Between Securitization and Secularisation: A Political Discourse Analysis on Members of Parliament in the British House of Commons and the Securitization of Islam and British Muslims.

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“I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other.”

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"Hiersteheich, ich kann noch anders, Gott helf mir. Amen."

Martin Luther at the Diet of Worms, 1521

Introduction

“Religion is regarded by the common people as true, by the wise as false, and by the rulers as useful”

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (ca. 4 BC-AD 65)\(^2\)

“Will the old flame not inevitably flare up again at some time in an even more fearful way, after much lengthier preparation?”

Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*\(^3\)

On the 23\(^{rd}\) of May 2017, British born Salman Abedi carried out a suicide attack, killing himself and twenty-two other people at a concert in Manchester, Britain.\(^4\) This has been one of many Islamist terrorist attacks which have taken place in the United Kingdom and throughout Europe in recent years. Paralleled with this wave of Islamist inspired terrorism in Europe has been the rise of the extremist organisation, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. This self-styled Caliphate has been responsible for, amongst other things, public executions, sex slavery, and genocide. The British Government has identified the threat from Islamist extremist terrorism by the Islamic State, al-Qaida, and like-minded groups and individuals as one of the most pressing security concerns in Britain today.\(^5\)

These securitization of British Muslims and Islam can be traced back to the European and Western secular idea that religion should be relegated to the private sphere and be subordinate to the State. In the current secular-liberal European order, Islam is often perceived as a monolithic, over-arching system which does not separate the private religious sphere from the public political sphere. British Muslims, as members of the Islamic faith, are therefore, treated with suspicion as to whether their loyalties lie with the British State or the Islamic Ummah.

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\(^1\) Intro


Whilst the strategic and security policy implementations to avoid future attacks within Britain, Europe and the West are of vital importance to governments and policy makers, the foundational theoretical, philosophical, and political ideas are also important factors in the fight against Islamist jihadist terrorism. Therefore, this dissertation will examine the securitization of British Muslims and Islam in the political discourse of the United Kingdom’s House of Commons of the British Parliament. This dissertation will add to the existing literature on the “complex interplay between security and religion”\(^6\) by examining the deliberation and rhetoric used in discussing the current security context and the future strategy of the United Kingdom.

Firstly, a justification for this dissertation will be given in relation to the intellectual context between security and religion and how this impacts upon government thinking. Then the methodological section will give the framework of the critical discourse analysis (specifically a political discourse analysis) and the securitization theory (of the Paris School), which will be used when discussing the political discourse of Members of Parliament (MPs) within the House of Commons (HoC) between the dates of 01/01/2014 and 01/01/2017. This period coincides with the rise of the Islamic State’s campaign to establish the Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the subsequent wave of jihadist related terrorism in Britain and Europe.

Next, there will be discussion on the ideological foundation of the secular hegemonic discourse within the contemporary mainstream British political discourse. The securitization of Islam will be placed in its proper “consolidated discourse realm”\(^\text{i.e.}\) the historical context) of secularism/religion. The development of the Westphalian secular state system in modern Europe, and how this historical process has constructed a secular subjectivity in which Islam is today seen as a threat, will be explored. Islam is perceived as not having benefited from the historical experience of the European Reformation and the privatization and submission of religion to the state.\(^7\)

The section after will show the current position on the securitization of British Muslims and Islam post-9/11 and 7/7. The analysis will show how and why the British


\(^7\)Ibid., pp 159-181
political discourse has securitized British Muslims, by associating a lack of British Muslim identification with the Britain State and British values and an association with the Ummah as a security concern.

Continuing with the exploration of political narratives, a discussion on the various discursive narratives which the political left and the political right have developed in their relation to Islam will be provided. The purpose of these sections is to fully comprehend that these political narratives towards British Muslims and Islam exist in Britain (and the West) outside of the official British Government’s discourse. To fully understand the counter-hegemonic position of political Islam a brief description of the Islamist narrative will also be provided, as Islamist values are seen as antithetical to the values of the British secular liberal democratic State and narratives and discourses about itself.

The final section will present the political discourse analysis and its discussion of the political discourse of British MPs in the HoC. Four main points of deliberation have been identified and will be discussed. These are: 1) Highlighting the brutality of jihadism and the Islamic State, 2) Defending Islam and British Muslims, 3) Highlighting the problem of political Islam within Islamic thought, and 4) Asserting British values, interests and the secular state. The conclusion will then end the dissertation.
“How can one pretend that there is less magic in the world today? These words seem to work miracles: the child leaves its parents, the lover abandons her beloved, and brother is denounced by brother. Is there any more powerful drug today than certain words administered in regular doses? They are administered according to the most efficacious magic ritual of our time, by men who well know their effects. In massive doses, following well-tried prescriptions and a carefully perfected technique, these words can inspire heroism or the most craven inertia. They can turn whole crowds of men into lions or into sheep. They are our modern vampires.”

Jules Monnerot, *Sociology of Communism*, 1949

Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, it has been theorized that wars and conflicts have been fought less for reasons of political-ideological systems, economics and material gains, territorial claims and power acquisition, but more for reasons of culture and identity issues. Samuel Huntington wrote in his famous book *The Clash of Civilizations* that this post-Cold War era will experience a “revitalization of religion throughout the world.” Since the 1970s, the movement towards religion and the decline of secularism has been defined as the “revenge of God.” This “return of religion” has meant that international relations and security studies have had to focus more and more on theological and identity matters, as the rise of theo-political movements across the globe has resurrected the notion that religious ideas and motivations are important factors in contemporary politics.

Religion in the West today is seen as a major cause of violence and conflict due to its absolutist, discordant, and irrational character. This sentiment can be best expressed by the 17th century French philosopher Blaise Pascal: “Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction.” There has been much debate on the question of just how much influence religion has in acts of political violence. Some have argued that it is the very character of religion itself that causes outbursts of violence and conflict. Others emphasise that non-religious economic and political factors such as foreign

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occupation, governmental repression, ethnic fractionalisation, and inter-group competition are just as important, if not more so, in explaining the bloodshed. More recently many scholars accept that religion does influence political violence and that religion helps to motivate combatants, but have argued its significance is secondary to non-religious factors such as the systematic organisational and motivational characteristics of groups in explaining political violence.  

As a consequence, scholars and thinkers of international relations and the sub-school of security studies, who have traditionally viewed religion as marginal to the discipline and have developed international relations “as if it concerned an autonomous [secular] space that is not fundamentally disturbed by its presence”, have had to re-accommodate religion into their thinking.  

Mary Kaldor contends that “new wars” are characterised by ethnic and religious differences. David Rapoport and Peter Neumann argue that “new terrorism” has found in religion “its most powerful motivation and ideological basis.” In addition, Mark Juergensmeyer argues that there is a “global rise of religious violence.” Whilst secular actors use a carefully calculated means-ends application of violence, in which no more harm is caused than practically needs to be, religiously inspired violence is differentiated by its “savage nature” to commit “acts of deliberately exaggerated violence” that is “meant to purposely ... elicit anger.”

Therefore, within the scholarship of international security there has been an increased focus upon the role which culture, identity, and religion has played in matters of security, both at the state and sub-state levels. The threat of religious extremism, specifically Islamic extremism, has been studied intensely since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 by al-Qaeda, but an eye has also been cast on the influence of evangelical fundamentalism upon the foreign policy of the United States, the role of Zionism in Israel, Hindu  

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13 Ibid., pp 177-199  
14 Laustsen, Waever, In Defence of Religion, pp 705-739  
nationalism,\textsuperscript{16} Buddhist-led violence\textsuperscript{17}, and the Sunni-Shia schism within Islam.\textsuperscript{18} Additionally, more attention is being paid to the concept of providing security to religious minorities, for example Egypt’s Coptic Christians\textsuperscript{19}, Iraq’s Mandaeans\textsuperscript{20}, and Iraq and Syria’s Yazidis minority group.\textsuperscript{21}

Religion has historically been a powerful motivator for legitimising state and non-state actors, which includes legitimising violence. As James Veitch has expressed it: “When religion empowers political terrorism then the terrorism apparently has no limits and acknowledges no boundaries.”\textsuperscript{22} Groups and individuals are liberated from ‘rational’ calculations and are ultimately willing to sacrifice others and martyr themselves for a cause higher than the state. This danger can be from within or without the state. For example, the attacks by al-Qaeda on 9/11 were from without, whilst Islamists in Turkey are an internal threat to the secular raison d’être of the state.\textsuperscript{23}

Many religiously driven conflicts in the world today are asymmetrical in nature. Secular states that are attacked by theologically driven groups using terrorist methods see such assaults as an attack upon their sovereignty and values. Their enemies are seen as being driven by anotherworldly metaphysical zeal rather than by rational calculations of power. The use of traditional state-based methods to deter threats does not work against those who are impervious to state based reasoning. Those motivated by religion may not be many in number, but their devotion to their faith makes them irrational, unpredictable, and dangerous.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21}BBC News, 16th June 2016, Islamic State committing genocide against Yazidis, says UN, BBC News, Available at: \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-36547467} [Accessed 11/07/2017]
\textsuperscript{23}Laustsen, Wæver, In Defence of Religion, pp 705-739
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., pp 705-739
Thus, religion has important implications for governments and statecraft. States will need to understand religion, defined in Clausewitzian terms as a social element which provides and shapes motivations for behaviours and actions, when formulating their security policy as well as national and grand strategies. Religion has the power to motivate members of society to either pursue peace or declare war. Consequently, the study of religiously motivated behaviour can help in providing security for states and societies. Additionally, the promotion of religious freedoms as a universal right can help to create a civil society. Subsequent greater societal stability advances the cause of the state’s national security.  

Hence, in order to fully understand and defeat those who would justify the use of violence on theocratic grounds, the West must engage in what Plato called anamnesis: “the bringing to consciousness of forgotten things.” Western governments and intellectuals need to rediscover religion’s connection with politics and understand why it mattered in the past - and continues to matter in the contemporary world. As Peter L. Berger preaches “[t]hose who neglect religion in their analysis of contemporary affairs do so at great peril.”

One aspect of this strategy is to consider the degree to which government communication enables or disables the ideologies and narratives that religiously inspired terrorists use in order to encourage and legitimise their cause. Beatrix de Graaf writes that the communicative element in counter-terrorism is important because the message created by political discourse such as counter-terrorist policies can often be used by terrorists who “use these to fuel sentiments of oppression and injustice” in their battle for legitimacy. Terrorist and state actors alike are thus conducting “influence warfare” in order to persuade a specific targeted audience to accept their legitimacy rather than that of their opponents.  

This dissertation will contribute to the literature of security studies and the theory of securitization by “widening” the concept of security (as explained by Buzan and Hansen) through the examination of the securitization of Islam and British Muslims within

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26 Mahoney, D, J (2016) Defending the West in All Its Amplitude: The Liberal Conservative Vision of Roger Scruton, Perspectives on Political Science, Vol 45:4, pp 281-288  
27 Laustsen, Wæver, In Defence of Religion, pp 705-739  
28 Kundnani, Security narratives and far-right violence, pp 129-146  
the United Kingdom and will examine the process of securitization so as to throw light on the politics of identity and threat construction. This dissertation will also “deepen”\(^{30}\) the concept of security, by studying, investigating, and explaining the secular political theory which established the contemporary foundational logic of the British State.

Positive critiques and changes to existing state security policies and practices partly rely on being knowledgeable and aware of the processes of securitization, normalisation, and on the construction of a narrative “by highlighting who or what “we” are, and what “we” have to fear.”\(^{31}\) By examining the discourse of the British House of Commons we can find out what the values, goals, and strategy of the British Government are towards Islamist extremism, how Islamist ideology and actions are securitized in the political discourse, and how British Muslims are also affected.

**Methodology – Political Discourse Analysis**

“I’m no prophet. My job is making windows where there were once walls”

Quote attributed to Michel Foucault\(^ {32}\)

\(^{30}\)Ibid., pp 13

\(^{31}\)Mavelli, *Between Normalisation and Exception*, pp 159-181

“Language is politics, politics assigns power, power governs how people talk and how they are understood. The analysis of language from this point of view is more than an academic exercise: today, more than ever, it is a survival skill.”

R.T. Lakoff

This section of the dissertation will provide an overview of the critical discourse analysis methodological which will be used in the research of this dissertation. The power of discourse has become an important element in the analysis of politics and security. Texts and discourse are valuable elements of social events and have causal effects in that they can enact social change. They have the power to change our knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, values and perceptions. They can also have long term causal consequences. They can influence our intellectual world, our social world and ultimately our physical world.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) “emerged as a programmatic development in European discourse studies in the late 1980s spearheaded by Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, and others”. The purpose of CDA, according to Wodak, one of its main exponents, is to analyse “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language.” Within CDA “discourse is seen as a means through which (and in which) ideologies are being reproduced”. For Fairclough “the articulation and re-articulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle.”

Political discourse analysis (PDA) is an approach contributing to CDA. PDA views politics mainly as a form of argumentation and is specifically focused on political argumentation where decisions over a course of actions are debated. In deciding upon on what policies to enact political actors argue for and against a set of actions, and deliberate over alternative measures. Politics is therefore perceived as making choices; creating strategies; and responding to events. The decisions, actions, and consequences which

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follow, are based upon argumentations - or as Aristotle called the process in the *Nicomachean Ethics* - “deliberation.”

As Aristotle says in book III of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, regarding the deliberation-decision-action nexus, political actors use deliberation “when we distrust our ability to discern [the right answer]”, and “when the outcome is unclear and the right way to act is undefined.” We cannot apply a Popperian principle of falsification to the social world, as the real world cannot be recreated in laboratory conditions. Human decision-making is made in a realm of incomplete (and sometimes false or deliberately misleading) information, uncertainty and risk. Deciding upon the correct course of action involves an element of randomness within the Clausewitzian “fog of war”, no matter how brilliant a strategy may be.

PDA is thus the study of political discourse and the examination of the role discourse plays in legitimising, “producing, maintaining, abusing, and resisting power” in the political sphere. Political practice can be seen as both the struggle for power and the cooperation between political actors to further a common agenda. This can occur at both the micro and macro level in society.

The PDA framework advocated by Fairclough will be used in this dissertation. Fairclough explains that the political sphere incorporates a stable institutional structure, which is relevant when examining the political discourse of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of Commons (HoC) in the British Parliament. The same author also advocates the studying of macro-level social and political contexts and their relationship with the micro-level political context. Again, this is a useful structural framework for this dissertation, which examines how MP’s discourse in relation to British Muslims and Islam is linked to broader historical, ideological, theological, and societal forces. In addition, PDA advocates how ideology is produced, maintained, and advanced. Fairclough provides a useful framework for the study of political power, illustrating how these ideological forces influence a specific

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37 Fairclough, Fairclough, *Political Discourse Analysis*, pp 5
course of action - in the case of this dissertation the advancement of the interests of a secular liberal democratic British Government.\textsuperscript{39}

Political actors (in the case of this dissertation British Members of Parliament of the House of Commons) have to respond to events and make strategies for future courses of action. Therefore, the practical argumentations of MPs not only have a direct impact upon Government policy and the final decision made by the Government, but also influence the wider political debate in society about how to proceed appropriately. MPs and their decisions and strategies are naturally political. Within their political discourses are the narratives, explanations, and imaginaries which both influence the decision-making process and define the boundaries of acceptable policy action. Thus, these narratives, explanations, and imaginaries provide the body politic with the justification for acting in a specific way. Their decisions, however, are challenged by different political actors (opposition MPs, interest groups, etc.) with their own objectives, goals, and competing strategic visions. Each of these competing groups have different narratives, explanations, and imaginaries to justify their particular course of action.\textsuperscript{40}

One way which in which security, intelligence, and strategic scholars can explain and understand the role played by these narratives as a motivation for political actions is by examining this social phenomenon through the prism of social constructivism (henceforth called constructivism.) Constructivism has developed our understanding of security by questioning the orthodoxy of rationalist, materialistic schools of thought such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and seeing how these security threats are socially constructed. Constructivism focuses upon the importance of social relations and matters of identity, norms, and cultures. Constructionists argue that the world is not a purely material one and that social constructions are important in how we view, create, and give meaning to the world.\textsuperscript{41}

The idea of narratives came to the mainstream by way of French post-structuralists. Texts could support any number of meanings, depending on the circumstances of the reader. These narratives, often simple stories, are important in explaining and predicting

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., pp 735–751
\textsuperscript{40}Fairclough, Fairclough, \textit{Political Discourse Analysis}, pp 3-4
events. They give meaning to lives, relationships and how the world is understood. For political actors, narratives are a political tool which are used to either legitimise or challenge existing power structures, without the need for material resources.42

The French philosopher Michal Foucault, like Thomas Kuhn, advances the idea of claims of truth being based upon the structure of power. Kuhn writes of “paradigms”, Foucault of “epistemes.” There is the “apparatus” which allows “the separation not of the true from the false, but of what may form may not be characterized as scientific.” These “epistemes” are “unique, dominant, and exclusive, unable to coexist with others.” For Foucault, there was a constant battle for truth, not for the purpose of discovering absolute truth but for the purpose of controlling behaviour and action. Therefore, all forms of thought are connected to power. The link between thought and power was discussed by Foucault in the examination of historical systems of power. Foucault observed that not all power systems need violence to enforce behaviour but can be based upon taught behaviour, perpetrated by self-disciplledbehaviour. This form of power is not owned or wielded but is an integral part of all societal spheres, including the personal and intimate. Power and knowledge are one and the same, which Foucault names as the “power / knowledge” concept. It is through discourse that the thoughts of people are fashioned and their subsequent actions are based upon these specific views of the world. These “Regimes of truth” uphold what is true and what is false and the discussion procedure to debate these truths. A specific perception of reality, embedded in everyday discourse, is established, reinforcing the existing power structure and patterns of behaviour.43

For Foucault, strategy was “the totality of the meaning put into operation to implement power effethe or to maintain it.” There is a link between the micro in the personal and the macro in society. There is also the idea of constant struggle. A confrontation would lead to victory of one side over another, leading to stability and eventually the possibility of resistance and reversion to the hegemonic “regime of truth.”

Lawrence Freedman writes: “In an inversion of Clausewitz, he [Foucault] presents politics as a continuation of war.” Foucault sees war as a “permanent social relationship, the ineradicable basis of all relationships and institutions of power.” In terms of social relations

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42Fairclough, Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis, pp 4
43Freedman, Strategy a History, pp 424-425
“we are all inevitably someone’s adversary”, and that there was “no such thing as a neutral subject.” Taking a stance on one position over another meant it was “possible to interpret the truth, to denounce the illusions and errors that are being used – by your advisories – to make you believe we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored.” Therefore, as the discourse of power was diffused throughout all of society, so too could an ideological resistance, subversion, and open competition to it be created. Knowledge claims were weapons in this struggle for truth and therefore power.\(^4^4\)

The Slovenian philosopher SlavojŽižek argues that a narrative that “impose itself” within the “discursive” ideology struggle and which presents itself in times of crisis (such as the 2008 financial crisis) determines the main perception of the event. The ability to persuade the body politic to accept a specific narrative of an event is a political concern because it creates a justification for people to adopt and advance a strategy. This process of giving and receiving reasons for an action is called argumentation. Žižek argues that a successful narrative and its creation of perception will influence the response to an event, and determine if “a radical emancipatory politics”, “the rise of racist populism”, a new conceptualisation of neo-liberalism, or another alternative outcome will emerge. Therefore, the relationship linking the representation of an event, decision making, and action highlights how a political decision can be created or influenced by the practical arguments of political actors.\(^4^5\)

The creation and adoption of a narrative by the body politic affects the course of action proposed. This explains why the battle to secure the dominant narrative is so important and is fought over so intensely.\(^4^6\)

Narratives of a political situation or event are part of the “circumstantial premise” of practical arguments (the context for political discourse.) Imaginaries are the possible and desirable outcome in relation to the goal premise. Practical arguments are a “mean-ends” argumentation, in which a claim or solution (“X, Y, or Z should be achieved”) is a judgement directing the course of action which is desirable to be achieved. Practical arguments are, therefore, a complex process of circumstantial premise, means-ends, and of goals-

\(^{4^4}\)Ibid., pp 426
\(^{4^5}\)Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis, pp 4
\(^{4^6}\)Ibid., pp 7
circumstances. Furthermore, the goal of one political actor, once realised and implemented, creates the context of circumstances on which future actions are to be based, further influencing the political discourse.

This dissertation will use the political discourse framework as advanced by Fairclough (see Figure 1.) which highlights the HoC’s narrative as part of the circumstantial premise and how this influences their 1) Values 2) Goals 3) Claim for Action and 4) Means-Goals.

![Figure 1. Framework for political discourse analysis in HoC’s Parliamentary debates](image)

*Figure 1. Framework for political discourse analysis in HoC’s Parliamentary debates*

By looking at the practical argumentation and deliberation we can examine the policies of political actors. The failure to predict major political events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the outbreak of the 2011 Arab Spring, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, means that public deliberation is an important remedy for the times when the experts are wrong. Rigorously testing suggested solutions is an epistemic way to open up bounded rationality and to challenge experts who often have a closed way of thinking and reasoning. By examining deliberation we can analyse political debates over issues such as the securitization of British Muslims and Islamists and see how this public debate and deliberation is either helping or harming the real-life security of all British citizens. Therefore, this dissertation can be seen as a qualitative contribution to the subjective normative goal of deliberative democracy by stressing how constructive criticism

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47Ibid., pp 44
48Ibid., pp 5-6
can improve the security of citizens in the United Kingdom, Europe, and the West against the threat of Islamist inspired jihadist terrorism.

Securitization theory can be perceived and analysed by using the PDA method of the political discourse of British MPs in an Aristotelian sense as part of the deliberation-decision-action nexus. This highlights how deliberation is an important aspect of the securitization of British Muslims and Islamist by the contemporary British Government.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Methodology - The Securitization Framework}

Combined with the aforementioned PDA framework proposed by Fairclough will be an examination of the securitization process of Islamist and British Muslims within the British House of Commons. The securitization process examines the procedure in which an issue or group is framed as a security threat. In this process, the government seeks to

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., pp 3-4
persuade the body politic to mobilise state and societal resources to combat this perceived threat. In order to do so a certain level of public support is needed in order to implement exception state actions and legislation. Once an issue or group has been securitized then becomes “common sense” that such an issue or such a group is indeed a threat. This process takes place in the security service, such as the military, and the wider political debate and discourse.  

Securitization theory takes place in the separation beyond the political. Politics is the process of decision making based upon discussion which takes place within the rule of law, for example, within the British Parliament. In contrast, security takes place beyond this periphery of established protocols, in “a special kind of politics or as above politics”. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde write: “Security is about survival” and is typified by “an inner logic” which is ontologically distinctive from the political.  

When an issue is seen as an existential threat to a referent entity (and here a referent entity can refer to a state, society or identity) exceptional measures may be used to secure the survival of this referent entity. The securitization of a threat is based on a securitizing actor’s (such as a state’s elite) ability to “speak security”. It is based upon presenting a specific problem as an existential threat that endangers the existence of the referent entity, which resonates with a “significant audience.” As Ole Wæver says:

“[W]e can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’ a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”

The Copenhagen School and the Paris School are two different theoretical frameworks of perceiving securitization. For the Copenhagen School of securitization theory, politics operates within the structure of law. However, this structure can be suspended by the ideas of sovereignty as discussed previously. As advocated by Carl

51 Mavelli, Between Normalisation and Exception, pp 159–181
52 Ibid., pp 159–181
Schmitt, the controversial 20th century German political and decisionistic philosopher, sovereign power can decide and act upon the exception. Here, the securitization “speech act” creates a break in the hegemonic discursive discourse in which the object of securitization is moved from the political sphere to one of security-exceptionalism, thus creating a new “regime of truth.” In this particular theoretical school, the linguistic “speech act” legitimises the beginning of a new “regime of truth” (although this is also reliant on whether or not the threat reverberates with a wider audience). An effective securitization has occurred if “by means of an argument about the priority and the urgency of an existential threat the securitising actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by.”

The Paris School of securitization inverts this relation between speech and action. An already established “regime of truth” legitimises a securitizing “speech act”, which is a reflection of the larger materialisation of securitization being conducted in the daily routine of governments, bureaucracies, and security professionals. Holger Stritzel has propositioned a “processual refinement” of securitization theory by supplementing the “speech-act-theoretical approach” with the idea of translation. This moves the stress from the securitising actor and the existential threat being framed to the practice where the discourse becomes “appropriated and incorporated” into a “consolidated discourse realm.” These speech acts “may reaffirm or harden a dominant discourse and power structure”, and “initiate a fundamental change and transformation in the recipient / target context.” Thus, “[t]he question, then, is no longer whether or not the security utterance spoken by a political leader is appropriated because it resonates with a significant audience, but how the utterance is appropriated through the process of translation.”

This dissertation will use the concept of the Paris school whilst discussing the securitization of British Muslims and Islam. It will argue that an already established “consolidated discourse realm” has been established in the years prior to the time period discussed in the PDA of this dissertation. It will demonstrate how British MPs are building upon such an already established discourse (whilst deliberating on British Muslims and Islam

53 Mavelli, Between Normalisation and Exception, pp 159–181
54 Ibid., pp 159–181
55 Ibid., pp 159–181
during the securitization process) instead of creating a new “regime of truth”, as advocated by the Copenhagen school.

To speak of the securitized issue or group is to imply a security threat from that issue or group. There is a wide range of literature (for example, Abbas 56, Brighton,57 and Kundnani.58) showing how the British political discourse has structured British Muslims and Islam in the securitization process.59 Whilst many of these books and papers discuss the role of racism in the securitization process, this dissertation will be exclusively examining the securitization of British Muslims and Islam via the prism of secularism, as well as the narrative and ideology considerations of the British State. Whilst racism and anti-Muslim prejudice are an “analytically distinct but often empirically inter-related phenomena”, racism is the “negative signification or cultural construction of biology or somatic characteristics” which explains the social world. Anti-Muslim discrimination becomes racialized when religious beliefs are seen a product of biology and not of socialisation or decisions based upon free will. Therefore, while the two concepts often conflate, in this dissertation the securitization of Islam and British Muslims is based upon political, ideological, and theological doctrine and not specifically racial or somatic characteristics. To conflate the two concepts would mean losing both concepts “distinctiveness and specific empirical referents” and doing both conceptualisations a disservice.60

Likewise, the term Islamophobia is a problematic, contested term. The term has been used to describe the inter-meshing of discrimination based on race and religious practice, cultural racism, and a concept distinct but interacting with racism.61 Therefore, this dissertation will refrain from using this term, as the primary focus is upon the political, ideological, and theological discourse in the House of Commons, although the author does recognise the complex interplay between race and religion of the lived experiences of British Muslims.

59 Hussain, Bagguley, Securitized citizens, pp 715–734
60 Hussain, Bagguley, Securitized citizens, pp 715–734
61 Ibid., pp 715–734
The securitization of British Muslims and Islam is partly a reflection of both British and Western governments and their societies questioning the process of Muslim integration into their nations. Muslims are seen as a threat to ‘Britishness’ and Western identity by their possession of a separate homogeneous theological identity.  

The securitization of Muslims and Islam in the West began as a new “regime of truth” (in the Copenhagen sense) after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. After President George W. Bush gave a speech in which the terrorist attacks were constructed as an attempt to annihilate the United States’ freedom and way of life (“a speech act” which framed terrorism as an “existential threat” to the “survival” of the state) a campaign of profiling took place. Around 5,000 foreign nationals, the majority Muslim, were detained for up to two years in what was a violation of their basic legal rights. The targeting of Muslims was made possible by a process of conflating “Terror” with “Islam.” President Bush did not specifically state that “Islam” is a threat, but “Terror”, which is a manner of “evil” committed in the name of Allah. Bush’s speech stated that “those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself.” Whilst this speech distinguishes between peaceful and non-peaceful Muslims, it also establishes Islam as the source of the threat. The suggestion that there is a connection between Islam and terrorism feeds into the broader discourse which sees extremism as part of mainstream Islamic doctrine. In addition, by creating a binary divide between “good” and “bad” Muslims there arises the implication that “good” Muslims cannot question or oppose United States’ hegemonic foreign policy without automatically being on the side of the terrorists.

The effect is that“Islam needs to be quarantined” i.e. securitized. Therefore, the securitization of Islam in the United States after 9/11 was a product of the United States’ leaders speaking security (of the Copenhagen School of thought), a process of translation, built upon an already existing “consolidated discursive realm.”

This “consolidated discursive realm” looks at events beginning with the tragedy of 9/11 in the United States and incidents in Europe such as the 2004 Madrid train bombing, the 2004 killing of Dutch director Theo van Gough, the 2005-6 Danish Mahammad cartoons, 

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62 Ibid., pp 715–734
63 Mavelli, Between Normalisation and Exception, pp 159–181
and the 2006 speech by Pope Benedict XVI at the University of Regensburg. This “consolidated discursive realm” can be traced back further historically before 9/11 to the 1995 Paris metro bombing and the 1988 Salman Rushdie controversy over the publishing of his book *The Satanic Verses*. This dissertation takes the view that a long-term historical perspective is needed in order to fully understand the process of securitization. This raises the question of just how far back into the past does one go in order to fully understand this “consolidated discursive realm” which contributes to the securitization of Islam. Richard Jackson argues that there are three main historical foundations to the contemporary “Islamic Terrorism” discourse - Firstly, the 1970s Orientalist scholarship of Arab culture and religion in the Middle East; Secondly, the 1980s examination of religious inspired terrorism; Thirdly, cultural stereotypes and negative media representations of Islam and Muslims since the beginning of the 20th century. However, this lineage of Islam being seen as an existential threat can be traced even further back to one of the modern foundational narratives of modern Western Civilization itself – the divide between the secular political sphere and the religious private sphere. Islam, having missed the historical process of the European Reformation and the subsequent 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, is seen as a dangerous and threatening deviation from the state’s ideological superstructure.64

The securitization of Islam is part of a development of “discursive sedimentation” that also incorporates Max Weber and his sociology of religion. When explaining the uniqueness of Western modernity an understanding of Islam was created that did not have the “positive ingredients of western rationalism”, which included “rational law, the modern state, [and] the application of science to all areas of social absence.” The main factor emphasised was the “divergence” of the Islamic polity from a normal concept and practice of politics.65

The conceptualisation of Islam as a threat in the contemporary era is also found in the works of Edward W. Said. He writes that the representation of the “Arab other” has its foundations in the fear of Muslims. Said writes: “Lurking behind all of these images is the menace of jihad. Consequence; a fear that the Muslim (or Arabs) will take over the world.” Such a world view perceives the West as “rational, developed, humane, superior” and the

64Ibid., pp 159–181
65Ibid., pp 159–181
Orient as “aberrant, undeveloped, inferior.” The Orient was perceived as “eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself.” The region was feared, and needed to be controlled by Western intellectuals. Orientalism, Said concludes, “clearly posits the Islamic category as the dominant one” in answering the question of which is perceived as the more significant threat to the West – ethnicity or Islam.66

This interpretive discursive framework has been employed in controversies about Islam in Europe. For example, Pope Benedict XVI’s speech at the University of Regensburg in 2006 opined that, in contrast to Western Christianity, “for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality.” Likewise, after the publication of the Danish Cartoons in 2005-6, a common sentiment expressed was that “Muslims have to decide whether they wish to live in a liberal democratic society”, thereby insinuating that democracy is incompatible with Islam. Additionally, the line that “the distinction between fact and belief is at the heart of Western thought”, hints that this distinction is not within Islam and explains Muslim outcry at the cartoons.67

The philosopher Charlie Taylor’s essay The Politics of Recognition attributes the controversy over the aforementioned Satanic Verses publication in Britain to the fact that “for mainstream Islam, there is no question of separating politics and religion the way we have come to expect in Western Liberal society.” The essay highlights the secular discourse of freedom of expression and fears of Muslim extremism, without addressing the political dimension of Muslim minorities within a “European secular hegemony.” Thus, by exaggerating the exceptionality of Islamic politics and the idea that historically and philosophically there are no Islamic traditions between church (mosque) and state he perpetuates ‘Orientalist’ ideas about the “irrationality of Muslims.”68

Whilst these analyses of Islam and securitization may be ignoring the “will to power” element found in the hermeneutics of Islam, the crucial point is to examine the perspective that Islam has “inassimilable difference” with the secular state. Whilst recent speech acts do not directly talk of specifically adopting extraordinary security measures against Muslims

66Hussain, Bagguley, Securitized citizens, pp 715–734
67Mavelli, Between Normalisation and Exception, pp 159–181
68Ibid., pp 159–181
such discourse still contributes to a secular epistemic framework used by a “regime of truth”, encouraged by a discursive sedimentation which holds up the idea of Islam as a threat. In this truth regime, the construction of the secular state being dominant over the irrationality of the spiritual is not disengaged from the idea that Islam is a threat to this regime. Islam is seen as a threat to Western secularism and is an “Other” onto which the West can ultimately project its own tensions, contradictions, and limits. In short, the West is able to define and feel secure in itself by projecting onto the Islamic other.69

This dissertation will thus continue to examine this process of discursive sedimentation of Western securitization and the Islamic other by investigating the recent parliamentary discourse of the British House of Commons in regards to the securitization of Islam and British Muslims.

What this dissertation will show is the range of interpretations, narratives, and explanations connected with human agency and the consequential reasons for action. The narrative of events strongly affects the proposed strategies and policies which will be deployed. The interpretation, narratives, and explanations of the secular liberal democratic British State, the left-wing and right-wing of the political discourse, as well as the counter-hegemony of Islamism as a foundation for the justification for a specific course of action will be discussed.

Methodological Limitations

It needs to made clear that the text-reader relationship is not a simple mechanical one. We cannot say conclusively that a text or single speech-act brought about a specific change in beliefs, behaviours or political effects. Texts have causal effects, rather than regular effects, because other factors may also have an impact upon the interpretation of a specific text.

69Ibid, pp 159–181
Many social scientists have been influenced by constructivism - the idea that the social world is socially constructed - and they emphasise the role of texts. Such theorists are idealists in nature and normative in practice. 

Whilst we construct the world via text, by re-imagining or re-wording the social world, constructionists often have the normative goal of re-shaping the social world based purely on text alone. Realists would agree that some elements of the social world are socially constructed (such as government institutions), but that there are material realities to the world which affect the discursive construction of the world. Thus, this dissertation adopts a realist ontological position, accepting the realities of social events and abstract social structures (based on political, theocratic ideologies) are a part of this realist centralised position that the social world is textually constructed and that words have power - but not the extremist version which stipulates that text alone can change all aspects of the social world.

The European Order, Secularisation and Securitization

“Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”

Mark 12:17, The Bible

“Thus there was strife upon the earth: there was he who conquered everything by his own strength, and he who conquered God by his powerlessness.”

Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling

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70 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse Textual Analysis, p 8
71 Ibid., pp 8-9
“The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapereaude! Have courage to use your understanding!”

Immanuel Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'*

“Man will never be free until the last King is strangled with the entrails of the last priest.” This colourful aphorism, attributed to the 18th century French philosopher Denis Diderot, highlights the intellectual and political revolution of the European Enlightenment and the desire to remove political authority from the Church, thereby making the state the only legitimate sovereign body. This radical rethinking of religion had an enormous societal, political, and intellectual affect. In the 19th century, important thinkers such as Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer and Max Weber all subscribed to the secularisation theory - the prophesy that religion would gradually fade away with the onset of modernisation. The sacred, ritual and superstition that partly characterised Christianity and was institutionalised by the Church in medieval agrarian society would disappear in the modern era of rational Enlightenment thought, industrialisation and bureaucratisation.

The foundation ideas of European state secularism are found in the writings of modern Western political philosophical thought itself. Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, important thinkers of the realist and idealistic school of thought respectively, have played an important role in the conceptualisation of this development. The 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes saw religion as a source of “irrationalism and conflict” and believed that only by removing religion from the public sphere would it be achievable “to remove the destructive conflict engendered by irresolvable questions of religious truth

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from the political realm.”  

Hobbes masterpiece, *Leviathan*, achieves this “Great Separation” of how political philosophy and the rational mind might separate theological matters from temporal government and thereby enable a political rule with no appeals to biblical scripture. Hobbes also argued that the “private man” should observe religious faith “in his head”, and that by complying with the word of God man would be inclined “to obey our civil sovereigns.” Religion should be confined to the public sphere but also be used as a legitimising power to create fealty to the sovereign power of a state.

Immanuel Kant, the 17th century Prussian philosopher, saw the pursuit of knowledge in the past as the attempt by man to understand the celestial order of God. However, it was now redefined as being the effort to properly understand and provably assert knowledge claims. Religion is no longer seen as ‘knowledge’ but has a functional use as a system of moral-practical reasoning that, in the private sphere and under the scrutiny of public reasoning, can encourage individuals to follow the cartological imperative through the threat of heavenly judgement. Kant argued that all demonstrations of private belief must be *instrumentumregni* – for the good of the government. Therefore, both Hobbes and Kant, despite having different philosophical outlooks, wanted religion to be limited to the private sphere and only displayed in the public sphere if it were ‘sanitised’ and was used to strengthen state sovereign power.

Michael C. Williams reasons that the historical development of European modernity and the nation state has been depicted by an idiosyncratic “quest for security” from the Wars of Religion which brought so much conflict and insecurity to the Continent. A solution was found in the rise of a secular “liberal sensibility.” Williams argues that the development of modernity was not a wholly intellectual affair but a progression that “emerged in a context of fear, violence and conflict” of opposing religious ideologies. Religious hostility became so extreme that for those involved in the religious violence “it ceased to be crucial what their theological beliefs were ... All that mattered, by this stage, was for supporters of religious truths to believe, devoutly, in belief itself.” This new identification with religious

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79 Mavelli, Between Normalisation and Exception, pp 159–181  
80 Ibid., pp 159–181
beliefs made it necessary to develop a “new epistemic liberal framework in which the noumenal was separated from the phenomenal and “claims of faith” (which are absolute in nature and cannot be negotiated, and often lead to violence) were separated from a Kantian claim of knowledge (which is more open to scepticism and therefore negotiable).”

The established narrative is that this process began with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. This treaty set up a system of sovereign secular nation-states as a reaction to the religiously inspired orgy of violence and destruction which took place during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). This war involved Catholics, Calvinists and Lutherans fighting out of theological conviction and various Kings and Princes of Europe fighting for temporal gains. Central Europe was consumed in brutal warfare. It was one of the most destructive wars in European history. For example, the Holy Roman Empire lost 40% of its population, some 8 million individuals. In order to solve the problem of “intolerance, war, devastation, [and] political upheaval” instigated by clashing ideological and theological positions a new system of state sovereignty was established.

Thus, the secular liberal state was created. This was to be a pacified domestic sphere in which religious beliefs were divorced from the individual. Violence was to be restricted by centralised state institutions. This new secular state became the modern institution of the security of secularisation. The modern era is still defined by this secular ideological foundation. It is this central assumption of the importance of the Peace of Westphalia which accounts for what has been described as the “fetishization” of the Westphalia peace of 1648.

Secularisation is, therefore, seen as a foundational ideology in the establishment of the modern European state. Dangerous irrational religious beliefs are to be relegated to the private sphere and marginalised from the rational public sphere. Discussions over the link

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81 Mavelli, *Security and secularization in International Relations*, pp 177-199
82 Ibid., pp 177-199
86 Mavelli, *Security and secularization in International Relations*, pp 177-199
87 Ibid, pp 177-199
between religion and violence can be seen as a deliberation “over the proper boundaries, character and role of religion in modern Western societies”, as well as a response to the modern secular liberal requirement that religion “be quite separate from politics, law and science.” From this liberal-secular perspective, religion is seen as a potential security threat, especially when religion becomes involved in the political process, crossing the regulated church - state division found in the liberal-secular state discourse.88

Ken Booth writes: “Once fundamental spirited belief becomes implicated in politics – the public sphere where ideally reasonable discussion, compromise, and consensus takes place – trouble can be expected.” According to this perspective, the public political sphere needs to be protected from religious influences and its secular nature secured. By creating a deliberate connection between religion and violence (especially in the public sphere), the secular-liberal perspective (and elite members) can argue for the need to secure the secularization of the state.

Talal Asad has submitted the idea that the modern construction of religion is a reflection of the power of the secular as a “dominant epistemic framework.” The secular nation-state is constantly engaged in establishing what is deemed as “religious” and redefining “the sphere that religion may properly occupy in society.” Additionally, William Cavanaugh has written that the concept that religion is “essentially prone to violence is one of the fundamental legitimating myth of the liberal nation-state” - a secular antidote to the poison of religious violence. This foundational myth is thus used to strengthen the power of the secular state by side-lining internal groups, discouraging competing discourses, and casting external “non-secular social orders, especially Muslim societies, in the role of the villains.”89

Therefore, secularization can be perceived as a hegemonic narrative and ideological system (in the Foucault-ian sense) which can also be seen as a “modern combat concept.”90 It has been argued that our modern concept of secularism was created and advanced by German Protestants in order to wrestle power from Catholics in 19th century German

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88 ibid, pp 177-199
89 ibid, pp 177-199
states.91 Through this process of secularisation religion becomes “Protestantized” and all other religions that do not fit neatly into what religion “ought to be” become a threat to the state, a threat that needs to be subordinated.92

However, in recent years, this theory of secularisation has been criticised and challenged.93 Some have argued it is an outdated metahistorical narrative or Whig interpretation of history.94 Others have argued that the world is going through a process of de-secularisation / counter-secularisation in order to explain the global resurrection of religion.95 Indeed, there are some who argue that we are living in a post-secular epoch.96

Additionally, the narrative of the secular state as a sphere of peace has been challenged. The relationship between the secular state and the religious is not quite so clean-cut as the liberal mythology of Westphalia suggests. The transformation from religious violence to modern secular liberalism ignores the confessional state and its “absolutist system of rule” which came before the appearance of the 19th century liberal constitutional state. The problem is what is defined by liberalism? Cavanaugh writes:

“If “liberal principles” is taken to mean the toleration and privatization of religious practices, then liberal principles would have to wait — in some cases, for centuries — before being adopted by most European governments. Liberal principles were not adopted in France until after the revolution, nor in Spain until the twentieth century. Roman Catholics in England were not emancipated until 1829. In Germany, the Treaty of Westphalia instituted a qualified toleration at best. The treaty reinforced the policy of cuiusreiuiseiusreligio in most Habsburg lands and allowed all rulers subject to the treaty to expel any dissenters with three years’ notice.”97

Therefore, if liberalism is the total divide of church and state, what came after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia can be seen as confessional rather than secular. John Bossy calls

92 Mavelli, Security and secularization in International Relations, pp 177-199
93 Norris, Inglehart, Sacred and Secular Religion and Politics Worldwide, pp3-4
97 Mavelli, Security and secularization in International Relations, pp 177-199
this “the migration of the holy.” After 1648 the state was to become increasingly sacralised, with institutions such as the monarchy appropriating “wholesale sacred rituals and formulae from the church”, what Walter Bagehot called the “dignified” aspect of the constitution. The establishment of this new state as a “semi-religious” body was essential “to endow the corpus morale et politicum of the state with the transcendent authority proper of the corpus mysticum of the Church which may command the ultimate form of loyalty in the form of sacrifice of its subjects.”

Carl Schmitt wrote that “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.” That is to say, modern secular political theory created its ideological superstructure on the back of theological thought and that secular political theory regarding political sovereignty itself is simply theological concepts of sovereignty transferred to the state. For example, the absolutism of God is transferred to the absolutism of the government and “the exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.” Schmitt argues that “Only by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical idea of the state developed over the last centuries.”

Leo Strauss called this the “theologico-political problem” – the question of how to divide the political from the religious in modernity.

Finally, even though violence was supposed to have been curbed by the secular state, this division of state and church powers “did nothing to staunch the flow of blood.” The historical experience of the 20th century was the most brutal and violent in human

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98 Ibid., pp 177-199
100 Mavelli, Security and secularization in International Relations, pp 177-199
101 The use of religious artifices to reinforce worldly power is not new. For example, the “Holy Lance” (Sacra Lancea), the crown of Charlemagne (Karlskrone) and the Imperial Cross, allegedly containing a piece of wood from the Crucifixion, formed a trinity of religious Imperial insignia from the 10th century onwards legitimising the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire as the true rulers of Christendom. For more, please see: Wilson, P, H., (2016) The Holy Roman Empire A Thousand Years of European History, Milton Keynes: Penguin Books, pp 167-169
102 Mavelli, Between Normalisation and Exception, pp 159–181
103 Laustsen, Wæver, In Defence of Religion, pp 705-739
history,\textsuperscript{106} with an estimated 187 million killed in wars\textsuperscript{107} which were, arguably, the “product of modern secular ideologies.”\textsuperscript{108} Indeed, some scholars have classed the 20\textsuperscript{th} century totalitarian movements of Nazism and Communism as secular religions in themselves, filling the void created by the Nietzschean “Death of God” and the collapse of the Christian Church after the trauma of World War One.\textsuperscript{109}

It is within this context that the United Kingdom, as a secular state, perceives its British Muslim population as an irrational other.

The British State, Islam, British Muslims, and Securitisation

“But when Zarathustra was alone, he spoke thus to his heart: "Could it be possible! This old saint has not heard in his forest that God is dead!"”

Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra\textsuperscript{110}

Great Britain, and Europe, has had a long history of political, social, and cultural interactions with the Islamic world. This has inevitably shaped the modern European-Islamic dichotomy. The 732AD Battle of Tours, when Charles Martel defeated the Umayyad

\textsuperscript{106} Myers, God’s Sovereign Word, pp 336-352
Caliphate, and the Crusades of the 11th to 13th centuries laid the foundations of this complex relationship. Continuing to the 16th century, antagonistic views towards Islam were displayed at the beginning of the English / British process of Empire building during the Elizabethan era. Britain’s contact with Islam and Islamic cultures continued with Imperial acquisitions in the Indian subcontinent and Africa, Britain’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East, and most recently the military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. All of these interactions have created the modern “consolidated discursive realm” which contributes to the securitization of Islam and British Muslims by the British State in the contemporary era.

A global narrative of a “Clash of Civilisations” between the secular West and the Islamic East has helped to create a domestic British narrative of “us” (secular, liberal, democratic Britain) versus “them” (irrational Muslims who are a threat to British society, culture, and its security). Since the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on the 11th September 2001 and the beginning of the “War on Terror” the British Government has responded to and led public perceptions of Islam and Muslims within Britain. The British State has also reasserted its role as the provider of security for all of its citizens against the real and perceived threats of terrorism.

After 9/11, whilst vowing to protect British Muslims from right-wing revenge attacks, the British State also identified certain elements within Islamist ideology as a threat to Britain’s security. The British Government did not want to blame the 2.8 million British Muslim worshippers within the country for the actions of a few. However, the State had identified the political ideology within Islamic thought as a cause of terrorism. Islamism is the political ideology that the temporal political sphere and the religion of Islam should not

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114 Bonino, The British state ‘security syndrome’ and Muslim diversity, pp 1-25
be divorced, and that societies should be ruled by the Islamic principles of Shari'ah law. There are many different branches of Islamism, some advocating a political and gradualist approach, others advocating violence and revolution in order to achieve their goals. Islamism, like other political philosophies, is not a “coherent set of beliefs.” It is the creation of many historical and modern interpretations of the Quran. Those who believe in changing the world through violence and revolution to achieve their goals are called jihadists. The ideology of Islamism will be explored in more depth later in this dissertation.

According to the United Kingdom Home Office’s 2016 First Annual Report of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, terrorism is a major risk to Britain’s security, especially from al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and those groups and individuals inspired by Islamist ideology. Britain has been under threat from Islamist groups and individuals since the start of the 21st century. The 2005 bombings in London on 7/7, the 2007 attack on Glasgow airport, the 2013 beheading of soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, and the recent 2017 terrorist attacks upon Westminster Bridge, Manchester Arena, and London Bridge all highlight the ongoing Islamist threat which Britain faces. Additionally, the terrorist attack outside of a London Mosque in Finsbury Park in 2017 emphasises the risk of right-wing retaliation attacks against British Muslims within the country.

The terrorist threat across Europe is high. Jihadist attacks in France, Denmark, Copenhagen, Brussels, and Belgium all demonstrate the serious threat which Islamists and Islamic-inspired terrorism poses to European societies. The mobilisation of Europe’s Muslim population in support of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is also unprecedented in size.

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118 Archer, Welcome to the Umma, pp 329–347
120 Bonino, The British state ‘security syndrome’ and Muslim diversity, pp 1-25
121 Ibid., pp 1-25
123 Walker, P (4th June 2017) Theresa May says 'enough is enough' after seven killed in London Bridge attack, The Guardian, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/04/london-attack-theresa-may-says-enough-is-enough-after-seven-killed [Accessed 16/07/2017]
compared to the number of fighters travelling to Afghanistan in 1980, Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s, and Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia in the 2000s.¹²⁵ In 2017, an estimated 850 British citizens had travelled to the front-lines of Iraq and Syria to fight for the Islamic State.¹²⁶

The decentralised nature of the Islamic State and its ability to generate ““individual jihad” operations by unaffiliated sympathisers in the West” has meant security agencies in Britain and across Europe and the West have needed to respond to this threat. The Government’s response has been to channel resources into areas such as policing, the intelligence services, and preventative measures. Furthermore, a Government narrative has been developed in order to explain, discuss, and combat this threat. This narrative has been articulated in a number of Prime Ministerial speeches such as by Tony Blair, David Cameron,¹²⁷ and Teresa May.¹²⁸ The main elements of the Government’s narrative concerning the security of the UK in relation to Islamist terrorism are:

- British Identity is based upon liberal values which include secularism, freedom of speech, gender equality, etc.
- There are two types of Muslims: Good moderate Muslims who share our liberal values and practise their religion peacefully, and Bad Islamist extremists who follow a political ideological Islamist interpretation of Islam, reject our values, and want to impose sharia law.
- Political correctness and multiculturalism have opened up a space into which Islamist extremists can wedge themselves.
- Terrorism has occurred in the United Kingdom due to these Islamist extremists.
- We need to be less concerned about multicultural sensitivities and assert our liberal values in order to combat Islamist extremism.¹²⁹

¹²⁵Bonino, The British state ‘security syndrome’ and Muslim diversity, pp 1-25
¹²⁷Kundnani, Security narratives and far-right violence, pp 129-146
¹²⁹Kundnani, Security narratives and far-right violence, pp 129-146
This narrative introduces three protagonists: a British us, moderate Muslims, and extremist Muslims. British Muslim identities are defined by whether they share our values or not. The disturbance (political violence/terrorism), the explanation (Islamic extremism), and a resolution (rejecting multiculturalism and re-asserting liberal values) are also highlighted. Therefore, questions of identity, values, and multiculturalism have come to the fore, all of which are linked to matters of security.130

British Prime Minister David Cameron’s Munich speech of February 2011 at the Security Conference in the Bavarian capital expressed a strong sentiment that Britain was facing a generational struggle from “radical Islamists” after a legacy of erroneous multiculturalist policies which had failed to integrate British Muslims into the wider British society. In this speech, it was claimed that the violence inflicted by a few individuals was a symptom of a much larger cultural and societal unease amongst British citizens. This implied that the solution was to be found within the population at large, and not just amongst British Muslims, who need to assert a stronger sense of national identity based upon “muscular liberalism.” Previous policies of multiculturalism and political correctness need to be weakened to solve a perceived community value and identity crisis.131

Part of this approach was a reaction to prior events. The 2005 London bombings had a massive impact upon the discourse in the United Kingdom relating to the loyalty of British Muslims and the perception of British Muslims being a security threat, as the perpetrators of these terrorist attacks were British born. The London bombers were presented as a double threat because they were both the enemy without and the enemy within, with a narrative about a disdain for the institutions and governance of the ‘host’ (secular) countries being created by the media and government.132 Comparisons can be made with the Paris metro bombing a decade before in 1995. In the 1990s, France was impacted by the Algerian conflict spilling over onto French soil. Islamist networks were established in 1993 to help recruit new members in France for the Algerian Armed Islamist Group (GIA). This eventually concluded in the Paris bombing, to protest against Paris support for the Algerian military

130 Ibid., pp 129-146
131 Ibid., pp 129-146
regime. Khaled Kelkal, the leader of the attack, was born and raised in France, leading to much questioning about French Muslim identity and integration.\textsuperscript{133}

Since the perpetrators of 7/7 were ‘home-grown’ in Britain, the fears of a separate community with links to radical jihadist violence developed. A narrative was crafted in which a lack of integration purportedly created a “crisis in identity” amongst British Muslims, which has led to acts of Islamist violence on British streets. Therefore, to solve this problem, it is seen to be important to create a shared sense of citizenship and values.\textsuperscript{134} Political discourse emphasises the topic of “civic integration, shared values, and collective identity.”\textsuperscript{135}

A reassessment of how Britain’s Muslim minorities were viewed in relation to their national community was conducted by the British Government. One notable point was the perceived international element of the Islamic religion. According to Jocelyne Cesar:

“Muslim immigration to Europe and North America can be seen as the foundational moment for a new transcultural space- a space where individuals live and experience different cultural references and values that are now disconnected from national contexts and boundaries.”\textsuperscript{136}

British Muslims are both national citizens of the State and transnational members of the Islamic \textit{Ummah}. Benedict Anderson described nations as “imagined communities” because “the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” This insight is important in the understanding of the religious community of the \textit{Ummah}, which comprises 2.1 billion people and includes many different national, ethnic, cultural, and ideological differences. The \textit{Ummah}’s power as an ideal has ebbed and flowed over history. Many other ideas have challenged this concept. Ideologies such as the nation state and nationalism, pan-Arabism, and secular ideologies such as socialism and communism have all challenged the ideal of the \textit{Ummah}. Yet, the concept of the Ummah has

\textsuperscript{135}Archer, \textit{Welcome to the Umma}, pp 329–347
\textsuperscript{136}Ajala, \textit{Muslims in France and Great Britain}, pp 123-133
experienced a resurgence, in part due to globalization and identity politics. This is a powerful idea. Abdullah writes that as a result of their Islamic beliefs: “British Muslims like all others feel a special sense of affinity and attachment to Palestine whenever they read the Quran.” This has a direct political implication for the British government in relation to domestic and foreign policy.\footnote{Archer, \textit{Welcome to the Umma}, pp 329–347}

In relation to the securitization of British Muslims and Islam by the State, this Islamic religious identity is seen as a barrier to British integration, and therefore a security threat. The increasing British Muslim identification with its Islamic identity has led to an increased identification with the \textit{Ummah}. Here, a diasporic Islamic community allied to a transnational Islamic doctrine which stresses its connection to the \textit{Ummah} is in competition with its British identity. The re-Islamification of European Muslims encourages an adherence to a transnational Islam. This, combined with the rise of an evangelistic radical Islamist doctrine, has led to the association of Islam with theological-political violence and suspicions about Muslim loyalties. Islam and British Muslims are perceived as both a domestic and a foreign threat by the British State. British Muslims are seen as the ‘Other’, a threat to secularism due to their overt religious identity and a threat to British security due to their perceived unwillingness to integrate into their country.\footnote{Ajala, \textit{Muslims in France and Great Britain}, pp 123-133}

The emergence of Islam as a transnational religion, clashing with a secular European public sphere, has created tensions between these two world-views. As Dalia Mogahed writes: “few constructs are more self-evident than the one dividing Islam and the West” and “Muslim minorities in the West are often scrutinized through this paradoxical prism.”\footnote{Ibid., pp 123-133} Such an event as the Salman Rushdie controversy was framed as a battle between the Western principle of freedom of speech and the Islamic admiration for the Prophet Mohammed. This highlighted the relationship between the Secular West and the Islamic East, triggering debates such as the compatibility of Islam with Western democracy and the levels of integration amongst European Muslims. In this context, the borders between the local and the global are now so blurred that both need to be taken into consideration when discussing this topic. Therefore, what has emerged in the political discourse is a complex web of religion, identity, and culture, at the sub-state, state, and supra-state level. All the
elements in this web need to be tackled by the British Government and are all factors which impinge on the securitization of Islam and British Muslims.\textsuperscript{140}

It is within this space of a dual sense of belonging to Britain and being part of the larger \textit{Ummah} that extremist Islamist groups push their own narratives. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State take advantage of this concept of Muslim identification with the \textit{Ummah} by conflating their group with the \textit{Ummah} or the Caliphate to gain legitimacy. It is advanced that Muslims are duty bound to support fellow Muslims. Jihad is seen as an obligation, and all Muslims are encouraged to launch attacks against their nation of origin.\textsuperscript{141} These acts of violence are legitimised by selected quotes from the Quran.\textsuperscript{142}

Therefore, an important element of the British Government’s narrative of inclusion is the role of British Muslim Imams. Since 9/11 Imams have been seen as central to combating extremism in Britain. The ‘Good Muslim, Bad Muslim’ dualist concept is applied to British Imams by the British Government. British Imams are expected to follow the example of the Church of England and represent a civic religion, a religion which emphasises community cohesion, interfaith dialogue, and economic renewal. As Birt states:

“The good imam is now to embody civic virtues, interfaith tolerance, professional managerial and pastoral skills, possibly become involved in inner city regeneration, work as an agent of national integration (most importantly on behalf of his young unruly flock), and wage a jihad against extremism. By contrast, the bad imam has become an agent of divisive cultural and religious alterity to be deterred by multiplying bureaucratic hurdles, defamed, deported or imprisoned.”\textsuperscript{143}

Within this space lies the tension between the British Government’s wishes, on the one hand, to control Islam and regulate its public religious practice and, on the other hand, its wishes to keep religion out of the public sphere. Faith can only enter the British public space if it is a civic religion. If religious groups become too assertive then they are deemed ‘fundamentalists’ or ‘extremists.’ They are seen to be socially divisive and perceived as

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\textsuperscript{140}Croft, Constructing Ontological Insecurity, pp 219-235
\textsuperscript{141}McDonald, \textit{Securing Identities, Resisting Terror}, pp 177-189
\textsuperscript{142}Lynch, O (2013) British Muslim youth: radicalisation, terrorism and the construction of the “other”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol 6:2, pp 241-261
\end{flushright}
blocking British Muslims from integrating into the wider British society. ‘Good’ Imams recognise this divide and work within its boundaries. ‘Bad’ Imams challenge this divide. This is also why there have been concerns over the influx of foreign Imams, with worries as to their vetting and their role in the preaching of an extremist form of Islam to British Muslims.144

All of this featurestensions between the secular and the religious in a modern liberal society, such as the balance between rights and responsibility, and the ability (or inability) of democracies to govern religious groups who may have values which areantithetical to the state and who are unwilling to compromise.145

Part of the desire to control British Imams derives from the idea that Muslim leaders have not done enough to condemn terrorism. This is illustrated by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stating she had not “heard enough condemnation from Muslim priests” and that “The people who brought down those towers were Muslims, and Muslims must stand up and say that that is not the way of Islam” after 9/11. Thatcher saw Muslims as “less vocal on the essential first step from the Muslim community itself; widespread and unambiguous condemnation of the terrorists and those who support them”.146

The question of loyalty is also linked to British Muslims’ relations with the British Army. Actions such as the killing of five British soldiers in the Afghanistan Helmand province by an Afghan police officer were presented as emphasising “a perception that loyalty to Islam will often outweigh loyalty to comrades, uniform, or country.” Additionally, “of the 2.4 million British Muslims, only 350 serve in the Armed Forces” and “[t]he military authorities have made repeated efforts to recruit more Muslims.”147 Thus, the low rates of Muslim enrolment in the Army is equated to a high rate of disloyalty of British Muslims to the British State. In addition, British Muslims were comprehended to be “on the wrong side” if they refused to support the actions of the British State in Afghanistan, which again plays into the ‘Good Muslim, Bad Muslim’ narrative.148

144 Ibid., pp 687-705
146 Ajala, Muslims in France and Great Britain, pp 123-133
147 Ibid., pp 123-133
148 Ibid, pp 123-133
Attempts to monitor, regulate, and securitize British Muslims by the Government have come under criticism. A Demos report from January 2007 noted the collateral damage created by an unsympathetic narrative of British Muslims by the Government. The report states that:

“...the government’s tendency to hold the whole of the Muslim community accountable for the actions of the few—within an already tense climate of Islamophobia and alienation—has had the effect of driving a wedge between the Muslim community and the rest of British society, rather than between the extremists and everyone else. A lazy parlance in which the words “extremist” and “radical” have become interchangeable has meant that any Muslim expressing anything other than unremitting support for the government is under suspicion.”149

The construction of such a narrative concerning British Muslim loyalties means that all issues relating to Islam and British Muslims – whether that be jihadists travelling to fight for the Islamic State or debates on whether to ban the veil – are placed at the same level of analysis as a threat to the values and norms of Europe. Solidarity with the *Ummah*, understood as an element of identity, is equivalent to disloyalty to the British State, a comparison given full legitimacy in the post-9/11 world and seen in the context of the ‘Clash of Civilizations.’ This creates a portrait of Muslims as a fifth column in society and thus a threat to British national identity and its security.150

However, although there has been a growth in fear and suspicion of British Muslims and the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks led to an increase in the securitisation of British Muslims and Islam, with an increase in anti-terrorist legislation and policies, British Muslims have not had the full weight of the State imposed upon them. As Balzacq argues, securitization needs an audience which accepts the securitizing argument. In Britain, the idea that British Muslims are a security threat has never been fully accepted by the wider British community, even after 7/7. A number of speeches by British Members of Parliament (MPs), such as Charles Kennedy MP and Lord Dholakia, after 9/11 show how Government policy in response to fears of terrorism may target ethnic minorities, including British Muslims.

149 *Ibid*, pp 123-133
150 *Ibid*, pp 123-133
Part of the integration of British Muslims into British society has been due to the policy of State multiculturalism combined with the idea of citizenship rights being official State policy in the post-WWII era. As a legacy of Imperial rule, a majority of British Muslims have their origins in the former British Empire. They were given rights, such as automatic citizenship for Commonwealth immigrants. In addition, British-ness is seen as a ‘light’ identity, with national identities within the Great Britain and Northern Irish home nations – Scotland, England, Ireland, and Wales – allowing for the creation of such identities as British Muslim. British Muslims have also been participants in the State organ, most noticeably in the Labour Party. Claims that Islam as a system of belief are an existential threat to Britain have never fully taken hold within the mainstream political discourse. British Muslims are inside the State and attempts to securitize this group are seen as being less than credible to the wider British citizenship. Nevertheless, there is, as Toby Archer notes, a “sense of unease” about elements of Islam within the United Kingdom, which the State attempts to control.151

The Political Left and Islam

“Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.”

Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*152

There has been a notable sentiment amongst left-of-centre Western intelligentsia regarding their assessment of the link between Islam and jihadist violence. During the Cold

151Archer, *Welcome to the Umma*, pp 329–347
War, many intellectuals in the West argued that the political violence committed by the Soviet Union was independent from the doctrine of Marxism. Likewise, in modern times it is common for Western intellectuals to say that Islam is a “religion of peace”, absolving Islam from any violence committed in the name of the religion. It is more plausible to state that the exact connection between ideas and actions are intangible and debatable, but that there is a link between ideas which provide legitimacy and confidence to those who plan and execute acts of political violence.

Many of these intellectuals rationalise Islamist violence by stressing the “root cause” of this violence, forming the basis of a non-judgemental or sympathetic perspective. One root cause of the suffering of the Islamic world is the alleged actions of the United States and Israel. Thinkers such as Noam Chomsky argue that factors such as United States, capitalism, and global inequality are what drive Islamist violence. This ‘root cause’ explanation has caused a moral re-evaluation of acts of political violence and terrorism. Author and public intellect Gore Vidal argued “the U.S. is the most corrupt political system on earth” and Osama bin Laden was “responding to U.S. foreign policy.” Vidal’s rival and fellow American author Norman Mailer likewise saw the World Trade Centre as a symbol of US power and inequality, writing: “Everything wrong with America led to the point where the country built that Tower of Babel which consequently had to be destroyed.” In addition, intellectuals such as Ian Buruma and Timothy Garton Ash have taken an uncritical, sympathetic position towards controversial Islamic figures, such as Tariq Ramadan, whilst denouncing critics of extremist Islamism such as Hirsi Ali Ayan as “Enlightenment fundamentalists.”

These arguments taken to their logical extreme have resulted in a new growing coalition between the radical left and Islamists. Religion was traditionally seen as incompatible with Marxist-Leninist ideology and a bulwark against Soviet Communism. The red-flag waving Communists saw religion as “the opium of the people” and the green-banner holding political Islamists believed Communism was a “godless ideology.” Yet despite this historical animosity between the two ideologies, in recent years there are signs

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of a growing partnership between Islamists and the radical left, a so-called “Red-Green alliance”, at the state and sub-state level.\textsuperscript{154}

There have been attempts to blend Islam with Marxist ideas in the past, notably in the 1960s by Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati, to create “red Shiism”.\textsuperscript{155} Much of the rhetoric of political Islamists borrows from the language of the far left, using anti-capitalist and liberation ideology in justification of their own ideology. Sayyid Qutb, one of the key Islamist thinkers of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, wrote that “[t]he Islamic doctrine adopts all struggles of liberation in the world and supports them in every place”. Islamic political theology was an “emancipatory movement” and “an active revolutionary creed”. The establishment of this Islamist doctrine would result in “expelling the colonialists”. Therefore, much of this anti-Western and anti-capitalist positioning creates an ideological space for those who wish to transfer their political allegiances from Marxism to Islamism. For example, the far-left terrorist and convert to Islam, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, published \textit{The Revolutionary Islam} in which he called for all revolutionaries and leftists to ally with Osama bin Laden “for the destruction of the United States through an orchestrated and persistent campaign of terror.” Many Islamists describe their political journey from Communism to Islamism. The Egyptian writer Mustafa Mahmud argues “that Islam-like Marxism rejects class structure and large concentrations of wealth” so that “the main principles of Marxism are already to be found in Islam”. The Shia Islamist writer Samih Atef El-Zein has argued against capitalism and advances a case for a state-centralised economy run according to Sharia law.\textsuperscript{156}

In Europe, Islamists and radical leftists have also formed an ideological alliance. Radical European left-wingers, such as the Red Brigade in Italy, view themselves as fellow travellers with militant Islamists.\textsuperscript{157} Within Britain, in January 2004, former Labour MP George Galloway formed the coalition political party Respect, combining the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain, and prominent members of the Muslim Association of Britain and the Muslim Council of Britain. Many of
these European radical left-wing political parties have championed anti-globalism and anti-imperialism and blame the West for the world’s problems.\textsuperscript{158}

Partnerships between the far-left and Islamic political actors can also be seen at the state level. For example, the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been courting leftist regimes such as Bolivarian Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and North Korea.\textsuperscript{159}

Whilst some Islamists are willing to support the economic and social criticism of the far-left, they do not agree with the materialistic and atheistic centrality of socialism and communism. In choosing between Vladimir Lenin and the Prophet Muhammed, Islamists will always place Lenin in second place to Muhammed. This is not the only point of contention between the two groups. Iran, despite its anti-globalization positioning, was condemned after the failed 2009 Green Revolution for being “a reactionary theocratic dictatorship, which has systematically repressed the workers’ movement, denied trade union rights, arrested, tortured and executed trade union activists, for decades.”\textsuperscript{160} Another point of incompatibility between the two groups is that of sexual freedom and gender equality.\textsuperscript{161}

For example, little progress has been made in the relationship between the far-left and the Taliban in Afghanistan due to the misogynist treatment of women by the Taliban.\textsuperscript{162}

The Red-Green alliance are united by a master framework which legitimises anti-globalisation, anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism activism and encourages solidarity between the proletariat and the followers of the Prophet Mohammed. By both groups accepting this master framework, radical leftists and Islamists can work together to fight against globalised capitalism, Western imperialism, and colonialisation (which is one reason why they oppose the state of Israel, which is perceived to be “the last stronghold of colonialism.”) Such an alliance may prove to be a security risk in the future, with the threat of home-grown far-left activists with links to radical jihadists committing acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{158} Karagiannis, McCauley, \textit{The Emerging Red-Green Alliance}, pp 167-182
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., pp 167-182
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., pp 167-182
\textsuperscript{161} Zimmerman, \textit{Sayyid Qutb’s Influence on the 11 September Attacks}, pp 222-252
\textsuperscript{162} Karagiannis, McCauley, \textit{The Emerging Red-Green Alliance}, pp 167-182
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., pp 167-182
The Political Right and Islam

“Islam’s borders are bloody, and so are its innards”

Huntington, S. P., *The Clash of Civilizations*\(^{164}\)

The blurring of domestic and foreign affairs comes from the duality of British Muslim identity as both British citizens and adherents of the *Ummah*. This also applies to the Muslim group in relation to foreign policy, especially in the post-9/11 context. For example,

the United States author, Francis Fukuyama, argued that France’s opposition to the 2003 Iraq War and the United States’ foreign policy in general, is designed to “appease Muslim opinion.” Political actions are calculated either to appeal to or appease Muslim voters in European societies. Therefore, the argument is made that within the ‘Clash of Civilization’ framework, there are growing ideological cleavages within European States, and the pressure exerted on the States’ foreign and domestic policies by the “Muslim streets” is a result of fear, either of losing political power or of social unrest and violence. Such fears eventually conclude in the “Eurabia” theory, that Europe will be a dependency of the Islamic and Arab world.\footnote{Ajala, Muslims in France and Great Britain, pp 123-133}

This theory, put forward by far-right extremist nationalists, insists that a “decadent” and “spiritually exhausted”\footnote{Carr, M., (2006) You are now entering Eurabia, Institute of Race Relations, Vol 48:1, pp 1–22} post-Christian Europe is in danger of being “exposed to a Muslim invasion and a galloping Islamification.”\footnote{Bangstad, Eurabia Comes to Norway, pp 369-391} This conquest takes places as a result of a “demographic takeover” within Europe caused by a higher birth rate amongst Muslims as compared to the non-Muslim native born Europeans.\footnote{Kinnvall, C., (2015) Borders and Fear: Insecurity, Gender and the Far Right in Europe, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol 23:4, pp 514-529} The ‘suicide of the West’ is promoted by a conspiring liberal elite facilitating Multiculturalism, Feminism, and ‘Cultural Marxism’ via compliant institutions such as the media, academia, and the European Union. Europe is “at the verge of developing into a new Arabia, a Eurabia”, and “step by step” Europe’s tolerance for intolerant Muslims “who want to destroy democracy and replace it with Sharia law” is leading to “cultural and national suicide”, the decline, fall and very “dissolution of Western Civilization” itself.\footnote{Bangstad, Eurabia Comes to Norway, pp 369-391} As quoted by Fjordman, the Norwegian domestic terrorist Anders Breivik wrote in his 1516-page manifesto 2083: A European Declaration of Independence:

“Our ancestors, better men and women than we are, held the line against Islam for more than one thousand years, sacrificing their blood for the continent. By doing so, they not only preserved the European heartland and thus Western civilisation itself, but quite...
possibly the world in general from unchallenged Islamic dominance. The stakes involved now are no less than they were then, possibly even greater. 

The West is engaged in an apocalyptic battle with Islam, a Manichean struggle between light and darkness. Europe has defended ‘herself’ twice before from conquest by the Muslim hordes, at the battle of Tours in 732AD and at the gates of Vienna in 1683AD. A third and possible final attempt is currently underway to take over Europe.

Such fears of an Islamic takeover have led to the rise of the right-wing ‘Counter Jihad’ populist movements across Europe, including the rise of the English Defence League (EDL) domestically in Britain, Marie Le Pen’s Le Front National in France, Geertz Wilder’s Party for Freedomin the Netherlands, and the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany. All these movements highlight a deepening sense of cultural, social and political anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments in the wider European society. As well as political movements, an anti-Muslim discourse is spread via a wide decentralised collection of individuals and groups who spread their anti-Islam message through online websites such as Gates of Vienna, The Brussels Journal, and Front Page Magazine as well as a plethora of books such as Robert Spencer’s The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam, Bruce Bawer’s Whiles Europe Slept and The New Quislings, and British writer Bat Ye’or’s Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis and Europe, Globalization, and the coming of the Universal Caliphate.

Such discourses do not distinguish between peaceful followers of Islam and those who support radical jihadist Islamist causes and terrorism. Islam as a religion and ideology is depicted as medieval, fascist, and inherently violent. Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom, described the Quran as being like Hitler’s Mein Kampf for Marx’s Das Kapital, as a “holy book that wants to dominate everything - and that is totalitarianism.”

Muslims, even those who are peaceful, law-abiding and friendly, are always Janus faced, hiding their true evil intentions from the public by lulling good-natured Westerners into a false sense of security in order to get them to drop their guard. This principle of taqqiya

172 Gardell, Crusader Dreams, pp 129–155
(dissimulation) – an idea created by Shiite jurisprudence in the 8th century in order to protect Shiite minorities from persecution – has been adopted by all Muslims in Europe, argue those who advocate this discourse.\textsuperscript{174} Danish MEP Mogens Camre opined days after 9/11 that if some Muslims are friendly, it is only because they are a Trojan horse for Islam, biding their time to become a large enough bloc “to get rid of us”, as occurred “in Sudan, Indonesia, Nigeria and the Balkans”. Ordinary Muslims and terrorists are essentially one and the same, with both having “a hatred founded on a sick ideology”.\textsuperscript{175} Islam is presented as being incompatible with liberal democratic values and Western values.\textsuperscript{176}

Such far-right discourse has bled into the mainstream British political discussion concerning British Muslims and Islam. The growth of the EDL, a protest movement which has been criticised for being Islamophobic, racist and encouraging anti-Muslim prejudice, promotes itself as defending the British “way of life”, “customs” and “rules of law” from an encroaching Islamic threat. The fear is that such movements scapegoat British Muslims and Islam as being the problem for societal, economic, and political ills. Additionally, by encouraging a nationalist message, the EDL will unleash the “dark side” of nationalism which extols the ideas that there are natural superiors and inferiors in human society and that equality is a myth. Where the EDL differ from traditional far-right groups (such as the British National Party) is that the EDL blur the lines which have influenced the behaviour of such far-right groups in the past. By including Jews, Sikhs, and members of the LGBTQ+ community into their fold,\textsuperscript{177} racial or ethnic nationalism is replaced with cultural nationalism instead.\textsuperscript{178} Here the language of defending liberal values and principles (i.e. freedom of speech, separation of church and state, gender equality) combined with a fear of being targeted by radical Islamist groups has created an alliance between the far-right of the political spectrum and individuals in those minority groups which have been traditionally targeted by far-right movements, to give groups like the EDL a sheen of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{179} In addition, the EDL and official State security narratives often overlap, in that there is a battle between ‘our

\textsuperscript{174} Gardell, Crusader Dreams, pp 129–155
\textsuperscript{175} Betz, Meret, Revisiting Lepanto, pp 313-334
\textsuperscript{176} Kinnwall, Borders and Fear, pp 514-529
\textsuperscript{177} Allen, C (2011) Opposing Islamification or promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the English Defence League, Patterns of Prejudice, Vol 45:4, pp 279-294
\textsuperscript{178} Önnerfors, A (2017) Between Breivik and PEGIDA: the absence of ideologues and leaders on the contemporary European far right, Patterns of Prejudice, Vol 51:2, pp 159-175
\textsuperscript{179} Allen, Opposing Islamification or promoting Islamophobia?, pp 279-294
values’ and ‘their values’ and that the fight is not against a few individuals but against a radical ideology within the Muslim community. Furthermore, there is difference between moderate and extremist British Muslims, and State multiculturalism is holding the Government back from fighting extremism. This makes divorcing EDL rhetoric and official British State policy difficult to achieve at times.  

Finally, it is argued that the EDL and other right-wing ‘Counter-Jihad’ movements are engaged in a form of “cumulative extremism” in which right-wing extremism and radical Islamism are part of a symbiotic self-reinforcing relationship, where a group’s rhetoric and actions reinforce and encourage the rhetoric and actions of the other group.  

The Counter Hegemony – Islamist Extremism

“There shall be no compulsion in religion”  

2:256, The Quran  

As discussed in the literature, the absence of political, social and economic development within the Islamic world is an important factor in explaining the deep sense of discontent within the Muslim world and the drift towards political violence, for example as seen by the events of the Arab Spring. However, highlighting the lack of democracy and poverty is only part of the explanation. The focus on economic materialism and political progress towards democracy alone does not address the fundamental critique made by 

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180 Kundnani, Security narratives and far-right violence, pp 129-146
181 Ibid., pp 129-146
radical Islamists – that of materialism and political equality. Islamist ideology does not attack the lack of modernity in the Islamic World, but rather the very idea of modernity itself. The concepts of Western democracy and liberalisms are challenged and an alternative counter-hegemonic system and ideology to the Western secular, democratic neo-liberalism order is offered.\textsuperscript{183} As such, it could be argued that the recent wave of nihilistic violence on display comes out from within Western style modernity itself, and not from Islam per se.\textsuperscript{184} A brief description of Islamism and jihadism will be given, in order to illustrate that the British State is not just combating the tactics of political violence. The description will also illustrate the antithetical opposite of what the secular British State is defining itself against, and how the political discourse reflects this.

It has often been stated that in Islam politics and religion are inseparable. The conventional wisdom is that “Islam has always been pre-eminently dedicated to delivering a moral message aimed at transforming social existence in this world”. To transform the non-spiritual world, the instructions of the divine were to be followed. Islam never accepted the formal separation of church and state as in Europe as discussed hitherto in this dissertation. This does not mean in practice that church and state in Islam have never been separate. There have been many religious groups in Islamic history that have taken no part in politics and many political groups that have taken no part in religion. While many political groups have used religion to gain legitimacy this does not mean that politics and religion are inseparable. The concept that politics and religion are inseparable in Islam has been promoted by those groups that believe they should be inseparable, and has been accepted by some scholars (especially in the past), but that does not mean that they actually are inseparable.\textsuperscript{185}

When describing Islamic extremism, the term “fundamentalism” is often used. However, this term is not necessarily useful one. “Fundamentalism” (often used as a pejorative) describes the idea that divine scripture (i.e. the Bible, Quran) is the ultimate

source of knowledge for humanity, and those who follow a fundamentalist approach to religion reject any competing or conflicting truth claims to the text of their religion. Therefore, fundamentalism can be political or non-political in nature and is not inherently violent.

Those who wish to change the political system itself and impose a theocratic Islamic based system of government are termed “Islamists” or followers of “political Islam.” Political Islam as a modern movement began in the 1920s as a reaction to the perceived failure of secular governments to bring prosperity and independence to the Arab world. After the decline and eventual fall of the major Islamic empires (Ottoman, Savafid, and Mughal), the successive waves of foreign intervention (i.e. by Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and the United States post-1945) and the failure of the various secular monarchical and/or military governments to bring political, economic, social, (and spiritual!) renewal, a new solution was seen to be needed. For Islamists, the reason for these governments’ failure was attributable to secularism, and the lack of Islam. Thus, the answer was to replace the secular with an Islamic Government and Sharia Law to bring about the revitalisation and rebirth of the Islamic world.

All Islamists see Islam as the answer to all areas of life, in both the temporal and spiritual realms. In this way, Islamism has been likened to totalitarianism, as such a system declares that it alone has the only answer to society’s ills and prospects for a bright future. Islamists are political and spiritual reformers. There are also many different and competing views within Islamism ideology, from traditionalists who wish to adopt a strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia) as shown by the example of the Prophet Mohammed, to more progressive Islamists who argue for continual human interpretation of Sharia law, in order to adapt to different contexts.

Islamists are partly motivated by the accusation that the West is actively trying to destroy their societies and eradicate Islam. As one Islamist ideologue wrote: “The West surely seeks to humiliate us, to occupy our lands and begin destroying Islam by annulling its laws and abolishing its traditions.” Islamists argue that ever since the first Crusade of the

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187 Whine, M (2001) Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol 2:2, pp 54-72
11th century, the West has tried to destroy Islam. This crusading effort has continued into the modern era, where an Imperialist West has imposed secular governments onto a humiliated Islamic world. The West – here encompassing the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War – has played a game of geopolitical chess with and within the Islamic world. One major symbol of this modern crusade is the formation of the State of Israel in 1948, which was seen as “a new declaration of Zionist-Crusading war against the Arab and Islamic peoples”. Is8Islam, as a political ideology and spiritual system, can unite Muslim countries against the internal and external threats to Islam.189

Islamists can be divided into two broad groups. There are those who wish for a peaceful form of the political system via preaching (da’wah) and also a small minority who advocate violent revolutionary action to achieve its goal of ushering in a new golden age for Islam.

Events such as the 1966 execution of Sayyid Qutb by the secular government of Egyptian General Nasser and the complete defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 Israel-Arab War (and with it Arab Nationalism) convinced radical jihadists to break away from the Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, and to call for jihad in order to protect Islam.190 As Sedgwick writes: “Just as European radicals had to turn away from Communism after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, so Arab radicals had to turn elsewhere after 1967.”191 This turn to radical Islamism was accelerated by the Arab defeat by Israel in 1973 and with the increase in oil revenues in the 1970s. Saudi oil revenues began to finance many Islamic movements such as Wahhabism.192 The jihadist philosophers such as Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam and Tamim al-Adani193 and groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Gama’alslamiyya led by Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, and al-Qaida led by Osama bin Laden all have their religio-political roots in these events.194

188Son, Islamic Fundamentalism and Political Islam, pp 181–185
190Son, Islamic Fundamentalism and Political Islam, pp 181–185
191Sedgwick, Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism, pp 795-814
192Zimmerman, Sayyid Qutb’s Influence on the 11 September Attacks, pp 222-252
194Son, Islamic Fundamentalism and Political Islam, pp 181–185
Concepts such as fatwa, mullah, sharia and jihad have entered the Western political discourse and are contested terms in which their meanings are fought over. Jihad is one such term. Jihad describes those acts that “bring religion into practice.” Jihad can be divided into both lesser (jihad asghar) and greater jihad (jihad akbar). Greater jihad is the existential struggle in the context of one’s faith, an internal battle against “one’s own mortal failings and weaknesses, which would include battling against one’s pride, fears, anxieties and prejudices”. Lesser jihad is the struggle for self-preservation and self-defence and it can also have a more collectivistic interpretation as an action undertaken in the pursuit of a legitimate Ummah.

Jihad also includes the idea of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, between dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (abode of war). Dar al-Islam is the lands in which Islam is established. In contrast, Dar al-harb is a “lawless territory” distinguished by a permanent state of war because the divine commands from Allah are not being followed. These two states are in conflict with each other, and are used by jihadists to distinguish between the Muslim and non-Muslim world. For radicals such as Abu A’la al-Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, the doctrine of Tawhid (the monotheistic idea that there is only one God) stipulates jihad against all non-Islamic systems without any possibility of dialogue or compromise.

Human beings have deviated from the path of true Islam, al-hakimiyya (divine rule), and replaced it with al-jahiliyya (paganism), nationalism, materialism and abstract philosophy. The Islamist al-Mawdudi perceived al-jahiliyya to be ubiquitous in the modern world:

“Humanity today is living in a large brothel! One has only to glance at its press, films, fashion shows, beauty contests, ballrooms, wine bars, and broadcasting stations! Or observe its mad lust for naked flesh, provocative postures, and sick, suggestive statements in literature, the arts and the mass media! And add to all this the system of usury which fuels man’s voracity for money and engenders vile methods for its accumulation and investment, in addition to fraud, trickery, and blackmail dressed up in the garb of law.”

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195 Diken, Laustsen, *Fundamentalism and the Politics of Security*, pp 199-221
As Mustapha Kamal Pasha writes: “For Islamic scholars, including modern interpreters of the faith (Qutb 1990, for instance), Western modernity is nihilistic in not only a moral (Nietzsche 1968), but also an ontological sense (Heidegger 1998).” The Western world is associated with this ominous moral depravation. Qutb wrote about the West: “We call you to be a people of manners, principles, honour, and purity; to reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling, and trading with interest.”

The Islamic world is also seen as being in decline due to al-jahiliyya. The cure for this al-jahiliyya, this evil, is to launch jihad to eradicate ‘paganism’ and introduce Islamic law. This jihad goes above and beyond the laws and control of the temporal nation State, and is legitimised by its moral fight of good against evil. It is a struggle between God (Hizb Allah) and Satan (Hizb al-Shaytan), where one has to choose a binary side. The idea of the Ummah no longer specifies the existing Islamic world but rather is an ideal, an “ahistorical ideal waiting to be actualized at any moment in history”, or as Sayyid Qutb writes is “a demand of the present and a hope for the future”. Many Muslims view their history with a sense of romantic nostalgia. The golden days of the Islamic civilization were when the Caliphates were ruled in accordance with Sharia law, and arts, sciences, and technology flourished. Interestingly, for many Muslims, the Islamic lands never experienced a European-esque ‘Dark Ages’, and so there is no need for a European style reformation.

Calls for jihad by Islamists reveal a world in which Islam itself is at war not just with the West and the world but actually within the Islamic community itself. Such calls for holy war are expressed in harsh and uncompromising language. Islam is depicted by radical Islamists as apsorelytising, triumphalist and monolithic religious doctrine. Yet this self-depiction hides the fact that because Islam has a decentralised system of belief Islamist groups are often plagued by sectarian and ideological in-fighting.

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196 Pasha, Islam, nihilism and liberal secularity, pp 272-289
197 Diken, Laustsen, Fundamentalism and the politics of security, pp 199-221
198 Ibid., pp 199-221
200 The idea of an Islamic Reformation in the same style as the European experience is a fascinating topic which is unfortunately outside the boundaries of this dissertation. For more on the topic please see: Toby E. Hunt (2007) article, or Ayaan Hirsi Ali 2015 polemic - Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now
201 Whine, Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences, pp 54-72
Jihadists engaged in irregular warfare in Europe, otherwise called ‘small wars’ or ‘the war in the shadows’, use terrorist strategies such as suicide bombings. Whilst irregular warfare is not new (the Roman Senator Sextus Julius Frontinus discusses such strategies) the combination of irregular warfare and political theory as a political end in itself rather than a means to an end is a modern formulation. During the years of Italian Unification, the Risorgimento (1831–61), Giuseppe Mazzini viewed guerrillas as “the precursors of the nation, which they would rouse to insurrection.” This comprehension was adopted by the Italian anarchist, Errico Malatesta, to whom is attributed the description of terrorist actions as the *propaganda dei fatti*. The aim is that the deed itself is to set an example for others to follow.\(^{202}\) Osama Bin Laden followed this principle, calling those who carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks the “vanguard of Islam” and “martyrs.” Muslims are depicted as being asleep and it is the duty of the few true believers to awaken them. The purpose of jihadist political violence is thus twofold: Firstly, to attack the enemy, the *infidels*; Secondly, to make the Islamic multitude rise up against their ungodly secular leaders and battle against their paganist behaviour. The use of violence is in a sense seen as liberating because it allows people to worship in unity with a celestial law that is infallible and from which there can be no opposition from true believers.\(^{203}\) Thus, the use of violence is not just a political strategy, but also a religiously transcendent experience.\(^{204}\)


\(^{203}\) Diken, Laustsen, *Fundamentalism and the politics of security*, pp 199-221

\(^{204}\) Pasha, *Islam, nihilism and liberal secularity*, pp 272-289
Political Discourse Analysis Data Collection

This dissertation collected Parliamentary debates between Members of Parliament (MPs) of the House of Commons (HoC) from the Hansard online Parliament database, which uploads the edited verbatim of debates within the British Parliament. The key words of “British Muslim”, “Muslims”, and “Islam” were searched in Hansard between the dates of 01/01/2014 and 01/01/2017. This period coincides with the rise of the Islamic State’s campaign to establish the Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the subsequent wave of jihadist related terrorism in Britain and Europe.

Debates from the House of Commons are used exclusively. The British Parliament is a bicameral legislature. The unelected second chamber, The House of Lords, is politically subordinate to the HoC’s. Therefore, this PDA will focus on Parliamentarians who wield the most political power in the UK. In addition, this time period had a Conservative – Liberal

Democrat coalition (formed in 2010 with the Liberals as the junior partner) until Prime Minister David Cameron and the Conservative Party were re-elected with a Parliamentary majority in May 2015. (Cameron was shortly replaced thereafter as PM by Theresa May in July 2016). Therefore, whilst there were changes in personnel in Government, there was an ideological continuation in its political make-up (that of mainstream liberal-democratic British Conservatism).

This PDA will incorporate the discussion of the political discourse in this section of the dissertation. Four main points of deliberation were identified for this dissertation, which will be highlighted and discussed. These are: 1) Highlighting the brutality of jihadism and the Islamic State, 2) Defending Islam and British Muslims, 3) Highlighting the problem of political Islam within Islamic thought, and 4) Asserting British values, interests and the secular state.

**Political Discourse Analysis and Discussion**

**Deliberation A - Highlighting the Brutality of Jihadism and the Islamic State**

The first deliberation as part of the securitization of British Muslims and Islam by Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of Commons (HoC) is the securitization of the Islamic State (IS) and jihadists as part of the circumstantial premise. The threat created by the rise of IS in the first half of 2014 (and its subsequent takeover of the city of Mosul in Iraq) was constructed as an existential threat to security and to the global international community because of its use of conventional military means to conquer territory, and a security threat to Britain because of its encouragement and use of asymmetrical warfare. The Islamic State has taken credit for many of the terrorist attacks committed by jihadists in both the Middle East and Europe within this time period. The first linguistic construction of the securitization speech act is to present and emphasise the exceptional

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existential threat the Islamic State is to the referent object – the British State and British values. Therefore, security measures in the form of either external military intervention or internal State actions against IS and jihadists are legitimised.

The labelling and rhetoric employed in order to describe IS is used as part of the threat construction in the securitization process. Terms such as “death cult”\textsuperscript{208}, “fascists”\textsuperscript{209} “a vile, loathsome, murderous organisation”\textsuperscript{210}, a “barbaric regime” which “glorifies suicide and slaughter”\textsuperscript{211} as well as being an organization which Britain has “no space for negotiation or diplomacy”\textsuperscript{212} are all used to highlight the high security threat which the group represents to Britain. As the then Prime Minister David Cameron (Con) described IS: “These women-raping, Muslim-murdering, medieval monsters are hijacking the peaceful religion of Islam for their warped ends.”\textsuperscript{213} This sentence, broken down, highlights how a narrative opposing IS is constructed as an existential threat to Britain and British values. “[W]omen-rape” highlights the reports of IS using sex slaves\textsuperscript{214} and is used to de-legitimise IS in the eyes of Britain and the West (who advance issues of gender equality), thereby gendering the securitization process. However, it can also reinforce the secular ‘regime of truth’ that Islam is ‘backwards’ and is regressive in the area of gender equality.

“Muslim-murdering” is part of the means-ends premise to undermine the legitimacy of the Islamic State, which justifies its rule on Islamic law. By highlighting and creating the narrative that IS is executing other Muslims, the organization can be delegitimised by those in the British Muslim community. In the same manner, IS is also often labelled as the “so-called IS”, “Daesh” or “so-called caliphate” in debates in order to disassociate IS from the religion of Islam and as a legitimate state.\textsuperscript{215} PM David Cameron (Con) articulated: “This evil

\textsuperscript{208}HC Deb, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 329, Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141 [Accessed 08/05/2017]
\textsuperscript{209}Ibid., Col 398
\textsuperscript{210}Ibid., Col 358
\textsuperscript{211}Ibid., Col 372
\textsuperscript{212}Ibid., Col 407
\textsuperscript{213}HC Deb, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 336-337, Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141 [Accessed 07/05/2017]
\textsuperscript{214}Graham-Harrison, E (1\textsuperscript{st} July 2017) ‘I was sold seven times’: the Yazidi women welcomed back into the faith, The Guardian, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jul/01/i-was-sold-seven-times-yazidi-women-welcomed-back-into-the-faith [Accessed 26/07/2017]
\textsuperscript{215}HC Deb, 26th Nov 2015, Vol 602, Col 1496, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-11-26/debates/15112625000002/Syria?highlight=islam#contribution-15112625000186 [Accessed 14/05/2017]
The concept that this conflict is heavily based on sectarian divides within Islam (such as between the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam) and that the majority of Islamist terrorism violence is directed towards other Muslims is included in Parliamentary discourses in order to combat the ‘us versus them’ master narrative framework of the Secular West versus the Islamic East, which both far-right and Islamist groups promote in order to gain support for their causes.217

Labelling IS “medieval” points to the secular power systems discourse of Islam and those following the teachings of Islam. Islam has not progressed into the secular Enlightenment era which the West in its own ‘power/knowledge’ self-image has. The overt religious nature of IS and the use of Islam to legitimise its actions only further reinforces the secular-liberal narrative that religion is a source of conflict which needs to be relegated to the private sphere. This idea of warfare based on religion has also been labelled as “primeval”,218 further reinforcing the manner of how jihadists (and thus Islam) are perceived as being historically backwards and unenlightened.

However, this narrative of ‘medieval barbarianism’ has also been challenged in the HoC’s. As MP Martin Horwood (LD) argues: “Mediaeval Islam was a pinnacle of civilisation when we were in the dark ages, and we owe it a huge intellectual debt. To compare it to the murderous extremists of ISIL is to do something of an injustice to that heritage.”219 The argument that the Islamic civilisation in the Middle Ages was a golden age is a part of the imaginaries narrative used by Islamists to advance their cause. All ‘knowledge/power systems’ use ‘claims of truth’ to legitimise their rule or justify their actions – including specific interpretations of history. To describe the Islamic civilization as the “pinnacle of civilization” justifies an Islamist interpretation of history. Likewise, calling the European

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218 HC Deb, 16th June 2014, Vol 582, Col 860, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-06-16/debates/14061619000002/IraqAndEndingSexualViolenceInConflict?highlight=Islam#contribution-14061619000080, [Accessed 14/05/2017]
Medieval era the unenlightened “dark age” reinforces the secular-liberal hegemonic position that overt religious rule is intellectually unsophisticated.

Continuing with the idea of using history to legitimise the means-ends premise of attacking the Islamic State, PM David Cameron concluded his opening remarks in the debate in the HoC’s to persuade the House to vote in favour of extending military operations against IS into Syria in 2015 by saying: “Throughout our history, the United Kingdom has stood up to defend our values and our way of life. We can, and we must, do so again.”

The use of imaginaries within the British historical narrative that the nation “defend our values” is to evoke memories of World War II and the fight against fascism, thereby justifying the action. Conversely, discourses such as Britain defending its “values and way of life” tap into right-wing narratives of preserving British identity from an encroaching Islamic menace.

It is through deliberations to target the Islamic State and jihadists that the British and Western values premise is also framed. United Kingdom and Western values are defined by what the UK and the West are not. As PM David Cameron said, British Muslims are: “…rightly disillusioned by the butchery of those people [IS] — their hatred of people with different ways of life and the appalling way they treat women as sex slaves and throw gay people off the top of buildings—can be some of the most powerful voices saying, “Those are not people we can deal with. Those are people we have to finish.”

British values of liberal democracy including pluralism, gender equality, human rights, and gay rights stand in opposition to the values of the Islamic State. Likewise, in an inversion of this, terms such as “the free world”, “decency” and “humanity” have been used to describe the United Kingdom, in which IS is therefore construed as “unfree”, “indecent”, and “inhuman”. In addition, because the Islamic State is opposing these values, this paradigm gives the British State the legitimacy to launch military operations against the Islamic State.

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220 HC Deb, 26th Nov 2015, Vol 602, Col 1494, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-11-26/debates/15112625000002/Syria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15112625000186 [Accessed 14/05/2017]
221 HC Deb, 17th November 2015, Vol 602, Cols 535, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-11-17/debates/15111751000004/G20AndParisAttacks?highlight=Islam#contribution-15111751000262 [Accessed 07/05/2017]
Depicting jihadist as murdering “infidels, heretics and apostates”\(^{223}\) and using Islamic terms to describe the problem of Islamist extremism, portraying Islam as a war-like religion,\(^{224}\) creates the problem of conflating Islamist extremists with moderate British Muslims.

Additionally, a number of MPs used historical examples to advance the means-end premise against the Islamic State and jihadists. One reason for this was to persuade MPs who were weary of military action in the Middle East, especially after the 2003 Iraq War was seen as a ‘root cause’ of the current wave of Islamism. Labour MPs, who are members of a left-wing party, would have to combat the “root causes” left-wing narrative about the sources of Islamist violence. Therefore, the past was used to justify the means-end premise of military action. MP Ivan Lewis (Lab), in support of action against IS spoke: “It is rewriting history to equate being on the left with always opposing military action. I feel this more than most, as my grandfather fought in Spain for the International Brigade against Franco’s fascists.”\(^{225}\) The left-wing tradition and value premise of fighting totalitarianism (specifically fascism in this case, the farthest position on the political spectrum from a left-wing Labour position) is invoked to gain support for action against IS and jihadists. However, the equating of Islamism with fascism justifies two criticisms. Firstly, not all Islamism advocates violence, thus to label all Islamism as Fascism is to generalise. Secondly, to bracket Fascism and Islamism together is to impose the Western historical experience and it’s ‘historical power system’ upon the Islamic world. Although there may be similarities between these ideological systems, the details and subtleties of Islamism in the larger picture will be missed. Finally, again, ironically from a left-wing MP, such discourses of ‘Islamic-fascism’ encourage a far-right narrative.

Finally, whilst the shock of IS on the world stage caused a new intensity in the deliberation surrounding British Muslims and Islamists, this discourse was itself built upon the ‘consolidated discursive realm’ which had already been established after 9/11 (in the

\(^{223}\)HC Deb, 2\(^{nd}\) Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 344, Available at [https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141) [Accessed 08/05/2017]


\(^{225}\)HC Deb, 2\(^{nd}\) Dec 2015, Vol 406, Cols 329, Available at [https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141) [Accessed 08/05/2017]
The discourse surrounding IS follows the Paris school of securitization - of government officials building upon the already established ‘consolidated discursive realm.’

**Deliberation B – Defending Islam and British Muslims**

The second deliberation when discussing the securitization of Islamists is one of the major discussion points of this dissertation. MPs continually reaffirm in their speech acts the disassociation of the religion of Islam from the acts of violence committed by both by IS and jihadists. Many references to Islam in the Hansard archives distance Islam and British Muslims from the acts of violence committed by jihadist. For example, MP Theresa May (Con), stated after the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris: “…this is not about Islam; it is about a perversion of Islam. There are Muslims in this country and other countries around the world who condemn these acts of violence and terrorism, and their voices are being heard in increasing numbers.” In the same debate she repeats this point stating: “It is very clear—everybody is very clear—that the attacks were not about Islam. The voices of Muslim communities and Muslim leaders in the United Kingdom, France and across the world have made it very clear that the attacks were not undertaken in their name. We should reiterate that very clear message.” MP Simon Hoare (Con) stated, in relation to Islam, Islamic State: “… have so bastardised that religion” when discussing the harm IS had caused to other Muslims in Syria, Iraq and worldwide. Finally, MP Johnny Mercer (Con) sums up how IS abuses the religion of Islam by “… use[ing] fear, religion and violence to promote nothing more and nothing less than their own self-interest and power.”

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226 HC Deb, 14th January 2015, Vol 590, Col 880, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-01-14/debates/15011442000003/TerroristAttacks(Paris)?highlight=Islam#contribution-15011442000078 [Accessed 07/05/2017]

227 HC Deb, 14th January 2015, Vol 590, Col 877, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-01-14/debates/15011442000003/TerroristAttacks(Paris)?highlight=Islam#contribution-15011442000078 [Accessed 07/05/2017]

228 HC Deb, 2nd Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 332, Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141 [Accessed 08/05/2017]

Such speech acts are the opposite of the securitization process, and are designed to *de-securitize* British Muslims and Islam within the United Kingdom after jihadist attacks or in debates about the Islamic State. This is to achieve the goal premise of A) not further alienating the vast majority of British Muslims from British society with the idea that a lack of British identity is one of the ontological reasons for domestic terrorism (thus not inflaming this security concern any further.) B) combating the right-wing ‘Clash of Civilization’ discourse and protecting British Muslims from retaliation attacks. After the 2016 Brussels bombings, MP Andy Burnham (Lab) made the point that such attacks raise anxiety amongst British Muslims: “…of reprisal attacks, rising Islamophobia and hate crime.” Therefore, such speech acts are needed to uphold the values premise of defending British Muslims. C) countering radical Islamist discourses linking Islam with political violence and making sure such groups and individuals are not emboldened further by an acknowledgement that they have a legitimate interpretation of Islamic scripture.

The British State’s concern after 9/11 and 7/7 has been to protect Britain’s Muslims from Islamist terrorism and right-wing reprisal attacks. MP Jeremy Corbin (Lab) discussed this point: “We should also remember the impact on communities here in Britain. Sadly, since the Paris attacks there has been a sharp increase in Islamophobic incidents and physical attacks. I have discussed them with people in my local mosque, in my constituency, and they are horrific. Surely this message must go out from all of us in the House today: none of us—we can say this together—will tolerate any form of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia or racism in any form in this country.” The United Kingdom’s Government follows principles of liberal democracy, which include: representative democracy, freedom, equality before the law, social justice, human rights, and free-market economic liberalism. The State rejects attacks against its minorities absolutely and seeks to protect them.

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232Graham, *Introduction to Liberal Democracy*, pp 10-20
As part of the strategy to defend British Muslims (as referent objects) PM David Cameron stated: “British Muslims are appalled by Daesh.”\(^{233}\) This plays into the “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim” narrative - Bad Muslims support extremist Islamists and Good British Muslims condemn such individuals and groups, thus showing their loyalty to the UK. From another HoC debate after the 2015 Bataclan concert hall in Paris, PM David Cameron articulated that “…some of the strongest and best statements following the Paris attacks have been made by a series of British Muslims who have come together to say that these attacks are in no way carried out in their name.”\(^{234}\) Again, ‘Good’ British Muslims condemn violent acts committed by ‘Bad’ Muslims in the name of Islam.

In continuing the goal premise of protecting British Muslims there were also calls to help protect moderate British Muslim communities from those who are pushing extremist ideologies. PM David Cameron states: “This is a battle within Islam, and we have to be on the side of the moderate majority and make sure that they win it.”\(^{235}\) Here there is a recognition that the current wave of political violence is found within a specific strain of Islamism which is not represented by the majority of British Muslims. Reinforcing this point, in order to combat Islamist extremism, MP John Barron (Con) states: “…we should be tackling the ideology and the sectarianism that feed the extremism that these groups, including Daesh, feed off. That is a long-term strategy—we cannot do it overnight—but again, I do not see much evidence of it.”\(^{236}\)

HoC’s MPs also highlight the challenges that the British Muslim community face in response to the rise and spread of radical Islamist ideologies. MP Nusrat Ghani (Con) opined:

\(^{233}\text{HC Deb, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 336-337, Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141 [Accessed 07/05/2017]}

\(^{234}\text{HC Deb, 18\textsuperscript{th} Nov 2015, Vol 602, Col 666-667, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-11-18/debates/15111852000028/Engagements?highlight=Islam#contribution-15111852000127 [Accessed 07/05/2017]}


\(^{236}\text{HC Deb, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 365, Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/ Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141 [Accessed 08/05/2017]}\)
“These ideologies and this extremism, increasingly rife, are like an invasive species. The Islam that came to this country with the communities that have settled here since the second world war is not the Islam now taught in some Muslim schools or practised in certain mosques. Wahhabi Islam is not the faith of my parents and does not reflect the cultural richness of the Muslim communities of the subcontinent, from which most of our diaspora come. Rather like an invasive species, Wahhabism has driven out many of the traditions that make my faith a spiritual rather than a political journey. It represents teachings that interpret Islam as a narrow stone age rulebook intolerant of modern society’s norms or indeed much of the basic human decency that we take for granted.”

The use of the imagery of political Islamism as an invading species is a troubling one. On the one hand, the means-goal premise is being advanced that British Muslims need to be protected against an extremist Wahhabis Islamist doctrine. A subtle point is made that Saudi Arabia Wahhabism is not the same as Islamic doctrine from the subcontinent of India and Pakistan, which highlights the many differences within Islamic thought and tradition, and challenges the notion that Islam is a monolithic entity. On the other hand, the idea of Islam being linked to an invading species, a parasite, is rhetoric which can be found in far-right works, which do not distinguish between extremist Islamism and moderate Islam, and view the arrival of Islam into Europe as an invasion. Additionally, an appeal to help create a civic Islam is being made. The political nature of Wahhabism is emphasised, highlighting the secular / religious divide of the West, and how this secular space needs to be defended.

One MPs contribution to the HoC emphasises the idea of British Muslims gaining access to further education and political representation. Access to further education means economic improvement and more representation in professional fields and public life. This ties into the idea that terrorism can be blamed on economic issues. The lack of British Muslim representation in key areas of British life only increases segregation and the inability to understand the problems of British Muslims. Likewise, issues of British Muslim

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representation in the press and media is highlighted in the House. One criticism was that of a BBC programme featuring a British Muslim character depicted as “... a beardy-weirdy chap.” Such issues may seem mundane, but constant depiction of the British Muslim community as ‘weird’ only normalises stereotypes about British Muslims, entrenches segregation, creates alienation, and encourages an ideological space in which extremist narratives can thrive. In addition, a debate about a proposal to exclude the then United States Presidential candidate Donald Trump from the United Kingdom due to his inflammatory statements regarding Muslims from January 2016 reveals how, even though his rhetoric is divisive and encourages groups such as the EDL, the best way to challenge such viewpoints is through free speech and open debate.  

On the wider international political level, there is also a rejection of the Huntington ‘Clash of Civilization’ thesis between the West and Islamic world. As PM David Cameron stated after the murder of Asad Shah in Shawlands, Glasgow: “The attack on Ahmadiyya Muslims by other Muslims demonstrates once again that what we face is not some clash of civilisations between Islam and Christianity or Islam and Buddhism ... What we are seeing is a small minority within one of the great religions of our world, Islam, believing that there is only one way—a violent, extremist way—of professing their faith.” Islam is de-securitized as “one of the great religions of our world” and those who commit violence are a “small minority”, thus further de-securitizing British Muslims.

Additionally, on the subject of the international element of Islamism and legitimacy, PM David Cameron highlighted how: “As the King of Jordan says in an article today, these people [Islamic State] are not Muslims, they are “outlaws” from Islam.” On the one hand, this is an attempt to engage with and include those moderates from the Middle East who

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align with Britain’s goal premise of combating Islamic extremism. There are appeals for a continual “Arabising” the narrative against extremists in the Middle East, an effort to develop an effective counter-radicalisation narrative within the Middle East region itself.

On the other hand, the attempt to delegitimise extremist Islamism by appealing to a higher celestial authority may be a difficult delegitimising tactic due to the decentralised nature of Islam. MP Khalid Mahmood (Lab) uses this technique as a delegitimising tactic, stating that: “...Daesh...have absolutely no connection at all to Islam...as has been affirmed by the Grand Imam Sheikh el-Tayeb of al-Azhar University.”

PM David Cameron also stated that: “Far from an attack on Islam, we are engaged in a defence of Islam, and far from a risk of radicalising British Muslims by acting, failing to act would actually be to betray British Muslims and the wider religion of Islam in its very hour of need.” This sentence is in relation to acting against the Islamic State but emphasises the idea that Britain is defending the religion of Islam, British Muslim and the wider Ummah from being hijacked by extremists. It is not just in Britain’s interests but also in Islamic interests for the United Kingdom to take action against Islamic State. The British State is defending ‘real’ moderate Islam and is working in the best interests of British Muslims. This is an intriguing inversion from the dominate secular subjectivity: the role of the secular state is to keep the spiritual out of temporal politics. Here, the Prime Minister is becoming involved in affairs of faith by championing a specific civic doctrine of Islam.

Deliberation C – Highlighting the problem of political Islam within Islamic thought

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Whilst British Muslims are de-securitized in political discourse, one view point for those on the left of the political spectrum is to deny that violent jihadism and Islam have any connection whatsoever. While there is a strong discursive move by some MPs to distance the religion of Islam and British Muslims from Islamist violence in order to protect them, there is still an acknowledgement that Islamist political violence gains legitimacy and encouragement from a radical interpretation of Islamist thought. PM David Cameron states: “It is not good enough to say that there is no connection between these terrorists and Islam; they are making a connection, and we need to prove that it is not right. As we do so, the support of Muslim communities and scholars is vital, and I commend them for their work.”\(^247\)

David Davis (Con) emphasised the asymmetrical terrorist threat to the West, further securitizing the political ideology of Islamism: “Last week, the greatest modern warrior, the American ex-special forces general Stanley McChrystal, was in the House and I spoke to him. He was talking principally about drones and aerial warfare, and he said ... that we should never believe that we can cut off the head of the snake in this kind of war, because it always regenerates and reorganises. He said that that was the wrong metaphor for this kind of warfare, and that it would not work on any level.”\(^248\)

For PM David Cameron, combating the narrative of radical Islamists was a particularly important element in defending Britain:

“... to defeat this terrorist threat in the long run we must also understand and address its root cause. That means confronting the poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism itself. As I have argued before, that means going after both violent and non-violent extremists—those who sow the poison but stop short of actually promoting violence; they are part of the problem. We will improve integration, not least by inspecting and shutting down any educational institutions that are teaching intolerance, and we will actively encourage reforming and moderate Muslim voices to speak up and challenge the extremists, as so many do.

\(^{247}\) HC Deb, 18\(^{th}\) Nov 2015, Vol 602, Col 666-667, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-11-18/debates/15111852000028/Engagements?highlight=Islam#contribution-15111852000127 [Accessed 07/05/2017]

\(^{248}\) HC Deb, 2\(^{nd}\) Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 388, Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141 [Accessed 08/05/2017]
It cannot be said enough that the extremist ideology is not true Islam, but it does not work to deny any connection between the religion of Islam and the extremists, not least because the extremists themselves self-identify as Muslims. There is no point denying that; what we need to do instead is take apart their arguments and demonstrate how wrong they are, and in doing so we need the continued help of Muslim communities and Muslim scholars. They are playing a powerful role and I commend them on their absolutely essential work.

We cannot stand neutral in this battle of ideas. We have to back those who share our values with practical help, funding, campaigns, protection and political representation. This is a fundamental part of how we can defeat this terrorism both at home and abroad.”

The idea that extremist Islamists and their ideology do not represent true Islam or the majority of British Muslims is emphasised, and moderate British Muslims, who are advancing a civic form of Islam in Britain, should be supported. However, there is a “battle of ideas” in which the arguments (and narratives) of extremist Islamists must be challenged and proven wrong. Thus, the UK should be engaged in “influence warfare” in order to defeat this ideology. By establishing a dominate ‘claim of truth’ the narratives of extremism can be defeated, integration can be improved amongst British Muslims, and the security strategy of the United Kingdom can be advanced.

Islam needs to be “reclaimed” from IS, jihadists, and extremists who preach a radical form of Islam. MP Gerald Howarth (Con) states that in order to combat extremism: “The principal onus to root out that evil must therefore rest on the Muslim community.” One example which was applauded in the House was given by MP James Duddridge (Con) after the attack in 2015 in Leytonstone Underground Station, London when he recalled the example of one passenger saying: “You ain’t no Muslim, bruv.” Duddridge stresses: “That

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250 HC Deb, 2nd Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 358, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141 [Accessed 08/05/2017]

was absolutely perfect and encapsulated the moment and what all British people think, regardless of their religion.”²⁵² Such examples are highlighted in efforts to spread British Muslim-led counter-extremist narratives within the British Muslim community.

In addition to challenging an extremist narrative of Islamism in the HoC, debates in the Chamber also become more critical of the role Islam has to play in political violence in relation to the monarchy of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran and their promotion of sectarianism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Europe. MP John Denham (Lab) challenges the role that the Saudi regime plays in spreading extremist Islamism: “Have not few countries done as much as Saudi Arabia to promote a sectarian and deeply conservative brand of Islam right around the world, including in the middle east? It and other conservative Gulf states stay high on the list of diplomatic friends of our Government. If we are to speak truth to power, why do we not challenge those who have helped foster the sectarianism that we now see?”²⁵³

Likewise, MP Caroline Lucas (Green) asks: “Why are we not applying sanctions to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that have turned a blind eye and allowed the flow of finance to ISIS and, potentially, other terrorist groups? Why are we still selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, when they are then used in a vicious and destabilising war in Yemen that has killed thousands and made millions homeless, and that is creating yet more chaos in which al-Qaeda can thrive? Why are we not putting pressure on Turkey over the oil sales and the transit of fighters across its border?”²⁵⁴ By referencing the circumstantial premise that regimes such as Saudi Arabia are promoting the extremist Wahhabi form of Islam, MPs are highlighting how this is an international challenge to the goal of providing security to the United Kingdom.

²⁵² HC Deb, 10th Dec 2015, Vol 603, Col 1250, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-10/debates/15121050000002/InternationalHumanRightsDay?highlight=British%20Muslims#contribution-15121050000946 [Accessed 10/05/2017]
Such political discourse has infiltrated the discussions regarding the security of Britain, and shows the interconnected globalised nature of state security in the 21st century with specific reference to the Islamic Ummah. This threat construction is achieved by depicting the United Kingdom, Europe, the Middle East, and indeed the secular Westphalian global system as under threat from radicals. As Harriet Harman (Lab) described the security situation after the Tunisia attack:

“...we are an island, but whether it is the terrorism in Tunisia, Syria, Kuwait or France, whether it is the refugees in the Mediterranean, whether it is the economy in Greece, or whether it is the radicalisation of young people here at home, this week’s terrible events remind us emphatically once again that we are all interconnected.”

The idea of understanding the Islamic mindset is important in countering extremism. MP Charlotte Leslie opines: “In Islam, the idea that man is here only for a season, and that it is his legacy that is important, is embedded in the way people think—a perfect of example of where political thinking and faith are inseparable.” “Furthermore, Gulf nations are at home with, and understand in a way that the west finds hard to digest, the role of religion and faith and their values, as integral to politics and political thinking.”

Critically, MP Charlotte Leslie (Con) shows that part of the West’s difficulty in dealing with the Islamic world is the flawed thinking within the West: “… western politics has such an inadequate currency of thought and language with which to discuss it: Islam and its values today.” To understand the problem of violent jihadism and understand the issue of Islamism ideology means to expand our own understanding of Islamic thought and tradition as well as to engage with the debates within Islamic communities. She continues:

“Islam is a religion that is inseparable in its content from the Arab peninsula. In its own 1400s, it is now, perhaps, going through an enlightenment or reformation process that Christianity went through so brutally and bloodily in our own calendar’s medieval period.

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This reformation, however, is happening with AK47s, global travel and the internet - “mass communication”. As a result of global travel and mass communication, Islam’s internal challenges are not only the problem of the Gulf and the middle east, because Islam is now a European religion, too, so its challenges are challenges for everyone.”

The use of the European Reformation to contextualise the current fighting in the MENA region emphasises the Whiggish idea of human progression based on the Western experience being projected onto the region, reinforcing the secular ‘regime of truth’. Whether such historical comparisons are useful or reinforce Orientalist ideas of a backwards MENA region is debateable. The challenges of globalization, mass communication and travel are emphasised as being part of the circumstantial premise of how extremist Islamist doctrines are spread. PM David Cameron also stresses this is an issue in dealing with extremism stating: “ISIL’s methods of murder might be barbaric, but its methods of recruitment, propaganda and communication use the latest technology. We must therefore step up our own efforts to support our agencies in tracking vital online communications…” ... “we must take on the radical narrative that is poisoning young minds.” The political narratives and arguments which legitimise and encourage acts of terrorism are seen as a threat to national security which must be challenged.

The most interesting phrase is that Islam is “now a European religion, too”. Islam has been constructed as the ‘Other’, a threat to Europe. The idea that Islam is now also European may lead to an increase in far-right fears of an Islamic conquest of Europe. However, this statement highlights a reality that many millions of Muslims live in Europe today, and European governments must engage with their Muslim citizens, in an effort to bring security to all of the citizens on the Continent.

Deliberation D – Asserting British Values, Interests and the Secular State

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The fourth deliberation when discussing the securitization of British Muslims and Islam by the HoC’s is how MPs deliberate British values, interests, and the secular State.

PM David Cameron, emphasising that the promotion of British values is an important element in the Government’s strategy to combat extremism: “Some people and some organisations—frankly, we know which organisations—go along with some of the narrative, think that a caliphate might not be such a bad idea, that Christians and Muslims cannot really live together and that democracy is inferior to another sort of system, and do not believe in equality. Those are people that we must call out, too. I want us to appeal to young British Muslims about what this country can be for them. This is a great multiracial democracy and a country of opportunity and we must also raise our game, as it were, and make this a society into which people want to integrate. It is time to speak out on both fronts. There is a need for integration, but also the need to confront a narrative of extremism, even if it stops short of violence.”

Asserting British values of democracy, multiracialism, and economic prosperity as a constructive narrative in which to combat extremism, under-scores the Conservative-Liberal Democrats concept of ‘muscular liberalism.’ British citizens are encouraged to promote liberal pluralism and equality and to reject the “narrative of extremism.” The use of the term “multiracial” is important. It may be unintentional on the part of the PM, but the absence of the term “multiculturalism” emphasises one of the Government’s narratives to combat Islamism, namely that multiculturalism has failed in recent years and has been a barrier to British Muslim integration into British society and accepting British values, thereby becoming a security risk.

As PM David Cameron stated in the aftermath of the Tunisian terrorist attack of June 2015: “We must confront this evil with everything we have. We must be stronger at standing up for our values, and we must be more intolerant of intolerance, taking on anyone whose views condone the extremist narrative or create the conditions for it to flourish.”

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Again, the idea of asserting the narrative of British liberal values internally and externally as a way to oppose extremism and terrorism is deliberated in the HoC’s.

The conservative MP Liam Fox suggests going one-step further in challenging the extremist narrative, contending that: “during the cold war we understood the value of counter-propaganda. Is it not time to rediscover, not only across Government but among our allies, the need to speak with one voice in order to send out one message when dealing with the dangers and one message about the values and freedoms that have made us who we are?”

This is an interesting suggestion, yet the question thus arises as to how much state ‘propaganda’ should be produced to combat an extremist narrative and defend a society which prides itself on having freedom of thought and expression? And where is the line between ‘influence warfare’ and ‘propaganda’?

Likewise, the role of the State in media regulation is discussed in debates over narratives and communications. MP Edward Leigh (Con) warns the PM David Cameron: “Will my right hon. Friend resist the principled siren voices trying to prevent him from giving the security services all the powers they need over the internet?”

The principle of freedom of speech and criticism of State intrusion and data collection is voiced, one of the dangers of over-securitizing an issue or group.

One other avenue of political discourse is the level of action Britain should take in order to defend itself. A left-wing master narrative which suggests that military interventionism by the United States, the United Kingdom and the West is the cause of radical jihadism advocates that more action will only increase the problem. There is deliberation amongst MPs about the effects of British foreign policy and military action in the radicalisation of individuals. Leader of the Opposition, MP Jeremy Corbyn (Lab), stated in the 2015 deliberation over military action against IS: “I am aware that there are those with military experience ... who have argued that extending UK bombing will “increase the short-term risks of terrorist attacks in Britain””, and, “we must be aware of the danger that some people, mainly young people, will become deeply radicalised and end up doing very

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262 Ibid., Col 1182-1183
dangerous things. Is the radicalisation of a small but significant number of young people across Europe a product of the war or of something else?\textsuperscript{265} This is the idea that military action will exacerbate the problem of extremism by radicalising more people, thus being detrimental to the goal of combating extreme Islamism.

MP Pat McFadden (Lab) countered the idea that Britain’s actions are the source of jihadism:

“According to this view, although the activities of terrorists are of course condemned, the real source of the problem is seen as the actions we have taken in the past, and the kind of action proposed in the motion. This was the view that saw the killings in Paris as “reaping the whirlwind” of the action that France, or perhaps the west more generally, has taken.

The danger of this view is that it infantilises terrorism and absolves it of full responsibility for its actions. That view, at heart, separates the world into adults and children, or perpetrators and victims, with the west as perpetrator and others as victims. But life is not that simple. The world is not, in foreign policy terms, split up into adults and children. The terrorists are adults, motivated by their own ideology, which justifies the killing of innocent people from France to Mali, Iraq and Syria. They are fully, not partially, responsible for what they do. No one forces anyone to sell women into sexual slavery. No one forces anyone to behead innocent aid workers. No one forces anyone to bomb the London underground or kill innocent Parisians at a pop concert.

The problem with this argument is that it not only misunderstands what we are up against, but implies that if we lie low they will leave us alone. They will not. If we disarm ourselves against the threat we face, we cannot confront or overcome it. This argument is also too timid in defending our own values. Our society is not perfect, but we strive for a society in which women and men are equal, and where we have freedom of association, freedom of religion, democracy and diversity, and those things are worth defending.”\textsuperscript{266}

\textsuperscript{265}HC Deb, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 344-345, Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141 [Accessed 08/05/2017]

\textsuperscript{266}HC Deb, 2nd Dec 2015, Vol 603, Cols 400 - 401, Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria?highlight=Islam#contribution-15120254000141[Accessed 08/05/2017]
we take this action we extend not only our involvement, but our responsibility. If we do this, he [PM David Cameron] has a personal responsibility, and the Government as a whole have a responsibility, not just to take military action as a response to Paris and then move on; it is a big moral responsibility to use every means that we have...The use of hard power and soft power go hand in hand.”

MP Pat McFadden (Lab) stated in a debate about taking military action against the Islamic State: “I accept that past decisions have angered jihadists and perhaps encouraged some people to join them, but it is a fundamental mistake to think that we are responsible for violent jihadism. Let us not forget that the bombing of the World Trade Centre on 11 September took place two years before the invasion of Iraq.” Here there is an appreciation that Western actions are often a rallying-cry for Islamists to recruit for their jihad, but that the rise of extremisms happened before 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War, and therefore implying that such narratives have an element of truth to them, but are overly simplistic.

There is an admittance that the 2003 Iraq War did exacerbate the problem of extremism in the Middle East. MP Graham Allen (Lab) referenced the Iraq War: “...fracture[s] within Islam ... exacerbated and the Pandora’s box that was then opened of violence and extremism within Islam, both in the middle east and internationally, are sadly the gift of the Iraq war that will keep on giving, and that there may be decades’ worth of interventions from extreme Islamic elements across the globe?”

Likewise, in discussing how to combat the Islamic State, the Green MP Caroline Lucas brought up the salient point that the “…so-called IS actively wants war? Its core message is to present itself as the guardian of Islam under crusader attack. That is a pernicious but effective message. Stepping up our involvement in air strikes reinforces that narrative, even

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267 Ibid., Col 400-401
268 HC Deb, 26th September 2104, Vol 585, Cols 1295-1296, Available at:https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-09-26/debates/140926600001/IraqCoalitionAgainstISIL?highlight=Islam#contribution-1409269000104 [Accessed 07/05/2017]
if we stop short of being involved in a ground war.”  

There is a delicate balancing act between being able to take action against Islamist and jihadist groups, and not falling into a trap in which the British Government’s actions fuels Islamist narratives and thus promotes their religio-political cause.

PM David Cameron proclaimed: “They [jihadists] attack us because of who we are, and not because of what we do.” The idea that the State’s actions contribute to the rise in Islamist violence is dismissed. Jihadists will attack because they are opposed to British values, not as a counter-reaction to British actions.

In deliberations surrounding the security of the United Kingdom relating to Islam and British Muslims the topic of the MENA region regularly arose. There is an angst about the failure to achieve the goal premise of getting Western secular liberal democracy values to blossom in the MENA region. As MP Julian Lewis (Con) laments:

“The failure of the ineptly named “Arab spring” in so many countries show’s the two most likely outcomes: a victory for authoritarian dictatorship on the one hand, or a victory for revolutionary Islamism on the other. Moderation and democracy have barely featured in the countries affected, and Syria seems to be no exception. I am genuinely sorry to say that we face a choice between very nasty authoritarians and Islamist totalitarians; there is no third way.”

Furthermore, at the beginning of 2014, there were concerns after the recent elections in Egypt that: “Over the past four years, secular parties have not emerged … The Al-Nour party, which won a quarter of the parliamentary seats, is a Salafist party inspired by political Islam. It is difficult to see how a multi-party secular democracy can emerge in a country in which the army and political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, play

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such dominant roles.”\textsuperscript{273} The failure of Western style secular-liberal democracy to take root in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the rise of Islamist parties caused concern amongst parliamentarians. This concern is based on the value premise of the hegemonic secular historical power system on which the British political system is built and this secular subjectivity ideological hegemony permeates the political discourse in the HoC’s.

One major question is raised by MP Crispin Blunt (Con) on the role of the secular versus the religious in the political sphere: “We face the much bigger question of how we will engage with political Islam. I am a secular, gay, western politician, and the values of political Islam are absolutely antithetical to mine, but people should be allowed to stand for election on a platform that brings their religious beliefs into play.”\textsuperscript{274} For example, when dealing with the current civil war in Syria Britain may: “...have to force a settlement, as far as is possible, between Assad, the Free Syrian Army and the moderate constitutional forces of political Islam that are ranged against him”, and this involves, “...a way of dealing fairly with political Islam.”\textsuperscript{275} Ultimately, this means “We need to get to a place where we understand the forces of political Islam that we are dealing with.”\textsuperscript{276}

Here, the MP for Reigate is challenging the secular ideological superstructure. As discussed before, political Islam is a broad church, and not inherently violent. If legitimately elected democratic Islamist parties are placed in power, how should Britain and the West engage with such political parties, governments, and even regional power blocs? Likewise, it is easy in the current political discourse within the Western political tradition of separation between the secular and spiritual to conflate all Islamists with extremism. MP Crispin Blunt continues: “In achieving a political and military mission to destroy Islamic State and

\textsuperscript{273}HC Deb, 29\textsuperscript{th} January 2015, Vol 574, Col 270WH, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-01-29/debates/14012948000001/Egypt?highlight=Islam#contribution-14012948000056 [Accessed 07/05/2017]

\textsuperscript{274}HC Deb, 10\textsuperscript{th} September 2014, Vol 585, Col 1000, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-09-10/debates/14091032000002/UkraineMiddleEastNorthAfricaAndSecurity?highlight=Islam#contribution-14091048000208 [Accessed 07/05/2017]

\textsuperscript{275}HC Deb, 10\textsuperscript{th} September 2014, Vol 585, Col 999, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-09-10/debates/14091032000002/UkraineMiddleEastNorthAfricaAndSecurity?highlight=Islam#contribution-14091048000201 [Accessed 07/05/2017]

\textsuperscript{276}HC Deb, 10\textsuperscript{th} September 2014, Vol 585, Col 999, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-09-10/debates/14091032000002/UkraineMiddleEastNorthAfricaAndSecurity?highlight=Islam#contribution-14091048000201 [Accessed 07/05/2017]
everything it stands for, we must isolate it from the other political forces in the region. That means establishing the criteria by which we engage with political Islam.”

MP Blunt highlights what is a delicate balance between asserting a nation’s own values and interests and engaging with other nations in the international community who may have different values and interests.

This section will end with MP Charlotte Leslie (Con) considering the role of values in the current political discussion:

“The west has been very good at debating political solutions using political institutions, and security solutions using military equipment. None of that, however, touches on what is going on at the heart of the faith of Islam - things that have become either a victim of language inflation through abstract noun overuse, or remarkably unfashionable: values.”

Values in the current political discourse are passé and out-of-date due to “…a western values vacuum, perhaps born of a bourgeois squeamishness about anything absolute in a relativist post-secular world…”

Here the MP for Bristol North West stresses the underlining issues of ideals and principles in Britain and the West. The West may be the superior military power and may have the most stable political institutions (although the author does understand that such broad generalisations are loaded terms), but what is occurring is a battle of ideas and values. And how does the West win such a struggle? What should its tactics, strategies, and grand strategy be? The first point is to understand the Middle East and Islamic thought in all of its forms and interpretation, with its subtleties and contradictions. Here, an effective form of argumentation and counter-narrative can be created. The second point is to be confident in our own values. Relativism is an important part of the Western Enlightenment and philosophical tradition of critical self-reflection. Yet this relativism has also helped produce a moral space creating (or created by?) a “bourgeois squeamishness”, which makes

277 HC Deb, 10th September 2014, Vol 585, Col 1000, Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-09-10/debates/14091032000002/UkraineMiddleEastNorthAfricaAndSecurity?highlight=islam#contribution-14091048000208 [Accessed 07/05/2017]

combating extremism based on an aggressive and assertive theo-politic ideology difficult. Thirdly, whist discourses of “values” and “defending our way of life” are part of a far-right anti-Muslim rhetoric and Islamist discourse, which needs to be challenged, Western values include the protection of minorities and the freedom of religion. This means defending the rights of British Muslim citizens, whilst also promoting secular democratic liberal values such as freedom of speech, human rights, and the freedom of worship.

Conclusion

“Realize that happiness is freedom, and freedom is courage.”

Pericles’s Funeral Oration, 431 BC

How will the current conflict between the Enlightenment Secular West and Islamic East play out? Will the two blocs be in a permanent ‘Clash of Civilizations’? Will the secularisation theory be proven correct – that is to say, after a brief historical period characterised by a last orgy of metaphysical inspired violence, Western Enlightenment values will permeate into the Muslim world after an Islamic Reformation and the irrational spiritual will be divided from the rational political sphere? Will the worst fears of the ‘Counter Jihad’ movement come to fruition? Will European Christendom, now in a post-Christian spiritual vacuum, be replaced by an aggressively expansionist Islam, just as the Roman Empire’s pagan value system was taken over by Christianity? Or are we part of a Hegelian process: a new synthesis between the West and East which will produce a civilizational structure with its own beauty and contradictions?

These are large eschatology questions which can be traced back to the creation of the Westphalian secular state and the European Enlightenment. Such events created the modern day ‘consolidated discursive realm’, upon which the modern-day British political discourse is based. The securitization of Islam after the events of 9/11 and 7/7 is a reaction against what is perceived as the threat of an irrational religion against the rational secular British State. In addition, the securitization of British Muslims comes from the perceived security threat of supposed dual loyalties of British Muslims to the British State and to the wider international Ummah.

Therefore, the British Government has a delicate balancing act in safeguarding Britain. On the one hand, the Government has to target radical Islamists who push an extremist jihadist narrative and agenda, in response to the terrorist threat which the country faces from extremists. On the other hand, the Government does not wish to demonise the majority of peaceful British Muslims in case it gives far-right extremists more examples to strengthen their anti-Muslim narratives, as well as alienating British Muslims, creating an ideological space in which extremist Islamists can advance their holy war.

This political discourse of MPs in the House of Commons (between 2014-2017) incorporates four main deliberations - 1) Highlighting the brutality of jihadism and the Islamic State, 2) Defending Islam and British Muslims, 3) Highlighting the problem of political Islam within Islamic thought, and 4) Asserting British values, interests and the secular state.

The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the wave of Islamist inspired terrorism meant that the British Government, through speech acts, framed the Islamic State and Islamists as a threat to British values and, therefore, the States’ security. This securitizing framework and narrative continued from the hegemonic discursive discourse (of the Copenhagen school) created in the aftermath of 9/11, as Islamists and jihadist were depicted as opposing British values.

The British Government also needed to protect its British Muslim citizens from both Islamist violence and right-wing reprisal attacks. Therefore, there was a discursive effort to de-securitize British Muslims, and to disassociate the religion of Islam from the theo-political creed of Islamism. There were criticisms of governments in the MENA regions and their role
in stirring up sectarianism, thereby highlighting the interconnected nature of religion and security in the 21st century.

At the same time, the issue of political Islamism and radicalism was identified as a threat. Efforts were needed not just to assert British secular liberal democratic values, but to help British Muslims in their efforts to adopt these British values and reject extremist narratives.

There was also plenty of deliberation over the extent to which the British State should take action against Islamists. Whilst left wing MPs such as Jeremy Corbyn argued that military action further radicalised Muslims and thus should not be used, other MPs argued that while UK actions in the past have contributed to extremism, most noticeably the 2003 Iraq War, the British Government has a duty to provide security for all of its citizens by targeting Islamists. Likewise, when it comes to the secular subjectivity of the HoC’s, there were worries that Western secular values were not being adopted in the MENA region. However, if governments in the future have to work with Islamist political parties and governments, the West will need to find a new language and conceptualisation of the interplay between religion and politics.

Finally, Britain and the West must be able to define their values, explain why they defend them and how they defend them. It must apply these democratic secular values to all of its citizens, especially those who feel alienated from the wider British society, in order to create a more prosperous and secure society for all.

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