A Case Study on British Muslims: Recent European Political Developments and Self-Censorship on Social Media

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Abstract

Numerous studies have established a notable securitisation of Muslims in mainstream media, following 9/11. However, there remained a gap where this securitisation was yet to be analysed comprehensively, in relation to the effect it had on self-censorship online. My primary hypothesis was that in light of recent political developments in Europe, increased Islamophobia had resulted in British Muslims imposing self-censorship on their expression on Facebook. This hypothesis was tested by evaluating empirical data from 10 interviews, and 62 questionnaires with British Muslims. My analysis concluded that the knowledge of government surveillance was causing some British Muslims to inadvertently alter their behaviour online. Moreover, 58% of questionnaire respondents maintained that online Islamophobia had affected their willingness to express opinions. However, the percentage of interviewees disagreeing was more significant. Most interviewees argued that online discussions had flourished on Facebook, and consequently, they were less likely to self-censor. My empirical data further highlighted gendered and geographical dimensions to Islamophobia in the UK. Ultimately, my study forms part of an emergent body of research on self-censorship on social media platforms, and will contribute to further studies on religion and self-censorship online.
Abbreviations

- 9/11: Terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on America on 11 September 2001
- BREXIT: The British exit from the European Union
- CAIR: Council on American-Islamic Relations
- ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights
- ECJ: European Court of Justice
- ECRI: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
- EU: European Union
- ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- ICTs: Information Communications Technologies
- ISIS: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
- MEND: Muslim Engagement and Development
- NGO: Non-Government Organisation
- RAND: American Research and Development Corporation
- Tell MAMA: Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks
- UK: United Kingdom
- UN: United Nations
- USA: United States of America
- WRAP: Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Research Significance

The originality of my research lies in its analysis of the link between securitisation and self-censorship on social media platforms. A number of studies have established a notable securitisation of Muslims in mainstream media, following 9/11. However, there remains a gap where this securitisation is yet to be analysed in relation to the effect it has on self-censorship online. My primary hypothesis is that in light of recent political developments in Europe, increased Islamophobia has resulted in British Muslims imposing self-censorship on their expression on Facebook.

The political landscape of Europe has rapidly been evolving between 2015 and 2017, in response to increased terrorism, the Brexit referendum, and persistent refugee entries. American politics have also been in upheaval since the election of Donald Trump. This development bears significance to my research, given the “real existence” (Dumbrell, 2009) of the UK’s longstanding and intertwined ‘special relationship’ with the US; it is also critical given Trump’s largely anti-Muslim campaign rhetoric (CSPAN, 2015). Altogether, these recent political developments appear to have generated unfavourable attitudes towards Muslims. In analysing empirical data from interviews and questionnaires with British Muslims, my study explores the online impacts of these unfavourable attitudes. I anticipate that this research will be of significance to academics, NGOs, policy makers, and most notably, the wider British, and British Muslim public. Moreover, my study forms part of an emergent body of research on self-censorship on social media platforms, and will contribute to further studies on religion and self-censorship online.

The literature review proceeds in three stages. Firstly, it draws upon existing securitisation theories, in order to highlight the under-researched gap between security and religion. Secondly, it analyses existing research on Islamophobia, and explores how the impacts of Islamophobia need to be more comprehensively studied on social media platforms. Finally, it examines the concepts of ‘free speech’ and ‘self-censorship’, and indicates that research about self-censorship on social media platforms is still in its infancy.
These conceptual frameworks are further reflected upon in the discussion chapters. In chapter four, I reveal the broader implications of increased Islamophobia, following recent political developments. In chapter five, analysis focuses on whether there has been an effect on freedom of expression online, and in chapter six, analysis centres on whether there are any gendered impacts. My research questions are geared towards establishing whether there is a resultant environment of suppression, both online and offline, as experienced by British Muslims.

1.2 Research Questions

1. How has the securitisation of Muslims, following recent political developments in Europe, affected freedom of speech as exercised by British Muslims?
2. Are British Muslims self-censoring their speech on social media platforms, in light of this securitisation?
3. If present, is this online self-censorship a gendered issue?

Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1 Securitisation and Religion

"Treating something as a security issue is always a matter of choice—political choice" (Weaver, 2000: 251).

In seeking to uncover the broader implications of Islam increasingly being framed as a security threat following recent political events, I first look to the highly contested issue of defining security itself. The Oxford Dictionary (2017) defines security as “the state of being free from danger or threat” and offers an example of “national security,” namely “the safety of a state or organisation against criminal activity, such as terrorism.” More often than not, dominant definitions of security in this decade, fixate on freedom from the threat of terrorism (Jackson and Hall, 2016); I expand upon this point in my discussion chapters. Altogether, Šulović (2010: 5) maintains that these continual redefinitions of security, are “one of the most interesting developments in contemporary security studies.”
In attempting to challenge military-based security theories, and provide a tool for practical security analysis, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, initially conceptualised security as a social construct in their seminal work, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. In this book, the theorists argued that the understanding of security should be widened to incorporate societal security—external threats to a collective identity (Buzan et al., 1998). Moreover, Ole Waever conceptualised his ‘securitisation’ theory, which primarily focusses on the social construction of security as extreme politicisation, rather than a state-centric, realist understanding of security. Rita Taureck (2006: 3) expands upon his theoretical work, highlighting that “the main argument of securitisation theory is that security is a speech act”—and that by discursively labelling something as a security issue, it becomes one (Wæver, 2004: 13). The purpose of this chapter is to highlight how and why securitisation will be applied as an underlying theoretical framework throughout my dissertation.

The Copenhagen School of security studies associated with Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, maintains that if a certain issue presents an existential threat to a referent object, measures are enforced to ascertain the survival of that object through extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Thus, an influential actor (Williams 2003: 514) constructs a threat “either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). It is possible that the referent issue the securitising actor claims to be threatened by, may also be an ideology (Emmers, 2013: 132). Critically, whatever the referent issue within the process of securitisation, it is the result of a conscious choice (Wæver, 2004).

According to Buzan et al (1998: 6), “a successful securitisation consists of three steps: (1) identification of existential threats; (2) emergency action; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules.” The consequence of this successful securitisation results in an issue being placed on the “panic politics agenda” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 34). In such cases, even if one is not directly threatened, one may *feel* threatened. This is due to a specific issue being continuously amplified as a security concern by politicians and the mainstream media. For instance, following 9/11, media framing “connected the events of that day with war and a military solution” (Dolinec, 2016: 27). This securitisation was further enhanced by “subsequent hours of discussion, debate and news coverage” (O’Reilly, 2008: 70). Overall, televisual media
succeeded in promoting audience acceptance of far-reaching government counterterrorism measures, through a framing which highlighted “the existential threat of the issue and diminished the arguments for handling it as a matter of routine” (Vultee, 2007: 13).

In the more recent example of the 2015 refugee crisis, there was clearly “a choice to characterise immigrants as threatening, to justify emergency measures” (McDonald, 2008: 8) geared towards preventing asylum seekers from reaching Europe’s shores. In regard to the securitisation of refugees, mainstream media broadcasters have been “productive forces in the stories they told; how events were described, when stories appeared, and whose voices were included” (Vultee, 2007: 22). Thus, the processes of securitisation “cannot be fully assessed by focusing on the speech-act alone” (Williams, 2003: 512). Critically, televisual media promotes certain issues over others, with the purpose of influencing, and showing the viewing audience how to perceive those issues. For example, immigrants are often portrayed as terrorists (Jaworsky, 2011: 43), which offers opportunity to enact a politics of emergency.

As early as 2003, an “analysis of respondents from twenty countries sampled in the European Social Survey demonstrated that they [were] unenthusiastic about high levels of immigration” (Sides and Citrin, 2007: 477). This general apathy towards immigration, has in part been constructed through repeated images and discussions centred on asylum seekers, on mainstream televisual media; for instance, through “nightly images of shadowy figures attempting to jump on trains through the Channel Tunnel” (Williams, 2003: 526). Chang (2002) argues that the consequences of this securitisation, are a climate in which “tensions mount, fear crowds out reason, while suspicion supplants fact.”

Certainly there is a marked public anxiety apparent in regard to the current immigration inflow, whereby many European citizens believe that Muslim immigrants and refugees are threatening their societal security (Ahmed, 2016) and European identity (Schiffauer, 2007: 77). My dissertation is based on the assumption that this attitude is prevalent in the United Kingdom—a nation currently looking to reaffirm its identity both within Europe, and across the globe. This supposition is supported by existing academic studies, in which securitisation frameworks have already been applied to
immigration being perceived as a cultural and socio-economic threat (Huysmans, 2000). For instance, Vultee (2007: 12) argues that most large-scale immigration “is portrayed as a threat to the very elements—culture, language, nationhood— that give the once secure nation its uniqueness.”

Balzacq and Šulović further argue that the construction of threat itself also lies with the audience’s reception of the securitisation. The audience “has a choice of either accepting or declining a given agenda” (Šulović, 2010: 4). O’Reilly (2008: 66) maintains that the critical mass is most important in terms of audience consent— “when the securitising actor has convinced enough of the right people that something constitutes a legitimate security threat,” the two pillars of volume and calibre are met. In regard to the Iraq War, O’Reilly (2008) asserts that its successful securitisation was based on the fact that above all else, the US Senate and American public were convinced; the international community’s level of opposition did not play a significant role. Audience acceptance is a prerequisite of successful securitisation, since the process essentially remains “intersubjective” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 30). My supposition is that through audience acceptance following 9/11, as well as the more recent European political events such as increased terrorism, the Brexit referendum, and refugee entries, Muslims have successfully been securitised as a group and as individuals.

In their research, Mamdani (2002) and Parvez (2007) have concluded that there is a broad audience acceptance of the link between Islam and terrorism. This link is embedded within British policies, under the guise of national security. For instance, Birt (2015) argues “it is shocking that the government’s counter-terrorism policy not only chills political dissent and free expression about contemporary issues, but also how Muslim communities might preserve, record and pass on their own histories.” Birt’s comment is linked to a recent incident, whereby the British Library refused to house a historically unique digital archive of Taliban documents, fearing UK counter-terrorism laws (Graham-Harrison and Rawlinson, 2015). This may in part be due to the fact that “the term Islamic terrorism has become a ubiquitous feature of Western political and academic counter-terrorism discourse in recent years” (Jackson, 2007).
Pelletier et al (2016) argue that the securitisation of Muslims in mainstream media, has been heighted by depictions of Islam's association with terrorism, and more specifically with the ideology and laws of ISIS. For all intents and purposes, ISIS has been moved into a “realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal democratic rules” (Taureck, 2006: 3). This securitisation process has further been heightened in response to the refugee crisis (Fekete, 2004), as previously mentioned. In developing my research, I comprehensively explore the online consequences of this increased securitisation. Thus, my study contributes to “the complex interplays between security and religion,” (Booth, 2007: 448). Balzacq et al (2016: 26) argue that Buzan “initially noted that religion could also constitute a referent object of security, but did not go beyond this observation.” This research builds upon these links between security and religion, which remain underdeveloped (Luca Mavelli, 2013; Balzacq et al., 2016: 26) within the securitisation frameworks I have above analysed.

2.2 Islamophobia and Online Platforms

"Les fondamentalistes islamistes se sont infiltrés dans les associations: on doit aller les chercher" (Marine Le Pen, 2017)

This chapter links Ole Waever’s securitisation framework and the securitisation of Muslims with broader Islamophobia. The term ‘Islamophobia’ was first coined by the Commission of British Muslims in the mid-1990s (Richardson, 2004). Essentially the concept refers to an irrational fear of Islam and to a “cultural racism” (Modood and May, 2001), the consequence of which is that Muslims are actively discriminated against, and subject to insults, threats and attacks. The impacts of these “unfounded hostilities” (The Runnymede Trust, 1997) were extensively debated last year, at the inaugural European Islamophobia Summit in Sarajevo (Ahmed, 2016).

However, it is also contended that allegations of Islamophobia have come to be a knee-jerk reaction against any criticism against Islam (Maréchal et. al, 2016). Moreover, it has been argued that the term should relate better to anti-Muslim hate, rather than anti-Islamic hate, since Islamophobia is about individuals, rather than the religion itself. Despite these ongoing debates surrounding the term Islamophobia, I
chose to use it in my study, as previously defined. My theory holds that in light of recent political developments in Europe, there has been increased Islamophobia, which has resulted in British Muslims imposing self-censorship on their expression on Facebook.

Certainly, Muslims have successfully been securitised following 9/11 (Chang, 2002), in part due to mainstream media increasingly associating Islam with terrorism (Mamdani 2002; Parvez, 2007). Awan and Zempi (2015) theorise that Islamophobia and this idea of “the threat within” intensifies following trigger events attributed to ‘Muslim’ extremist groups; in principle, these trigger events would be inclusive of the 2016 Nice, 2016 Brussels, 2017 Westminster, and 2017 Manchester terrorist attacks. Moreover, Ahmed (2016) argues that Islamophobia was particularly evident following Brexit, which itself was, in part, based upon a “campaign that used images of Syrian refugees to evoke fears of an impending demographic takeover of Europe.” According to Stephan and Stephan’s Integrated Threat Theory (1996), prejudicial reactions are principle defense mechanisms, when individuals believe their values are under attack.

Altogether, it appears that following recent trigger events, Muslims have been “constituted as radically opposed” (Hansen, 2011: 365) to the cultural practices of Europe, thereby inviting increased Islamophobia. These fears may, in part, be founded upon Huntington’s perception (1996) that “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization.” Although many scholars argue that it remains challenging to measure Islamophobia, partially due to the mix up between race and religion within the concept (Bleich, 2011), there does exist a vast literature on increasing fears centred around Islam (Cherribi, 2011; Taras, 2012; Valk, 2012).

Islamophobia manifests itself in numerous ways (Awan and Zempi, 2015), one of which is online hate speech. In The Harm in Hate Speech, Jeremy Waldron (2012) defines hate speech as the expression of “profound disrespect, hatred, and vilification for the members of minority groups.” Awan (2016: 1) argues that “there is a growing number of online virtual communities, who share a violent, Islamophobic and racist narrative which attempts to create a hostile virtual environment.” My research builds upon Awan’s assertion, to analyse how freedom of speech as exercised by British Muslims, has been impacted. The offline effects of Islamophobia are widely
documented (Hirvonen, 2013; Allen, 2015; Zemni, 2011; Stone et al., 2004; Bakali, 2016), therefore this research specifically focusses on the online effects of hate speech.

Of course, hate speech is not exclusive to Islamophobia; “hate speech occurs in all societies, to radically varying degrees” (GenocideWatch, 2016: 3). For instance, the normalisation of hate-speech during the 1920s and 1930s played its part in the deadliest genocide in European history— the Holocaust. Susan Opotow (2011: 205) argues that the liquidation of Europe’s Jews was largely enabled in 1942 because moral exclusion, stemming from hate speech, meant that Jews were “seen as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply.” Today, there remains “no consensus on what constitutes hate speech— international criminal law governing this area is still in flux” (GenocideWatch, 2016: 6). In one example, The Online Hate Prevention Institute (2013) reported that Facebook chooses not to remove images provoking religious-based hate speech, because their community standards have not been breached. That being said, there has been increased pressure placed on social media companies in the UK, after the Attorney General insisted that Twitter and Facebook do more to remove online hate speech (Morris, 2015).

In terms of hate speech geared specifically towards Muslims, existing research points to a notable increase in the past year. Islamophobia in the UK tripled following the Brexit referendum vote and the 2016 Brussels bombings (Ganesh, 2016). Moreover, there has been “a 200 per cent increase in offline Islamophobic incidents in 2015” (Ganesh, 2016: 6). Figure 1 illustrates incidences of anti-Muslim hate on Twitter in 2016. Moreover, Imran Awan’s study (2016) has established that Muslims are being vilified online, and that Islamophobia on social media platforms has “the potential to incite violence or prejudicial action” offline. Awan and Zempi (2015) also concluded that anti-Muslim hate crime impacts upon people’s lives, in that victims may experience disquiet, depression and isolation. My discussion in chapters five and six build upon these conclusions, to further explore the online impacts of Islamophobia.
In exploring the online impacts of Islamophobia, my third research question focusses on whether there are any gendered impacts. Elmir (2016) argues that Muslim women bear the brunt of Islamophobic prejudice, and that “although the venom of anti-Muslim sentiment is directed against both men and women, it is a particularly gendered crisis.” Numerous studies on offline Islamophobia determine that visibly Muslim women are disproportionately targeted (Hopkins, 2016). Elmir (2016) concludes that Muslim women on the street are “seen simultaneously as recognisable representatives of a religion to be feared and passive targets of male dominance.” She argues that this status of Muslim women as both victims and villains, drives not only hate crimes, but also government policies rooted in bias. In building upon Elmir’s research in chapter six, I articulate female Muslim voices, in order to further analyse the online impacts of Islamophobia.
2.3 Freedom of Speech and Self-Censorship

“If liberty means anything at all it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear” (Orwell, 1972: 112).

Are British Muslims self-censoring their speech on Facebook, in light of increased securitisation? How have recent trigger events in Europe impacted upon their freedom of speech? In this chapter, I explore the existing literature underpinning these notions of ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘self-censorship.’ Article 19 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression” (UN General Assembly, 1948). Moreover, the charter notes that freedom of expression “requires people to tolerate speech that may shock, offend or disturb.” Thus, whether or not hate speech should be criminalised, is not within the remit of my research. Rather, this dissertation explores the impact of hate speech on British Muslims, specifically whether an unequal environment of suppression has been established on social media platforms.

British Muslims have the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR, as well as under the 1998 UK Human Rights Act. Under the former, they have the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority.” Moreover, according to Article 19 of the UN ICCPR, they “have the right to hold opinions without interference.” Therefore, like every other citizen, British Muslims have right to free speech and free press, to political and religious association, and to petition and protest peacefully; essentially they have the right to “receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, by any means” (Amnesty International, 2013). Nevertheless, the increased securitisation of Muslims has resulted in consequences which are yet to be comprehensively realised, especially pertaining to online expression.

My hypothesis holds that increased securitisation has led to restrictions in freedom of speech for British Muslims. Such restrictions can be enforced through leeway in Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR, which allow for limits to freedom of speech “for the protection of national security” and in “the interests of territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.” There is widespread acknowledgement of these limits in Council of Europe documents. For example, in the ECRI report on Luxemburg (2017: 18), one recommendation states that “authorities should ensure that social networks and internet access providers take more effective steps.” Moreover, a Declaration of the Committee of Ministers (2011) notes that “free speech online may fall victim to action taken by privately owned Internet platforms and online service providers. It is therefore necessary to affirm the role of these actors as facilitators of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.”

Clearly, there is not an autonomous right to express opinions, and this may justify the censorship of specific opinions from individuals, groups and organisations. Indeed, in a number of cases, the ECHR has held that there has been no violation of Article 10, for instance in the 2008 Leroy versus France case (ECHR, 2017: 6), in which Leroy was charged by domestic courts for condoning terrorism, by means of his cartoon. Chang (2002: 102) argues that this government intolerance of dissent, can lead to marginalised citizens becoming “adept in the art of self-censorship”; individuals may suppress their speech due to the perceived sensibilities of others, without any explicit pressure from authorities, thus effectively preventing themselves from speaking (Das and Kramer, 2013: 120). The potential for this ‘chilling effect’ on expression remains omnipresent at a time when “rights to freedom of expression and privacy are under increasing threat from mass surveillance” (Article 19, 2013).

In Orwell’s novel, Animal Farm, self-censorship and self-doubt lends itself to the animals ultimately accepting a new set of Seven Commandments. The fact that Animal Farm was initially refused by four publishers on account of its criticism of Stalin, led Orwell to note (1972: 105) that “the sinister fact about literary censorship in England is that it is largely voluntary… not because the Government intervened, but because of a general tacit agreement that ‘it wouldn’t do’ to mention that particular fact.” Philip Cook and Conrad Heilmann (2013) categorise this as “perfect non-alignment”— when a self-censor’s expressed opinions, are in direct contradiction to what he or she privately believes.
Certainly “people are much less likely to express themselves and share information if they know, or suspect, that their personal records are being collected by the government.” (Article 19, 2013). This ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression is further illustrated in the works of Michel Foucault. According to Foucault, “if a person knows that they are being watched constantly for potential signs of a particular political position, that knowledge in itself will alter their political position and what they are (or are not) willing to do or say” (Werbin, 2011: 1255). This pressure is evident on social media, whereby accounts are often suspended by governments, for the ideas they have expressed or endorsed.

The concept of surveillance and self-discipline was first notably employed in Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon prison design—a circular building with prison cells arranged around a central inspection tower, “from which the prison inspector could look into the cells at any time, though the inmates would be unable to see the inspector” (UCL, 2017). Essentially, since the prison supervisor’s gaze is omnipresent and omniscient, the Panopticon induces “in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, 1977: 201). This automatic functioning of power can be further analysed through Weber’s “iron cage” theory (Schroder and Ling, 2013: 790), which illustrates how technology structures every day routines, and makes “for a more cohesive and routinized type of society” (Schroder and Ling, 2013: 790). More often than not, “ICTs are treated in isolation rather than in terms of their role in society as a whole” (Schroder and Ling, 2013: 790). Clearly however, ICTs have become embedded within our everyday actions. In the same manner as the Panopticon instils discipline, Weber posits that each technological “ritual as practiced in its mediated form, is hardly noticed by participants as it has become part of a taken-for-granted routine” (Schroder and Ling, 2013: 801).

Gramsci too, in his conceptualisation of the integral state, “theorises its sphere of influence as extending beyond political society and into civil society” (Leijendekker and Mutsvairo, 2014: 1040). In doing so, he highlights how “civil society permeates the private as it disciplines individuals to think and act in a prescribed manner” (Leijendekker and Mutsvairo, 2014: 1040). It is probable that online self-censorship is one consequence of the integral state extending its powers into the private sphere. In my dissertation, I explore these effects of self-censorship and self-discipline on
Facebook. Although there are numerous studies on self-censorship in general (Horton, 2011; Baltussen and Davis, 2015; Cheung, 2003), as well as self-censorship and religion (Starrs, 2016; Lecker, 2014; Sloan, 2012), only a limited few analyse “private self-censorship” (Cook and Heilmann, 2013) on social media platforms (Das and Kramer, 2013). This is the literature gap I seek to bridge.

Social media platforms have undoubtedly changed the way in which information is shared; the digital revolution has shaped them to be the most participatory medium within our possession. “The new age of the citizen-journalist allows everyday people to report on any number of events” (GenocideWatch, 2016: 10). Nevertheless, technology remains socially and politically constructed. By its very design, social media excludes some, and includes others, which is entirely “at odds with the widespread perception that the Internet intrinsically embodies deeply egalitarian exchange” (Graham, 2005: 569). How effective then, are social media platforms in enabling freedom of expression, when the voices of marginalised individuals may be disproportionately affected? Hampton et al. (2014) have concluded that self-censorship on social media tends to mostly affect those holding minority opinions.

Moreover, in his study, Imran Awan (2016: 17) established that “Islamophobia on Facebook is much more prevalent than previously thought, and is being used to inflame religious and racial hate.” This dissertation seeks to uncover how increased Islamophobia has impacted freedom of expression online. Moreover, it establishes how events online affect those offline, and vice versa, rather than exploring online incidents in isolation. This leads on from Awan and Zempi’s existing research, which touches upon anti-Muslim hate crime, both in the virtual and physical world. Finally, my dissertation builds upon theories of self-censorship, since “self-censorship on social media has scarcely been studied in its own right” (Das and Kramer, 2013: 121). This lack of literature on self-censorship online, may stem from the fact that the “accused always denies it, and observers can hardly prove the intention behind the act” (Lee, 2007: 136). Nonetheless, my study aims to provide some of the intentions behind acts of online self-censorship.
Chapter Three: Methodology

3.1 Ethical Considerations

This dissertation covers a mildly sensitive topic. However, all major concerns were previously mitigated through submissions to The University of Glasgow’s ethics board. Information sheets (appendix A) and consent forms (appendix B) were thoroughly clarified, prior to interviews taking place. Participants were under no obligation to be interviewed, and all individuals were free to retract their participation at any stage. Participant confidentiality was a key concern, however, this was moderated by employing the use of pseudonyms for all interviewees. Moreover, interview transcripts were retained on a password protected private laptop, to prevent them from being retrieved by unauthorised individuals. As Facebook, Email, WhatsApp, LinkedIn and Twitter were all utilised for the distribution of the online questionnaire, I ensured my privacy settings were up to date for these online platforms.

The majority of the fieldwork was conducted in London, as the UK’s capital has the highest proportion of Muslims, at 12.4% according to the 2011 census (Office for National Statistics, 2014). All interviews undertaken with unknown participants were carried out in public places. Furthermore, I ensured to operate a phone-in-phone-out system. Finally, bearing in mind that recruiting minorities to participate in academic research requires special attention (Roberson, 1994), I have attempted to achieve a positive impact throughout the written study, and have kept reflexive notes (appendix C) to organise each stage of my research process.

This study employed a mixed methodology approach, due to the complexity of the issues being examined. The approach involved both quantitative and qualitative sampling, in the form of interviews and questionnaires. In the following sections, I give further details about the rationale behind my data collection methods.

3.2 Quantitative Data: Questionnaires

Survey Monkey was employed for the collection of quantitative data from British Muslims between 8 March 2017 and 31 March 2017 (appendix D). In total, I received
62 questionnaires, which surpassed my target of 50. A key benefit of this methodology was that the questionnaire could be widely distributed on social media platforms. The survey was further distributed through email to the Muslim Council of Britain, the Islamic Society of Britain, and the Muslim Council of Scotland, all of whom warmly received the questionnaire. Finally, the link was forwarded to friends and family on WhatsApp, who were then able to pass it onto their acquaintances. Though this snowballing approach “runs a high risk of producing a biased sample” (Jacobsen and Landau 2008: 196), it did succeed in generating the response rate required. Since I intended to receive as many responses as possible to the questionnaire, there were no strict limitations on age, aside from the fact that the respondents had to be at least eighteen years of age, as specified by the ethics board.

In drafting the questionnaire, I required “several attempts at wording in order to remove ambiguity” (Bell, 2005: 137). Following this drafting, a pilot questionnaire was conducted to verify “that all questions and instructions [were] clear” (Bell, 2005: 147). I limited my survey to ten questions; only three questions required written comments, two questions were inclusive of an optional comment box, and the remaining five questions were multiple choice. I limited the survey in this manner, with the assumption that a short questionnaire would encourage a higher response rate (Bell, 2005). A progress bar was also utilised in order to enable participants to monitor their progress, and motivate them to complete the questionnaire. Although the questionnaire may have been answered superficially by some respondents, given its sensitive nature and assumed knowledge of current affairs, it did ultimately offer snapshots which significantly enhanced the overall study.

3.3 Qualitative Data: Participatory Interviews

The questionnaire was complemented with interviews conducted in February 2017. My second research question queries whether British Muslims are prone to self-censorship online. However, whether the absence of an issue is evidence of self-censorship, or is merely an opinion not expressed out of choice, is difficult to gauge on social media platforms. Moreover, identities are not always discernible online; individuals who choose not to visibly appear as Muslim online, may not experience Islamophobia. In order to overcome these two issues, I chose to collect detailed
qualitative data from participatory interviews, rather than from a content analysis of Facebook. Directly questioning individuals about their experiences has been incredibly valuable to my research, particularly in examining “the nature, determinants and impacts of both virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime” (Awan, 2015).

Interviews aided me to uncover unanticipated data, and to delve deeper into the subject matter of online self-censorship. The interviews had additional benefits as a research methodology, since I was able to prepare discussion schedules in advance, based upon my project objectives (appendix E). While structured interviews allow for standardised data comparison, I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews in a bid to generate more innovative ideas, and develop spontaneous conversation. Critically, these interviews allowed me to “concentrate less on what others have said about the Muslim community and more on what Muslims say about themselves” (Hoque, 2015: 100). Ultimately, I conducted ten, thirty minute to one hour interviews. Half of the interviews were undertaken with males and half with females (table 1). This was in order to answer my third research question— if present, is this online self-censorship a gendered issue?

In conducting the interviews, it was imperative for me not to impose my own personal views on the interviewees, and to consciously maintain “analytical scrutiny of the self” (England 1994: 82). I was aware of building a rapport from the beginning of each interview in order to: overcome challenges of disconnection, promote positive interaction, and keep the flow of the conversation going (Kvale, 2007). As a British Muslim myself, there were benefits to being perceived by interviewees as an insider—as someone who shared a positive self-identification. Roberson (1994) notes that minorities are often reluctant to participate in academic research, due to feelings of fear and mistrust. However, as my rapport with the interviewees was strengthened “based on empathy and mutual respect and understanding” (Valentine 2005: 113), I believe I successfully overcame obstacles of doubt and anxiety, to garner powerful insights into personal stories. It appeared that my insider position allowed for a greater understanding of minority issues, and increased participant willingness to disclose sensitive information.
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Table 1 shows interviewee pseudonyms for this research project.

3.4 Data Analysis

Following the data collection, I undertook analysis. The key words identified from my pilot interview consisted of: discriminatory, radicalised, target, threat, stereotype, racist, Trump, Brexit, and Prevent. This pilot analysis using the search bar on Word, offered me a preview into themes I would later code. To analyse my ten semi-structured interviews, I first transcribed all of the audio recordings (appendix F). I then coded my transcripts by employing the use of emic constructs. Emic coding reveals “categories regarded as meaningful by the native members of the culture whose behaviours are being studied” (Lett, 1990: 30). It was more valuable to centre my analysis on the themes arising from the interviewees themselves, rather than imposing a predetermined set of themes in the form of etic coding (Lett, 1990: 30).

During the emic coding process, I organised the ten written transcriptions under a set of themes which consistently appeared. The headings which emerged were: surveillance and self-censorship, blocking users on social media, Facebook opinions, Islam and terrorism, Donald Trump, Brexit, freedom of speech, media and social media, defining and experiencing Islamophobia, Prevent, online versus offline environments, and gender. Under each heading, I established the most significant quotations, and drew upon them in my discussion, to support and contest arguments from existing literature.
A key obstacle in coding interview transcripts, was that themes were mixed together with irrelevant text. To overcome this issue, I reminded myself to capture only those themes which featured repeatedly in the transcript; this was the key influence behind my decision to include certain quotations, and not others. Moreover, I skinned each transcript beforehand, in order to thoroughly grasp reoccurring ideas. This enabled me to generate more precise coding, and to avoid cherry-picking content.

In analysing the questionnaire, I utilised automatically generated bar graphs from Survey Monkey, to visually illustrate the answers to closed questions. In line with Dorling’s (2003) notions, I chose not to overuse complex statistics where they were not required. Instead, I employed the use of tallying to quickly gauge an idea of high frequency words and patterns arising from my three open questions, and two comment boxes. Following this, I was effectively able to match the questionnaire themes to those that had previously arisen from the emic coding process for my interviews. I selected the most significant quotations to incorporate into my established theme headings from the interviews.

In summary, the data analysis allowed me to successfully compare and contrast my quantitative data with the qualitative data garnered earlier, as well as assess how everything related back to the research questions (McGuirk and O’Neill, 2010: 193). Moreover, I was effectively able to examine how diverse perspectives confirmed one another’s conclusions, as well as brought to light meaningful inconsistencies. These findings will be analysed in the following discussion chapters.

**Chapter Four: Reactions to Recent European Political Developments**

4.1 “It’s instantly called a terrorist attack”

Chapter four lays the foundation for my discussion, by examining British Muslim opinions on increased Islamophobia, following recent trigger events in Europe, and to some extent, America. In chapter 4.1, I analyse reactions to the amplified link between Islam and terrorism, whilst in chapter 4.2, I analyse reactions to more specific developments, such as the 2015 refugee crisis, the Brexit referendum, and Donald Trump’s election.
The association between Islam and terrorism has been further normalised within mainstream media discourse and political rhetoric. Conrad and Milton (2013: 318) contend that over the years, there has been a transformation of terrorism “from a largely secular phenomenon to one that has been primarily driven by Islamic motivations.” Consequently, most of my interviewees highlighted that they repeatedly felt as if they had to demonstrate their ‘moderate’ nature online, following terrorist attacks. In an interview, Bruce argued that “anytime some brown person does something, it’s a terrorist attack. But if some white person crashes an aeroplane, he’s got a psychotic problem.” Aaron was in agreement in regards to the racial and religious undertones of mainstream discourse on terrorism. “Let’s face it, when there’s a terrorist attack, and this so-called Muslim has done it, it’s instantly called a terrorist attack. When it’s a white guy, he’s mentally unstable.” In supporting these personal opinions, Anthea Butler contends that mainstream American media outlets in particular, do tend to portray violence by Muslim and people of colour, as systemic, thus mandating action from everyone who shares their faith or race. Moreover, although generalisations should not be made in a sweeping manner, a number of studies (Harris, 2005; Press, 2010; Ojanen, 2010) have also evidenced that widespread practices of ethnic profiling, remain counterproductive in combating terrorism.

My questionnaire respondents echoed this line of thought on the difference in portrayal between ‘Islamic’ terrorists, and headlines which gave sympathy to attackers for being ‘mentally ill.’ Although Islam at this point in history, is being exploited by terrorist groups to accomplish their political goals more so than any other religion, “you haven’t heard the white, male suspect, 21-year-old Dylann Roof, described as ‘a possible terrorist’ by mainstream news organisations” (Butler, 2015). Roof was humanised through explanations of mental illness, despite the fact that his actions and writings demonstrated “a mind significantly more rational and reality-based than one might presume at first glance” (Leonard, et. al., 2014). Undeniably, most of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe have been carried out by individuals affiliating themselves to Islam. However, in her interview, Zara argued that the mainstream media “specifically single out Muslims to be a problem” in terms of terrorism.
Although this “focus on Islamic terrorism has been intense for the past few years, media framing of it began several decades ago” (Wicks, 2006: 245). As such, Aaron pointed to a recurrent pattern. “If I say Muslim, what’s the first thing that comes into your head? Subconsciously, terrorist. Subconsciously it’s done, because of the media.” Several questionnaire respondents noted that this association has been present well before the 2015 Paris, 2016 Nice, and the 2016 Brussels terrorist attacks, and that as an expected norm, anti-Muslim bias no longer comes as a shock to them. Since the broad connection between Islam and terrorism was established following the 9/11 attacks (Mamdani 2002; Parvez, 2007), the depiction of Muslims as “irrational, primitive, belligerent” zealots has become a “clearly observable” configuration within news framing (Shadid and van Koningsveld, 2002: 174). Specifically, Parvez (2007) argues that “no religion or group is linked to suicide bombings as often as Islam or Muslims, despite incontrovertible evidence that shows suicide bombings being perpetrated by many other groups as a by-product of the secular-political struggles against occupation.”

Certainly, it may be contentious claiming a broad sweeping anti-Muslim media bias, however data does suggest that this underlying trend is evident. For instance, Shaver et al’s study (2017) reveals that in New Zealand, “greater news exposure is associated with increased anger toward Muslims.” Moreover, “a meta-analysis of research of European media content related to immigrants by Bennett et al. (2011), found that” Islam was widely portrayed as a threat to security. On the other hand, there has been a conscious effort by some media outlets and commentators to mitigate this anti-Muslim bias. Ariyanto et al (2007) argue that perceptions of bias are subject to a variety of factors unconnected to media content. They assert that “people have a tendency to view media reports of intergroup conflicts as biased against their own group.” Furthermore, this mitigation of anti-Muslim bias is also existent in civil society organisations, which have a tangible impact upon shaping public discourses (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).

Nevertheless, it can be contended that with the securitisation of ISIS, in particular following recent terrorist attacks in Europe, the focus on Islam being linked to terrorism, is more than ever negatively affecting public perceptions of Muslims living in Europe. On 22 March 2017, following the Westminster attack, although Theresa
May, faith communities, and the wider London population all spoke out in favour of diversity and unity, online, social media posts largely focused on division, and continued to link Islam to holy war and terrorism (Canan-Şokullu, 2007: 99). Malik (2017) argued that “the right wing was literally waiting in the wings, almost grateful that the imaginary fears it had been trying to provoke, had become real ones.” In particular, a photograph had been disseminated on Twitter showing a “woman wearing a hijab and looking at her phone on Westminster Bridge as people gathered around an injured person nearby. It was circulated as supposed evidence of her lack of concern” (Hunt and Pegg, 2017). In response to the viral hate this photograph generated, the woman in question gave the following statement to Tell MAMA (a government funded project which records anti-Muslim incidents in the UK).

“To those individuals who have interpreted what my thoughts were in that horrific moment, I would like to say not only have I been devastated by witnessing the aftermath of a numbing terror attack, I’ve also had to deal with the shock of finding my picture plastered all over social media by those who could not look beyond my attire, who draw conclusions based on hate and xenophobia” (Boult, 2017).

In her interview, Panda highlighted how increased Islamophobia, which has evidently affected public perceptions, as illustrated above, has impacted her own outlook.

“As soon as there’s an attack— oh is this another one of those where I’m going to have to justify it again? Before you even know about it, that’s what your worry is. You know when there was that stabbing in one of the tube stations in 2015? This hashtag took off #yourenotevenamuslimfam. And then David Cameron said it. And I hated it. Again it was justifying that we’re not like them. That person in the tube station was mentally unwell. But it was instantly because he was brown and he had a Muslim name, that he was a terrorist. That wasn’t the case at all. It had nothing to do with the fact that he was a Muslim.”

For Panda, this “principle of collective guilt being applied to Muslims the world over” (Al-Maeena, 2005) results in needless feelings of constantly having to validate Islam— “after an attack, there’s always a surge of Muslims trying to justify that they’re not like that, which I don’t think needs to happen... people should know that I don’t represent
a terrorist organisation." In her interview, Clementine also argued that following the 2015 Paris attacks, “there was a real call worldwide, on Muslim leaders to condemn the attack.” In her opinion this was incredibly damaging, because doing so, was “asking them to take responsibility for something that wasn’t their fault.”

Nevertheless, it is likely that the “repeated framing of Islam in the context of Middle East terrorism [has caused] a sizeable portion of the media audience to conclude that Islam and terrorism are inextricably linked” (Wicks, 2006: 246). The perception of Muslims as the critical threat endures today (Morin, 2016), despite the fact that statistics since 9/11 illustrate that “Muslim-linked violence in the United States has claimed a total of 64 lives, and in that same period more than 200,000 murders took place” (Kurzman, 2015). Moreover, the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (2017) illustrates that there has been significantly less terrorism in Western Europe over the past two decades, compared to the rest of the world.

Regarding the discrepancy between these statistics and general public sentiment, Bruce argued that increased attention geared towards the Muslim community, may be related to the fact that politicians need a scapegoat group to blame for domestic issues. This would be unsurprising in light of the securitisation framework, since a single-minded focus on terrorism effectively allows for “the suspension of the normal rules of the game” (McDonald, 2008: 8) when it comes to policy decisions. On this matter, my questionnaire respondents added that an increased focus on the link between Islam and terrorism also enables the furthering of a political agenda centred on power, and fills existing Orientalist narratives of barbarians in the East, opposing the civilised in the West (Said, 1995: 53).

Additionally, in his interview, Pete asserted that “from media reports on the threat of terrorism, your big terrorist threat is ISIS.” This focus on the destruction caused by ISIS is always viewed with a Western lens, despite the fact that Muslims in the Middle East are being persecuted to a greater degree (McHugh, 2015). My interviewee Bruce, argued that only a minority of voices within mainstream media, speak out about ISIS killing more Muslims than non-Muslims. Pete asserted that this impact was also apparent online, whereby Facebook flag filters and safety checks were established for attacks in Paris and Stockholm, but not for attacks in Syria and Kenya, for instance.
My questionnaire respondents also noted this discrepancy, highlighting that the same terrorists slaughter many more in the Middle East, without the same level of condemnation. This certainly points to a degree of securitisation when it comes to the association between Islam and terrorism, and the perception, as one questionnaire respondent noted, that “Muslim blood is deemed cheaper.” Nevertheless, it is understandable that Western media inevitably focuses more on European geopolitical events, given that the European and American public are their key consumers. In the same manner, on the day Emmanuel Macron won the 2017 French elections, the Pakistani newspaper, Dawn (2017), focused on breaking stories in Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan.

In terms of an online impact on freedom of expression, in relation to the aforementioned links between terrorism and Islam, my empirical data revealed some underlying concerns regarding the government, private service providers, and Intelligence agencies, monitoring suspected terrorists. Rudner (2004) argues that “in dealing with the international terrorist menace, intelligence has been transformed into a hunter.” Nevertheless, my interviewee Hamza, asserted that “if they have grounds to believe something suspicious is happening, then I understand that.” Clementine was also in agreement. “Where you have reasonable evidence of suspecting someone is engaging in terrorist activity, I think it’s important to police that on social media.” 68% of my questionnaire respondents further established that surveillance was imperative for the benefit of the wider community.

However, there remains a danger that given the current levels of securitisation of Muslims, government policies will, as my interviewee Zara asserted, increasingly allow for “targeting people based solely on their ethnic background, or religious background.” Research (Harris, 2005; Press, 2010; Ojanen, 2010) has already evidenced counterproductive law enforcement practices based on ethnic profiling. The knowledge of this profiling technique increasing online, may cause British Muslims to inadvertently alter their expressions on social media platforms. For my interviewee Pete, although “the stuff I post is probably not a national security risk, you do have that sub-conscious thought. Say you had a hashtag on Instagram, and it sounds a bit dodgy, then you have to think, is it really appropriate to post that?” Clearly, there is
room for further research on how the securitisation of Islam offline, is affecting freedom of expression online; I explore this in greater detail, in chapter five.

4.2 “We don’t want this to happen in Europe”

Notwithstanding the continual and broad sweeping links between Islam and terrorism, the political landscapes of Europe and America, have also been undergoing specific changes over the past two years. In this section, I gauge the opinions of British Muslims following trigger events, such as Donald Trump’s election, the Brexit referendum, the 2015 refugee crisis, and the UK counter-terrorism strategy.

Unmistakeably, American politics have been in upheaval since the election of Donald Trump. This development may have had an impact on freedom of expression as exercised by British Muslims online, given the background of Trump’s largely anti-Muslim campaign rhetoric (CSPAN, 2015). Since taking office, Donald Trump’s executive orders pertaining to his blanket travel bans, were blocked by American courts for being unnecessarily overreaching, and for targeting a specific demographic, rather than addressing explicit security concerns (Foley and Ahmed, 2017). It can be argued that this policy may have aided in generating increased anti-Muslim hate. However, in his interview, Pete asserted that “ironically, Trump has made people a lot more sympathetic towards Muslims.”

A questionnaire respondent further noted the more positive mainstream media coverage of Muslims, since Donald Trump’s inauguration. Hasan Minhaj (2017) also examined this improved media response following Trump’s travel ban, arguing that whilst being Muslim in an airport is usually not a pleasant experience, “how can I hate Trump right now?” The ban enabled Muslims to publically pray at airports, something inconceivable to Minhaj beforehand. My interviewee Gloria was in agreement, maintaining that Trump’s “election is doing the opposite of what he’d hoped.” For her, the American election was a call “to realise that actually, we don’t want this to happen in Europe.” Her sentiments seem to be reciprocated, given the respective losses faced by Geert Wilders in the Dutch elections in March 2017, and by Marine Le Pen in the French elections in May 2017.
Nonetheless, for my interviewee Clementine, “the idea that a country could vote for Trump when he was so obviously racist, was sadder than anything else, because it wasn’t that people hated Muslims and Mexicans in private anymore.” Of course, America as an entity did not vote Donald Trump into office; “Hillary Clinton won the most individual votes nationwide” (PEW, 2016). According to Burston (2017: 6), those that did vote for Trump, did so because they held “longstanding disappointment at economic injustices.” Rob Suls (2016) also outlines that Trump voters were largely motivated by stricter policies to prevent people from overstaying their visa, and to deter illegal immigrants from receiving government benefits; the US-Mexico border wall was “not at all important” in their motivation to vote for Trump. Nevertheless, it is “undeniably true that many of Trump’s most ardent and devoted fans are vicious racists, like his chief strategist, Stephen Bannon” (Burston, 2017: 6), and to some extent, as noted by a questionnaire respondent, Trump’s election has symbolised the normalisation of hatred. In his interview, Hamza asserted that this “narrative must have been in people’s minds for them to vote for him.”

On the other hand, Hamza argued that Trump’s objective was not to offend Muslims; “I think he truly believes in the vision he wants to achieve.” Hamza did not consider Donald Trump’s travel bans to be Islamophobic because “he’s carrying out policies which he said he would. Everyone knew what those policies were. He thinks it’s going to improve the security of the country.” Noticeably, there is a divide in opinion over Donald Trump, even within the British Muslim community. These counter-narratives of “voter dissatisfaction” (Fox News, 2016) certainly should not be overlooked when assessing the impacts of Trump’s presidency. Altogether however, my empirical data suggests that Trump did not have a major impact on how British Muslims were expressing their opinions on social media platforms. Only 28% of questionnaire respondents were either commenting on other people’s posts related to Donald Trump’s policies, or posting themselves about Donald Trump’s policies (Figure 2). It is likely that Trump’s policies may not have been such a major issue for my British respondents, since the US president is removed from the UK’s domestic sphere of politics. Thus, I went on to query an issue closer to home: the impacts of the 2016 Brexit referendum.
In her interview, Zara contended that “many people voted yes to Brexit because they felt it would stop refugees coming in from Syria.” As with Trump’s election, it is prudent not to generalise, as many people voted ‘yes’ in the UK for economic reasons, and because they had “little cultural affinity with political union at an EU level” (Bourne, 2016: 360). Nevertheless, Clementine believed that for many Britons “this idea of leaving the EU was a way for them to validate their incredibly racist opinions.” Then again, Bruce argued that immigration was far from the only issue driving the referendum. For him, the campaigns and dismissals of any sincere debate leading up to the vote were the key issue, because “there wasn’t any actual information about what was going to happen”; these claims are confirmed in the literature of Littvay (2016). Bruce believed that both the authorities in power, and the mainstream media, should be held accountable for misinformation disseminated to the British public.

In terms of the mainstream media, Gloria claimed that “they’re failing in their duty to be unbiased” through the language, framing and stories being utilised. She argued in her interview, that the general public are not inherently discriminatory, however prejudices are being established on televisual media, and for that reason “it’s the
responsibility of the media to present a more unbiased picture.” Malik (2017) is in agreement, asserting that “over the past few years an infrastructure of hate promotion has been established and incorporated within the mainstream.” Clementine picked up on this assertion.

“I don’t read the Daily Mail, but if for example I see a shared article online, with a very clickbait heavy title like, ‘Muslim woman found beating child’—when you read the article, you find her religion had nothing to do with the fact that she was beating up this child. She was vile and cruel, but it wasn’t her religion telling her to do that. There was no need to put her religion into the headline. But people love to hate things that they already hate. If you already feel anger or disgust towards a particular group, and you see loads of negative stories about them in the media… it doesn’t matter to you because it’s just adding fuel to fire. It’s making you confirm your hate more.”

These damaging links conflating the individual with the collective, are a key impact of the increased securitisation of Muslims. Of course, it is not merely Muslims who are prey to these conflations. In Hungary, prejudice is “highly salient in public opinion, the media, and in the political discourse” (Orosz et al, 2016) against the Roma people, for instance. Certainly, according to Hamza, “it depends on what most people read or most people watch.” Nevertheless, in her interview, Zara reinforced the fact that “often, Muslims are misrepresented in the media.” She argued that “where a so-called Muslim has been the perpetrator of an attack, they’ve definitely used the word terrorism. Whereas if it’s a non-Muslim, they’ll use strange words like lone-wolf.” In their Canadian study, Carver and Harrie (2017) illustrate how “the news media and political leaders regularly frame certain violent offences as terrorism while excluding other similar events… based on subjective judgements by those in a position to directly benefit from the use of the label of terrorism.” This duality in reporting can also be applied to the 2015 refugee crisis, which 89% of my questionnaire respondents argued, had increased Islamophobia (Figure 3). Clementine noted that in terms of refugees, the mainstream media either made them “into sob stories or villains. We went from, they’re all animals, to actually look at this poor kid on a beach who’s died.”
The final development explicitly influencing the securitisation of Islam, which I wish to touch upon, is the UK counterterrorism strategy, specifically, the revised version of ‘Prevent’. “Prevent itself was just one element of the four Ps (the others being Pursue, Protect and Prepare) that were originally framed within Contest—the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy” (Durodie, 2016: 25). In aiming to counter home-grown terrorism, Contest has undergone several revisions since its inception, primarily “a refocusing around a particular set of values portrayed as being British” (Durodie, 2016: 25). Prevent is more culturally and socially orientated than the other elements of Contest, therefore it has come under criticism for emboldening “the infiltration of Muslim communities and justifying a culture of suspicion” (CAGE, 2013). The Prevent strategy, according to MEND (2014), is further said to lack “empirical evidence to justify its focus upon religion over more influential factors.”

In terms of my empirical data, 91% of questionnaire respondents were of the opinion that Prevent criminalised activism; skewed the concept of radicalisation; instilled fear and paranoia; targeted mosques and Islamic societies; and failed to target non-Muslim radicals in Britain. In his interview, Aaron reiterated that Prevent is “targeted specifically at Muslims. If you look at Prevent policies, it’s supposed to be every child. What about the far right nationalist groups? Why are they not being targeted?”
was in agreement. She contended that Prevent is counterproductive in that “it’s making people even more suspicious of Muslims. I think that’s perpetuating Islamophobia.”

One of my questionnaire respondents elaborated on Panda’s sentiments, highlighting how compulsory WRAP training left them feeling helpless, because they had to view everyone as a target, which then alienated sections of their community. The research conducted by Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013: 396) concurs that “Prevent actively tries to induce specific types of conduct from the British Muslim community while also securitising them in terms of risk.” Moreover, Bayrakli and Hafez (2015: 561) maintain that the hastily enforced 2015 Counterterrorism and Security Act, has been “instrumental in creating not only a hate environment, but in solidifying in law a state of reasonable fear on the part of Muslims that they are under pervasive surveillance.”

Nevertheless, it should be noted that not all British Muslims dispute Prevent. In Hamza’s opinion, “people can think what they want.” Two questionnaire respondents further argued that Prevent was in fact an effective counter-terrorism strategy, as most schools and official institutions are now equipped with the knowledge to tackle radicalisation in the UK; moreover that Prevent does work within the Muslim community in a positive way. However, from a researcher’s perspective, it should be noted that of the 53 questionnaire respondents queried, only 47% were aware of Contest. Given this study’s small sample size, these results may not be entirely representative of the British Muslim population.

**Chapter Five: Self-Censorship on Social Media Platforms**

### 5.1 “There’s no point commenting”

In this chapter, I analyse how the increased securitisation of Muslims, following the aforementioned political trigger events, has affected freedom of speech as exercised by British Muslims online. My analysis is centred on Facebook, as one of the most frequently utilised platforms, and as “the sociotechnical engine of trends in communication” (Dijck, 2012: 161). In chapter 5.1, I evaluate British Muslim attitudes towards sharing political and religious opinions online, and towards responding to Islamophobia on Facebook. In chapter 5.2, I delve more deeply into the matter of self-censorship, in light of online Islamophobia.
In her interview, Clementine argued that although sharing political and religious views can be a positive factor, “people who have got unfounded news stories, and share them, provoke hate.” On the other hand, Zara asserted that “if you have well-informed, interested people, they could have a good discussion, despite their differences.” In terms of individuals sharing Islamophobic hate on Facebook, my interviewees were split on whether they would respond, partially because “unlike the anonymous environment of some Internet forums, social media are closely tied to the relationships and activities of everyday life” (Hampton et al., 2016: 1). Nonetheless, in his interview, Flash asserted that “if someone posts a comment, and if it’s something I agree or disagree with, then I’ll comment.”

“There was one guy at my uni who did journalism. And he kept posting crap about Muslims. Every single one of his, I used to reply to, because I didn’t like it. It used to escalate. He used to delete stuff if it made him look bad. So he would delete my comment and his comment. He kept deleting it, and I kept reposting it. Then he stopped me from posting on his wall. I didn’t really like him. It was more for his friends. I was trying to make it seem like he’s an idiot” (Flash).

On the other hand, Pete argued that he would not respond to hate posts on Facebook “because I know it’s a big can of worms. I try to keep neutral where possible.” Panda also avoided posting political content, or engaging with anti-Muslim hate on Facebook, “because I don’t want to get sucked into the hype that it creates.” She felt “like I get very emotional and angry about it. I can’t be bothered overthinking what I’m going to write.” Likewise, although Gloria had once “posted a rant on Facebook” about an Islamophobic incident, she also tended “to stay away from things like politics and religion.” These views were all consistent with the research conducted by Hampton et al (2016), which concludes that social media platforms are “associated with lower willingness to discuss a political issue.”

Nevertheless, my interviewees Bruce and Hamza, contended that certain people would be willing to respond to hateful comments online. “When people are behind a computer screen, they get really brave. They say all these things that they wouldn’t say to your face necessarily” (Bruce). Hamza argued that “people feel they are more protected behind screens. They act more stupidly. They say ridiculous things. Things
escalate. I don’t think there should be any political discussions on social media platforms.” In his interview, Aaron argued that he “wouldn’t waste my time with keyboard warriors” on anonymous forums. Nevertheless, on Facebook, “if I can change a particular person, then I will do everything in my power to do so.” In contrast, for my interviewee Fatima, responding to Islamophobia online was easier than having to do so offline, because “online you can be safe, and just write your comment. You have time to compose your thoughts. In person, in the heat of the moment, it’s harder to have a rational argument.”

Even so, my empirical data concluded that by and large, non-engagement with Islamophobia had more to do with individuals using Facebook as social media platform, rather than it being an explicit case of self-censorship, as hypothesised by Cook and Heilmann’s “perfect non-alignment” theory (2013). Approximately one third of my questionnaire respondents also acknowledged their choice not to engage with political and religious opinions on social media platform (Figure 4). For my interviewee Gloria, non-engagement was linked to her belief that people “so single-mindedly believe in what they’re saying, that I don’t think anybody’s argument on Facebook, can change their mind.” Pete was in agreement with her notion, arguing that “they’re all stuck in their ways.” Bruce too, asserted that “on Facebook everyone is only really friends with people with the same political ideologies.” This contention has been established in previous research (Sunstein, 2001; Himelboim, 2013). Most of my interviewees believed that it was futile to engage with Islamophobic hate speech on Facebook.

“I don’t comment. I don’t feed the hate. There’s no point commenting because nobody listens. Even writing a very clear and polite argument, that you’re wrong for these reasons— I don’t think that’s the platform to do it” (Clementine).

Furthermore, although 42% of my questionnaire respondents stated that they would challenge a Facebook friend if he or she uploaded Islamophobic content, the majority of respondents asserted that they would either block or ignore the individual. My empirical data concluded that engagement with Islamophobia on social media, was largely viewed as ineffectual by British Muslims. Moreover, in contrast to the conclusions drawn in Hampton et al’s (2016) study on social media and political discussion, my interviewee Gloria argued that engaging offline would be more
productive; “talking to them in person, or showing them with actions, have more of an effect than having a battle on social media.” Flash was in agreement— “I would be nice, and hope that by the way I’m acting, they might change.”

On Facebook, for most of my interviewees, engagement with Islamophobia depended, as highlighted by Zara, on “the person, and how well I know them. If I felt like I could have a reasonable conversation with them, I would engage with them.” Pete argued that it would be awkward if the first contact he had with people on Facebook “was me criticising their views on things. Even though I feel like it’s incorrect.” These comments support Das and Kramer’s conclusions (2013: 125) that “people censor more when their audience is hard to define.” Offline, the audience is easier to define; for this reason, and so that she could more effectively encapsulate her thoughts, Panda maintained that she would rather have sensitive discussions offline.

That being said, it should be noted that most individuals do use social media platforms “to access content contributed by their connections on multiple occasions per day” (Hampton et. al, 2011: 4). Facebook alone boasted “1.28 billion daily active users on average for March 2017.” Therefore, as argued by Clementine, people “get a lot of their information from social media. So there’s definitely an opportunity for well-balanced, reasonable arguments” online.
On the other hand, when individuals did not wish to engage with hate posts online, blocking their Facebook friends appeared to be a common trend. For instance, although my interviewee Clementine had not consciously deleted anyone, “if someone I knew, suddenly started posting a lot of hate towards a certain ethnic group or religion, I would block them because I don’t use social media for that reason.” Similarly, even though Zara agreed with the concept of largely unhindered freedom of expression online, she maintained that “if it became intolerable, and if there was no need to have this person on my Facebook, I probably would delete them.” My interviewee Panda, also had no qualms asserting that “whenever there’s an opinion I don’t like, for example if I know someone is racist, then I will just delete them.” This action of deleting people who were not close friends on social media, was a recurrent theme. Yet these deletions, were often an issue of convenience rather than one pertaining to freedom of expression. Certainly, Coleman (1988) asserts that abandoning or replacing social ties as people move through their life, is not an extraordinary occurrence.

The shortcomings of deleting Facebook friends, was that most of my interviewees were exposed to a very one-sided opinion, and in Panda’s case, a very left opinion, when it came to political developments such as the 2016 Brexit referendum. My interviewees appeared to be mindful of this problem; “it’s important to talk to people who don’t have the same view as you” (Pete), “because everyone is entitled to different opinions. That’s how you learn from each other” (Fatima).

Nevertheless, in her interview, Panda argued that Facebook was too saturated with opinions, and for the most part people were only willing to share their opinions if they perceived that their audience would be in agreement (Hampton et al., 2014: 3). She maintained that a better platform for engagement would be through offline education. For my interviewee Bruce, these shortcomings could also be better tackled by Facebook, which “could do more to allow other opinions to be expressed. Not just suggesting things that you agree with. Suggest alternate viewpoints.” In his opinion, “that’s why Brexit happened. That’s why Trump got elected. People aren’t listening. When they try to speak, left wing people try to shoot them down. They feel like they can’t voice their opinions. So they just vote in secret.”

Enabling discursive conversations online, is one means to counteract hate, to promote tolerance for differing political opinions, and to allow for a fluid communicative process
whereby opinions can be subject to change (Delli Carpini et. al, 2004). Clementine asserted that her friends “have never discussed the news more than now, because we know it directly affects us. We know that Trump coming into power, directly affects us. We know that a knobhead blowing himself up in a Paris nightclub, directly affects us.” Naturally, it should not be overlooked that online discussions have the potential to damage the cause rather than helping (Hampton et. al., 2016); nor should it be overlooked that nearly 60% of my questionnaire respondents argued that online Islamophobia had an offline impact on their willingness to express opinions (Figure 5). However, generally speaking, it appears that for British Muslims, recent political trigger events in Europe have opened up discussions on Facebook.

![Figure 5 illustrates how Islamophobia has affected freedom of speech.](image)

In terms of expressing her political opinions, my interviewee Zara, contended that she had been “more active in the last few years in terms of student activism and going to protests.” Moreover, Zara asserted that although she was not constantly posting content on Facebook, she believed her “awareness of issues has peaked because everything is becoming more relevant, and closer to home than before.” In a concluding thought, Zara argued that there was a pressing requirement for engagement with Islamophobia both online and offline simultaneously, since people posting online hate “could be so used to it, that it becomes normalised. Eventually, they stop hiding behind the screen.” Clementine was in agreement.
“In my local area, a group of middle-aged builders beat up a girl wearing a headscarf. When police investigated, they were also big contributors towards Britain First style groups on Facebook. There has been a rise in physical attacks, and whilst I can’t say it’s a direct cause of people sharing hate and spewing vitriol online, it seems foolish to say that there is no correlation. The more you read about Muslims bombing you and wanting to enforce a certain type of law, the more likely you are to think that every Muslim person you meet is awful, and that they should be taught a lesson. There was a big police campaign to find the guys who beat her up. But she’d reported that she’d been receiving Islamophobic hate for months and months. She had reported it a few times and nobody had done anything about it. It was only when someone had beaten her up that they were like, well, we better find the people who did this.”

Clearly, “online life is not a separate thing anymore” (Pete). Conceptualising online communication as something that begins online and remains online, with no impact on the offline world, is certainly an outmoded concept (Wellman and Hampton, 1999).

In summary, although my empirical data concluded that by and large, non-engagement with Islamophobia had more to do with using Facebook as social media platform, rather than it being an explicit case of self-censorship, there may be a persuasive case for increased engagement with Islamophobia, both online and offline.

5.2 “I’m not less likely to give an opinion”

My empirical data as a whole concluded that the securitisation of Muslims following recent political developments in Europe, had not led British Muslims to self-censorship on Facebook. However, in building upon outcomes detailed in chapter 5.1, I now more closely analyse the nuances surrounding this matter of self-censorship.

Facebook allows its users to type out statuses and comments prior to posting them. This effectively enables “filtering after a thought has been formed and expressed, but before it has been shared” (Das and Kramer, 2013: 120). In their study, Das and Kramer (2013) concluded that 71% of users present some manner of last minute self-censorship when utilising social media platforms. Consequently, I queried my interviewees on this form of self-censorship. Zara felt “like if I speak out on some
issues and not others, it might be misconstrued. For example, if something happens in the Middle East, and if I spoke out about that, and didn’t speak out about something that happened in Europe. So I tend to not post, because I’m worried about that.” Zara’s sentiments were shared by less than half of my interviewees, as illustrated in table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AARON</th>
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<tr>
<td>BRUCE</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLEMENTINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATIMA</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLASH</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLORIA</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>HAMZA</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANDA</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETE</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZARA</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows whether or not interviewees have ever self-censored on social media.

For most of my interviewees, not engaging with political events and sensitive religious content on Facebook, was “nothing to do with feeling vulnerable as a Muslim” (Fatima). In regards to self-censorship, my interviewee Fatima claimed that she had never “posted and then deleted anything.” For her, a minimal presence on Facebook had more “to do with being quite a private person,” rather than it being the consequence of a “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) instigated by experiencing online Islamophobia. For example, although Fatima disagreed with Donald Trump’s travel ban policies, “I have not once made that vocal on any of my social media platforms. To an outsider, it might look like I don’t care, but that’s just my nature.” For Panda, non-engagement with these policies, was more to do with her feeling “a little bit exhausted, seeing it everywhere.” She preferred to post about issues “that I think will make a slight bit of difference.” For example, “when we decided we were going to Brexit—people I know on social media, took a lot of time to break down and explain it with pros and cons for each side” (Clementine).

On the topic of sharing opinions on Facebook, I queried my interviewees about their opinions on Islamophobic posts. In his interview, Bruce argued that “in most cases it
is fine to say whatever you want. You can be Islamophobic and have free speech. You can express your Islamophobic views. You can’t stop people from expressing those views” and although “it’s impolite to cause offense, it shouldn’t be against the law. I agree with criticism of religion” (Clementine). Zara also asserted that “everyone is allowed their own opinion.” My interviewee, Clementine, maintained that “the whole point of living in a free country, is that you should be able to share your beliefs and your opinions and your ideas, and your anger or your disgust. I’m not less likely to give an opinion. I’m more likely almost, to share it. Because that’s the way you change people’s ideas. You talk about it.” Nonetheless, Pete slightly disagreed in line with John Stuart Mill’s 1859 treatise On Liberty, arguing that freedom of speech is limited by what Mill terms as the “harm principle.”

“Freedom of speech. Yes, you should have the freedom to express yourself. But at the same time, being a decent human being means considering others. I think it has its limits. You can’t just say anything for the sake of it. That’s why I don’t agree with supporting Charlie Hebdo in being offensive against Muslims. Solidarity with free speech, yes. But not solidarity with spreading hate.”

Altogether, most interviewees made a clear distinction between expressing opinions, and specifically targeting religious groups with unsubstantiated facts. For example, Clementine argued that “if you’re having a reasonable conversation with someone who is critiquing an element of your religion— whilst it might not be a particularly pleasant conversation, it’s very different to someone spewing vitriol at you, because you’re Muslim and you’re all the same and all going to kill us.” Hate speech such this, can cause psychological harm, and damage “our self-respect” (Seglow, 2016: 1103). In response to the negative psychological effects generated by Islamophobic hate speech, several interviewees asserted that they preferred to limit their Facebook circle to close friends, because “it’s quite protective, because I’m not experiencing any hate. I’m seeing things that I enjoy reading” (Zara). This limitation, as previously analysed in chapter 5.1, has its shortcomings as well as its advantages.

“I’m highly aware that I have this one-sided opinion on Facebook. But that’s better for me in terms of my own well-being. I get really angry when I see opinions— I don’t mind other people having different opinions to me— but when I know for example that it’s on such a mass scale, like institutional racism that’s
being perpetuated by the government, that makes me angry. I know it exists. But I don’t want to be reminded of it every single day of my life” (Panda).

In terms of expressing opinions on Facebook, Panda explained that she was “not worrying about offending people, because people offend me all the time. If they’re offending me, they shouldn’t be afraid to take it back.” Nevertheless, Panda claimed that she would rather not initiate sensitive discussions on Facebook, and in that regard, “would definitely censor what I would say on social media platforms.”

Vis-à-vis freedom of expression online, both Flash and Gloria claimed that there were double standards when it came to Muslims. Gloria strongly felt that Islamophobia was not widely perceived as a serious issue on social media platforms, and argued that “we don’t ask that question with homophobia. We just say, it’s not allowed.” For her, discussing which variations of anti-Muslim hate were permissible in terms of freedom of expression was irrational, because the same was not the case for anti-Semitism—“you would just not talk about it.” Flash was of a similar sentiment.

“If you say something about the Holocaust, it’s a federal crime. You get arrested. My issue is that you see people saying anything they want about Islam. Why is it freedom of speech for them? If we do the same thing, it’s not freedom of speech for us.”

Unquestionably, online Islamophobia cannot be placed on the same platform as the Holocaust. However, in these assertions Flash and Gloria do underline conceivable double-standards, regarding the targeting of religious minorities on Facebook. In terms of its Community Standards, Facebook notes that its most challenging issue is hate speech, as “people from different backgrounds may have different ideas about what’s appropriate to share” (Bickert and Sonderby, 2015). Certainly, it would be interesting to determine how many anti-Muslim Facebook pages have been blocked in comparison to anti-Christian and anti-Semitic pages.

In summary, despite increased Islamophobic vitriol on social media platforms, (Wright, 2015), most interviewees underlined that they would not respond to hate. Far from highlighting cases of last minute self-censorship as posited by Das and Kramer’s study (2013), an analysis of my empirical data has revealed, that despite there being minor
impacts on the willingness to express opinions, by and large self-censorship on Facebook had “nothing to do with feeling vulnerable as a Muslim” (Fatima).

Chapter Six: Islamophobia: A Gendered Issue?

6.1 “Words perpetuate”

Chapter six is divided into two parts. In chapter 6.2, I analyse whether any online self-censorship as a direct consequence of Islamophobia, is a gendered issue. However, in chapter 6.1, I first consider direct online and offline experiences of Islamophobia.

For the most part, these first-hand experiences reflect increased public concerns “that practitioners of the Muslim faith are fundamentally intolerant, and violent” (Johnston, 2016: 165). Islamophobia is undoubtedly a growing concern in Europe (Cherribi, 2011; Hansen, 2011; Taras, 2012; Valk, 2012). The term was defined by my interviewee Zara as “an irrational fear or prejudice against Muslims.” Panda argued that the “moral panic” (Young, 1971) stemming from Islamophobia encompassed “the marginalisation of and discrimination against anybody that looks like a Muslim. It’s so widespread and institutionalised, that it affects a Sikh man walking on the street with a beard.” This discrimination is further compounded by the fact that many individuals deny the existence of Islamophobia as a concept (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2015: 5).

For my interviewee Clementine, discrimination was a reality. She argued that Islamophobia becomes a greater problem when individuals act upon their generalisations; “this is my big thing, it’s generalising about people because they’re Muslim, and not because of individual actions.” In their research, Maréchal et al (2016: 226) also touch upon the propagation of generalised attitudes towards Muslims, “who are all wrongly presented as invasive, cunning, or aggressive.” Maréchal et al argue that this proliferation is manifest in “a general irrational attitude rejecting everything that is Muslim.” In her interview, Fatima stated that such fearmongering was dangerous “because the more you spread that, the more hatred there is.” Pete also argued that the normalisation of anti-Muslim hate was “scary because then it has more of an impact of people’s daily lives. There’s more reason to discriminate.” In terms of Islamophobia impacting daily life, and blurring the boundaries between the online and offline, Zara outlined the experiences of her friend on an aeroplane.
“She was just messaging her dad on WhatsApp, and one of the people next to her on the plane, saw some Arabic on her phone. They immediately went to the EasyJet flight attendant and said, this person is a risk. These two girls who wore the hijab, and one guy, were taken off the flight and questioned for a few hours. These people are law-abiding citizens. What constitutes as suspicious behaviour is heavily influenced by the media. It makes me quite appalled frankly. And quite annoyed at the flight attendant who should have inquired more about what had been seen on the phone, instead of instantly believing the woman. It’s ridiculous. I mean, I want to be as safe as the next person, but targeting someone because they wear a headscarf, or because they look Middle-Eastern, that’s unacceptable. Any other language— if you heard someone speaking French, or typing French on their phone, you wouldn’t report that to the flight attendant.”

My interviewee Pete, defined Islamophobia as “a hatred which is different from ignorance.” This form of hatred “as a Muslim it makes me feel sad” (Bruce) because, as outlined in Zara’s account, “it’s your ordinary people, as opposed to your politicians” (Pete). Nevertheless, the majority of my interviewees agreed that causing offense and speaking out against religious beliefs as part of a wider debate, was not a problem; “it’s just where people are trying to provoke a type of reaction, or trying to insult for the sake of insulting” (Hamza). Diane Frost (2008) argues that this rhetoric of insult, is increasingly manifest through the normalisation of hostile reporting in mainstream British tabloids.

As a consequence of hostile reporting on recent trigger events in Europe, my interviewee Zara, argued that she had noted an increase in the “small things, people getting upset, hijabs being ripped off, and people shouting things.” Certainly, Lorraine Sheridan’s study (2006) concludes that “religious affiliation may be a more meaningful predictor of prejudice than race or ethnicity.” Moreover, a study conducted by Ameli and Merali (2015), determines that there has been a rise in religious hate attacks from 14% in 2010, to 18% in 2014. In her interview, Clementine claimed that she too, had “noticed an increase in Islamophobia. I don’t know whether this is because as I’ve gotten older, I’ve gotten more aware of more subtle Islamophobic comments.” The increase in these “subtle, snide remarks” were also noted by my interviewee Aaron,
who further revealed that “when you’re in the workplace, it’s more surreptitiously done.” In highlighting this trend of increased anti-Muslim hate in the UK, my empirical data also pointed to a geographical dimension to these experiences of Islamophobia.

Most of my interviewees highlighted the fact that London is “a very tolerant city” (Fatima) and “it’s so multi-cultural and diverse” (Clementine), that “I don’t think that it’s a problem in a place like London” (Hamza). This may well be the case given Sadiq Khan’s recent appointment as the Mayor of London. In April 2017, Khan established a novel Online Hate Crime Hub whereby “five specially trained Met police officers will try to identify, prevent and investigate online abuse” (BBC, 2017). Future research into the effectiveness of this Online Hub in countering Islamophobia would be fascinating and highly welcomed. Of course, regardless of this Online Hub, London as a city itself, is not entirely immune to hate, xenophobia or intolerance, however “what one has in London is this—not a sentient defiance, but a composite of millions of individuals making way and turning the other cheek” (Malik, 2017). In general, the equivalent cannot be specified for cities outside of London. One questionnaire respondent was of the opinion that a disenfranchised and disenchanted majority of the population in the UK blamed external factors, namely immigrants and refugees, for slowing economic growth. My interviewee, Clementine, further noted “that if I walk into a shop outside of London, people will be surprised if I speak English without an accent.” This geographical variance between London and other UK cities, was also highlighted in Panda’s personal encounter with Islamophobia in Liverpool.

“I was just walking with two hijabi friends on the high street of Liverpool. I didn’t get a good look, but they did look like kids to me. They started throwing things at us, at a very high speed. I think they were hard boiled sweets. They weren’t being merciful at all, they were completely pelting them at us. They were hitting the bins next to us, and splitting in half, and one of them hit my friend’s backpack and I was scared for my head. We ran away and they ran after us. All these people on the high street were not doing anything. They were just staring. Luckily we were just walking two minutes to our hotel, so we ran inside. We told the receptionist, who was just looking at us like, so what? Even though we were clearly shocked by the whole incident.”
Though there appears to be an increase in offline Islamophobia, my interviewee Fatima argued that on Facebook, “my non-Muslim network is a lot more vocal about recognising Islamophobia as a major problem.” In terms of Donald Trump’s travel bans for example, Fatima “saw more posts from my non-Muslim network.” This online support was evident on more than one occasion, as illustrated in the following case.

“A girl I became friends with— she’s a Muslim, and wears a hijab. She was running for some university presidential position— the law society. She had created an event page on Facebook to get people to come and vote. Somehow, a random, middle-aged, white guy, who didn’t even go to that university, who had no connection to her, or that society, commented on her page with a really hateful message about how a Muslim shouldn’t be running. On the post itself, all her friends— and these are people of all backgrounds— all these people who supported her, were commenting on it, attacking the guy for being racist and rude. There were some funny responses too, because where did he come from? She got so much support, and at the end, she acknowledged it in a really nice way, because she addressed the guy. She said sorry you feel this way, but I’m happy to sit down with you for a chat, if you want me to explain about my religion. People supported her even more for that, because that shows she was fit for the role.”

However, for Fatima, these occasions of online support were also bittersweet. “The bitter part is that it has come to this point where Muslims are so attacked that they need people to defend them” whilst the ‘sweet’ part Fatima referred to, was the change in public sentiment since 9/11. “I remember feeling it more back then, in the sense that people weren’t vocal in supporting Muslims.” Fatima’s assertions contradict Farhana Khera’s research (2015), which points to a “disturbing level of hate crimes, coupled with an increasingly prejudiced and vicious environment of anti-Muslim rhetoric” since 9/11. Of course, Fatima’s contention could be dependent upon her geographical location, given the earlier conclusions drawn about London from my empirical data. As such, this link should be further explored in future research on Islamophobia.

For my interviewee Pete, despite having never directly experienced Islamophobia, “just seeing these things makes you feel marginalised. You feel a bit demotivated.” On the contrary, Panda argued that “I think people are just so used to knowing that people
hate them. I would just be like, whatever, it’s another one of those comments.” Bruce also maintained that “if it was targeted at me, I would reply. But probably just ignore them.” These assertions link to the conclusions drawn by Hayes (2007), in that “a hostile opinion climate prompts greater use of expression avoidance strategies than a friendly climate.” For my interviewee Zara, this hostile opinion climate was one of the reasons why she would, in response to someone inciting hatred, “behave in a humane way, because often I feel like people think Muslims are violent individuals, and are different to the rest of society. Behaving in a way where you fit the norm, could change their mind.” Flash upheld similar sentiments of behaving humanely when exposed to Islamophobia in his workplace.

“Someone said something extremely Islamophobic. And he said it to everyone on the floor. Once he said it, I looked around to see everyone else’s reaction. I kind of felt alone. It was a really weird feeling. Afterwards I took him to the side, and spoke to him alone. And I was really nice. If I show him anger, that’s what he’ll perceive Islam to be. I remember telling him, it’s your opinion. But if I’m in the room, you know I’m Muslim. And now he won’t do it again.”

When I queried my interviewees on whether they felt that this increased Islamophobia was an issue to be tackled by the Metropolitan Police, both Panda and Aaron, stated that they probably wouldn’t report incidents, and would only be likely to do so with substantial evidence—“I feel like the things that have the most action, are when someone has taken a video.” My interviewee Flash argued that “it would waste more of my time reporting it. And I don’t think anything would happen.” Moreover, Hamza contended, in opposition to conclusions drawn by James and Simmonds (2013), that “it’s not that I wouldn’t feel the police wouldn’t do something. It’s more that it’s not worth the hassle. There are bigger things to worry about. I don’t want to waste their time. I would ignore it.” Zara too, “would leave it, because they probably wouldn’t be able to do anything anyway.” Nevertheless, Zara acknowledged the fact that reporting hate incidents to the police, is “more about statistics, so that Islamophobia is represented correctly. It’s probably massively underreported.” This problem of Islamophobia as an underreported issue, is evident in research conducted by CAIR into harassment in Californian schools. In one case “the lack of data wasn’t due to a lack of bullying; Muslim kids weren’t reporting the abuse” (McCollum, 2017). These
conclusions are further reinforced in studies undertaken by MEND (2014) and by the FRA (2012).

My interviewee, Clementine, also maintained that she would not report incitement of Islamophobic hate. However, she asserted that “if someone physically threatened me, I think I’d be more inclined to see the police. Though long-term, I think words are probably more conducive to causing hate. Words perpetuate, and people do less about words than actions.” Clementine’s contentions are evidenced by Awan, whose research (2015) determines that victims of both virtual and physical world Islamophobia are likely “to suffer from emotional stress, anxiety and fear of cyber threats materialising in the real world.” Cohen-Almagor (2009: 36) adds that “hateful remarks are so hurtful that they might reduce the target group member to speechlessness or shock them into silence.”

However, rather than remaining silent, my interviewee Fatima argued that she would be likely to report incidences of Islamophobia, especially those offline. Yet given the tangible impact of words, as evidenced by Awan (2015) and Cohen-Almagor (2009), it is just as critical to make the online environment a priority. This is important given that “more than 215000 Islamophobic tweets were sent in July 2016— an average of 289 per hour” (Allegretti, 2016). Mattias Ekman (2015), notes that of late, the Internet “has facilitated a space where racist attitudes towards Muslims are easily disseminated into the public debate, fuelling animosity against European Muslims.” Furthermore, Ekman (2015) argues that xenophobic currents within mass media, frame online Islamophobia as a defence of Western freedom of speech, which is further augmented by legitimisation from intellectuals and political elites.

For my interviewee Pete, this is “a serious issue because the political elites and media, their way of retaining power is to always have a scapegoat group, all through history. In this case, it’s now Muslims” who are “excluded by only appearing in the media when they present a problem” (Frost, 2008). For these reasons, Pete asserted that the Muslim community need to increase awareness about Islamophobia, and to tackle it along with “a broad group of people. Muslims, Christians, religious groups, some government agencies, all working together.” In his opinion, the general public have a duty, given that “things are getting worse.”
On the other hand, my interviewee Aaron, felt “like the reason we think it’s a big issue is because we’re Muslim ourselves. It impacts us directly. On our parents. On our relatives. Obviously we’re going to be quite biased towards it.” Aaron’s perspective certainly rang true for Panda. She argued that “there are a lot of people who wouldn’t even admit that Islamophobia exists. There’s so much ‘Islamic’ terrorism that people don’t even think about Islamophobia.” This line of argumentation is also manifest within academic studies. For example, Maréchal et al’s research (2016: 248) concludes that “it is questionable whether these incidents should be labelled as Islamophobia.”

Despite deliberations on the exact nature of Islamophobia as a theoretical concept, anti-Muslim hate is extremely prevalent online. Tell MAMA documented 364 online anti-Muslim incidents in 2015. Although Tell MAMA’s “credibility amongst British Muslims is questionable” (Warsi, 2017), given the inquiries into its data collection methods and allegations of its embodying a policy arm of the establishment, reports written by non-profit organisations such as MEND (2014), have also reported that Islamophobia remains a serious issue in the UK.

Furthermore, Awan’s research (2015) reveals that anti-Muslim hate increasingly continues to be “viewed in the prism of physical attacks.” For these reasons, my interviewee Pete, asserted that social media companies such as Facebook, “need to be very on the ball about any hate. A page against Jewish people would be shut down. But you have loads of pages against Muslims.” On the whole, my empirical data concluded that the cyber context of Islamophobia was an underreported reality (Awan, 2015). However, as it is a sphere with widespread psychological consequences, as well as one which establishes the context for hate crimes offline (Cowan, et.al, 2002: 261), there continues to be a pressing requirement for the meticulous analysis of online Islamophobia.

6.2 “It’s a piece of clothing”

In this chapter, I consider perceptions of the veil in light of Ole Waever’s securitisation theory. Moreover, whether any self-censorship, as a direct consequence of increased anti-Muslim hate either online or offline, is a particularly gendered issue.
Offline, my interviewee Fatima argued that “as a female Muslim, especially if you wear a hijab, I think you’re more susceptible to attacks.” On this matter, Ganesh (2016: 59) has concluded that “there is a gendered dynamic.” The majority of my interviewees were in agreement that “women are more susceptible to attacks” (Hamza) because “wearing a headscarf makes you most likely to be a Muslim. Often women are seen as more vulnerable, and will be targeted anyway” (Zara). The sentiment that visibly wearing the hijab makes you more prone to offline Islamophobia, was also reinforced by the majority of my questionnaire respondents. Tyrer (2013) argues that this gendered dynamic is an example of “post-racial racism,” whereby Muslim women are primarily targeted not for their skin colour, but rather for their headscarves. Certainly this statement rings true for the recent Portland attack, in which “two men were fatally stabbed on a train car, when they tried to intervene as a fellow passenger screamed anti-Muslim insults at two women, one of whom was wearing a hijab” (Haag, 2017).

Ganesh’s research (2016: 32) further reinforces the argument that “misinformed narratives about the ‘oppression’ of veiled Muslim women are repeated in attacks on visibly Muslim women. A visibly Muslim woman becomes an easier target for a perpetrator because her Muslim identity is more pronounced.” My interviewee Panda agreed that “women are targeted more in terms of aggressive Islamophobic attacks.” Fatima reinforced this point, describing how a “girl had her hijab pulled off.” What is more, in a report on the geography of Islamophobia, Ganesh (2016: 32) asserted that this “unique process of racialisation whereby arrangements of clothing denote ‘Muslimness’ and make the individual a target for racist and anti-Muslim attacks, has a clear impact on the mobility of Muslim women.” Chakraborti and Zempi (2012: 269) add that these “stereotypes about veiled women’s subservience coupled with the assumption that their Muslim identity cannot be mistaken, renders veiled women ‘ideal subjects’ against whom to enact anti-Muslim hostility.”

However, in her interview, Panda argued that “men with beards are targeted as well.” Zara also pointed out that “I wear a hijab, and I have never actually experienced any form of Islamophobia.” Therefore, this may not be a straight-forward gendered issue. My questionnaire data illustrated that only 48% of my respondents believed anti-Muslim hate was a gendered issue. Moreover, my interviewee Gloria asserted that “I don’t think women have it worse off than men. I think both have it equally bad. Because
if a Muslim man has a beard, then that’s also a red flag, isn’t it?” Two questionnaire respondents further maintained that young, bearded Muslim men were more disadvantaged than Muslim women wearing the hijab; these sentiments are reinforced in Pratt Ewing’s ethnographic study (2008) of Muslim men in Germany.

Nonetheless, it remains a fact that Muslim women are disadvantaged in several respects. For example, it is widely perceived in Britain that the niqab is a security concern, as well as challenging in terms of societal integration (Cantle, 2001). Khiabany and Williamson (2008: 69) highlight that “the increased visibility of veiled bodies in Britain today has stirred a response that draws on long-standing orientalist oppositions and reworks them in the current climate of the war on terror.” This has evidenced itself in numerous ways. For my interviewee Gloria, it was manifest during her travels through an airport.

“In Italy, they took me aside, took me to a different room, asked me to take off my scarf so they could look under it, which hasn’t happened again or before. I’ve never ever had to do any of that. So it was a bit of a shock.”

On the subject of airports, Bayrakli and Hafez (2015: 563) highlight that “the government’s own data shows that the existing Schedule 7 stop-and-search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 have relied on profiling and led to a disproportionately high number of non-whites and Muslims being detained.”

In terms of embodying a general security concern, whilst my interviewee Zara agreed that “with the full niqab or burqa, criminals could use it to be unidentifiable,” she argued that the hijab is “just a choice of what you want to wear. It’s a piece of clothing. You’re not hurting anyone by wearing it. I don’t see why you’re offending anyone by wearing it, because you’re not actively influencing them to wear it.” Nevertheless, research points to a growing sentiment in Europe that “veiled women need to unveil themselves in order to be accepted into Western societies” (Chakraborti and Zempi, 2012: 270).

Whilst my interviewee, Hamza, argued that “Muslim women should be allowed to wear what they want to wear,” provided that they go through the same security checks as everybody else, Panda argued that the niqab being perceived as a security threat, was an incredibly confusing concept.
“I will probably always be of the view that women who wear the niqab are more like victims than national security threats. I think women should be allowed to wear whatever they want. I get really angry when people who claim to be feminist talk about niqab being oppressive. It should go both ways. You should be able to do whatever you want. And if a woman wants to wear the niqab, then she should be able to do that. It’s surprising to me, because when I talk to my friends about it, even Muslim friends, they agree with the idea that the niqab is too far, and is a security threat because you should be able to see people’s faces. That to me is a very confusing concept. I can’t get my head around that.

How many crimes have been committed by someone wearing a niqab? Maybe one person did it. Or two people. And the Daily Mail took it as another excuse. Now everybody thinks the niqab is some sort of security threat.”

In further illustrating this perception of niqab-wearing women as a security threat, my interviewee Clementine highlighted that “if a woman with a buggy comes on with three large bags, no matter how suspiciously bulky those bags are, no-one will report that. But they will report a woman who comes on in full niqab, who has a big bag.” In general, these public perceptions centred on niqab-wearing women being threats to security and culture (Cantle, 2001), are also embodied in government policies which attempt to control how Muslim women dress in Europe.

Chakraborti and Zempi (2012: 270) maintain that “the multiple meanings of the veil find themselves subsumed in Islamophobic rhetoric that concentrates on veiling as a sign of difference.” For example, it can be argued that the March 2017 decision by the European Court of Justice to ban religious symbols in the workplace, will disproportionally affect Muslim women wearing the hijab (Bilefsky, 2017). Although the ban pertains to all political and religious symbols, the hijab does not fit the bracket of being a religious symbol in the same way as a cross on a necklace for example. It can be reasoned that the latter can easily be concealed, whilst the former is an integral part of practicing one’s faith. Moreover, “in the aftermath of 9/11 the Muslim veil has a stronger symbolic load in comparison to a kippah or a Sikh turban” (Lyon and Spini, 2004). Bilefsky (2017) contends that a ban on religious symbols is essentially a ban on Muslim women in the workplace, because anyone who reasons that Muslim women will take off their hijab before beginning work each day, is mistaken.
Thus, rather than increasing integration, it could be that this policy, though not explicitly Islamophobic, will do the opposite of what was intended. Gökariksel and Mitchell (2005) note that such rulings highlight how secularism is increasingly being used as a technology of governance. Policies such as these, which are “expressed in humanitarian terms so as to ‘liberate’ veiled Muslim women from the ‘oppression’ of Muslim men (Mancini, 2013; Williamson and Khiabany, 2010), lead themselves to the observation that the face veil must be removed. It can be argued this weakens European guarantees of equality, and lends itself to the notion that faith communities, and Muslim women in particular, are no longer protected as members of the imagined community.

On the other hand, Shoaib Khan (2017), argues that the ECJ’s ruling is much more nuanced than maintained by Bilefsky (2017). The seemingly controversial law does not ban religion itself in the workplace. He maintains that the justifications present are powerful; for instance although religious symbols are banned in the workplace, this policy must be “consistently applied across the board.” Therefore, it is highly likely that employers may feel that a blanket ban is impractical. Khan (2017) and Evans (2017) also note that details have been omitted in overblown mainstream media coverage on this ruling, namely that the decision on the recent case was more about workplace attire, and was thus “not intrinsically a question of religious freedom, but one of employment rights” (Khan, 2017). They argue that employers have to be still more careful of indirect discrimination in light of this ruling—companies will not be able to act without justification. Furthermore, Stephen Evans (2017) maintains that “the court’s opinion simply mirrors existing British equality and anti-discrimination law.” Finally, it is worth remembering that the ECJ does not have extensive powers; rather than deciding cases, the court merely “provides guidance to domestic courts on specific questions of EU law that arise within a case” (Khan, 2017). If the nuances and practicalities behind this ECJ ruling are taken into account, it may indeed decrease gendered consequences of Islamophobia in the workplace. Certainly, in 2001, “London’s Metropolitan Police Service accommodated the hijab as an optional part of the force’s official uniform” (Evans, 2017).

As a final point, although my empirical data indicated that offline Islamophobia has an explicitly gendered dimension, the same cannot be determined in regards to the cyber
context of Islamophobia. Online self-censorship according to gender illustrated that, of those who had self-censored on Facebook, 50% were male, and 50% were female (table 2). Thus, in regards to self-censorship being a gendered issue online, further research must be undertaken to drawn firmer conclusions, utilising a much larger pool of British Muslim participants.

Chapter Seven: Summary

7.1 Conclusions

“I won’t say it though I may think it, that thing. I dream of saying, that thing, banging in its padded cell… I bite my lip, my tongue. I mute the speaker” (Jarman, 2008).

My primary hypothesis was that in light of recent political developments in Europe and America, specifically those that have linked Islam with terrorism, amplified Islamophobia has resulted in British Muslims imposing self-censorship on their expression on Facebook. A number of studies (Mamdani, 2002; Parvez, 2007) have concluded that there is a notably broad audience acceptance of the normalised link between Islam and terrorism, moreover, that there has been a significant securitisation of Muslims in mainstream broadcast and print media following 9/11. In numerous cases, it was highlighted by both my interviewees and questionnaire respondents, that “where a so-called Muslim has been the perpetrator of an attack, they’ve definitely used the word terrorism. Whereas if it’s a non-Muslim, they’ll use strange words like lone-wolf or focus on mental health causes” (Zara). As repeated by the majority of my respondents, this subconscious link between Islam and terrorism, is a critical issue.

This link between Islam and terrorism is not only evident in the UK, but also in America. However, as far as Donald Trump and his travel bans were concerned, several questionnaire respondents believed that these executive orders had paradoxically “made people a lot more sympathetic towards Muslims” (Pete) in general, and had allowed for increased freedom of speech on social media platforms. Rather than singling out Trump’s policies as Islamophobic, my interviewee, Hamza, argued that the American president’s primary goal was not to offend. Questionnaire respondents
further asserted that in this case, it was not about peddling a victim mind-set, but rather, positively engaging with these issues as a community, both online and offline.

Nevertheless, my empirical data highlighted that my interviewees felt more victimised when discussing recent developments in Europe, as opposed to America. This was expected as all ten interviewees were British. For example, in terms of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, most, but not all of my respondents believed that it was targeted specifically at countering ‘Islamic’ extremism, with little focus on other far-right extremism. Of those questionnaire respondents who were aware of Prevent, 91% opposed the policy. It should be noted however, that only 47% of the respondents were aware of the Prevent strategy in the first instance; this was expected, given that in general, when the public are questioned about specific policies, they struggle with the specifics (PEW, 2010).

In terms of general sentiments, my data collection concluded that Muslims felt the need to justify their religion in terms of its association with terrorism, particularly following the 2015 Paris attacks. Given that this established association between Islam and terrorism is highly securitised offline, there was nothing to suggest the same was not the case on the Internet. Online, there was a danger that government policies could increasingly allow for “targeting people based solely on their religious background” (Zara). My empirical data concluded that the knowledge of this possibility was causing some British Muslims to inadvertently alter their behaviour online, in terms of cautiously considering social media posts they uploaded, lest anything sounded “a bit dodgy” (Pete). In spite of these reservations however, social media platforms could have an amplified role to play for British Muslims, in terms of enabling freedom of expression and the circulation of delegitimised voices (McDonald, 2008: 9). Yet when I tested this hypothesis, my empirical data revealed that two thirds of my questionnaire respondents did not engage with political or religious opinions on Facebook.

For most of my interviewees, far from this being a case of last minute self-censorship as posited in Das and Kramer’s study (2013), not engaging with recent political events and sensitive religious content on Facebook, was “nothing to do with feeling vulnerable as a Muslim” (Fatima). Their non-engagement had more to do with using Facebook primarily as a social media site. For my interviewee Fatima, a minimal presence on
Facebook was more about “being quite a private person,” rather than it being the consequence of a “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), instigated by experiencing Islamophobia. Nevertheless, in terms of the impacts of Islamophobia online, my interviewee Panda did argue that “people are just so used to knowing that people hate them. I would just be like, whatever, it’s another one of those comments.” Panda’s assertion links to the conclusion drawn by Hayes (2007), that “a hostile opinion climate prompts greater use of expression avoidance strategies than a friendly climate.”

On the whole, most of my interviewees were not hesitant about expressing their opinions on Facebook, and were in agreement that “everyone is allowed their own opinion” (Zara). However, for some of my interviewees, there was a clear distinction between freely expressing opinions, and specifically targeting religious minorities with unsubstantiated facts. Both Gloria and Flash were of the opinion that there were double standards when it came to online hate propagated against Muslims, versus other religious minorities. This is a cause for concern, because aside from causing psychological harm (Seglow, 2016), “people posting online hate could be so used to it, that it becomes normalised. Eventually, they stop hiding behind the screen” (Zara).

My interviewees were ultimately divided on whether they would engage with individuals posting Islamophobic hate on Facebook. In general, most, like Gloria, asserted that they tended “to stay away from things like politics and religion.” Moreover, although 42% of my questionnaire respondents stated that they would challenge a Facebook friend if he or she uploaded Islamophobic content, the majority of respondents asserted that they would either block or ignore such posts. The bulk of my interviewees believed that offline engagement was a better option; they argued that engaging on Facebook was effective only when dealing with close friends. Thus, the action of deleting people who were not close friends on Facebook, was a recurrent theme over the course of both my interviews and questionnaires. More often than not, this action was one of convenience, rather than being one pertaining to self-censorship. Certainly, Coleman (1988) asserts that abandoning social ties as people move through their life, is not an extraordinary occurrence.
In regards to the impacts of Islamophobia on the Internet, more than half of my questionnaire respondents maintained that anti-Muslim hate online had explicitly affected their willingness to express opinions. However, the percentage of interviewees disagreeing at 60%, was more significant. The majority of my interviewees argued that in the context of the aforementioned trigger events, rather than having undertaken some degree of “private self-censorship” (Cook and Heilmann, 2013), online discussions had opened up on Facebook. Consequently, they were less likely to self-censor; “I'm not less likely to give an opinion. I'm more likely almost, to share it” (Clementine). This finding is in direct opposition to Das and Kramer’s study (2013), which concludes that 71% of users present some manner of last minute self-censorship when utilising social media platforms. On the other hand, the fact remains that the majority of my questionnaire respondents did contend that online Islamophobia had explicitly affected their willingness to express opinions both online and offline. This conclusion should not be entirely overlooked, as it links to the study undertaken by Hampton et al. (2014), which posits that self-censorship on social media tends to most affect those holding minority opinions. It also adheres to Weber and Gramsci’s theorisations of ICTs becoming increasingly embedded into the world, and embodying a means through which the ‘integral state’ is able to permeate civil society.

In terms of the impacts of Islamophobia offline, reports written by Tell MAMA (2015) and MEND (2014), point to increased anti-Muslim hate crimes in the UK. The severity of Islamophobic incidents appears to be influenced by recent trigger events such as the 2016 Brussels and Paris attacks, and the 2017 Westminster and Stockholm attacks. This outcome corresponds to Stephan and Stephan’s Integrated Threat Theory (1996), which demonstrates that prejudicial reactions are defense mechanisms when individuals believe their values are under attack. Certainly, 89% of questionnaire respondents were of the opinion that the refugee crisis had increased anti-Muslim hate. Although these connections require further study, it is apparent that “today, more than ever, we need our government, our political parties and of course our media to act with the utmost responsibility and help steer us towards a post-Brexit Britain where xenophobia and hatred are utterly rejected” (Ganesh, 2016: 6).
This is particularly critical given that “the visibility of Muslim identity is key to triggering anti-Muslim hate crime” (Awan and Zempi, 2015). Most interviewees like Zara, asserted that there had been an increase in the “small things, people getting upset, hijabs being ripped off, and people shouting things,” and that “things are getting worse” (Pete), following recent trigger events in Europe and America. Nevertheless, most of my interviewees believed that London itself was “a very tolerant city” (Fatima) and “it’s so multi-cultural and diverse” (Clementine) that Islamophobia is not “a problem in a place like London” (Hamza). Thus, my empirical data clearly highlighted a geographical dimension to Islamophobia, with London generally being perceived as much more tolerant than other UK cities. However, despite this perceived tolerance, given that most of my interviewees did not, or would not, report anti-Muslim hate to the Metropolitan Police, it can be concluded in line with McCollum’s study (2017), that Islamophobia remains a statistically underrepresented problem nationwide.

Vis-à-vis Islamophobia being a gendered problem which contributes to the silencing of women, “whose suffering and engagement with security discourses is [often] neglected” (Hansen, 2000), there are several concrete conclusions which can be deducted from my research. In terms of the niqab, in line with Ole Waever’s securitisation theory, most of my interviewees were in agreement that the garment was indisputably perceived to be a security threat by the general public, despite the fact that “I’ve not seen any evidence of crime-waves orchestrated by burqa-wearing hoodlums” (Robbins, 2011). Moreover, most of my interviewees and questionnaire respondents were in agreement that offline, due to increased “post-racial racism” (Tyrer, 2013), “wearing a headscarf makes you most likely to be a Muslim. Often women are seen as more vulnerable, and will be targeted anyway” (Zara). This supplements the conclusions made by Zempi (2012) and Elmir (2016), that Muslim women bear the brunt of Islamophobic prejudice. Nevertheless, some interviewees and questionnaire respondents did contend that young, bearded men were also at a disadvantage when it came to experiencing offline Islamophobia.

Finally, although my empirical data indicated that offline, Islamophobia had an explicitly gendered dimension due to the visibility of the hijab, the same could not be determined in regards to the cyber context of Islamophobia. Of those that had self-censored on Facebook as a consequence of Islamophobia, 50% were male, and 50%
were female. Thus, the prevalence of gendered self-censorship in terms of online Islamophobia requires further research. Nonetheless, my overall study has concluded that, despite deliberations on the exact nature of Islamophobia as a theoretical concept, anti-Muslim hate is extremely prevalent online, and has both positively and negatively affected freedom of speech as exercised by British Muslims.

7.2 Auto-Critique

It is imperative to conduct an auto-critique because “researchers are themselves a powerful, and often under-recognised, influence on their research and their findings” (Blaxter et al., 2006). In conducting this review, my aims are to recognise my own biases (Schutt, 2011: 333), as well as the junctures where my research could be bettered in the future.

Firstly, it should be noted that selection biases begin from the moment researchers choose their topic (Collier & Mahoney, 1996). For me, this was a limitation in that I was given the title “does the UN have a role surrounding the issue of freedom of speech on the internet and human rights?” in conjunction with my internship. Selecting a theoretical concept and research objectives to mould into a pre-existing title was demanding, as my flexibility was limited. This was especially challenging, since it was also imperative for me to include both a gender and a technology aspect. Nevertheless, the broad sub-topic “freedom of speech” did offer me the elasticity to alter my research title from one initially centred on Pakistan’s Electronic Crimes Prevention Bill, to my ultimate topic on Islamophobia and self-censorship on social media platforms.

Secondly, the fact that I chose to focus on the issue of Islamophobia, was both a positive and a negative. On one hand, as a British Muslim myself, I was able to instantly understand, and effectively analyse terminology and concepts pertaining to Islam. Moreover, there were benefits to being perceived by my interviewees as an insider; this allowed rapport to be strengthened through “mutual respect and understanding” (Valentine 2005: 113). Despite the fact that a one month time limitation, meant that I interviewed only ten British Muslims, my position did allow me to gather powerful insights into personal stories, and increase the willingness of
interviewees to disclose sensitive material. On the other hand, as asserted by my interviewee Aaron, it may have been that “the reason we think Islamophobia is a big issue is because we’re Muslim ourselves.” Certainly, I was emotionally involved when reading reports from organisations on anti-Muslim hate crimes in the UK. However, this passion was balanced following regular feedback sessions with my two independent supervisors, who ensured that I continually took a step back, and reconsidered certain assertions and policies with a more objective lens.

Finally, whilst conducting my interviews I could have noted “adjectives used in descriptions [and] tonal qualities such as aggressiveness, sarcasm, flippancy, and emotional language” (Macnamara, 2016: 17), in order to complement my coding and provide greater depth to my discussion chapters. Moreover, if I were to conduct my research again, I would use an alternative to snowball sampling for recruiting my interviewees; this would ensure a less biased sample in terms of age (Jacobsen and Landau 2008: 196). I could have further benefitted from a more representative sample size in my survey. Given that the 2011 census reports that there are 2706066 Muslims living in the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2014; World Mapper, 2017 (Image 6)), I would have required 384 questionnaire responses, according to the website surveysample, in order to have ascertained at a 95% confidence level that my mean results would be +/-5 of the real average. Unmistakably, my sample size of 62 questionnaire respondents is a limitation, as I risk committing ecological fallacities.

However, in conclusion, I believe that I have successfully answered and analysed research questions significant to my broader literature. Moreover, this dissertation has achieved its wider aim of bridging the gap where the securitisation of Muslims, was yet to be analysed comprehensively in relation to the effect Islamophobia has on online self-censorship.

Image 6 (left) from World Mapper illustrates territory sizes to show the proportion of Muslims living in each country.
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