impulse to generate a culture or a state’¹³³⁴. It is also to be noted that the location of borders depends on the vitality of the geohistorical nucleus.

GEOMISGUIDANCE – innovative concept created by the author. It is one of the possible characterizations of RAUMSINN. Geomisguidance designates the *élites*’ ignorance or misunderstanding of geographical setting’s incentives, i.e. a misleading “sense of space”.

GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITY – dynamics of continuity that can be deduced from the endurance of a certain objective.

GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN – the identification of state’s ‘geopolitical design’ corresponds to one of the cores of the investigation in geopolitical studies. The purpose is to identify both the list of state’s goals and its hierarchy. The means of how to unveil such information rely on analysis of diplomatic, military and intelligence/secret services documentation¹³³⁵.

GEOPOLITICAL DOCTRINE – provides coherent intellectual system for guidance in the processes of explanation, instruction, and controversy of a particular perspective concerning the geopolitical science (e.g. Mahan doctrine, Mackinder doctrine, Spykman doctrine, etc.)

GEOPOLITICALLY NEUTRAL AREAS – areas with no particular strategic interest to be dominated, conquered or influenced over¹³³⁶.

GEOSTRATEGY – ‘the strategic management of geopolitical interests’¹³³⁷.

GRAND STRATEGY – ‘The role of grand strategy is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy...’¹³³⁸

GLOBALIST PROJECTS – ‘...historic forces that today fight for power in the world are assembled into three projects of global dominance, which I will provisionally call the “Russian-Chinese,” the “Western” (sometimes mistakenly called “Anglo-American”) and the “Islamic” one’¹³³⁹.

HEARTLAND – the concept of Heartland was developed by Mackinder, who attempted to find an explanation for “World’s geopolitical dynamics”. Mackinder explained that, at their epicenter, was the geographical pivot of history, a Eurasian land-core inaccessible to maritime strike. History would be, therefore, based on Land-Sea clashes. Such theorization of LAND POWER or TELLUROPOLITICS, highly based on the study of circulation in the territory, identified the danger, for Great Britain, of an alliance between Germany and Russia. Thus one of Mackinder’s prescriptions was the necessity of creating a buffer zone in Eastern Europe among those two countries.

IDEOLOGY – set of logical ideas that aim to explain the world but, most of all, to change it, in favor of aspirations of a group, class, culture, state¹³⁴⁰. In this way, ideology is normative, since it looks for a desirable dimension, i.e. *it should be*. Moreover, as Marx and Engels taught, ideology dissimulates the reality, emphasizing some characteristics, in detriment of hiding others¹³⁴¹. Ideology is then materialized by a social force, which implements a DOCTRINE, with the objective to get or maintain the power. In this way, the ideas themselves are not important in the dialectic process of power seizure – they can be even radically transformed – what matters is to achieve power indeed (the goal)¹³⁴².

IDENTITY –Chauprade made *identity* the second geopolitical stable causal factor (after physical geography)¹³⁴³. Identity comprises, among others, the notions of : tribe/dynasty/ethnicity/nation/empire, language and religion, societal-economic group, civilizational representations, the role of the name. Almeida also argued that population, culture and national character are as important as geography in geopolitical studies¹³⁴⁴. All this corresponds to the psychosocial projection on the territory as geopolitical factor.

Justified by the popularity of studies on language and religion one may further elaborate:

¹³³⁴ Author’s translation of Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 130. Other systematization would be: “the natural space from which cultural founding forces emerge, contributing for the posterior implantation of a State” [author’s translation] – Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 43.

Another designation, simpler, was given by Cohen: ‘historical core’ – Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers, 2009), 313. In this respect, Cohen also affirmed: ‘The relative strength of particular cores determines where and at what hierarchical scales geopolitical repartitioning takes place’ – Saul B. Cohen, ‘Geopolitics in the New World Era – A New Perspective on an old Discipline,’ in *Reordering the World – Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century*, ed. G.J. Demko and W.B. Wood (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 45.

¹³³⁵ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 486-487.

¹³³⁶ Therezinha de Castro, *Nossa América: Geopolítica Comparada* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1994), 48.

Less eloquently, Cohen called them ‘empty areas’. For example: Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers, 2009), 226-228.

¹³³⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard – American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (USA: Basic Books, 1997), xiv.

¹³³⁸ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Penguin, 1991), 322.

¹³³⁹ Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Olavo – Introduction,’ *Giuliano Morais & Ricardo Almeida’s Blog*, March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.cz/2011/03/olavo-de-carvalho-introduction.html>

¹³⁴⁰ Nina Tannenwald, ‘Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda,’ *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 15.

¹³⁴¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘The German Ideology,’ last modified November 20, 2014, Works of Marx and Engels 1845, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/index.htm>

¹³⁴² Olavo de Carvalho, *O mínimo que você precisa saber para não ser um idiota* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2013), 240.

¹³⁴³ Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l’histoire* (Paris: Éllipses, 2007), 597.

Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 496.

¹³⁴⁴ Políbio Valente de Almeida, *Do Poder do Pequeno Estado (Enquadramento geopolítico da hierarquia das potências)* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 2012), 32.

Languages – Although the control of a language makes part of states' strategy for cultural homogenization or segregation, on the path of the refusal of a single cause, the study of language only would not be enough to sustain geopolitical studies. It is true that constructions such as: Anglosphere, *Francophonie*, *Hispanidad*, *Lusofonia* (Lusosphere) do have political influence with clear political outcomes, but in terms of geopolitical studies, the light should not be projected on that domain only¹³⁴⁵;

Religion – Together with language, religion constitutes part of the identity¹³⁴⁶. The Catholic Church, as the only main religion in the World with a single, constituted, regular and very old state (e.g. territorial sovereignty, diplomatic representations) deserves a special reference.

LAGE – (German word for POSITION/LOCATION) is a fundamental concept in geopolitical studies. Together with RAUM and LEBENSRAUM, LAGE (or geographical position) was theorized by Ratzel¹³⁴⁷.

LEBENSRAUM – (German word for LIVING SPACE). Elsewhere¹³⁴⁸, the concept was attached to the realist assumption of "state's struggle for survival" and reframed under neoclassical geopolitics. The concept of *Lebensraum* – as the territory in which the state pursues its activities – was analyzed by Vives in its original meaning (having no connections to the misuse of the term in the Nazi Germany¹³⁴⁹).

MODALITY OF ACTION – (instrumental definition by the author) – a dialectic schema for strategic action with the purpose of achieving objectives defined by politics, in which the agent's actions and his opponent's reactions are formulated and predicted.

NEW WORLD ORDER – in this thesis is understood as WORLD/GLOBAL GOVERNMENT.

PAN-IDEEN – (German word for PAN-IDEAS) as geopolitical concept developed by Haushofer¹³⁵⁰, Pan-Ideas were originally allocated to a perspective of division of the World under four areas, with four director-states. Currently, Pan-Ideas may use various cloaks, from religious to ethnic-linguistic meanings. Neo-Eurasianism re-captured the notion of the Pan-Ideas with ideological purposes of strengthening the Russian power. In this way, although the concept creates an artificial homogeneity that is inexistent, geopolitical studies can by no means ignore it, since its POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT is more than patent¹³⁵¹.

QUOTIENT OF PRESSURE – this concept designates the pressure upheld by states in border regions. If the pressure remains constant, borders remain unchanged as well. If one of the states increases the pressure, or another one reduces it, the border moves towards the weaker side¹³⁵².

RAUM – (German word for SPACE) the primary concept in geopolitical studies was firstly theorized in *Political Geography* by Ratzel (like the concepts of LAGE, LEBENSRAUM, and RAUMSINN). Without the study of the physical space under geographic terms, there can be no geopolitical studies.

RAUMSINN – (German word for the MEANING OF SPACE) framed in *neoclassical geopolitics* this concept is now developed in order to assess the conscience or the sense of space that *élites* may – or may not (GEOMISGUIDANCE) – have concerning their own country, i.e. how far can they know or ignore geographical setting's incentives in the conduct of foreign policy.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION – tendencies (intergovernmental, supranational) of the integration of states into blocs: economic, military, political. The economy is the most frequent domain for integration, which reflects several levels: Free-trade area (NAFTA, CEFTA), Custom Union (CAN), Common Market (Eurasian Customs Union), Economic Union (CARICOM Single Market and Economy), Economic and Monetary Union (EU).

RESOURCES – [natural, mineral resources, etc.] e.g. fresh water, crude oil, gas, coal, aluminum, iron. Apart from GEOGRAPHY, and IDENTITY, Chauprade argued that the struggle for resources constitutes the third causal stable factor in geopolitical studies¹³⁵³.

RIMLAND – the concept of *Rimland* was firstly introduced by Spykman. Contradicting Mackinder's thesis at some extent, Spykman sustained that geopolitical dynamics on the Globe depend on the control of the Rimland – a coastal area between Mackinder's *Heartland* and the Oceans. Yet, alike Mackinder, Spykman tried to search for a single center of attention, from which all geopolitical dynamics would be related to. Somehow, a deterministic approach as well.

¹³⁴⁵ Haushofer deeply associated his studies with cultural irradiation too (Karl Haushofer, *Grenzen in ihrer Geographischen und Politischen Bedeutung* (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinkel Verlag, 1939)). Unfortunately, Haushofer's time was one of tragedy, in which the consequences of ideological hegemony resulted on the misuse of geopolitical analysis for inhuman purposes. Yet, cultural irradiation remains as a core of states' foreign policy.

Another note to the relevance of language respects to Husserl's phenomenology, since '... shared meanings of a community of language-users...' affect the 'common sense' – Pauline Couper, *A Student's Introduction to Geographical Thought – theories, philosophies, methodologies* (London: SAGE, 2015), 90 – in other words, the argument for the relevance of identity is strengthened.

¹³⁴⁶ Acknowledging the role of religion for geopolitical studies, it proliferates analysis of this kind (e.g. *Eurasia, Rivista di Studi Geopolitici* 3/2014 <http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/la-geopolitica-delle-religioni-3/21850/>).

¹³⁴⁷ Vide: Friedrich Ratzel, *Géographie Politique*, trans. Pierre Rusch (Paris: Éditions Régionales Européennes S.A., 1988).

¹³⁴⁸ Nuno Morgado, 'Vindicating Neoclassical Geopolitics, Challenging Postmodernism. A New Look at an Old Problem,' *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 234.

¹³⁴⁹ Jaume Vicens Vives, *Tratado General de Geopolítica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico* (Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 69-72.

¹³⁵⁰ Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen* (Berlin: Zentral Verlag, 1931).

¹³⁵¹ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thuau, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 552.

For example, the Islamic State, proclaimed as Caliphate (on the 29th June 2014), makes direct or indirect use of a pan-idea too, following the secular traditional goal of unity of all Muslims (*Ummah*) under a common flag.

¹³⁵² Everardo Backheuser, *Curso de Geopolítica Geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948), 150 – 155.

¹³⁵³ Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l'histoire* (Paris: Éllipses, 2007), 599- 728.

ROUTES – no matter if a cultural accident, a sea lane (SLOC), a land road, all key routes with no exception make part of the ‘nervous system’ in geopolitical studies¹³⁵⁴. The word *transit* or CIRCULATION is then connected to both RAUM and LAGE¹³⁵⁵.

SECURITY – (instrumental) ‘the concept of National Power is connected to national survival, *i.e.* what is commonly accepted to be globally defined as *Security*’¹³⁵⁶.

SPHERE OF INFLUENCE – geopolitical studies do not neglect this concept. It is a claim by – or a material influence *de facto* of – a state for exclusive or predominant control over a foreign area or territory¹³⁵⁷.

STATE – instrumentally understood as ‘... the top officials and central institutions of government charged with external defense and the conduct of diplomacy’¹³⁵⁸.

[STATE] POTENTIAL – ‘...relative material power [*sic*] capabilities...’¹³⁵⁹ ‘the capabilities or resources... with which states can influence each other’¹³⁶⁰ meaning both material and non-material resources.

[STATE] POWER – The definition of power as ‘... specific assets or material resources that are available to a state’¹³⁶¹ creates misunderstanding among concepts of POWER and POTENTIAL. Although accused of too simplistic the following definition may still be accepted: ‘...an actor controlling another to do what that other would not otherwise do’¹³⁶². Or even: ‘... the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society...’ ‘... a function of the politico-military institutions of the state, as well as nationalism and ideology’¹³⁶³. Consequently, POWER is a concrete capacity that produces effects, a concept dependent on POTENTIAL understood as the amount of resources. It follows logically that POWER is always inferior to POTENTIAL.

STATE’S ECUMENE – country’s area with the highest density of population and the thickest network of communications and transports¹³⁶⁴. It does not correspond necessarily to the area of the GEOHISTORICAL NUCLEUS.

STRATEGIC POTENTIAL – the same than STATE POTENTIAL with the difference that the former terms mean that the potential will be used in strategic planning, *i.e.* in a non-cooperative MODALITY OF ACTION concerning the opponent¹³⁶⁵.

STRATEGY – ‘the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute’¹³⁶⁶.
TELLUROPOLITICS– (theory) the land as generatrix of power is logically opposed to THALASSOPOLITICS. It sustains that the source of the Great Power lies on the Land. Mackinder and the German School of Geopolitics defended that argument, although with the remotest similarity with respect to geostrategic goals. Neo-Eurasianism – as self-proclaimed Russian School of Geopolitics – maintains and develops the argument of LAND POWER, based – unsurprisingly – on Mackinder’s Land-Sea clashes.

TERRITORIALITY – expresses intentions, by an individual or group, of controlling a certain space, namely establishing boundaries and SPHERES OF INFLUENCE. It is not only a concept of Ethology [cf. Subchapter 1.1.], but Territoriality is also an important concept in geopolitical studies, taking into account that is interrelated to POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT as theoretical fundament.

THALASSOPOLITICS– (theory) the case of the sea as generatrix of power, *i.e.* the circumstances in which the power of the state lies on structures connected to the Oceans. In terms of *classical* geopolitics, Admiral Mahan is the author to be studied, although there are precursor studies [cf. Section 5.1.1]. Mahan entered into the geostrategic field having given several foreign policy prescriptions to the U.S.A.¹³⁶⁷ [cf. CHOKE POINTS]. The importance of the Ocean is not only geographical, but also economic, political, military¹³⁶⁸. Moreover, the Ocean persists as space of deep POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT, *i.e.* great geopolitical instability¹³⁶⁹.

THEORY – an abstract conception with genuine theoretical objectives.

TOPOGRAPHY – branch of geography that describes Earth surface and shape.

¹³⁵⁴ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thuau, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 565.

¹³⁵⁵ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Conjuntura Política Nacional, o Poder Executivo & Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio editora, 1980), 35.

¹³⁵⁶ Therezinha de Castro, *Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999), 29.

¹³⁵⁷ ‘... [P]rüft und lokalisiert räumlich die «Kraftlinien», die von jedem geopolitischen Akteur ausgehen’ [transl. ‘to check and localize in the space the «lines of force» that emanate from each geopolitical actor’] – Heinz Brill, *Geopolitische Analysen – Beiträge zur deutschen und internationalen Sicherheitspolitik 1974-2008* (Bissendorf: Biblio, 2008), 41 – assists in the delimitation of SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.

¹³⁵⁸ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,’ *Security Studies* vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 470.

¹³⁵⁹ Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ *World Politics* vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 146.

¹³⁶⁰ Wohlforth gave this definition for state *power*, but actually it is the most appropriate for state *potential* – William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4.

¹³⁶¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 57.

¹³⁶² Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics,’ *International Organization* Vol. 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 39.

¹³⁶³ Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 38.

¹³⁶⁴ Example: Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield publishers, 2009), 171-172.

¹³⁶⁵ Abel Cabral Couto, *Elementos de Estratégia*. Vol I. (Lisboa: Instituto Altos Estudos Militares, 1988), 241.

¹³⁶⁶ André Beaufre, *An introduction to strategy: with particular reference to problems of defense, politics, economics, and diplomacy in the nuclear age* trans. R.H. Barry (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 22.

¹³⁶⁷ Alfred Mahan, *The influence of sea power upon History 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890).

¹³⁶⁸ *Vide*: Nuno Morgado, ‘Maritime Spatial Planning as element of Geopolitics of the Sea,’ *Maria Scientia*, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 44-45.

¹³⁶⁹ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thuau, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 534.

TOPOLOGY – the study of 'geopolitical logics' from the point of view of spaces' characteristics¹³⁷⁰.

UNIPOLAR WORLD – [non-ideological definition] 'a distribution of measurable capabilities among states such that there is only one super power,' one state is 'above the rest in terms of basic capabilities'¹³⁷¹.

'WILL' – In his formula, Cline included the 'will of the nation' to pursue action towards a certain objective. Although that feature depends on the *élites'* role, it constitutes *per se* a concept in geopolitical studies¹³⁷².

WORLD GOVERNMENT/GLOBAL GOVERNMENT – The Global Government may be included as a geopolitical concept in the basic sense that comprises, or presumptive aims to comprise, the Globe under a single political structure.

¹³⁷⁰ Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique – États, Concepts, Auteurs*. (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 569.

¹³⁷¹ Those are William C. Wohlforth's statements – Johns Hopkins, 'Shifting from a Unipolar to a Multipolar World?' last modified November 2015, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7ULmu_G-Uk

Vide also: William C. Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World,' *International Security* vol. 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 7.

¹³⁷² Ray S. Cline, *World power assessment: A calculus of strategic drift* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977).

While analysing Cline's formula, De Almeida joined "will" and "capacity" an argument that easily converges with neoclassical realist intervening variables – Políbio Valente de Almeida, *Do Poder do Pequeno Estado (Enquadramento geopolítico da hierarquia das potências)* (Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 2012), 215.

APPENDIX 3 – SYSTEMATIZED METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES

GOAL

A geopolitical study is a descriptive-analytical approach that aims to explain the impact of the geographical setting, filtrated by *élites'* perceptions and capacities, on foreign policy and, by extension, on international politics.

THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTS

- Geography remains the bedrock of geopolitical studies
'Geography is the most fundamental factor in foreign policy because it is the most permanent' (cf. Spykman);
- Possibilism
Refusal of single cause and determinism. Identification of possible GEOMISGUIDANCE. Geography not as simple representation, but as a group of causal factors that, among others, can explain state's foreign policy outcomes;
- Multidisciplinarity
Several variables and factors (e.g. geographical setting, resources, culture/identity, technology). At this point strategic studies give their contribution. **COORDINATED APPREHENSION**;
- Geopolitical continuities
Dynamics of continuity, which assist in the explanation of the international political reality;
- Potential for conflict (territoriality)
E.g. struggle for resources, geostrategic areas, or identity conflicts. Nevertheless, GEOCONJUNCTIVE PROCESSES are also an object for geopolitical studies;
- Predictions
Connected with 'geopolitical continuities' studied by the scientific method (assistance of intelligence techniques);
- Unit of analysis: the State
Political *élites*, i.e. states' top officials (foreign policy executive);
- Epistemology in geopolitical studies
Describe situations and objectives (*what?*), highlight actors (*who?*), identify reveal motivations (*why?*), and ascertain causes, means and modalities of action (*how?*). Ethics in the research. Relevance of facts/ documents as sources. Distinction between *correlation* (observable) and *causality* (inferred).

ONE SINGLE LAW IN GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES - *power general rule* is included in geopolitical studies: "there is no vacuum of power", i.e. spaces empty of a certain power will necessarily attract another power.

METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

(IV) Assessment of the relative state potential (cf. e.g. Backheuser's aspects on *Morpho-politics*, *Physio-politics* and *Topo-politics*, Cabral Couto's and Couto e Silva's systematization):

FACTORS OF GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES

- 1. Geographical Space (RAUM)**
 - Extension of the territory (strategic depth and defensive value)

- Shape of the territory (strengthens and weaknesses)
- Coastline or access to the sea (e.g. LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES)
- Assessment of the sea (e.g. configuration (open, closed, semi-closed), deepness, seaworthiness (e.g. ice, streams))
- Peripheral line (maritime, land and air borders)
- BORDERS:
 - o Shape/ type of border
 - o Density of occupation
 - o Borders of civilization?
 - o Level of conflict/ litigation
 - o QUOTIENT OF PRESSURE
 - o Key locations
 - o Militarized/ de-militarized
 - o Defensive positions
 - o Customs control/ free circulation
 - o Geographical landforms
- Natural landscape, Geomorphology, GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES (soil (e.g. food supply, circulation), rivers, land relief (e.g. altitude (mountain, plateau, plain)), drainage, flora, type of climate)
- Natural homogeneous sub-divisions (regions and sub-regions)
- Penetrability of the territory
- State's ecumene, secondary and tertiary nucleus (LEBENSRAUM)
- Evolution of political space (e.g. GEOHISTORICAL NUCLEUS, tensions or frictions, historical steps of expansion/retraction)
- Internal division of the territory (political/cultural/ ethnic/ religious)
- Centers of gravity (capital or others)
- Level of integration (center-periphery of the territory)
- Critical areas (man-made and/or naturally created)

2. Geographical Position (LAGE)

- Latitude (Meira Mattos) / Longitude (Backheuser) [at World-level]
- Predominance of Land or Sea? TELLURIC or THALASSOCRATIC? Historical assessment (**Geohistorical method**)
- Accessibility of the territory
- Geographical instability (Travassos)
- External pressures
- Litigation zones
- Strategic assessment (e.g. value of the position (at World- and Regional levels), CHOKE POINTS, GATEWAYS, GEOPOLITICALLY NEUTRAL AREAS, SHATTERBELTS)
- Regional context (MAP):
 - o Proximity/ distance to main centers of power
 - o Allies, enemies, neutrals, BUFFER STATES in the surrounding area
 - o Level of dependence
 - o SPHERES OF INFLUENCE/ platforms for expansion
 - o Location of the country in the cultural/strategic environment

3. Circulation

- ROUTES (land (roads, railways), rivers, sea lanes, harbors, pipelines, airlines)
- Lines of communication/ information
- Cyberspace's key 'choke points'

4. RESOURCES

- Food (e.g. cereals, fish), which depends on quality of soils and waters
- Water
- Energy (e.g. oil, gas, coal)
- Any strategic resource and/or raw-materials (e.g. iron, aluminum, niobium, gold, silver)

Identification of: nature, quantity (production and/or reserves), location and self-sufficiency of resources

- Economic structure:
 - o Classification of the state in accordance with the economic capacity (World ranking), *i.e.* assess its economic capacity
 - o GDP, GDP *per capita*, economic growth (inflation), balance of trade, balance of payments, Government debt, Government budget, foreign-exchange reserves, savings, unemployment
 - o Dynamics of economy: production of *what* by sectors, stability, technology, laws, foreign dependence, future perspectives
 - o Geographical distribution of wealth
 - o Economic projection of the country in international politics (economic diplomacy)

5. Psychosocial projection on the territory

- Population in quantitative terms (number, density and geographical distribution, dynamics (growing/decreasing), age, migrations)

- Further elements of the structure of the society: organization of society and relations between *élites* and society [existence of state-sponsored nationalism], capacity of association in the society, welfare, health, social tensions, ideologies [investigate particularly statist ideology in the *élites*]
- IDENTITY:
 - o Culture and national character: basic elements, relevant historical habits and traditions, national aspirations, patriotism, internal cohesion (race/ethnicity, language, religion), capacity to act collectively, adaptability, beliefs and motivations of public opinion, WILL and military capacity
 - o Cultural projection of the country in international politics (cultural foreign policy)
 - o Homogeneity of population and MINORITIES
 - o Other issues (e.g. levels of education, society's technological level with scientific, economic and military purposes [e.g. fields of expertise])

6. Politico-military structures

- POLITICAL STRUCTURE: division of power and state's sovereign organization, efficiency of administration, quality of diplomacy/ diplomatic relations, political stability, cohesion in the political class, diplomatic and intelligence objectives (*vide* GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN). Political potential as a whole (technology, military, economy, culture);
- MILITARY STRUCTURE: Strategic Concept, Military Agreements (allies and enemies, threat perception), % of GDP committed to defense and its evolution, manpower (number of soldiers), quality of command, quality of weaponry and equipment (export/import; capacity for technological development), type of recruitment, logistic system, levels of training and readiness, moral of the soldiers and international prestige of Armed Forces, limits for action, and military and intelligence objectives (*vide* GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN);
- Relate those structures with the study of: state-sponsored nationalism (cohesion and capacity to act collectively) and *élites'* statist ideology (willpower), added to *élites* capacities of how to extract and manage resources allocated to foreign policy (*vide* IDENTITY). Overview of both (i) the political-diplomatic and (ii) the military projections of the country in international politics.

(IV) Steps to be accomplished with respect to the examination of systemic constraints (cf. Geography's objectives and Brill):

- To locate the phenomena geographically, to circumscribe its impact and to identify the position of the country in concrete terms of Space-Power-Constellation (*where? LAGE*);
- To describe the phenomena, to assess the geostrategic or geoconjunctive position as political causation in the decision-making process (*what? who? with what? which intentions and goals?*);
- To explain and contextualize the phenomena, including it within international conflicts (*how? how so?*);
- To establish the relations of the phenomena – long-term perspective (GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES) (phenomena does not subsist by its own, consequently it is not isolated, but is integrated into a net of relations with others phenomena and/or actors instead, which should be pointed out) (*which connections? which advantages?*);

Accurate systematization of two cores:

- **GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN** (Thual):
 - o To disclose state's 'geopolitical design' corresponds to uncover and to list geopolitical goals and its hierarchy in the following spheres:
 - Diplomatic
 - Military
 - Intelligence
- **RAUMSINN** (originally Ratzel):
to study the *conscience* or *sense of space* that the foreign policy executive may – or may not (GEOMISGUIDANCE) – have concerning his country.
That means to assess what kind of perceptions the foreign policy executive has concerning the implications of the geographical setting in the foreign policy conduct.
Furthermore, those perceptions must also be associated with the capacity of *élites* (and the nation as a whole) on how to take advantages of the geographical setting.

Therefore geopolitical studies' variables could be systematized (e.g. Rose):

- I. **Relative material state potential**
- II. **Systemic constraints**

In order to better assess those variables, Chauprade's geopolitical variables assist with the following classification:

- ◇ **Stable variables**
 1. Geographical reality (location, space, geographical features)
 2. Identity reality (ethnicity/ nation, language, religion, pan-ideas, minorities, socio-economic categories, civilizations, demography (number of population))

3. Struggle for resources (sea, routes, water, oil)
 - ◊ **Unstable variables**
 4. Geographical revolutions (cataclysms, human action "changing" Geography)
 5. Technological revolutions (sea, industry, air, airspace, nuclear, military affairs)
 6. Transnational problems (international crime, globalization, regionalization)
- III. (IntV) *Élites'* perceptions**
IV. (IntV) *Élites'* capacities

*

Particular approach:

- ***Geohistorical Method*** (Vives)
 - 'challenge-and-response dynamics' depends on ***élites'* perceptions** (which include WILL (Ray Cline)) **and capacities** (and also the capacities of the nation/ human community);
 - the intentions/goals studied by geopolitical studies are generally identifiable in long-term perspective (GEOHISTORICAL DEDUCTIONS or GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES);
 - identification of state's historical objectives and their evolution, and cores of foreign policy on the path of History (*e.g.* geographical areas of interest, alliances and objectives, cultural relations of the country)
 - the **coordinated apprehension** (Chauprade and Thual), *i.e.* the interconnection of Geography (space) and History (time) (Haushofer), is the basis to unveil GEOPOLITICAL CONTINUITIES. A dynamic approach towards phenomena, supporting historical analysis in order to: (1) understand phenomena's past developments and (2) produce some **prediction** concerning future evolution;
 - consequently, included in this framework, the ***geohistorical method*** is eminently an instrument on geopolitical studies, and not merely a historical approach;
- **States' territorial morphogenesis outline in two phases** (Chauprade and Thual) (MAP):
 - Territorial appraisal: steps of territorial foundation, identification of core/s of impulse [GEOHISTORICAL NUCLEUS], consolidated expansion areas, gained/lost areas, definitely lost areas, platforms for expansion;
 - Threats to territorial integrity: claims, secessionism, etc. their motivations, ambitions. Furthermore, comprehension of questions concerning IDENTITY (ethnicity, MINORITIES, religions, language);
- **Assistance of:**
 - Topography – as branch of geography that describes Earth surface and shape;
 - Topology – as the study of 'geopolitical logics' from the spatial point of view;

Special considerations:

- Physical space [territory] constitutes the predominant element to be analyzed, although geopolitical studies focus on other factors (*e.g.* identity, technology, new threats) too;
- Data and sources need to be continuously evaluated;
- Only data connected to the topic is relevant to the study;
- Refusal of: a single model/ formula/ equation/ 'geopolitical theory', but thoughtful analysis of cases instead;

SOURCES/ INFLUENCES: Ratzel, Kjellén, Blache, Haushofer, Backheuser, Golbery, Cohen, Vives, Meira Mattos, Cabral Couto, Brill, Thual, Chauprade, Csurgai, Sicker, Carvalho, Schweller, Taliaferro, and the neoclassical realist variables (*e.g.* Rose's systematization)

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