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*Reception of Strategic Economic Narratives:
Case Study of the Kenyan News Discourse*

Ph.D. Thesis

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Abstract

Strategic narrative is a communicative tool for political elites to construct a shared meaning to the international politics, to articulate state's interests, to change the discursive environment, and to shape the behaviour of other actors. It has three different dynamics, which proceed simultaneously and reinforce each other: formation of the narrative within the given state, its projection in the international arena, and its reception in other states.

Theory of strategic narratives fits well into the framework of *new regionalism*, which tries to analyse relations between the processes of globalization, globalism, regionalization, and regionalism. Until recently, such analyses were conducted from state-level and positivist perspective. As a result, the dimension of reception remained understudied. The presented thesis is an attempt to fill this gap. It analyses global political economy from the interpretivist constructivist perspective: it uses the leading local newspaper as a data sources and analyses media (news) discourse as one form of a broad societal discourse. Such an analysis can help us to analyse how local society assesses and reacts to strategic narratives and their internalization or rejection by local elites.

In my thesis, I focus on narratives of the three superpowers (the US, the EU, and China) and their reception in Africa. Kenya was chosen as a representative case due to its vivid relations with all the three superpowers. Furthermore, I analyse also local and regional narratives related to regional integration under the umbrella of the East African Community and to the Kenyan development strategy as realised by the state.

China has clearly defined "African" narrative and actively uses local media to disseminate it. While Kenyan political elite seems to have internalized this narrative, Chinese engagement is seen as highly controversial within part of the Kenyan society. At least two main constituent parts of the narrative (non-conditionality and selflessness) are contested.

The US also actively uses local media. However, its message is much less clear and much less persuasive. The US disseminates two different narratives focusing on trade/investment and democracy, which it unsuccessfully tries to merge into a single narrative. Thus, the audience can exploit this ambiguity to choose between the two narratives. Not surprisingly, Kenyan leaders and businessmen have adopted the economic narrative and rejected the political one. Civil society is more critical as it recognizes that Africa has never been the US priority and current US activities are rather symbolic.

Contrarily, the EU seems to be the least controversial partner as it is portrayed as an indispensable long-term trade partner. This narrative is projected by EU representatives and seems to be internalized by Kenyan audience both within elite groups and within society as a whole.

Maybe surprisingly, even regional integration is often challenged. Regional leaders express their deep commitments to integration, but this rhetoric is not followed by concrete actions to eliminate barriers to free movement of production factors. Moreover, people are not involved in the integration process and thus they can hardly identify with it. This confirms the contrast between Asian societally driven regionalization and Africa, where societal interplays have been substituted by ambitious mandates of the regional communities.

Similarly, Kenyan development strategy focusing on massive investment into infrastructure megaprojects (financed from external sources) is challenged by many

commentators and readers. According to them, Kenyan successive administrations have prioritized the economic pillar of the development at the expense of the political and particularly social pillars. While this strategy leads to economic growth, it does not lead to development and empowering the people. Instead, the rich become richer, the poor become poorer, and the inequality gap increases.

To sum up, my analysis shows that although the media generally reproduce the elite discourse (which The Daily Nation confirms), we can find a very broad spectre of voices in the newspaper. Journalists, analysts, civil society representatives, and readers are contesting the official discourse, and their tone is often very sharp and critical. Economic relations with the US, the EU, China, and within the EAC are seen by many commentators as reflecting interests of political and business elites and overlooking interests and needs of ordinary people, who are not allowed to participate.

Keywords

new regionalism, strategic narratives, perception of global powers in Kenya, discourse analysis, media discourse, national models of political economy

Abstrakt

Strategický narativ je komunikační nástroj politických elit, které jeho prostřednictvím konstruují sdílený význam mezinárodního dění, formulují národní zájmy, snaží se změnit mezinárodní diskurzivní prostředí a také ovlivnit chování ostatních aktérů. Strategický narativ je složen ze tří dynamických procesů, které probíhají současně a vzájemně se ovlivňují a posilují: formování narativu v daném státě, jeho projekce na mezinárodní scéně a jeho recepce v ostatních státech.

Teorie strategických narativů zapadá do teoretického rámce tzv. *nového regionalismu*, který se snaží analyzovat vztahy mezi procesy globalizace, globalismu (globálního vládnutí), regionalizace a regionalismu. Až donedávna byla tato analýza prováděna výhradně ze státně-centrické a pozitivistické perspektivy, což víceméně znemožňovalo zahrnout do analýzy otázku percepce a recepce mezinárodně-politických, resp. mezinárodně-ekonomických událostí. Předložená dizertace se snaží vyplnit tuto mezeru v současném výzkumu. Dizertace analyzuje globální politickou ekonomii z interpretativního konstruktivistického pohledu: jako zdrojová data využívá články z místního nejčtenějšího deníku a analyzuje mediální (zpravodajský) diskurz jako jednu z forem širokého společenského diskurzu. Takto provedená analýza nám může pomoci odhalit, jak místní společnost hodnotí a reaguje na strategické narativy a jejich přijímání nebo odmítání místními elitami.

Ve své dizertaci se zaměřuji na narativy tří velmocí (USA, EU, Čína) a jejich recepci v Africe. Pro případovou studii byla zvolena Keňa jako reprezentativní případ s ohledem na své rozsáhlé vztahy se všemi třemi supervelmocemi. Mimo to také analyzuji místní a regionální narativy související s regionální integrací pod hlavičkou Východoafrického společenství (EAC) a s keňskou strategií rozvoje, jak je realizována místními vládami.

Čína má jasně definovaný "africký" narativ a aktivně využívá místní média k jeho šíření. Zatímco keňská politická elita ve velké míře přijala tento narativ za svůj, část keňské společnosti považuje čínské angažmá za značně kontroverzní a otevřeně zpochybňuje minimálně dva základní prvky čínského narativu (nepodmíněnost a nezištnost).

USA také aktivně využívají místní média, jejich narativ je však mnohem méně jasný a přesvědčivý. USA šíří dva různé narativy zaměřené na obchod/investice a demokracii, které se neúspěšně snaží propojit do jediného narativu. Příjemci tak mohou tuto

dvojznačnost využít k tomu, aby si mezi dvěma narativy vybrali ten pro ně výhodnější. Není proto příliš překvapivé, že keňští političtí lídři a představitelé obchodních kruhů přijímají ekonomický narativ a odmítají politický narativ. Občanská společnost je kritičtější a upozorňuje, že Afrika nikdy nebyla americkou prioritou a současné americké angažmá má spíše symbolický než reálný charakter.

EU je v keňské společnosti vnímána jako nejméně kontroverzní a je vykreslována jako nepostradatelný dlouhodobý obchodní partner. Tento narativ samozřejmě šíří zástupci EU, nicméně je keňským publikem přijímán, a to jak v rámci místních elit, tak ve společnosti jako celku.

Překvapivým zjištěním může být, že také regionální integrace, nezřídka vnímaná jako určitá protiváha globálním vztahům, je často zpochybňována. Regionální lídři sice vyjadřují svou oddanost k regionální integraci, ale za touto rétorikou nenásledují konkrétní kroky, které by směřovaly k odstranění překážek volného pohybu výrobních faktorů. Občanská společnost navíc není do procesu integrace zapojena, proto se s ním jen obtížně identifikuje. To potvrzuje kontrast mezi asijskou regionalizací vycházející ze společenských vazeb a Afrikou, kde tyto vazby jsou nahrazeny ambiciózními mandáty regionálních organizací.

Podobně je mnoha komentátory a čtenáři zpochybňována i keňská rozvojová strategie zaměřená na masivní (zahraniční) investice do infrastrukturních projektů. Podle těchto kritických hlasů keňské vlády upřednostňují ekonomický pilíř rozvoje na úkor politického a zejména sociálního pilíře. Tato strategie sice vede k ekonomickému růstu, ale nevede k rozvoji a k posilování lidského kapitálu. Namísto toho se bohatí stávají bohatšími, chudí chudšími a příjmová nerovnost v zemi se zvětšuje.

Předložená analýza ukazuje, že média obecně reprodukuje oficiální (elitní) diskurz, což *The Daily Nation* potvrzuje, současně ale v tomto deníku nalezneme velmi široký okruh různých hlasů vyjadřujících velmi široké spektrum názorů. Novináři, analytici, zástupci občanské společnosti a čtenáři nezřídka zpochybňují oficiální diskurz a jejich tón je často velmi ostrý a kritický. Hospodářské vztahy se Spojenými státy, EU, Čínou a v rámci regionu jsou mnohými komentátory považovány za reflektující zájmy politických a obchodních elit a naopak zcela přehlízející zájmy běžné populace, která je v podstatě vyřazena z procesu aktivní participace.

Klíčová slova

nový regionalismus, strategické narativy, vnímání globálních velmocí v Keni, diskurzní analýza, mediální diskurz, národní politicko-ekonomické modely

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Declaration of Authorship

I confirm that I have compiled this thesis independently.

I confirm that I have acknowledged all sources used for the purpose of this work. Where I have used or consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed. Where I have quoted from the works of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this dissertation is entirely my own work.

I confirm that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree. Where any part of this dissertation has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this university or any other institution, this has been clearly stated.

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Prague, 21 August 2017

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Introduction

International political economy (IPE) is an interdisciplinary subfield of political science / international relations, which emerged in the 1970s after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the first oil crisis. These events showed that it was impossible to treat economics and politics as two distinct and separate domains. Contrarily, it became obvious that the political actions of nation-states affected international trade and monetary flows, which in turn affected the environment in which nation-states made political choices and entrepreneurs made economic choices (Veseth 2004). Political forces shape the system of economic interactions and economic forces affect the political structures. Thus, broadly speaking, IPE is a discipline analysing the interactions among governments and markets across countries (Abdelal 2009: 62).

In the following decades, several other events providing impetus for development of IPE occurred – for example the second oil crisis, the debt crisis, the rise of newly industrialized countries and emerging markets, the creation of the European single market, the rise of regionalism, the financial crises in different world regions etc. This list of events also shows what the main topics of study of IPE are: globalization, international trade, international development, international finance, North-South relations etc.

Theoretical development in IPE reflected theoretical debates in the wider discipline of IR and Political Science. In 1987, Robert Gilpin, one of the founding fathers of IPE, identified three broad theoretical traditions in IPE (Gilpin 1987).

Liberalism separates politics and economics as two distinct domains governed by distinct mechanisms – by the nation state in the former case and by the market in the latter case. Actors are rational individuals pursuing their self-interest; collective actors (states, but also international organizations or international regimes) are aggregates of rational individual actors. Markets are impersonal and if they are not disrupted by political interventions, they are self-stabilising systems, which naturally harmonise demand/supply and lead to greater economic efficiency and growth. This is beneficial to all, albeit to a different degree.

Realism (also called economic nationalism, statism, mercantilism, developmentalism) sees the world as an anarchic system of states as primary actors. This means that states focus on military security and political and economic independence. Economics

should be subordinated to politics and should serve “higher” goals such as survival or expansion of the state. Economic assets are only a tool of power: states struggle for economic resources to enhance their power. Realism does not deny the role of non-state actors, the possibility of cooperation, or the power of free market to deliver favourable outcomes. However, realism is sceptical whether such outcomes can occur automatically. For realists, optimum conditions need some regulatory control of public power.

Both perspectives differ in how they describe globalization. For liberal scholars, globalization is a process, which is fundamentally eroding the position of the nation states in the global system. Market forces function independently to political forces and cannot be confined within political borders. In some time, this will result in emergence of real global markets. For realist scholars, states remain the main actors in the global system and set rules within which markets function. Effects of globalization are highly exaggerated. In reality, globalization is limited only to a small number of actors and to a small number of sectors (Gilpin 2001: 10).

For Marxism, the natural relationship between state and markets is opposite: it is economics (the logic of capital accumulation) that govern politics. This leads to the class struggle and core/periphery division both on national and international level. The result is that states must take active part in influencing and shaping economic processes to reverse this trend and avoid that benefits are distributed within the capitalist elite at the expense of the whole population. Thus, robust application of strong public power is needed (command economy).

Since 1987, theoretical debates have further developed. Fall of the Soviet Union and communist regimes has weakened the Marxist worldview, while Liberalism, as the (perceived) winner of the Cold War, became prominent in last quarter a century.

In the 1990s, Constructivism emerged as a new fourth worldview. It differentiated itself from the three existing worldviews by stressing values, norms, and identities as significant determinants of economic action beside material interests. According to constructivists, only very little about the world economy can be deduced from material facts of cross-border economic activity. Practices and rules of international markets are not natural entities, but social constructs, collectively shared ideas of how agents interpret the material reality around them (Abdelal 2009: 63-66). Constructivists focus on meaning (how collective identities give meaning to material facts), cognition (how

the world works and how agents understand and narrate material changes), and discourse (how discourses constraint and shape economic action)(Abdelal 2009: 72-74).

Positivists often accuse Constructivism of overemphasising the potential autonomy of ideas and institutions. Gilpin himself dismisses any relevance of Constructivism as a distinct approach: according to him, all big theories must integrate both ideas and material factors if they wish to explain IPE (Gilpin 2001: 20). This may be a consequence of different methodological foundations of IPE/IR in the US and in the UK/Europe. Since the 1970s, the former camp focuses on state-centric positivist causal quantitative research and new perspectives come to the fore only very slowly. Contrarily, the British tradition is different: due to its long-term focus on colonialism, decolonization, and decline of the British Empire it is more historically focused, it is open to different perspectives and it takes more seriously the reflexive and constructed nature of the world (Blyth 2009: 5-11). Continental Europe is much closer to British than to the US tradition.

From the other side, post-structuralists accuse Constructivism of operating within the regulatory framework of the conventional IPE, which focuses on top-down understanding of a small number of big and important things (trade, international finance, international organizations, or hegemony). As a consequence, it focuses on elites that use ideas as weapons backed by material resources. Then, these ideas play role of constraint and self-disciplinary behaviour on non-elite actors. These critics prefer to focus on everyday aspects of IPE (everyday IPE or EIPE), which means to focus on bottom-up agency. We must study practices that are engrained in the lives of non-elite actors and which reflects historically and socially contingent identities and interests (Hobson - Seabrooke 2009: 290-293). Change in the world economy stems from these everyday practices. Generally, there is a strong tendency toward inertia (Cerny 2009: 149). Sometimes the change is invoked by resistance or defiance. More often, the non-elite actors are not defying governmental policies, but their actions aiming to enhance their own welfare alter the calculus of elite interests (Broome, cited in Hobson - Seabrooke 2009: 303). Thus, EIPE provides a new insight on the world economy, which takes into account also perceptions and opinions of non-elite actors, that is ordinary people, peripheral societal groups such as trade unions, peasants, or women entrepreneurs, but also peripheral states from developing regions (Hobson - Seabrooke 2009: 301).

Thus, we can see that the theoretical and methodological background of IPE has become rich in the last two decades.

New regionalism represents one example of current trends in IR/IPE that is fruitfully combining mainstream research with constructivist insights. It emerged in the early 1990s as a reflection of sudden and steady rise in number of regional trade agreements, including those linking countries from different geographical regions. This new wave of regionalism raised a fundamental question of complementarity or competition between regionalism and global multilateral trade talks. Later it became evident that probably more problematic is the relationship between naturally occurring bottom-up cross-border processes based on human exchange and top-down political projects of regional integration or global governance. Thus, as will be thoroughly analysed in the following chapter, new regionalism denotes a general framework for analysing mutual relationship and interplay between global and regional economic forces and global and regional political forces as four basic processes. The economic domain (market) is a social domain of human practices and transactions, composed both of its material expressions and related discourses. Issues such as a system of production, resource allocation, and distribution of goods and services within a society are determined by historical patterns, institutions, and decision-making processes. Role of geographical, linguistic, and cultural factors cannot be gainsaid. However, state administrations more or less attempt to shape these practices and transactions to serve their political goals. This creates a tension between states and markets, which is one of the fundamental topics of (international) political economy as an academic discipline.

My focus in this dissertation is on effects of globalization and related economic processes in Africa. If we wish to fully understand such processes, we should treat constructivist and post-structuralist academic perspective seriously and incorporate everyday agency into our analyses. This conclusion is more and more accepted by scholars, particularly those analysing IPE out of the Western hemisphere. As Smith argues, mainstream *positivist* IR “looks very much like a debate restricted to the prosperous nations of the West”, which “takes for granted many of the features of this globalized world that theory should in fact call into question” (Smith 1997: 171). Opening such taken-for-granted questions of global politics or economics, until recently “reserved” for non-mainstream scholars, is finding its way also to mainstream IR/IPE.

Scholars associated with the Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (CRIS) of the United Nations University in Bruges warn that there are three deep divisions in the study of regionalism (Lombaerde et al. 2010: 752). First division is between those studying the European Union and those studying non-European regionalisms. Second division is between rationalists and reflectivists. Third division is between those preferring single case studies and those preferring comparative studies. These divisions often mutually reinforce each other. For example, focus on Europe matches well with rationalism and with comparative ambitions; scholars take the unique European experience as a model, they compare this model with regional integration schemes in other regions, and they try to generalize their findings into theories. On the other side, scholars analysing regional processes in other regions focus rather on deep analysis of their selected case, they are more reflective to local context, and deny possibility of any generalization, which they label as false universalism. Surely, not all academic works fit well into this simplified dichotomy. However, we cannot deny existence of this divide and lack of communication between different conceptual, theoretical, and methodological traditions.

Study of regionalism often takes the EU as a model and appears to be a list of do and don'ts for states on the periphery (Raschdorf 2006: 61). However, regionalism should be rather treated as an expression of real communicative cooperation of states or regions with shared interests. It is clear that "any international, regional, national or local system that is not based on complementary normative understandings ultimately undermines itself and becomes a subject of disintegration" (Raschdorf 2006: 57). Regionalism and similarly global economic agenda are based on intersubjective incentives and on the way in which "actors' interests *change* as a result of *interacting* with other partners in the international system, and how the latter needs and expectations *shape* the response of the former" (Mecea 2014: 149). We should focus on a degree of local ownership and processes of discursive inclusion and exclusion (Raschdorf 2006: 61).

Mainstream tradition in the study of regionalism focuses on products, not on processes or projects (van Langenhove 2011: 98). There are many quantitative studies of the economic impacts of regional trade agreements or comparative case studies. Perceptual dimension of regional integration is neglected, although the reception and interpretation of narratives is vital and the targets matter as much as the agents (Roselle et al. 2014: 74-75). The "structural-functional and neo-liberal assumptions

influence the way we think and talk about regional integration” (Raschdorf 2006: 53). These theoretical and methodological findings correlate with empirical findings discussed later in the next chapter: regionalization and regionalism are often two distinct processes. Until very recently, academic writings have not been reflecting this dichotomy. Analyses were predominantly state-centric and formalistic, and there were only few case studies on how regionalism was affecting people on the grounds and what were popular reactions to formal and informal processes (Söderbaum - Taylor 2008: 14-17). Research still lacks empirical insights that allow moving beyond stereotypes produced by one-sided analyses of African regionalism (Lorenz-Carl - Rempe 2013: 1). The same findings hold true also for new forms of functional regionalism across regions. The way to understand North-South trade relations needs to take an “outside in route”, which takes into account also local dynamics in the regions of the South (Lorenz 2012: 25). This is particularly important in the case of Africa. Despite exhibiting growth rates higher than global average, continent was still seen as unable to adjust to external shocks because of persistent political weakness and social and economic rigidity. As a result, Africa was expected to adjust to the global (read: Western) economic system and market principles (Doty 1996: 158-161). But mainstream research seemed to neglect or even refuse to analyse “what Africa thinks” of its position in the global economy.

Question of perception is of particular importance now for several reasons. First, new non-Western actors enter Africa. China is the most visible example, but other emerging and middle powers gradually increase their activity in Africa – see for example trade negotiations between India and Southern African Customs Union, top-level summits between Africa and Japan or Korea, but also growing top-level contacts between Africa and Turkey or Indonesia. Secondly, global economic crisis seems to have at least partly undermined image of the West as the global leader both in terms of hard power and soft power. Similarly, success of EU integration as the role model of regionalism is crumbling (Lorenz-Carl - Rempe 2013: 1). North-South dependency is being substituted by “a novel East-South axis” (Shaw 2016: 113). Third, new actors bring to Africa new worldviews, which may be non-compatible with the prevailing Western worldview. Fourth, perception of these actors by African governments and citizens may be fundamentally different, which is particularly true in the case of China (Carmody 2011: 88, Taylor 2014: 115). However, this may not be surprising as there still remain vast power inequalities between external and African actors and similarly between the

masses and political elites within Africa (Carmody 2011: 189, Taylor 2014: 26). As a result, peripheral voices are still of marginal interest to mainstream academic work – actors “below the radar” are marginalized in current regional developments and in academic research as well (Lorenz-Carl - Rempe 2013: 7). Probably the most neglected is the (civil) society as a whole as “ordinary people still remain objects, and not subjects, in a regional project ostensibly aimed at improving their lives” (Matlosa and Lotshwao, cited in Godsäter 2015: 105). But this is slowly changing as scholars increasingly focus on regionalization processes involving society, economy, and culture, instead of regionalism as expressed in formal regional arrangements (Väyrynen 2003: 44-45). However, studies usually shift focus to micro-level and provide us with an in-depth analysis of a concrete societal group in a concrete country or region based on interviews with local stakeholders (representative example is Godsäter 2015, overview of many other studies is provided in Bach 2016a). I have chosen an alternative path and I will study local media: such analysis goes beyond the state-centric view and allows assessing broad societal discourse, thus offering an intermediary level between state-centric analyses and micro-level analyses (further details will be analysed in the methodological chapter).

Kenya was chosen as a representative case due to its deep-rooted trade relations with the EU, its long-term strategic alliance with the US (allegedly) fostered by Kenyan origin of the former US President, its warm welcome of the growing Chinese engagement in the region represented particularly by massive investment into country’s infrastructure, and its position of the regional leader within the East African Community, the most dynamic regional integration scheme in Africa. Thus, Kenya is in a unique position to study potential clash of different narratives and how are these narratives received by the audience.

This is a starting point of this dissertation. IPE is focusing on issues such as globalization, international trade, or regionalism, but its view is predominantly Western-centric. To enhance our knowledge about those processes in non-Western world, we must go beyond this Western-centric view, analyse those processes on site, and gain knowledge about local perceptions of these processes. Thus, my main research question is **how external economic partners (including regional integration) are portrayed in the Kenyan news discourse**. This main research question is further elaborated into several sub-questions focusing on different aspects of projection and reception of narratives.

First, does Kenyan news discourse reflect the fact that major superpowers have different ideas about how the global economy should be governed and that they construct substantially different narratives based on these ideas? In other words, do American, European, and Chinese “system” narratives appear in the Kenyan news discourse, directly or indirectly?

Second, do major superpowers use the leading Kenyan newspaper as a tool of public diplomacy through which they attempt to disseminate their narratives, both “system” narratives and “issue” narratives?

Third, which main “issue” narratives about cooperation of the outside world with Africa appear in the Kenyan news discourse? Are American, European, and Chinese narratives clearly articulated or are they rather vague or even ambiguous?

Fourth, to what extent do Kenyan political and business leaders adopt, modify, or reject these narratives to form the official discourse (as appearing in the newspaper)?

Fifth, which discourse(s) appear in the Kenyan news discourse? Does Kenyan news discourse replicate the official discourse, or does it contain alternative discourses questioning the official one? Who represents these alternative discourses?

Sixth, different strategic narratives necessarily clash in the international (media) arena and influence each other. Is this dynamics reflected in the Kenyan news discourse? Do different strategic narratives react to each other, or do they run in parallel? Does official discourse (and alternative discourses) combine different narratives into one or does it treat them separately?

Seventh, do superpowers’ narratives influence the way in which Kenya defines its own development strategy? Is official discourse incorporating some parts of these narratives? Is there any alternative to this official discourse?

The dissertation proceeds as follows. First two chapters are theoretical. In Chapter One I briefly describe the so-called *new regionalism approach*, which introduces constructivist views into IPE. I focus on the main theoretical debates on rise of regionalism and mutual relationship between globalization, globalism, regionalization, and regionalism. In Chapter Two I describe the theory of *strategic narratives* as a tool how to analyse intersubjective nature of globalization and how to get to the fore local perceptions of global processes. Next two chapters are methodological. In Chapter Three I describe my philosophical position of interpretive constructivism and discourse analysis as the chosen methodology for my research. In Chapter Four I describe the

interpretive textual content analysis (ITCA) as the concrete method of my research. I explain my choice of data source and my case selection. Chapter Five briefly analyses strategic narratives of the main global actors and how are these strategic narratives projected into trade deals with Africa. Chapter Six consists of data from protocols of news articles and data analysis. I try to interpret the collected news articles, show what different voices can be found in the most read local newspaper, and analyse whether there is any substantial divergence between official opinions and popular perceptions as expressed by journalists, business leaders, think-tank analysts, common readers, and other different societal voices. Finally, Conclusion sums up my findings and delineates opportunities for future research.

Chapter One: Four processes in the global economy

Contemporary global economy is characterized by two paired processes. Two of them are objective economic processes; the other two are political strategies aiming to influence these processes. Two of them occur on global level; two of them occur on regional level. Thus, we have a matrix of four processes, which necessarily influence each other.

Globalization is a process of transcending space and compressing time. Key aspect of globalization is increasing mutual interdependence between global and local social, cultural, economic, and political conditions and structures. Global economy is becoming more and more internationalized since the end of the 19th century due to technological progress, capitalism, colonialism, liberal trade, and gold standard. Development of aviation and information and communication technologies in the 1970s and 1980s brought this trend to a qualitatively higher level. Trade, movement of capital, movement of people, and the dissemination of knowledge have never been as easy as in the last three decades, leading to convergence of institutions and practices (Abdelal 2009: 70).

Globalism refers to different political reactions to globalization (ideologies of globalization and global governance). After the Cold War, the prevailing globalism is liberal multilateralism based on stability of exchange rates and financial flows (guaranteed by the International Monetary Fund, IMF), economic reconstruction and development (guaranteed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD), and liberalization of trade and the movement of capital (guaranteed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and later by the World Trade Organization, GATT/WTO). However, this ideology is not unreservedly accepted all over the world, particularly out of the Western core.

Regionalization is an objective bottom-up process of regional delimiting of international economic relations. This process is an outcome of undirected social and economic interactions between non-state actors (Bach 2016a: 5). Obviously, one aspect is geographical proximity, common history, or cultural affinity, which lower transaction costs, lead to some level of synchronization across countries, and make intra-regional economic activity easier. Second reason is the growing transnational nature of economic shocks and different non-economic issues such as pollution or migration, which pushes affected populations to search for solutions and cooperation.

Regionalism is a top-down strategy of states to influence regionalization. It is a program and a strategy, based on institutions, agreements, but also identities and ideas (Bach 2016a: 5). First waves of regionalism were represented by ancient and medieval military empires, economic regionalism in the 19th century (European customs unions or colonialism), and interwar economic blocs. Fourth phase is hegemonic regionalism, characterised by strategic and security motivation during the Cold War, although often expressed by economic cooperation (European Community in the Western part of the continent and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in its Eastern part are the best examples). In Africa and Asia, regionalism created multifunctional organizations, which tried to surpass the Cold War rivalry. Contrary to previous phases, regionalism was formalized and institutionalized. Such regionalism was an introverted, protectionist form of regulating the global market economy at the level of state and region (Spindler 2002: 12). At the end of the 1980s, regionalism entered qualitatively and also quantitatively new phase called *new regionalism*.

Terminology

First, we should clarify what we mean by the concept of a region. For “old” regionalists, a region was represented by a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and a degree of mutual interdependence. For “new” regionalists, geography seems to be much less a topic. For example, Hettne (2005: 544) defines region as being represented by states with some level of social, economic, political, and organisational cohesiveness. Van Langenhove (2011: 47-58) differentiates between cross-border regions created by bottom-up economic and societal activities, sub-national political and cultural units, and supra-national regions. In the latter case, region is a discursive tool used when referring to a unit of governance that is not a state, but has some statehood properties. He also introduces the concept of *regionhood* describing properties of regions (van Langenhove 2011: 82):

- region is a system of intentional acts with certain degree of autonomy and power to engage in purposive action (region is an actor),
- region is a rational system with values, goals and means to realize them (region has statehood properties),
- region is an entity recognised by other actors (recognition),
- region is a generator and communicator of meaning and identity.

Neither author defines region by geographical proximity. Obviously, it is easier to build

common identity on geographical proximity and/or common language, culture, history. However, common identity can be built also across regions and without common culture as coalitions among states are formed on economic basis (Väyrynen 2003: 31) or are based on political and security concerns (Villarreal 2012: 2). The “idea of the region as a socially constructed space” has “reduced the significance previously attached to territoriality and geographic proximity” (Bach 2016b: 72).

Thus, “regional” means less than global, more than national, but also more than purely regional in the geographic sense – regional trade agreement may tie together individual countries from different parts of the world (Bach 2016a: 4). We can illustrate this on an example of the BRICS countries. Not coincidentally, these countries are also regional leaders in their respective regions (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This group was “invented” in 2001 by economists and journalists.¹ However, in the following years, this term began to have real content as member countries started to cooperate, then they formalized this cooperation through annual summits, and later they established their own development bank as an antipode to the IBRD/World Bank Group. So, we can identify in the BRICS group both autonomy and power to engage in purposive action and goals and means to realize them. This group is recognized by other actors as influential bloc with massive economic and political power. Finally, it also generates some meaning and identity, even though it would not go much beyond simple reluctance to Western liberal order. BRICS countries show some level of organizational, political, economic, and social cohesiveness, albeit to a limited degree, particularly in the social sphere.

Regionalism was often equated with formalized economic cooperation. Cihelková (2007: 3) describes regionalism as trade and economic policy of two or more states aiming to liberalize their mutual relations and leading to their closer linkages and integration. This is probably influenced by the Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO, which enables member countries to negotiate free trade agreements or customs unions under condition that (a) restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all the trade between members; (b) restrictions are eliminated within a reasonable length of time – usually not exceeding ten years; and (c) regulation of commerce to non-members will not be higher or more restrictive than the regulation

¹ Originally this group consisted of Brazil, Russia, India, and China and was called BRIC countries. South Africa joined this group in 2011.

existing prior to the formation of the free trade area or customs union.² If these trade agreements are reciprocal, the WTO put them under single label “regional trade agreements”³ regardless of their geographical dimension, stressing only the effect of trade liberalization. If we return back to our example, BRICS would not fulfil this definition. Member states are not bound together by formal trade agreements and their relations are not based on trade liberalization (not yet – trade negotiations between India and South Africa have already started and are notified to the WTO in the form of an early announcement). And member states do not head to economic integration.

The BRICS is undoubtedly an expression of new regionalism, although most of us would not label it a region, but would use different terms instead. New regionalism is characterized by many definitions, trying to precisely define something, which probably cannot be precisely defined. Region is a socially constructed entity dependent upon perceptions and interpretations of political actors; hence it is politically contested entity (Hettne 2005: 544). And this process of political contestation is more dynamic than common understanding between scholars on definitions. I define the key terms as follows:

- “region” is an entity between national and global level;⁴ we can divide world into several economic regions based on geographical, economic, political, and cultural criteria inherited from the “old” regionalist phase (North America, Central America, Andean states, MERCOSUR, European Economic Area, Eurasian Economic Union, Arab region, West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, Indian region, South East Asia, Far East, Oceania)⁵
- “regionalism” is a top-down process of a formalized economic cooperation of

² Since 1979, developing countries are allowed to negotiate free trade areas and customs union among themselves, even if they do not fulfil these criteria (Enabling Clause).

³ If they are not reciprocal, but unilateral, the WTO calls them preferential trade agreements.

⁴ There are two different conceptions of a region. For political scientists, region is a sub-state entity operating between national and local level. For political economists, region is an entity between national and global level. In the text, I use the term “region” in the latter sense.

⁵ We still have to keep in mind that regions are social constructs. This is a very tentative list based on existing regional groupings. Africa is likely to become a single region in next decades, but currently, economic activities happen primarily on a lower level. The same is true about the Americas with relation to the continental free trade area. Similarly in Asia Pacific, there may potentially emerge a single region from India to Australia. Far East is not at the moment a region at all – China, Japan, and Korea negotiate bilateral agreements and are associated members to the South East Asian regional organization ASEAN (the so-called ASEAN + 3), but there is no formal organization between these countries.

two or more states leading to increase in degree of social, economic, political, and organisational cohesiveness,

- “regionalization” is a bottom-up process of natural economic activity occurring within regions,
- “inter-regionalism” is a formalized cooperation between two regional organizations (such as EU-EAC trade agreement)⁶,
- “trans-regionalism” denotes economic cooperation going across two or more regions, which may be state-led (such as Chinese engagement in Africa building upon top-level meetings and formal trade and economic cooperation agreements), or business-led (such as trade cooperation between Indian private sector and Indian diaspora in Kenya without top-level meetings and formal trade agreement),
- “new regionalism” is an umbrella term for any regional, inter-regional, and trans-regional economic activity in the globalized economy, which is not protectionist.

New Regionalism as a Process

As already mentioned, at the end of the 1980s, regionalism entered the phase of *new regionalism*. This phase differs from the previous phases in nine aspects.

First, new regionalism is open. In the globalized world, benefits of free trade come not only from free imports, but also (and more) from free exports, which pushes states towards reciprocal liberalization (Bergsten 1996). States and regions compete for international investment and international markets, but this competition results in outward, not inward regionalism: new phase of regionalism is globalising and marketising regionalism (Spindler 2002: 16).

Second, new regionalism is deep and much broader in scope. It goes beyond traditional cross-border trade-in-goods issues and addresses also other issues such as investment, services, intellectual property, public procurement, standards, environment protection, labour rights, or fight against corruption.

Third, despite deep level of integration, institutional structure of new regionalism is

⁶ As inter-regionalism is quite a new phenomenon (and its research as well), there is not any unified terminology and different authors present different typologies (see for example Chen 2005, Hänggi 2006, Rüländ 2006, Holland 2006, Lai 2012, Tsardanidis 2013, Pinfari 2013). For the purposes of this dissertation it is not necessary to go into detail, except for differentiation between inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism, which some authors see as pure and hybrid forms of inter-regionalism.

weak and cooperation is strictly intergovernmental. New regionalism is more about negative integration (removing obstacles to trade and economic exchange) than about positive integration (building institutions or even achieving unity in external action). However, different regional agreements have different motivation and different objectives, which results in different level of institutionalization.⁷

Fourth, new regionalism involves new actors. States such as the US, China, Japan, or India did not participate in the previous hegemonic phase of regionalism, but became the most important proponents of new regionalism. For example, Japan signed 15 trade agreements since 2000, the US signed 12 agreements. Currently, almost all states in the world participate in this regionalist wave. But not only states participate in new regionalism. Often, existing “old regionalist” organization is one side of the “new regionalist” bilateral agreement as it attempts to disseminate its norms outside its territorial domain and to create zones of conformity (Väyrynen 2003: 40). Occasionally, both sides of the agreement are organizations.

Fifth, new regionalism has different logic. While old regionalism was based on geopolitics and created physical regions controlled by states, new regionalism is based on capitalism and creates functional regions defined also by non-territorial factors such as culture or market or environmental issues (Väyrynen 2003: 25-27).

Sixth, new regionalism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, which incorporates political, security, economic, social, and cultural aspects into a single framework.

Seventh, new regionalism is based on some level of common identity. “Old” regions were created primarily against outsiders with the aim to increase welfare and/or security within the region. Such closed blocs did not necessarily require any internal social cohesiveness in terms of identity. In the era of globalization, the situation is changing. Somehow paradoxically, openness of regionalism requires not only negative internal links with relation to outsiders, but also positive internal links with relation to us. Region is a social construction in internal sense (values, goals, meanings, identity) and it is a social construction in external sense (recognition by other actors). Thus, we can speak of inside-outside-regionalism, which is based on activation of region’s internal potential, including common values and needs, and simultaneously on outward demonstration of regionalism and self-promotion (Kučerová 2014: 94). At the

⁷ For example, for comparison of Czech, Russian and Chinese regionalism and its motivation see Hnát - Cihelková (2007).

moment, identity is probably a weak aspect of many existing regions, but we can expect that growing regionalism will be reinforcing regional identity and vice versa, stronger regional identity will strengthen position of regions as global actors.

Eight, new regionalism goes beyond state-centric processes and involves both state and non-state actors (civil society, private sector...) and both formal and informal actions to create complex actor networks within which regional order is negotiated (Lorenz-Carl - Rempe 2013: 6).

Ninth, new regionalism is a concept with more complex, normative meaning than original regionalism (Väyrynen 2003: 43). It aims to promote certain universal values such as security, development, or ecologic sustainability, because it can do it better than globalism (Hettne 1999: xxvi). Regionalism reflects that capacity of states to deliver good local governance is diminishing and limitations of multilateral organizations to deliver good global governance are growing (van Langenhove 2011: 5). I will discuss this normative aspect later in this chapter.

Emergence and spread of new regionalism since the end of the 1980s has several economic and political reasons. First, the main reason is globalization. It leads to growing dependence of states on international trade and particularly on investment. If trading costs are higher than investment costs, firms have an incentive to switch from trade to investment. Since the 1980s, transport costs and regulatory barriers remain high, while investment costs continuously decline. As a result, investment flows are growing faster than the trade flows. States wish to attract investment and regionalism is a way how to make investment more secure - larger regional markets provide the opportunities for economies of scale and thus stipulate competition and investment. For many states, regional integration leading to investment creation is preferable to multilateral trade liberalization (Langenhove et al 2004: 5, 8).

Second reason is the slow pace of multilateral liberalization negotiations. If states gain more from free exports than from free imports, unilateral liberalization does not lead to desired results. Multilateral liberalization would be highly welcomed, but its progress is too slow. Frustrations with the “slowness in reaching agreement, due to the varied interests of its many participants, have led some [member states] to the conclusion that IEI [international economic integration] could result in a quicker pace for negotiations” (el-Agraa 2015: 35). In this sense, regional initiatives “have kept the bicycle moving forward after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round” (Bergsten 1996).

For example, bilateral and regional agreements enable the US to achieve its objectives such as exclude free riders of the liberal trading system, deepen liberalization agenda, and reinvigorate global free trade (Cameron 1991: 52).

Third reason is the development of global economy. East/West dualism was ended by a landslide victory of the latter. However, the US lost its dominant position in favour of united Europe, Japan, and increasingly also China. Consequently, the US withdrew from many world regions. Similarly, the formerly united group of developing countries is not a monolithic bloc anymore (if it ever was). The post-Cold-War world is decentralized, fragmented, and multi-polar.

Fourth reason is the deepening of European integration, which serves as a model for other continents, but which is also a threat of being closed economic bloc excluding non-members. Fifth reason is regionalization of conflicts of low intensity, which requires regional responses. States become more and more interdependent, not only in economic sphere, but also in security sphere.

Theoretical Reflection of New Regionalism

Obviously, new regionalism as a process has become a subject of interest of scholars. Brief characterization revealed that (new) regionalism was naturally interlinked with other three processes. Frontiers between national, regional, and global integration are diluted and states tend to adopt leaner and functionally driven institutional architectures (Bach 2016a: 115). Thus, theoretical reflection of new regionalism focuses rather on the interplay between the four processes than on regionalism itself.

There is nothing such as theory of new regionalism. We may rather speak of many different theories of new regionalism. Probably it is better to speak about concepts trying to explain some aspects of new regionalism. These concepts are by no means mutually exclusive as they usually focus on different issues.

Some concepts try to explain the spread of new regionalism in the 1990s. Among the most renowned concepts are the *logic of regional integration* (Matlli 1999) and the *domino theory of regionalism* (Baldwin 1997). Other concepts focus rather on relationship between regionalism and multilateralism and particularly on question whether and how can regionalism contribute to further global liberalization. Concept of *open regionalism* is one of the most prominent (Bergsten 1997). *Regional security complex* (Buzan 2003) is a concept focusing on security aspects of regionalism. These

concepts focus on regionalism as a state-led project, thus accepting nation-states as the main actors in the global economy.

On the other side, there are many scholars going beyond this state-centric view. Some of them assert that nation-states are in decline and rising regions represent a challenge to current global order. These authors assume that nation-state system should not be taken for granted. It is rather one of possible orders, which may be replaced by another order. Different authors present different typologies of possible post-Westphalian orders, which reflect uncertainties about future in the case of substantial decline of nation-states. Such typologies are presented by Gamble (2009), Hettne (2005), Falk (2003), van Langenhove (2011), or Rosenau (2000). Subset of this group is presented by authors focusing on *inter-regionalism* as the promising intermediary stage between undesirable nationalism and unattainable globalism (Hänggi et al. 2006, Doidge 2011).

Other authors shift focus from regionalism to regionalization, thus from political-economic projects to naturally occurring processes involving a plethora of different non-state actors (Bach 2013, Bach 2016a, Higgott 1997, Söderbaum - Taylor 2008, Väyrynen 2003).

European scholars represent more constructivist stream of new regionalist concepts focusing on political and sociological aspects such as internal cohesion of regions as a prerequisite for new regionalism. Such concepts usually present a typology of different qualitative stages of regionalism leading to growing internal cohesion of a region. One of such concepts is *regionness* (Hettne 2003); another typology is presented by Hurrell (2004). Other scholars deal with the question of regional identity as a necessary condition for regionalism, including for example concepts of *regionhood* (van Langenhove 2003) and *region-building* (Neumann 2003, van Langenhove 2011).

In the remaining part of this subchapter I will analyse the complex relationship between the four processes of global economy.

The least problematic is the relationship between **globalization and regionalization**. Market forces operated for centuries at lower levels of human economic activity. Recently, they have extended beyond national borders. National barriers to trade, investment, and financial flows are continuously falling down (IMF 2000). Thus, regionalization and globalization are results of the same process of transnational expansion of markets, which leads to increase in mutual linkages and mutual

interdependence both on regional and on global level. Some markets such as capital and financial markets are globalized, some markets such as markets in goods and services are rather regionalized, and some markets such as labour markets are still national (Jiráňková 2010: 43). Globalization interacts directly with both national and regional economies. Regionalization does not occur at the expense of globalization. There is mutual interdependence between the two (Väyrynen 2003: 32) and the world economy at the same time becomes “globalised AND regionalised” (Spindler 2002: 7). In the case of Africa, the continent is becoming increasingly integrated into the global economy and the intra-African trade is rapidly growing as well.

Relationship between the two political strategies of **globalism and regionalism** is more problematic. Number of regional trade agreements is steadily rising since the beginning of the 1990s. According to Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), 635 notifications have been received by GATT/ WTO. Of these, 423 are in force (as of 1st July 2016). This enormous number raises question, what is the relationship between globalism and regionalism. If prevailing globalism is synonymous to multilateral liberalization, these two strategies can be hardly compatible. “By definition, the cornerstone of these regional trading arrangements is preferential treatment for some members of the multilateral trading system, and discrimination for others” (Sampson 2003: 3).

For some authors, this relationship is positive and regional agreements are *building blocks* or *stepping stones* for global multilateral trade liberalization. They create conditions for it (Tavares 2004: 14) by stimulating trade liberalization, unifying regulatory systems, and reducing the number of involved parties.

In the beginning of the 1990s, there were big hopes connected with the spread of regionalism. Old regionalism was based on closed economic blocks all over the world, which was hardly compatible with global multilateralism. Contrarily, new regionalism is open. *Open regionalism* as a theoretical concept is defined by four aspects (Bergsten 1997):

- maximal unilateral liberalization of trade and investment in the region,
- commitment to reduce trade barriers against non-member states,
- willingness to liberalize trade with non-members on a reciprocal basis,
- right of all countries to unilaterally reduce trade barriers against non-members.

Thus, open regionalism does not create closed protected blocks and is not a threat to

multilateralism (Baldwin 1997: 884-885). However, during the 1990s, this idea proved to be unduly optimistic. Failure of WTO negotiations in Singapore, Seattle, and Cancun led to expansion and strengthening of regional agreements in Europe (Eastern enlargement of the European Union), in the Americas (US plan to create whole-continental Free Trade Area of the Americas), in Asia (negotiations between ASEAN and China and growing number of bilateral agreements between Japan and its regional partners), in Africa (start of the African Economic Community or resurrection of the Eastern African Community), and even across geographical regions. Developing countries strongly opposed global liberalization in trade with services and rejected to subsume to any global rules concerning intellectual property, public procurement, or environmental standards. On the other side, the European Union and the US were unwilling to open their agricultural markets and to stop subsidy their farmers. Doha round of negotiations is blocked for more than a decade and it is not surprising that the strongest economies are trying to reach their goals by different means, including trade agreements with other major world economies. The EU is an example of such ideological turn. It was one of the main proponents of global liberalization and strongly supported WTO negotiations. However, being under pressure from European companies willing to invest outside EU borders, the European Commission had to change its trade policy. In October 2006, the *Global Europe* strategy confirmed European commitments to the WTO, but it also suggested possible directions for bilateral trade negotiations exceeding the WTO framework. Evidently, the European interest is to negotiate trade agreements and obtain as many advantages as possible that would “match or exceed the gains attained by competitors” (Heron – Siles-Brügge 2012: 256).

This development led some authors to pessimistic conclusion. These authors warned that regional agreements had negative impact and were *stumbling blocks* for global multilateral trade liberalization due to its discriminatory nature, fragmentation of global economy, redirection of states’ capacities away from global negotiations, and non-compatible legal and institutional frameworks in different regions. Therefore, states must seek global solutions, not regional ones.

However, empirical evidence does not confirm the pessimist notion that competitive regionalism is detrimental to liberalization. Both globalism and regionalism are in some way results of and reactions to globalization. Very likely, they run in parallel and not necessarily must be mutually harmful. Empirical analysis of six RTAs confirms that in

many aspects these agreements are WTO+, which means that they complement rather than undermine multilateral rules⁸ (Woolcock 2003: 329).

Similarly, Villarreal (2012) analysed trade liberalization in Mexico since the 1990s and drew three conclusions: (1) through regional agreements, Mexico lowered its tariffs to almost all main trading partners, with the only notable exception of China; (2) Mexican trade policy is among the most open in the world;⁹ (3) the result of regionalism is less than would be achievable by global liberalization under the WTO, but more than no liberalization due to stalled Doha round. The Mexican example would suggest that regionalism is a step towards trade liberalization, an intermediary and mitigating stage between national and global levels (Higgott 1997: 172). There is little evidence of closed regional blocs or trade wars. Contrarily, both intra-regional and inter-regional trade are expanding (Väyrynen 2003: 33). Regional initiatives are globally and regionally trade enhancing; there is no perceived incongruence between multilateralism and regionalism (Higgott 1997: 170). Regionalism does not result in the fall of world trading system (Winters 1996: 45). Contrarily, it tries to maximize benefits of multilateralism (Kučerová 2014: 94). Both regionalism and multilateralism proceed in interaction and regionalism only reflects the fact that some states prefer faster or deeper liberalization than global arena can offer (Tussie 2003: 114). Thus, relationship between regionalism and multilateralism is not a priori harmonious or contradictory, but depends on its management by key economic powers (Bergsten 1997). Trade and investment regimes are multi-level process and regionalism is one level of this process. This is confirmed also in Africa, where both internal and external regionalist efforts follow the global path of trade liberalization and hesitantly incorporate also WTO+ agenda, particularly with relation to foreign direct investment (such as in the case of Trade and Investment Framework Agreements between several African countries and the US).

However, some authors argue that “coexistence between regionalism and multilateralism seems to be at the end of the phase in which they have been mutually reinforcing” (Porfilio 2002: 17). The reason is that major powers seem to use regional agreements differently than open regionalism would assume. They wish to push ahead the WTO+ agenda. But very often this means that they try to disseminate their

⁸ WTO+ agenda goes beyond the trade in goods. It focuses also on trade in services, investment, public procurement, intellectual property, environmental and labour standards etc.

⁹ Regional trade agreements cover almost 95 % of Mexican exports and more than 70 % of Mexican imports. Own calculations, data for 2015, source: www.trademap.org.

domestic regulatory mechanisms to other regions, instead of creating new global rules. New inter-regional and trans-regional agreements “aspire to become norm-makers against the backstage of a stalled multilateral system” (Bach 2016a: 5). Such negotiations aspire to establish quasi-multilateral agreements and represent a threat to WTO’s centrality in global trade governance (Bach 2016b: 76). This may lead to *regulatory regionalism* with divergent and incompatible regulatory mechanisms in different regional models (Woolcock 2003: 330-331). Moreover, superpowers can exercise their power and slow liberalization in sensitive sectors. Regionalism is generally a strong impulse towards liberalization, but it can also be associated with protectionism, agriculture being the most significant example (el-Agraa 2015: 14). Thus, despite WTO+ bilateral agreements, many trade barriers remain. “Rule-making in PTAs tends to go beyond the WTO when a powerful actor (usually the United States or the EU) promotes these rules in a bilateral deal with a smaller, usually developing country, partner. (...) In practice, however, there is evidence that PTAs fail to address the most entrenched protectionism, and that the “gaps” in liberalization are much the same in PTAs and the WTO” (Manger 2012: 415). As a result, regionalism in the 21st century, called also post-hegemonic regionalism, seems to be different from the new regionalism of the 1990s, at least in that it is less compatible with global efforts. Probably, global economic crisis will have also significant impact upon relationship between regionalism and globalism, but it is too early to assess such impact in a convincing way.

Now let’s shift to relationship between **globalization and globalism**. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama announced that liberal capitalist democracy was the final form of human government and that mankind had reached the end of history. However, no end of history did happen. In developing countries, all three features of the existing order (liberalism, capitalism, democracy) are more or less contested. Increasingly, even Western core is not uniform in following these principles. We witness rise of anti-free-trade, illiberal, authoritarian, and populist moods both in the US/EU. This suggests that globalized liberal capitalist democracy is not the only possible global order or model of global governance (and also a strategy leading to it) and that there may be other possible orders, although based on market economy. As we will see in third chapter, while free market capitalism is prevailing model in the West (both in its neoliberal and social market version), other parts of the world prefer state capitalism as their strategy. The main difference between the two is that the latter regards the state as

the main economic actor seeking to control the market not only for economic gains, but primarily for political gains, both domestic and international. Thus, relationship between globalization and globalism is an uneasy one. Until recently, the two were probably complementary as the dominant neoliberal globalism was a political counterpart of globalization. Neoliberalism tried to use globalizing economic processes to enhance global welfare. Although some core regions have benefited more than other peripheral regions, basic neoliberal idea is that overall welfare has increased. Global crisis has undermined credibility of this idea and state capitalism emerged as an alternative model, supposedly more capable to ensure long-term economic growth. This alternative globalist strategy is inevitably less complementary to globalization. Globalization is eroding the power of states. While neoliberal states try to adapt to these new circumstances and exploit new opportunities, states preferring state capitalism try to oppose, stop, and reverse this trend. As a result, relationship between globalization and globalism is becoming tenser than in the last thirty years. This trend is clearly visible also in Africa where many states openly support China and even the biggest economies such as South Africa and Nigeria adopt some form of state capitalism (Bremmer 2014: 112-115).

Relationship between **regionalization and regionalism** is different for different regions. While in the EU there is a high level of convergence between regionalism and regionalization, in developing regions the situation is different and regionalization frequently thrives at the expense of state-centric regionalism (Bach 2013: 95).

Richard Higgott analysed regionalism in Asia Pacific region and found out that there is a dichotomous relationship between private sector economic power and public sector authority. The former is driven by intra-regional trade, foreign direct investment and globalization of production networks (*de facto structural economic regionalisation*), the latter is a socially constructed phenomenon requiring positive social and political action, which cannot be explained simply in rational market-driven terms: it must take into account also questions of identity, culture, political will, *raison d'état* and others (*de jure institutional economic cooperation*). However, there is no necessary correlation between *de jure* regional projects and *de facto* regional integration, cooperation, or coordination. This is particularly true when extra-regional trade is more important than intra-regional (Higgott 1997: 166-168, 171, 182).

The same findings can be applied also to sub-Saharan Africa. Fredrik Söderbaum and Ian Taylor distinguish between formal regionalism and informal regionalism. The

former comprises rhetorical top-level commitments to regionalism, legal treaties, and codified interactions. The latter denotes actual practice of mutual understandings and accommodations and tacit agreements between informal workers, self-employed agents, families, business networks, petty traders, migrant labour, refugees and other societal groups. This dichotomy is very similar to Higgott's de facto vs. de jure dichotomy (Söderbaum - Taylor 2008: 13-17).

In a similar manner, Väyrynen speaks about static-place physical regions and dynamic-flow functional regions. Due to the double reorganization of power (vertical reorganization as a shift of power upward and downward from the national level, horizontal reorganization as an emergence of transnational networks of subnational or regional units), there is growing disjuncture between physical and functional regions (Väyrynen 2003: 44-45). "Regional integration in Africa is still largely an affair of government, rather than of the people" (Jerome - Nabena 2016: 89).

Shortly, regionalization is a bottom-up approach, while regionalism is a top-down approach, which creates some tensions between the two phenomena.

Regionalism as a Normative View

We have seen that the complex relationship between the four processes is less problematic on the same functional level regardless territorial level (processes of globalization and regionalization, strategies of globalism and regionalism) and more problematic on the same territorial level between different functional levels (globalization vs. globalism, regionalization vs. regionalism). This tension between objective economic processes on one side and political strategies on the other side increases the uncertainty about what the world will look like in the next decades.

Global arena is characterised by interaction between technology, market, and politics (Strange 2000: 185). The decisive battle is fought between markets/technologies (global level) and states (national level). The tension lies in existence of territorial borders, which states seek to maintain and markets seek to eliminate - and this tension intensifies in time (Jiránková 2010: 17). States wish to have the power over markets, but they have not been successful in their effort. Similarly, market forces have not been able to substantially decrease the state power.

Albeit recent technological and communicational change has shifted the state-market balance in the favour of the latter (Strange 2000: 7), there has been no clear winner in the battle until now. In fact, globalization leaves national territory basically unaltered.

Corporate structures have strong tendencies toward concentration in control and profit appropriation – and these corporate central functions are disproportionately concentrated in the national territories of the highly developed countries. Similarly, global financial markets are located in particular cities in the highly developed countries as well (Sassen 1999).

States seem to be on a retreat (Strange 1996), because “policy choices of the states are deemed to be ‘straitjacketed’ by the pressures of trade competition, the preferences of MNCs and financial markets, and the rules of multilateralism” (Weiss 2003: 8). However, “there is no other institution capable of political integration and effective membership in the world's political community, (...) therefore, the nation-state will survive the globalization of the economy and the information revolution that accompanies it” (Drucker 1997). Thus, global governance is now a multi-layered system composed of states and powerful non-state actors, with different actors exercising power in different spheres. State system remains an embedded part of this system (Doidge 2011: 31). “[I]t is not the state as an institutional structure per se that is withering away, it is the logic inherent in the state as a form of political authority that is changing” (Spindler 2002: 13).

States remain the most powerful actors in the global arena and will remain so in a foreseeable future. Nevertheless, power distribution in the global system has changed. Power had shifted from weak states to stronger states, from states to market and non-state authorities and some power has evaporated and is not exercised by anyone (Strange 2000: 189). Authority of states has been relocated in “diverse directions, upward to supranational institutions, downward to subnational entities, and sideward to social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and a wide range of other types of collectivities” (Rosenau 2000: 7). Power is at the same time integrating and fragmenting. As Rosenau puts it, there are six types of collectivities (governments, corporations, international organizations, national NGOs, international NGOs, markets) and three overlapping and potentially conflicting systems of rules – coercion, markets, and ideas. Political agents rely primarily on coercion, economic agents rely on markets, and social agents rely on ideas.

As a result of this structural transformation, states can no longer operate only within their national spaces. Contrarily, they must act simultaneously on sub-national, national, regional, and global level. To retain their position in the changing world, states have to find new horizontal forms of authority to govern the world. The optimal

strategy is probably the openness of regionalism and cooperation of regions with global regimes on one side, and representative and sustainable coordination of global economic relations on the other side (Cíhelková 2010: 303). New architecture of global trade requires an effective combination of multilateral and regional efforts (Mrlinová 2013: 101) to “ensure that the measures taken on the respective levels are consistent and mutually reinforcing” (Sampson 2003: 15).

We witness a fundamental structural transformation and change in the global political economy, which is brought about by agents (Spindler 2002: 19). However, different actors may have different visions about desirable and attainable global order. Similarly, different actors may see regionalism differently. It is a cognitive construct. It is a normative view of the world. It is a kind of discourse (Kučerová 2014:97), within which different concepts are created and compete. These different concepts are bound to particular actors in particular periods of time and particular spaces (Spindler 2002: 8). Similarly, there are always different discourses about any concrete regionalism: what it brings (prosperity, security and peace, enhanced global power, more democracy...) or who it serves (political elite, capitalists...)(van Langenhove 2011: 76-77).

For the three traditional perspective of IPE, world order is given and is exogenous to actors (Jiráňková 2010: 31, 37-39).

For social constructivists, world order is endogenous to actors. There are different possible world orders and different actors see the world differently according to their identities, ideas, values, and interests. In the 1990s, the US wished to retain the multilateral liberal capitalist order and to retain the position of the leader of the free world. However, the Cold-War order has been already disrupted. It is still a prevailing norm, but new actors started to challenge the existing order. Thus, it seems worth analysing differences between major powers’ conceptions of global order and reception of these different conceptions in other regions of the world.

Chapter Two: Theory of Strategic Narratives

One of new trends in theorising about new regionalism is to introduce communication studies into IR. Regardless whether we focus on regionalization processes based on day-to-day interaction or whether we focus on regionalism based on internal cohesion and identity, in both cases we must go beyond measuring volume of trade exchange or investment or analysing committed or real depth of integration. Study of new regionalism must incorporate also ideas and communicative action – what do people think and say, but also what states and regional organizations think and say. My dissertation falls within this branch of new regionalist research.

To capture these phenomena, I will use the theory of *strategic narratives*. Put simply, strategic narratives are “future oriented identity claims that articulate a distinctive (national/regional) position on a specific issue or policy domain” (Miskimmon et al. 2012: 4). We can distinguish between system narratives (“how the world is structured, who the players are, and how it works”), national narratives (“what the story of the state or nation is, what values and goals it has”), and issue narratives (“why a policy is needed and desirable, how it will be accomplished”) (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 7, Roselle et al. 2014: 76). These three levels of narratives are not mutually exclusive: economic models used in this dissertation bear elements of all three levels.

We can assume that all actors try to arrange their ideas about themselves and international system and to formulate a coherent vision of future world order. „At any given time we have specific ideas about who we are and who we are dealing with in our world. These ideas influence how we interact with others. (...) Similarly, how we interact with others (aggressively or peacefully) influences how we understand our own identity (as weak or strong, aggressive or peaceful) and how we understand the identities of our neighbors and the nature of the world around us” (Chernoff 2007: 144). We can also assume that actors will attempt to disseminate this vision and get support for it from other states. Finally, we can also assume that power asymmetries will influence this process and that powerful states will be more likely to have consolidated visions, to persuade others to adopt these visions, or even to enforce them to do so through different means.

Strategic narrative is a communicative tool for political elites

- to construct a shared meaning to the past, present, and future of international politics,

- to articulate state's interests, values and aspirations for the international order,
- to articulate end-states and ways how to achieve them,
- to manage expectations about behaviour in the international system,
- to change the discursive environment,
- to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors,
- to extend own influence (Miskimmon et al. 2012: 3-4, Miskimmon et al. 2013: 2-4).

Strategic narratives have two-fold power effect: constitutive power of creating identity (domestically) and behavioural power of shaping behaviour (internationally).

Strategic narratives have three different dynamics, which are not linear, but proceed simultaneously and reinforce each other. Formation of narratives is a domestic dynamics and its analysis focuses on how and under what conditions political actors construct narratives. Projection of narratives is an international dynamics and its analysis focuses on how and under what conditions narratives are disseminated. Reception of narratives is a domestic dynamics of the other states and its analysis focuses on how and under what conditions narratives are received and understood (Miskimmon et al. 2012: 6-7).

Strategic narratives are closely interlinked with the concept of soft power (Nye 2004: x, 8, 14). While hard power is based on coercion (force, sanctions) and inducements (payments, bribes), soft power is based on agenda-setting (institutions, diplomacy) and attraction (values, culture, ideas, government policies). When Nye describes aspects of soft power, he describes exactly the same dynamics as strategic narratives theory. First, soft power depends on how we frame our own objectives (Nye 2004: 61). In fact, framing our objectives is formation of narratives in different words. Second, world is full of information, which decreases attention of the receivers. Contemporary politics is about "whose story wins" (Nye 2004: 106). To make their story victorious, states engage in different forms of public diplomacy - or in other words, in projection of narratives. Third, soft-power effects depend on acceptance by the receiving audiences (Nye 2004: 99) - thus, reception of narratives. To sum up, when analysing soft power, "question is what messages are sent and received by whom under which circumstances, and how that affects our ability to obtain the outcomes we want" (Nye 2004: 44). This definition of soft power contains all the functions of strategic narratives described above.

Strategic narratives fit well into the general framework of new regionalism. On one side, strategic narratives remain on the state-centric level of analysis. On the other side, they go beyond this level. Formation of narratives is done not only within the state apparatus, but it involves different non-state actors such as interest groups, private sector, NGOs, universities, churches, and others. Obviously, different political systems involve different actors to a different degree. Even more, some systems wish to and attempt to avoid involving non-state actors at all. Projection of narratives is usually done through state channels, but it also involves other channels such as cultural or sport organizations, academic exchange, churches... Reception of narratives is targeted both to state elite and ordinary population, and is received by both groups – directly, or indirectly, for example through media. We can assume that there will be no trade agreement and no regional integration schemes if no one wishes them. Thus, it is our task to uncover which societal groups are favouring such arrangements because they can benefit from them, which societal groups are countering them because they are losing from them, and what are opinions of those who are unaffected (at least directly) by them. The latter is what this dissertation seeks to reveal by studying media discourse. While adoption of new ideas is usually done by top policy makers, their consolidation requires a broad-based societal consensus, a political discourse of a nation (Sikkink 2012: 2).

At this point, I have to deal with four key questions related to the theory of strategic narratives. First question is theoretical: can we apply strategic narratives on IPE? Strategic narratives are a tool of soft power, but they are inseparable from hard power. Often, they are used as a means to legitimate order based on material power distribution in the system (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 89). For Nye, there are three sources of power - military power, economic power, soft power - and world politics is “a three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally” (Nye 2004: 4). Each of these “chessboards” is relevant in different degrees in different relationships (Nye 2004: 30-31). Smart power is neither hard nor soft, it is both (Nye 2004: xiii). There is no reason why to narrow strategic narratives only to military power and “high politics” - states have their visions and objectives in different issues such as trade or environment, and the logic of strategic narratives applies to these topics in the same manner. System narrative is a vision how the world is and should be structured and governed and this involves both political organization and economic relations. Moreover, it would be a difficult task to separate these two

domains - is regionalism an economic, or political agenda? From this point of view, economic governance is one of the basic system narratives of all states and thus should be of a great interest of academia.

Second question is the same: can we apply strategic narratives on IPE? This time we must assess practical empirical applicability of this concept. If narratives about world order compete to gain wider acceptance, this means that there must be at least two different narratives to compete. Is this the case of economic narratives? In political terms, the post-Cold-War era witnessed contestation over the legacy of the Cold War. The US wished to retain existing liberal capitalist multilateral international order, which it understood as a public good (Nye 2004: 61). While the EU hesitantly agreed, rising powers with China in the lead started to challenge the unipolar world based on US hegemony or dominance. They also started to project their own narratives of future global order (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 62). However, in economic terms, situation seems to be different. End of the Cold War brought the ideological battle between capitalism and communism to an end, with an overwhelming victory of the former. Similarly, many developing countries left protectionist import substituting strategies, which did not lead to development, but rather escalated the debt crisis. As a result, virtually all states in the world have their economic system based on more or less open markets and participate on new regionalism to liberalize trade in goods, services, investment. Most of states are member parties to the WTO.¹⁰ None of the BRICS countries (and the EU or Japan even less) has any serious agenda to change the world. They are all implementing market policies to boost their economic growth - they are not changing global economic rules (Taylor 2014: 12). The overall structure of global geo-governance remains intact (Carmody 2013: 46). However, although globally there may be “imperialism of free trade” (Nye 2004: 136), this does by no means imply that all states have the same foreign economic policy. We are still witnessing battle of ideas. As Joseph Stiglitz (2010: xii) puts it: “The battle between capitalism and communism may be over, but market economies come in many variations and the contest among them rages on”. Three component parts of the economic core of the world, the so-called Triade (the United States, the European Union, and Pacific Asia), differ substantially in their visions how the market economy should work properly. These differences have deep historical roots. For the US, individual freedom is the highest virtue and state (or

¹⁰ As of 2016, approximately 85 % of independent states are members of the WTO. From the top states with regard to area, population, or GDP, all are members of the WTO.

institutions generally) should only create conditions for activities of individuals. Europe generally shares this virtue of freedom, but has different social values. “[W]hile many Europeans admire America’s devotion to freedom, they prefer policies at home that temper neoliberal economic principles and individualism with a greater concern for society and community” (Nye 2004: 56). Ideology of *Asian values* goes even further as it prioritizes societal welfare over individual rights (Nye 2004: 85). I will analyse these three models into detail in chapter three. Globalization was expected to erase these differences as transnational markets were supposed to be more powerful than national political and social forces. However, this assumption was not fulfilled. Macroeconomic convergence happened, but there was no convergence at the level of national institutions. These institutions are the result of national negotiations, not of automatic globalizing processes. Thus, it is very unlikely that the EU and Pacific Asia would leave their model in favour of the US model - and in reality, they did not (Gilpin 2001: 186-188). Economic affairs are still primarily determined by national policies and domestic economies, not by the processes of globalization (Gilpin 2001: 3). Moreover, states even resist such convergence by undertaking or expanding regional economic and political arrangements (Gilpin 2001: 147). This is particularly true after global economic crisis in the late 2000s and early 2010s. States have different economic policies and different visions of global economic order/governance. Thus, it is very likely that they will also have different strategic narratives reflecting their respective visions.

Third question is about scope of our analysis. Strategic narrative is a complex phenomenon. In the introductory chapter, I stated my goal as to go beyond the Western-centric view of new regionalism and analyse the ongoing processes on site. To fulfil this goal, I will focus on the reception of narratives through the leading local newspaper. Our world is an enduring competition between narratives. To win in this competition means to formulate and project my narrative in a more convincing and compelling way than the other states do (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 116). However, all information goes through cultural filters of the receivers. It is rarely heard as intended, and it is always interpreted by audiences in the context of their own experience (Nye 2004: 111; Miskimmon et al. 2013: 169). Thus, projection and reception are interlinked processes. Projection of narratives is done through public diplomacy, which has three dimensions and three tools (Nye 2004: 107-111). First dimension is daily communication, which is done through local media. Second dimension is strategic communication,

which is done through branding central themes. Third dimension is lasting relationships with key individuals, which is done through cultural and academic exchanges. The three tools are broadcasting (closely connected with the first dimension), actions (closely connected with the second dimension), and direct talks (closely connected with third dimension). Public diplomacy contains different channels of communication used by the state apparatus, NGOs, cultural and educational institutions, corporations etc. Its aim is to shape the environment in the receiving country, to thicken social spaces, and to foster connectivity (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 155). Projection of narratives is not my primary focus. However, as local media is one possible channel for public diplomacy, I will also partly deal with the projection of narratives through local newspaper. On the other side, formation of narratives is out of my scope. It is also a very complex issue on its own with many stakeholders, including the state, private business, trade unions, NGOs, think tanks, and others. However, this is a domestic issue, which is of less importance for IPE and which is almost irrelevant to my topic. Formation, projection, and reception of narratives are interlinked and build one upon the others. This means that the strategic narrative may be continuously contested within the domestic arena and may be time from time amended, modified, or even changed. Despite this dynamics, I take narratives in my analysis as given and focus on how are they projected and, more importantly, received. We may expect that system narratives are less prone to changes than issue narratives and that they show some degree of continuity and durability.

Last question to answer is whether strategic narratives are appropriate analytical tool at all. The main objection is that states will not necessarily behave in full accordance with their narrative, or that narratives can even be some form of a rhetorical game. What one says is not necessarily the same as what one does (Nye 2004: 55). This is true. We can hardly expect that states will follow the same economic policy with regard to all other states. New regionalism has many different motivations, some agreements may be motivated by purely economic reasons, some agreements are more of strategic importance, and some have mixed motivation.

However, accepting reality of *ad hoc* motivation for such agreements does not deny the fact that all parts of the so-called Triade (the US, the EU, and Pacific Asia) have to some extent different views how to manage and organize global economic relations. It is very likely that both foreign economic policies (what states do) and strategic narratives (what states say) will reflect these differences and that there will be high

level of convergence between the two. It does not make sense to negotiate trade agreements violating basic principles in which I believe. Similarly, it does not make sense to invest into public diplomacy and defend different principles than those in which I strongly believe. In this sense, link between vision, narrative, and action is rather straightforward. I have a vision how to organize global economic relations; I negotiate trade agreements which reflect this vision and incorporate its basic principles; I formulate a strategic narrative around these vision and principles; I invest into public diplomacy to disseminate this narrative and to justify my trade agreements; and finally I hope to persuade other states to adopt my vision and to show willingness to negotiate similar trade agreements. Issue narratives probably have a hidden potential for rhetoric games, when it may be useful to bluff about my real interests, at least in initial phases of negotiations. It does not make sense to bluff about system narratives, which are more stable and generally well known, at least those of superpowers. In fact, there is no “say-do” gap, because saying is doing (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 177). Paradoxically, this increases demands on system narratives to succeed in competition with the rival narratives as they must be well formulated and carefully projected to be positively received.

Chapter Three: Role of the interpretive research in social sciences

New regionalism brings innovative features into the academic research. On one side, it may still study global relations through state-centric prism, but using interpretive methods, particularly those focusing on discourse. This shift is indeed logical: if our world is characterized by competition between different ideas and narratives, it may be necessary to turn to interpretive methods to capture these processes in their entirety. Thus, instead of searching for causal explanations or causal mechanisms, researchers conduct interviews with key stakeholders or study relevant documents to uncover meanings. On the other side, new regionalism may go even further and shift focus away from state-centrism to include non-state agency and from institution-building to regionalization (Bach 2016a: 52), thus including also “marginalized” groups. Researchers conduct in-depth analyses of a concrete societal group in a concrete country/region based on interviews, study of documents, or ethnographic research. One of representative collections of such innovative research is Lorenz-Carl and Rempe (2013). However, both presented directions of current research have their limits. The former cannot capture perceptions and identities of local societies, the latter is focusing on quite narrow parts of reality and to make some generalizations would require making comparison of large sample of studies. I have chosen an intermediary path, which is to focus on local media and news discourse. Obviously, such research has also limits, which I will discuss later.

Typology of basic philosophical assumptions

International relations as an independent scientific discipline were established in 1919. In the past hundred years the discipline has witnessed fierce battles, not only empirical and theoretical, but also methodological. Since the late 1980s, IR seems to be divided into rationalist (positivist) and reflectivist (post-positivist) camps.

In 1990, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith described different approaches of these two groups as positivist “explanation” and post-positivist “understanding”.

These two camps do not share the same view of how to build the knowledge; they do not speak the same language; they are rival camps publishing in different journals, going to different conferences, and not talking to one another (Smith 1997: 184). Each of the two justifies its own research by its own criteria and dismisses research of the other camp as non-scientific.

However, different philosophies generate different body of knowledge, each of which is internally justified in distinctive ways, but none of which commands unqualified universal assent (Jackson 2011: 210). The demand to choose between “outside” naturalist and “inside” interpretivist method is a false dichotomy: some questions are best answered by “outside” methods that would include an examination of many cases and an attempt to find associations among variables; some are most effectively answered by “inside” methods; some are best answered by the application of moral theory. Given the many different sorts of inquiry in which IR theorists engage, plurality of methods is desirable (Chernoff 2007: 184).

Main philosophical positions differ in how they characterize the world that we study. They have different epistemological and ontological requirements, different formulation of scientific standards and truth conditions, and different style of reasoning (Pouliot 2007: 360). Basic philosophical positions are summarized in the following graphics. Horizontal axis divides positions on a continuum from orthodox nature of knowledge (believe in objective, simple, transparent, and agreed truth) to gnostic nature of knowledge (believe in subjective and hidden truth gained through personal struggle). Vertical axis divides positions according to how they conceive the relationship between knowledge and reality. However, these positions “should not be taken as hard categories (or fixed labels), but rather as positions on a spectrum from the most positivistic to the most humanistic” (Della Porta - Keating 2008: 23). Epistemology denies any fixed categories and represents a continuum without sharp borders (Lamont 2015: 17, Moses - Knutsen 2007: 7, Klotz - Lynch 2007: 11).




Figure 1: Typology of philosophical positions in social science (Source: Fisher 2010: 17, adapted to IR, with reference also to Della Porta - Keating 2008: 23, 32 and Moore 2007: 27)

To briefly describe the four basic philosophical positions (Della Porta - Keating 2008: 23, 32): Positivism is ontologically based on existence of objective reality and possibility to know it; epistemically is positivism based on dualism between the researcher and the researched and knowledge in the form of natural causal laws; methodologically is positivism based on empiricism and imitation of natural experimental methods such as mathematical models or statistical analysis.

Realism is ontologically based on existence of objective reality and natural order in social events, which is possible, however not easy to capture; epistemically realism accepts that knowledge is influenced by the scholar and focuses on deductive procedures and probabilistic laws; methodologically realism combines empiricism and recognition of context and tries to approximate to the natural method. Critical realism shares these basic assumptions, but stresses critical and emancipatory role of science. Critical theory moves further from foundationalism to anti-foundationalism.

Interpretivism is ontologically based on intrinsically linked objective and subjective reality and impossibility to know reality as separate from human subjectivity; epistemically interpretivism aims to understand and reconstruct subjective meanings within specific contexts; methodologically interpretivism focuses on meanings and context through textual or discourse analyses.

Postmodernism is ontologically based on existence of only subjective reality and impossibility to (objectively) know it; epistemically is postmodernism based on impossibility of objective knowledge and focuses on empathetic knowledge; methodologically postmodernism focuses on values, meaning, purposes, and empathetic interactions between researchers and objects of research.

What role for a Czech Africanist?

Typology of basic philosophical positions evokes a fundamental question: where to posit myself on this continuum? Tradition of African studies at the Charles University (Faculty of Arts) dates back to the early post-war period. However, due to the complex nature of the study programme and its primary focus on linguistics, languages, and culture, we can hardly speak of any unified theoretical and methodological Czech Africanist tradition related to politics, international relations, or political economy. In this respect, research on Africa has become embedded as a part of research in Political Science, thus reflecting theoretical and methodological debates in the discipline.

Political Science is dominated by the US research, which is strongly positivist and based on quantitative research. International Relations and International Political Economy, as two distinct sub-disciplines, both share this tendency towards wider use of mathematic and statistical methods (Kofroň - Kruntorádová 2015: 30-31, Hnát et al. 2016: 77). Nevertheless, theoretical field of IR is highly pluralistic (Beneš 2016: 11). Although leading US and British universities are positivist and most of the dominant journals are quantitatively-oriented, there are also important IR journals oriented to qualitative explaining research. Moreover, there is also strong post-positivist and reflectivist tradition on some British universities (Záhora 2016: 75), not speaking about continental Europe. As even positivists concede, the European political science has done a big progress in the last twenty years and have enriched the discipline particularly with interpretive and critical approaches (Kofroň - Kruntorádová 2016: 84).

The apparent distinction between the mainstream US tradition and alternative European tradition is well documented on the study of regionalism by Swedish scholar Fredrik Söderbaum (2010: 2): the overwhelmingly dominant mainstream rationalist theories of regionalism “are based on a specific mode of knowledge production and privilege certain research questions at the expense of others”, which results in “a rather narrow focus on formal and state-centric regional projects (political science) or the analysis of official trade flows within comparative static frameworks (economics)

with a view that regionalism should follow the same route as in Europe”. According to him, “it is necessary to challenge the rationalist and largely ‘positivist’ theoretical frameworks in the field” and shift our focus to “a critical and reflectivist theoretical framework, which is more sensitive to the particular historical context”.

Compared to the West, situation in the Czech Political Science is unique as the discipline emerged only after the fall of communism and had to be built from nothing. New discipline was established by historians and philosophers, who inclined towards idiographic research and focused on historicizing empirical analyses and normative questions of the post-communist politics (Kofroň – Kruntorádová 2015: 41-42, Beneš 2016: 10). Contrarily, nomothetic research was dismissed due to its perceived link to Marxist science in the communist era. When the Czech Republic joined the European Union, students and young scholars were allowed to study abroad, which resulted in transmission of current trends in the European research of international security, European integration, and economic development. New generation of researchers introduced new theoretical and methodological insights, particularly constructivist and critical, including the less known and until then only rarely used approaches (Beneš 2016: 11-12). As a result, the leading Czech academic and research centres are oriented towards interpretivist and critical research, particularly (but not only) in the security studies (Kofroň – Kruntorádová 2015: 42). Similarly, research in international political economy introduced critical approaches only around 2000, when it focused its attention (among others) on issues of new regionalism and inter-regionalism (Hnát et al. 2016: 73-76). Not surprisingly, then, the leading Czech journal *Mezinárodní vztahy* (International Relations) has published formal-theoretical quantitative analyses, which form the standard in the “Anglo-Saxon mainstream”, only very rarely (Beneš 2016: 11).

To sum up, the Czech tradition of research in Political Science is for historical reasons linked to the European qualitative/interpretivist constructivist tradition, not to the US positivist tradition. Moreover, being an Africanist means to find myself in a very diverse theoretical and methodological environment, which is not limited only to PS/IR/IPE scholarship, but also includes for example anthropological or sociological works based on ethnographic or other interpretive methodologies. Finally, opportunity to conduct field research in Africa enhances any Africanist’s doubts whether Western-centred theories and generalizing methodologies are capable to capture the diversity and specificity of African reality. Thus, my preference for interpretive research is indeed logical and hardly surprising.

Philosophy: Interpretive Constructivism

The presented text is based on interpretivist philosophy, which Chernoff (2007) labels as interpretive constructivism. Interpretivism is often portrayed as denying the existence of material real world “out there”. However, this is a misinterpretation. Interpretivists accept that there is a real world out there, but deny possibility to experience it otherwise than through our mind.

Interpretive constructivism is based on three key claims. First claim is the interpreted nature of social facts. Although the real world exists, there is nothing such as objective reality independent on the researcher/agent. Reality is always affected by knowledge and social factors (Adler 1997: 324). Agents have different subjective meanings and interpretations of the world, based on their identities, values, beliefs, and specific contexts. They experience the world through these perceptions. Whenever something happens, there are many ways to interpret and describe the event (Chernoff 2007: 132). Each of us sees different things. What meanings actors give to the world, they behave according to them and thus objectify them. Reality is not based on “the nature of things” (Chernoff 2007: 151), but on the attachment of meaning and functions to physical objects by human action and interaction. Truth is created rather than discovered: it is a socially produced consensus (Monteiro - Ruby 2009: 29).

Similarly, there is no objectivity in the scientific approach. There is nothing as universal knowledge. Knowledge is always context specific, it is “simply a set of beliefs or presuppositions that do not rest on any foundations; any body of knowledge provides only one of many possible perspectives; there is no underlying reality that ties together the different perspectives” (Chernoff 2007: 177). As researchers, we do not attempt to describe reality; we focus on the consequentiality of representations of that reality (Hynek - Teti 2010: 175). We want to understand actors’ behaviour in a specific context. We want to discover the meanings and interpretations created by humans. But we are not neutral observers. We have also our subjective meanings and interpretations influenced by our identities, values, beliefs, and context. Our meanings and interpretations inevitably influence how we analyse interpretations of the others. As a result, social science is an interpretation of the interpreted. It is re-interpretation of subjective meanings, which always focuses on specific events or situations and their context.

Second claim is reflexivity of theories. Social science means that people study the actions of people. Reality is inter-subjective, the research and the researched are mutually constitutive. Theory may change the subject matter by affecting the decisions of actors (the so-called self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies; Chernoff 2007: 140-141). It is impossible to distinguish between theories and facts.

Third claim is the role of constitutive relations. Causal relations between X and Y signify that both events can be described independently of one another and that either event can occur without the other. But this is not true in the social world, where X and Y constitute each other. Thus, interpretivists reject applicability of causation on social world. Instead, we must explore the rules constituting social reality.

To sum up, meta-theoretical constructivism is based on epistemological claim that knowledge is socially constructed, on ontological claim that social reality is constructed, and on reflexive claim that knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive mostly through linguistic feedbacks. Thus, philosophical position of interpretivist constructivists is anti-foundationalism, or some would say post-foundationalism. Although there are no ontological foundations of knowledge, there are epistemological foundations. Social facts are created by agents, but then they are reified, taken by real, and they make social world to come into being. Thus, we focus not on what is real, but on what social agents take to be real (Pouliot 2007: 362-364, Pouliot 2010: 54-58).

Methodology: Discourse Analysis

As already mentioned in the theoretical chapter, our world can be characterized by an enduring competition between different ideas and narratives. To capture this process in its entirety, we have to employ interpretive methods such as discourse analysis.

Discourse is a particular way of talking about and understanding the world, which plays an active role in creating and changing identities and social relations (Phillips - Jørgensen 2002:1). It is an interrelated set of texts and the practices of their production, dissemination and reception bringing an object into being (Phillips - Hardy 2002: 3). Discourse is constructing and interpreting the meaning through language used in different social events and contexts (Hájek 2014: 113).

Discourse in social sciences has been popularized in the 1960s by French philosopher Michel Foucault. According to Foucault, the real world is inaccessible to our knowledge. We cannot know the world in any neutral way, only through socially

conditioned system of symbols. This symbolical order is organized through discourses, which are products of a concrete societal organization (Kraus 2003: 19). Foucault distinguishes between statements, discourses, and discursive formations (Hájek 2014: 117-120). Statement is anything that has been said or written (any text). Discourse is a group of statements in the social space sharing the same values and the same rules how to construct and structure statements. Scientific discourse, media discourse, political discourse, religious discourse, all these discourses undoubtedly differ in their core values and rules. Similarly, all of these discourses can be further divided into more specific discourses with different core values and rules. Natural sciences discourse is not the same as social sciences discourse; TV discourse differs from the internet discourse as well as communist discourse differs from the liberal one and Catholic discourse from the Islamic one.

The most important feature of our discursive environment is a discursive formation. It is a collection of (hidden) rules creating a system of the formation, the distribution, and the ordering of statements in the social space and relations between statements. In any society, production of discourses and texts is organized according to some rules and processes. These rules determine which objects and terms are delimited within the discourse and which are excluded; what are the key topics; who is a legitimate author in the discourse; how are the concrete statements produced. Shortly, these rules determine what can be said/written and what cannot. These discursive formations are crucial because they create discourses – not oppositely (Hájek 2014: 119).

Foucault's innovative approach to discourse rests on his assumption that discourse is closely linked to knowledge and power. Power relationships are reflected in language, which shapes or even constructs our social world, its content, subjects, their identities, or relations between them. Power is linked to the formation of discourse(s) within specific historical periods. Moreover, there is a mutually constitutive relationship between power and knowledge, which is mediated through discourse: discourse enables knowledge to operate as power, and it simultaneously enables power to behave as knowledge (Hájek 2014: 117).

Discourse analysis is a term that “broadly denotes methodologies that capture the creation of meanings and accompanying processes of communication” (Klotz - Lynch 2007: 19). It is a methodology philosophically based on anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism (interpretivism). Its core is that our knowledge is not reflection of the reality out there, but that it is historically and culturally conditioned and interlinked

with social processes and social action. Our knowledge is just one representation of the world among many other possible representations (Phillips - Jørgensen 2002: 5, 22). Task of discourse analysis is to interpret social reality as it exists and to uncover the way in which it is produced (Phillips - Hardy 2002: 6). It does so by carrying out “an interpretive analysis of some form of text with a view to providing an understanding of discourse and its role in constituting social reality” (Phillips - Hardy 2002: 10). “Analyst has to work with what has actually been said or written, exploring patterns in and across the statements and identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality” (Phillips - Jørgensen 2002: 21).

In his works, Foucault developed a genealogic method to uncover how discourse is produced to govern social groups. Genealogy is a historical inquiry into the discursive constitution of subjectivity conditioned on power relations (Ditrych 2014: 16). For Foucault, the most important level of analysis was the rules behind the discourse and the conditions for the articulation of statements (discursive formation). Thus, he focused on a social analysis of discourse. Norman Fairclough built upon Foucault’s insights and complemented his social analysis of discourse with a linguistic analysis (Hájek 2014: 121). On one side, he shares with Foucault his preoccupation with power relations. He also sees discourses as a way of sustaining uneven distribution of power in the society. He also sees the role of the researcher as to uncover and change these power relations to emancipate the powerless. Not coincidentally, he is one of the founders and key representatives of the critical strand of discourse analysis (critical discourse analysis, CDA). On the other side, he is concerned with the mutual effects of linguistic textual properties and sociological practices. He believes that if practices are discursively shaped and enacted, then they are linguistically analysable. Contrary to Foucault, Fairclough puts much more emphasis on the text itself and uses linguistic methodology to analyse it (his approach is often called as textually oriented discourse analysis).

Fairclough presents a three dimensional approach (Fairclough 2010: 3-5; see also Phillips - Hardy 2002: 4 and Hájek 2014: 127). First dimension is the text itself. This dimension focuses on what is expressed in the text. Second dimension is a discursive practice giving meanings to concepts and the processes of text production and interpretation. This dimension focuses on authorship, distribution, and consummation of the texts in the social context. Third dimension is historical and social context, social practice and the institutional and organizational circumstances, which structure the

knowledge and social practice and which constructs or constitutes social entities and relations. This dimension focuses particularly on the order of discourse as a foundation for hegemony and asymmetrical power relations. Thus, discourse analysis aims to produce systematic description of both textual and contextual dimensions of discourses: properties of the text and cognitive processes of discourse production and understanding and social interactions in sociocultural situations (van Dijk 1988: 29-30).

There is rarely one discourse in given time and given context. Rather, there are multiple competing discourses, which are created in reference and opposition to one another. One is usually prevailing and constitutes hegemonic order of discourse, which reproduces existing social and power relations. However, equilibrium constituting such hegemony is contradictory and unstable (Fairclough 2010: 93). Events are incorporated into existing sets of meaning and may force actors to create new sets of meaning to garner resources, attract constituents, and realize goals. This can subsequently reframe the debate by changing the content, form, and legitimacy of competing discourses. Thus, the relationship between discourse and events is dialectic (Ellingson 1996: 101-107). If there is a moment of crisis and someone offers new discourse, this may be more persuasive than the existing one and replace it (Klotz - Lynch 2007: 44). For example, Ruth Wodak in her analysis describes changes of attitudes of the Austrians toward people from Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s in reaction to the end of the Cold War (Wodak 1996).

However, this is just one version of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is an umbrella term for different varieties of interpretive analyses. Using two axes of whether analysis focuses on text or on context (forming rather a continuum than two sharply separated positions) and whether analysis focuses on process or power (constructivist vs. critical analysis), we can distinguish four basic varieties of discourse analysis: social linguistic analysis (text/process), critical linguistic analysis (text/power), interpretive structuralism (context/process), and critical discourse analysis (context/power). My aim is to analyse news discourse as one example of a broad societal discourse. Data corpus consists of more than five hundred articles. Thus, I am not concerned much with the concrete texts (micro-level), rather with “bodies of text” (Salignac 2012: 130) and their societal context of different clashing voices and alternative discourses (macro-level). We can assume that there is an official elite discourse about economic agenda and economic relations within the global economy. We can assume that there are other different and alternative discourses circulating within the Kenyan society. We

can assume that media are reproducing the official elite discourse. We can also assume that there are multiple and often clashing sources of input information and that free media offer space to alternative voices and discourses, if they exist (these assumptions will be later discussed more into detail). However, my aim is not to uncover power relations behind the hegemonic official discourse, but rather to find out which voices appear in the news discourse and whether the official elite discourse is internalized within the society or whether there are alternative voices or discourses. Thus, although my research is influenced by works of Norman Fairclough and Teun van Dijk, two leading representatives of the critical discourse analysis, it falls rather to the interpretive structuralist strand of discourse analysis. Such an analysis “helps in making sense of how social realities are constructed through the analysis of bodies of text, their interrelatedness and the context in which they are produced and consumed” (Salignac 2012: 130).

Text is a material manifestation of discourse, which may take written or spoken form. Text is any readable object or a set of objects, from which a reader can abstract meaning and rearticulate it. Most of texts emerge to be read by human readers who have some subjective motivation based on their identity and knowledge (Hájek 2014: 17, 20, 23). However, text is not meaningful individually, out of the discourse. We are not interested in the text itself; instead we have to focus on socially important impacts of the text and how do they enable readers to understand social events and to intervene into these social events (Hájek 2014: 21).

Thus, **textual analysis** is an essential part of discourse analysis. However, it must go beyond mere linguistic analysis of the text. Text analysis oscillates between a focus on texts as actual instance of language in use and a focus on the order of discourse as relatively durable social structuring of language as part of the relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices (Fairclough 2009: 3).

Chapter Four: Textual analysis in the interpretive research

More specifically, I will use interpretive textual content analysis (ITCA), which focuses on analysing the content of written texts in interpretative way. This means that while traditional quantitative content analysis focuses on key words or statements and their appearance in the text (coding and counting), interpretive content analysis attempts to understand the process and character of social life and meaning (Altheide 1996: 42-43).

Altheide (1996) distinguishes six phases and steps in conducting the ITCA.¹¹ First, we must decide what kind of documents to use and select the unit of analysis. As a second step, we have to prepare a protocol - a list of questions, items or categories that guide data collection from documents. Third step is to define a sampling strategy. Fourth step is data coding, which means reading articles, writing protocols, and searching for frames and themes. Next step is data analysis, which means repeated reading of protocols and searching for key differences within categories. Last phase is writing a report/paper.

Case selection

My analysis focuses on Kenya as a representative case. Kenya has long-term deep relations with the European Union. Although the government of Mwai Kibaki (coming to power in 2003) started the rapprochement with China, it did not substantially alter the existing patterns of trade, investment, or development aid. April 2013 may be a turning point: Uhuru Kenyatta was elected as a new president, which caused reserved reactions in the West. The reason is that both Kenyatta and his Vice-President William Ruto faced charges by the International Criminal Court of committing crimes against humanity during post-election violence in 2007/2008. Contrarily, China warmly congratulated new President on his election, which initiated a new era of close cooperation under officially proclaimed “Look East” policy. Similarly, visit of Barack Obama, the US president of Kenyan origin, to Kenya in July 2015 resulted in promises of close cooperation between the two countries both in political and economic terms. However, the EU did not remain passive as it concluded negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EAC in October 2014. Political development goes hand in hand with economic events – global economic crisis damaged the image of the West in favour of China, but even the latter started to show signs of economic slowdown in

¹¹ Altheide uses the term „ethnographic content analysis“.

2015, probably opening up space not only for West to regain its position, but also for other “new” actors. Thus, Kenya is closely cooperating with many different external partners and it may be of a great academic interest to explore perceptions of these partners and changes in these perceptions in the covered period.

Period under investigation is between 1st January 2012 and 30th September 2015. Besides key political events, several milestones related to global and regional trade agenda occurred within this period: fifth China-Africa summit supposed to further enhance existing mutual relations (July 2012); signature of the monetary protocol of the EAC (November 2013); the Bali Package adopted at the Ninth World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference (December 2013); signature of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the EAC (October 2014); extension of the US preferential trade regime for African countries called AGOA for another ten years (June 2015); launch of the Tripartite Free Trade Area in Eastern and Southern Africa supposed to be basis of whole-continental free trade area (June 2015). Period under investigation finishes by the time of my research trip to Nairobi.¹²

In my analysis, I use articles from the leading Kenyan newspaper *The Daily Nation* as the data source and take whole articles as the unit of analysis. There are four reasons why to use this daily newspaper as the data source.

First reason is the media environment in Kenya generally. Rankings by Reporters without Borders (2017) and Freedom House (2016) show that it is free, although it has slightly deteriorated in the last two years. New constitution adopted in 2010 prohibits the state from interfering with the editorial independence of media outlets. According to Freedom House country report, local private media provide rigorous and critical coverage of politics and a diversity of views. This is highly important due to crucial role of free and independent media for democracy, offering open access to information (Stiglitz 2003: 25). The Daily Nation is an independent newspaper, published by local private media company Nation Media Group (NMG). NMG was founded in 1959 by the British business magnate, philanthropist, and religious leader Aga Khan IV. NMG is listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange with 45 % of shares still owned by the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development. According to public Kenyan sources, total number of shareholders is about 7.500.

¹² Thus, it does not cover other potential milestones such as Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December 2015 etc.

Key points of NMG's editorial policy are as follows (adapted)¹³:

- The Group's news and information outlets must remain independent of vested interests or external influences. All editorial content will be selected for its inherent news value and not to appease, augment or respond to political, commercial or any other interests.
- The Press, as a social institution, is responsible for allowing different views to be expressed. The Group's news and information outlets aim to appeal to wide audiences and no one sector, community, profession or editorial objective will dominate the media platforms.
- In general, the trend must be towards a wise mix and balance of reporting, analysis and interpretative journalism to help our audiences and readers better understand the issues that are part of their everyday lives.
- Editors shall not shy away from objective and generally constructive criticism of any group or person, action or policy where such criticism is considered in conscience to be well founded, based on a full and accurate assessment of the factual realities, and offered in the interests of the public at large.
- The Group's news and information outlets will differentiate clearly between views and opinion on the one hand and news and reportage on the other. Columnists and commentators (on staff or outside) should always be identified not just by name, but also by affiliation.
- The fundamental principle of the typographical layout of the Group's news platforms is to present editorial content in an attractive but disciplined, sober, consistent and non-sensationalist format. Our media platforms will avoid such "non-news" content as empty statements of a general nature, occasions or releases where publicity for individuals, groups or organisations is the sole dominant objective.

Thus, we can conclude that The Daily Nation is an independent newspaper operating within free media environment and thus it is likely that it will offer space for different voices, including the non-official ones.

Second reason is that The Daily Nation is the most important Kenyan newspaper with some 200,000 copies sold every day. Karen Rothmyer (2010) asserts that "each newspaper in Kenya is typically read by fourteen people and those who can't afford to

¹³ See <http://www.nation.co.ke/meta/1194-1199444-157ja8l/index.html>.

buy a paper sometimes “rent” one”. According to the survey by GeoPoll (2015), the number of readers may be even higher as The Daily Nation has an average readership of approximately 4.379.400 per day. This means that The Daily Nation has 40% share of the national newspaper market and each issue of the newspaper is read by some 15 % of population over 15yrs.

We may think of internet being a better source of data. Kenya is the first in Africa with internet penetration rate over 70 %. However, only 0.2 % of users use fixed broadband connections, while majority has internet access via their mobile connection. This may cause distortion in the penetration rate as it counts number of connections, not taking into account that one person may have more SIM cards with internet connection. Thus, real penetration rate is thought to be some 40 or 45 %. Number of people using Facebook is substantially lower, some 11 % of population, far behind the West, Asia, and even many African countries (Otieno - Ng'ethe 2016, World Bank 2015). This may signal that number of real everyday users of the internet is rather meagre and does not exceed number of The Daily Nation readers. Moreover, readers of The Daily Nation are spread across regions and across different strata of the society, contrary to users of the internet, who are supposedly concentrated in large cities and within middle and upper classes. Data show that The Daily Nation has a strong position with 32% market share even among the youngest generation between 15 to 24 years (GeoPoll 2015).

Obviously, TV or radio broadcasting would offer higher penetration rate, but these sources are much more difficult to obtain and analyse. Such task unfortunately exceeds the possibilities of a dissertation. One may also think of conducting interviews as the source of data. However, media news is naturally occurring text appearing in the normal day-to-day activities, which the interviews are not. Use of data sources depends largely on research questions and object of study. If the research focuses on individuals, interviews may be a suitable source of data. If the research focuses on broader societal discourse, it is better to analyse widely disseminated texts such as media news (Phillips - Hardy 2002: 71-72).

Third reason is methodological. As already mentioned in Chapter Two, one of important tools for public diplomacy is media and broadcasting. Thus, if we wish to analyse strategic narratives and their projection and reception, analysing local media is one of possible and desirable directions of our research.

As van Dijk asserts, news is a specific form of public discourse, because it is a frame through which the social world is constructed (van Dijk 1988: vii, 8). News reports “are the main form of public discourse that provides the general outline of social, political, cultural, and economic models of social events, as well as the pervasively dominant knowledge and attitude structures that make such models intelligible” (van Dijk 1988: 182). Media discourse is a speech in action as presented by mass media. People can influence it, participate on it or try to ignore it - but not to control and dominate it. On the other side, media discourse is one of arenas for hegemonic struggles and for the articulation and re-articulation of the order of discourse (Hájek 2014: 127).

We can hardly imagine that issues connected with Kenyan external economic relations within global(ized) economy do not appear in the news discourse. Kenya hosts one of 139 delegations and offices of the European Union External Action, whose task is among others also to present and explain EU policies.¹⁴ We can expect that members of this delegation will be in close contact with Kenyan authorities, media, interest groups organizations, or the most important NGOs, and that they will try to use local media as a channel for its public diplomacy.¹⁵ Obviously, this is not limited to official authorities. There are many other possible channels to disseminate narratives such as business organizations, cultural or sport associations, civic organizations etc. Similarly, China, the US, and other partner states attempt to enter Kenyan media space with their own narratives and messages. Thus, news articles enable us to partly assess projection of narratives and, primarily, to assess reception of narratives by the editorial staff and readers (Talking Point and Opinions double page).

Last reason is that Nairobi has become an African hub for Chinese media houses, which try to penetrate Africa, to balance the supposedly pro-Western information asymmetry on the continent, and to improve image of China. The Daily Nation has become part of this media game as it entered into a partnership with Chinese state press agency Xinhua in 2011. It may be of even greater interest to analyse media discourse in The Daily Nation. We may ask whether the image of China is more positive than the image

¹⁴ See eeas.europa.eu.

¹⁵ The EU disseminates its norms through symbolic power (“power by example”) and through substantial power (“power by relations”). Physical presence through delegations and embassies is one example of the substantial power; the others are institutionalization by incorporating principles into agreements or material exchanges (trade, development assistance). Symbolic power is exercised through strategic declaratory communication, cultural diffusion and political learning, or simply by being an example worth to be followed (Manners 2001: 13). All these aspects may be medialized in the local media.

of the West, and whether the image of China has changed after the turning point of 2013 elections. The covered period does not allow assessing whether the image of China has changed after this partnership started if compared with the pre-partnership period. However, such analysis would substantially enlarge the data corpus and probably would not bring much added value as this issue is not directly linked to my research questions.

However, it is obvious that this choice of data source has its limits. Media are mediators of social events. Although news discourse is non-persuasive in principle or intention, media are not neutral or rational mediators. Media indirectly presupposes some positions or opinions and help to reproduce pre-formulated ideologies (van Dijk 1988: 179).

This is related to which sources of information do the journalists use: authorities and companies are always more valuable sources of data than for example NGOs or labour unions. The press produces and reproduces part of the political, social, and economic status quo based on organizations providing input texts, because alternative sources are not available, or are not reliable, or require transformation for which there is no time (van Dijk 1988: 11, 129, 132). “Newspapers are important sites for the reproduction, and occasionally the contestation, of official discourses, and especially those dominant discourses that circulate among elites” (Weldes 2006: 182). Contestation of official discourses is important, so we should focus particularly on different voices in the media news. Naturally, not all voices appear in the media. Similarly, those that do appear are not expressed on equal terms (Phillips - Hardy 2002: 85). This is partly related to strategies of journalists how to choose topics for their articles and how to write about these topics. When receiving source information and transforming them into articles, journalists usually focus on novelty, recency, relevance, public interest, consonance with socially shared values, local and ideological proximity, but also on difference, deviance, negativity (van Dijk 1988: 113-124). Thus, access to media becomes a valuable asset and “capacity to influence and control processes of mediation is an important aspect of power in contemporary societies” (Fairclough 2009: 33).

Writing an article means to transform the input information, which is usually provided to the journalist from outside. Thus, media news rarely reproduces facts, rather interpretation of facts by journalists. This means that input information (narratives) can be and usually is received differently than intended. Moreover, media news itself may be received differently than editors intended. Readers rarely construct their

knowledge solely on the article they are just reading. Rather, they compare the article with their existing subjective situation models about actions and events, which are based on their previous knowledge, but also on collective ideologies. Readers interpret the article, which is an already interpreted narrative, and they can amend, update, or modify their situation models. “The meaning of a news article is not objectively there in the text but rather arises from a reconstruction by the reader” (van Dijk 1988: 99). Obviously, this re-interpretation by readers cannot be captured in the textual analysis. Nevertheless, if the main goal is to analyse broader societal discourse as emerging in the leading Kenyan newspaper, it is not necessary to deal with the question of re-interpretation by readers, although this may be different from the media discourse. Crucial is that media news serves as a filter between pre-formulated ideas of elites and everyday stories of people (van Dijk, cited in Wodak 1996: 109).

What is more important is the role of the researcher. In interpretive research, sources of data are accessed (be it people, events, conversations, or documents), but the data as such are generated by the researcher. Thus, data gathering and data analysis are two separate processes (Yanow - Schwartz-Shea 2006: xix, 125). All references to empirical data are the result of researcher’s interpretation (Phillips - Hardy 2002: 83). Moreover, we can never find discourses in their entirety. We can only attempt, by analysing a body of texts, to capture the interrelations (Phillips - Hardy 2002: 5). Both researcher and readers must keep in mind these limitations of the presented research, which reflect the limitations of knowledge in social sciences described earlier in the third chapter.

Data analysis

Second step of the analysis is to prepare a protocol. Protocol is a list of questions, items or categories that guide data collection from documents. As documents reflect social activity, we focus on categories expressed by questions *What is done? How? Where? When? By whom? With what rationale?* (Altheide 1996: 26-27). We have to take into account both properties of the text (macrostructures) and properties of the sentences (microstructures). In the former case, we search for main events, its consequences, actual context, background history, verbal reactions, expectations, and evaluations. In the latter case, we reveal and assess lexical choices aimed to increase persuasiveness of the news (van Dijk 1988: 55-56, 82). Categories as defined by van Dijk are similar to seven aspects of textual analysis as expressed by Fairclough (2010). He distinguishes four aspects focusing on the text (vocabulary, grammar, cohesion

between clauses and sentences, text structure) and three aspects focusing on the discursive practice (force of utterances, coherence of texts, intertextuality).

Creating a protocol is a form of reference coding. Coding can be described as transforming naturally structured data for their interpretation and analysis. We distinguish two types of coding. Factual codes are coding facts in the text with the aim to make generalizations. They are set prior to the analysis and are widely used in the quantitative research. Reference codes are coding relevant parts of the text. They are not set in advance, but emerge during the analysis. This kind of coding is used in qualitative research as it serves to construct systematic and coherent framework for further analysis (Hájek 2014: 62-64).

Based on both van Dijk and Fairclough, I have prepared the following protocol:

Number of article: #

Date:

Section:

Type:

Author/source:

Category of author:

Size:

Headline:

Topics / Frames:

Main events:

Consequences:

Actual context:

Non-recent history:

Verbal reactions:

Expectations:

Evaluations:

Connotations:

Wording:

Semantic operations:

Quotes:

Exactness:

Important proposition(s):

The protocol consists of four parts. First part is background data about the article such as when was the article published, in which section, what type the article is, who is the author, and how many paragraphs did the article have.

Section can be one of the following: front page (“story of the day” – usually short message with a photo, followed by long article on the following pages), back page (“second story of the day”), national news, counties (local news), world (international

news), business, opinions (two pages reserved for opinions, analyses, messages and readers' reactions; however, opinions are often published also in thematic sections), supplement (separate topical supplements inserted in the newspaper, often with slightly different layout), or other (for example advertising section). In the case of Sunday edition, there is also a specific category Sunday review, which offers more analytical articles to different actual topics. The last category is "not known". Relevance of position of the article in the newspaper became clear only when I started to analyse data. Unfortunately, not all photocopies of articles allow me to precisely define in which section the article appeared. However, it is certain that such article was not on the front page, on the back page, in supplement, or in opinions' section. Thus, category "not known" means that article was published in one of the "inside" editorial news sections (national, counties, international or business). Overall analysis is in no way affected by this minor deficiency in source data.

Category of type is one of the following: article, opinion (including also analysis, commentary etc.), short (meaning short news or editorial), letter (from the reader to the editorial staff), interview, and advertising.

Category of author is one of the following: Eastern press agency, Western press agency, journalist, local public official, foreign public official, local businessperson, foreign businessperson, academia/analyst, civil society, and reader. This broad spectre reflects possible differences between the main groups of stakeholders and may be a key to analysis of media discourse on trade and economic issues. Category "journalist" consists only of journalists writing directly for the Nation Media Group (including its branches in Uganda and Tanzania). Journalists from other media writing opinion articles are sorted into "academia/analyst" category to capture the possible differences. Affiliation of the journalist is deduced usually from his email address. There is also category "no author" for those articles that are not signed.

Second part of the protocol focuses on information about macrostructures. We analyse what is the message (headline), what happened (main events), what is direct consequence of this event, what is actual context and non-recent history of the actual event, whether someone has reacted to the event, what is expected to happen, and how is the whole event evaluated. Some of the categories may overlap. Consequence means that something will objectively happen or is very likely to happen, while expectation means that author subjectively expects something to happen. We may assume that consequence exhibits higher certainty, while expectation is probably more

uncertain. However, the same thing may be expressed both as a consequence and as an expectation. If something is likely to happen, we expect it to happen. It depends whether we express our expectation explicitly or not. Contrarily, if we expect something to happen, this must not necessarily happen. However, the difference may not be clear and often is rather lexical than substantial (new deal will boost trade vs. new deal is supposed to boost trade). The same holds true for evaluations. If we say that a new deal will boost or is supposed to boost trade between two countries, it is also an evaluation of this trade deal. Sometimes to distinguish between consequence, expectation, and evaluation is rather a matter of intuition. However, as this dissertation is a version of discourse analysis focusing on context rather than on concrete texts, the precise sorting of propositions into pre-set categories is not fully determining.

Let's show an imaginary example of the categories. Negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the EAC were impeded, inter alia, by different positions between five member states of the EAC. Newspaper article may inform readers that five member states have finally reached a consensus (main event), which will pave way for immediate conclusion of the EPA talks (consequence). Consensus was reached at the summit of Heads of States (actual context) at the end of tenth year of EU/EAC negotiations (non-recent history). Leader of the National Chamber of Commerce warmly welcomed that different positions of the EAC members were finally reconciled (verbal reaction) as signing the EPA is likely to boost mutual trade and benefit Kenyan producers and traders (expectation). Article concludes that the recent summit is a long-awaited breakthrough to the EPA negotiations and whole EU/EAC partnership (evaluation). However, this is an ideal example where all the categories are present. In reality, only headline and main events must be present in news discourse, while the remaining categories are used deliberately (van Dijk 1988: 56).

Last category in this part of the protocol is topic. Topic is a subjective perception of a reader "what is it all about". When analysing news articles, a researcher is not an abstract reader searching for the only true interpretation. Contrarily, he is a concrete reader with his own particular reading of the text (Hájek 2014: 181). Thus, different readers may identify different topics. However, when using news articles as a data

source, this is less likely.¹⁶ Articles are often composed of more topics than one, but these are rarely independent one on each other. Topics are usually realized top-down, but they are delivered in parts and cyclically (van Dijk 1988: 48, 59). Topics act on a higher level of abstraction. For example, topic is neither a concrete trade deal signed during a state visit of one President to another country (this is main event) nor the state visit itself (this is actual context); topic is trade relations between the two countries.

Third part of the protocol focuses on information about microstructures. We analyse connotations (who is agent and who is subject, whether agents of processes are explicit or absent in the text, use of active or passive voice, use of positive or negative mode, use of promises/request/threats etc.), wording (which words are used to describe agents or processes, see for example difference between describing an armed rebellion as terrorists x guerrilla x freedom fighters; particularly representing verbs are of great significance), and use of semantic operations (such as comparison, metaphor, parallel, irony, understatement etc.). In other words, what is important is not only what actors say, but also how they say it (Sikkink 2012: 26). We also analyse quotes (who is quoted or which documents are cited) and exactness (precise numbers, places, time). Quotes are very important feature of media discourse. However, distinction between report and opinion in the tabloid press has become less clear. Original voice and the news often merge to the extent that it is unclear whether something is represented discourse or not. External voices are sometimes identified and demarcated, sometimes translated into a newspaper's version of popular language. Most often, media discourse is combining public and private discourse types. The voices of power are expressed in a disguised and covert form (Fairclough 2010: 108-113). If direct quotations are used, it is often "to establish a distance between the newspaper and the person or opinion quoted" (van Dijk 1988: 136).

Fourth part of the protocol is important propositions, which means sentences that cannot be sorted into categories, but which are worth being quoted in length.

¹⁶ Empirical studies show that when readers are asked to recall what they have read in the newspaper, they usually recall something what they already know, not new information. Generally, knowledge updating from the news is quite modest. The most probable thing to be recalled is the title and the lead (usually first paragraph), that means what is signalled to be relevant by the journalists or editors (van Dijk 1988: 153 and 170). Thus, it is likely that different readers will identify relatively similar topics based on titles and lead paragraphs.

After having prepared the protocol, third step of the analysis is to define a sampling strategy. We can choose between three basic sampling strategies (defined by Foucault, quoted in Ditrych 2014: 24). First strategy is to adopt a sampling method as in statistics, which is probably the least usable in interpretive research based on news articles. As Ditrych asserts, to yield reliable results, sampling procedures “would have to be rather complex” (ibid.). Second strategy is to preselect in advance important and the most representative documents/texts and analyse them. This means that we choose a set of articles because we consider them relevant or representative for some reason, usually because they cover some important issue. Major reports about various issues occur in miniseries, often over a period of several days, which offers a possible way of sampling (Altheide 1996: 21). For example, we may focus on official state visit of Kenyan President to the US, to the EU, or to China, and on official state visit of leaders of partner countries to Kenya. Such events are likely to attract media for several days. It is also likely that important things happen during such state visits or summits (trade deals, cooperation agreements, memoranda of understanding etc.), which are subsequently analysed in the media. We wish to have the biggest possible range of voices and it is likely that the more important event, the more people to talk about it and write about it. Alternatively, we may choose some time period within the data corpus for the detailed analysis.

Both of these strategies are pre-reading strategies. Third sampling strategy is to treat the documentation exhaustively. Selecting one of these three sampling strategies is a crucial task for the researcher, because results of the textual analysis are to a certain degree dependent upon how the data corpus is selected (Hájek 2014: 149). My data corpus is relatively robust, but not unreachable to be analysed in its entirety. Thus, I have chosen the third sampling strategy.

First, I read articles, write protocols, and search for topics. Then I aggregate topics into frame topics, which act on an even higher level of abstraction. One issue may evolve in time into several distinct topics. However, it is still a single frame topic. Prolonged EPA negotiations went through several phases identified as the following topics: negotiation of the EPA (until 2014), possible consequences of not signing on time (before October 2014), direct economic impacts of failed deadline (October to December 2014), signing the EPA (October 2014), steps leading to renewal of duty-free quota-free access (November and December 2014), renewal of duty-free quota-free access (January 2015), ratification of the EPA (2015). These are separate topics, which

refer to the same issue – frame topic “Economic Partnership Agreement”. Or, different events may be identified as different topics, although having the same substance – for example, we may identify three different topics “tourism industry in Kenya during global economic crisis”, “changing trends of Chinese tourists”, and “marketing campaign of the Kenya Tourism Board”, which may be aggregated into one frame topic “tourism”. Or, one topic may be a subset of another topic. Both are slightly different, but can be aggregated into one frame topics. For example, “trade relations between China and Africa” and “trade relations between China and Kenya” are different topics, but the latter is a subset of the former. Both can be subsumed under a frame topic “trade”.

When I identify frame topics, I search for differences, particularly whether tone of articles varies across different newspaper sections and/or different categories of authors and/or different frame topics. In his/her analysis, the researcher should not focus on frequency or representativeness, but rather on conceptual adequacy. When using this strategy, sampling is not pre-selected, but is based on emerging understanding of the topic and of the available data (Altheide 1996: 33-36). Finally, findings are used to write a report/paper.

Chapter Five: Strategic Narratives of the Global Superpowers

When different states share common modes of economic thinking and common sets of preferences, it facilitates the development of common international institutional arrangement. Most often, states emulate other states and adopt their successful ideas and practical policies (Darden 2010: 41). Global liberalism in the second half of the 19th century stemmed from the leadership of Great Britain. When its power declined, liberalism was substituted by global protectionism in the first decades of the 20th century. In the post-war era, the US as a new global hegemon introduced once again liberal ideas of free trade into global agenda. “Embedded liberalism” represented a specific way of balancing between trade liberalism and domestic political stability of the US as the winner of the war, partly also of the EU as its closest ally (Kelly - Grant 2005: 2). It was a compromise aiming to liberalize trade in competitive industries (particularly manufactured goods) and to protect trade in less competitive industries (particularly agriculture and textile industry). However, the existence of dominant global norms and institutions does not mean that all states comply with it. In the second half of the 20th century, there were three multiple competing orders: liberal West, integralist East preferring central planning and social organization of labour, and nationalist Third World composed of developing countries (Darden 2010: 309-310).

After the Cold War, liberalism seemed to win this competition. It proved to be more effective than its rivals. Many states deliberately selected liberalism as the basis for their economic policy – in Latin American (Phillips 2005: 187) or in Central Europe. In other cases, for example in Africa, liberalism was adopted through imposition (indoctrination, forced conversion). In the early 1990s, liberalism has spread worldwide (Darden 2010: 41-42). Creation of the WTO in 1995 signalled a shift from embedded liberalism to pure liberalism (neoliberalism). Leading powers supported global trade agenda to be widened and deepened to cover trade with other commodities than manufactured goods (agriculture, textile, services) and new trade-related issues (intellectual property, investment). They also envisaged new organization as having legal powers, albeit limited, through binding dispute-settlement mechanism. Shortly, creation of the WTO signalled a move from trade concessions to discussions about general global trade rules (Wilkinson 2005: 20-21). But, again, not all states did comply with the dominant neoliberalism, as Darden (2010) illustrates on the post-Soviet example.

Current global financial crisis has caused a crisis of legitimacy of neoliberal globalization (Abdelal - Meunier 2010: 350). Obviously, this is not the only possible idea of globalization: there is a competition of different blueprints for globalization (Jacoby - Meunier 2010: 311). Market economy is rather a conceptual articulation, but its implementation occurs at the local level. Despite globalizing tendencies, the local still matters. Markets are not homogeneous and spontaneous, but made by social actors in specific contexts. Supranational markets emerging as a result of a regional integration scheme are a typical example of such created market. Pursuing of free trade is a social endeavour depending on ideas. Number of different outcomes is possible and it depends on whose view wins (Duina 2007: 3-4, 196, 200). Such battle of ideas originates within the economic profession. Economy is not based on rationality or consistency, but rather on uncertainty with unknown outcomes. Thus, economics is not a science, rather a philosophy based on beliefs about what policy works best (Wein - Atkinson 2015: 1, 6). In many parts of the world, such debate is not just academic, but also very practical one. Governments have usually preference for wealth and economic growth, but differ in their choice of means leading to this goal (Darden 2010: 11). What kind of economic system will work best and deliver the greatest benefits is for many countries a question of survival (Stiglitz 2010: 211). Africa is an inherent part of this competition, but a number of variables limit options for African leaders, constrain their behaviour, and guide them toward certain solutions (Duina 2007: 185). The key variable is marginalized position of Africa in the global economy and dependence on the Triade. This means that Africa is persuaded by the US, the EU, and China to accept and adopt their respective models as a way out of misery.

Gilpin (2001, chapter 7) recognizes three national models of political economy: the US model, the German model (which I treat here as the European model), and the Japanese model (which I treat here as the Asian¹⁷ model and use China as an example, due to its extensive relations with Africa, compared to Japan). These models differ in three fundamental questions: what is the purpose of economic activity, what should be the role of the state in the economy, and what are the mechanisms of corporate governance and private business practices. Thus, these models are sets of ideas and theories about well-functioning economy (Sikkink 2012: 1). As economic policy may

¹⁷ As mentioned, these different models are represented by the constituent parts of the so-called Triade: the US, the EU, and Pacific Asia. Thus, it is more precise to speak about Pacific Asian or East Asian model rather than about general Asian model.

change over time, I will treat these models rather as ideal-types and real economic policies as more or less approaching them. In this chapter I will describe these three ideal-typical models and briefly analyse trade policies of the US, the EU and China. Finally, I will briefly analyse also regional integration in East Africa as either part, or an antithesis to these three models (this question will be however left open to be answered in the concluding chapter).

Neoliberal model

First, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term “neoliberalism”. Originally, neoliberalism emerged in the 1930s as an antithesis to classical *laissez-faire* liberalism of the 19th century and to collectivist solutions, both socialist and later Keynesian. Its aim was to “reform and refocus the state so as to actively foster and bolster the market” (Wacquant 2012: 71-72). Market was no longer seen as a natural order and its functioning was supposed to require a strong state (Hilgers 2012: 81). However, during the second half of the 20th century, the dominant neoliberal US model has become strongly opposed to any significant role of the state in economy. The fear of collectivism and socialism, as represented by the expanding role of the state under New Deal, was further exacerbated by the Cold War and the position of the US as the main opponent of communism. Thus, neoliberalism has approached the original liberal ideology and adopted “the-market-can-do-no-wrong” ideology (Schnyder - Siems 2013: 258-259) as represented particularly by the Chicago School and its neoclassical version of classical economic thought. It also reflects cultural factors such as radical individualism, which was further promoted by the ideological conflict embedded in the Cold War (Palley 2004).

In 1970s, this neoclassical liberalism became the dominant economic paradigm because it promised to solve the “problems of capitalism [represented by the Fordist variant of social liberalism] as a global system of accumulation (...) in ways that were congenial to the wielders of capital” (Kalb 2012: 326). However, neoliberalism is a utopia (Hilgers 2012: 90). Political elites worldwide have largely adopted existing neoliberal ideas, which led to some level of neoliberal convergence and “common-sense”. However, they have selectively appropriated these neoliberal ideas and mixed them with other ideas and agendas based on their everyday political experience. Institutional environment and social relations of the respective state and local political agency determined whether this mix was more ideological or more pragmatic. As a result, there is a significant discrepancy between neoliberal theory and the practice of

“actually existing neoliberalism” (Cahill 2015: 28, 55-56, 119). In reality, “there is not one big-N Neoliberalism but an indefinite number of small-n neoliberalisms born of the ongoing hybridisation of neoliberal practices and ideas with local conditions and forms” (Wacquant 2012: 70). Thus, we can define neoliberalism as “a political project that is justified on philosophical grounds and seeks to extend competitive market forces, consolidate a market-friendly constitution and promote individual freedom” (Jessop 2013: 70).

Despite heterogeneous practice, we can distil the above mentioned “philosophical grounds” of the current neoclassical neoliberalism. Its core postulates are (compiled from Gilpin 2001, Palley 2004, Stiglitz 2008, Wein - Atkinson 2015 and Jacques 2016):

- individuals as market participants are identical and they act rationally to maximize their own self-interest, which finally benefits all and fulfils the public interest,
- there are symmetrical information for all market participants,
- welfare of citizens is superior to the state,
- markets are perfect and market competition is efficient as labour and capital get paid what they are worth through the supply and demand process,
- as a result, all factors are fully employed,
- economic growth is driven by the supply of capital,
- goods and services are consumed on the basis of the prices consumers are willing to pay and produced on the basis of equality between marginal cost and price,
- prices are set on the market and tend to an equilibrium approaching allocative efficiency,
- if markets make mistakes, they quickly correct them,
- government should not distort prices by incentives, subsidies, regulations, or other interventions,
- the only role for the state is to reduce barriers to economy, ensure property rights and enforce contracts, increase money supply (monetarism), invest into infrastructure, and guarantee transparency and good governance in financial matters,
- these postulates holds both for national economies and global economy – thus, both national and global markets in goods, services, and capital should be free,

- model is based on view that economics is about efficiency and growth measured by increase in GDP, while redistribution is political issue,
- this model suits all states well regardless their actual economic situation (“one-size-fits-all” policy).

Neoliberal economic policy thus promotes deregulation of financial markets, privatization, weakening of institutions of social protection, weakening of labour unions and labour market protections, shrinking of government, macroeconomic austerity, cutting of top tax rates, opening of international goods and capital markets, and abandonment of full employment goals. It also stresses strong regulatory framework. Thus, neoliberal society can be described as market-mediated relationship relying on legal enforcement (Stiglitz 2010: 293). Neoliberal trade policy also promotes trade liberalization. Trade should be free because it improves allocative efficiency and consumer welfare. Put simply, “neoliberalism is a political economic philosophy that highlights the use of public policy to enhance private sector - particularly privatization, fiscal austerity, and free trade” (Bassett 2016).

The US is the most representative example of a neoliberal state, although it was not the first to start neoliberal reforms (see Chile in the mid-1970s), nor did it implement the most radical neoliberal reforms (see austerity measures and structural reforms in many African states in the 1980s under the so-called structural adjustment programmes, or radical neoliberalism in Russia in the early 1990s). The US case is not paradigmatic, but it is dominant thanks “to the weight of the US economy (...) in the world market and to the US state’s role in helping to displace and defer the contradictions of neoliberalism onto other spaces and times” (Jessop 2013: 72). As a comparative study of six Anglo-Saxon economies reveals, policy ideas adopted in the US (and the UK) were very influential in other liberal market economies (Butzbach et al. 2013: 238).

In 2001, Walter Russell Mead identified four traditions of US foreign policy represented by four US Presidents (Nye 2004: 139-140, Mead 2010). These traditions are divided in their focus on domestic or foreign policy and in their stress on interests or ideas. The resulting matrix (Millman 2007) is extroverted realism (Hamilton), introverted realism (Jackson), introverted idealism (Jefferson), and extroverted idealism (Wilson). Their position with relation to global economic relations is as follows. Hamiltonians are realists supporting free trade, investment, and integrated rule-based global economy, which simultaneously ensures profits of US commerce, strengthens US global position,

and brings overall benefit and development. Jacksonians are populists stressing self-reliance, economic well-being, freedom, security, and military power. One of their main goals is to defend the living standards of US citizens, including retaining jobs. Their preferred trade policy is to seek trade privileges for US goods abroad and to avoid offering such privileges to others' exports. Jeffersonians are isolationists focusing on building and improving domestic system as a model of democracy for other countries and minimizing foreign commitments. They do not discard trade as such, but they are wary of long-term commitments and they do not favour boosting global commerce. Instead, they stress domestic support of the key economic groups. Wilsonians are idealists stressing self-determination, collective security, democracy, and human rights. They strive for removal of all economic barriers, establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations, and creation of global free and fair trade.

The US foreign policy, trade policy included, is shaped by the competition of these four traditions. Changes in US foreign and trade policy are summarized in the following chart.

Period	Presidency	HAMI	JACK	JEFF	WILS
[1865 – 1945]		x ¹⁸		x	
[1945 – 1950s]		x			x
[1950s – 1970s]		x	x		
[1970s]			x		
[1977 – 1981]	Jimmy Carter			x	x
[1981 – 1989]	Ronald Reagan	x	x		x
[1989 – 1993]	George Bush	x			
[1993 – 2001]	Bill Clinton	x			x
[2001 – 2009]	George W. Bush		x		x
[2009 – 2017]	Barack Obama		x	x	x
[2017 –]	Donald Trump		x		

Figure 2: Changes in US foreign and economic policy according to four traditions (based on Card - Daschle 2011, Chorev 2007, Goldstein 1993, Hufbauer - Suominen 2012, Jacques 2016, Laagland 2008, Millman 2007, O'Grady 2012, Ottens 2015, Porter 2005, Sbragia 2010, Stephens 2016, Wein - Atkinson 2015)

US trade policy in the post-war period has relied heavily on Hamiltonian and Jacksonian principles. The former gained momentum between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, while the latter seems to have prevailed in the last decade and will be undoubtedly even more so under Donald Trump. Successive US administrations are more wary of

¹⁸ In this period, Hamiltonians supported mercantilist (nationalist) trade policy to protect the domestic market and secure America's role in the world economy. However, their final vision was a free market system (Laagland 2008: 10), which they started to introduce in 1934 (see Goldstein 1993) and finally adopted after World War II.

potential threats that free trade poses to US middle-class and blue collars. While lowering tariffs (as the GATT did) may bring overall benefit, changing regulatory standards and norms (as the WTO attempts) may create more losers than winners (Stephens 2016). As a result, several laws have been passed to protect interests of US companies and its workers.¹⁹This shift from the Hamiltonian to the Jacksonian trade policy means also partial departure from the neoliberal model.

As some argue, the global economic crisis, which started in 2008, eroded faith in “market fundamentalism” and unfettered markets. “Today only the deluded (...) would argue that markets are self-correcting and that society can rely on the self-interested behavior of market participants to ensure that everything works honestly and properly” (Stiglitz 2010: 219). However, ideas of neoclassical neoliberalism are still alive. John Allison, former CEO of one of US top banks, asserts that general opinion that financial crisis was caused by financial deregulation is a myth. Financial sector has not been deregulated, but rather mis-regulated. Free markets are a collective learning process and they produce the best outcomes possible given people’s means of knowledge; any government regulation necessarily hinders this process. Thus, current recession is nothing more than a corrective response of the market to government’s focus on consumption in the residential sector and the unprecedented rise of government budget deficits. According to him, the US has a different sense of life and its founding principles are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and each individual’s moral right to his own life and to the product of his labour (Allison 2013: 133, 157-158, 160, 219, 231).

Moreover, the US model still heavily influences US economic policy and the US still favours liberalization, free trade, and related policies. Most of the policies of the Washington Consensus²⁰ are still in place, although modified. One reason may be that the neoliberal political economy has led to the most remarkable period of growth in history. Some estimates suggest 125 % growth in the global economy from 1990 to

¹⁹ For example Trade Reform, Accountability, Development, and Employment (TRADE) Act of 2008 or Increasing American Jobs through Greater Exports to Africa Act of 2012.

²⁰ Washington Consensus was initially formulated in 1989 as a policy to help restructure Latin American economies through the disciplined macroeconomic policies, the use of markets, and trade liberalization. However, the term started to be equated with neoliberalism or market fundamentalism, which stresses supply-side economics, monetarism, and minimal government. This is far from its initial meaning as it was never meant to prioritize markets at the expense of governments (Williamson 2008: 30).

2010. As Kaplan (2012) states, the US still pursues post-WWII policy of trade idealism, although it seems to be the only country in the world to do so. Global economy has changed, while US policy did not. As a result, US trade policy serves a few rich companies, but not people. In the last decade, US governments seem to have realized it, which caused shift to Jacksonian principles. Despite shift away from pure neoliberalism in the last decade, it is Donald Trump whose victory may probably result in the end of neoliberalism. His message is openly anti-neoliberal and illiberal, announcing introduction of specific taxes for US companies moving capital overseas, renegotiation of existing trade deals including NAFTA, stop on negotiations of new TPP and TTIP deals, or imposition of duties on imports from low-wage countries such as China (Bassett 2016).

Welfare (social market) model

Neoliberal model and financial deregulation as part of it are blamed to cause the global financial crisis. Originally, neoliberalism was “a reaction to failures of the state in attempting to correct failures of the market. But the pendulum swung too far in the other direction and for too long” (Stiglitz 2008: 46). According to critics, “in the last twenty-five years, America lost that balance [between markets and governments], and it pushed its unbalanced perspectives on countries around the world” (Stiglitz 2010: xii). After the crisis, the US capitalism has lost a great deal of support. In most of the world, there is a consensus that government should play a larger role than neoliberalism assumes (Stiglitz 2010: 218). Reason why neoliberalism has failed is that its core postulates are theoretical, but far from reality. Markets do not produce efficient outcomes when information is imperfect, when markets are incomplete or when technology is changing. This is true particularly in early stages of development when there are important externalities (Stiglitz 2008: 42). Global benefits of globalization exceed national benefits. Neoliberal model is not suitable for developed countries, not speaking about developing countries. What is needed is to find a balanced role of the state, to strengthen both market and public institutions, and to focus on social and environmental sustainability (Stiglitz 2008: 54). Welfare model, called also social-market or post-Keynesian (Palley 2004) model, formerly derided as sclerotic European social model (Stiglitz 2010: xx-xxii), is one alternative to the dominant neoliberalism.

This model acknowledges that markets are not perfect and self-corrective and that there is fundamental information asymmetry among different market participants. As a

result, there are persistent differences between private and social returns (Stiglitz 2010: 243). Welfare model rejects the idea that labour is paid what it is worth. Reality is opposite: general tendency of markets is to favour capital over labour. If market is to produce results corresponding to its theoretical potential, a strong role for the state is required. Thus, ideal economic policy as prescribed by the welfare model differs substantially from the neoliberal one. While neoliberalism stresses economic growth, welfare model combines growth policies with high living standards, good working conditions, transparency, and social and environmental progress and sustainability. While neoliberalism prioritizes big businesses and lets them freely operate to bring benefits to whole society, welfare model prioritizes consumers, workers, and small enterprises. Welfare model stresses social cohesion and governments are expected to directly intervene into economy to help achieve it.

Gilpin calls this model “German” model. Intellectual basis of the German post-war social market economic system is the so-called ordoliberalism, theory developed between 1930 and 1950 by economists and legal scholars from the Freiburg School. It was practically realized under Christian Democratic governments after the WWII until mid-1960s. Originally, ordoliberalism was a neoliberal doctrine until the neoclassical shift of the latter in the 1950s. Since then, “[w]hile there are many overlaps with other forms of neoliberalism, two distinctive features of ordoliberalism can be identified: a prominent and positive role for the state in upholding the liberal economic order and the importance of the “social question” due to the need to embed economic activity in a sound society” (Schnyder – Siems 2013: 251). Put shortly, private interests usually undermine competition, which means that the functioning market requires strong government. Difference between the German and US versions of neoliberalism reflects the different position of both states in the post-war global order. While the former needed to rebuild a strong and functioning state after the war, the latter emerged as the main opponent of communism (Schnyder – Siems 2013: 258).

Contrary to the US, success of modern Germany stems from main-street-entrepreneurship deeply embedded in local communities and supported by a dense network of national and local institutions. Deep ties between enterprises, employees, and communities are safeguards for stability, long-term orientation of businesses, and their strong economic performance. Moreover, Germany has defied the inevitability of the trade-off between economic growth and traditions and has been able to leverage its strongly rooted traditions to generate competitiveness in the globalized economy.

While neoliberal model is part of globalization processes, social market model shows that economic resilience in the era of globalization is possible. It does not leave decisions and outcomes entirely up to the market, but aims to ensure that the respective state or region is able to compete in global markets, achieve a strong economic performance and generate prosperity for people (Audretsch - Lehmann 2016: 135, 166, 168).

Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands have adopted their own welfare state model based on social-democratic principles, while welfare state model in United Kingdom and Ireland is based on liberal reforms starting in the early 20th century. Despite some differences, all welfare models share the basic features listed below:

- bureaucratic capability and responsibility,
- strong regulatory and supervising mechanisms,
- commitment to full employment and strong institutionalized labour protections and regulations (minimum wage laws, labour unions, employee rights...),
- social protection through welfare programs (unemployment insurance, retirement pensions...),
- universal health care and free education,
- strong competition law to prevent creation of monopolies and oligopolies,
- wealth redistribution towards society as a whole,
- inclusive democracy,
- global trade should be free, but rule-based and socially and environmentally responsible,
- dialogue instead of the strong imposing their will on the weak.

Moreover, the European Union since its beginnings has been influenced by the German ordoliberalism (Schnyder – Siems 2013: 255), adhered to the welfare model, and committed itself to promoting the social dimension of globalization (Kerremans - Orbie 2009: 630). The reason is quite obvious: in many European countries, globalization is perceived more as a threat to existing social welfare than as an opportunity. In countries with strong anti-globalization views such as France and Germany, the prevailing discourse is that the political foundation of the EU is an economy based on social and ecological responsibility. Thus, European integration is seen as a means of preserving this social model from the globalizing neo-liberal imperatives (Hay - Rosamond 2002: 157). These anti-globalists are often the most ardent critics of

European integration, which is said to have facilitated the penetration of globalization by opening up European economies instead of resisting it (Jacoby - Meunier 2010: 299, 311). "Social market economy" is explicitly stated as a foundation of the EU in Article 3/3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, as modified by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007). Moreover, the EU wishes not only to strengthen social market economy at home, it also wishes to diffuse it worldwide. If Europe has managed the world's most impressive variant of regionalism, why it would not attempt to also manage globalization as well? (Jacoby - Meunier 2010: 304). This position is called "Normative Power Europe". According to Manners (2001: 7- 11), the post-Cold War environment has changed so much that it is no longer enough for the EU to present itself only in terms of successful management of economic issues. The EU is not an intergovernmental civilian power utilising economic tools and diplomacy. The EU must go beyond this. On the other side, the EU is (still) not a supranational military power using armed force and intervention. Thus, the EU is an ideational normative power characterised by common principles and predisposed to act in a normative way in international relations. TEU in its Preamble speaks about European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world. Thus, the EU as a specific kind of polity per se is based on several norms, which are not simply declaratory, but which "represent crucial constitutive features" (Manners 2001: 11).

In the Preamble and in the Title I: Common Provisions of the TEU, Manners (2001: 10-11) identifies five core norms and four minor norms. The former are peace; liberty; democracy; the rule of law; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The latter are social progress; the fight against social exclusion and discrimination; the sustainable development; and good governance. I would add also economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among Member States as the fifth minor norm. These norms form the social dimension of globalization and the basis of the social market model.

The EU has also strong interest in disseminating its regulatory framework and creating/shaping international norms. The best way to achieve this goal is to negotiate trade agreements with other world regions (inter-regionalism), to stimulate partner regions to adopt EU-like laws, and to help them financially to achieve this harmonization of laws (Duina 2007: 192-193). Inter-regionalism functions both externally and internally. With relation to general foreign policy, it serves as a substitute for non-existing common foreign and security policy as it is the most

important source of EU's international influence. With relation to trade policy, it serves as a balancing behaviour against the US/China and as a means to assure EU's economic security. Internally, it serves to strengthen EU identity and EU institutions. Inter-regionalism is externalization of EU's institutional form to other regions (Aggarwal - Fogarty 2004: 12-16).

Dissemination of EU social market model is done through the concept of "managed globalization". This term was for the first time used by then European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, but the concept itself dates back to the 1980s/1990s. It originates within the French socialist party and globalization dilemma of its leaders. On one side, they acknowledged that market capitalism, although far from perfect, was the only working economic system. On the other side, they still believed that a centralized bureaucracy was responsible to manage the economy. Managed globalization was a reconciliation of these two principles: liberalization and organization must proceed simultaneously. This idea subsequently became a consensus of the French socialism, UK's liberalism, Germany's ordo-liberalism, continental statism, and the realities of the late twentieth-century markets. European Union itself is a product of this idea (Abdelal - Meunier 2010: 355). Managed globalization is a middle way between laissez-faire ad hoc deregulation and protectionism. It is an "attempt by public or private actors to ensure that the liberalization of rules about international flows of goods and services, capital, and labor goes hand in hand with formal practices to bind market players and their governments" (Jacoby - Meunier 2010: 300). Managed globalization is surely rhetoric towards worried European citizens and voters, but it has also its substance in concrete EU policies. Jacoby and Meunier (2010: 305-311) identify five mechanisms, which the EU uses to manage globalization:

- expanding policy scope to cope with the effects of globalization,
- exercising regulatory influence,
- empowering international institutions,
- enlarging the territorial sphere of EU influence through membership or regional trade agreements,
- redistributing the costs of globalization, for example through non-reciprocal preferential market access for least developed countries or Aid for Trade initiative.

Managed globalization became the guiding doctrine of EU trade policy. EU wished to build strong institutions with strong rules that would cover a wide range of issues and would apply to as much countries as possible. In the 1990s, the EU was one of the biggest proponents of the new World Trade Organization. It even imposed on itself a moratorium to negotiate bilateral trade agreements until new round of multilateral negotiations is concluded. However, this strategy proved to be counterproductive: the US and Japan started to follow aggressive bilateral trade policy (competitive liberalization²¹); China as a new member of the WTO started to pursue its interests more assertively; and emerging markets such as Brazil, India or South Africa were able to coalesce against the Western dominance in the global economy. Success of the EU in its efforts has been limited. While relation to trade, the EU was not successful in pushing ahead new WTO+ issues. With relation to capital flows, attempts to introduce binding rules completely failed and the US vision of ad hoc globalization remains the guiding principle. Moreover, relative market power of the EU has been declining (Woolcock 2010: 4). In 2006, the EU had to reassess its strategy, which meant to leave its adherence to multilateralism and to follow more aggressive bilateralism (“Global Europe” strategy in 2006 and “Trade, Growth and World Affairs Strategy” in 2010). Although Global Europe reaffirmed European commitment to the WTO, it argued for further and faster promotion of openness and integration through bilateral free trade agreements (Heron - Siles-Brügge 2012: 251). Increasingly, “EU trade policy has been relatively consistent in its pursuit of progressive trade liberalisation on the basis of reciprocal trade concessions” (Woolcock 2010: 15).

Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2013) sees this strategy as an important shift in EU trade policy. European Commission started to pursue more aggressively interests of exporters, even at the expense of import-competing interests. In other words, the Commission “purposefully chose to trade away the EU’s “pocket of protection” for market access” (Siles-Brügge 2013: 599). The reason is that the Commission has at least partly internalized a neoliberal discourse and sees the marketization, increased competitiveness, and integration of the EU into the world economy through enlarged market access as the desirable outcome. Transnational capitalist elite, which is increasingly influential in Brussels, seeks deregulation, downsizing the public sector, labour market flexibility, fight against distorted competition and protectionism. Social

²¹ Shortly, all economic superpowers seek to get a maximum of trade preferences, especially those that also the other superpowers may be able to negotiate for themselves.

and environmental regulations may be attacked as barriers to trade and national welfare policies are stripped down (Tiedemann - Dörr 2014: 4, 8, 12). Although some industries may be affected, overall impact of liberalization is seen as being positive on economic growth, consumer benefits, and labour effects. Globalization and trade liberalization are seen as positive-sum game having no real alternative (Siles-Brügge 2013: 604, 609).

This may signal a shift from social market model towards neoliberal model. However, it seems that it is rather DG TRADE that shares and pursues this neoliberal policy, not the Commission as a whole, not speaking about member countries. Global financial crisis has shown the limits of neoliberal model and probably has strengthened the stress on social market model. For example, Commissioner for Competition Joaquim Almunia (2011) has stated that fair and open society must rest on solid values, on broader intellectual foundations, and on the combined efforts of market forces and political action, because “the private optimum and social optimum usually diverge”. Free market is not an end in itself. “The market is a means to ensure our economic wellbeing; but our freedoms, our democracies and our model of society should be based on values and principles that go well beyond the supply and demand of goods and services.” Similarly, strategy Europe 2020 defines desirable European growth as smart, sustainable, and inclusive.

This is also confirmed by the institutional developments on the European level. The Treaty of Lisbon has extended exclusive EU competence to cover more trade, trade-related issues, services, investment, intellectual property etc. On one side, it means strengthening the technocratic, de-politicized conduct of trade policy. However, it is uncertain whether DG TRADE will be able to push through new free trade agreements if they imply politically contentious trade-offs (Siles-Brügge 2013: 611). The Treaty of Lisbon also enhanced the role of the European Parliament in shaping the legislative framework for trade. It is a confirmation of the trend that domestic “principals” seek to increase their control over trade negotiations and to reduce the independent role of the European “agent”. Member states want to have a bigger say in trade negotiations to protect interest of their citizens. Thus, the Treaty of Lisbon may eventually reduce efficiency of EU trade policy and limit the role of the EU as an actor in global economic relations (Woolcock 2010: 5, 15). In 2016, this dilemma became a reality. Although it is exclusive EU competence, the Commission has decided to cede power in ratification of EU-Canada free trade agreement with national parliaments. This is final confirmation

that the EU trade policy has re-politicized (Aggarwal - Fogerty 2004: 12). There is a big opposition to new free trade agreements among different interest groups. As a result, there is a growing pressure from member states to involve citizens in designing trade policies. One of the main criticisms is that agreements with Canada and the US will harm European workers and consumers. Therefore, we can see this as a confirmation of EU's commitment to social market model and against pure neoliberalism. This stance has been clearly expressed also in the *Reflection Paper On Harnessing Globalisation* (European Commission 2017 21):

Globalisation and the associated technological change will transform our lives at an unprecedented speed. (...) The question now is whether Europe can find a common understanding on the way forward to effectively manage this transformation. (...) Rather than sitting back and letting globalisation shape our destinies, we have the opportunity to shape globalisation in line with our own values and interests. The evidence presented here clearly shows that globalisation can be beneficial where properly harnessed. (...) Harnessing globalisation therefore starts at home. Europe must act to more fairly share the benefits of globalisation in line with our principles of solidarity and sustainability.

Nevertheless, current social market model is more liberal than it was until the mid-1980s, when the EU was willing to support its "national champions" in the global markets.

However, social market model creates a dilemma. The EU has to choose between two competing interests: to defend its own economic interests, or to create binding net of global rules, which may time to time be in contradiction with its interest? As the example of EU trade policy in last decade shows, the EU has not clearly prioritized one set of interests over the other (for this discussion, see Abdelal - Meunier 2010: 356-358, 363). This is a reason why the European Commission has (temporarily?) pushed for a trade policy which probably corresponds more to neoliberal than to social market model.

With relation to Africa, there are three basic underlying differences between the two models. First, the US still focuses primarily on markets. Although neoliberalism "failed the test of the real world, bequeathing the worst economic disaster for seven decades, politically and intellectually it remained the only show in town" (Jacques 2016). Contrarily, the EU seeks to bind globalizing forces by rules set by the states, or in other words, to put markets and governments into a balance.

Second, in the case of the US, economic and political issues seem to be unrelated. While issues of good governance and human rights may be important in designing development aid initiatives, it rarely matters in trade and investment negotiations. In

the case of the EU, economic and political issues seem to be more interlinked (see below).

Third, the US motivation has always been rather selfish. Its economic policy is based “less on principles than on its own self-interest – or more accurately, the desires and aversions of the special interest groups that have played, and will continue to play, such a key role in shaping economic policy” (Stiglitz 2010: 236). US trade policy has consistently involved an aggressive use of political measures to promote US economic interests. It does not reflect the ideology of liberalization. Even in the Hamiltonian period, it reflected primarily the interests of US business (Porter 2005: 204-205, 216). It is even so after the Jacksonian shift. US trade policy is generally liberal, but with the aim to benefit from positive effects of globalization and to avoid negative effects of globalization (Kelly 2005a: 84). Contrarily, discourses on managing or even harnessing globalization, on sustainable development, and on multilateral governance support the vision that the EU is oriented towards “milieu goals”, not towards “possession goals” – thus, focusing on providing global public goods instead of pursuing own selfish interests. Democracy, civil society, and human rights are universal elements of EU’s inter-regionalism (Aggarwal - Fogarty 2004: 224).

Moreover, the EU is expected to promote these global norms by many developing countries and NGOs (Orbie 2004: 17). The EU disposes both positive and negative hard power tools, but prefers using carrots such as development aid, market access, or even membership over sticks in the form of sanctions or denial of the carrots (Orbie 2004: 13). Obviously, the Normative Power Europe model is not a pacifist utopianism (Orbie 2004: 10). The EU is not an altruist actor of international relations. It has its interests. It attempts to achieve its own goals. It attempts to multilateralize its own internal norms as global norms, because it “strongly believes that its own successful model should serve as a role model for regional development” in other regions (Lorenz 2011: 148). However, in doing so, it also wishes to help other regions to benefit from globalization. This perception of the EU as a promoter of global norms as opposed to the US unilateralism may represent a crucial difference in reception of both models in the third countries.

Trade relations with Africa may illustrate this claim. There is clear difference between “trade” agreements such as with Korea, Canada or the US and “trade and development” agreements with peripheral countries such as ACP group (Heron - Siles-Brügge 2012: 258). Cotonou Agreement as the main framework for relations between

the EU and the ACP countries is metaphorically described as “a house built on three pillars - development cooperation, trade and the political dimensions of ACP-EC cooperation - which are closely interrelated. Remove any one of these pillars and the stability of the whole house is likely to suffer” (ACP Secretariat 2013). Economic Partnership Agreements, although focusing on reciprocal liberalization of trade, are above all an instrument for development. As the European Commission stated, EPA is a combination of rational interest-based trade agreements with a normative developmental component based on regional integration, increased trade and investment capacity of developing countries, their greater integration into the world economy, sustainable development, and eradication of poverty (Lorenz 2011: 143). Contrarily, the US AGOA regime is often criticised on the grounds that only a handful of countries have made strong use of the preference program and have increased employment in economic sectors that benefited from duty-free treatment under AGOA. In fact, more than two thirds of US imports were represented by crude oil and approximately half of the rest came from South Africa. AGOA countries have not been able to translate short-term preference benefits into transformative changes in their manufacturing capabilities and overall competitiveness. This is partly caused by negligible sum directed to technical assistance and building trading capacities. For the US, the strategic aspects of AGOA may have been more important than trade and development issues (Williams 2015: 9, 12, 13). New initiatives in last few years aim to foster business ties between the US and Africa. This shift is not meant to eclipse the ongoing need to support efforts in poverty alleviation, governance, transparency, and citizen participation (Cooke - Downie 2014: 16). However, we can hardly expect that these two lines of US engagement in Africa will be interconnected. Rather, they will run in parallel.

Developmental model

Gilpin calls the third model as Japan model. Japan was a war-torn economy, which needed to be re-built, partly with US economic assistance. Powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) followed economic policy aimed to quickly renew the destroyed industrial capacity. Import of technology was encouraged, which enabled renewal of industry, rapid growth, and improvements in industrial production. Japanese government stimulated private sector growth by different measures: protectionism towards imports other than technologies, good relations with conglomerates of manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, and banks (*keiretsu*), low-cost

capital provided by the Japan Development Bank, massive investment in infrastructure etc. In the 1960s, domestic industry was so strong that the government could push trade liberalization and trade expansion. In 1965, Japanese government reacted to big trade surpluses by relaxing controls on capital outflow, which started an era of active Japan's foreign economic policy (Moss – Ravenhill 1985: 41). Since the early 1970s, Japan was increasingly looking beyond its borders and tried to increase its trade activities worldwide due to lack of resources, large population, scarce land, and raised productivity stemming from its previous shift from labour-intensive industrial production to production based on technology. Japan lowered its barriers to trade, exposed itself more to global economy and became more active in it, both in trade and development aid (Kelly 2005b: 337). Main goal was to support home industry by exporting manufactured goods and importing materials (Moss – Ravenhill 1985: 66). Success of Japan inspired other Asian countries to follow very similar paths based on rapid industrialization through large businesses strongly supported by the state. Korea is another successful example of this model with its corporate conglomerates called *chaebol*. As the first generation of Asian tigers has become globally competitive and has opened its economies, currently it is China that represents the developmental model the most.

There is one substantial difference between Japanese/Korean and Chinese models. In the case of Japan, MITI acted as a regulator and a tool of interventionist policy, but not in order to ensure full government's control over economy. State supported its biggest companies, but did not own them or control them (Bremmer 2014: 52). Japanese strategy was purely economic: to recover domestic industry and to make it globally competitive. When this goal was achieved in the mid-1970s, the role of MITI started to decrease. Contrarily, Chinese model is based on state property, state ownership, state investment, and direct control of whole industrial sectors. Key economic actors are state-owned or state-controlled companies (including banks), national champions, and state-owned sovereign wealth funds. China is a representative example of a new model called state capitalism. This is a system in which the state assumed the role of leading economic actor in order to rule the markets and to exploit market-generated benefits for political gains, particularly to increase state's power externally and to consolidate state's power internally. On the other side, efficiency and general welfare are not the highest virtues. In this respect, Japan represents a free-market model, where private sector is considered to be an engine of growth and government helps

private sector to achieve this growth. In state capitalist system, growth is driven by government, which seeks to strengthen its power (Bremmer 2014: 12, 38, 47, 142, 163).

- However, despite differences based on political and economic ideology, both approaches share basic features of this developmental model, particularly that state sets substantive social and economic goals and intervenes in the market, including using protectionist measures, to guide and nurture domestic industries to become globally competitive. Strong role of the state is deemed necessary because there is no simple formula leading to development and prosperity (Levine 2016: 318-319). It is always necessary to carefully assess the context of the given economy. Key features of this model are :markets are semi-free, state asserts a high degree of control over the economy²²,
- government actively intervene in the economy to promote particular substantive goals,
- government balances between domestic development and opening to the outside world,
- industrialization is a top-priority and requires active industrial policy,
- industrialization and growth are driven by foreign investment, government creates highly favourable environment to attract such investment, but determines which sectors and/or companies will benefit from investment,
- government controls strategic industries (directly or indirectly) and supports national champion firms,
- model aims to lower imports except for technologies,
- model is based on excessive supply to increase exports,
- government helps to increase exports by undervalued currency,
- model is based on high domestic savings - income from exports and positive trade balance are retained (for example in sovereign wealth funds) to create an additional source of investment for domestic firms to lower reliance on foreign investment,
- focus on technological sectors with high potential of spill-over to the rest of economy,

²² Market forces should be regulated by both the visible hand and the invisible hand, as the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao asserted in 2008 in an interview with CNN (cited in Bremmer 2014: 122).

- government is manipulating with prices and interest rates (usually it pushes commodity and energy prices down and keep interest rates low) to help new industries,
- it stresses self-determination and independence from outside pressure – every government should be free to choose and design its own way of development which is most suitable to local conditions,
- it prioritizes flexibility over rigid prescriptions,
- it rejects possibility of any universal blueprint for development ,
- it recognizes political and cultural difference as well as differences in regional and national practices within a common global framework,
- significant resources are channelled to primary education,
- commerce, trade and investment are used as a means to promote national interests, both domestically and internationally,
- this model (particularly in its Chinese version) rests on “growth at any cost” (Condon 2012: 6) strategy taking no regard to issues such as environment, social rights, corruption, or potential moral dilemmas.

This model seems to be increasingly attractive in Africa, because it confirmed its economic credibility during the global crisis (Bremmer 2014: 151). Neither rigidly state-directed economies under Soviet influence nor rigidly privatized economies under the influence of the US brought development to Africa. Moreover, globalization helped most in those countries that realized that government could play an important role in development and did not rely on market self-regulation to solve the problems (Stiglitz 2003: 385). Developmental state strategy seems to be innovative, pragmatic, and non-ideological alternative (Shaw 2016: 117). In political terms, this model fosters stability of local regimes, allows escaping from Western domination, and bolsters statehood, while using the power of the market as an engine for economic growth (Carmody 2013: 14). “No matter what the rhetoric, political leaders in Africa jealously guard their sovereignty and are unwilling to reduce the power and authority of the state” (Asante 2016: 132).

However, a border between free-market models (both in US and EU version) and state capitalism is not so sharp. There are many “hybrid” states, particularly emerging markets, showing some features of free-market model and some features of state-capitalist model. It is very likely that they will adhere more closely to one of these models in the near future, particularly when the gap between the two models widens

and competition gets tougher (Bremmer 2014: 173, 181). This makes analysis of perception of these models even more important.

In the 1950s, Chinese trade policy was extremely protective and oriented to the USSR. In the 1960s, political factors became less relevant and economic relations less ideological. However, trade policy was still a strategic means. “One of the major political objectives of the People's Republic of China has been to gain diplomatic recognition from as many countries as possible. Foreign trade has been used as one of the avenues to achieve this aim. It has been thought that once trade relations were established such contacts would gradually evolve into diplomatic relations” (Wang 1973: 185). In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping started economic reforms, which included opening up of China to trade and its greater integration into the world economy. This process culminated in 2001, when China accessed the World Trade Organization, which led to further opening of China’s economy and confirmation of the “go-out-policy”.²³

Chinese activities in Africa copy this general trend. In the first phase, China saw Africa only as a battlefield to counter the diplomatic influence of its main ideological rivals, the United States and later also the Soviet Union. China supported radical ultra-leftist nationalist movements, not only politically, but also economically. Despite still being relatively poor developing country, it started its aid programme for ideologically friendly Asian countries in the early 1950s and extended it to North Africa in the late 1950s and to sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1960s (Brautigam 2008: 199). In the second phase, economic policy was interlinked with the diplomatic offensive against Taiwan with the final aim to become the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. When successful in 1971, China rewarded its African allies with an increased budget for development aid, which was used to finance construction of public infrastructure. In the third phase, China started to seek economic opportunities in Africa. However, economic ties remained limited, because China sought particularly modern technologies attainable only from the West (Taylor 2004: 83). In the fourth phase, trade between China and Africa rose more than tenfold. Between 1960 and 1980, volume of mutual trade rose from 100 million to 1 billion. Between 1980 and 2000, it rose from 1 billion to 10 billion; then it rose to 55 billion in 2006 and to 120 billion in 2009 (Anshan 2008: 35, Iwata 2012: 25).

²³ Go-out policy was officially announced in 2003. However, in practice, it started a decade earlier.

Chinese engagement in Africa intensified in the late 1990s. Several unrelated processes occurred simultaneously and caused changes in African external relations (Kavalski 2009: 182-184, Jiang 2008: 54-61, Taylor 2004: 83-89):

- events at the Tiananmen Square in spring 1989 led to growing anti-Chinese sentiments in the West, which spurred renewed China's look to Africa to gain diplomatic support to prevent hostile votes in the UN,
- the end of the Cold War created a diplomatic and political vacuum in Africa to be filled by China: the Soviet Union and Russia delved into internal chaos, the US shifted its focus on the Middle East, and the EU found its main strategic interest in the Eastern Europe,
- the structural adjustment programmes and the Washington Consensus did not bring to Africa the desired development, which caused growing frustration and resistance among African leaders towards neoliberalism and offered space for alternatives,
- many African leaders resisted the "third wave of democratization" in Africa - for them, China was much more natural political partner than Western liberal democracies,
- in the 1980s, Chinese economy started to grow at an unprecedented rate, which created abundant manufacturing production to be sold abroad and financial resources to be invested abroad,
- African states started to open their economies towards foreign investment, so Asian newcomers did not have any initial disadvantage,
- China shifted from oil producer country to oil consumer country and required new sources of oil supplies (similarly with other resources),
- China had no political limits to enter controversial projects and was willing to invest in troubled areas, often left by Western companies (for example Sudan in the mid-1990s or Zimbabwe one decade later),
- entering Africa was for China of a great geopolitical importance to balance the international order, to confirm its position of the leader of the developing countries and simultaneously its superpower status, and to enhance its bargaining leverage with the US.

China contrasts its developmental model with the Western approach on three issues. First, while the Western approach is rejected as exploitative and beneficial for Western companies, Chinese approach is said to be a new type of strategic partnership based

on mutual benefit and win-win solutions, thus leading to real development. Second, while the West conditions economic cooperation on pro-market reforms, good governance and respect for human rights, China asserts that its engagement is unconditional and based on equality of partners and non-interference into partner state's domestic affairs ("business-as-usual" principle). Both China and Africa (particularly some leaders) refer to national sovereignty as one of key principles of the United Nations, thus advocating that statehood must be strengthened, while neo-liberalism is rather weakening it. Third, while the Western approach assumes that there is single successful way to development, China denies possibility of universal solutions. It advances a position of moral relativism regarding human rights and good governance issues (Taylor 2004: 89-92). Such principles were formulated in 1964 by then Chinese leader Zhou Enlai and confirmed in 2000, when China formalized its relations with Africa through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Forum is held every three years and during the summits and China usually offers Africa with a package of different economic stimuli (cancellation of debt, tariff relief, trade cooperation, development aid, preferential loans, investment into industrial development etc.).

Comparison of the three models

These three models are summarized in the following table. First three rows differentiate models according to its internal characteristics with relation to Gilpin's three basic questions. Fourth row simplifies these differences with relation to balance between states and markets. Fifth row shifts focus to foreign economic policies of the respective models, last two rows to different types of cooperation that the respective models prefer and to main motivation of the respective models.

	<i>neoliberal model</i>	<i>social market model</i>	<i>developmental model</i>
purpose of economic activity	benefit of consumers and maximization of wealth creation (national welfare through individual welfare)	industrial efficiency and national welfare are paired with public welfare, emphasis on national savings and investment	economy is subordinated to the social and political objectives of the society (self-sufficiency, internal social harmony...)
role of the state	state creates environment for free markets	state creates stable and favourable environment for private enterprises; state cooperates with capital and organized labour to achieve social and environmental sustainability	central role for the state in economic development; close ties between private sector and government; selection of number of powerful firms to be protected against competition
corporate governance	separation of industry and finance; fragmented business activity with dispersed control; shareholder model	integration of finance and industry; originally not rejecting the concentration of economic power (national champions), but actually promoting more competition; prominent role of medium-sized firms; stakeholder model	focus on market share rather than profit maximization; creation of conglomerates of manufacturers, suppliers, distributors and banks; in original Japan's version also social responsibility of companies
market/state balance	market > government	market < = > government	government > market
foreign economic policy	trade liberalization; deregulation; privatization; prudent macroeconomic policy; free capital markets; pro-market reforms (the rule of law, fight against corruption, enforcement of property rights, antitrust policy etc.)	trade liberalization and free markets; , but important role for political action of governments to remedy market failures (particularly related to social and environmental issues) and to stabilize the business cycle through fiscal and monetary policy; economic development is inseparable from democracy, good governance, respect for human rights etc.	state sovereignty is the highest value, government should be free to choose its own development path according to current level of economic development of the country - even though it is at the expense of liberalization
form of cooperation (with Africa)	not important (preferably trans-regionalism)	formerly: trans-regionalism currently: inter-regionalism	rhetoric: trans-regionalism reality: bilateralism
main interest	commerce	dissemination of norms	strengthening state sovereignty

Figure 3: Overview of the three ideal-typical models (Source: my compilation based on the previous text)

Regional integration

Table below summarizes trading data of Kenya. Data show that the US, the EU, and China are important trading partners of Kenya. However, these countries represent less than one third of Kenyan trade. To have a more complete picture, we have to focus also on regional market, which is the most important destination for Kenyan exports.

Partner	Exports	Share	Imports	Share	Total trade	Share
Total	5 536 953	100,00	16 394 469	100,00	21 931 422	100,00
USA	347 270	6,27	667 463	4,07	1 014 733	4,63
EU	1 214 662	21,94	2 395 902	14,61	3 610 564	16,46
China	48 737	0,88	2 117 409	12,92	2 166 146	9,88
EAC	1 285 408	23,22	334 534	2,04	1 619 942	7,39
India	109 756	1,98	2 998 426	18,29	3 108 182	14,17
others	2 531 120	45,71	7 880 735	48,07	10 411 855	47,47

Figure 4: Kenyan trade in 2013, in thousands of USD (Source: www.trademap.org)

Regional integration in East Africa dates back to the early 20th century.²⁴ Railway running from Mombasa through Nairobi to Kampala was operated jointly by the two colonies. Similarly, taxes and duties were collected jointly for the two territories since 1900. Shortly after, common currency was introduced for Kenya and Uganda. In 1919, the cooperation between the two colonies was formalized by establishing a Customs Union. Tanganyika, originally a German colony, which became a mandate territory of Great Britain after the World War I, joined in 1927. In the inter-war period, the three colonies shared common services, common currency, common collection of duties, common external tariff. Trade and the movement of production factors between them were free. In reality, three colonies established a common market, which was governed by the three Governors. During the 1930s, their meetings started to be organized regularly on an annual basis and were complemented by a permanent secretariat. After the World War II, cooperation was further formalized through the East African High Commission.

As Kenya was economically the most developed of the three colonies and as market regulation and harmonization of economic policies were absent, Kenya benefited from the formalized cooperation more than the other two colonies. In 1961, system of financing of the common services was changed. Until then, these were financed

²⁴ The following text is taken from my Master Thesis (Řehák 2009: 100-104), chapter 4.5. It was translated from Czech, slightly modified, and actualized.

directly by colonial administrations. Newly, these were financed through redistribution fund, which was based on collected taxes and duties. The same year, High Commission was replaced by the East African Common Services Organization, which was governed by a 41-member Central Legislative Assembly. This arrangement strengthened the role of the central level, although governments retained the right of veto and the EACSO had no direct executive power. It was rather a coordinative body for proper functioning of more than twenty organizations responsible for distinctive common services.

When the three colonies became independent in the early 1960s, they initially wished to retain the existing level of cooperation or even deepen it. However, negotiations on the establishment of the East African federation failed. Uganda feared it would lose its economic and political sovereignty and left the talks. Tanganyika was not willing to create only two-member federation with Kenya and had to resolve more immediate problems connected with establishment of its own “domestic” federation with Zanzibar. East African Community (EAC) was created in 1967 as an attempt to strengthen economic ties between the three members, but it was not successful. Despite favourable starting conditions, even economic cooperation ran into problems.

There were several reasons explaining the failure of the EAC. First, the three members had fundamentally different foreign policies. Kenya oriented itself towards the West. Tanzania concluded trade agreements with the Eastern bloc countries or Japan, later it shifted its focus on China. Uganda initially pursued also pro-Western courses, but under Idi Amin it focused primarily on the Arab and Soviet world. Second, there were political differences and personal rivalries between the three leaders. Disagreements escalated in 1971 after the coup of Idi Amin in Uganda. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere refused to recognize new Ugandan regime and refused to sit with Idi Amin at one table. This led to the total paralyze of the East African Authority as the highest body of the EAC composed of the three presidents.

Third, despite redistribution mechanisms, benefits from integration were distributed highly asymmetrically in favour of Kenya. Fourth, all three member states adopted national and regional economic policies, which were going against the spirit of integration. In the 1960s, Tanzania and Uganda were successful in lobbying for introduction of quotas in intra-regional trade to protect their infant industries. All members raised barriers to free flow of goods and productive factors. All members introduced their own national currencies. In the 1970s, Amin expelled Indian retailers

from Uganda, which led to a rise in inflation. Tanzania started to nationalize domestic companies. In response to both, Kenya ended the convertibility of Kenyan shilling to Ugandan and Tanzanian shillings. In 1977, the EAC finally crumbled when Tanzania closed the border with Kenya.

Non-binding talks on restoring broken cooperation began in 1984. In 1991, it was decided to revive the organization. In 1996, member states created Permanent Secretariat based in Arusha, Tanzania. In 1999, member states signed a treaty to re-establish the EAC, which came into force in July 2000. Currently, the EAC has six members after Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2009 and South Sudan in 2016.

Customs Union Protocol was signed in 2004 and came into force in January 2005. Due to its position of largest regional exporter, Kenya faced duties in other member countries on a declining scale until 2010. In 2010, member states signed Common Market Protocol with the aim to assure free move of goods, capital, labour, and services. However, despite substantial progress, there still remains a variety of non-tariff barriers. These barriers still hinder regional trade and proper functioning of common market. In 2013, member states signed Monetary Union Protocol with the aim to reintroduce common regional currency in ten years. In 2015, member states started a process to draft Constitution of the East African Federation – a proposed federation of six members into a single sovereign state with one set of political institutions.

What is important is that member states were able to go beyond elimination of tariffs to harmonization of different policies, which is a prerequisite for deeper integration (for example convertibility of currencies, common travel documents and tourist visas, single customs territory and harmonization of customs documentation, harmonized industry standards, banking rules or VAT rates, agreement on double taxation, convergence criteria or rules of origin, establishment of the East African Development Bank etc.). However, in some cases, not all member states participate in these harmonizing efforts. Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda seem to be willing to proceed in integration efforts rapidly, while Tanzania and Burundi seem to hesitate in joining. South Sudan as a new member will need more time to join its more developed counterparts. As the threat of multi-speed integration emerged in 2012-2013, it will be covered more into detail in the following empirical part of the dissertation.

Chapter Six: Data & Analysis

There are 767 articles dealing with foreign economic relations of Kenya published in the covered period. Graph below reveals that the most frequent theme is the East African Community, followed by economic relations with China, the European Union, and the United States. Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project is defined as a separate category. It is the major regional infrastructural project realized by all member states of the EAC except for Tanzania. First part of the railway from Mombasa to Nairobi is financed by the Chinese government. All other parts from Nairobi to Kampala and later to Kigali/Bujumbura and Juba are supposed to be financed also from a Chinese loan. Thus, articles about the SGR relate both to China and the EAC. Citations related to Chinese financing will be analysed in the section “China” and citations related to the SGR as regional infrastructural project will be analysed in the section “EAC”. Similarly, articles about rivalry between China and the West in Africa are defined as a separate category, but will be analysed under the respective sections based on the concrete citation.

EAC, China, the EU, and the US are by far the four most important directions of Kenyan foreign economic policy, as appearing in news discourse. This may be surprising as they represent less than 40 % of Kenyan trade. The most striking is probably absence of articles about India. However, the explanation is quite straightforward. Cooperation between Kenya and India is almost exclusively business-led, driven by local small and medium enterprises, without interference of any of the two governments, without formal trade agreement, without top-level state visits. This contrasts with harsh negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EU), state visit of President Kenyatta to China and Chinese Prime Minister to Kenya (China), US-Africa Leaders’ Summit and state visit of Barack Obama to Kenya (USA), or plethora of regional summits and ground-breaking ceremony of the SGR (EAC). Such events always get a prominent place in the daily newspaper, while day-to-day business activities usually not. This implies that news discourse is inevitably reflecting rather politico-economic issues than purely economic issues.

More than ninety articles focus on foreign economic relations from the Kenyan side: how to support export industries, how to diversify export base and export destinations, how to attract investors, how to finance (re)construction of necessary infrastructure, how to define national economic interests etc. These articles will be also

used for my analysis. Thus, data corpus consists of 586 articles, forming approximately three quarters of all articles.

The two remaining big categories are “Africa” and “others”. The former category comprises African economic relations except for the EAC – bilateral relations with other African states, other regional initiatives, Tripartite Free Trade Area covering half of the continent in its Eastern and Southern part, continental initiatives under the African Union, or African Development Bank. The latter category comprises bilateral relations with other states such as India, Japan, Korea, Israel, Turkey, Arab countries, Norway, Switzerland and others. Global organizations such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank Group, and also BRICS Development Bank are by far the least important economic partners, at least in the news discourse.




Figure 5: Overview of the data corpus

Analysis proceeds as follows. After reading the articles, I have found out that location in the newspaper is not much important. What is more important is who is the author of the text or who is quoted in the text – thus, whose ideas and opinions are expressed. In the case of articles written by journalist, which form majority of articles, it is also important whether it is standard newspaper article, or whether it is different form of article such as opinion, analysis, commentary etc. Tone and content of two articles on the same topic in the same issue may substantially differ if one is written as article and the other one as commentary. Analysis will be divided into four subsections. Each direction of Kenyan foreign economic policy (the US, the EU, China, and the EAC)

will be analysed separately, although interlinked. Analysis of each subsection will be divided into ten parts according to ten predefined categories of the author. Within the category of journalists, we will analyse articles and opinions separately. Analysis aims to reveal whether we can speak of one news discourse or whether we can identify different voices in the newspaper.²⁵

United States

First, I will analyse the US and its neoliberal model as the dominant global norm in the last thirty years. There are 78 articles relating to the US. Distribution of articles in time is highly uneven: 26 articles were published in the second half of 2014 and 20 articles were published in the second half of 2015. The reason is quite obvious. In August 2014, Barack Obama invited leaders from all African states to Washington to attend the first US-Africa Leaders' Summit. In July 2015, Barack Obama for the first time visited his "home" country as the President of the US. These two events, despite both lasting only three days, took a prominent position in *The Daily Nation* for the whole month, including two front pages for both events ("story of the day"). This contrasts with only a very few articles between 2012 and mid-2014. This may signal that the US is not important economic partner for Kenya (low trade figures confirm it) and that both events may be seen as an accelerator for reviving mutual relations. There is also very important political dimension of mutual relations: general elections in April 2013 invoked a discord between the two countries. Mutual relations became frozen for more than a year, but both diplomatic events signalled that the US and Kenya had started *détente* in their relations. Another feature is pressure from US business community to make US-Africa economic relations more symmetrical – this means not only to open US market for African goods, but also to open African markets for US goods and particularly services. Under this pressure, Obama weakened his stress on human rights and democracy and focused rather on trade/investment and security issues, which was welcomed by African leaders, including the Kenyan leadership. Thus, from the total of 247 single topic appearances, the two main frame topics are investment opportunities in energy and infrastructure, particularly recent Power Africa initiative (42 appearances), and trade preference offered to Africa under the AGOA Act (39 appearances).

²⁵ All excerpts from articles will be transcribed in its original version, including mistakes and typing errors. In most articles, some less important parts are omitted. All articles are transcribed as one paragraph, regardless the original typography. Crossheads are also ignored.

Eastern press agency

There is no article about US-Kenya/Africa relations taken from Eastern (read: Chinese) press agency or media house. The reason is probably that China tries to improve its image on the continent through positive means, by emphasizing its own economic successes and real benefits of its engagement in Africa, rather than by attacking others.

Western press agency

There are three articles taken from Western press agency or media house – one is about agriculture subsidies in the US under the new Farm Bill, one is about Power Africa Initiative, one is about the AGOA. These articles are informative, without normative accent, as we would expect from press agencies.

US President Barack Obama was today set to unveil a \$7 billion (...) plan to upgrade African power networks, in bid to end blackouts that deter business investment on the continent, the White House said. (...) The initiative, dubbed “Power Africa”, aims to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa, where more than two-thirds of the population is without electricity.²⁶

Local public official

There is one article written by Eric Ng’eno, lawyer, director of messaging in the Presidency and President’s speechwriter.

Had Obama come here in the 1990s or early this century, the agenda would have included human rights, greater political freedom, release of political prisoners, free assembly, even electoral playing field, liberalisation of the economy and presidential term limits. But last week we spoke about shared values, entrepreneurship, the rise of a new Africa, a wide spectrum of partnership opportunities and investment. In other words, the USA was not “talking baby” to a petulant infant; it was having a rational conversation with a mature and responsible grown up.²⁷

This article is interesting in that it reflects a shift in the relationship from the rephending one to the co-operating one. Until very recently, the US behaved like a teacher disseminating knowledge on the best political and economic system to the developing world. Part of this was push for “liberalisation of the economy”, which means dissemination of the neoliberal model in Africa. Global crisis changed the game: the US is not anymore in a position to dictate the terms of relationship with Africa. African agency has risen to the extent that it can defy its former subordinate position

²⁶ #190, AFP: Obama set to unveil Sh600bn Africa electricity upgrade plan, The Daily Nation, 1 July 2013.

²⁷ #708, Eric Ng’eno: If Kenya is not rising, you’re looking in wrong direction, The Daily Nation, 2 August 2015.

when dealing with external partners – or at least, Africans themselves feel that such relations should be more balanced than before. Contrast between “then and now” can be read also as an open challenge to the neoliberal model, which is seen as a representative part of the former asymmetrical relations.

Beside this article, several top government officials are quoted in different articles. The following quotations are from Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs Amina Mohamed, Cabinet Secretary for Industrialization and Enterprise Development Adan Mohamed, President Uhuru Kenyatta, and Cabinet Secretary for EAC, Commerce and Tourism Phyllis Kandie.

“I want to assure you that the economic growth prospects remain very strong,” Ms Mohamed said, according to a government press statement. (...) Cabinet Secretary presented the government’s 45 priority Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects as ripe for American investment. The United States has traditionally not been among Kenya’s largest trading partners. However, recent trends indicate that the country is increasingly becoming a key source of investment and trade for Kenya. Institutional investors from the US accounted for over 60 per cent of uptake on the two tranches of Kenya’s recently issued sovereign bonds.²⁸

Mr Mohamed said Kenya is seeking to diversify exports and has stepped up to help women entrepreneurs access the American market following the Agoa period extension. (...) Kenya hopes to go beyond the textile market and will prioritise products in which it has a comparative advantage in the making.²⁹

“The United States of America, from the time of our independence, has been a very strong partner and ally. Kenya has benefited from Agoa, it has benefited heavily in the health sector and education. This has been for all the years and that has never stopped (...),” said President Kenyatta.³⁰

Yesterday, Cabinet Secretary for Commerce and Tourism Phyllis Kandie said that the impact of President Obama’s visit will be felt in Kenya for many years to come. Ms Kandie said that the trip and the Global Entrepreneurship Summit (GES) boosted Kenya’s credentials as a regional leader and investment destination.³¹

From these excerpts, we can construct a story of mutual relations as seen by Kenyan leaders: Kenya and the US have been close partners and allies since the mid-1960s, but economic relations were rather marginal and stagnating. In 2000, the AGOA opened

²⁸ #481, Muthoki Mumo, Kevin J Kelley: Come invest in Kenya, Amina tells US forum, The Daily Nation, 11 July 2014.

²⁹ #718, Nation Correspondent: Kenya asks for direct US flight to benefit from Agoa, The Daily Nation, 15 August 2015.

³⁰ #704, Lilian Ochieng, Joshua Masinde: Sh100 billion investment pledge as global meeting closes doors, The Daily Nation, 27 July 2015.

³¹ #707, Andrew Teyie: Sh1.2 trillion deal struck but not all are winners after Obama’s visit, The Daily Nation, 2 August 2015.

US market for African exports, which Kenya was able to benefit from, albeit not fully. More recently, Kenyan government started to implement economic and political reforms, which attracted new investment, including from the US. Investment is expected to create value chains and added value for local production and also to diversify the production base. More export products with higher value-added will enable Kenya to benefit more from the AGOA, balance the current trade deficit, and speed up economic growth and development, which will attract more investment to the country. Kenyan leadership seems to assert purely economic logic when dealing with the US. President Obama brought with him concrete deals to be signed, but the main benefit is more abstract: Kenya got a worldwide positive image in media, including an image of being a business-friendly country open to foreign investment.

Foreign public official

Understandably, the most active US official is Ambassador to Kenya Robert Godec with three articles and one interview, followed by the US Trade Representative Michael Froman with one article.

It [US-Africa Leaders' Summit] was truly historic. It was an extraordinary meeting. It represented a new model of partnership between America and Africa. (...) During this summit you see a partnership of equals and focus on Africa's capacity to solve problems and Africa's capacity to grow. (...) Kenya and the US share a lot of values, share interest in growth and investment, in prosperity.³²

As African countries assume their new role, they want meaningful economic partnerships that deliver the sustainable, inclusive growth they seek. (...) By those criteria, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been tremendously effective since its enactment in 2000. By removing tariffs on exports to the US from 39 sub-Saharan countries, it has stimulated growth, encouraged economic integration, and created opportunity where it otherwise might not have existed. (...) Today, the chief impediments are supply side constraints, which require well-designed strategies and capacity-building efforts[.](...) Africa needs to build its capacity to trade competitively in today's global economy. That's why (...) US government agencies are advancing programmes (...) to help the continent develop sustainable infrastructure and increase regional integration.³³

Beside these articles, we can find many quotations in other articles from US Ambassador Robert Godec and other US leaders including President Barack Obama, former President Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, or Secretary of State John Kerry.

³² #513, Andrew Teyie (interview with Robert Godec): Envoy: America is with Kenya; we are with the President, The Daily Nation, 17 August 2014.

³³ #739, Michael Froman, Dana Hyde: Africa's rise could be faster, but trade challenges greatly hamper progress, The Daily Nation, 26 August 2015.

America has turned its focus on Africa amid concerns that China's growing influence on the continent could undermine Washington's. (...) Currently, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is on an 11-day tour of the continent to raise interest in security, sustainable partnerships and investment. "Indeed, we believe that if you want to make a good investment in the midst of what is still a very difficult global economy, go to Africa," she told a Senegalese audience last Wednesday. (...) Clinton's comments in Senegal that America would stand up for democracy in its pursuit of economic interests were interpreted as a swipe at China. (...) Last Tuesday, he [Mr Obama's deputy national security adviser for international affairs Michael Froman] spoke enthusiastically in Washington about a policy shift from aid to facilitating trade. "If there is one way to summarise the change, it is that the focus has shifted from how much aid will be provided to how best to create the enabling environment for the trade and investment to drive broad-based economic growth," he said.³⁴

Secretary of State John Kerry urged African ministers to embrace free-market ideals and US-African cooperation at a forum on the African Growth and Opportunity Act.³⁵

On Monday, the US Secretary of State, Mr John Kerry, was straightforward about Washington's aims. "I say unabashedly: We want and we will work hard to get more American companies to invest in Africa. We also want more African companies to invest here in the United States, and there's no reason that they shouldn't," Mr Kerry said. On Friday, President Obama had told a news conference: "We want to do business with these folks." (...) Other nations, most notably China, have been moving aggressively to tap into growing African markets. China surpassed the US as Africa's largest trading partner in 2009. "We also realise we have some catching up to do," said Mr Michael Bloomberg, the former New York City mayor and a billionaire businessman. "We are letting Europe and China go faster than the US."³⁶

President Obama will meet with his host, President Uhuru Kenyatta tomorrow, to discuss "issues of mutual interest," according to Mr Godec. (...) Mr Godec said that his government will still press for more democratic space and fight against corruption. "The United States continues to believe that justice, human rights and rule of law are critically important. These are values that we frankly promote and work for across the world..."³⁷

Although the US stresses need to embrace free-market ideals (Kerry), both US-Africa Leaders' Summit and Obama's visit to Kenya focused rather on business and investment opportunities than on principles of global economic governance. In none of these articles do US leaders mention neoliberalism and neoliberal model, or whether Africa should adopt it.

³⁴ #094, Muthoki Mumo: US raises stakes in Africa to cut back China's trade influence, The Daily Nation, 5 August 2012.

³⁵ #490, Nation reporter with additional reporting by AFP and Voice of America: Trade ties top on agenda as Obama meets 26 leaders, The Daily Nation, 5 August 2014.

³⁶ #496, BMJ Muriithi: US political, business leaders woo Africa at investment talks, The Daily Nation, 6 August 2014.

³⁷ #695, Aggrey Mutambo, Stella Cheron: Kenya ready to receive US leader and sign key business deals during summit, The Daily Nation, 24 July 2015.

From all the excerpts, we can construct a story of mutual relations as seen by US leaders. Africa has not been much important for US economic interests and US business ignored the continent. In the last decade, China started its offensive on the continent and the EU concluded Economic Partnership Agreements. The US lags behind. Thus, in his second term, Obama tried to hop the US back on the train of business opportunities in Africa and to shift economic relations with Africa from one-way street focusing on development to “two-way street” focusing on trade promotion³⁸ - thus, to assert economic logic similar to those of the Kenyan leaders. However, the US still has its political agenda focusing on democracy and good governance. Whether this poses a dilemma for US leadership or not will be discussed in the final part of this subsection.

Local businessperson

There is no article written by local businessperson, but we can find many quotations in other articles. As textile and apparel industry benefits the most from the AGOA regime, businessmen from this sector are quoted very frequently, particularly African Cotton & Textile Industries Federation (ACTIF) chairman Jaswinder Bedi, ACTIF executive director Rajeev Arora, and Kenya Apparel Manufacturers Exporters Association (KAMEA) chairman Thomas Puthoor. In the reporting period, three key problems were commented by the representatives of Kenyan textile industry.

In 2012, the biggest problem was the so-called third-country-fabric provision. Under the AGOA, textile exporters from Africa to the US are obliged to use either African, or US raw materials. Third-country-fabric provision allows exporters to use raw materials also from other sources, but this provision was valid only until September 2012. As most of the Kenyan textile companies use raw materials imported from Asia, extension of this provision was of vital importance for them.

Textile and apparel firms operating under the (...) Agoa (...) are uncertain about the future of the arrangement. (...) As a result, the textile manufacturers say, their clients abroad are “nervous” about their ability to guarantee continued supply, threatening to reverse gains made in recent years. (...) “The period left is very short, and the buyers are nervous about continued supply. The orders that fall during the spring in March for supply in December are likely to be affected,” said Mr Jaswinder Bedi, a Nakuru textile manufacturer.

³⁸ See #681, Nation Correspondent: US group heads to Nairobi seeking enhanced trade, The Daily Nation, 24 June 2015.

(...)Manufacturers warn that further delays in extending the compliance period will bring uncertainty with the possible loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs.³⁹

In 2015, textile manufacturers lobbied for extension of the AGOA regime.

Kenya is pushing for an extension of the African Growth and Opportunities Act (Agoa) window of not less than 10 years ahead of the September 2015 deadline to enable the textile industry to grow and become self-sustaining. (...) “The long period will be predictable to allow for good investments to flow into the beneficiary countries. This predictability principle has been the reason for the beneficiary countries to appeal to the US Administration to even consider Agoa a permanent feature in the Sub-Saharan Africa-US trade arrangements,” said (...) Rajeev Arora. (...) ACTIF vice-chairman Jaswinder Bedi said textile and apparel manufacturers would invest more when the Agoa initiative is given a relatively longer period to enable these countries enhance the value-chain from cotton production to modern manufacturing technology.⁴⁰

General problem for Kenyan textile manufacturers is whether Kenya is able to benefit fully from the AGOA regime and what should be done to benefit more from it.

While admitting that Kenya has done little to benefit economically from Agoa, (...) Actif chairman Jaswinder Bedi (...) said the government should intervene to help the private sector invest in the machinery. (...) According to Mr Arora, a lack of coordination along the whole value chain is killing the sector’s growth prospects and has encouraged reliance on imported cotton.⁴¹

Plans are underway to expand warehouses for the textile industry at the Export Processing Zones Authority grounds in Athi River in anticipation of increased business from America. (...) This comes in the wake of the government’s renewed focus on the textile and leather industry[.] (...) “There are capacity constraints for warehouses owing to a shift in orders from Asia to East Africa, particularly Kenya. Most firms cannot meet the demand; and have to expand,” said Jaswinder Bedi.⁴²

These excerpts show that the main problem for textile manufacturers is uncertainty and unpredictability caused by temporary character of the AGOA preferential regime. This results from its character as a development tool rather than business initiative (Cooke - Downie 2014: 4). For local manufacturers, long-term business relations would be more beneficial than periodically re-assessed short-term initiatives. The former would enable manufacturers to sign long-term contracts and to increase investment to further develop the industry, particularly to create local product value chains and to lower reliance on imported materials. Textile and apparel industrialists see their sector

³⁹ #006, Mwaniki Wahome: Textile firms fear losses amid uncertainty over Agoa fate, The Daily Nation, 29 January 2012.

⁴⁰ #182, Mwaniki Wahome: Kenya wants US to extend Agoa plan for over 10 years, The Daily Nation, 23 June 2013.

⁴¹ #052, Charles Wokabi: Farmers face doom in Agoa push, The Daily Nation, 22 April 2012.

⁴² #514, Mwaniki Wahome: Bid to expand EPZs as textile market swells, The Daily Nation, 21 August 2014.

as potentially booming due to increased demand on global markets. Similarly to previous two categories, they see US-Kenyan relations purely in economic terms. However, role of government is also recognized, both as a coordinator and as a lender.

Foreign businessperson

There is no article written by US businessperson, but we can find a few quotations in other articles.

Kenya is becoming an attractive destination for American companies and investors. "I'm higher on Kenya than I was a year ago," president of the Corporate Council on Africa Stephen Hayes said on Thursday following a four-day visit. (...) Although several large US corporations have offices in Kenya, the country is still not widely perceived in US business circles as one of the most advanced in Africa, Mr Hayes said. (...) A trade initiative much touted by the US government during the past decade – the African Growth and Opportunity Act – "has not been important to Kenya" and has proved generally disappointing, Mr Hayes said. (...) Mr Hayes offered a more favourable assessment of two initiatives recently unveiled by President Obama – Power Africa and Trade Africa – both of which could prove important to Kenya. (...) Both these programmes could lead to much greater US corporate activity in Kenya, Mr Hayes said.⁴³

Corporate Council on Africa is a trade association with almost two hundred members – US companies, including large corporations. Its interest is to develop business ties of US companies in Africa. It is not much surprising that it does not support the AGOA unilateral regime, but it welcomes initiatives which open up space for US investment in power generation sector (Power Africa) and for reciprocal business relations based on free trade agreement (Trade Africa).

Journalist

There are 45 "standard" articles and two "editorial" articles written by journalists. Most of them deal with the AGOA regime and its extension for another ten-year period until 2025. As Kenya is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the regime, articles analyse benefits of the AGOA for Kenyan economy. Debates over extension of the AGOA were closely followed in the newspaper, particularly whether the US would renew it as a unilateral preferential regime, or whether it will seek greater reciprocity. However, it was quite clear that negotiating reciprocal regime with almost fifty African states would be very time-consuming, if not impossible. Thus, African exporters would lose access to US market, which would go counter Obama's promises to assist African

⁴³ #407, Kevin J Kelley: US investors eye Kenya market as State progress acknowledged, The Daily Nation, 19 April 2014.

development and growth. It seems that for the US there had been no other option than to renew the AGOA and seek reciprocity through different means and initiatives.

Agoa is said to be responsible for creating thousands of jobs in the Kenyan textile industry. But as a condition to Agoa's extension beyond 2015, American negotiators may press African countries to give the same preferential treatment to US exports to Africa. (...) Ambassador Froman said US "stakeholders are raising the question" of why European exports should enjoy such a competitive advantage [of duty-free access to African markets] over American exports which are subject to tariffs at African countries' borders.⁴⁴

However, some articles warn that the AGOA regime is beneficial only to concrete groups, probably those that can lobby the government most successfully. While textile manufacturers could benefit from exports to the US, cotton growers are set aside.

Kenyan cotton farmers are facing a bleak future in the latest push to have the US Congress to extend yet again, by three years, a requirement that would have forced apparel manufacturers eyeing America's market to source raw material locally. (...) But in a poor showing of misplaced priorities, the country is now seeking a third extension of the Agoa requirement[.] (...) The push to extend is thus seen as a selfish move by the apparel exporters to extend their money-making window while local farmers continue to suffer. Some farmers have recently complained of the absence of a profitable market for their cotton even as the country depends too much on imported cotton for apparel production.⁴⁵

First US-Africa Leaders' Summit in August 2014 was also closely followed in the newspaper. The summit was praised as having potential to foster African development by increased trade flows and investment. On the other side, journalists were not naïve about real sense of the summit, which was not to serve African interests, but to serve economic and geopolitical US interests.

The US-Africa leaders' summit will bring together African presidents and American business leaders in a forum expected to boost trade and investment between the two regions. This comes as the United States seeks to flex its economic muscles in Africa in the face of increased activity from China.⁴⁶

Journalists also analysed the changes in US approach towards Africa and shift to pragmatism in mutual relations.

In the past such gatherings would be dominated by such issues as human rights – galore abuses in Africa – democracy, governance, and US aid. This time the emphasis was on how the US and African governments can assist, by formulating policies, business people and entities on both sides make money on an "all-win" basis. Two obvious observations: One,

⁴⁴ #210, Kevin J Kelley: New twist in planned Agoa renewal talks, The Daily Nation, 7 August 2013.

⁴⁵ #052, Charles Wokabi: Farmers face doom in Agoa push, The Daily Nation, 22 April 2012.

⁴⁶ #486, Muthoki Mumo: East Africa plans united front in search of Sh2trn Lapsset funding. The Daily Nation, 1 August 2014.

*the idea of US aid as an instrument of development was on the back burner. Two, the China's mantra on investment in Africa, "No questions asked," was in vogue.*⁴⁷

This article implies that this shift may be perceived as accepting the Chinese approach focusing on business and leaving sensitive political questions aside. In other words: the US gave up its principles of democracy and freedom. However, this would be a misreading. "No questions asked" principle may prevail in the investment agenda, but surely will not prevail in general approach towards Africa. I will return back to this question in the final part of this subsection.

When writing about Obama's visit to Kenya in 2015, journalists agree with leaders that the main benefit from the visit is improved global image of Kenya.

*The endorsement from the US President now puts Kenya at an elevated focal point in the innovation space with many ideas set to receive financial and technical support from commitments made at the GES.*⁴⁸

Beside "standard" articles, there are also six opinions and analyses written by journalists from the editorial staff of The Daily Nation. Five of them were written shortly after the US-Africa Leaders' Summit, the last one was written after Barack Obama had left Nairobi. It is worth quoting excerpts from all the first five articles to illustrate that "journalists" and "columnists" write about the same topic and express the same opinion, but use very different tone and wording.

*The African leaders would no doubt have sought assurances that the forum would not be used to lecture them on such "alien" impositions as human rights, freedom of speech, good governance, democracy (...). Gone is the imperialistic finger-wagging and moralistic lecturing, to be replaced by more pragmatic relationships built on the need to secure US commercial and political influence before China runs away with the continent. (...) The fact is that the US no longer has the leverage to bully and blackmail African leaders into toeing its line, and must now join China and other emerging economies that are ruthlessly moving to exploit the continent's vast markets and natural resources without being hamstrung by pretended morality.*⁴⁹

According to this author, global arena has changed so much that the US lost the privilege to lead the world and teach others. Stress on democracy, human rights, and freedom is labelled as "hypocritical pretended morality", which had to give way to economic pragmatism. The reason for this shift is obvious: rising China.

⁴⁷ #505, Chege Mbitiru: US capital feels the pinch as African leaders visit, The Daily Nation, 11 August 2014.

⁴⁸ #699, Edwin Okoth: Kenya economy endorsement open doors of opportunities, The Daily Nation, 26 July 2015.

⁴⁹ #492, Macharia Gaitho: By gathering African leaders to his country, Obama has pulled off a coup, The Daily Nation, 5 August 2014.

America has not given up on dreaming of a democratic and prosperous Africa where citizens are respected and rights protected. The Washington summit, however, represents a subtle but important shift in focus and tactics of engagement. (...). [T]he US is showing the kind of pragmatism we have come to expect from – you guessed it – China! This is not to say that the US is adopting China’s see-no-evil, hear-no-evil approach. (...) America is changing the way it relates to Africa. It is a subtle shift away from preaching politics and democracy to its leaders, to inspiring its youth and its entrepreneurs to drive the change that the continent needs.⁵⁰

According to this author, the US did not change its goal, but it changed tactics how to reach this goal. Instead of lecturing leaders about democracy, the US wishes to bring change to Africa from below, through young entrepreneurs and innovators. Although the new style may seem very similar to the Chinese one, the author recognizes substantial differences between Chinese and American pragmatism.

The message from the US-Africa Summit couldn’t have been clearer: What Africa needs is trade and investment, not aid handouts. Aid never brought meaningful development to any country. Nor has it killed poverty on our continent. Agoa, the trade opportunity that was started by Bill Clinton, has done more to Africa than aid ever did.⁵¹

According to this author, shift to equal bilateral economic relations is highly desirable as it can bring development to Africa, contrary to aid or unilateral preferences.

President Obama summoned African leaders to Washington to remind them who’s still boss – Uncle Sam, not any latter-day Chairman Mao. It is classic American hubris, that. (...) The real reason for the entire three-day production had been an open secret even before it began. “I want the United States competing in these fast-growing markets, too,” President Obama wrote in an op-ed. “I want a growing Africa buying more goods stamped “Made in America””. (...) Africa would do well to break down its boundaries, open up its markets and discard its prejudices. African leaders wouldn’t need to queue up for the headmaster’s approval in Washington if they facilitated trade and investment among themselves back home. Why are more than 50 different nationalities fighting for a piece of pie smaller than that available to Brazil? Have we no dignity?⁵²

According to this author, summit is not result of decreasing hegemonic power of the US, but rather confirmation of its global position. Only a very few African autocrats were not invited. From those African leaders who were invited, most of them attended the summit personally. This is, according to the author, a clear indication of strong soft power, which goes hand-in-hand with its political and economic power. However,

⁵⁰ #499, Daniel Kalinaki: From tyrants to turbines: Obama’s subtle shift in African foreign policy, The Daily Nation, 10 August 2014.

⁵¹ #501, Gitau Warigi: There’s lots of money to be made if America changes its Africa game, The Daily Nation, 10 August 2014.

⁵² #506, Larry Madowo: US-Africa summit was more about style than substance, The Daily Nation, 12 August 2014.

author sees the summit negatively as an expression of American “hubris”. Moreover, the summit had no real substance, because whole Africa was given less money than Brazil. For the author, by queuing in Washington, African leaders have lost their dignity.

Veni, Vidi, Vici? All of the 50-odd African leaders who travelled to the United States can say with satisfaction they went and they saw, but how many can claim they conquered? (...) [T]he jury is still out on whether there were any tangible gains.⁵³

This author has very similar view than the previous one: African leaders went to Washington, attended the summit, and got nothing. The summit was not about concrete deals or investment plans, but rather about future opportunities, which have to materialize in next years.

Academia/analyst

There are ten articles written by scholars and analysts.

I fully agree with the Secretary [of State Hillary Clinton] in that the various initiatives by the United States have gone a long way in helping Africans deal with some very critical human development challenges. (...) This donor-recipient approach, which has for long defined US-Africa relationship, was informed by a view of a continent characterised by hopelessness. However, this view is out of tune in present-day realities of an emerging Africa. (...) Whoever is elected President, the next Administration must radically change the approach to engaging Africa. (...) Key to this engagement is the realisation that Africa offers numerous profitable opportunities for Americans that would also benefit Africa through economic growth and job creation. (...) Rather than complaining about the imperfections of the Africa-China relations, the US must rethink its African strategy carefully, or else it will soon be a marginal player in the continent.⁵⁴

This article was written by Kenyan scholar, director of the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution, Washington. According to the author, real development of Africa requires business-to-business approach, which can lead to growth and creation of jobs. Government-to-government aid approach is outdated and if pursued, it will lead to further marginalization of the US in Africa.

Both at home and abroad, Obama has failed to outgrow the defining symbolism of being the first African-American to be elected president in America. (...) Obama knows a lot about Africa. That he chose to ground his main speech in Senegal on the need for African states to expand the rights of gay people shows his obsession with shallow symbolism. (...) The point he was really intent on making on gay rights is that America will deal with Africans on its terms and on issues as it defines. (...) There is no substance in his great

⁵³ #507, Macharia Gaitho: Uhuru brought cowboy boots and a stetson from America, if nothing else, The Daily Nation, 12 August 2014.

⁵⁴ #113, Mwangi Kimenyi: America will have to craft new terms of engagement with African countries, The Daily Nation, 11 October 2012.

*speeches. He is the head of an empire in its twilight facing many challenges. Africa is not a priority and has never been one.*⁵⁵

This author, Nairobi-based lawyer and publisher, is highly critical to the whole African policy of Barack Obama. Africa has never been top priority of the US and Obama has not changed it. His speeches to the African audience are full of symbolism and void of any real substance. The US continues to speak about what it wants to speak, regardless real needs on the continent.

*The event is about far more than trade and investment, however. The meeting is also about shoring up American influence in Africa. Although the US remains a major player in most African countries, American policy makers are painfully aware that they have lost ground to China. (...) President Obama has tried to avoid direct criticism of China, but is clearly keen to encourage the continent to think twice signing up to the Chinese economic model. (...) It is too early to say, but it seems likely that a resurgent America would be able to take advantage of the inevitable backlash against China that, in many states, has already begun. (...) President Obama wishes to give deals to “well governed” states in order to reward them and encourage other investors to follow suit. The problem with this is that, with the exception of South Africa, the biggest players on the continent – whether we are talking in political or economic terms – are not full democracies. (...) This reflects a broader trend in which the American government has been willing to compromise on governance issues where its security is at stake.*⁵⁶

This article was written by the director of the African Studies Centre at the Oxford University. Although being neutral with relation to the topic, he also recognizes that the main purpose and goal of the summit is catching up China. This article is of particular interest for us, because it mentions “Chinese economic model” and the US as an antithesis, although this was not explicitly stated by Obama. Thus, article written by Oxford scholar confirms that there are different economic models competing for audience in Africa. Author also assumes that competition between the models can even increase in next years as the initial fascination with China has started to fade away, at least in some countries with longer “Chinese” experience. However, Kenya is not this case and probably is not likely to be in the near future. One reason is that deals, signed between China and Kenya, are ten times worth than US deals. Author also argues that while the US still wishes to pursue good governance goals in Africa, these may be in contradiction with economic goals or security goals. If this happens, political goals are the most likely to be compromised.

⁵⁵ #189, Ahmednasir Abdullahi: Africa has never been a priority for the United States, The Daily Nation, 30 June 2013.

⁵⁶ #488, Nic Cheeseman: What Obama’s Washington Summit means for Uhuru and other African leaders, The Daily Nation, 3 August 2014.

*President Kenyatta's attendance at the US-Africa Summit (...) has been heralded as a great success. However, at a public discussion on the US-Africa Summit hosted in Nairobi last week by the British Institute in Eastern Africa, it became evident that many Kenyans do not regard Kenyatta's trip as a success. Instead, many participants felt that African heads of state were summoned to Washington for a photo opportunity with President Obama and his Wife to further American interests. For some, the real audience for that performance of international relations was China. The message? America can bring any African head of state to Washington because it is still the major global power and a country that African states want to do business with.*⁵⁷

This article was written by British political scientist, who is specialising on politics in East African countries. She analyses public discussion on the US-Africa summit held in Nairobi, with quite straightforward conclusion. The summit was a victory for Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, who was finally accepted by the US as a lawful head of state. However, it is hardly a victory for Kenya as a country: The Summit was nothing more than a message to China that the US is still a major player in Africa.

*And then he [Obama] was gone. And a thoughtful Kenyan must ask: so what? (...) Certainly, we reaped some significant benefits. (...) And yet, the cynics are out in force, asking whether the US delivered any real "goodies" or whether Kenya is any different after its most powerful relative left. (...) What did we actually expect Barack Obama to do for us? Can he solve our problems, accelerate our development, dole out largesse? Why do we remain so stunted, that we expect miracles from what was just a visit, a conference, a set of talks? It was a good visit, and some good things happened. That is all.*⁵⁸

This last article was written by renowned Kenyan management consultant and writer of Indian origin. Similarly to other authors, he asks what the real impact of Obama's visit was. Again, the answer is straightforward. Obama's visit is primarily a set of talks, which can hardly change Kenya – although probably many people, including top leaders, expected that.

Civil society

There is no article written by a representative of civil society, but we can find two quotations from them in other articles. In both cases, these are quotations from representatives of US civil society.

The US denies it is "playing catch-up" to China, (...) but officials suggested that African countries should recognise and act on the advantages of doing business with the United States. "We do believe we bring something unique to the table," US national security official Ben Rhodes said in the run-up to the summit. "We are less focused on resources from Africa and on deepening trade and investment." "That sounds nice, but it's not actually true," commented John Feffer, director of a Washington-based group that critiques

⁵⁷ #518, Gabrielle Lynch: Who benefited from US-Africa summit?, The Daily Nation, 30 August 2014.

⁵⁸ #713, Sunny Bindra: The US President came to Kenya. So what?, The Daily Nation, 9 August 2015.

US foreign policy from a left-wing perspective. “Strip away all the modern PR and prettified palaver and it’s an ugly scramble for oil, minerals and markets for US goods,” he wrote.⁵⁹

But the larger point of the overhaul [of the World Bank] must be to make the Bank “user-friendly” to Africa. American civil rights leader Jesse Jackson has written of an institutional culture in the Bank that is almost colonial in attitude. It is reflected in the paternalistic conditionalities the Bank imposes on poor borrowers.⁶⁰

These two quotations show criticism of the US foreign policy from domestic civil society groups as being motivated by economic profit and perceived moral superiority, without taking respect on Africa itself.

Reader

There are four articles written by readers. The first one was written by Kenyan citizen living and working in the US, the other three by Kenyan citizens from Kenya. Readers’ opinions do not differ substantially from that of scholars, analysts, or journalists. Thus, they do not need further comments except for one topic, which was not mentioned in any of previous articles. Gay rights became a vexed issue of Obama’s visit. Kenyan leaders refused to include it on the agenda, while Obama wanted to touch the current wave of anti-gay legislation in East African countries. Eventually, during the press conference, Obama urged Kenya to respect gay rights, while Kenyatta dismissed gay rights as being “non-issue” for the country. The reader agrees with his President: if Obama came to Nairobi to attend the Global Entrepreneurship Summit, he should speak about economic issues, not about gay rights.

What has changed in my opinion is that US interests in Africa are under threat. When US interests are threatened, she becomes paranoid. She can do the unthinkable. Her interests supersede truth, democracy, rule of law and human rights; US interests come first.⁶¹

Last week’s US-Africa leaders summit was initially received with bated breath. Unfortunately the forum (...) was heavily skewed towards US economic interests. Apart from rekindling diplomatic relations between US and Africa, the Obama administration failed to address key problems bedevilling the continent such as poor governance, corruption, insecurity, civil wars, and political and economic turmoil. At a glance, the renewed US interest in Africa seems to have emanated from recent discoveries of massive natural resources on the continent. (...) It seems the summit fared below expectations and China’s presence in Africa is what is giving the US sleepless nights. It begs the question: Will the renewed US interest in Africa bring the much-awaited sustainable economic growth in

⁵⁹ #500, Kevin J Kelley: Summit lives up to its billing as a unique event, The Daily Nation, 10 August 2014.

⁶⁰ #501, Gitau Warigi: There’s lots of money to be made if America changes its Africa game, The Daily Nation, 10 August 2014.

⁶¹ #497, Jacktone Ambuka: American interests solely behind change of heart towards Kenya, The Daily Nation, 8 August 2014.

*Africa? Who is the big beneficiary in the just-concluded summit? (...) It is time the AU strengthened economic and political ties among African countries as the way forward.*⁶²

*I think he [Obama] made a mistake ignoring Kenya during his earlier visits to Africa. This has enabled the Chinese to make inroads in the country, and even the continent. When Mr Obama arrives in July, it will wound American pride that their president will use Chinese-designed roads. (...) President Obama's visit could be described as a case of too little, too late. Welcome home, Barack!*⁶³

*It is, however, improper to divert the attention of the public and participants of the summit from the main agenda. The summit seeks to promote innovation, enhance market for products and explore funding for small scale traders. (...) I am aware that all these discussion will take place without regard to sexual orientation. Men and women will sit together to discuss these matters, It is, therefore, distracting to pre-occupy ourselves with the debate on sexual orientation at the expense of more relevant themes[.] (...)The debate on sexual orientation can wait.*⁶⁴

To sum up this subsection: we can distinguish three different voices in The Daily Nation on US-Kenyan relations. The first one is expressed by Kenyan leaders, Kenyan businessmen and US businessmen. All these groups see mutual relations in purely economic terms. They have a common goal: how to maximize the benefits from renewed interest of the US in Africa? The second voice is expressed by journalists, scholars, analysts, and readers. For them, both top events were much ado about nothing. The US focuses primarily on its own interests and both events served two goals: to further promote US interests in Africa and to send message to China that the US is still there in Africa. This same voice is also expressed by US civil society representatives, who are even more critical to their own government and hypocrisy in its foreign policy.

Third voice is expressed by US leaders. Excerpts confirm that US African policy is highly ambiguous. On one side, there is Hamiltonian/Jacksonian tradition of free trade and benefits for US businesses. On the other side, there is Wilsonian tradition of exporting democracy and making the world a better place. Historically, the US tried to separate these issues: development aid was conditioned politically by good governance, democracy, and human rights, while trade and investment was conditioned economically by structural pro-market reforms. Now, this separation seems obsolete

⁶² #508, Joseph Muthama: US-Africa summit was much fanfare and no substance, The Daily Nation, 13 August 2014.

⁶³ #645, Thomas: Welcome home, Obama, it's not too late to mend fences and agree to go on, The Daily Nation, 2 April 2015.

⁶⁴ #697, Auscar Wambiya: Obama visit is all about trade and innovation, not gay debate, The Daily Nation, 25 July 2015.

as trade/investment is seen as the main driver of development. Thus, while Hillary Clinton (2009-2013) pursued more Wilsonist policy, John Kerry (2013-2017) accentuated Jacksonian principles. We may expect that Trump's Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross will even more emphasize Jacksonian principles. This means that they will focus more on trade and business opportunities for US companies than on free trade as a principle and creating global rules for trade and investment. This is likely to weaken support for the neoliberal model as the US will be less willing to exact pro-market reforms in developing countries.

However, does it mean that the US will have to prioritize between trade and democracy? Does it mean that the US will favour trade at the expense of democracy? The answer is no. In reality, there is no dilemma to choose between the two. The US will undoubtedly pursue both trade/investment and democracy in Africa. There is substantial difference between the Chinese and US approach. While the former is based on government-to-government relations, the latter aims to foster business-to-business relations. China offers Africa with loans in the form of tied aid. Thus, these loans are beneficial for China in two ways. First, China invests its vast financial reserves, which will be repaid in the future. Second, substantial part of the loan must be used to buy Chinese goods and services (principle of tied aid). If China conditions these loans, it would threaten both these benefits. Contrarily, the US wishes – in line with its neoliberal model – to create business-friendly environment and let private companies on both sides to freely operate. Current pragmatic approach means that the US will not endanger the promotion of this business-friendly environment by references to “democracy and human rights” agenda. However, it will stress these issues in political negotiations between the two governments. The main difference brought by the pragmatic approach is that the US has lost its “hard power” leverage: development aid is not as important as before and trade/investment agenda will not be hampered by good governance issues. The US will have to disseminate its ideals of democracy and freedom by other means, particularly by soft power means. Jacksonian tradition is very likely to be the dominant one in the near future. On one side, the US will prefer being a model of democracy for other states than actively disseminating it to other countries. On the other side, the US will still promote the neoliberal economic model.

European Union

Secondly, I will analyse the EU and its social market model. There are 103 articles relating to the EU. From the total of 175 single topic appearances, the main frame topic

is Economic Partnership Agreement (87 appearances). Thus, every second topic appearance is somehow connected to the EPA. Second main frame topic is phytosanitary standards (23 appearances). This is hardly surprising. The EU is the most important trading partner of Kenya and by far the most important export market for horticulture products (40 %) and flowers (70 %). Kenya is not a least developed country, so it does not enjoy duty-free quota-free access to the European market under the Everything but Arms initiative (EBA). Thus, concluding the EPA and setting new trade rules with the EU was a necessity for Kenya. Similarly, phytosanitary standards are very important issue for Kenyan exporters: if they fail to meet the standards, their exports to the EU will be under threat. Third main frame topic is the European investment in Kenya (14 appearances).

Eastern and Western press agency

There is no article either from Western press agency/media house or from Eastern press agency/media house.

Local public official

There are two articles written by local public officials. One was written by the Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Karanja Kibicho.

Basically, the EU wants to restrict the EAC from imposing duty and tax on its exports. This is a vital policy instrument used by all the World Trade Organisation countries for purposes of value addition to products, industrial development, development of infant industries, food security, environmental protection, currency stabilisation, and revenue collection. (...) While the EU is putting a lot of pressure on this issue, its member states used the same instrument to industrialise. It would only be fair for it to grant the EAC policy space on this matter that is purely domestic.⁶⁵

Mr Kibicho was directly involved in the negotiations and his article may be read as an open letter to Kenyan citizens. It recognizes a delicate position of the Kenyan government, which has to satisfy two different set of requests. On one side, business sector urges government to conclude the negotiations, which is the only way how to guarantee duty-free access to the European market. On the other side, citizens will hardly accept any agreement, which will be unequal and asymmetrical with relation to benefits. Thus, Mr Kibicho wished to calm both groups by insisting that the EAC negotiators were well aware of high stakes for local exporters, that they were trying to

⁶⁵ #510, Karanja Kibicho: EU must be fair during EPAs negotiations, The Daily Nation, 14 August 2014.

achieve the best possible agreement for the region, and that they resisted “unfair” requirements by the EU.

Second article was written by the Kenyan Ambassador to Germany and focuses on relations between the two countries, which have flourished since Kenya’s independence. We can find also many quotations from public officials in other articles. Officials from the Ministry of East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism commented on the EPA negotiations.

The East Africa Community has accepted a draft agreement for fresh produce exports to the European Union market. (...) “The agreement is particularly significant to Kenya who stood to lose billions in exports to the EU if a deal was not finalised by October 1,” she [Commerce and Tourism Cabinet Secretary Phyllis Kandie] said.⁶⁶

Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture commented on the issue of minimum residual levels of pesticides in Kenyan horticulture exports.

The EU has given the country up to end of September to ensure all produce meant for the market meets the “required minimum residual levels” or lose the Sh100 billion market. (...) “Measures we are going to take are painful but necessary as we cannot let few exporters destroy the sector,” Mr Koskie [Agriculture Cabinet Secretary] added. (...) “We better have 10 companies exporting than 100 that do not comply. Thailand has done it and reduced the horticulture products exporting companies from 85 to 25,” Mr Kosgei⁶⁷ said.⁶⁸

The EU has accused the local producers and exporters of consistently shipping contaminated produce, contrary to new trading requirements by the EU developed from consumer preferences in the economic bloc. (...) “We must ensure that Kenya is safe from harmful chemicals (...),” said Mr oskei. “There are greedy businessmen who are selling wrong chemicals or farmers are applying it wrongfully or the chemicals being used is not effective. This threatens a market that we cannot afford to lose. Each player along the value chain must play their rightful role to ensure we expand our key market and not reduce it.”⁶⁹

Kenya is racing against time to beat the September 30 European Union deadline for ensuring that horticultural produce meets stringent safety standards, failure to which the sector will suffer a severe blow. (...) “From a ministry point of view, we should not have waited for the EU red flag (...),” said Agriculture Secretary Sicily Kariuki.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ #530, Aggrey Mutambo: Bloc strikes deal with EU on fresh produce, The Daily Nation, 22 September 2014.

⁶⁷ Name of Agriculture Cabinet Secretary is sometimes spelled as Felix Kosgei, sometimes as Felix Koskei. In the presented excerpts, it is twice written incorrectly (Koskie, Oskei) – both are typing errors.

⁶⁸ #484, Mwaniki Wahome: Kenya stares at Sh100 billion sales ban to European Union, The Daily Nation, 26 July 2014.

⁶⁹ #512, Zeddy Sambu: Koskei orders probe of agencies after EU’s threat to ban exports, The Daily Nation, 17 August 2014.

⁷⁰ #515, Walter Menya: Kenya races against the time to beat EU deadline over fresh produce, The Daily Nation, 24 August 2014.

These excerpts show that the EU is seen as an indispensable market for horticulture producers and exporters. Kenyan public authorities are well aware of this fact and see their mission as to safeguard this key market for future, although it may require adopting “painful” measures. Article #515 is particularly interesting as it sees the problem in more general terms: it is not about EU standards, it is about the quality of Kenyan fresh produce and how to increase it, which can also increase global competitiveness of Kenyan agricultural exports. However, there is also one article with totally different view.

The insistence by the European Union to scrap export duty on some of its products sold in the East African Community is one of the sticky issues stalling trade talks between the two blocks. And with the community negotiation team terming “uncooperative” the attitude of the Europeans at a meeting to resolve contentious issues, a new tax has been imposed on several of Kenya’s horticultural exports to Europe. A document prepared by the community and seen by the Sunday Nation shows that the decision by the EU to reject taxes on its exports is a ploy meant to continue getting raw material for their industries. (...) “By so doing, EU is intent on watching on our trade policies to ensure they get what they want without considering what would happen to EAC economy,” the statement further says. (...) “Accepting the EU position will cause EAC to remain a perpetual supplier of raw materials, and will never industrialize,” the ministry noted. (...)”⁷¹

This article quotes some document from the headquarters of the regional organization, which is not further concretized. We may speculate that it was some confidential internal document, which the journalist was able to get. Probably, the document was leaked to the journalist intentionally. The article was published on 5th October, five days after the deadline for concluding the EPA talks, which was not met. As a result, Kenyan exports lost duty-free access to the European market and were subjected to standard GSP regime for developing countries. This article tries to persuade readers that they should blame the EU: the EU was not cooperative, it insisted on unfair clauses, it wanted to dictate terms of trade talks and the final agreement, it refused to participate in the new round of talks to resolve a few remaining issues. It is hard to assess whether this document was motivated more by serving regional interests, or whether it was an attempt to avoid criticism of the regional negotiating team. Probably both motivations lay behind this document. What is crucial for us is that this document was paraphrased by the journalist in his article. Moreover, this article was published on the back page (“second story of the day”), which can attract more readers to read it. Thus, although such sharp rhetoric is rather

⁷¹ #541, Joshua Masinde: Region accuses EU of dictating terms, The Daily Nation, 5 October 2014.

exceptional, it is part of the news discourse and it can enter the broader societal discourse on Kenya-EU trade relations.

Foreign public official

There are five articles written by foreign public officials. One was written by World Bank economist and deals with impact of Eurozone crisis on Africa. Another one was written by the Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs and focuses on bilateral relations between the two countries. Two articles are more relevant for this dissertation. First was written by the Ambassador of the EU to Kenya:

Starting with the trade-based Arusha Convention in 1968, our partnership has broadened and deepened to become a comprehensive relationship of cooperation in development, security, humanitarian assistance and investment. (...) Trade, particularly with Europe, remains strong and has been a long-term driver of Kenyan growth. As the buyer of more than a quarter of Kenya's exports Europe's consumption continues to underpin hundreds of thousands of jobs around Kenya, supporting a growing middle class and a strong pillar of economic expansion. (...) This is no longer just a partnership between governments. It is a modern relationship, of people to people, trader to trader, and business to business. (...) Our deep-rooted partnership is about respecting the values and standards that our people espouse and that our governments have committed to.⁷²

Although this article focuses on EU-Kenya relationship and does not mention any other global actor, it does not require much imagination to read it as a soft attack on China. Mr Briet highlights those aspects of the partnership, which are often criticised of being lacking in the China's case. First, European engagement in Kenya goes beyond trade and investment issues to cover also security and humanitarian issues. Second, European engagement is based on wide spectrum of political, business and societal contacts. Third, European engagement remains consistent throughout decades regardless current political or economic situation. Message of this article is quite straightforward: the EU is a reliable partner and helps Kenya in its development.

Second article was written by the EU Commissioner for international cooperation and development Neven Mimica:

The European Union is working towards an ambitious and comprehensive package that includes the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in a balance way. (...) We stand ready to play our part in mobilising the resources for putting the future agenda into practice. (...) However, the question of financing for development cannot be addressed in isolation – that is not just about donor funding. (...) Good governance and effective institutions will be fundamental for progress and success.

⁷² #299, Lodewijk Briet: EU looks forward to a meaningful partnership with the Kenyan people, The Daily Nation, 1 December 2013.

*Unleashing the potential of the private sector is key. (...) Trade is one of the most powerful means at our disposal to promote sustainable development and growth.*⁷³

This article focuses on global development agenda and sends to readers two messages. First, that division between development aid and trade is anachronistic. Contrarily, these two are interlinked: trade is the key tool for development. This message probably wants to highlight the importance of the EPA, which was signed in October 2014 and which was supposed to be ratified within two years. Second message is that the EU is committed to global development agenda and remains a reliable partner in Kenya's development.

A very specific example of "article" is the whole-page advert of the EU delegation to Kenya entitled "Note for Kenyan Exporters", which was published on 22nd September 2014, just few days before Kenya lost free access to the EU market. Advert is factual information about changes related to the shift from DFQF regime to the GSP regime. It states that changes will be only temporal as both sides of the negotiations are close to conclusion of talks. It openly puts responsibility on the EAC countries, which have not concluded the negotiations yet. This is probably meant as an inducement to Kenyan interest groups to press their government to conclude the talks.

We can also find many quotations from public officials in other articles: British High Commissioner to Kenya Christian Turner was quoted several times on the issue of ban on imports of miraa⁷⁴ to the UK; British Home Secretary Therese May was quoted on the same issue; EPA talks were commented by EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht, EU Ambassador to Kenya Lodewijk Briet, or EU Trade and Communications Counsellor in Kenya Christopher de Vroey; cooperation between Africa and the EU was commented by the President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy, among others. Let's add three short quotations from the EU officials:

⁷³ #690, Neven Mimica: EU ready for post-2015 agenda to share prosperity and reduce poverty in Africa, The Daily Nation, 14 July 2015.

⁷⁴ Miraa, called also khat, is a stimulant, classified as a drug under the World Health Organization. However, in many countries it is a legal substance. In July 2013, the UK government imposed a ban on miraa imports for two reasons. First, miraa causes health and social harms. Second, as the UK was the last member country of the EU which allowed imports of miraa, it became a regional hub for miraa business and for re-exports to other member states and also to North America.

Recently, EU delegation chief in Kenya Lodewijk Briët warned that Kenya risks being left out of the agreement. “Although negotiations are at an advanced stage, only a few issues to do with the pact have been finalised,” he said.⁷⁵

Speaking to the Sunday Nation, EU Trade and Communications Counsellor Christopher de Vroey said signing the agreements is important as Kenya is the only country in the region that does not now qualify for duty free export.⁷⁶

EU head of delegation Lodewijk Briët said though the EU was hopeful of a deal, it was not prepared to budge on two of the issues. “The EU Parliament insists on respect for Human rights and the Most Favoured Nation clause, giving us a symmetrical access in time and in scope for EU’s 28 member states,” he told the forum.⁷⁷

First and second excerpts reveal that members of the EU delegation in Kenya pursue active public diplomacy through local media to influence the discourse on the EPA. The EU officials remind Kenyan stakeholders that not signing the EPA and not meeting the EU trade rules will have a fatal consequence: Kenya will lose access to the European market, which will be detrimental for producers, exporters, and for the whole country. This form of public diplomacy is in fact pushing Kenyan stakeholders to accept and obey the rules set by the EU. The third excerpt reveals that there are some red lines, which the EU can hardly accept to cross. One of such red lines is giving up the reference to respect for human rights, which is part of the Cotonou Agreement and which is part of European development policy.

Local businessperson

There are two articles written by Kenyan businesspeople. One was written by the manager of the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry:

Kenya has great potential and its economic foundation must be safeguarded to enable it to regain independence and have a bigger say in its own destiny. That is why we need egalitarian pro-poor agreements in the 21st century. (...) The government is on the right path in insisting that the contentious issues in the EPAs be dealt with to regain global fairness in international trade. Trade between Kenya and the European Union has always been in favour of the EU. Trade deficit is expected to deepen even further if the EPAs are signed in their current form. The main issues at the centre of controversy – agricultural subsidies and export taxes and duties – are a trap that have the potential to harm Kenyans,

⁷⁵ #363, Zeddy Sambu: Impasse on trade talks threatens Kenya’s quota-free market status, The Daily Nation, 16 February 2014.

⁷⁶ #482, Francis Mureithi: Kenya could lose lucrative European flower markets over trade pact, The Daily Nation, 13 July 2014.

⁷⁷ #433, Zeddy Sambu: Kenya “ready” to soften stance on EU trade pact, The Daily Nation, 11 May 2014.

*particularly farmers and micro and small enterprises. They are likely to consolidate the trade imbalance since they are tailored to render Kenya's agricultural sector uncompetitive.*⁷⁸

This article sees the EPA negatively as it will not benefit Kenyan society. If signed, farmers and small enterprises will be affected as they will not be competitive with the subsidized European farmers. If not signed, large producers and exporters will be affected, which can threaten tens of thousands of jobs in the sector. Main message of this article is expressed in its title: Kenya should not “rush” to sign the EPA in the deadline set by the EU. Instead, government should sign only such an agreement that is balanced and beneficial for Kenyan people.

Second article was written by the chief executive officer of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers. She focuses on different feature of the negotiations, on difficulties with finding a consensus between member states of the EAC. She also analyses impact of the lost preferential access to the EU market since October 2014.

*Though EPAs should be signed by the EAC trade bloc, Kenya's position is particularly precarious since the other EAC states are classified as least developed countries and will continue enjoying duty-free and quota-free exports to Europe. (...) In a nutshell, the competitiveness of our goods in the European markets will be eroded by around 5 to 20 per cent. (...) If we are unable to sell these goods in Europe, we will be staring at a one-billion-shilling loss. Our job base is also threatened. More than two million people are employed, or are dependent on horticultural alone.*⁷⁹

There are also quotations from Kenyan businesspeople in other articles. In the US case, the textile and apparel industry was the most engaged and the most cited sector. In the EU case, horticulture and floriculture sectors are the most engaged and the most cited. Top representatives of the leading sectoral organizations were often asked to express their opinions on the topic – for example chairman of the Kenya Flower Council Richard Fox, CEO of the Kenya Flower Council Jane Ngige, CEO of the Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya Stephen Mbithi, and others. Throughout the period, they commented the ongoing negotiations and possible or real consequences of signing or not signing the EPA for the sector. Perception of consequences reflects different phases in the negotiation process. In 2012, the ongoing and protracted negotiations created uncertainty and threatened long-term contracts. It had also negative effect on planning and investment. Since the late 2013, uncertainty had been replaced by an imminent threat that exporters would be prevented from free access to

⁷⁸ #522, Peter K. Biwott: Sign trade pacts in a rush, regret the inevitable economic damage at leisure, The Daily Nation, 8 September 2014.

⁷⁹ #542, Betty Maina: Why Kenya exports will attract higher tax, The Daily Nation, 6 October 2014.

the European market. However, there was still cautious optimism among producers that the agreement would be concluded on time. When it was not, it was seen as a disaster for the sector with expected substantial economic and social consequences. When the EPA talks were finally concluded, consequences are generally perceived as positive: new agreement means that Kenya will soon regain the DFQF access to European market. Fresh produce sector will then return back to its normality. When Kenya finally regained the DFQF status, it was seen as a relief for the industry. We can illustrate this development of views on the following excerpts:

Kenyan exporters fear that uncertainty over trade agreements may jeopardise access to European markets[.] (...) “We engage in forward looking contracts. If we do not know what taxes we will be charged for our products come 2014, we can’t sign the contracts. Our buyers are starting to look elsewhere,” said Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya CEO of the Stephen Mbithi.⁸⁰

Panic has gripped fresh produce and exporters in East Africa following failure to reach an economic deal between the East African Community and the European Union, a key trade ally. (...) Mr Richard Fox (...) said the delays were a great concern to the industry after competing producers elsewhere “long did it”. “Columbia, which is a strong competitor, has reached a deal with the European Union. Failure to reach an agreement means our exports to the EU will start incur duties. It means that Kenya will become uncompetitive because all the other EAC countries and Ethiopia are LDCs,” said Mr Fox. (...) ⁸¹

More than 150,000 Kenyans stand to lose their jobs if the horticulture industry – collapses from the effects of new taxes imposed on Kenyan exports to Europe, the country’s biggest market for fresh produce. (...) “It is a total disaster. We are talking about new taxes of up to 15 per cent for some of our most popular products in Europe,” said Mr Stephen Mbithi, CEO of the Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya. “This basically means the retail price has to go up by at least a similar margin which leaves us at a disadvantaged position.”⁸²

Exporters (...) have expressed cautious optimism that all EAC members will ratify the regulations ahead of the peak Valentine season in February. “We make almost 40 per cent of our total annual sales during this season,” said Finlays Horticulture Kenya managing director Richard Hechle, adding that reinstating Kenya to duty free, quota free status before the peak season would be instrumental in the recovery of the flower industry that has suffered heavy job losses when firms were forced to shut down. “We have closed down the company and laid off 85 per cent of the employees. The remaining few, who are all in

⁸⁰ #036, Muthoki Mumo: Traders worry over Europe market access, The Daily Nation, 22 March 2012.

⁸¹ #411, Nation Reporters: Alarm as East Africa fails to strike export deal with EU on fresh produce, The Daily Nation, 25 April 2014.

⁸² #539, Charles Wokabi, Ramenya Gibendi, Aggrey Mutambo: 150,000 jobs to go as EU taxes Kenya goods, The Daily Nation, 3 October 2014.

administration, have voluntarily accepted a 50 per cent pay cut as a result,” said Balem Nyowe, general manager of Wananchi Marine Products which exports tuna to the EU.⁸³

The EU formally returned Kenya to this status [DFQF access] after the European Parliament and the European Council accepted the proposal for the country to be put back under the Market Access regulation. (...) “This decision is a relief for Kenya’s floriculture sector and for all operators and businesses involved in the floriculture trade in Kenya, in view of the approaching peak sale season – Valentine’s Day,” Kenya Flower Council chief executive Jane Ngige and Union Fleurs (an international flower trade association) secretary general Sylvie Mamias said in a joint statement last week.⁸⁴

With relation to the second main frame topic – phytosanitary standards, business associations take the EU regulation as a fact and urge government to take adequate steps to help farmers and producers to cope with the strict standards. They recognize that the problem is on the Kenyan side and its underdeveloped agriculture sector.

Growing concern by the European Union market on the minimum chemical residue levels on horticultural products, is a warning to the government to rethink its strategy reviving the ailing pyrethrum sub-sector, a farmer’s club said. Pyrethrum Growers Association national chairman Justus Monda said the country can still avoid losing the multi-billion horticulture market if it gives the crop the attention it deserves. (...) “The only way to avoid losing the horticulture market is to review our budgetary allocation and give the sector enough funds that would turn it into a profitable venture,” Mr Monda said.⁸⁵

Foreign businessperson

There is no article written by European businesspeople, just two articles quoting them. In both cases, articles inform about concrete French and German investment in Kenya.

Journalist

There are 90 articles written by journalists. All of them are “standard” articles; there is no opinion, analysis, or commentary. These articles inform readers about different aspects of EU-Kenya economic relations. One aspect is access to the EU market, which is crucial to the region’s economic growth. Kenya needs to sign the EPA in order to safeguard international trade with Europe, especially in the lucrative horticulture and tea sectors. This issue is of great relevance and appeared twice on the front page. On 3rd October 2014, The Daily Nation predicated that more than 150,000 jobs would be lost due to taxes imposed on Kenyan imports (see excerpt from article #539 above).

⁸³ #555, Ywonne Kawira: Kenya to regain duty-free status for European markets in January, The Daily Nation, 2 November 2014.

⁸⁴ #590, Aggrey Mutambo: Duty-free exports to Europe resume today, The Daily Nation, 25 December 2014.

⁸⁵ #526, Nation Correspondent: EU’s threat a wake-up call, says lobby group, The Daily Nation, 15 September 2014.

On 15th October 2014, The Daily Nation informed that the EU and the EAC had reached the deal and that 150,000 jobs in the sector had been saved. Second aspect is different position of five member states with regard to EPA talks. These two issues are often mentioned in the same article as they are in fact two sides of the same coin.

Kenya is also keen to seek an end to the drawn-out negotiations for a pact that will safeguard its exports to Europe (...). Kenya has a Sh105 billion market – for flowers, fish, tea and coffee – to lose, should Europe introduce the punitive taxes. However, the other EAC members have strongly resisted a reciprocal deal with EU, saying it could hurt their domestic industrialisation. This has placed Kenya in what technocrats call an “interesting scenario”. While it is the strongest economy in the region, it has to take care not to hurt the interests of other members of the bloc.⁸⁶

Kenya has no option but to sign an Economic Partnership Agreement by October 1, to keep enjoying duty-free access to the European Union market. (...) There are concerns among trade experts that if Kenya decides to go it alone, it could upset the East African common market protocol and customs union. Kenya is in a different trade band from its counterparts in the trade bloc as it is considered a developing country while others are ranked in the least-developed countries category.⁸⁷

The East African Community has accepted a draft agreement for fresh produce exports to the European Union market. (...) However, the decision appears to have been reached too late, since Kenyan flower exporters will have to pay taxes from October 1 after all. (...) Kenya wants a flexible regime to enable the country introduce preventive measures especially in times of drought, without burdening the farmers. Kenya could have chosen to negotiate alone with the EU, but Nairobi opted to bring in the regional bloc, saying it would accelerate integration.⁸⁸

Another issue is government priorities – some articles assume that agricultural sector is not a top priority for government, despite it is the main source of foreign exchange (see excerpt from article #526 above).

Analyst/academia

There is one article written by independent writer and analyst. This article was written at the occasion of EU-Africa Summit in Brussels in April 2014. It analyses mutual relations in more general perspective, including political and security issues.

The EU-Africa summit will be held amid clear recognition by European countries that they have lagged behind in launching tactical diplomatic offensives to win favour with the erstwhile lacklustre Africa. The delay has been in contrast to frantic moves by China, the United States, India and other patently more proactive nations that are reportedly

⁸⁶ #349, Nation Reporter: Talks on EAC exports to Europe resume today, The Daily Nation, 27 January 2014.

⁸⁷ #370, Mwaniki Wahome: Kenya in tight spot over European trade accord, The Daily Nation, 23 February 2014.

⁸⁸ #530, Aggrey Mutambo: Bloc strikes deal with EU on fresh produce, The Daily Nation, 22 September 2014.

preparing to host their own Africa summits later this year. Europe, in its turn, is striving to resuscitate traditional commercial ties with the continent once lorded over during the colonial times. Having in the past been widely perceived as hard taskmasters in their dealings with Africa countries, many developed nations evidently realise they must change tack and espouse more tactical relations with the continent. (...) [T]he carrot-and-stick approach to African issues has left the West open to mounting criticism of what is viewed as a continuation of the condescending attitudes.⁸⁹

According to the author, Western countries and the EU in particular found themselves in the defensive position vis-à-vis growing Chinese diplomatic and economic activities in Africa. Facing this challenge, Western countries had to change their tactics in Africa, which means that they softened their uncompromising stance on governance issues and human rights in favour of more pragmatic trade-oriented and investment-oriented approach. According to the author, “there are clearly few options better than the current cautious diplomacy” and giving up being “Africa’s morality police” if the EU wishes to keep or even strengthen its position in Africa.

In one “journalist” article, there is also a quotation from analyst from the leading think-tank Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) on the EPA talks.

Ten years on, and with Kenya under pressure to sign the protocol or risk massive disruptions to the economy, fingers are being pointed at the negotiating skills of the delegation in which the majority of the negotiators are new, coming in with the new government in 2013. This has prompted the hiring of the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, a public policy think-tank, to strengthen the government’s negotiating position. “We are doing a paper for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the implications of EPAs on Kenya. We are trying to back up the government,” said a top Kippira official, who did not want to be named. “The negotiators did not push hard enough for a common position for the region,” added the official.⁹⁰

According to the analyst, it would be odd to blame solely the EU for delays in negotiations. Not only European intransigence on some issues and absence of consensual regional position, but also incapability of Kenyan government to push the crucial regional agenda harder ahead is responsible for the delay.

Civil society

There is no article written by the civil society representative, just one quotation from the leader of the Central Organisation of Trade Unions of Kenya:

Central Organisation of Trade Unions Secretary-General Francis Atwoli said it is time the European Union stopped dictating terms to the bloc. “The colonial mentality that continues

⁸⁹ #398, Ciugu Mwagiru: High-stakes summit to redefine EU, Africa ties, The Daily Nation, 30 March 2014.

⁹⁰ #363, Zeddy Sambu: Impasse on trade talks threatens Kenya’s quota-free market status, The Daily Nation, 16 February 2014.

to be harboured by the European Union remains the greatest impediment to success of the economic partnership agreements and as a region,” he said in a statement on Sunday. Mr Atwoli said East Africa should oppose any form of coercion since EU’s main pre-occupation has always been how to extract raw materials from the region. “Our industries have collapsed and the few surviving have to heavily depend on government subsidy, yet we have given a blanket market access to the EU,” Mr Atwoli said.⁹¹

Trade union leaders worldwide are known for their sharp rhetoric and the Kenyans are not different. Author strongly opposes the trade talks as he feels that the bloc is forced to sign an agreement, which will harm domestic industry, and workers in particular. According to the author, EPA talks are nothing less than further continuation of European colonial mentality and colonial resource-extracting interests.

Reader

There is one letter written by the reader. However, this letter thinks about whether and how Kenya’s cooperation (including economic) with Western powers will be affected by the ongoing ICC trial against President and Vice-President.

To sum up, when we analyse articles on the EU-Kenya relations, we get a very different picture from analysis of US-Kenya relations. First, nine in ten articles on the topic are “standard” articles. Their tone is neutral, informative, without expressing strong normative values. EPA or phytosanitary regulations are taken as a matter of fact. Articles focus on consequences of not signing the EPA – significant economic losses with substantial social consequences – rather than on the content of the agreement itself. Compared with the US and China, relations with the EU seem to be by far the least controversial. The EU market has been crucial for Kenya for more than fifty years and no one contests that it will be so in the future. Contrary to the US, there is real substance in mutual relations, not only shallow symbolism.

Second, despite generally neutral tone, negative voices are also heard. The most radical attacks come from leaders of trade unions or industry chambers. Contrarily, agricultural interest groups seem to have more positive attitudes. This is not surprising as agriculture is heavily dependent on exports to the EU, while industrial companies and workers may be affected by opening up Kenyan market. Similarly strong negative position is expressed also in an unspecified EAC document. Nevertheless, general picture contrasts with that of US-Kenya relations. It seems that in the case of the EU there is one prevailing news discourse, which is shared by Kenyan and European

⁹¹ #543, Nation Correspondent: Cotu says no to EU taxes, The Daily Nation, 7 October 2014.

officials, Kenyan businesspeople, journalists, and analysts. The EU is seen as an indispensable trade partner and Kenya should do its job to conform to EU trade regulation in order to safeguard this crucial export market. However, there are also sharp dissent voices, but they are rare and isolated, so we can hardly speak of any alternative news discourse.

Third, what may be surprising is that the potential of public diplomacy through local newspapers remains underutilized. On one side, we can find five articles written by US officials, including one interview. On the other side, there is one article related to economic issues and one article related to development agenda written by the EU official. If we take into account that this was a final phase of EPA negotiations, it is even more surprising. Although members of the EU delegation to Kenya (particularly the former EU ambassador Lodewijk Briet and Trade and Communication Counsellor Christophe de Vroey) are quoted in many articles, they only react to issues raised by others. They rarely raise issues by themselves. As a result, quotations are often “defensive” reactions. Two opinion articles and one advert in almost four years is very modest contribution to building positive image of the EU in Kenya.

Fourth, Cotonou Agreement as the main framework for relations between the EU and the ACP countries is metaphorically described as “a house built on three pillars - development cooperation, trade and the political dimensions of ACP-EC cooperation - which are closely interrelated. Remove any one of these pillars and the stability of the whole house is likely to suffer” (ACP Secretariat 2013). However, analysis of articles in The Daily Nation does not confirm this metaphor. As EPA represents the trade pillar of the house, trade issues are predominant, while political issues and development cooperation are less important – but not neglected. Link between these three pillars, which forms the external basis of the European social market model, is expressed only very cautiously and rather indirectly, see excerpts from articles #299 and # 690 above. Moreover, there is no direct or indirect reaction either from the editorial staff or from the readers. This implies that both articles were an isolated address to the readers – something as to remind that the EU is here working for better world. However, impact of such exclamation is very doubtful. If the EU presents itself as a promoter of the social dimension of globalization and of universal norms (Normative Power Europe), we would expect it to use public diplomacy more actively to promote the “ambitious and comprehensive package” as a European added value.

China

Thirdly, I will analyse China and its developmental model. China became very active in Kenya in last few years and its presence is highly visible, particularly in the construction industry. There are 107 articles related to economic relations between Kenya and China and other 22 articles focusing rather on Kenyan foreign relations within the framework of China/West rivalry. These articles will be analysed also in this subsection, because this rivalry is perceived as a result of Chinese growing interest in Africa. From the total of 396 single topic appearances, the most frequent frame topics are cooperation in general terms (58), development aid (51), the impact of China on Africa (37), soft power (33), trade (32), investment (29), and infrastructure (28). China offers Africa with a complex package of development initiatives, which includes debt relief, trade, grants, loans, investment, and industrial development. Articles usually deal with such packages in their complexity, thus combining more frame topics together.

Eastern press agency

There are eight articles taken from the Chinese state press agency Xinhua. These articles express the Chinese narrative: each state has its inviolable sovereignty, which means that it should be free to independently assess its development needs, set appropriate goals, and define its means on how to achieve these goals. China is ready to help Africa to speed up its development by grants, concessional loans, and increased volumes of trade. Its approach is based on the mutually beneficial win-win “business as usual” principle, which means that China is interested in economic opportunities, not in political lecturing and moralizing.

When the Chinese Prime Minister visited Kenya in May 2014, readers could find a whole-page article taken from Xinhua, which was published in the advertorial section, thus probably paid for by the Chinese Embassy.

In 2006, China and Africa agreed to upgrade their relationship to a new type of strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges. (...) The cooperation between the two will not only bring about mutually beneficial and win-win results, but also help promote world economic balance and inclusive growth.”⁹²

The day after, another article taken from Xinhua, this time published in the Sunday Review section, repeats the same narrative. This article also quotes several African

⁹² #421, Xinhua: China-Africa ties to enter new era, The Daily Nation, 10 May 2014.

scholars and ministers from different countries, probably to enhance the reliability of the message.

Francis Chigunta, senior lecturer of development studies at the University of Zambia, said this type of cooperation is long over-due and should assure Africa that China is not interested in imposing anything. (...) Calling China an “all-weather friend”, Peter Machungwa, senior lecturer of management and business at the Zambia Open University and a former Zambian minister, said China has been a very good friend of Africa for a long time and has helped Africa in many areas such as improving infrastructure and the economic well-being of many countries.⁹³

Chinese policy towards Africa was clearly defined in the article about the Chinese President’s speech at the United Nations in September 2015:

The Chinese leader said that his country would step up investment in the least developed countries – which are mostly in Africa – by at least \$12 billion by 2030. China has been an increasingly active investor around the world, although it has generally focused on seeking resources rather than broader humanitarian goals.⁹⁴

Western press agency

There are six articles taken from Western media: four articles from the French press agency AFP, one article from the British media company BBC, and one article from the New York Times. The AFP articles are about Chinese investments in oil and gas production in Kenya, Chinese development aid, African traders living in cities of southern China, and the Chinese Prime Minister’s speech at the African Union.

The NYT article focuses on the fact that most Western broadcasting and newspaper companies are retrenching due to economic crisis, while China’s state-run news media giants are rapidly expanding in Africa. It also notices the different role media play in the West and in China.

The BBC article focuses on the rivalry between China and Japan in Africa:

China and Japan are criticising each other’s policies in Africa as each country pledges more money for the continent. (...) Mr Abe’s spokesman Tomohiko Taniguchi (...) said: “Japan’s aid policy is to really aid the human capital of Africa.” He said many African leaders believed through strong links with Japan they can obtain industrial expertise. China insists its aid and co-operation with Africa are completely selfless. (...) China does not approve of “certain countries” which try to compete with others for their own interests and offer aid to Africa out of purely political motives. This appears to be a reference to Japan’s attempts to win

⁹³ #432, Xinhua: China’s clear commitments to Africa get the point, experts say, The Daily Nation, 11 May 2014.

⁹⁴ #766, Xinhua: Taking greater role, China leader pledges \$2bn to aid poor nations, The Daily Nation, 28 September 2015.

*the votes of African leaders in support of its bid to be a permanent member of the UNSC, something China opposes.*⁹⁵

Although *The Daily Nation* has a partnership with Xinhua, there is not any difference in frequency of publishing articles from Chinese and Western sources. However, it seems that the latter are published only if they present neutral information and do not openly attack China, or if they reproduce the Chinese narrative (as for example the last AFP article, which, using the Prime Minister's words, repeats the Chinese narrative of iron-clad equal friendship with Africa).

Local public official

Only two articles were written directly by Kenyan public officials. The first one was written by the Presidential Strategic Communications Unit and focuses on the results of the President's state visit to China. The second is a letter written by the former Kenyan Ambassador to China, who asserts that:

*We turned to China when the situation became desperate. (...) China understood Africa's problems. Every nation looks out for its own interests, and China is no exception. The difference is that the Chinese policy was a win-win one. The African countries were to identify their interests and the Chinese would come in to do their part, not by giving aid but in a business-like fashion. As a result, our infrastructure has been fixed. (...) There is nothing wrong with looking West again, now that our problems have eased. After all, the West is our traditional friend.*⁹⁶

In this article, we can see a very typical tone of many articles in *The Daily Nation*. On the one side, the author praises China for its engagement in the infrastructural development of Kenya, particularly when the West became affected by the global economic crisis. On the other, he recognises that the West is a traditional partner of Kenya and rising China should not lead Kenya to repudiate the West. Rather, the current situation enables African leaders to balance between different external partners and to increase their leverage in negotiations. Nevertheless, even this "balanced" opinion repeats the Chinese narrative. It acknowledges partnership with China as being a win-win solution. Both sides have their interests and both sides are able to satisfy their interests and needs through this partnership – in the case of Kenya physical infrastructure is the main interest.

Top officials, most often President Kenyatta, are also quoted in other articles:

⁹⁵ #340, BBC: Japan, China criticise each other's Africa policies, *The Daily Nation*, 12 January 2014.

⁹⁶ #649, Julius Ole Sunkuli: Let us respect the Chinese, our friends and partners in Kenya's development, *The Daily Nation*, 7 April 2015.

*President Kenyatta called on the Asian economic giant to build the highest level of partnership with Kenya to foster economic benefits for both countries. Kenya's major interest was to secure funding for infrastructural development projects including the construction of a standard gauge rail line[.]*⁹⁷

*President Kenyatta stressed that the Kenya government was keen on ensuring a steady relationship with China. The President said that Nairobi's ties with Beijing had led to improvement of infrastructure over the past 12 years. "A critical lesson we have drawn from China's remarkable growth over the last three decades is that prosperity is achievable with proper planning and prudent investment," he said. President Kenyatta added that Kenya and China will continue to deepen mutual investment and trade ties.*⁹⁸

*China's engagement with Kenya is set to expand with a new focus on industrial development and technology transfer. (...) President Kenyatta said Kenya appreciates the partnership. "Our relationship is built on the principle of partnership. This is a partnership I want to see increased and cemented to bring mutual benefits," said the President.*⁹⁹

These three excerpts are important. In all cases, the actual context of the article is a state visit on a top level - President Kenyatta's state visit to China, Chinese Prime Minister's state visit to Kenya, and Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister's state visit to Kenya. Because such top level state visits usually lead to signing concrete agreement and deals, they are highly medialized. First and third articles appeared on a back page, while second article appeared on a front page and the following pages ("story of the day"). As the following excerpt confirms, such words by President Kenyatta are not just verbal performances for his hosts/guests, but reflect real position of the current Kenyan administration.

*Kenya's donor relations have shifted, with China and the African Development Bank taking centre stage in funding the huge infrastructure projects going on across the country. (...) President Kenyatta has often said Kenya will work with countries that share common interests and respect the sovereignty of the country, which experts interpret to mean loans that have less stringent conditions.*¹⁰⁰

Kenyan government views China in positive terms, partly due to its generous borrowing, which is financing infrastructure development in the country, partly due to its diplomatic support in the ICC case. Kenyan leadership sees China as an example of rapid development, which it would like to follow. Kenya has formulated its development goals in the Vision 2030 with the aim to become middle-income country

⁹⁷ #218, Charles Wokabi: Uhuru woos Chinese investors, The Daily Nation, 21 August 2013.

⁹⁸ #425, Isaac Ongiri: Now China rewards Jubilee with billions, The Daily Nation, 11 May 2014.

⁹⁹ #592, Aggrey Mutambo: China to help Kenya set up industries, The Daily Nation, 11 January 2015.

¹⁰⁰ #324, Mwaniki Wahome: China, AfDB top state's list of project financiers, The Daily Nation, 29 December 2013.

by 2030. Current administration wishes to achieve this goal even earlier and China is supposed to be the right partner to help Kenya to do so. All excerpts confirm that Kenyan leaders are far from defying the Chinese narrative. Contrarily, it would not be much exaggerating to say that they are in fact replicating the Chinese narrative. Nevertheless, after Kenyatta's visit to Washington, Obama's visit to Nairobi and particularly after the withdrawal of the ICC charges relations with the West have improved to the extent that Kenyatta has softened his rhetoric on "Look East" policy.

President Uhuru Kenyatta (...) said Kenya could not afford "the luxury" of aligning itself to either the East or West.¹⁰¹

The "Look East" policy (...) has not only earned big dividends for Kenya in loans and grants for major infrastructure projects; it has also demonstrated that Kenya can afford to ignore traditional western lenders and donors. The repairing of relationships between Nairobi and Washington, and the Chinese card, featured heavily in the backdrop of all Uhuru-Obama engagements. (...) President Kenyatta put it that for Kenya it was not about looking West or East, but looking forward on the path of development.¹⁰²

This position is similar to that of Ambassador Sunkuli and indicates that in the second half of his term, Kenyatta would pursue policy of balancing between different partners, rather than focusing exclusively on China. This may signal that Look East policy resulted rather from political controversies than that it was some coherent and strategic foreign economic policy. The author thinks that with Look East policy, Kenya was playing the Chinese card against the West – and it was playing successfully, both in political and economic terms.

Foreign public official

There are three articles written by foreign public officials. One was written by the World Bank analyst, who claimed that despite a massive flow of Chinese products into Africa, there is still a big space for Africa how to avoid direct competition with China, particularly in food processing and local services. The other two articles were written by the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya. On the occasion of the Chinese Prime Minister's visit to Kenya, he wrote:

The past five decades have witnessed cordial China-African relations being handed down from generation to generation. China and Africa have been firmly standing together through storms and supporting each other no matter how the international climate

¹⁰¹ #745, Otiato Guguyu: Kenya risks souring ties with partners over projects, The Daily Nation, 30 August 2015.

¹⁰² #706, Macharia Gaitho: US leader's visit massive boost for Kenya, The Daily Nation, 28 July 2015.

changes. (...) Though geographically far apart, China and Kenya are well connected politically, economically, culturally and technologically.¹⁰³

In other articles, we can find quotations from other Chinese officials, including President, former President, Prime Minister, or Minister of Foreign Affairs.

*[China's Foreign Affairs Minister] Mr Wang said his mission was to strengthen the existing bilateral co-operation between Kenya and China and chart new areas that the two countries can partner. He said Kenya is at the stage of industrial take-off and China is ready to support it with its experience of attaining successful industrialisation.*¹⁰⁴

All Chinese officials disseminate the official narrative. It is not surprising, foreign officials from other countries do the same and they reproduce their own narratives. A significant feature of such articles is that they focus on depicting a positive image of their respective countries and avoid using negative images about other countries, at least openly. However, there are foreign officials who do not fit to this general trend, such as the former governor of the Nigerian Central Bank Lamido Sanusi. His words from the *Financial Times* are reproduced also in *The Daily Nation*:

*Sanusi warned that Africa's relations with China carry a "whiff of colonialism." He argued that China is pursuing extractive policies that are undermining local manufacturing and "deindustrialising" Africa. The continent, he says, is carrying a torch for the romance of the Non-Aligned Movement that united China and Africa. China has since ceased to be an underdeveloped state and has as much capacity to carry out mass exploitation as any Western power. "Africa must recognise that China – like the US, Russia, Britain, Brazil and the rest – is in Africa not for African interests but its own. The romance must be replaced by hard-nosed economic thinking," he wrote.*¹⁰⁵

Here, China is seen in much more negative terms as neo-colonial power, which pursues in Africa selfish extractive and exploitative policies. Obviously, such opinion is in direct contradiction with the Chinese narrative.

Local businessperson

No local businessperson has written any comment, but some of them are quoted in standard articles. The supplement "Enter the Dragon" focused on small-scale traders in Nairobi and the competition they faced from Chinese traders.

Traders in Nairobi say small-scale Chinese competitors are undercutting them out of business. (...) "They usually come to our shops disguised as customers and ask for our prices, only to go back to their country and bring to the market the same products at a

¹⁰³ #419, Liu Xianfa: China-Kenya voyage on a new trajectory, *The Daily Nation*, 6 May 2014.

¹⁰⁴ #592, Aggrey Mutambo: China to help Kenya set up industries, *The Daily Nation*, 11 January 2015.

¹⁰⁵ #151, Muthoki Mumo: Economic ties with Africa top agenda of China's new president, *The Daily Nation*, 24 March 2013.

much lower price.” “Most of the Chinese don’t have shops, which means they don’t pay rent or tax, hence they can afford to sell their products cheaply,” the trader lamented to DN2.¹⁰⁶

Foreign businessperson

Chinese managers wrote just two letters to The Daily Nation:

*That Kenya has been selected among the few African countries to host the President [of China] is evidence of the huge premium both countries attach to this deepening and mutually beneficial relationship.*¹⁰⁷

*This incident [of a Chinese restaurant not allowing African guests to enter after 5pm] was deliberately planned by people who do not want the Chinese and Kenyans to do business. They do not want Kenyans to enjoy decent and affordable housing. They do not want Kenya to realise Vision 2030. (...) As we reflect on the common journey we have taken, let us ask ourselves who supported Kenya in the fight for independence? Who have supported Kenya in its economic and social development in the last 50 years, and especially in the last 10 years? Who are working day and night to build roads, bridges, hospitals, railways, affordable houses and working with Kenyans to do all flagship projects towards realising Vision 2030? Let’s look at the facts and think with clear minds on our relations.*¹⁰⁸

Not surprisingly, Chinese businessmen replicate the narrative of long-term partnership and mutual benefits. The attitudes of Kenyan businessmen seem to depend on whether they gain or lose from Chinese presence in Kenya, particularly in retail trade.

Journalist

There are 66 articles written by journalists from the Nation Media Group, the publisher of *The Daily Nation*. First, let’s look at “standard” articles published in the national news, county news, international news, or business news sections. Generally, journalists recognise that the main rationale for Chinese activities in Africa is the “growing hunger for resources and markets,” but also attempt to increase its soft power and image, which has been until recently created almost exclusively by Western media. However, the current level of partnership is the result of diplomatic pragmatism: Kenya supports One-China policy, while China supports the Kenya government’s position in the trial at the International Criminal Court.¹⁰⁹ On the one side, this partnership is beneficial for Kenya as Chinese money is “a boost to overall development” and “infrastructure development ultimately provides support to the

¹⁰⁶ #101 Mwaura Samora: Who is the bull in a China Shop?, *The Daily Nation*, 21 August 2012.

¹⁰⁷ #419, Steven Xiong: Chinese Premier’s visit heralds good tidings, but all that glitters is not gold, *The Daily Nation*, 9 May 2014.

¹⁰⁸ #647, Zeyun Yang: Row over restaurant should not jeopardise Kenya-China links, *The Daily Nation*, 4 April 2015.

¹⁰⁹ #425, Isaac Ongiri: China rewards Kenya’s friendship with billions, *The Daily Nation*, 11 May 2014.

economy in the long term”.¹¹⁰ Investment is also expected to help Kenya to establish industrial parks to support manufacturing sector.¹¹¹

On the other side, *The Daily Nation* reporters do not overlook the substantial negative effects on the economy of Kenya: the inflow of counterfeits and sub-standard products;¹¹² large infrastructural projects attracting big political and financial lobbying locally and internationally;¹¹³ trade imbalances between the two regions, which may eventually lead to trade dependency;¹¹⁴ local businessmen losing their markets in favour of Chinese traders or Kenyan traders selling Chinese goods;¹¹⁵ foreign debt rising at a pace, which may lead to the unsustainability of the debt.¹¹⁶

Articles are written in a rather neutral tone, focusing on value-free facts, without normative content. Some articles describe the supposedly ideal state of affairs, which may at least partly eliminate the negative effects of Chinese activities. No article is challenging the Chinese narrative.

*Over the past 10 years, the relationship between China and Africa has literally soared, transforming a continent[.] (...) That new dawn has brought with it kilometres of tarmacked roads and a whole new development hegemony replete with modern infrastructure never before known in Africa. The ongoing facelift is moving with outstanding speed; it is a diplomatic approach that is couched as a meeting of minds without usual stultifying, meddlesome conditionality the West insists on and this is certainly a game-changer for Africa. (...) It can be assumed that the new government will embrace this goodwill and escalate the engagement of the two countries. But in doing so, Kenya must start contemplating fresh and practical rules of engagement with the land of the Dragon. (...) [T]he unfolding friendship must be encouraged but also bound by firm and well thought through strictures. Such strictures must rein in any excesses and anticipate as well as delineate a regime of cooperation guided by a stringent set of mutually beneficial dos and don'ts.*¹¹⁷

¹¹⁰ #219, Joshua Masinde: China's loan to push Kenya debt to Sh2.3trn, *The Daily Nation*, 23 August 2013.

¹¹¹ #425, Isaac Ongiri: China rewards Kenya's friendship with billions, *The Daily Nation*, 11 May 2014.

¹¹² #072, Muthoki Mumo: Africa made highest trade deals at China exhibition, official data shows, *The Daily Nation*, 3 June 2012.

¹¹³ #098 Mugumo Munene, Alphonse Shiundu: Kimunya at the centre of a row over a Sh55bn airport tender, *The Daily Nation*, 12 August 2012.

¹¹⁴ #151, Muthoki Mumo: Economic ties with Africa top agenda of China's new president, *The Daily Nation*, 24 March 2013.

¹¹⁵ #216, Muthoki Mumo: China follows a well-trod path as it seeks more trade with Kenya, *The Daily Nation*, 18 August 2013.

¹¹⁶ #219, Joshua Masinde: China's loan to push Kenya debt to Sh2.3trn, *The Daily Nation*, 23 August 2013.

¹¹⁷ #155 Special Correspondent: Nairobi needs new practical rules of trade with Beijing, *The Daily Nation*, 31 March 2013.

Second category of texts written by journalists is editorials. These are short articles positioned in the opinion section, which are usually unsigned, and which supposedly express editor-in-chief's opinion on some important actual topic. There are six editorials focusing on China or China/West rivalry. As the following excerpt reveals, editorial does not challenge the Chinese narrative (although it seems that it does not agree with the claim that the Chinese aid is without conditions), but it touches the issue from a different point of view. Major global actors disseminate their narratives, but Kenya is not in position that it needs to choose between these narratives and prioritize one partner over the others. In fact, different actors offer Africa with different kinds of partnership with different benefits.

The perception of weakened ties [with the US] has also been fuelled by increased Chinese investment in Africa that some think does not come attached with conditions, unlike support provided by the Western countries. But while China is largely interested in infrastructure projects, the US remains a key partner in areas such as health, security and governance.¹¹⁸

If we shift our focus to fourteen opinions and comments written by journalists, we can see a different picture. Contrary to reporters, columnists are free to go beyond value-free facts, to present relatively sharp normative statements, and to ask uncomfortable questions. They also analyse growing foreign debt or low transparency of the deals resulting in high corruption risks. However, wording and tone of opinions is different from standard articles. While the latter cautiously write about methods of procurement and constitutional principles, opinions openly attack Chinese deals as becoming part of the entrenched Kenyan corruption system. The different tone can be seen at a glance from the title of the articles. However, columnists go even further to undermine the foundations of the Kenya-China relations and to challenge the Chinese strategic narrative. Some of the texts express strong critical view on relations between China and Kenya, although they are by no means anti-Chinese. Let's show examples:

Rapidly rising powers are inherently unstable. China isn't an exception.¹¹⁹

But China has benefited far more from its growing relationship with Kenya than Kenya has. (...) I heartily support China's growing presence in Africa and believe that the continent should welcome it[.] (...) But as President Kenyatta heads to Beijing tomorrow, one of the questions that should exercise his mind is why Kenya has not gotten as good a deal from the Chinese as its neighbours. (...) In Kenya, rumour has it that the Chinese don't have to work

¹¹⁸ #487, No author (editorial): US ties good for Kenya, The Daily Nation, 2 August 2014.

¹¹⁹ #158, Chege Mbitiru: Africa needs to avoid plunge into ties with China, The Daily Nation, 8 April 2013.

too hard investing in such projects because, ahem, government officials have other ways of being convinced to sign off on contracts. This must change.¹²⁰

Critics of the Chinese generosity (...) have cited its potential to burden Kenyans with a huge public debt that will take generations to repay. Yet public debt alone cannot be reason enough for a cash-strapped government to look the Chinese gift horse in the mouth. (...) What should worry Kenyans though is the very high likelihood that the Chinese loans will go down the bottomless pit of official corruption where much of the money from the World Bank, the IMF and Western countries has disappeared over the years. Perish the thought about Chinese loans being cheap or that they come with no conditionalities.¹²¹

Chinese aid is welcome and invaluable to our development, but we should look East with wise and open eyes, not like foolish virgins who don't realise that the rich fellow bearing gifts is not a kind-hearted philanthropist. He will always want something in return. By all means, let us build on relations with China, but do so in ways that advance our national interests rather than just opening ourselves up to exploitation. If we rightly are fed-up with neo-colonialism, we would be foolish to exchange one exploitative relationship for another. There's a lot to gain from China, but we must realise that the rich men from the East are here to expand their geopolitical tentacles, and need us as much as we need them. (...) And if President Kenyatta thinks that Chinese aid does not come with strings attached, let him try, tomorrow, inviting the Dalai Lama to Kenya, or sending an envoy to Taiwan.¹²²

The truth of the matter, in any case, is that the Look East policy was all a big ruse. Yes, they looked to Chinese largesse to fund big development projects, but neglected the simple detail that the Easterners were not holding out freebies. What they offered was very expensive loans designed primarily to expand Chinese economic interests.¹²³

The Chinese will recruit a local middleman today and drop him tomorrow, depending on where the political wind is blowing in Kenya. (...) Then there is this thing they like calling a memorandum of understanding. They have signed these documents all over the place with all manner of parastatal and State departments. Yet the truth of the matter is that it is usually not worth the paper it is written on. It does not commit the Chinese to do anything. (...) I see the Chinese becoming a big political factor in this country. (...) The bigger and more complex the project, the better for the rent-seeking elite[.]¹²⁴

These excerpts formulate some of the key questions, which Kenya should ask and which Kenya seems not to be asking. If China-Kenya partnership is a win-win solution, shouldn't it be more balanced? Is loan from China really more favourable than a loan from the West? Does China pour money into sectors that will help Kenya to speed up

¹²⁰ #215, Murithi Mutiga: Uhuru must reset Kenya's relationship with China on his maiden Beijing visit, The Daily Nation, 18 August 2013.

¹²¹ #221, Otieno Otieno: Chinese deals likely to fuel official graft in Kenya, The Daily Nation, 25 August 2013.

¹²² #436, Macharia Gaitho: The Chinese didn't come to Kenya on charity: We'll pay through the nose, The Daily Nation, 13 May 2014.

¹²³ #657, Macharia Gaitho: Now that America has come calling, let's put the Look East policy on hold, The Daily Nation, 5 May 2015.

¹²⁴ #659, Jaindi Kiseru: Looking East, the cutthroat way of doing business with Chinese partners, The Daily Nation, 13 May 2015.

its development? What is the real motivation of China to pour money into Africa? Is Chinese interest in Africa long-term, or is it a temporary and conditioned by the global financial crisis? And most importantly, do we (read: Kenyans) ever consider strategic interests when dealing with foreigners?¹²⁵ Kenyan leaders, according to some articles, are charmed by Chinese generosity so that they forget to assess what China is offering and why. One of the most respected business journalists, Jaiindi Kiseru, is clear in his view that “China is not Mr Santa Claus”.¹²⁶ China focuses primarily on its own interests and uses its leverage to get what it wants. Thus, many articles openly deny the Chinese narrative. More than anything else, Africa should build its own capacities to lower dependence on others. This idea is nicely expressed in a story about donkeys, horses, and wagons:

*The point is that because Africa had hitched its wagon either to the East or West’s donkeys, and when they took away their animals, our wagons had nowhere to go. The lesson we should have learnt is that we needed to buy and raise our own donkeys. We didn’t. Most African countries surrendered, and went with the winner of the Cold War – the West. Then along came China. (...) Unlike the West, it didn’t demand that African governments observe human rights or stop stealing taxpayers’ money before doing business with them. African leaders loved that. So we unhitched our wagons from the Western donkey, and hooked it up to China. And, for sure, we grew rich, and people started writing and talking about “Africa rising” and “looking East”. Then it happened. China’s economy started to slow, and it slowly reduced what it bought from Africa. (...) Part of the problem was that we left it to China’s horse to pull Africa to development nirvana, and as happened in 1989, we have been again left stranded by the roadside with our wagons.*¹²⁷

Analyst/academia

There are twenty articles written by university scholars and independent analysts. The range of opinions is very broad, from openly pro-Chinese to denouncing partnership between the two countries as a temporary pragmatic issue. Let’s give some examples:

China is no more interested in the continent’s natural resources than are firms from any developed country. (...) Another widespread claim is that Chinese companies prefer to employ their own nationals rather than locals. (...) But Chinese firms say that few local workers have the necessary skills; if they do, African governments can dictate some employment terms, including the proportion of local recruits on a project[.] (...) One must also recognise that low labour costs are an essential component of China’s competitive advantage. Along with tighter margins, low-cost financing, and cheaper materials, this

¹²⁵ #617, Jaiindi Kiseru: Digital migration across Africa is all about dubious deals with Chinese, *The Daily Nation*, 18 February 2015.

¹²⁶ #663, Jaiindi Kiseru: We should be careful not to be tied to corrupt deals with Chinese firms, *The Daily Nation*, 20 May 2015.

¹²⁷ #737, Charles Onyango-Obbo: Nothing wrong with Africa; we just need to stop being Chinese for a while, *The Daily Nation*, 27 August 2015.

allows Chinese firms to compete for projects with tenders for as little as half the price sought by their Western competitors.¹²⁸

The policy of “looking East” is often hurled about as an accusation that Kenya is abandoning “trusted traditional friends” in the West. (...) Conveniently forgotten in this debate is how the West itself contributed to the global geopolitical and economic reorientation towards Asia. China’s dalliance with Africa can be traced to the West’s own disengagement from the continent. (...) China filled the vacuum in Africa created after the West has left. In addition, the “Washington Consensus”, those neo-liberal prescriptions by the likes of the IMF and the World Bank, drove many developing countries to their knees. (...) The dragon played the imperialist bogeyman card well. And African states were all too willing to join it, in what was seen as an opportunity for the continent to develop without too many conditions being pushed down its throat.¹²⁹

While the former comment sees Western accusations of China’s African policy as unfair, the latter reminds readers that China’s growing influence in Africa has been primarily caused by Western disengagement from Africa. Thus, it does not make sense to speak about Look East or Look West policies. Africa needs massive resources to finance its development needs and China showed more willingness to help Africa. China pursues its own interests, as well as the West did. But, according to the author, there is one crucial difference between the two. West wanted Africa to adopt its principles such as neoliberalism, which eventually did not lead to development, but rather consolidated continent’s underdevelopment. Contrarily, China with its business approach does not apply imperialist conditions. This article is important because it explicitly mentions Western neoliberalism, its failure in Africa and contrasts it with more successful China’s model. However, there are also opposite views.

*While the embracing of China has dominated Kenya’s foreign policy in the past decade, resulting in huge infrastructural projects, the reality is that unlike the West, most Kenyans share very little, social-culturally, with the Chinese. (...) The reality is that our affair with China at the moment is purely transactional. It is nothing personal, just business. (...) The so-called East and West should never be seen as mutually exclusive. (...) Kenya should be more pragmatic, clarify its interests, and partner with those states that identify with and meet those interests.*¹³⁰

What China has done is to increase the national debt. The country gives loans and very little grant. The US does the opposite; it increases trade and gives development aid. (...) Now that the dust has settled, there is room for review on who the US actually is to Kenya, and whether China makes any difference to our development agenda. (...) China is not really a big thing in terms of trade with Kenya. Africa, America, and Western Europe are far more

¹²⁸ #272, Simplice Asongu: Is China a friend of Africa? In deed it is, The Daily Nation, 13 November 2013.

¹²⁹ #747, Patrick Mbataru: What is this big deal about Africa looking East? Everyone else’s doing it, The Daily Nation, 31 August 2015.

¹³⁰ #711, Duncan Omanga: Looking East or West is all the same, so Kenya should look out for its interests, The Daily Nation, 5 August 2015.

important than China is assumed to be. In terms of trade relations, Kenya has more goods traded with Africa countries and especially with neighbours in the region than goods trade with China. (...)The journey to the “east is not real”.¹³¹

*The Chinese-African axis will transform the continent and, over time, the global economy. Yet its benefits will not be equally spread, nor will it be an unadulterated public good. Chinese investment tends to be in (literally) concrete things – showcase investment like stadiums, dams, or highways. This is in stark contrast to the projects Western governments generally support: Humanitarian relief, say, or social programmes to educate children, relieve poverty, wipe out malaria or treat Aids (...). The obvious bottom line: Kenya needs all its friends, not casting one aside only to become dangerously dependent on another.*¹³²

First article argues that Kenya is indeed a Western country and a shift to the East is a pragmatic step invoked mainly by the global economic crisis. The author also highlights that the division between the West and the East is outmoded and ideological. Instead, Kenyan leadership should be more pragmatic and assertive. Second article argues that China's share on trade, development assistance, and even investment is rather marginal. Although China helps with building infrastructure, Kenya should not forget that development programmes are financed by the Western donors plus Japan and main trading partner is Africa itself, followed by the EU. Third article argues in a similar way. Thus, many analysts see no sense in looking West or looking East. Kenya should primarily look to its interests and enter into partnership that will help Kenya the most in its development. It is likely that different partners can help to solve different urgent needs. The following excerpts illustrate this view, although they deal with the renewed US-Kenya partnership rather than with China itself.

*So, has Kenya's foreign policy shifted its focus from West to East? I see Kenya's position as remaining as it has always been: seeking a balanced engagement with traditional friends while at the same time taking advantage of new opportunities.*¹³³

*We are perfectly capable of funding ourselves, paying for ourselves, sorting out our own issues. We are not children who should be looking for parenting from the West or the East. We need to have our own development agenda and our own way of doing things.*¹³⁴

Most African countries are well aware that they don't actually need to choose between China and America at all. Rather, they can have their cake and eat it. Chinese trade and loans are extremely valuable, but they cannot replace the trade and aid that African states have traditionally secured from North America and Europe. Moreover, when it comes to some of

¹³¹ #723, Karuti Kanyinga: Obama visit was not by accident; China is just but an illusion, The Daily Nation, 16 August 2015.

¹³² #462, Michael Meyer: Kenya is right to look East for its future prosperity, but still needs its old friends, The Daily Nation, 13 June 2014.

¹³³ #668, Levi Obonyo: Kenya-US relations a cycle of friendship, The Daily Nation, 27 May 2015.

¹³⁴ #713, Sunny Bindra: The US President came to Kenya. So what?, The Daily Nation, 9 August 2015.

*the most pressing challenges facing the continent today, such as terrorism, America can offer superior know-how and technology. By combining the best deals from the two countries, African leaders can secure the funds they need to grow their economies.*¹³⁵

Civil society

Representatives of civil society wrote three comments. One was written by trade union's leader.

*Since independence, our country has been an ally of the West and they will not watch the country slip away to the East. They are going to make our lives miserable. (...) For the sake of the workers, Kenya should sell its oil to the West if that will bring peace. The leadership should play smart in international politics.*¹³⁶

The author sees shift to East as a result of political discords between successive Kenyan governments and the West. Although China's non-political approach and stress on sovereignty may find audience among African leaders, it can be eventually detrimental. Recently discovered oil reserves in Kenya are supposed to attract "hyenas" fighting to control the natural resources, as happened in many other African countries. Many resource-rich countries are plagued with armed conflicts and terrorism. China does not intervene and rather finds its way to continue business-as-usual. According to the author, Kenya has been an ally of the West for half a century and should try to cement its relations with the West to ensure stability and development. However, the West is depicted also rather negatively as capable to "make Kenyans' lives miserable".

The other two comments deal with an issue of the growing presence of Chinese people in Kenya, including troublesome day-to-day contacts and the language barrier. Enhancing the friendship between the people of Kenya and their Chinese friends is seen as a challenge for the foreseeable future.¹³⁷

Reader

There are nineteen letters written by readers to The Daily Nation editorial staff. Similarly to the academia/analyst category, the range of opinions is very broad. On the one side, the import of affordable manufactured goods is seen as beneficial to the local society:

¹³⁵ #488, Nic Cheeseman: What Obama's Washington Summit means for Uhuru and other African leaders, The Daily Nation, 3 August 2014.

¹³⁶ #483, John Wanguba: To save Kenya, let's look West once again, The Daily Nation, 15 July 2014.

¹³⁷ #652, George Opiyo: We need to do more to enhance relations with Chinese friends, The Daily Nation, 16 April 2015.

Indian and Chinese motor bikes have reduced unemployment rate by a big percentage. Many youths wake up to transport bankers, teachers and other civil servants to their place of work using Chinese and Indian motorbikes. (...) Hundreds of thousands of youths are nowhere near the poverty line they were in 10 years ago, this writer included. How did Europe expect poor Africans to afford Merc and BMW motorbikes and operate them as boda boda? I will not say that the Bajaj, TVS and Haojin motorbikes are as durable as European makes, but by the time they are worn out, they should have given you a return on investment to buy another.¹³⁸

Other readers are more cautious about China and see the business-only approach of China as problematic. Relatively more than other groups, readers are more sensitive to the cultural differences or even racism.

Instead of teaching us how to fish, however, the Chinese have decided to give us the fish. Chinese contractors usually import their own labour, material and machinery for all the projects they undertake. Only the unskilled or semi-skilled jobs are left to Kenyans. The question we should be asking ourselves is whether we want to remain dependent on the foreign knowledge and assistance.¹³⁹

China is in business, searching for profit. It never brokers peace. When Kenya burst into flames in 1992, 1997 and 2007, we didn't see Chinese anywhere trying to save Kenya. (...) We shouldn't keep them too close to our chest. When a nation goes to the dogs, China keeps off. Let's stop chest-thumping.¹⁴⁰

Kenya spends lavishly on education, but all lucrative contracts are awarded to foreigners. What is the point of training a large pool if they remain under-utilised?¹⁴¹

[T]he Chinese are not doing all their "development work" in Kenya for Kenya. They are doing it for China. Yes, they are "good" at what they do which, in essence, is extremely simple and costs a small sum compared to what they are planning to extract from us: All Kenya's natural resources they can lay their hands on.¹⁴²

The Chinese restaurant at the centre of racist claims might just be a tip of the iceberg. After Boers, the next most anti-black people are possibly the Chinese. (...) Kenya invited them to come and build roads, bridges and railways (we pay of course), but now they think we are thieves and terrorists. Soon they might start spraying us with anti-bacteria.¹⁴³

We warmly welcomed the Chinese and they brought money, engineering prowess and speed in delivering infrastructure projects. But cases of racial discrimination (...) prove that

¹³⁸ #099, Emmanuel Bahati Ngala: Whatever we have against the Chinese, let's accept they have made life easier, The Daily Nation, 13 August 2012.

¹³⁹ #237, Dennis Omondi Otieno: China should be forced to transfer technology, The Daily Nation, 7 September 2013.

¹⁴⁰ #437, Justin Nkaranga: China in business, The Daily Nation, 14 May 2014.

¹⁴¹ #438, Sonia Gakuru: Compel the Chinese to use Kenyan labour, The Daily Nation, 14 May 2014.

¹⁴² #630, John Mark: Chinese in Kenya for their selfish interest, The Daily Nation, 8 March 2015.

¹⁴³ #642, Hunja Moses: Chinese discrimination unacceptable, but Kenyans are also hard on whites, The Daily Nation, 27 March 2015.

*there is a hefty price to pay for our hospitality. (...) They don't trust us but we entrust them with our billions of shillings and mega projects? They need to change their attitude.*¹⁴⁴

To sum up, the image of China is highly ambiguous. Contrarily to the US and the EU, there is clearly defined Chinese “African” narrative, which is articulated towards audience both directly by Chinese leaders and indirectly by Chinese press agency Xinhua. Chinese strategic narrative seems to be much better developed than narratives of its competitors. Moreover, China was immensely successful in disseminating the narrative among the Kenyan political elite. President Kenyatta and other members of the Government seem to have adopted the narrative and have replicated it. On the other side, analysis revealed that the Chinese narrative was certainly not accepted unreservedly within Kenyan society. On the contrary, high number of opinion articles and letters from readers show that question of China in Kenya is highly controversial.

At least two main constituent parts of the Chinese narrative are openly contested. First is the claim that Chinese aid to Africa is provided without conditions. The analysis has shown that co-operation with China is conditioned both in political and economic terms. China co-operates strictly only with countries that follow a one-China policy, have established diplomatic relations with China and have not established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Similarly, the terms of concessional loans are quite strict and the recipient countries are obliged to purchase a substantial part of goods and services in China. Such single sourcing and awarding the tenders to Chinese companies is hardly transparent.

Second is the claim that the Chinese engagement in Africa is selfless and mutually beneficial. This is hardly the case, as the relation is asymmetric and China has benefited far more from its growing relationship with Kenya than Kenya has. For many authors, it is time to establish new rules of engagement and become more assertive when dealing with China. Moreover, while Kenya is being assured of the highest level of partnership, it has been side-lined several times, for example during the Chinese President's first foreign trip (he visited Tanzania, but not Kenya) or when China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and did not invite Kenya to become a founding member, although it invited several Western countries.

Thus, if we go beyond the elite perception, a very different picture arises. Kenyan opinion makers (scholars, analysts, or journalists) are much more cautious about the

¹⁴⁴ #643, Anthony Alex Irungu: Chinese must change attitude towards blacks, The Daily Nation, 28 March 2015.

benefits of close co-operation with China. Letters from readers confirm that even the ordinary population may be highly critical of Chinese activities. Despite an official Look-East policy and its partnership with Chinese press agency Xinhua, *The Daily Nation* can hardly be accused of being pro-Chinese. The news sections inform in a rather neutral way; opinions, commentaries, and letters are often very critical to China, although of course many of them are fervid to China.

East African Community

Fourthly, I will analyse regional integration in East Africa. Members of the regional grouping are the most important trade partners of Kenya, and it is also the most frequent topic in *The Daily Nation* with 151 articles. Another 33 articles focus on the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), which is the most ambitious infrastructure project in the region. First phase of this project, which was financed by China, has already been finished and new railway between Nairobi and Mombasa is expected to fully operate within one year.¹⁴⁵ SGR is defined as a separate category, but will be analysed in this subsection. From the total of 269 single topic appearances, the most frequent frame topics are barriers to regional trade (64), deepening of the integration (48), trade and economic cooperation among member states (35), Standard Gauge Railway (2 + 33 separate articles), and two-speed integration¹⁴⁶ (32).

Eastern and Western press agency

There are three articles taken from Chinese press agency Xinhua. First article is about the start of the East Africa Payment System, which is expected to reduce transaction costs and enhance safety and security of intra-regional payments. Second article is about the EAC Vehicle Load Control Bill, a new legislation designed to harmonize load limits for vehicles in the region. Third article is about Africa Import Fair in Nairobi.

A global trade fair to be held in Nairobi (...) will seek to correct the flaws hampering trade amongst the East African states, organisers have said. The Africa Import Fair's managing director Solomon Kinyanjui said flaws in the East African Community (EAC) treaty put

¹⁴⁵ Railway is planned to be opened in June 2017 for trial operation and in January 2018 for commercial operation.

¹⁴⁶ In 2013, leaders of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda formed the so-called „Northern Corridor“ initiative to speed up integration of these three countries in terms of free movement of goods, services, people and capital. SGR railway became the flagship project of this initiative. South Sudan and Ethiopia joined later as observers. This initiative opened question whether Tanzania and Burundi were not set aside and how would this two-speed integration affect the future prospects of the EAC.

several Kenyan exporters at a disadvantage.“ The decline in Kenya’s exports to the region is due to the failures within the EAC treaty (...),” Mr Kinyanjui told state broadcaster KBC.¹⁴⁷

This article is ambiguous in its intent. It may be read as information on declining exports from Kenya to its regional counterparts, which the trade fair is about to address. However, China does not support sub-regional integration on the continent. It partners with the African Union and above all, it negotiates with individual states on a bilateral basis. Thus, this article may be read also as encouraging Kenyan traders to look for other export markets – obviously, China being one of them. Nevertheless, this message is hidden between the lines, if the author wanted to send this message at all.

There is no article taken from any Western press agency or media house.

Local public official

There are eight articles written by local public officials. One of them is written by the President of the three “Northern Corridor” countries:

So there is much that we in Africa must do to seize our opportunity. Building bigger, more integrated sub-regional markets that are deeply embedded in the global economy is one of the most urgent tasks we are facing. (...) Unfortunately, across Africa, national borders have tended to be choke-points rather than enablers of intra-continental cooperation on trade, security, labour, and environment. (...) Progress will be achieved not by building monuments for politicians or holding summits, but by lowering the costs of doing business and raising the incomes of our people.¹⁴⁸

According to authors, African dream is that the 21st century becomes an African century. To make this dream a reality, Africa must work hard. One of the main tasks for continental leaders is to stop relying on national borders and increase cooperation within Africa by unlocking existing cross-border exchange. The logic is following: if African countries eliminate artificial barriers between them, intra-continental cooperation will flourish. This will help to build lacking and necessary infrastructure, to ease doing business, to increase economic growth, and to achieve greater prosperity. Bigger and integrated markets will increase trade opportunities and attract more investment, which will help Africa to become an integrated part of the global economy. Eventually, Africa and its people will benefit from the globalizing processes. The same logic is expressed in other writings and speeches by President Kenyatta:

¹⁴⁷ #222, Xinhua: Expo set to address regional trade flaws, The Daily Nation, 26 August 2013.

¹⁴⁸ #495, Paul Kagame, Uhuru Kenyatta, Yoweri Museveni: Integration is the surest way for our nations to realise the African Dream, The Daily Nation, 6 August 2014.

Greater inter-connectivity of East African region will increase the ability of member states to trade with each other, President Uhuru Kenyatta has said. He said better infrastructure would also boost competitiveness and attractiveness of the economies and countries of the region.¹⁴⁹

*[President Uhuru Kenyatta] and commerce and Tourism CS Phyllis Kandie praised the heads of states for their strong political goodwill and unwavering commitment to the integration agenda. (...) President Kenyatta said the launch of the monetary union will further catalyse trade growth within the region. “Businesses will find more freedom to trade and invest more widely, and foreign investors will find additional, irresistible reasons to pitch tent in our region. Such advantages will no doubt result in increased investment and further transformation of East Africa.” (...) The President also called for the removal of all obstructions in the growth of the Community, stressing the need to allow free movement of people, businesses and capital within the community to provide opportunities for generating prosperity.*¹⁵⁰

Deepening of integration, which means proceeding from the customs union to the common market and later to the monetary union, is seen as necessary for regional empowerment. Another member of the Cabinet asserts that idea of regional integration is sound, that it does not give rise to any opposition.

*If you have not paid attention to the integration process in East Africa, now is a good time to do so. A great milestone was achieved recently when regional Heads of State signed the single monetary union protocol. (...) It is a pointer that prosperity will flow a lot quicker from one corner of the region to another. So too will products, services and talent. (...) This is a new dynamic that directly affects how we trade with each other, how the world trades with us and, more importantly, how we create opportunities and economic progress. (...) The fundamental idea underpinning the East African integration remains sound, which is why over a decade later, it is yet to attract any meaningful opposition.*¹⁵¹

Former President Mwai Kibaki expressed the same view during his Presidency:

*[T]he President regretted that trade barriers continued to exist in the bloc despite the enactment of the Customs Union and the Common Market Protocols that root for free movement of goods, labour and services across the community. “We must all do more to ensure removal of these barriers, which are a bottleneck to regional integration,” said the President, adding that some of these barriers were being placed by people who do not understand the workings of a common market.*¹⁵²

Managing Director of the Kenya Railways focuses on the SGR project with the same logic described above.

¹⁴⁹ #629, Presidential Strategic Communication Unit: Uhuru pitches for East Africa links, The Daily Nation, 8 March 2015.

¹⁵⁰ #297, Sunday Nation Reporter, Presidential Strategic Communication Unit: Tension thaws as East African states give nod to single currency, The Daily Nation, 1 December 2013.

¹⁵¹ #320, Phyllis Kandie: Single monetary union will be the best thing that ever happened to East Africa, The Daily Nation, 18 December 2013.

¹⁵² #051, Nation Writer: Remove trade barriers to realise EA unity – Kibaki, The Daily Nation, 18 April 2012.

The fact that the two leaders [President of Kenya and Prime Minister of China] will be present during the signing ceremony [of the SGR] carries with it great symbolic value. It amplifies the premium they place on this landmark project, which is key to securing and maintaining Kenya's overall competitiveness by significantly improving the transportation of goods and people within the country and within the region. (...) The SGR is critical to Kenyan and regional economies. It is our ticket to competitiveness.¹⁵³

The only opposing view was written by the former Attorney-General and Justice Minister. He does not reject the idea of creating larger market and facilitating regional trade *per se*. However, he questions whether an economic agenda can create a community in a region where people do not share basic values and where people are not involved in the integration process. His answer is negative: integration is not about leaders and their projects, but about people and their transactions. Unfortunately, the EAC integration process seems to serve rather the former than the latter.

The underlying rationale, for example, of uniting the region's peoples into a larger market and doing away with the impediments to trade and commerce are entirely laudable. However, we seem determined to make some of the mistakes that brought us to grief in the 1970s again. (...) A community is not a club of presidents or a mere alignment of economic policies. (...) It would be unfortunate to enter into a partnership that is not derived from shared values [...] (...) However, the greed of leaders undermines the best of intentions. (...) As long as service to the people remains disconnected from the way we conduct our politics then politics will remain about people fattening themselves and not service to the people of East Africa.¹⁵⁴

We cannot find any article written by the EAC officials. However, we can find many quotations from them or from the EAC's official statements in other articles. Obviously, they speak in favour of fast integration and they criticise member states for slow implementation of the regional agenda. They also complain about low binding force of the EAC acts. However, we can find a difference between the three following excerpts. On one side, officials at the EAC Secretariat and members of the regional legislative assembly issue straightforward statements about member states' non-compliance. On the other side, secretary-general of the EAC speaks in a more diplomatic tone: although he admits that the bloc is facing challenges, he denies any internal conflict among member states and confirms their commitment to integration. Such tone is probably necessary in order not to damage the image of the EAC among the public and not to antagonize national leaders with regard to the integration agenda.

¹⁵³ #434, Atanas Maina: Signing of agreement brings railway project closer to reality, The Daily Nation, 11 May 2014.

¹⁵⁴ #383, Charles Njonjo: Learning from history: It is now time for a referendum on the Community, The Daily Nation, 10 March 2014.

The regional body is undertaking a study with the objective of developing a legally binding enforcement mechanism for elimination of non-tariff barriers. “In spite of the efforts at national and regional levels, non-tariff barriers have persisted or merely “mutated”, this necessitated a mechanism to be put in place to deal with the problem,” says a status report from EAC secretariat on Non-Trade Barriers (NTB).¹⁵⁵

Regional law makers have decried the slow pace of project implementation in the East Africa Community (EAC) (...). “The Committee (...) recommends that bureaucracy and the often delayed approval procedures in the EAC be minimised to allow for speedy, efficient and appropriate implementation of activities,” reads a statement from the assembly.¹⁵⁶

The East African Community has admitted that recent concerns raised by Tanzania and Burundi that they are being sidelined in some key regional activities posed some challenges to the bloc. The Arusha-based secretariat had consulted the five partner states on the state of EAC integration, said secretary-general Richard Sezibera, but dismissed any cause for alarm. (...) He said the partner states, in the Bujumbura meeting, committed themselves to implementing the EAC protocols on the Common Market and the Customs Union, particularly laying the requisite infrastructure and removal of trade barriers.¹⁵⁷

Foreign public official

There is no article written by foreign (non-regional) public official and just one quotation from the Chinese Foreign Minister on the SGR.

*[Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi] said the African Union and China had agreed on a vision to aid regional integration through infrastructure. Kenya, he added, is the first step to that vision. (...) What Kenya needs now is infrastructure development, and therefore it is not about China’s interests. It is more about Kenya’s urgent need of developing infrastructure. That is why China is ready to lend a helping hand when a friend is in need,” Mr Wang argued.*¹⁵⁸

This excerpt confirms that Chinese focus is not regional, but continental. Foreign Minister also replicates the Chinese narrative that China is not in Africa for its own interests, but because it wants to help its African friends. Obviously, it is impossible to separate these two in practice: better infrastructure in Africa means increased trade opportunities for China, which Foreign Minister admits in his speech.

¹⁵⁵ #008, Nation Correspondent: EAC states to face penalties on trade checks, The Daily Nation, 8 February 2012.

¹⁵⁶ #071, Nation Correspondent: Legislators ask EAC nations to fast-track projects, The Daily Nation, 2 June 2012.

¹⁵⁷ #263, Zephania Ubwani: EAC pledges to tackle “cracks”, The Daily Nation, 4 November 2013.

¹⁵⁸ #598, Aggrey Mutambo: Why China is keen on the SGR project, The Daily Nation, 18 January 2015.

Local businessperson

There are six articles written by local businesspeople. Most of them express their support to regional integration, following the same logic as their leaders – particularly with relation to the SGR as a key regional project.

The President's key message is that while those against the project have every right to air their views, they should not try to downplay the economic imperative of having such a railway, both for Kenya and the region. That even as we interrogate the deals around the project, we must not make the mistake of throwing out the baby with the bath water. (...) In Kenya alone, economic activity linked to the corridor is estimated to account for 80 per cent of the country's gross domestic product. (...) Sadly, most of the heavy freight transport within the Northern Corridor still relies on a strained and poorly maintained road network. (...) The result is that the cost of doing business within the corridor is astronomical. In a continent where investors' dollars are looking for the optimal destination and where countries are putting their best foot forward, we cannot afford to rest on our laurels.¹⁵⁹

Author of this article is the director of a Nairobi-based construction company, which has built one of the stations of the Nairobi commuter rail line. In the article, he argues in general terms that new railway will significantly lower the costs of doing business and increase attractiveness of Kenya for investors. However, he also pursues his own personal business interests. As he is personally interested in the infrastructure construction, we would expect him to support massive investment into transport infrastructure, from which his own company can benefit. Thus, it is not surprising that he prioritizes the railway itself (“economic imperative”) over transparency issues. We may compare this article with another one written by a Nairobi-based manufacturer. He also recognizes benefits of the new railway for future economic development of the country. However, he opposes the view that Kenya should build this new railway at any cost. According to the author, there are many questions related to the construction of the new railway such as increasing costs of the project, rapidly rising foreign debt, low transparency of the procurement process, or lack of information to the public. Moreover, there are other relevant questions related to the efficient operation or commercial viability of the new railway, which no one seems to be asking.

*We can move goods halfway across the world more cheaply than, for example, doing it from Mombasa to Kigali. Yes, there is an urgent need for a modern, professionally run railway and port with expandable capacity.
(...)*

¹⁵⁹ #373, Yussuf Loge: Standard gauge railway will end freight problems and spur growth in EA region, The Daily Nation, 24 February 2014.

*To carry on blindly with the government thinking it can talk its way out of the mess is a recipe for disaster with severe macroeconomic consequences.*¹⁶⁰

CEO of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers highly appreciates the progress in integration, which helps intra-regional trade. However, she also recognizes that many barriers are still in place and that integration is proceeding ahead only very slowly.

*Last year alone, the block eliminated 66 per cent of the non-tariff barriers, and that has enhanced trade. Regional integration is important for the manufacturing sector, as it provides a larger market. That notwithstanding, a number of areas still need to be concluded or ratified to ensure a smooth flow of business. (...) There are double standards in implementation of market access. Chinese products are not subject to the same scrutiny as EAC goods, for example[.]*¹⁶¹

Contrarily, CEO of the Kenya International Freight & Warehousing Association argues against premature integration. In his view, regional initiatives should be introduced only when all members are equally prepared for their implementation, which would guarantee benefits for all. According to the author, start of the single customs territory within the EAC was not well prepared, member states are in different position and Kenya will not benefit from it. More precisely, author is afraid that members of the association will lose their business to their counterparts from other member states, which will be allowed to freely operate in Kenya. This article is in fact lobbying for the suspension of the SCT programme.

*[Single Customs Territory] cannot be seen as an end in itself. Rather, it is a culmination of an elaborate but gradual process, including restructuring of the legal and institutional framework in the socioeconomic sectors. Further, the impact of SCT on trade and industry, movement of persons, sustainability of jobs, and revenue streams for the governments must be determined prior to its full roll-out. (...) There is no doubt that facilitation of trade is of great significance to the EAC integration process. (...) In the face of such concerns, the government needs to determine the effects of SCT on the economy and the livelihoods of Kenyans. The country may be walking on quicksand - moving from the known to the unknown. This could have dire consequences.*¹⁶²

Another article was written by an investment manager, who supports integration and the logic of integration as explained earlier. However, he applies this logic not on regional integration, which has not brought any significant success, but on continental

¹⁶⁰ #347, Robert Shaw: Too many issues remain unresolved on the standard gauge railway saga, The Daily Nation, 23 January 2014.

¹⁶¹ #621, Betty Maina: Strides in regional trade despite problems, The Daily Nation, 25 February 2015.

¹⁶² #551, Boaz Makomere: Adopting customs union should not be at the expense of our economic interests, The Daily Nation, 24 October 2014.

integration. Only Africa as a single market can effectively and successfully compete in the global economy.

Unfortunately, African economies are largely fragmented, while the rest of the world is integrating. Although African integration has long been envisaged, however, not much has been realised. (...) Indeed, it has been a case of one step forward and two steps backwards. Arguably, African governments lack the political will to usher in complete integration while the broader population are not keenly getting engaged with the concept, its advantages and consequences, yet we are aware that gains made through integration outweigh the benefits of sovereignty and regionalism. There is an urgent need to speed up African integration. (...) A huge market close to one billion will entrench the economics of large-scale production, which will, in turn, attract the attention of the investing members of the global community.¹⁶³

Thus, we can see that there is hardly any single view among businesspeople. Not surprisingly, all of them pursue their own differing particular business interests depending on whether they will gain or lose from faster integration.

Foreign businessperson

There is no article written by foreign businesspeople and no quotation from them.

Journalist

There are 136 “standard” articles written by journalists. Similarly to other subsections, these articles are rather informative, value-free, focusing on what is actually happening with relation to regional integration. Due to number of articles, I will focus on top stories to illustrate their tone and content.

Two topics were of such a great importance that they deserved being on the front page (“story of the day”). Moreover, both of them deserved the front page position more than once. We can find four front page stories about the SGR railway: two of them reported on the ground-breaking ceremony in November 2013, one of them followed a press conference of the Cabinet on the criticism raised against the project in January 2014, one of them informed about President of Kenya and Prime minister of China having signed a deal on financing the railway in May 2014. We can find also three front page stories about the sugar dispute and sugar deal between Uganda and Kenya in August 2015. However, neither of these topics is representative for regional integration, so I will turn to back page stories (“second story of the day”).

Excluding articles on transparency of the SGR project, there are five back page stories on different topics related to regional integration, written in an informative tone.

¹⁶³ #281, Charles Okechukwu: African integration must be speeded up, The Daily Nation, 21 November 2013.

*Tanzania will not quit the regional bloc despite efforts by Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda to sideline it, President Jakaya Kikwete has said. (...) Mr Kikwete's reaction comes after Presidents Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda held a series of three meetings this year (...) where they discussed and agreed to start the implementation of several infrastructure projects, the political federation and the single customs territory.*¹⁶⁴

*Tour firms from Kenya will now be allowed to drop tourists in specific towns in Tanzania. This follows an agreement between the two countries [...] (...) Ms Kandie said the agreement is a win-win for the two countries. (...) She said the new agreement would also help in marketing the region as a single tourist destination, adding that she hopes the new-found relationship with Tanzania would continue to grow.*¹⁶⁵

*President Uhuru Kenyatta will travel to Arusha, Tanzania, tomorrow where he is expected address members of the East African Legislative Assembly (Eala). (...) "The President will address Eala in context of the strengthened regional integration (...)," said [the presidential spokesman] Mr Esipisu. (...) The focus of the address reflects on matters of general policies relating to the progress that the community has made, while outlining strategic challenges requiring greater attention.*¹⁶⁶

*President Uhuru Kenyatta, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame of Rwanda noted that free movement of people within the region had improved trade. The presidents have therefore directed their ministers in charge of immigration to conclude the Agreement on Total Liberalisation of Free Movement of Labour and Services agreed upon at an earlier meeting.*¹⁶⁷

*Kenya and Uganda have agreed to remove all trade barriers that have made it difficult for Ugandan goods, including sugar, to come to the country. East Africa Community Affairs Cabinet Secretary Phyllis Kandie said yesterday the two countries agreed to remove the barriers to help in balancing the trade between them, which she said was currently in favour of Kenya.*¹⁶⁸

Besides "standard" articles, there are four editorials and thirteen opinions written by journalists. Similarly to other subsections, opinions of journalist are far more critical to the integration process. Scope of articles is very broad, as are the expressed views. For one writer, sugar dispute was an opportunity to express his East-African identity, which leads him to prioritize free trade between the member states over protection of uncompetitive domestic industries.

Now there is small argument between President Kenyatta and opposition Cord leader Raila Odinga about, of all things, Ugandan sugar. Kenyatta says it makes business sense to import Ugandan sugar, because Uganda is reciprocating and will import dairy and beef products

¹⁶⁴ #269, Citizen Reporter: We're in EAC to stay, says Kikwete, The Daily Nation, 8 November 2013.

¹⁶⁵ #369, Lucas Barasa: Tour firms to be allowed into TZ, The Daily Nation, 23 February 2014.

¹⁶⁶ #392, Zephania Ubwani: Uhuru to address Eala in Arusha, The Daily Nation, 23 March 2014.

¹⁶⁷ #581, Muchemi Wachira, Mwaniki Wahome: You can now work in any EA country, The Daily Nation, 12 December 2014.

¹⁶⁸ #738, Jeremiah Kiplang'at: Kandie: Our trade deal with Uganda, The Daily Nation, 25 August 2015.

*from Kenya (...) That is better than importing sugar from Brazil, which is not buying Kenyan goods in return, and Uganda is, after all, a fellow member of the East African Community. Raila's concern is that this will result in cheap sugar being dumped into the Kenyan market, and cane farmers will suffer. (...) But as an East Africanist, I am with Kenyatta on this one. First of all, (...) not every country needs to produce its own sugar[.]*¹⁶⁹

Two respected columnists of The Daily Nation share the same view: Uganda is the most natural trading partner of Kenya and there are deep-rooted trade relations between the two countries. Sugar dispute is just a political game caused by narrow perspective of the involved actors. Moreover, integration between the two countries lies in people-to-people interactions, not in government-to-government deals.

*The noisy politicking over sugar imports from Uganda has the potential of damaging a system of co-operation which citizens of the two countries have painstakingly developed over years. (...) Indeed, integration between Kenya and Uganda is at a level beyond personal relations between their leadership. Nor can this phenomenon be credited to the work of some bureaucrat sitting on an armchair in a carpeted office in Arusha. It is about the attitudes of people of the two countries. (...) Our leaders are too preoccupied with short-term political calculations and risk losing sight of the benefits of co-operation between the two countries.*¹⁷⁰

*Our problem is always the failure to see the larger picture. (...) Uganda, smaller in every way than we are, happens to be very, very important for our prosperity. Official figures may show Tanzania has overtaken our eastern neighbour in trade figures but, overall, Uganda is far more precious. First of all, the figures don't account for the hefty black market with Uganda, which they and us prefer to remain blind to. But, more critically, our neighbour will remain forever locked with Kenya because of its landlocked geography. (...) Uganda's quite simply the most important bilateral relationship Kenya has in the world.*¹⁷¹

Another writer agrees that integration is primarily about people and their interactions and exchanges. However, this part of the integration process is largely missing and the EAC seems to be a project of political and business elites. Moreover, it seems to be a project of elites only in three of the five member states. Particularly Tanzania is hesitant or even reluctant with regard to regional integration. Despite integration rhetoric of its President, its actions run counter the spirit of the EAC. Thus, despite current integration dynamism, there is a big risk that the EAC will split “over the egos of its leaders” in the future.

¹⁶⁹ #716, Charles Onyango-Obbo: What the Museveni-Kenyatta trade deal tells us about Uganda and Kenya, The Daily Nation, 13 August 2015.

¹⁷⁰ #726, Jaindi Kiseru: We are stoking an unnecessary trade war with Uganda by spreading myths, The Daily Nation, 19 August 2015.

¹⁷¹ #735, Gitau Warigi: Leave the sugar politics aside, Uganda remains our most precious trade partner, The Daily Nation, 23 August 2015.

The EAC will split over the egos of the leaders of the day as long as it is not engraved in the hearts of the more than 150 million East Africans. For now, the EAC looks like a project belonging to a few political leaders and business people running multinationals. To the ordinary person, the bloc is one where business people are out to seek tax waivers and less red tape in their effort to make more profit. But until all the countries in the bloc address the pertinent issues affecting ordinary citizens, we shall be moving in circles.¹⁷²

For one of the aforementioned columnist, reality of two-speed EAC is confirmation that regional integration in Africa should find a new way to go ahead: instead of EU-style linear integration process, regionalism in Africa should focus on “integrating and developing supply chains” and building infrastructure, which does not require transfer of sovereignty to any supranational body.

In East Africa, we adopted the European Union model that put the accent on trade liberalisation[.] (...) But what’s in it for the ordinary citizen of East Africa? Not much. (...) Yet the economies of East Africa still remain very closed and restrictive to movement of persons, labour and capital. What lessons have we learnt? First, that in Africa, economic integration projects that put emphasis on trade liberalisation will always progress slowly. Truth to be told, countries do not want to surrender sovereignty especially when it comes to immigration, labour and right of establishment. (...) What presidents Yoweri Museveni, Uhuru Kenyatta and Paul Kagame have done is to move the economic integration agenda beyond tacky issues. It is a case where three countries, which share supply chains, have entered into a deal to deepen economic integration on the corridor that connects them. (...) In the future, economic integration will be about integrating and developing supply chains. Rather than formal EU-style integration, what will bring East Africa together economically are the large infrastructure projects.¹⁷³

Similarly, another writer asserts that move to single currency should be slowed down. The idea itself is seen as good. Nevertheless, the EAC seems to hastily proceed to the monetary union phase of integration without analysing its costs and benefits. Current Eurozone crisis should serve as a warning to regional leaders to start common currency only when the time is ripe to do so. In East Africa, this does not seem to be the case. Common currency is political project with little input from those who will be affected – people in the member countries.

There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with the united currency plan. It stitches East Africa closer politically and economically. It will make it easier for the region to do business (...). However, there is much to worry about. (...) The world’s premier experiment in a united currency is in a shambles. (...) The Euro has fallen apart on a familiar altar – sovereignty over economic affairs is still confusingly shared. (...) Planners in the EAC seem to be proceeding with no regard for any argument against monetary union. (...) East African citizens have been treated as noisy but harmless gnats to be swatted away if they seek to

¹⁷² #270, Mike Ssegawa: Kikwete’s EAC talk smacks of doublespeak, The Daily Nation, 10 November 2013.

¹⁷³ #278, Jaindi Kiseru: EA’s “Coalition of the Willing” just an alternative name for integration, The Daily Nation, 20 November 2013.

*know more than they do about the union. The grand experiment has been conducted at presidential and ministerial level, with very little input from the people who have to live in the brave new world.*¹⁷⁴

Another regional issue is the SGR railway project. One writer assumes that Africa has manoeuvred itself to the situation that it needs massive investment into infrastructure, far exceeding national budgets. Unfortunately, big projects attract “world class crooks” that care less for African needs and more for their high-return-opportunities. Whole saga about who is going to finance and build the railway and on what terms is the result of this critical state of infrastructure, which is caused by erroneous priorities set by the past administrations in virtually all African states.

*Because nothing was done for years, the scale of the required new build grew very large. And the money needed to erect these infrastructure projects became massive. The money needed to do a railway becomes so much; a government has to look to foreign money markets to raise the fund. The matter gets internationalised, and because the pot of money is so big, it becomes a honey pot that attracts world class crooks.*¹⁷⁵

One of the most respected Kenyan columnists wrote two opinions on the SGR project. At a glance, they may seem to be in contradiction. However, they just reflect different phases of the project, although written only within the period of three months. First opinion reflects the tense debate whether the project is run in a transparent way, which emerged in the Kenyan public space between November 2013 and January 2014, including investigation by the parliament committee. Second opinion reflects the debate is over and focuses on the project itself. It recognizes that with Chinese money, the much-needed railway will be realized much earlier than it would be possible with money from traditional donors/lenders. However, it also argues that the project must be thoroughly monitored and supervised to ensure that the Chinese deliver the goods.

*Tied aid is not a Chinese phenomenon. (...) As beggars, we cannot choose. However, we must at all times insist on basic minimum conditions of transparency in dealing with lending nations. (...) Why did we bend the rules to accommodate the Chinese in the case of the standard gauge railway project? (...) Where a foreign government gives a full grant to finance a project (...), we must allow the person who pays the piper to call the tune. But where billions in public resources are to be spent, as is the case with the standard gauge railway project, competitive bidding and independently conducted feasibility studies and designs should be mandatory.*¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ #295, Wallace Kantai: Tread carefully on single currency idea, The Daily Nation, 29 November 2013.

¹⁷⁵ #353, Charles Onyango-Obbo: The standard gauge railway fight is a very African story: Here’s why, The Daily Nation, 30 January 2014.

¹⁷⁶ #357, Jaiindi Kisero: Although railway project is “tied aid”, basic rules of transparency still apply, The Daily Nation, 5 February 2014.

The Chinese are not Santa Claus. The deals we have signed with them are loans, which we will have to repay. But I must admit I admire the way these deals are arranged, especially the time-frames and project completion dates. (...) Had we sought money from the conventional sources (...), we would still be arguing about settlement action plans, sovereign guarantees, letters of no objection and all manner of conditionalities. Anyone who takes a long-term view will admit that new infrastructure assets (...) will always make economic sense, especially in the future. (...) [T]he long-term benefits will outweigh the issues that critics raise during the planning and implementation stages.¹⁷⁷

Analyst/academia

There are four articles written by analysts. First article was written by a UK scholar and focuses on internal cohesiveness of the region as a necessary precondition for the success of the integration process. His opinion is very similar to that of the former Justice Minister presented earlier: integration process is not about infrastructure megaprojects, but about exchanges between the people. For this reason, isolation of Tanzania and creation of the “coalition of the willing” in the Northern Corridor has potential to foster integration in the short term and to weaken it in the long term.

[I]t makes sense to plan and finance pipelines, refineries, transport networks and electricity grids at the regional level. But are these policies alone strong enough to withstand possible political and economic challenges ahead? (...) If integration is to survive economic downturns and political instability, then it will have to be rooted in the political imaginations of citizens across East Africa. In essence (...) it means discovering the “deep ocean of shared knowledge, mutual responsibilities, and interlocking affections” that encompasses this region. East Africa needs to be more than just pipelines and customs unions if the EAC is to survive future challenges.¹⁷⁸

Second article was written by Kenyan media consultant and focuses on the SGR. His opinion is very similar to that of Nairobi-based manufacturer: although the railway projects promises to bring great benefits to Kenya, the government should be absolutely transparent about this project.

Here is my take on the proposed Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) vis-à-vis the existing Metre Gauge Railway (MGR). (...) What is my balance sheet? The benefits, technological and capacity superiority, and security of freight of SGR over MGR are not in doubt. That this is a Beijing-funded line to be constructed by a Beijing-owned firm on Beijing terms is also not in doubt. The liability in that this deal is akin to a closed shop. A mega deal, brokers, big money and secrecy often spawn breeding grounds for mega scandals. Nairobi and Beijing must persuade Kenyans that this is absolutely not the case.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ #440, Jaindi Kisero: Standard gauge railway project may become a game-changer in the future, The Daily Nation, 14 May 2014.

¹⁷⁸ #260, Daniel Branch: EAC’s success needs more than pipelines, The Daily Nation, 2 November 2013.

¹⁷⁹ #356, Kwendo Opanga: Why scepticism persists over new railway, The Daily Nation, 2 February 2014.

Third article was written by Kenyan university scholar and focuses on the “sugar deal” between Kenya and Uganda. In August 2015, a dispute arose about sugar imports from Uganda to Kenya, which have increased several fold between 2014 and 2015. Then, Kenya banned sugar imports to enter the country. Uganda criticised it as a breach to the regional trade protocol. After few weeks of negotiations, both governments agreed to allow sugar to freely cross the border. Farmers from Western Kenya rejected this agreement and the Opposition started to denounce this agreement as a “secret deal” to support local sugar barons at the expense of local farmers. However, as the author of the article argues, this verbal dispute lacked any substance. Most of imported sugar comes from other countries, total balance of trade is highly in favour of Kenya, Kenya as a regional hegemon should show leadership in regional affairs even though it may pay some price for it, and lastly, dispute blurs the real problem that Kenyan sugar industry is uncompetitive in the global market. The author supports regional integration, which should not become part of domestic political game.

Kenyans should be made aware that the balance of trade between Kenya and Uganda is in favour of Kenya, a reality that would make Uganda uncomfortable at a time when their sugar is being rejected in Kenya. Therefore, the controversial sugar deal has opened up a “public sphere” that has enabled Kenyans to contribute on how they would want to do business with their neighbours. Kenya is the political and economic hegemon in East Africa and therefore, it ought to show sober leadership in matters that touch on the common East African market.¹⁸⁰

Last article is about Lamu Port project, which has not been started yet.

Civil society

There are two articles written by civil society representatives. First article was written by a lawyer, who doubts whether open procurement process could provide higher value for money than single-sourcing. Big infrastructure projects such as the SGR are very specific projects, for which it is often difficult to find a financier. According to the author, Kenyan government did its job well as it secured external financial source for the project, which is expected to prove as a great value for money in the future. Second article was written by a Global Young Diplomat co-operating with the UN Habitat agency. In his view, young people have little interest in regional integration. It is a political construct of elites, which is far away from real problems of ordinary people, who are not allowed to participate in the integration process.

¹⁸⁰ #749, Fredrick Ogenga: The fuss over sugar imports indicates that we are gaining political maturity, The Daily Nation, 2 September 2015.

The standard gauge railway project (SGR) has always been touted as a socio-economic game-changer. (...) Few can dispute the imperative of the railway. Some, though, have loudly raised questions as to the scope, design, financing and implementation of the project. (...) For project implementers, (...) the choice is restricted to finding a financing source with the capability, and willingness to accommodate a risk of a massive sum of over Sh327 billion to a single project in a single country. This is not as easy as many would like to believe. (...) I suspect that if one was to undertake a sober analysis of the project based on the technical considerations of risk profiling, its unique circumstances due to the huge capital costs and the potential socio-economic benefits it has for the country, it may very well turn out to be great value for money.¹⁸¹

The findings of the East Africa Institute indicate that nearly 70 per cent of East Africa's young people are not enthusiastic about regional integration. (...) [T]here is little interest among the youth because they have not been allowed to participate. This has led to the notion among young people that the bloc offers no solutions to the problems they face, that it is a political construct of the heads of the East African states, with little relevance on the lives of ordinary folks. Poor public participation is reinforced by the fact that (...) the five EAC members (...) have different levels of democratisation. This makes it difficult to embrace public participation as an integral part of the integration process.¹⁸²

Reader

There are eight letters written by readers. Similarly to previous categories, range of topics and views is very broad. First two letters deal with the problem of multi-speed integration. For one reader, integration should go ahead even if only part of members participate in the process. For another reader, excluding Tanzania means that the community is collapsing, because it lacks trust among members.

*Tanzania is not a member of East African Community in spirit. It should be noted that the death of the original EAC was engineered by Tanzania (...). Efforts to integrate the community of East Africans have always met hurdles from Tanzania[.] (...) Tanzania is a sovereign state and has a right to choose her friends and enemies. Other East Africans should move forward as Tanzania puts her house in order before joining them.*¹⁸³

*It shows the community is collapsing. When you cross borders of these EAC nations you'll know that we aren't one. You must produce heaps of papers because you are a foreigner. The one identity card, or one currency is still a dream.*¹⁸⁴

Other readers focus on the SGR project. For one reader, this project brings significant economic benefits. Moreover, as it is a regional initiative, the project is more reliable. For this reader, those who criticise the project refuse to see the benefits. This opinion

¹⁸¹ #354, Crispine Odhiambo: The standard gauge rail project may turn out to be great value for money, The Daily Nation, 31 January 2014.

¹⁸² #654, Raphael Obonyo: What is the value of integration to youth?, The Daily Nation, 27 April 2015.

¹⁸³ #233, Martin Baariu Muriuki: Tanzania cannot stop EAC from moving on, The Daily Nation, 3 September 2013.

¹⁸⁴ #568, Justin N. Nkaranga: EA unity a dream, The Daily Nation, 1 December 2014.

may signal that concrete projects and concrete growth estimates are for ordinary people worth more than abstract values such as transparency. Another explanation may be that corruption is so rampant in Kenya that the SGR deal is just another piece to the puzzle, which is extraordinary only in its total amount.

Critics say the project is expensive and will saddle the taxpayer and future generations with a heavy repayment and tax burden; that it does not have a bankable business proposition or demonstrable return on investment. (...) The SGR project is a child of the inefficiencies of the existing railway system, especially speed and capacity. (...) Of note is the fact that this project is a regional initiative and its viability is underwritten by the trilateral agreement (...). It makes sense for Kenya to have a gauge that is compatible with partners to allow seamless movement of goods and people. The SGR carries with it a lot of economic promise. (...) It will also add 1.5 per cent growth to the economy.¹⁸⁵

Last reader focuses on general political environment in the region, where three of the five leaders belong to the group of Africa's "strongmen" serving more than two regular electoral periods.

The recent troubles in Burundi [announcement of the incumbent President to run for a third term, leading to demonstrations and subsequently to police violence] are a clear indication that regional integration remains a mere dream. The thirst for political power among the region's leaders is a major obstacle to the realisation of integration. Those in power are ready to manipulate the law for their own gain. (...) The East African Community should champion constitutionalism.¹⁸⁶

To sum up, even the picture of regional integration seems to be highly ambiguous. Regional leaders express their deep commitments to integration and that they would like to speed up the integration process. However, as contributions by journalists, analysts, civil society representatives, and readers reveal, this rhetoric is not followed by concrete actions to eliminate barriers to free movement of production factors. Many of authors see integration as a project of elites with high symbolical value, but with no concrete impact on the livelihood of the people. People are not involved in the integration process and thus they can hardly identify with it. Some authors go even so far to challenge the whole concept of EU-style regional integration with supranational bureaucracy and see the "Northern Corridor Infrastructure Summit" as a shift to loose inter-governmental cooperation focusing on concrete infrastructure needs of the countries. Integration brings benefits to people only through big infrastructure projects such as the SGR railway. No one questions the benefits of such projects, but many observers challenge the process of designing such projects. After decades of

¹⁸⁵ #375, Kiendi Ndambuki: Critics of standard gauge railway project just refuse to see its benefits, The Daily Nation, 24 February 2014.

¹⁸⁶ #664, Arnold Rono: Leaders are the main obstacle to integration, The Daily Nation, 22 May 2015.

dependence on the West, African nations can easily become dependent on China for another few decades due to the massive loans. Moreover, such projects are prone to corruption, which is omnipresent in Kenyan public sphere. Business community views differ according to their potential and perceived benefits and costs from the integration.

Kenya

Finally, let's briefly analyse whether there is some public discussion about the overall trajectory of the Kenyan development. In my data corpus, there are 92 articles focusing on Kenya and its economic development. From the total of 141 single topic appearances, the most frequent frame topics are trade, investment, loans (33), agriculture and agro-industry (19), infrastructure (18), economic strategy of Kenya (16), and human development (12). This may indicate that the news discourse is generally reflecting the overall trend within Kenyan political elite to prioritize market-driven and economically open economic strategy, although it also asks questions about possible alternatives.

Eastern and Western press agency

There are two articles taken from the Chinese press agency Xinhua informing about Kenyan maize imports and about a regional infrastructure and investment summit organized by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development¹⁸⁷ (IGAD); there is no article taken from any of the Western press agencies. We can assume that Kenyan development strategy is rather a domestic issue, which attracts less attention of the foreign journalists.

Local public official

In 2006, Kenya has adopted a new development program called Vision 2030 aiming to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens.¹⁸⁸ The program is based on three pillars. Economic pillar aims to achieve an average annual GDP growth rate of 10 %, which requires macro-economic stability, increased foreign investment and development assistance, and enhancing country's infrastructure. Social pillar aims to build a just and cohesive society with social equity in a clean and secure environment. Political pillar aims to

¹⁸⁷ IGAD is one of regional organizations in Africa covering the area of the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and East Africa.

¹⁸⁸ For details see <http://www.vision2030.go.ke>.

realize a democratic political system that is issue-based, people-centered, result-oriented and accountable to the public.

We can find three opinion articles written by local public officials focusing on three different issues (need to improve manufacturing sector to avoid exporting raw skins and hides; need to attract domestic tourists; export marketing), but none of these three articles discusses the general development strategy. Even when we read articles written by journalists, we can find only a few quotes by local public officials related to Vision 2030.

The Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industries leads a delegation of 60 businessmen today to meet business experts at a global trade forum in Uganda. (...) According to Cabinet Secretary for East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism Phyllis Kandie, exposing Kenya's top business minds to new markets presents an opportunity for growth and investments. "We are pursuing regional markets aggressively to increase chances of meeting the 20 per cent annual export growth targeted under Vision 2030," said Mrs. Kandie.¹⁸⁹

Kenya needs to position itself as an exporter of services in order to drive economic growth and create new jobs. This will be crucial in supporting poverty eradication efforts. According to Vision 2030 acting director-general Gituro Wainaina, there is a need to increase focus on investments in the sector by targeting the external market, which is critical in raising the country's global competitiveness. "It makes a direct and significant contribution to the GDP and job creation (...). This has a significant effect on the overall investment climate, which is an essential determinant of growth and development," he said.¹⁹⁰

In both of these excerpts only the economic pillar of the Vision 2030 is mentioned. However, we could expect it; trade minister focused on her agenda and the second article quoted from Vision 2030 director-general's presentation at a workshop on "The Role of Services in Economic Transformation". Generally, Vision 2030 development programme is only occasionally mentioned by Kenyan public officials. This may signal that this development program and government's effort to achieve its goals is taken for granted among Kenyan leaders. For few more quotes by local public officials see the section "Journalist".

Foreign public official

This category is represented by a commentary from the World Bank economist in Kenya. He criticizes the underperformance of Kenya's export sector and asserts that improving export sector requires active government creating favourable conditions.

¹⁸⁹ #465, Nation Correspondent: Kenya hunts for extra new export markets, The Daily Nation, 18 June 2014.

¹⁹⁰ #655, Joshua Masinde: Exporting services could be magic bullet for growth, says "Vision" DG, The Daily Nation, 29 April 2015.

These conditions are infrastructural, legal, and social, which corresponds with the three pillars of the Vision 2030.

*Last year, Kenya's economy was behaving like a plane flying on one engine through a storm. (...) Kenya's first engine – domestic consumption – which is fuelling vibrant service and construction sectors, has always been strong. But the second engine – exports – needs to perform better. If not, Kenya will continue to operate below potential, for years to come. (...) The government needs to provide the conditions – such as infrastructure, the rule of law, and basic social services – for business to thrive, but not running them.*¹⁹¹

Local businessperson

This category is represented by a commentary from one of Kenyan businessmen in sugar industry. Although he analyses situation in this particular sector, he ends up his commentary with a short reflection on the policy of liberalization, which can be seen as a part of overall economic strategy. He does not argue against liberalization of the sugar industry, but he warns against rapid liberalization before securing necessary background conditions for it.

*If the liberalisation of the sugar market is not done within the law and proper measures taken, then the sugar industry in Kenya will not survive. Such liberalisation will create negative economic impact, specifically in regions that depend largely on sugarcane growing as their major cash crop.*¹⁹²

Foreign businessperson

There is no article in this category.

Journalist

All but one articles written by journalist is standard news reporting focusing on different actual, albeit partial aspects of the Kenyan economic development. Let's present seven short excerpts:

*“An investor may identify an area of interest to develop but they are then pushed away by lack of infrastructure in those regions,” said acting Industrialisation minister Amason Kingi (...). He pointed out that there is need to address poor road conditions, lack of electricity and water, if the country plans to meet its goals.*¹⁹³

“[Thika] superhighway is a great example of efforts and commitment to transform Kenya into a strong economic hub for the region and beyond,” President Kibaki said (...). He said

¹⁹¹ #021, Wolfgang Fengler: Kenya has to diversify its exports to remain dominant in East Africa, The Daily Nation, 3 March 2012.

¹⁹² #751, Ambrose Weda: Illegal sugar, not the imports, is the greatest threat to the local industry, The Daily Nation, 4 September 2015.

¹⁹³ #065, Nation Correspondent: Poor infrastructure could hinder growth of special economic zones, The Daily Nation, 25 May 2015.

infrastructure development promotes trade, creates a conducive environment for business and plays a key role in national unity and integration.¹⁹⁴

[The 2013/2014] Budget (...) highlighted several measures that are meant to improve the infrastructure which will lead to a reduction in the overall cost of doing business. (...) The announcement came at a time when the country has come under the spotlight as being among countries in which it is most costly to do business in the region.¹⁹⁵

Kenya will have to stop relying heavily on domestic consumption to grow its economy if it hopes to attain growth targets (...). [E]xports have performed poorly while investment levels are underwhelming. (...) Over the last ten years, the World Bank says, Kenya's economic growth has been erratic and has lagged behind peers in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁹⁶

The government has approved 47 major infrastructure projects to be funded through partnerships with the private sector in a bid to seal a huge gap between public investments needs and available resources. (...) In the wake of a bloated recurrent expenditure, the government currently spends only about 30 per cent of the total budget on development programmes, starving the economy of much-needed incentives to drive growth.¹⁹⁷

Kenya successfully raised Sh175 billion from the international market to pay for key infrastructure projects (...). If these are successfully implemented, they will lead to a reduction in the cost of electricity and an increase in food supply among other benefits that could ease the cost of living.¹⁹⁸

President Kenyatta has a chance to fight corruption because he is reputedly not needy himself. But while we all abhor corruption, simply fighting graft is not a meaningful policy in itself. A much better legacy would be the large-scale expansion of infrastructure to attract investors who would, in turn, stimulate employment.¹⁹⁹

These excerpts show that the development strategy (at least in the elite's view) is driven primarily by the economic logic. Lack of infrastructure is seen as the biggest barrier to further development, thus Kenya needs to massively invest into infrastructure. If Kenya does not possess adequate resources, which is the case, it has to borrow money both from public and private international creditors. Improved infrastructure will boost country's trade and attract foreign investors that will invest in the manufacturing sector and services. This will create jobs and help Kenya to move in

¹⁹⁴ #118, Lucas Barasa: Thika Superhighway to steer Kenya into an economic hub, says Kibaki, The Daily Nation, 10 November 2012.

¹⁹⁵ #179, Immaculate Karambu: Cost of doing business to reduce, say manufacturers, The Daily Nation, 16 June 2013.

¹⁹⁶ #258, Muthoki Mumo: Diversify exports to speed up growth, World Bank advises, The Daily Nation, 30 October 2013.

¹⁹⁷ #329, Joshua Masinde: Over 40 major projects get the nod to seek private sector funds, The Daily Nation, 1 January 2014.

¹⁹⁸ #469, Muthoki Mumo: Kenyans set to reap big from Eurobond / Sh176bn bond set to cut the cost of living, The Daily Nation, 24 June 2014.

¹⁹⁹ #396, Murithi Mutiga: Ethiopia's mega rail projects are on track while Kenya looks on, The Daily Nation, 30 March 2014.

the global value chains upwards. And this will enhance export opportunities and increase export volumes, which will further boost domestic production and services sector and will create more jobs. Finally, this strategy can help Kenya to quickly shift from being developing country to the status of middle-income country.

When Kenya statistically reached the middle-income status in 2014, this development strategy seemed to prove to be suitable and viable. First part of the following excerpt argues that the economic growth has a significant positive effect also on the poor. However, in its second part, it expresses a view of an economist that rapid economic growth within the framework of the globalized economy is in fact making the poor even poorer. This signals that analysts and scholars may see the issue of Kenya's development strategy differently. We will analyse it in the following subsection.

Kenya's new status as a middle class economy will give the government more room for borrowing for infrastructure spending (...) [which] will stimulate productive sectors of the economy and this will result in a trickle-down effect that will help improve the living status of the poor. (...) Some analysts, however, say the economic status of most Kenyans may not get any better even with the new status. University of Nairobi development economist Samuel Nyandemo said that whereas the economy will improve, the life of the man on the street will not get any better. He cited the high cost of living and income inequalities that have seen the poor sink further into poverty and the richer become even richer.²⁰⁰

One article informs about the poll asking Kenyans whether they are satisfied with their situation or not. Results of this poll may signal that ordinary people have also different views about Kenya's development than their leaders. We will analyse this later in the "Reader" subsection.

High cost of living, lack of jobs as well as insecurity come top on the list of things that worry Kenyans, a new survey shows. As a result, majority [64 %] of Kenyans feel the country is headed in the wrong direction.²⁰¹

Analyst/academia

As we could see in the previous subsection, not all analysts share the view of Kenyan elites that Kenya needs above all the massive investment into infrastructure. This is well illustrated by the debate between economist David Ndi and other Kenyan scholars throughout the year 2014.

In the aftermath of the [unsuccessful 2005] constitution referendum, all the progressives were booted out of government and President Kibaki's conservative wing of the coalition

²⁰⁰ #533, Joshua Masinde: Kenya joins middle income economy status on Tuesday, The Daily Nation, 26 September 2014.

²⁰¹ #322, Dave Opiyo: Cost of living tops worries list, The Daily Nation, 25 December 2013.

took charge. The result was a complete triumph of capital fundamentalism, in the name of Vision 2030: growth above all else, fuelled by mega infrastructure projects. (...) This is why we find ourselves where we are after a decade of growth, mesmerised by one mega infrastructure project after another, as the ordinary person wonders why the struggle to make ends meet gets more difficult by the day.²⁰²

[T]he massive infrastructure projects (...) have had positive spill-overs. Kenyans do not use the time saved by using the Thika superhighway and other highways to sleep for longer hours; they use the time saved on productive activities. (...) And how about looking inside ourselves as the source of economic growth? Mr Ndiir knows that economic development is not achieved overnight; it takes time and the mega-projects are just a start.²⁰³

The defining feature of economic development is not steady progress but very rapid economic transformation and structural change. (...) And that's the crux of my argument: the "pro-poor" investment generates four times the growth of "pro-rich" investments. The long and short of it is: the Wabenzi²⁰⁴ economy cannot sustain a growth rate of more than four per cent per year no matter how much infrastructure we smother it with.²⁰⁵

This first opinions exchange from January 2014 shows that both scholars dispute whether investment into infrastructure is pro-rich investment, or whether also the poor can yield some benefits from it. This debate continued later in 2014 in the same direction:

The overall development trajectory of the Asian Tigers closely mirrors their human capital formation. (...) We are investing Sh300 billion or thereabouts in the standard gauge railway. A year of tertiary education costs about Sh300,000. (...) Which mega-project, the SGR or an additional million person years of tertiary education would have a bigger impact on long term economic growth rate?²⁰⁶

[T]here is no question that we should focus more on higher education. (...) [W]e have ample evidence that poor infrastructure has been a major constraint to growth in Kenya (...) [T]here is ample evidence showing the various benefits of infrastructure to an economy: Direct job creation, improved productivity of the private sector, property values, stimulating market exchanges and creating value, reduced costs, improved international competitiveness, etc. (...) [We need to] look at the region and how best to connect the economies and this will not be possible without large investments in infrastructure.²⁰⁷

²⁰² #331, David Ndiir: Why Kenyans are getting poorer despite rapid growth, The Daily Nation, 4 January 2014.

²⁰³ #336, Robert Tinale: Economist's arguments without any basis, The Daily Nation, 9 January 2014.

²⁰⁴ Wabenzi is a pejorative Swahili word describing the members of the privileged class all over Africa, particularly government officials. Literally the word means "the people of Mercedes Benz", referring to the fact that members of this class like German luxury cars.

²⁰⁵ #343, David Ndiir: Why the Wabenzi economy will never take this country to the promised land, The Daily Nation, 18 January 2014.

²⁰⁶ #558, David Ndiir: Human beings, not mega-projects will turbo-charge economy, The Daily Nation, 8 November 2014.

²⁰⁷ #561, Mwangi Kimenyi: How mega projects can help fight poverty and spur growth, The Daily Nation, 15 November 2014.

My contention in a nutshell is that the specific mega infrastructure projects we are investing in are mostly bad investments. I have argued that even those that are economically viable are based towards making existing capital more profitable at the expense of productivity raising, job creating investments. (...) What we will end up with is a high productivity enclave unconnected to the rest of the economy. (...) This is not what economists mean by growth. By economic growth we mean and are interested in widespread and sustained rise in productivity, year after year, that translates into mass prosperity.²⁰⁸

David Ndi is not the only scholar arguing against the large infrastructure projects and the economic logic behind the prevailing development strategy. Patrick Mbataru shares his view that growth does not automatically lead to development. He sees Kenya as a “dysfunctional capitalist economy”, where the expected trickle-down effect does not occur and government must adopt active and robust social policy.

In the past decade, Kenya has prioritised economic infrastructural expansion as a strategy of development. The idea is that some of the benefits of a new road will “trickle down” to the poor. Experts are increasingly questioning this kind of “trickle-down” development. (...) Economic growth is not sufficient to uplift the well-being of the poor. There is also social infrastructure. (...) [I]n a dysfunctional capitalist economy like ours, businesses hardly share increased profits with customers. We end up having economic growth without development. People cannot eat GDP. (...) [N]ational investment decisions are often not entirely altruistic. Political, corporate, or individual interests are the key factors.²⁰⁹

Rasna Warah asserts that government officials and their projects are detached from reality and as a result they are unable to identify the real problems. New highways and by-passes may partly solve the problem of congestions in Nairobi. Unfortunately, such a solution tackles only the effects of the problem, not the cause of it. What Nairobi needs instead, is a reliable system of public transport, which requires a different style of reasoning and brand new ideas different to the economic logic.

State House and ministries draw up plans and strategies based on an idea of Kenya that only exists in their imagination. Cabinet secretaries appear to be carrying out elaborate, well-thought-out blueprints to propel the country to a sustainable and progressive emerging economy, but these blueprints are not rooted in reality. (...) The President must be aware that the absence of an affordable, safe, environmentally friendly, and less obstructive public transport system is hindering Nairobi to become a world-class city. Hours lost on the road translate into less hours spent doing productive work that contributes to the GDP.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ #562, David Ndi: Why skyscrapers and superhighways are not development, The Daily Nation, 22 November 2014.

²⁰⁹ #359, Patrick Mbataru: Kenya’s development model is not doing well because it ignores human growth, The Daily Nation, 14 February 2014.

²¹⁰ #563, Rasna Warah: It should worry us that our leaders seem to have no idea what we need, The Daily Nation, 24 November 2014.

Finally, Abdulla Ido highlights that the main issue in Kenya is security in its widest sense, including terrorist attacks, inter-ethnic violence, and probably also crime. If investors do not feel secure in Kenya, they will leave.

Under the new Constitution, internal security remains a function of the National Government, while county governments are charged with spurring economic growth and promoting equitable social development. But no government can achieve this in the absence of security. The fact is, the National Government has largely failed in its security role. (...) No number of conferences can lure investors to these counties if sustainable peace is not restored. (...) The true test of county leadership is not how many superhighways or skyscrapers are constructed, though essential, but how peacefully the communities sharing these resources co-exist.²¹¹

Civil society

Similarly to other analysts, lawyer and human rights activist Maina Kiai asserts that the poor people do not benefit from the economic growth. Contrarily, despite growing economy, the inequality in the Kenyan society is rising.

It is perplexing that in all the political wrangles in Kenya, there is scarce debate or ideas (...) on how to fix the enormous income inequality gap (...). We have had good economic growth since 2003. But for the majority, this growth has not been felt.²¹²

Reader

Two readers have expressed similar concerns about national development, which is not inclusive and beneficial for all. The reason, according to the second reader, is that the government prioritizes the economic pillar of development over the social and political pillars.

Certain sectors of our economy, such as tourism and horticulture, receive much attention in terms of infrastructure. However, most rural parts (...) still suffer from the poor state of roads. Only a small quantity of the total production reaches consumers and this comes with the headache of transport. This means the livelihood of the common farmer is jeopardised.²¹³

Drafters of Vision 2030 were alive to the fact that the country needed a holistic approach to development. However, there is obsession with the economic pillar at the expense of the

²¹¹ #333, Abdulla Ido: Forget investor conferences: Just fix the insecurity problem to realise progress, The Daily Nation, 6 January 2014.

²¹² #731, Maina Kiai: The rich do not care about the poor, and that is the society we are creating, The Daily Nation, 22 August 2015.

²¹³ #458, Hezron Rotich: Economy cannot grow with the many poor rural roads, The Daily Nation, 7 June 2014.

*social and political ones. (...) Social justice is becoming a pipe dream. When an economy grows amid worsening disparities between the haves and have-nots, all is not well.*²¹⁴

Another reader assumes that the main problem of Kenya is the lack of responsible institutions, which is a prerequisite both for social and economic development.

*Indeed, the ultimate concern of development is the alleviation of mass poverty[.] (...) Economic growth consists of raising national and per capita real incomes. However, development demands a good deal more – structural change, technical advance, closing regional socio-economic gaps and new resource discoveries like the oil. (...) Developing high human capital without favourable institutional frameworks would simply result into brain drain. Our crisis is one of institutions, with 35 per cent of the budget lost every year through “chicken eating businesses.”*²¹⁵

Finally, it is worth mentioning also two letters from readers, which belong to “SGR” and “China” categories, but which also tackle the issues related to Kenyan economic development. First reader discusses the problem of unreliable supply of electricity, second reader asserts that need to acquire finance for investment abroad is at least partly caused by the rampant corruption among top officials.

*As I write this letter, I guess you are launching the new railway – very good! (...) I’m of the opinion that no matter how many railway lines you launch, no matter how many counties we have, no matter how many markets your deputy opens, no matter how we adhere to the best Constitution in the world, without electricity, we will not develop. I’m just a butcher, but my profits are eaten up by petrol to run the generator. Think about it.*²¹⁶

*Believe it or not, we can actually build our own roads and bridges if those at the helm were not so corrupt!*²¹⁷

To sum up this final subsection, although Vision 2030 is based on three pillars, the development strategy of Kenyan government seems to prioritize the economic pillar, with less focus on the political pillar and particularly on the social pillar. As some analysts and readers argue, economic growth is not the same as development. Moreover, economic growth seems to be beneficial only for urban middle and upper classes, while the poor rural population is getting even poorer. According to these analysts, the government should invest above all into human capital, not into financial capital and infrastructure mega-projects.

²¹⁴ #553, Benard Amaya: Too much emphasis on economy at expense of other pillars, The Daily Nation, 30 October 2014.

²¹⁵ #582, Billow Khalid: To develop, we need mega-projects, brains and dependable institutions, The Daily Nation, 12 December 2014.

²¹⁶ #294, Grace Njuguna: Hello Mr President, The Daily Nation, 29 November 2013.

²¹⁷ #630, John Mark: Chinese in Kenya for their selfish interest, The Daily Nation, 8 March 2015.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have tried to analyse the image of the US, the EU, China, and their models of economic governance in Kenyan news discourse.

Overview

First part offered a theoretical background within the current debates of the new regionalist literature and the discipline of international political economy. I described the process called *new regionalism* as another wave of regionalism in the global economy. Then, I presented some basic theoretical concepts connected with the new regionalism, which emerged since the early 1990s until now. Overview of the existing literature reveals that there is a tension between globalization and globalism, and between regionalization and regionalism. In more general terms, that there is a tension between objective economic processes and subjective political strategies. Necessarily, both influence each other, but also both attempts to overcome each other. This is a reflection of the long-term tension between economy/markets and politics/governments.

However, there is also other dimension to this relationship: identity. Until recently, research focused on whether states can shape markets or whether states react to markets. Current research tries to go beyond this dichotomy by incorporating people. This seems logical. We can create regional space cemented by shared institutions, but the real glue is direct interaction and exchange between people. And this exchange is a result of regionalization more than of regionalism. It is hardly an exception that people on both sides of a border interact more than people from different and distant parts of one nation-state. This dynamics seems to have been overlooked until very recently.

Then, I explain the theory of strategic narratives. Its starting point is rationalist: actors use discourse strategically to pursue specific policy outcomes (interests). However, the concept is complemented by reflectivist issues such as identity, shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics, perception of my own position in the international system, norms, or discourses, which all constrain narrative options. States seek to maximize interests, but it is always dependent on the meaning of situations for them, and this subjective experience is structured by narratives (Miskimmon et al. 2012: 9, Miskimmon et al. 2013: 117). What is important is that there are three dimensions of strategic narratives. They are formulated, they are projected, and they are received by others. The last dimension remains often overlooked, although it is of the utmost

importance: we need to explore how the narrative is received and interpreted by its audiences and how audiences evaluate that narrative alongside other narratives (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 148). Theory of strategic narratives usually works on the level of the state. This may seem to be in contradiction with my aim to go beyond state-centric view to incorporate identity and people into the analysis. However, it is not. Different strategic narratives often clash and influence each other. How do we receive narratives of others influences formulation of our own narratives; this is not purely top-level exercise, but it involves different societal groups, which can assert their own values, identities and interests to be incorporated to the strategic narrative of the state.

Second part is methodological and elaborates further on the theoretical issues. I describe my methodological position as interpretive constructivism, which advocates post-foundationalism with relation to knowledge. Although there are no ontological foundations of knowledge, there are epistemological foundations. Social facts are created by agents, but then they are reified, taken by real, and they make social world to come into being. Thus, interpretive constructivists choose methods that are able to uncover this constructed and reified nature of the social world. One of such methods is a discourse analysis. I use a specific version of discourse analysis, which can be called interpretive textual content analysis. Contrary to standard content analysis, it does not count words, but search for meanings in the texts. Then I proceed to explain my case selection (Kenya) and data source selection (articles from the leading Kenyan newspaper *The Daily Nation*). I argue that news discourse is one version of a broad societal discourse, which can offer us an important, although not complete, insight into the public debate. Surprisingly, media as data source are used only very rarely in the new regionalist literature.

Third part describes three strategic narratives of the three global superpowers regarding the global economic governance. I call these narratives neoliberal model, social market model, and developmental model. These are ideal-typical models articulating different views on how to manage global economy. Then, I analyse foreign economic policies of the US, the EU, and China in the last thirty years. These are three representatives of the three different models, which more or less approach to the ideal type. Finally, I also briefly describe the history of regional integration in East Africa, which is another important direction of Kenyan economic policy.

Fourth part is empirical analysis using excerpts from articles to illustrate news discourse, which allows answering research questions that were posed in the introductory chapter.

Research Questions

I aimed to analyse **how external economic partners are portrayed in Kenyan news discourse**. This main research question was further elaborated into seven sub-questions, which will be answered below.

1. **Does Kenyan news discourse reflect the fact that major superpowers have different ideas about how the global economy should be governed** and that they construct substantially different narratives based on these ideas?

The answer is negative. Models focus rather on abstract issues and ideas of global economic order/governance. Analysis reveals that models, described in Chapter Five, appear in the news discourse only rarely.

Neoliberal model is expressed once and indirectly by Secretary of State John Kerry who urges African leaders to “embrace free-market ideals”. US representatives avoid using the term neoliberalism, supposedly due to its negative connotations in Africa. As one analyst points out, the Washington Consensus and its “neo-liberal prescriptions drove many developing countries to their knees”, although he does not mention the US openly. Creating markets and expanding economic opportunities led to increased global inequality and further marginalization of Africa. He equates neoliberalism with imperialism. Similarly, local public official identifies liberalization of the economy as part of agenda of the 1990s, which he sees in negative terms. Dominant powers (again, the US is not mentioned openly) forced African states to adopt Western political and economic principles regardless local conditions and traditions. Contrarily, current relations are being characterized as “rational conversation” about shared values, which is based on partnership between the two partners.

Neoliberalism is rather an ongoing process than an end-state or a single ideology. Although it is backed by a series of guiding principles, these are applied inconsistently and unevenly based on different specific local contexts (Peck – Theodore 2012: 179). Thus, “real-world neoliberalisation cannot be reduced to a process of enacting a singular, pristine plan or grand design” and “does not produce a singular, “advanced” or globalising state” (Peck – Theodore 2012: 177). Other scholars go even further: actually existing neoliberalism(s) “are more than curious local manifestations of global

norms, but sets of theories and practices about the world that are fundamentally the products of local history and experience” (Goldstein 2012: 305).²¹⁸ Africa produces different results of neoliberalism than the Western core of the global economy. Neither the atrophy of the social state nor the hypertrophy of the penal state is the defining feature of neoliberalism in Africa (Hilgers 2012: 89). What exists in many poor non-Western societies is neither neoliberalism nor post-neoliberalism (Goldstein 2012: 308). Although we may argue that Kenya is likely to be more neoliberal than other states in the region, it does not adopt the US neoliberal model as such.

Similarly, Chinese economic model per se is mentioned only rarely. British economist in his article sees this model as an alternative to the West and recognizes increased Obama’s focus on Africa as an attempt “to encourage the continent to think twice signing up” to this model. Thus, he confirms that there are different economic models and that there is a battle of ideas based on these different models. Kenyan banker working for bank in Saudi Arabia in his article recommends adopting Asian development model, although this model is not seen as an alternative to the Western model, but to the resource-based model, which many African oil-producing countries have adopted and which is dependent upon volatile world commodity prices, thus unstable and fragile.²¹⁹

Finally, European social market model is not mentioned at all. One possible reason is comparatively low level of using local media as a channel for European public diplomacy. Another possible reason is that African audience does not take European policy towards Africa as one “comprehensive package”, but rather differentiates between trade issues, development issues, and political issues. EU serves as a model not for global economic issues, but for regional integration.

Thus, “African” narratives of all the three powers ignore the pertinent questions of global economic order. This is understandable: such questions are very likely too

²¹⁸ However, we can assume that while academic scholars may describe Kenyan (or any other state’s) system as a localized version of neoliberalism, local agents will not use the term neoliberalism at all. Thus, we can assume that discussion about localized neoliberalism(s) will only rarely appear in the local news discourse. Moreover, such analysis will be a departure from the initial aim to analyse superpowers’ strategic narratives and their reception in Africa. Reality of localized neoliberalism(s) does not reject the idea that the US represents the globally dominant version of neoliberalism, although it is in fact just one of the many existing localized neoliberalisms. However, due to the economic and political strength, the US has successfully disseminated and continues to disseminate its vision worldwide.

²¹⁹ #585, Mohamed Wehliye: Why Kenya shouldn’t pin all its hopes on oil, The Daily Nation, 15 December 2014.

distant and too abstract from everyday life of the ordinary people. Thus, when using local media as a tool of public diplomacy, superpowers omit these rather philosophical issues and focus on concrete benefits of cooperation.

Chinese narrative is the closest to the ideal-model as it stresses more abstract values such as the sovereignty. However, it concentrates solely on China-Africa partnership and does not go beyond to delineate contours of the future global order. As part of the narrative is a claim that every state should be free to choose its own development path, China can hardly push its developmental model by force. It would undermine the model from inside and make it less persuasive. Thus, China uses its narrative to enhance its soft power in hope that at least some African states will turn their back to the West and will voluntarily adopt the Chinese model as the most suitable for their development. This will subsequently enhance China's soft power also globally. Until very recently, China lagged in soft power resources behind the US and the EU due to language barrier, inward-oriented culture, and domestic political issues. However, one important source of reputation and attractiveness is also the economic prowess (Nye 2004: 33, 89). Thus, global economic crisis is likely to have increased China's soft power, and China attempts to build on it in Africa. Contrarily, European narrative focuses rather on history: the EU has offered a comprehensive partnership for more than fifty years, it is the most reliable partner for African development, and it will remain so. American narrative focuses rather on current trade and investment opportunities.

The US is not presenting itself as a representative of the neoliberal model, the EU is not presenting itself as a representative of the social market model, and China is not presenting itself as a representative of the developmental model. News discourse reflects the content of the respective narratives, so it also ignores the questions of global order.

2. Do major superpowers use the leading Kenyan newspaper as a tool of public diplomacy through which they attempt to disseminate their narratives?

My analysis confirms that the US, the EU, and China actively use *The Daily Nation* as a tool for their public diplomacy. China has a clearly defined narrative, which is articulated towards audience both directly by Chinese leaders and indirectly by Chinese media and press agency Xinhua. Thus, China seems to be the most active in using local media for public diplomacy. The US attempts to disseminate its narrative as well and

uses local media as a tool of public diplomacy quite actively. However, the number of articles through which the US representatives directly address Kenyan audience is relatively low, just five articles in almost four years. The EU seems to disseminate its narrative least actively, there is only one article related to economic issues. This is quite surprising, because the covered period contained also the final phase of negotiating the crucial Economic Partnership Agreement with the region. We can sum up that although superpowers actively use The Daily Nation for public diplomacy, its potential remains underutilized.

3. Which main “issue” narratives about cooperation of the outside world with Africa appear in the Kenyan news discourse? Are American, European, and Chinese narratives clearly articulated or are they rather vague or even ambiguous?

China has clearly defined “African” narrative. This narrative says that China-Africa relationship is, contrarily to the Western approach, based on political equality, economic win-win cooperation, mutual benefits, respect for sovereignty and cultural differences.

EU narrative is also relatively clear. Due to the long-term close economic relations, the EU remains an indispensable trade partner and Kenya should do its job to conform to its trade regulation in order to safeguard this crucial export market. This regulation is often based on a strong normative view reflecting the general aim to further deepen the existing global trade rules. Although the European trade policy with ACP countries is interlinked with development cooperation and political cooperation, this link, which forms the external basis of the European social market model, is expressed only very cautiously and rather indirectly.

Contrarily, the message sent by the US officials to Kenya is not clear, which makes the narrative less persuasive. The US is not sure about the content of its narrative – whether the main message is that of free trade, investment, and economic cooperation, or that of democracy, liberty, human rights, and good governance. The problem is not in choosing between the two. The US has for a long time treated these two issues separately and used different tools for leverage to achieve its goals. The problem is that trade and investment has become much more important tool than development aid. As a result, the US has lost its leverage to assert democratic agenda. This poses a dilemma whether and to what extent trade and investment issues should be conditioned by non-economic criteria. In the second term of Obama’s presidency,

the US seems to have shifted towards more pragmatism, particularly due to pressure from the private sector to improve its position on the continent. Thus, the view that economic and political issues should be treated separately has been strengthened. This opens a space for a formulation of a new economic narrative, which may be more persuasive than the current double narrative.

4. To what extent do Kenyan political and business leaders adopt, modify, or reject these narratives to form the official discourse (as appearing in the newspaper)?

China seems to be successful in disseminating its narrative among the Kenyan political elite. Kenyan leaders welcome and appreciate particularly financial cooperation with China, because such cooperation enables them to finance large infrastructure projects without having to fulfil complex set of conditions.

Similarly, Kenyan leaders seem to have adopted the EU narrative. Although they repeatedly talk about the need to diversify Kenyan export base both in items and target markets, they are well aware that this cannot happen immediately. For some time, the EU will remain the most important export market for Kenya, local exporters should strive to comply with the EU rules, and Kenyan government should be helpful in their efforts.

In the case of the US narrative, the US leaders are straddled between the economic narrative and the liberty narrative; sometimes they try to merge the two into a single narrative (unsuccessfully). This ambiguity allows others to choose between these two narratives. Thus, US businessmen adopt the economic narrative and neglect the liberty narrative. In a similar vein, both Kenyan leaders and businessmen adopt the economic narrative and seek to maximize the benefits from renewed interest of the US in Africa.

Regional integration in Africa went through multiple phases, with different phases mirroring all these three models. Until the mid-1980s, states pursued closed import substitution industrialization strategies (similar strategies in Latin America were called *cepalismo*). Economic nationalism was not conducive to integration and such strategies did not bring expected results neither on a national level nor on a regional level. Then, most of African states shifted to liberalization, openness, and other neoliberal prescriptions according to instructions from the World Bank and the IMF. This strategy helped to achieve financial stabilization, but with enormous social costs, which subsequently led to political instability.

In the early 1990s, the EU emerged as an “attractive substitute” to both *cepalismo* and neoliberalism as it combined openness with regulatory and socially motivated policy concerns. African states started to emulate the EU model with its robust institutional structure, pooling sovereignty with supranational bureaucracy, and elimination of all barriers to free movement of production factors. Creation of the African Economic Community and strengthening of the regional economic communities as its pillars are based on the unique European experience. However, in the following decade the EU model started to be increasingly stigmatized due to its inability to boost intra-regional trade in Africa. As my analysis shows, some Kenyan analysts assume that the EU-style linear integration process focusing on trade liberalization and harmonization of economic policies is not suitable for Africa. Instead, Africa should focus on integrating and developing supply chains and building infrastructure.

In 2001, the African Union adopted a new program of economic development called “New partnership for Africa’s development” (NEPAD). This program was a return to neoliberalism and stressed market economy, private investment, and trade concessions as a way from poverty to development. This form of neoliberal regional governance is market-driven, the welfare ambitions of the state are sidelined, poverty reduction is limited to economic growth, and one of the primary goals is to foster state sovereignty (Godsäter 2015: 103).

Currently, new model of developmental regionalism seems to gain influence in Africa: regionalism should be open and integrate developing countries into world markets through creating larger regional markets. However, there should be temporary protection of domestic capital in this market to enable it to build adequate capacities to participate in global market activities. Moreover, focus of regional integration should go beyond trade liberalization to cooperation in investment and research and development in industry and infrastructure (Sakyi - Osei Opoku 2014: 22).

Without deeper regional cooperation, market integration and trade liberalization will lead to promoting non-African goods and services and further marginalization of Africa within the global economy (Asante 2016: 133). In fact, this idea of pragmatic mix of market and state (Shaw 2016: 117) is replication of the Asia-inspired developmental model on a regional scale. This is one new aspect of African agency: innovations are taken from outside the troubled North Atlantic region, for example from China and other Asian nations (Shaw 2016: 114). Asian model stresses the state and its capacity as the relevant scale for decision-making, not region. This may seem contradictory to the

current state of regionalism Africa, but we must take into account that African states seek integration fostering sovereignty, not pooling sovereignty, which the Asian model fulfils (for discussion about different forms of regionalism in Africa see Bach 2016a, particularly pages 8, 111-116, 127-129, 134).

Thus, it is clear that the current state of regionalism in Africa is a mixture of all the three models and searching for the best alternative. None of these models deny the need for fragmented African economies to create larger regional markets, which can facilitate Africa's inclusion to the global economy. Kenyan leaders, along with some Kenyan businessmen (those whose business can flourish on a single regional market), emphasize the need for a regional market and potential benefits for Kenya and express their deep commitments to integration.

5. **Which discourse(s) appear in the Kenyan news discourse?** Does Kenyan news discourse replicate the official discourse, or does it contain alternative discourses questioning the official one? Who represents these alternative discourses?

Analysis of the articles in *The Daily Nation* confirms that newspapers are "important sites for the reproduction, and occasionally the contestation, of official discourses, and especially those dominant discourses that circulate among elites" (Weldes 2006: 182). It also confirms that the press produces and reproduces part of the political, social, and economic status quo based on organizations providing input texts (van Dijk 1988: 11, 129, 132). "Standard" editorial articles use usual sources such as press conferences and press statements of the Cabinet, Ministries, foreign embassies, or influential interest groups such as business associations. Thus, articles are largely reproducing the official discourse, which responds positively to economic opportunities offered by the three superpowers and enshrined in their narratives. Thus, it is not exaggerating to say that the official discourse is pro-Chinese, pro-European, pro-American (particularly after 2014), and pro-African, with no anti- dimension.

However, *The Daily Nation* provides a wide and open space for opinions, analyses, and commentaries and we can find a very broad spectre of voices on its pages. I have identified ten categories of authors (Eastern press agency, Western press agency, local public official, foreign public official, local businessperson, foreign businessperson, journalist, academia/analyst, civil society, reader) and all of them are present in the newspaper. Some articles were written directly by these groups, although articles written by journalists are (logically) predominant. Almost all articles use quotations

from other categories, but we must take into account a risk that quotations may be sometimes very different from what the speaker actually wanted to say. If possible, I preferred to use articles written by the author himself/herself than quotations. Obviously, frequency of the respective categories is different and sometimes using quotations is inevitable.

Analysis shows that journalists-columnists, analysts, civil society representatives, and readers are often contesting the official discourse in their texts, and their tone is often very sharp and critical. Many opinions are openly anti-American or anti-Chinese.

Although the Chinese narrative is internalized by the elite, it is certainly not accepted unreservedly within the Kenyan society. Contrarily, high number of opinion articles and letters from readers show that Chinese engagement in Kenya is highly controversial and at least two main constituent parts of the Chinese narrative are openly contested: non-conditionality and selflessness of Chinese activities in Africa.

In the case of the US, we can find out three different narratives on the US-Kenyan relations. Not only the liberty and economic narratives analysed earlier, but also another narrative expressing a critical view of journalists, scholars, analysts, and readers on the substance of mutual relations: both the US-Africa Leaders' Summit and Obama's visit to Kenya were symbolic events earmarked particularly for Chinese eyes. Africa has never been US priority and is not likely to be in a near future, except for strategic issues such as fight against terrorism.

What may be surprising is that the number of anti-European articles is relatively low. It seems that in the case of the EU there is one prevailing news discourse, which is shared by Kenyan and European officials, Kenyan businesspeople, journalists, and analysts. We can find sharp dissent voices, but they are rare and isolated. Moreover, most of them emerged in the critical period in October 2014, when Kenya temporarily lost duty-free access to the European market. Number of opinions and letters is also very low compared to the US and China: nine in ten articles on the EU are "standard", neutral, informative, value-free editorial articles written by journalists. Compared with the US and China, relations with the EU seem to be by far the least controversial, based on real substance, not on shallow symbolism (the US) and geopolitical ambitions (China).

What may be also surprising is that even regional integration is often challenged. Regional leaders express their deep commitments to integration, but this rhetoric is not followed by concrete actions to eliminate barriers to free movement of production

factors. Many journalists, analysts, and readers see regional integration as a project of political and business elites with high symbolical value, but with no concrete impact on the livelihood of the people. People are not involved in the integration process and thus they can hardly identify with it. This confirms the contrast between Asian societally driven regionalization and Africa, where societal interplays have been substituted by ambitious mandates of the regional communities. As a result, top-level projects and bottom-level regionalization are two separate and largely unconnected processes (Bach 2016a: 76-77). As Taylor (2016: 164) points out in the case of Southern Africa, narratives by regional leaders lack trust within population, which impedes region-building and the constitution of regional identity. East Africa is not any different.

6. Different strategic narratives necessarily clash in the international (media) arena and influence each other. **Is this dynamics reflected in the Kenyan news discourse? Do different strategic narratives react to each other, or do they run in parallel? Does the official discourse (and alternative discourses) combine different narratives into one or does it treat them separately?**

All the three superpowers formulate their narratives at least partly with relation to the other two superpowers. Their African narratives are not designed solely for the African audience, but also for the audience in the other two superpowers (this holds true particularly for the China/US relationship, in both directions, less for the EU). Moreover, they are partly designed also for the domestic audience, thus serving also as the “identity” narratives. Probably to foster credibility and persuasiveness of the narrative, all the three superpowers put an emphasis on depicting themselves in positive terms, while avoiding using negative images of their rivals. Thus, although their narratives are interconnected, they run rather in parallel, one next to the others, without exhibiting the expected dynamics. It is likely that strategic narratives about economic issues are relatively stable and would undergo rather evolutionary than revolutionary changes, except under specific circumstances. The covered period of 45 months is too short to catch any evolutionary changes to the respective narratives. Neither does it contain any turning points in the global economy leading to revolutionary changes in the respective narratives.

Similarly, Kenyan audience seems to treat the different narratives separately. When topics related to Chinese engagement in Kenya are covered in the newspaper, we can find on its pages the Chinese narrative directly or indirectly articulated by Chinese representatives, its more or less modified replication by Kenyan elites (official

discourse), and reactions by both journalists and readers (alternative discourses). The same holds true for the US and the EU. There are only 22 articles in the China/West category, where we can find some attempts to put superpowers (in some cases also Japan is included) into a comparative perspective, often leading to the conclusion that Kenya can hardly prioritize the East over the West or vice versa and that relatively cordial relations with all superpowers may be a comparative advantage (Taylor (2014) describes this attitude as “diversifying dependency”). In some cases, intra-African cooperation is envisaged as a way how to lessen this external dependency.

More interesting is the question how is the Kenyan official narrative formed. Although not explicitly stated anywhere, we can summarize the Kenyan narrative in this way: the government wishes to make Nairobi a regional trade and investment hub and a gateway to East Africa, and in order to achieve this goal, it is open to cooperate with whatever partner willing to trade with Kenya and/or invest in Kenya. This view is in line with superpowers’ narratives and at least partly influenced by them.

The very same can be said about the alternative discourse. Again, although not explicitly stated anywhere, we can summarize it in this way: economic relations with the US, the EU, China, and within the EAC reflect interests of political and business elites and overlook interests and needs of ordinary citizens, who are not allowed to participate. New regionalism was supposed to shift the focus away from government-to-government relationships to involve the people (Asante 2016: 131), which does not seem to be the case in Africa.

Obviously, this conclusion is overly simplistic. Official discourse may be one extreme position and the above mentioned alternative discourse is the other extreme position, which is nevertheless held by many Kenyans. Many Kenyans would posit themselves somewhere in-between these two extreme positions, leaning more toward the official or toward the alternative discourse. Moreover, while we may assume that official discourse is widely shared within the political and partly business elite²²⁰ and thus to some degree institutionalized, we can hardly speak about one alternative discourse shared by different societal groups. Instead, we can speak about alternative voices,

²²⁰ Not surprisingly, local businesspeople pursue their own interests, not ideas. They may adhere to official discourse or they may be against it for pragmatic reasons, with relation to their benefits. However, voice of local businesspeople is expressed predominantly by big businesses, which are more often than not a part of the official discourse.

from which we as analysts can distil some underlying similarities, which are not institutionalized (at least not at the moment).

7. Seventh, **do superpowers' narratives influence the way in which Kenya defines its own development strategy?** Is official discourse incorporating some parts of these narratives? Is there any alternative to this official discourse?

When answering the previous research question, I have tried to distil from the articles non-articulated, however undoubtedly existing official narrative and its alternative. The official narrative is prioritizing the economic pillar of the development and supports the openness to global trade and investment structures. Although the three superpowers differ in their emphasis on the state as an economic actor, they are all market-oriented and open to international economic transactions. During the Cold War, Kenya was a close ally of the capitalist West and did not undergo socialist experiments, which may also partly explain its market-oriented approach. Moreover, successive Kenyan governments were aware of the country's infrastructure deficiencies and had to ask international borrowers and investors to finance its infrastructure needs. This led to the preference of large infrastructure projects, which are supposed to benefit the whole society. However, as some analysts and readers argue, Kenyan government focuses primarily on economic growth, which is not the same as development. Economic growth seems to be beneficial only for urban middle and upper classes, while the poor rural population is getting even poorer. Thus, we can find out strong dissent voices against the prevailing development ideology.

Findings

Despite the rise of the internet, "old media still matter to how strategic narratives are projected, received, and interpreted[.] (...) [I]t is now clear that many old media organizations have adapted to the new media ecology and that mainstream journalism remains the main source of news to most citizens around the world. Citizens may get news from niche online sources but usually this is interpreted with reference to and in the context of a lifetime of mainstream media consumption. Mainstream news editors and journalists remain important gatekeepers who can keep a strategic narrative out, or authoritatively reinterpret it for audiences" (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 157). If we wish to know what Africa thinks about global economic issues, study of local media discourse is a promising direction of research. However, this direction is overlooked within the academic research. My dissertation tried to fill this gap by focusing on news

discourse in the leading daily newspaper in Kenya. My analysis reveals some important aspects of the news discourse.

First, economic relations of Kenya with the world are an important issue for the newspaper and the number of articles is relatively high. However, despite the topic is important, it does not seem to be much relevant in the sense to appear frequently on the front page or the back page. Most topics such as US-Africa summit, Obama's visit to Kenya or Chinese Prime Minister's visit to Kenya are rather political issues, despite having an important economic agenda. The number of economic articles on the front page is twelve, including four articles on the SGR railway and three articles on the Uganda/Kenya sugar deal. The number of economic articles on the back page is fifteen. Together, these top articles represent mere 3.5 % of the total. This confirms that "top news" are rather political economic in nature than purely economic.

Second, analysis shows that "system" narratives about global economic order are almost absent in the news discourse. These are substituted by partial and more concrete "issue" narratives about cooperation with Kenya or Africa generally. Such narratives are less normative and more issue-oriented. Indeed, this is not much surprising. Narratives cannot be made up of nothing and events that people experience can counter even the most sophisticated strategic narrative (Roselle 2014: 78). Thus, it can be more strategic and less risky to disseminate issue narratives rather than system and national narratives. Different issue narratives clash, but are not necessarily exclusive. As many authors argue, there is possible division of labour between China and the West in Africa – the former gives and lends massive sums of money into local infrastructure, while the latter can help with high-tech technologies, security issues, or social programmes.

Third, China has a clearly defined African narrative, which seems to be internalized by Kenyan elites. The EU has also a clearly defined narrative based on a long history of close trade relations, which also seems to be internalized by Kenyan elites. Contrarily, the US is ambiguous in its message, because it has two different narratives (the economic narrative and the liberty narrative) and it is largely unsuccessful in its attempt to merge them into a single narrative. As a result, Kenyan elites identify with the economic narrative and reject the liberty narrative. Thus, we can conclude that Kenyan elites seem to have adopted narratives of the superpowers and incorporated them into their worldviews and political agenda, which is reflected in the Kenyan economic strategy focusing on investment into large infrastructure projects and into

manufacturing with the aim to increase volumes of export and improve the current negative trade balance.

Fourth, Kenyan media environment is free and The Daily Nation is an independent daily newspaper offering enough space not only for the elite voices, but also for alternative voices, which are expressed by the journalists themselves, by scholars and analysts writing opinion articles to the newspaper, and by “ordinary” readers whose letters to the editor are published in the respective subsection of the newspaper. Based on the analysis of 586 articles, we can assert that a broad spectre of different voices appears in the newspaper, expressing also a broad spectre of views from the most supporting to the most critical. Surprisingly, relations with the EU seem to be the least controversial as the number of critical voices is relatively low. Contrarily, China, the US, and even regional integration within the EAC are seen by many commentators in highly critical terms. Similarly, the Kenyan development strategy is criticized by many commentators, who suggest replacing investment into infrastructure mega-projects with empowering the people. However, despite broad spectre of voices, not all voices appear in the media discourse. As one commentator argues, the rural poor people are the most vulnerable, however rarely heard in the media.

[W]e have a classic paradigm of “us” and “them” culture. (...) There is a huge disconnect between the issues that concern the media and elites and the every day concerns of rural communities. While debate rages about the railway tenders, most Kenyans just want their rural roads graded before the rains (...). The agenda is usually set by urban media competing with their rivals for headline news. It is not only urban but urbane and determined to portray a progressive and international image of the country, usually to the detriment and neglect of “them” whose narratives are rarely heard except as “human interest” stories.²²¹

Future research

I have tried to illustrate that studying local media is a perspective way how to find out and analyse popular reactions to formal economic processes in Africa (Söderbaum - Taylor 2008: 14-17). Generally, news discourse is created and influenced by national elites and the dissemination of information goes in the top-down direction. However, if the media environment is free and the given media is independent, it is likely to open space also for bottom-up reactions. Although we cannot expect that all voices appear in the news discourse, example of the Kenyan leading newspaper shows that we can identify alternative voices, including the critical and dissent ones. Carmody (2011: 88)

²²¹ #389, Gabriel Dolan: Our media only serve elitist interests, The Daily Nation, 15 March 2014.

and Taylor (2014: 115) assert that there is a huge gap between perception of global actors by African governments and citizens. I would soften this conclusion. Obviously, some people share with their government the positive perception of global actors. But other people are highly critical to the activities of global actors in their country. This opens space for further research using local media as a source data.

Focus of my research was general, to analyse news discourse in Kenya in the period 2012 to 2015 in its entirety. This analysis brings some important findings on which the future research can build on. There are two possible trajectories of any further research.

First trajectory is to shift focus from analysing the general tone of media discourse to concrete events. This will allow a researcher to analyse media discourse into more detail and to go beyond the tone of the discourse and *macropropositions*, which was my primary aim, to analyse also more into detail *micropropositions* and linguistic categories of the protocol.

Second trajectory is to shift focus from a case study to a comparative study. For example, a researcher can compare discursive differences between two (or more) similar events. Or, he/she can compare discursive differences between coverage of the same event in two (or more) different newspapers. This may be particularly interesting in states where the leading newspaper is government-owned and co-existing with other privately-owned newspapers (Tanzania is such a case). Another possibility is to compare printed version of the newspaper with its online version, particularly if online discussions to the articles are allowed. Another challenging possibility is to compare differences in the discourse between printed media and audio-visual media. Obviously, a researcher can compare discursive differences between states. For example, it may be interesting to analyse how the same event is covered in Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia with three different media environment (privately-owned newspaper in free environment vs. publicly-owned newspaper in free environment vs. publicly-owned newspaper in not-free environment).

Data

Articles quoted in the text are identified in the footnotes. List of all articles is an annex to the dissertation, which is available on the attached CD-ROM, as well as photocopies and protocols of all articles.

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