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MASTER'S THESIS

UN Role in the Mediation of Intractable Conflicts: The Case of Cyprus

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Master Thesis Proposal

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Proposed Topic:

UN role in conflict negotiation and mediation: the case of Cyprus

Topic Characteristics:

This thesis will focus on the United Nations role in conflict negotiation and mediation through the case of Cyprus which has challenged the international community for over 50 years. Some scholars examined the Cyprus conflict as an intractable, identity-based conflict (Bolukbasi, 1998; Fisher, 2001; Hadjipavlou, 2007; Michael, 2007). Despite the ideas of Greek Enosis and Turkish taksim/partition, the Republic of Cyprus came into existence in 1960 together with the Zurich-London Accords and Britain, Greece and Turkey became the guarantor powers of the Republic of Cyprus according to the Treaty of Guarantee 1960. The conflict in Cyprus started with the political and constitutional crises in 1963 between the Cypriot communities and turned into violent conflict after a short time. After the Greek coup and military intervention of Turkey in the island in July 1974, the ceasefire was declared and the United Nations immediately started to intercommunal talks and continues to do. In this thesis, I aim to analyze the attempts of the United Nations, including third-party initiatives, intercommunal talks, resolutions over 50 years for ending the conflict together with examining the perspectives of the Cypriot communities throughout history about a subject of refugees, presence of the Turkish army and increasing of Turkish settlers in the North, economic embargo to the Northern Cyprus and unification or partition ideas. Although the United Nations has an important role in providing a

settlement on intrastate and interstate conflicts and despite all UN initiatives to implement a settlement in Cyprus, the peaceful solution has not been produced between the actors and this small island of the Eastern Mediterranean remains divided. I am going to comprehend and analyze the UN conflict negotiation and mediation policies in search of a solution in the case of Cyprus. Accordingly, it is important to analyze the UN approaches to solve the conflict and produce a settlement in the region in order to examine what is the role of UN in conflict negotiation and mediation in deep-rooted conflicts.

Hypotheses:

1. Despite the fact that the United Nations has an important role to reduce the level of violation in deep-rooted conflicts, its role as a conflict negotiator and a mediator is limited because of deadlock in the intractability of the conflict parties.

2. United Nations' traditional policies in conflict negotiation and mediation have problems to produce a desired settlement in intractable conflicts because of the failure in the creation of confidence and new communal area among citizens.

3. The mediation policies of the United Nations in Cyprus are driven by representation of the fulfillment of Cypriot communities' desires as a tool for the promotion of the peaceful settlement.

Methodology:

This thesis is designed as an explanatory case study and it will help to comprehend the role of the UN in search of a settlement as a conflict negotiator or a mediator and to understand the dimensions of the continuity of deep-rooted conflicts through the case of Cyprus. Data of this research were collected through secondary sources, including books which focus on the conflict in Cyprus, articles about the intercommunal talks between the Cypriot communities since the 1960s as well as articles about the UN conflict negotiation and mediation in intractable conflicts, and UN documents such as reports, resolutions or guidelines about both Cyprus conflict and conflict negotiation and international mediation. Cyprus conflict has

challenged the UN conflict negotiation and mediation efforts to produce a peaceful settlement in the zone. I will exemplify this connection together with providing an analyzes of resources, which were used in the thesis, about mediation efforts and policies of the United Nations in Cyprus. Indeed, thanks to the case study method, I will describe the characteristics of the UN's conflict negotiation and mediation policies throughout the case of Cyprus as an intractable conflict and all ways of UN's contribution in Cyprus as a conflict negotiator and a mediator since 1960 in order to analyze what is the UN's role in conflict negotiation and mediation. It is clear that secondary sources are helpful for my analysis to describe what is the understanding of the UN in mediation and to operationalize the UN policies in mediation of intractable conflicts.

Outline:
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      o The last attempt of the UN and new talks
4. The future of the UN's role in conflict negotiation and mediation
5. Conclusion

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Onur Kaya

DECLARATION:

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 159.795 keystrokes long (including spaces), i.e. 83 manuscript pages.

Onur Kaya   31.07.2017

Abstract

This thesis investigates United Nations role in mediation of intractable conflicts through the case of Cyprus. Intractable conflicts are identified as complex, long-standing and resistant to conflict resolution. We examine the complexity of intractable conflicts regarding its persistence, deep-rooted fear, the existence of historical grievances, political and social asymmetries, and lack of communication between conflict parties. Mediation is a conflict resolution method which is a third-party intervention and aims to encourage conflict parties to produce a permanent solution to the conflict. The case of Cyprus is an obvious example to understand and analyze the UN mediation as a conflict management policy in intractable conflicts. The UN, Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have tried to find a permanent settlement over 50 years. Despite all efforts, the conflict remains unresolved. Although the UN mediation has managed to prevent further escalation and violence in Cyprus, it has limits to encourage parties to produce a permanent solution. This thesis empirically analyzes the historical development of the UN engagement in Cyprus and examines its role in the mediation of intractable conflicts through the UN-sponsored inter-communal talks in Cyprus.

Keywords: Intractable conflict, conflict resolution, Cyprus conflict, United Nations mediation, inter-communal talks.

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1. Introduction

Cyprus is strategically important due to its geopolitical location, although the population is low. Since the outbreak of the inter-communal crisis in 1963, the island has hosted an ongoing conflict between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. According to Georgiades (2007), "the Cyprus problem is highly complex, combining ethnocultural, political, and religious overtures and the vested interests of a multiplicity of external paragons, including Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, the USA, the UN and the EU" (p. 574). "Accordingly, the conflict on Cyprus is not merely a conflict of substantive issues, such as territory or refugees, but essentially is a conflict of mistrust, fear, and suspicions" (Yılmaz, 2010: 52). The dispute in the island of Cyprus one of the intractable conflicts in the world because of its complexity regarding permanent failures in the negotiations to put an end to challenges in conflict. There are also different cultural, political and social approaches of the two Cypriot communities to negotiations together with the continuity of the lack of communication, trust, confidence between them.

The attention to the intractable ethnonational conflicts has increased in recent years (Hadjipavlou, 2007: 350). Schiff (2008) stated that "the resolution of ethnonational conflicts is one of the most difficult challenges facing the international community" (p. 387). When the intractability of the conflict increases, its impact on civilians and institutions become more devastating (UNITAIR, 2010: 5). There are several sources of intractability in the conflicts. In the beginning, intractable conflicts are self-perpetuating, protracted conflicts. Producing of an agreement between the conflict parties is more difficult in these conflicts. Protracted conflicts are identified as

intractable conflicts because of the several failed attempts to build a settlement to put an end (Schiff, 2008: 387-388). Intractable conflicts are described as long-standing conflicts. "Conflicts that continue over extended periods of time lead to the accumulation of grievances incorporated into each party's version of history" (Cracker et. al., 2005: 7). In addition to this, Peck and Westheim (2014) stated that "the longer a conflict persists, the more intractable it becomes, making its resolution ever more difficult" (p. 58). Hadjipavlou (2007) defined the intractability of a conflict as;

Intractability is partly due to the complexity of conflicts that involve some parties, persistence, existential fears, loss of hope for a constructive resolution, ethnic victimization, unaddressed historical grievances and traumas, economic asymmetries, unequal distribution of resources, and structural inequalities.

Hadjipavlou, 2007: 350

Also, there are deep-rooted fear and hostility between the parties in intractable conflicts. Historical grievance plays a key role in the continuity of the intractable conflicts. The past of the conflict creates an obstacle for the future of it. The elimination of the fear and the hostility between the conflict parties is the most difficult challenge during the conflict management efforts. According to Cracker et. al. (2005), "deep-rooted communal or ethnic cleavages contributing to 'winner-take all' psychology" (p. 9). Each party in the conflicts "develops a vested interest in the continuation of the conflict" (Bercovitch, 2003). Thirdly, intractable conflicts resist conflict management, resolution efforts. According to UNITAIR (2010), when the parties could not produce a settlement for many years, the conflict becomes more intractable, and the solution

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becomes excessively hard to establish (p. 5). In intractable conflicts, official negotiations repeatedly reach a deadlock (Schiff, 2008: 388). Conflict parties are not willing to compromise to produce a peaceful settlement in intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013: 924). The failure of the previous efforts to create an agreement increases the intractability of the conflict. In fact, that conflict parties tend to refuse a settlement including direct negotiation between them or any other third-party intervention (Cracker et. al., 2005: 5). Intractable conflicts resist conflict management and conflict resolution efforts, including mediation, negotiation or diplomacy (Coleman, 2000).

Furthermore, there are complicated issues in intractable conflicts such as sovereignty or identity. According to Bercovitch (2003), the concepts of sovereignty, identity or value become an intangible issue in intractable conflicts. Intractable conflicts are rooted in different ethnics, religions or cultures. Different identity has a significant role in the intractable conflicts because of that it creates a continuity of the conflictual relationship between the parties. Furthermore, the concept of sovereignty serves as a basis for the negotiations in intractable conflicts regarding identity differences. According to Brahm (2003), "sovereignty is typically taken to mean the possession of absolute authority within a bounded territorial space." Conflict parties tend to guarantee their power within their authority during the negotiations. Finally, there is a lack of communication between the parties in intractable conflicts. "Communication becomes impaired and eventually nonexistent" (Coleman, 2000). The lack of communication causes the increasing of the intractability of the conflicts. The hatred, the fear creates a non-existent communication between parties and the lack of communication between the conflict parties increases the hostility. According to

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Anastasiou (2002), the absence of mutual communication is the primary reason of the intractability of a conflict (p. 585). In order to eliminate intractability, parties must improve their communication with each other. Moreover, Ladisch (2006) stated that reconciliation is necessary and can provide a peaceful environment for a solution in intractable conflicts (p. 116). The tension can be easily escalated UN the protracted conflicts (Schiff, 2008: 387). Reconciliation and mutual communication would prevent the escalation of tension. Conflict management efforts always focus on the establishment of communication in intractable conflicts to produce a peaceful settlement (Bercovitch, 2004).

The Cyprus conflict has also been an important issue for foreign policies of Greece and Turkey. Because of the internationalization of the conflict, United Nations established a peacekeeping force in the island. The United Nations has been encouraging the Cypriot communities to put an end to ongoing conflict and to promote a peaceful settlement (Yılmaz, 2010: 36). The Security Council Resolutions has clarified the United Nations' position on the Cyprus problem in the ways of emphasizing the political equality of the community and searching for a federal solution (Müftüler-bac, 1999: 563). Mediation is identified as the conflict management method by the UN in Cyprus. Throughout history, there have been different methods for conflict management or conflict resolution in the protracted social conflicts. UN uses mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement as conflict resolution techniques (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 148). Mediation is a different form of conflict resolution than arbitration and conciliation because of that the responsibility to produce a peaceful settlement is between the conflict parties in mediation process not on mediators (Ridley-Duff & Bennett, 2010: 4). United Nations Department of Political Affairs defined mediation as

a "political process in the two or more parties to a violent conflict agree to the appointment of a third-party work impartially with the parties to help them talk through options and voluntarily reach an agreement to end the armed conflict and secure a just and sustainable peace" (UNDPA, 2011: 12).

In this paper, I will focus on United Nations' role in the mediation of intractable conflicts with an emphasis on the case of Cyprus. At the beginning of the paper, I will examine the United Nations mediation policy in intractable conflicts. United Nations' mediation is an effective form of conflict resolution policy in intractable, protracted conflicts. The UN contributed an outline to produce a sufficient form of peacekeeping and peacemaking method. In the second part of the paper, I will focus on the UN mediation policies in the Cyprus conflict, characterized as intractable, throughout the UN-sponsored negotiations since the collapsing of state in 1963 to examine its role in intractable conflicts. In order to understand the mediation policies of the UN in Cyprus, firstly I will analyze the historical background of the conflict. After that, I will focus on the UN-sponsored talks throughout the history of dispute from the establishment of UNFICYP in 1964 to the Geneva Talks in 2017. In the final part, I will focus on the future of the UN's mediation role in intractable conflicts together with examining the failures and successes of United Nations engagement in Cyprus.

2. Understanding of the UN mediation in intractable conflicts

The concept of mediation could be identified as a valid instrument for interstate and intra-state conflicts to produce a peaceful settlement. It is a beneficial method to

prevent further escalation of the conflicts (UNDPA, 2011: 14). It is also helpful to find

creative solutions for the prevention of the continuity of the conflict. Ki-Moon (2012)

examined that the mediation is very effective method for conflict prevention, conflict

management and conflict resolution (p. 1). According to UNDPA (2011) the concept of

mediation is;

> helpful to encourage communication and to find common ground, focus on the
>
> underlying or real interests of, focus on both the future and the past, to find
>
> creative solutions, place the responsibility on the parties to decide the outcome,
>
> assist parties to reach mutually satisfying agreements.

UNDPA, 2011: 12.

In the process of mediation, mediators are trained to take responsibility for the

negotiation process. To add, they let disputants complete outcomes (Ridley-Duff &

Bennett, 2010: 12). They aim to control the negotiation process and encourage conflict

parties to determine outcomes (Ridley-Duff & Bennett, 2010: 12). About the fact that;

the creation of necessary conditions for the settlement, mediators can use several

tactics (Beber, 2012: 400). For instance, they can arrange negotiations for the conflict

parties (Beber, 2012: 401). The negotiating capacity of this dispute is strengthened

with the help of the mediator (Ki-Moon, 2012: 6). There are two basic options for the

UN mediators, face-to-face in direct talks or the 'proximity' indirect talks between the

parties (Peck & Westheim, 2014: 108). According to Peck and Westheim (2014), to

provide new points, indirect talks can be a useful way to establish for conflict parties

(p. 109).

In addition to mediators, facilities, good offices, dialogue efforts, joint technical and working groups can be used in mediation process a (Ki-Moon, 2012: 4; UNITAR, 2010: 32). The Secretary General and his representatives implement the mediation and use of good offices or working groups in conflicts (Peck & Westheim, 2014: 61). If the Security Council's efforts to produce a settlement are failed, these alternative methods of the Secretary General should become a part of the mediation strategy (IPI, 2009: 28). They are also effective ways to reach the parties. For instance, good offices of the UN Secretary-General have an important role in the conflicts. According to Myint-U (2006), it is essential to recognize the role of good offices in the conflict (p. 90). In 2005 World Summit Outcome, parties agreed on the necessity of supporting the Secretary General's strength on the dispute to promote the capacity of good offices in conflicts for the establishment of effective mediation (Myint-U, 2006: 90).

United Nations mediation policies have several principles and strategies to create an effective mediation process to encourage conflict parties. First of all, there are several elements which constitute the elementary principles of the mediation process. To name these elementary principles one by one, voluntary, impartial, confidential, binding in honor, towards an agreed solution (Ridley-Duff & Bennett, 2010: 15). Mediation refers to the establishment of an acceptable, impartial and neutral third-party intervention to assist conflict parties for contributing their settlement. States and other actors support mediation which is a voluntary process to produce an agreement between conflict parties (Ki-Moon, 2012: 2). Impartiality is essential for the UN Peacekeeping forces in armed conflicts (IPI, 2009: 7). Administration of Justice in United Nations (2009) defined the mediation strategy as an informal conflict resolution strategy (p. 3). It is important to guide parties through the negotiation process to create

a suitable setting rather than to impose a solution (Peck & Westheim, 2014: 60). It contains both ingenious and obvious ways in response to managing the conflict (Bercovitch, 1991: 3). Although the United Nations supports peace talks and mediate the negotiations, it is not always at the center of negotiations (Hampson, 2003: 26).

Furthermore, the other principle for the mediation is the building of common ground in the conflict together with the consent of conflict parties. Mediation efforts require parties' consent. The conflict parties must be ready to negotiate with each other and accept the UN as a mediator for the establishment of effective mediation strategy. They must be willing to solve the conflict. There is no enforcement in the mediation for a solution. Conflict parties must be ready to negotiate with each other for effective conflict resolution (Hampson, 2003: 10; Ki-Moon, 2012: 8). It is, of course, crucial that the conflict parties must accept the UN's mediation role to resolve the dispute (Peck & Westheim, 2014: 61). Due to that, the establishment of a common understanding between the conflict parties is necessary for the mediation (Ki-Moon, 2012: 9). There must be recognition that the mediation has a vital role in the continuity of negotiation and hope for producing a hope for a solution. Because of that, the building of confidence, common understanding and conflict between conflict parties is a necessary step to create a peaceful environment for the settlement during the negotiations (UNITAR, 2010: 8).

Moreover, mediation process should be contributed according to characteristics of the conflict and interests of conflict parties (Ki-Moon, 2012: 4). The nature and features of the conflicts shape the mediation process and mediators' plans (Bercovitch, 1991: 4). There is a relationship between the character of the conflict and mediation process; it depends on the nature of conflicts (Peck & Westheim, 2014: 63). For

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effective mediation, understanding of each party's interests is crucial regarding the context of concerns, fears, aspirations, and needs (Peck & Westheim, 2014: 40). Mediators try to encourage conflict parties to produce an acceptable solution for all. In other words, they assist the conflict parties in order to contribute negotiations for reaching a peaceful settlement (Administration of Justice, 2009: 3; Ridley-Duff & Bennett, 2010: 4). Because of that, the mediator should try to find out what interests, concerns, fears, aspirations, dreams, and nightmares led to setting those positions (UNITAR, 8). Moreover, the recognition of intra-state conflicts as a threat to international peace and security is a significant step for the mediation process to examine the nature of conflict (Ki-Moon, 2012: 2). Mediators have an important role in eliminating these problems to provide the continuity of the negotiations. It is essential to understand each side's most vital interests and concerns for the possible solution (UNITAR, 7). Mediators can draft an agenda and discuss interests and demands of conflict parties during the negotiations. They can help to prioritize the parties' interests and develop a plan during the negotiations (Beber, 2012: 401). They aim to avoid minor issues due to prevent a deadlock in the negotiation. A mediator clarifies what matters most importantly and encourage the conflict parties to find a solution. In addition to this, Mediators can provide information between the conflict parties to manage the relationship (Beber, 2012: 401). The mediation policy can be efficient and fruitful, only if a mediator analyzes the nature of the conflict and vital interests of conflict parties.

Also, a mediation policy should be contributed together with analyzing of the ongoing or previous negotiation examples. According to UNDPA (2011), the failure or success of current or past mediation engagements is underlying criteria for the creation of a sustainable mediation (p. 12). In the case of conflicts, there could be many failed

attempts before the establishment of the peaceful settlement. There should not be short-term and quick-fix solutions in the mediation process (Apakan, 2013: 41). We can simplify the exact reason behind this continuous mediation process as it is an issue of persistence. It is a matter of persistence, because, when one side accepted the UN proposals, the other would refuse maybe as if a settlement acceptable to the other be suspected or not good enough (Fisher, 2001: 322). According to UNDPA (2011), the mediation strategy should be designed together with analyzing previous efforts given the fact that what were the reasons for success or failure (p. 12). Mediation process could be faced with different problems such as the lack of communication or deadlock in the negotiations. The establishment of the direct communication between the conflict parties is the biggest issue for the mediation process, whereas there is no violence (IPI, 2009: 10-11). The UN mediation involves an encouragement to communication. The UN mediation policy believed in that listening and understanding of the parties' interests is very necessary for effective mediation (UNITAIR, 2010: 17-18). Mediation policies aim to contribute a communication support for the conflict parties (IPI, 2009: 26). Communication support must be established in the mediation process. According to IPI (2009), the lack of communication channels posed problems in the peace process (p. 26).

There is growing support for mediation as a method of conflict prevention and resolution in regional, natural and international levels due to its effectiveness (Apakan, 2013: 39). United Nations was always a famous and important mediator in the intra-state conflicts. Even in the 21st century, the United Nations has continued its importance on the mediation in conflicts (Hampson, 2003: 26). United Nations'

mediation is essential on the ground of the protection of international peace and security (Yılmaz, 2012: 2). According to UNITAR (2010), the UN's mediation, including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building measures, aims to resolve the conflict sooner (p. 2). Cyprus is an example case for analyzing and understanding of the UN mediation policies in the intractable conflicts. Despite to all attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict; the peaceful settlement could not be produced on the island as the way that local and international actors desired. In fact, the Cyprus conflict can be identified as a protracted social conflict and one of the most intractable conflicts in the international arena (Hampson, 2003: 20; Müftüler-bac, 1999: 560; Khasman, 1999: 1).

Since the beginning of inter-communal violence in Cyprus in 1963, there has not been any significant change in the conflict. According to Kanavau (2006), the Cyprus issue has deeply resistant to any change (p. 280). Due to that, it can be identified as a frozen conflict (Kovras, 2012: 407). According to Psaltis (2016), the frozen conflicts can be defined better by the term 'protracted conflict' (p. 19). Broome also examined the case of Cyprus as an example of protracted social conflict (p. 191). Furthermore, Fisher (2001) defined the Cyprus conflict as an intractable, identity-based conflict which is deadlocked and frustrated over 40 years (p. 307-308). United Nations has been accepted as a third-party mediator by both Cypriot communities since UNFICYP's establishment in 1964 (Yılmaz, 2012: 10). UNFICYP preferred mediation to restore peace and security in Cyprus (Findlay, 2012: 95). In the following part, I will focus on the UN mediation efforts in Cyprus together with examining the historical background of the conflict in order to understand and analyze the vital interests of

Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the UN-based negotiations throughout the history of the conflict.

3. The Historical Background of the Cyprus Conflict

3.1 From British rule to the independent Republic

The historical background of Cyprus conflict is essential to analyze and understand the nature of United Nations mediation efforts on the island and relationship between Cyprus communities. The island of Cyprus was under control of the Ottoman Empire during 1571 and 1878 (Yılmaz, 2010: 39). In 1878, the Ottoman Empire turned over the island to the British Empire, and the British rule had continued over the island until 1960. Although the Greek nationalist movement started in the 19th century against the Ottoman Empire, it failed to spread in all Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 1985: 190). But, it caused a widening the gap between the two communities of Cyprus. The Greek nationalist movement was accelerated in the middle of the 20th century in Cyprus. There are two major periods for the Greek Cypriot nationalism in that time. The first one is the Greek Cypriot rebellion against the British rule. In 1931, the idea of joining with Greece (Enosis) started to turn into a violent form of the British rule on the island, but the uprising was failed (Rappas, 2008: 364; Yılmaz, 2010: 42). The rebellion proclaimed the 'Enosis' of Greek Cypriots, and it spread rapidly on the island, but it was not successful (Rappas, 2008: 363). Until the beginning of the1950s, the nationalist campaign had failed to shift into a violent form. According to Yılmaz (2010), after the election of Makarios III as the Archbishop, Enosis was spread between Greek Cypriots at the beginning of the 1950s (p. 42-43). Together with the spread of Enosis

on the island again, the Greek Cypriot communities started a new form of the uprising which is the second phase of the development of the Greek movement is associated with the establishment of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) on the island, a violent uprising against the British rule. (Fisher and Keashly, 1991: 39).

The EOKA began its violent campaign against the British forces in 1955. Once after their actions began, in 1956, the Archbishop Makarios was exiled through charges regarding his complicity with the EOKA (Yılmaz, 2010: 44). On the other hand, although Turkish Cypriots protected its collective identity with Turkey after the independence of Turkey in 1923, Turkish Cypriot community had a good relationship with the British rule on the island and refused to join the independence uprisings of the Greek Cypriot community (Yılmaz, 2010: 44). Turkish Cypriots were opponents of Enosis. Due to the spread of EOKA in the island, Turkish Cypriot community started to think the partition. They entitled the right of self-determination. Most Turkish Cypriots prefer the separate Turkish Cypriot state rather than any Greek Cypriot rule (Bahcheli, 2000: 204). Due to the spread of EOKA on the island, Turkish Cypriots started to consider the partition and establish armament in the late 1950s. Turkish Cypriot community urged a campaign for the separation against the idea of enosis of the Greeks (Bahcheli, 2000: 204). Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) started to act against EOKA in 1958. The British rule failed to stop violent attacks between EOKA and TMT. Because of violence between EOKA and TMT, paramilitary groups of the Cypriot communities caused numerous refugees and displaced persons (Moore, 2011: 30).

In 1959, the British Empire decided to leave the island. In order to discuss terms and future of the island, the Empire called Greece and Turkey to the meeting. In February 1959, Britain, Greece, and Turkey started to negotiate in Zurich regarding a solution to the Cyprus problem and after in London (Yılmaz, 2010: 46). To summarize the results of these meetings separately; In Zurich, the formula for the solution of Cyprus problem was the creation of an independent Cyprus (Yılmaz, 2010: 46). In London, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey decided to establish an independent Republic in Cyprus after providing requirements in a year. Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not participate in the Zurich-London meetings, although those meetings were about their future (Camp, 1980: 46). Their opinions and demands were not taken by Greece, Great Britain and Turkey (Hadjipavlou, 2007: 358). The second point of the agreements clarified that there would be a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president, and both would have a right to veto (Stegenga, 1968: 13). Furthermore, according to the fourth point of the agreements, there would be '70 to 30' ratio between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities in the light of composition of the security forces of the Republic (Stegenga, 1968: 13). Moreover, '70 to 30' ratio between the communities would also be in the House of Representatives (Stegenga, 1968: 13). The Zurich-London Agreements produced a regulation for the Communal Chambers in Cyprus. Agreements promoted two different communal chambers between the Cypriot communities and gave each of them to organize right to shape services and taxes, according to each community's needs (Stegenga, 1968: 13-14). In addition to this, there would be different municipalities between the communities in the largest towns of the island. Moreover, together with the Zurich-London Agreements, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee were signed between Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey.

Owing to the Treaty of Alliance, Greece would have 950 men as a security force in Cyprus, whereas Turkey would have 650 men (Lindley, 2007: 230; Stegenga, 1968: 13-14). Moreover, the Treaty of Guarantee provided a right to protect Cypriot communities' rights to guarantor powers. Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey became the guarantor powers for Cyprus regarding the Zurich-London agreements. The Treaty aims to protect the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus if it is necessary. All ideas of Enosis or taksim/partition were prohibited by the Treaty of Guarantee (Lindley, 2007: 230). The Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee banned the Republic of Cyprus' political and economic unification of any other country (Camp, 1980: 47). Moreover, the Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee also prohibited the unification of Cyprus with any other state or the partition of Cyprus (Camp, 1980: 47). In addition to these, The Treaty of Guarantee also provided rights for the guarantor powers. For instance, The Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee allowed to guarantor powers to the right to take action depending on an aim of re-establishing of the status quo and protecting the rights of the Cypriot communities regarding the Treaty (Camp, 1980: 47).

The Republic of Cyprus was established on August 16, 1960, after the preparation and acceptance of the constitution and became a member of the United Nations after its independence. Makarios was elected as its first president. Greek and Turkish Chambers were created with legislative and administrative powers (Bora, 2013: 35). In the case of a law-making system, the constitution of the independent Cyprus was designed by the British, Greek and Turkish governments (Yılmaz, 2010: 46). The 1960 Constitution was an acceptance through all articles in Zurich-London

Agreements. In accordance with the agreements, the president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president would be a Turkish Cypriot and there would be 7 to 3 ratios between Greek and Turkish Cypriots through Council of Ministers, House of Representatives (Yılmaz, 2010: 46). The elections for the House of Representatives regulated separately for both Cypriot communities (Bora, 2013: 34).

Seven to three ratios for Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were provided in the cabinet, parliament, police and civil ratio by the 1960 Constitution (Bahcheli, 2000: 204). Also, the Constitution introduced a rate in the army and the public and the security services. In the military, the ratio was 60 to 40 between Greeks and Turks (Camp, 1980: 48). Furthermore, the idea of union and partition was also forbidden by the Article 155 of the Constitution (Camp, 1980, 47). According to Yılmaz (2010), "the Republic was born in the midst of inter-communal violence and against the real wished of the Cypriots" (p. 45). Yılmaz (2010) also stated that Cyprus was forced into independence (p. 45). In addition to Yılmaz, Burgess (2006) examined that "ironically the 1960 Constitution enshrined asymmetrical arrangements at the outset in order to try to make bi-communalism work on the basis of political equality between two distinct communities" (p. 224).

The 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was a complex agreement in the light of its context, including legislation, communal chambers, a cabinet, public service, police force and army (Fisher, 2001 310). The Republic was failed to create a bi-communal community. Greek Cypriots hardly used the term of 'Cypriot.' They preferred being a Greek rather than being a Cypriot. Solomonides (2008) examined

that "Greeks and Turks on Cyprus thought of themselves as Greeks and Turks, not as Cypriots" (p. 65). The ideas of union and partition had continued after the independence of Cyprus as a republic. The desires of Greek Cypriots for a union with Greece and of Turkish Cypriots for partition in Cyprus were denied during Zurich-London Agreements (Yılmaz, 2010: 45). Although the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus had forbidden any unification or separation of the island, the idea of Enosis had continued in the Greek Cypriot community (Abulafia: 2012: 624). It is clear that the 1960 Constitution was an obstacle to their majority on the island and their desire to reunify the island with Greece For Greek Cypriots, (Bahcheli, 2000: 205).

3.2. 1963 Intercommunal crisis and the internationalization of the conflict

The violence in Cyprus increased again in 1963. Makarios criticized the Zurich-London Agreements and aimed to reduce the Turkish Cypriots constitutional power in Cyprus. In December 1963, the inter-communal violence between the Cypriot communities started. Makarios canceled the 1960 Constitution and decided to reshape the laws, and the Cypriot state de facto collapsed in early 1963. He aimed to reduce the Turkish Cypriots' right of the veto and quotas in the constitution (Lindley, 2007: 230). In November 1963, Makarios proposed 'thirteen points' in order to end the power of the Turkish Cypriot minority in terms of the abolitions in the legislature, in separation of judicial systems, and the elimination of the separation of city governments in the main cities, and the veto power of the vice-president (Camp, 1980: 49-50). According to Makarios' thirteen points of 1963, the president and vice-president of the state would disclaim the right of the veto. Makarios also decided an

abolishment through the division in the numerical strength of the composition of the Security forces which was established by the Zurich-London Agreements and accepted by the 1960 Constitution (Stegenga, 1968: 14). Furthermore, Makarios aimed to unify the division of municipalities in the largest towns. In his proposal, Makarios mentioned that the reformation in the ratio of participation in Security forces and public services according to the proportion of the population in Cyprus rather than '7 to 3' ratio of the Zurich-London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution (Stegenga, 1968: 14). Makarios' 13 points turned Turkish Cypriots into a minority (Ladisch, 2006: 112). According to Campbell-Thomson (2014), the cancellation of the Constitution by Makarios was against the 1960 Constitution and Zurich-London Agreements (p. 74).

As we could understand, in 1963, the constitutional structure of the Republic collapsed (Jackson & Popper 1970: 1). The intercommunal violence also continued in 1964. The Turkish Cypriot community mainly suffered because of the inter-communal violence between the years of 1963 and 1964 (Fisher, 2001: 310). 25.000 Turkish Cypriots and 500 Greek Cypriots became refugees between December 1963 and September 1964 (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 62). Moreover, according to the UN mediator Galo Plaza, the Turkish Cypriot vice-president, and the ministers were prevented from their offices after inter-communal violence in 1963 (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 62). In addition to this, in 1964, the Turkish Cypriot representatives were deported from the Parliament and other institutions of the state (Markides & Cohn, 1982: 90). Turkey aimed to intervene on the island to end the inter-communal crisis. The USA prevented any Turkish military intervention in 1964 when the fighting broke out between the Cypriot communities (Camp, 1980: 50). Turkey's intention to intervene was ended by the U.S. President Johnson's initiatives (Kanavau, 2006:

290). After the continuity of the inter-communal violence, the Guarantor powers and Cypriot communities aimed to end the inter-communal crisis. Due to this goal, there was a conference between them in order to put an end the violence, but the discussion broke down, and violence had continued (Fisher, 2001: 313). The Guarantor powers and Cypriot governments failed to find a solution to end the inter-communal fighting in 1964 (Yılmaz, 2012: 8). Both Cypriot communities and the guarantor powers accepted the international interference and assistance to the situation in Cyprus. In the case of foreign intervention, Makarios refused a NATO involvement in Cyprus. Following the continuity of inter-communal violence between the communities, Makarios insisted on that the establishment of peacekeeping force wider than the Guarantor powers and NATO (Jackson & Popper, 1970: 2).

Together with the policy of internationalization of the conflict, Makarios aimed to prevent Turkish intervention in the island (Richmond, 1998: 123). He demanded a UN involvement in Cyprus. Although the international pressure occurred to restore the peace in Cyprus, the president Makarios did not lose his power in Cyprus after the UN peacekeeping mission (Castleberry, 1964: 127). The United Nations created its peacekeeping force in Cyprus together with the decision of the UN Security Council in 1964. The next chapter will focus on the United Nations' efforts in the Cyprus conflict and examine the negotiations between the Cypriot communities and the UN mediation role together from its first involvement in 1964 to its last attempt in Geneva in April 2017.

4. The UN Involvement in the Cyprus Conflict

4.1 The establishment of the UNFICYP and the beginning of the Intercommunal Talks

According to the UN Security Council Resolution 186 in 1964, the creation of a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was recommended and the composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UNSC Resolution 186, 1964). UNFICYP was established to restore and ensure peace on the island. Resolution 186 aimed to prevent the recurrence of fighting by using peacekeeping force (Coufoudakis, 1976: 463). The United Nations' strategy was to stabilize the situation on the island together with its peacekeeping force after the emergence of inter-communal violence (Camp, 1980: 62). Therefore, due to that strategy, UNFICYP was established to prevent the recurrence of the violent conflict between the communities (Jackson & Popper, 1970: 3). Sakari Tuomioja was assigned to the UN mediator in Cyprus (Richmond, 1998: 100). The cost of UNFICYP has not been covered by the UN expenses (Migdalovitz, 2007: 21). Its fees are paid by voluntary contributions. The first extension of the UNFICYP was renewed in December 1964 (Talmon, 2002: 44). Since that time, UNFICYP has remained as a Peacekeeping force on the island.

The United Nations legitimated its role as a mediator and its institutions on the island together with achieving a consensus from both local and international actors (Michael, 2007: 594). There was no objection to the establishment of UNFICYP from both sides. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have a consensus about the existence of

the UN mediation on the island. It is one of the necessary steps for the establishment of the UN mediation. The UN Secretary-General U Thant charged Galo Plaza as the UN mediator for the island after the death of Tuomioja in September 1964. The UN mediator Galo Plaza immediately gave a start to the mediation process and prepared a report for the restoration of peace in the island. Plaza believed that his plan would be successful to restore the situation not only in Cyprus but also in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The process of the UN mediation in Cyprus started with the different perspectives on the existence and the continuity of the 1960 Treaties. Makarios proposed the abrogation of the Treaty of Alliance, afterward the beginning of the UN mediation in Cyprus (Richmond, 1998: 100). The Turkish Cypriot community rejected the abrogation. Both Cypriot communities were suspicious of each other for the negotiations. According to Galo Plaza, to produce a settlement, both communities should search for a solution together with considering tolerance and good faith.

There were direct impacts of Greek and Turkish pressures on the island. Plaza criticized that the efforts of Greek and Turkish forces and clarified that the importance of talks between the two communities (Richmond, 1998: 102). Furthermore, Plaza criticized the 1959 Zurich-London Agreements and the Constitution of 1960 regarding its unpractical principles for Cyprus (Bolukbasi, 1998: 419). Galo Plaza also recommended that a unitary system in Cyprus rather than a federal constitution and protection of minority rights for Turkish Cypriots (Fisher, 2001: 314). He offered the abrogation of constitutional treaties in Cyprus. In October 1964, Plaza reported that there should be only self-determination, not Enosis. Although Plaza encouraged the Greek Cypriot side to renounce Enosis, Greek Cypriots described Plaza very favorable to their demands (Richmond, 1998: 124). The Turkish Cypriots believed that the Plaza

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report ignored the critical needs of Turkish Cypriots. They claimed that Plaza was aiming to end the authority of Turkish Cypriots in the state and blamed him for not being impartial during the negotiations. They examined that it is against the nature of mediation.

Moreover, the UN policy had a general opinion regarding the Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty of Guarantee and the 1960 Constitution. United Nations accepted the necessity of modification in the 1960 Agreements (Mirbagheri, 1998: 79). The 1960 Treaties and the Constitution were contributed without a consensus of both Cypriot communities by the guarantor powers. Galo Plaza described the 1960 Constitution as a 'constitutional oddity' (Bora, 2013: 35). The UN mediation policy in Cyprus aimed to contribute the necessity for reform in the Constitution. The Turkish Cypriot community criticized Galo Plaza that he had exceeded his mandate as a mediator (Bolukbasi, 1998: 419). Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community rejected Galo Plaza's mediation report in March 1965 (Coufoudakis, 1976: 467). As a result, the Plaza report failed to gain support from the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkish Cypriots examined that the report was one-sided and far away from impartiality, and ignored the rights of their community. Plaza stated that the demands of Turkish Cypriots were unrealistic (Richmond, 1998: 103).

It is clear to see that, the UN mediation approaches to the 1960 Treaties, and the Constitution of Cyprus created an unwilling in the Turkish Cypriot community, and the UN negotiation policy was directly related to one-sided policy by Turkish Cypriots. The UN mediation failed to clarify its impartially to the Turkish Cypriots and due to that

Plaza's effort ended with a failure. Turkish Cypriots believed in that the ignorance of the international arena on their problems, in the light of the Plaza report (Mirbagheri, 1998: 65). Also, Turkish Cypriots argued that the UN was strengthening the Greek Cypriot position in the negotiations (Richmond, 1998: 123). Galo Plaza resigned from his mediator duty in Cyprus due to the rejection of Turkish Cypriots to the Plaza report in 1965 (Mirbagheri, 1998: 79). The Greek Cypriot community rejected the designation of another UN mediator in Cyprus. Makarios insisted on calling Plaza to resume his duty, but it was denied by the Turkish Cypriot side (Richmond, 1998: 104). Due to that, the UN Secretary-General started to use his 'good offices' in Cyprus.

After the failure of Plaza report, U Thant aimed to provide direct talks between the Cypriot communities in March 1966 (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 152). The negotiations between the communities resumed thanks to the efforts of U Thant. In general, UNFICYP was successful in reducing violence between the years of 1965 and 1967. The Security Council Resolution 186 in 1964 and the UN General Assembly Resolution 2077 in 1965 implied the recognition of the Greek Cypriot government as only government in Cyprus (Mirbagheri, 1998: 80). The good offices were established in 1966 thanks to the efforts the UN Special Representative Carlos Bernardes (Richmond, 1998: 106). The good offices applied new negotiations between both sides as an alternative policy of the UN mediation. Until the end of 1967, the UN good offices were successful to continue discussions for peacemaking process.

In November 1967, the inter-communal crisis was started on the island again. There was a coup in Greece in 1967, and it directly affected the nationalist movement

and Enosis in the Republic of Cyprus. Together with occurring events in the villages of Kophinou, Turkish Cypriot village, and Ayios Theodoros, the Greek Cypriot village, Greek Cypriot leadership blocked the road between Nicosia and Limassol and it created a fight between Greek Cypriot forces and Turkish Cypriot fighters (Mirbagheri, 1998: 54). The situation in Korphinou created a problem for the negotiations. Greek Cypriot leadership insisted on a quick solution. UNFICYP's efforts were unsuccessful to postpone any military operation of Greek Cypriot leadership in the region (Mirbagheri, 1998: 54). The crisis in Cyprus was increased in 1967 shortly after that the Cypriot National Guard attacked the Turkish Cypriot positions (Adamson, 2001: 286).

The inter-communal crisis showed that UNFICYP was ineffective to maintain the peace in the island (Mirbagheri, 1998: 80). It was not possible to stabilize the situation in Cyprus and reestablish the status quo again. The UNFICYP's problem as its inability to restore the normal conditions like the first three years of the Republic of Cyprus regarding the Resolution 186 (Coufoudakis, 1976: 466). The UNFICYP failed to encourage the Cypriot communities to establish a common ground and common understanding for the solution. The hostility between the Cypriot communities continued in 1967. In addition to this, Enosis became more brutal after 1967 together with the coup in Greece (Abulafia: 2012: 624). Together with the renewed violence between the communities in 1967, the United Nations has been very prompt to defuse the crisis (Fisher & Keashly, 1991: 40). The UN Secretary General had a touch with Greece and Turkey and called them to withdraw all troops. Greece and Turkey accepted the appeal made by the UN Secretary General's request for withdrawal all troops introduced into Cyprus on December 3, 1967 (Bolukbasi, 1998: 419).

4.2 Intercommunal talks between 1967-1974

After the reappearance of the intercommunal violence in 1967, the United Nations get in a search for a solution which related with resuming the negotiations. The United Nations supported inter-communal talks resumed in 1968 and continued until 1974 (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 65). Between the years of 1968 and 1974, the United Nations arranged a series of intercommunal talks to produce an agreement between the Cypriot communities to end the enclaves in the constitution (Fisher, 2001: 314). There were two sets of negotiations between the period of 1968-74 thanks to the UN mediation efforts. The intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash started in Beirut on June 11, 1968 (Bolukbasi, 1998: 420). It was called as the first set of talks and had continued until 1971. There were three rounds of the first set, and the United Nations had a major role in these negotiations. Fisher and Keashly (1991) stated that the intercommunal talks provided a progress thanks to the UN mediation efforts in 1968 (p. 41). Turkish Cypriots accepted the abolition of the vice-president's right to veto, reduction of participation in the House of Representatives from 30 per cent to 20 per cent and simple majority rule in the intercommunal talks between August 1968 and January 1969 (Mirbagheri, 1998: 56).

Turkish Cypriot leadership wanted to return of Turkish Cypriots to their villages, but it was rejected by the Greek Cypriot administration and offered a new proposal (Richmond, 1998: 110). The intercommunal talks had ended due to the rejection of counter proposal of Makarios by the Turkish Cypriot side regarding the local government issue and the subjects of religion, culture, and education (Mirbagheri,

1998: 56). The problem of power in local governments became an underlying issue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In December 1969, a new round of the first set of the negotiations had started. During the 1970 talks, local government issue had continued, and the Greek Cypriot leadership refused the Turkish Cypriot side's demands on local government autonomy. The continuity of the refuses in proposal had caused the self-perpetuation in the conflict.

On the other hand, in this round, the junta in Greece started to increase its power in Cyprus. Makarios was afraid of the losing support from both Greek Cypriot nationalists and junta in Greece (Richmond, 1998: 110). The second round of intercommunal talks ended in September 1970. The third round of the first set continued in 1971. But both communities were unwilling to produce a settlement for the negotiations. They examined the absence of the establishment of common ground in the negotiations (Mirbagheri, 1998: 56). U Thant blamed both sides for the lack of movement (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 152). The intercommunal talks had broken down in 1971. The first set, between the years of 1968 and 1971, could not produce a settlement because of the local political resistance (Fisher, 2001: 314). The UN mediation policies failed to end the political resistance. This situation increased the intractability of the Cyprus conflict.

The second set of the talks had started in 1972 together with the more active support from the UN mediator Osario Tofall (Fisher, 2001: 314). Although it continued until the intervention of the Turkish military in 1974, the local political resistance on the negotiations continued, and the Cyprus conflict became more intractable in this period. At the beginning of the talks, Makarios was against the establishment of resolution with the federal terms, whereas Denktash wanted to focus on consolidation of the current

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situation (Richmond, 1998: 119). The question of local government shaped the faith of the intercommunal talks between the years of 1968 and 1974. During the intercommunal talks between 1968 and 1974, the demands of the Turkish Cypriot community were basically about the precise definition of territorial powers, increasing in the local autonomy of Turkish Cypriots and administrative organs (Mirbagheri, 1998: 58-59). United Nations peacekeeping force failed to establish a mutual communication between the Cypriot communities during the negotiations (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993: 344). In April 1974, the intercommunal talks had interrupted by the Greek coup and the Turkish military occupation in July 1974 (Kanavau, 2006: 290). The fortification of Enosis on the island was undermined the second set of talks.

4.3 The effects of Greek Coup and Turkish intervention

The coup in Greece directly affected the situation in Cyprus. Also, the relationship between Makarios and Greek leadership was broken at the beginning of the 1970s. The Greek nationalism was spread in all island. Greek Colonels tried to achieve the idea of Enosis by using force especially in 1974 (Abulafia, 2012: 624). In July 1974, there was a Greek sponsored coup in Cyprus. The military junta in Athens organized the coup in Cyprus. Together with the coup, negotiations were ended, and Turkish Cypriots came up against the suffering. According to Diez et al. (2006), the coup in Cyprus was an existential threat to the Turkish Cypriots (p. 567). The junta did affect not only the Turkish Cypriot community but also the government in Cyprus. President Makarios was replaced with Nikos Sampson during the coup. According to Bora (2013) during the Greek sponsored coup in Cyprus at least 2000 Makarios supporters were killed (p. 39). Moreover, together with the assistance of the British

forces, Makarios escaped from the island (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 67). According to Adamson (2001), the Greek coup in Cyprus violated the Zurich-London Agreements (p. 288). On July 20, 1974, the Turkish military force intervened in Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek-sponsored coup on July 16, 1974. The Turkish Cypriot community was frightened because of the coup and Turkey justified its military intervention in Cyprus as a necessary action to protect Turkish Cypriots. Turkey claimed the right to intervene as a guarantor state and landed 30.000 troops and occupied the northern part of the island (Abulafia, 2012: 624). The UN Security Council called for a ceasefire in Cyprus immediately.

After Turkish military intervention on the island, Turkey was forced with international pressure (Dodd, 2010: 133). There was an embargo to Turkey by the United States, and it forced Turkey to negotiate (Dodd, 2010: 139). According to Adamson (2001), Prime Minister of Turkey, Bülent Ecevit, believed that the military intervention would rebuild democracy in the region (p. 291). On the other hand, there was a military regime in Greece during the 1974 crisis. Turkish forces occupied 37 percent of the island. Three days after Turkish military intervention, the system in Greece fell on July 23, 1974. The dictatorship in Greece was overthrown from the government and the junta regime in Cyprus was ended (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 67). Greece aimed to restore its democratic institutions after the fall of the military junta. After the wars of 1974, the Greek Cypriot community had constituted democratic and economic institutions (Kovras, 2012: 411). The civilian democratic rule was restored in Greece. After the intervention of the Turkish military, there were several efforts to provide starting of negotiations between communities, in particular with the assistance of the UN Secretary General (Yılmaz, 2010: 49).

On July 25, 1974, the negotiations between Greece and Turkey started in Geneva together with the participation of Great Britain (Adamson, 2001: 292). The first Geneva Talks took place on July 25-30, 1974 and resulted in a declaration which offered an establishment of a security zone (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 68). Moreover, The Population Exchange Agreement between parties was signed in Vienna on August 2, 1974. Anastasiou (2002) stated that approximately 200.000 Greek Cypriots became a refugee and moved to the south (p. 583). In addition to this, around 50.000 Turkish Cypriots moved to the north after partition (Bora, 2013: 40). In August 1974, the buffer zone was established to maintain the ceasefire and peace on the island and the second Geneva Talks took place on August 9-13, 1974. The cease-fire was broken by the second operation of the Turkish military. On August 14, 1974, the Turkish army started a second operation (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 68). "Turkey continued to expand its position in Cyprus and refused to work with the UN peacekeeping troops" (Adamson, 2001: 294). Greece rejected to negotiate with Turkey after the second intervention. In the end, the estimated number of casualties was about 2.850 persons during the 1974 wars, and there were hundreds of thousands of refugees (Anastasiou, 2002: 583).

Due to the partition, the gap between Cypriot communities had continued to widen, although there were several negotiations (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993: 344). The separation has increased the deep feelings of fear and hostility between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The negotiations failed to produce a settlement on the island. Fisher and Keashly (1991) examined that the Geneva Talks in 1974, could be exemplified as a failed mediation effort (p. 41). The physical division of the island was established together with the intervention of the

Turkish army. After the partition, the tension between the Cypriot communities very low (Lindley, 2007: 224). Since the ceasefire in 1974, the level of violence between the two communities remains at a minimum level, but attempts for the implementation of a satisfactory settlement between these communities has been still failed (Broome, 2004: 191).

Perspectives on the intervention and the continuity of the presence of the Turkish military in Cyprus were different for two Cypriot communities. Whereas the Turkish Cypriots see the Turkish army as a peace force on the island and protector of the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots see the military intervention of the Turkish military as an invasion (Anastasiou, 2002: 583). Greek Cypriots believed that the presence of Turkish military power is a threat to their sovereignty, while Turkish Cypriots stated that their presence is a guardian for their sovereignty. Moreover, there was a change in the perspective of Greek Cypriots, during the 1950s, they were seeking to unify Cyprus with Greece, on the other hand, after the partition in 1974, they attempt to establish a unified state (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993: 347). In addition to these perspectives, Adamson (2001) believed in that together with the second military operation in Turkey; the international public opinion was shifted from Turkey to Greece (p. 292). Lindley (2012) also stated that although Turkish military invasion was legal, it soon became illegal because of that the status quo would not be restored (p. 234). Together with the occupation of 37 per cent of the island by Turkish forces, Greek Cypriot community gained international support (Dodd, 2010: 131). According to Mirbagheri (1998) between the period of 1965 and 1974 was one of the best time to produce a settlement in Cyprus (p. 53).

After the partition in July 1974, the situation became more frustrated than ever, although the violence had ended. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus has been very functional to reduce the violence between the parties among the buffer zone (Lindley, 2007: 234). "The impact of the UN on peacemaking in Cyprus in the 1965-July 1974 period was significant" (Mirbagheri, 1998: 79). But it was ineffective. It's mediation efforts failed to build a consensus between the Cypriot communities, establish a mutual communication, analyze the vital interests of both Cypriot communities and prevent the further escalation of the inter-communal tension in the 1965-July 1974 period.

UNFICYP was a peace monitoring operation between the years of 1964 and 1974. The United Nations expanded its operations after the 1974 events. The reconciliation between the Cypriot communities and re-establishment of a central government have been primarily focused on the United Nations after partition in 1974 (Migdalovitz, 2007: 3). UNFICYP became an inter-state peacekeeping force between the Cypriot communities (Talmon, 2002: 36). Yılmaz (2012) stated that since 1974, the United Nations' operation in Cyprus could be identified as a traditional peacekeeping operation (p. 9). After the events of 1974, both Cypriot communities' perspectives on United Nations Peacekeeping mission in Cyprus were restructured. The Greek Cypriot community wanted to return to the pre-1974 status quo, whereas the Turkish Cypriot community wanted to implement its demands in the new status quo (Richmond, 1998: 120-121).

5. The Growing Role of the UN in Cyprus

5.1. 1975-77 Vienna Talks and High-Level Agreements

United Nations wanted to continue to negotiations to produce a settlement although the Greek coup and the Turkish military intervention destroyed its efforts since 1964. In the beginning, the Greek Cypriot representative Clerides did not accept to continue to negotiations because of the current status quo in the island. Clerides clarified that the presence of Turkish military is an obstacle for the sovereignty of Greek Cypriot community (Richmond, 1998: 139). Together with the efforts of the UN Secretary-General Waldheim, Clerides accepted to meet with Denktash. In 1975, the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim focused on inter-communal talks. The UN-led negotiations in Vienna were held for April 1975 and the middle of 1976. In the first round of the Vienna Talks, Denktash was criticized by both the UN Secretary-General and Turkey because of not preparing for negotiations (Richmond, 1998: 140). In this round, Greek Cypriots focused on the territorial aspects, three freedoms, and governmental issues.

In the Vienna Talks, Clerides clarified the demands of Greek Cypriots regarding the subjects of return of refugees and demilitarization of the Turkish side (Dodd, 2010: 132-133). The UN supported his request. The Security Council stated that "all refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end" (Dodd, 2010: 131). Furthermore, in the Vienna Talks which had started in April 1975, the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash concentrated on a federal solution regarding of two zones together with separated extensive autonomy, whereas the Greek Cypriot president of House of

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Representatives Clerides focused on the rights of property of Greek Cypriots and their return to their homes in the northern part (Bolukbasi, 1998: 421).

Denktash wanted to continue the negotiations in Cyprus together with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. He did not desire the Secretary-General to have an active role in the talks, whereas Clerides wanted to continue to negotiations in Vienna under the control of the Secretary-General (Richmond, 1998: 140). Due to these events, Denktash threatened the UN and Greek Cypriot government to establish an independent Turkish Cypriot state in the north, but the Secretary-General clarified that it would end the negotiations and prevent a possible solution in the island (Richmond, 1998: 142). After the end of the first round of the Vienna Talks, Kurt Waldheim launched a new mission of good offices in Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 153). In 1976, both Cypriot communities accepted to continue negotiations under the auspices of de Cuellar, the UN Special Representative of Cyprus. The use of good offices in Cyprus was contributed by the UN Security Council Resolution 367 in 1975 (UNSC, June 1986: 2). Both Cypriot communities accepted to discuss and exchange their proposals regarding territorial and constitutional aspects (Richmond, 1998: 144). One of the biggest problems in the negotiations was the recognition of Turkish Cypriots. They insisted on the recognition matters (Richmond, 1998: 145). Denktash wanted to be treated within equal basis for his and the Greek community leadership.

During the negotiations, Greek Cypriots had insisted on the elimination of territorial borders (Dodd, 2010: 134). Greek Cypriots aimed to establish a unitary federal state with strong central government, on the other hand, Turkish Cypriots

focused on a decentralized federal solution with territorial boundaries (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993: 345). There was a disagreement in the Vienna Talks about the federation and territorial basis (Dodd, 2010: 138). The Turkish Cypriot community declared itself as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975. The declaration of Turkish Federated State was deplored by the UN Security Council Resolution 367 in 1975 (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 69). The UN did not recognize the Turkish authority in the north, and it selected the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimated power on the island. "The UN Security Council called 'all' states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus" (Talmon, 2002: 35). The Security Council expressed the territorial integrity of the Republic and refraining from any unification of Cyprus with other country or any partition in 1975 (Talmon, 2002: 35).

Makarios and Denktash met and agreed on a set of principles in January 1977 under the auspices of the United Nations which was called as the starting points of the second round of the Vienna Talks (Fisher, 2001: 314). They met in Nicosia and signed a four-point agreement. Leaders of both Cypriot communities agreed on four points that Cyprus will be independent, bicommunal federal state; freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and freedom of property; administrative control over rights; and safeguarding of the central government over the unity of Cyprus in 1977 (Migdalovitz, 2007: 3). The Makarios-Denktash 1977 four guidelines are;

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bicommunal, Federal Republic

2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership

3. Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right to property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties that may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community

4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard for the bi-communal character of the state.

On 31 March 1977, the rounds of talks based on four-point guidelines between the Cypriot communities began in Vienna under Waldheim's and Cuellar's directions (Camp, 1980: 63). According to Dodd (1999), the sovereignty issue from both Cypriot communities was submitted by the UN in July 1977 (Dodd, 1999: 3). Clerides and Denktash agreed on that Cyprus should be independent, demilitarized and non-aligned (Bolukbasi, 1998: 421). The primary point of the high-level discussions in 1977 was that the parties were seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic (Fisher, 2001: 314).

In 1977, together with the meetings under the UN auspices, Makarios explained that he accepted a federal solution if the independence and unity of Cyprus are assured (Dodd, 2010: 134). Denktash assured Makarios about the three freedoms (freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right to property). Both Cypriot communities prepared their proposals in the negotiations. The Turkish proposals of 1977 talks were rejected by the Greeks, while the Greek proposals were denied by the Turkish Cypriots

(Camp, 1980: 64). High-level discussions were failed because of the question of the power division between the central government, the constituent administrations and the territorial aspects of both communities (Fisher, 2001: 315). Both communities in Cyprus ended the talks in later 1977. In the territorial base, Makarios insisted on 20.25 per cent, although Denktash claimed 32.8 per cent of territory (Dodd, 2010: 135. The negotiation was deadlocked at that point. Dodd (2010) stated that there was no agreement at the end of the negotiations (p. 138). Although it failed to produce a settlement, it provided progress in Cyprus. "The 1977 High-Level Agreement officially marked an end of Enosis as a policy objective" (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 160). Moreover, "article 4 of the 1977 agreement did not say that the powers and functions of the government had to be strong powers; they had only such as to safeguard the unity of the country" (Dodd, 2010: 137). Makarios died in August 1977 than Kyprianou became president of the Republic of Cyprus.

It is clear to see that the UN mediation efforts in Cyprus failed to analyze the nature of the conflict and vital interests of the Cypriot communities between the period of 1975-1977. The UN sponsored talks were always in a deadlock due to the lack of progress in the establishment of policy regarding interests and concerns of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. During the UN-led Vienna Talks, Greek Cypriot community clarified their interests of that the demilitarization of the Turkish part and the importance of the issues of territory and sovereignty, whereas the Turkish Cypriots focused on the recognition of their community and sovereignty with the weak central federation. The UN mediation failed to contribute an environment for the negotiations due to the continuity of the lack of progress to analyze the vital interests of both Cypriot communities.

In 1979, the UN Secretary-General set new conditions for the negotiations. Kyprianou wanted to continue the negotiations under the 'good offices' in Cyprus rather than new talks under auspices of the UN Secretary-General (Richmond, 1998: 151). Kyprianou and Denktash agreed to talk based on the 1977 guidelines (Migdalovitz, 2007: 3). The talks between the Cypriot communities' leaders in early 1979, under the UN auspices, accepted Makarios-Denktash guidelines. Together with visiting of Waldheim, both parties set their proposals for the ten-point agreement and clarified their other demands for the negotiations in May 1979 (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 154). Meetings on 18 and 19 May 1979 provided the 1977 High-Level Agreements as a basis for future negotiations. Denktash and Kyprianou contributed the Ten Point Agreement in May 1979. The ten-point agreement, which was also called as the 19 May Accord, was produced on May 19, 1979 (Camp, 1980: 67; Bolukbasi, 1998: 421). The Ten-Point Agreement was basically about the acceptance of 1977 guidelines and the UN resolutions as the basis, respect for three freedoms, aiming to deal with constitutional and territorial matters, the question of Varosha, the establishment of mutual confidence, demilitarization of Cyprus and the nature of intercommunal talks (Dodd, 2010: 141-142). According to 10-point Agreement, there should be respect for human rights for all citizens of the Republic of Cyprus (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 72).

The agreement focused on Varosha settlement, initial practical measures for removing restrictions on the minority Turkish Cypriots, constitutional aspects of any future national government of Cyprus, and territorial aspects of such a government (Camp, 1980: 67). Although the question of Varosha had been a critical issue for the Greek Cypriot community, Turkish Cypriot community did not want to bring it to the negotiation table (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 154). There was a disagreement on the question

of Varosha in the 1979 talks. The Turkish Cypriots' refusal of the issue of Varosha and Famagusta caused a deadlock in the negotiations. Secondly, the 1979 talks had failed because of the concept of bi-communality (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 154). Denktash claimed that the Greek Cypriot community did not accept the 1977 guidelines as the basis (Dodd, 2010: 142). Furthermore, the internationalization of the conflict by the Greek Cypriots was seemed to be a problem for Turkish Cypriots (Richmond, 1998: 151). Greek Cypriots aimed to maintain the economic embargo on the Turkish Cypriot side, and that objective was established together with the General Assembly Resolution on November 1979 (Dodd, 2010: 142-143). United Nations identified the Republic of Cyprus as only recognized state in all of the island. United Nations declared that the Republic of Cyprus is the only controller of all territory in Cyprus. Dodd (2010) examined the UN General Assembly Resolution of 20 November 1979 as one-sided resolution (p. 143). The intercommunal talks in 1979 were ended together with the Turkish Cypriot rejection of Resolution.

Although the UN Secretary-General was successful to encourage both parties to produce a basis for the negotiations and to prepare their proposals, the UN mediation failed to understand what are the fundamental interests of both Cypriot communities especially in the issues of sovereignty and territory. The UN-led negotiations always in deadlock because of the continuity of different perspectives on the issues of sovereignty and territory. The existence of the complicated matters such as sovereignty had increased the intractability of the Cyprus conflict, and the UN mediation policy failed to analyze and understand the both parties' interests and concerns in this issue. Moreover, both Cypriot communities had different approaches to the question of Varosha, which became a self-perpetuating issue during the

negotiations. Furthermore, in the UN-led negotiations of 1979, it is clear to see that, there was a lack of confidence between the Cypriot communities. The UN mediation efforts were limited to contribute the trust and common ground between the parties. The deep feelings of the hatred and the fear had continued to exist in the hearts of the Cypriot communities.

5.2. The Independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Continuity of the UN-Sponsored Negotiations

On 9 August 1980, thanks to UN efforts, both communities resumed to the negotiations. Hugo Gobbi attended to the negotiations as the representative of the UN (Dodd, 2010: 144). According to Müftüler-bac (1999), there were endless negotiations to produce a federal solution during the 1980s (p. 562). In 1980, Hugo Gobbi was appointed as the UN Secretary-General Social Representative in Cyprus. According to Fisher (2001), the talks resumed in 1980 together with the mediation efforts by the UN representative Hugo Gobbi (p. 315). Hugo Gobbi started new negotiations on 9 August 1980. In the talks, Gobbi and conflict parties focused on the issues of the question of resettlement in Varosha, the necessity of improvement in confidence between parties, and contexts of constitutional and territorial issues (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 154). He clarified that the mediation policy of the UN in Cyprus would be successful if there is confidence between the communities. The establishment of trust or building of consensus is a necessary step for the mediation process. According to UNDPA (2011), mediators must encourage the parties to find common ground (p. 12). Previous efforts of the UN mediation had failed to help to communicate or find a common understanding in Cyprus. The intractability of the conflict had increased in this period, although there was some progress such as the four-point guidelines or the High-Level Agreement.

Together with the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, United Nations' mediation focused on the underlying interests and concerns of the Cypriot communities. He presented the Interim Agreement in mid-1981. The Interim Agreement includes the question of Varosha and the existence of economic embargoes to Turkish Cypriots (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 154). The Interim Agreement planned to reopen the Varosha to civilian settlement and the Nicosia International Airport (Richmond, 1998: 158). Moreover, it was intended to lift the economic embargo against the Turkish Cypriot community. According to Richmond (1998), the Interim Agreement was failed to produce a deal on federal issues (p. 159). Turkish Cypriots proposed to 6 per cent reduction in their territory (Dodd, 2010: 144). In 1981 talks, Greek Cypriots offered 20 per cent of the area of all island to Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot side demanded the settlement in Varosha first, but their request was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side (Dodd, 2010: 145). Turkish Cypriot community examined that the necessity of separate sovereignty for both Cypriot states, whereas, Greek Cypriots believed in that the importance of a central sovereignty (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 154). Also, the UN General Assembly Resolution 34/30 called support to the Republic of Cyprus to produce a sovereignty and control over its territory (Richmond, 1998: 155). Turkish Cypriots denied the resolution, whereas the Greek Cypriots welcomed.

The General Assembly Resolution 37/253 of May 1983 focused on the lack of progress in the negotiations and called for the withdrawal of Turkish military forces in the island (Richmond, 1998: 163). The UN General Assembly Resolution37/253 in May 1983 showed much stronger support to the Greek Cypriot side (Dodd, 2010: 145). Turkish Cypriots were annoyed by the Resolution 37/253. They believed that the UN

had lost its neutrality in the conflict and lost their hope for the future. Their vital interest was shaped with the recognition of their political equality and territorial authority in Cyprus. The continuity of the unrecognition of Turkish Cypriots in international arena caused the emergence of the idea of independence in the north. In addition to this, Turkish Cypriot community was isolated, and its economic position became worse than ever in 19. Dodd (2010) stated that "by the end of 1983 the Turkish Cypriots convinced that the Greek Cypriots would not treat their community as equal" (p. 147). Turkish Cypriot side believed in that the declaration of independence of the state would have more status (Dodd, 2010: 152).

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared its independence on November 15, 1983, but the only country which recognized the TRNC has been Turkey. The TRNC and Turkey could not find support for the independence of the TRNC. According to Ker-Lindsay (2009), even though Turkish Cypriots accepted the federal state solution, they declared the independence of TRNC (p. 155). The Greek Cypriot community defines the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an illegitimate state (Anastasiou, 2002: 584). Moreover, there were sanctions against the TRNC in the international arena. The declaring of the TRNC caused the growing intractability of the conflict (Fisher, 2001: 315). The UN Security Council believed in that recognition of TRNC would cause a setback in the negotiations (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 155). The United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 in 1983 considered that the declaration of TRNC was against the 1960 Constitution and Zurich-London Agreements (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 74). Due to the collective sanctions against the recognition of the TRNC by the UN Security Council, the Turkish Cypriot community has objected to the UNFICYP in Cyprus (Talmon, 2002: 62). Because of the zero-sum game approach in

the UN mediation policy in Cyprus, both Cypriot communities had tried to convince the other. According to Peck and Westheim (2014), traditional mediation of the UN involves the zero-sum game between the conflict parties together with the aim of achieving an absolute advantage in the negotiations (p. 29-34). The Cypriot communities designed to strengthen their role as an international actor to protect their interests (Michael, 2007: 589).

After the foundation of the TRNC, Denktash directly stated that he is ready to resume the intercommunal talks for a federation (Richmond, 1998: 165). On the other hand, The Greek Cypriot community rejected to continue negotiations until the withdrawal of independence of TRNC (Dodd, 2010: 154-155). According to Dodd (1999), the TRNC became more insistent on the issue of 'recognition' of their sovereignty (p. 3). As it was mentioned in previous chapters, there are intangible issues in intractable conflicts such as sovereignty. The parties had failed to produce a creative solution for the problem of the sovereignty since the Vienna Talks between the period of 1975-1977. Denktash pointed out the necessity of political equality between two communities. "On 16 March 1984, the Secretary General met Denktash in New York, and during their discussion asked him to stop the consolidation of TRNC and refrain from seeking recognition of it" (Mirbagheri, 1998: 128). Moreover, at the beginning of 1984, the Greek Cypriot community prepared a plan to provide demilitarization on the island and to put an end to the Treaty of Guarantee (Richmond, 1998: 179). Turkish Cypriots rejected this plan due to their needs of the guarantor.

In 1984 talks, Kyprianou refused to meet with Denktash (Bolukbasi, 1998: 423). Due to that, the UN Secretary General offered proximity talks between leaders of Cypriot communities. Proximity talks are efficient in the mediation process to discuss the primary interests and concerns of conflict parties (Peck & Westheim, 2014: 109). Both leaders accepted to join talks in Vienna. The talks had started in September 1984 and continued until December 1984. There were three rounds of proximity talks in 1984. In the first round of proximity talks, parties focused on confidence-building measures, territorial and constitutional matter according to the federal government (Richmond, 1998: 183). De Cuellar aimed to improve confidence between parties and due to that he presented a five points suggestion. He clarified that the importance of trust between the communities to eliminate the fear and concern between the communities and to produce a sustainable solution (Richmond, 1998: 183). De Cuellar's mediation approach focused on the understanding and analyzing of the previous failures of the UN mediation regarding confidence-building measures. In the second round of talks, parties focused on the powers of local autonomy and central government, and they prepared a draft agreement (Richmond, 1998: 140). During the third round of proximity talks in 1985, the Secretary General suggested that both Cypriot communities should study on the drafts (Mirbagheri, 1998: 133). They prepared a draft agreement and proposed to the Secretary-General. He was successful to encourage the Cypriot communities to work on reaching a mutually satisfying agreement. Moreover, together with the authorization of the UN Security Council Resolution 578 in 1985, the mission of good offices in Cyprus had continued (UNSC, June 1986: 2). The UN working groups were directly related to proposals of both parties to find an outcome for the continuity of the negotiation. It is a beneficial method in mediation for understanding their own

and other's interests. According to Peck and Westheim (2014), the problem-solving approach of the UN mediation points out the aim of the understanding of the both parties' needs, fears and concerns (p. 29-34).

In 1985, the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar started a new round of intercommunal talks in New York. The UN Secretary General de Cuellar organized High-Leve meeting to address all the key issues in 1985 (Fisher, 2001: 315). De Cuellar invited both leaders of Cypriot communities to a summit meeting on 17 January 1985, to discuss the draft agreement, which based on proximity talks (Bolukbasi, 1998: 423). Perez de Cuellar aimed to achieve "an overall solution which would preserve the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus by the frequently expressed view of the Security Council (UNSC, June 1986: 5). The Draft Framework Agreement was prepared after proximity talks between the Cypriot communities under the auspices of Cyprus (Dodd, 2010: 153). De Cuellar identified the issue of sovereignty as the primary subject of the both Cypriot communities interest. It was the main issue in 1986 Draft Framework Agreement. The first three matters in Draft Agreement of April 1985, which should be agreed by the parties, were:

a. Recommit themselves to the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979;

b. Indicate their determination to proceed with the establishment of a federal republic that will be independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial issue;

c. Reaffirm their acceptance of constitutional provisions that were agreed upon at the intercommunal talks in 1981-1982

In the New York Summit, the draft agreement came to a deadlock due to concerns of Kyprianou on demilitarization of North and territorial matters. The negotiations failed to guarantee three freedoms and solve the territorial aspects of Greek Cypriots (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 155). The Greek Cypriot leader declined the document of High-Level meeting with de Cuellar and stated that it would only be a basis for further negotiations, while Denktash accepted the report (Fisher, 2001: 315). Greek Cypriots refused to sign the 1986 Draft Framework Agreement. "In turning down the Draft Framework Agreement, Kyprianou asserted that he was not aware there would be a deal for him to accept or reject" (Dodd, 2010: 153). In 1986 The UN Secretary-General report to the Security Council, Perez de Cuellar stated that "at a joint high-level meeting in New York on January 1985, the Turkish Cypriot side informed me that it accepted the documentation; the Greek Cypriot side stated that it could take it as a basis for negotiations" (UNSC, June 1986: 2). Also, he maintained that there was no way to continue to negotiations, because of one side had rejected (Fisher, 2001: 316). The Secretary General's officers met with the Turkish Cypriot representatives on 18 November 1985 in London and with the Greek Cypriot officials on 30 November 1985 in Geneva (UNSC, June 1986: 2-3). Kyprianou described the important issues in his letter to the Secretary General and proposed the demands of Greek Cypriots for the agreement. Kyprianou's proposal to the Perez de Cuellar focused on the demilitarization of Cyprus, ending of the guarantorship of any state in Cyprus, reduction of Turkish Cypriot territory to 25 percent of the island, returning Famagusta and Morphou to Greek Cypriots, 70:30 ratio in Council of Ministers (Mirbagheri, 1998: 128).

In February and March 1986, the new round of proximity talks was held in Geneva with the representatives of both Cypriot communities (UNSC, June 1986:

3). De Cuellar proposed a document in March 1986, and the Greek Cypriots rejected it because of that it did not offer the three freedoms the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and the Turkish settlers from the island, although proposed bi-zonal federalism and reduction in the Turkish Cypriot's territory (Bolukbasi, 1998: 423). Denktash sent a letter to Perez de Cuellar on 21 April 1986 to express their acceptance of the Draft Framework Agreement. The Greek Cypriots argued that the Secretary-General had exceeded his mandate because of that he enforced a settlement (Bolukbasi, 1998: 423). De Cuellar replaced his draft document in order to fulfill the objections of Greek Cypriots in the first draft including reduction of the Turkish Cypriots' veto powers, but in this time, the report was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community the draft (Fisher, 2001: 315-316; Bolukbasi, 1998: 423). The Secretary General examined the Draft Framework Agreement in his report to the UN Security Council in June 1986 as:

Draft framework agreement suggested solutions to the remaining divergences in a manner that in my judgement protected the interests of both communities and proposed procedures for negotiation of the outstanding issues which remained to be tackled; including withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, guarantees and three freedoms (i.e., freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property).

UNSC, June 1986: 3

The Secretary-General regretted that the continuity of the negotiations for resolution is not possible through the rejection of one side of the draft agreements.

According to Mirbagheri (1998), Greek Cypriots' objections to the Draft Framework Agreement were its' lack of concern on the refugee problem and ignoring of the settlement issue, which has been the primary subject for Greek Cypriots to settle; its offer of political equality between Cypriot communities in the government structure, although the Turkish Cypriot side only reflected to 18 percent of population in Cyprus; providing a veto power of Turkish Cypriots in the Executive and the Legislative branches of government; lack of providing three freedoms; and finally its' suggestion of a confederal state based solution rather than federal based (p. 136-137). Although the Draft Framework Agreement provided some progress, it failed to gain both parties' consent. De Cuellar's mediation efforts were successful to encourage the parties to discuss their interests, and work for a possible solution, but his efforts were limited due to the intractability of the conflict regarding to fear of Greek Cypriots in the light of presence of Turkish military in the north and, intangible issues such as territory or sovereignty.

5.3. The Set of Ideas and Confidence Building Measures in the period of 1988-1994

After the two years of stagnation in intercommunal talks, negotiations resumed in 1988, together with the acceptance of high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 but not the drafts of 1985-86 (Fisher, 2001: 316). George Vassiliou won the election in February 1988 and prepared to restart negotiations. He directly focused on the internationalization conflict policy. According to Richmond (1998), the policy of internationalization of the conflict and the presence of Turkish troops was continued in the Greek Cypriot side, and the UN was affected by this policy (p. 187). Vassiliou

refused to meet with Denktash and wanted to meet with Ankara, but it was rejected. Turkish Cypriot community wanted an equal representation in Council of Ministers.

The Greek Cypriot fear of the Turkish military presence in the island and the concerns of the absence of political equality of Turkish Cypriots had continued in this period and became an obstacle for the future of the negotiations. Thanks to the UN efforts, in 1988, both Cypriot communities decided intercommunal talks to know each other's interests very well (Müftüler-bac, 1999: 562). Denktash and Vassiliou engaged in a meeting under the UN auspices. The basis of the meeting was identified as the 1977-1979 High-Level Agreements and focused on the understanding of each party's primary needs, fears, and vital interests. The UN mediation was helpful to encourage the Cypriot communities to communicate with each other. It was an interest-based approach to the UN mediation. This approach aims to provide a cooperation between the parties rather than a competition between them (Peck & Westheim, 2014: 29-34).

There were three rounds of talks between September 1988 and February 1990, and talks ended in a failed summit in March 1990 (Bolukbasi, 1998: 424). The draft agreement was established by the UN representatives Oscar Camillon and Gustove Faissel regarding the parties' developed papers on the most important issues (Fisher, 2001: 316) In 1989, Vassiliou decided that to apply for membership of the EC (Richmond, 1998: 194). In the talks, parties continued to negotiate according to the UN Secretary-General. In April 1989, Perez De Cuellar proposed proximity talks to draft an outline of an overall agreement. In June 1989, De Cuellar joined a meeting with Vassiliou and Denktash and produced an overview of the agreement. In July 1989,

Perez de Cuellar submitted 'Set of Ideas' to conflict parties. According to Richmond (1998), the 'Set of Ideas' was considered as a basis for the talks (p. 195). Denktash rejected the 'Set of Ideas' which presented in June 1989 (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 156). "Denktash argued that the Secretary General had no right to present formal plans to the two sides, a complaint reminiscent of that made by the Plaza report in 1965" (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 156).

In February 1990, parties were invited to proximity talks in New York. Denktash clarified that without self-determination, there could be no federation without the right of self-determination in negotiations of New York in 1990. During the talks, Denktash insisted on the recognition of two people in Cyprus and the self-determination issue (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 156). On the other hand, Vassiliou stated that if every minority were to have the right to self-determination, almost every country would disintegrate (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 156). De Cuellar's attempt in February 1990 failed due to Denktash's demand on equal sovereignty and the right to secession matters (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 156). In March 1990, the second round of negotiations was started. During the negotiations, Denktash emphasized his demands on political equality between leaders of two communities. In March 1990 Summit, Denktash stated that there were two different identities on the island, and both had a right of a self-determination (Bolukbasi, 1998: 424-425). The Turkish Cypriot community criticized the United Nations in the way of exceeding its mediation role on providing good offices (Fisher, 2001: 316). Although the establishment of good offices is helpful to the continuity of the negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot community's approach had clarified that the intractability of the conflict could create an obstacle for the principles or strategies which both parties had agreed on. In March 1991, De Cuellar emphasized

bi-zonality with the equality of the two communities in his report to the Security Council. In 1991, De Cuellar became more positive to the Turkish Cypriot side. In May 1991, Denktash re-emphasized the importance of recognition of the TRNC and his presidency. On the other hand, "the Greek Cypriots remained outwardly committed to the creation of a bizonal, bicommunal federation" (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 156).

On 1 January 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the UN Secretary General. De Cuellar's 'Set of Ideas' was developed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Boutros -Ghali formed the 'Set of Ideas' of 1988-1990 talks as the basis for new settlement in 1992 (Fisher, 2001: 316). Leaders of two Cypriot communities met under the UN auspices in New York in June 1992. Boutros-Ghali met with Denktash and Vasiliou separately to iron out their differences in New York Talks (Bolukbasi, 1998: 426). He submitted his proposal of 'Set of Ideas' in 1992 (Kyriakou & Kaya, 2011: 19). The Set of Ideas was regulated by the UN Security Council Resolution 750. Boutros-Ghali suggested a bizonal federation of two politically equal communities in his 'Set of Ideas.' Boutros-Ghali presented two reports to the Security Council and his second report on April 1992 was considered as a framework for a solution including principles of bi-zonality, sovereignty, partition in executive and legislative structures, the refugee problem and territorial adjustment. He aimed to find a solution for the endless discussions about the sovereignty and territory issues to put an end the self-perpetuation. According to Boutros-Ghali's report, there is an aim to reduce the Turkish Cypriot zone to 28.2 percent of the island and Morphou would be returned to the Greek Cypriot area. Greek Cypriot side accepted the plan as a basis for negotiations. There was no mention to issue of settlers in Boutros-Ghali's Set of Ideas. The proposal was supported by the point of the importance of equality between two Cypriot communities to produce a

peaceful settlement (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 74). Boutros-Ghali planned to demilitarization by gradual reduction of forces with an agreed level of Turkish and Greek contingents. According to Boutros-Ghali, 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance would remain. There should be the bi-communal and bi-zonal constitution. The ratio in legislative should be 70 to 30 Greek to Turkish Cypriot in Lower House and 50 to 50 in Upper House. There would be 70 to 30 ratio bases in the Executive Council of Ministers.

In November 1992, Boutros-Ghali called a halt to the process (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 156). Boutros-Ghali acted like a party in the conflict and focused on even the minor details of the negotiations. For instance, Boutros-Ghali examined that if Denktash refuses to cooperate, the Security Council will produce its settlement for the solution in Cyprus (Bolukbasi, 1998: 427). In the 'Set of Ideas' negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot side agreed on 91 paragraphs of the proposal which was one-hundred paragraphs. The Turkish Cypriot community rejected 10% of the ideas, although the Greek Cypriot community accepted the document in November 1992 (Fisher, 2001: 316). Turks accepted 91 out of 100 paragraphs of the Set of Ideas except much of Constitutional concepts including the demand for equality in the Council of Ministers, demand of the consensus rather than counting votes Dispute in the regulation of federal solution. According to Ghali, Secretary General, although Turks accepted 91 out of 100 paragraphs of the Set of Ideas, they refused it because of demand for equality in the Council of Ministers and demand of the consensus rather than counting votes. "Denktash refused to engage in substantive discussions on the plan" (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 156). According to Khasman (1999), the 'Set of Ideas' failed to contribute a method in the way of electing a president (p. 7). Former the UN Secretary-General Dr.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 'Set of Ideas' was a significant third-party effort to motivate that the way of searching the peace was taken into consideration more seriously by the Cypriot communities (Yılmaz, 2010: 49). Khasman (1999) described the 'Set of Ideas' as the most detailed document for a possible settlement to the Cyprus problem regarding the bi-communal, bi-zonal federation (p. 7). In 1993, Glafkos Clerides became the new president of Greek Cypriots. Clerides was well aware that if Cyprus joined the EU before Turkey; it would be in a strong position to persuade Turkey to exert a beneficial influence on the Turkish Cypriots.

Due to the failure of 'set of ideas,' UN Security Council started creation and implementation of Confidence Building Measures. Boutros-Ghali believed in that the necessity of confidence-building measures for providing an improvement in the intercommunal talks (Bolukbasi, 1998: 427). In Cyprus, the communities could not have confidence. Migdalovitz (2007) stated that "there was neither a level of confidence nor a disposition to compromise" (Migdalovitz, 2007: 12). According to Boutros-Ghali, the confidence building measures would be beneficial for both Cypriot communities (Bolukbasi, 1998: 428). The United Nations focused on confidence building measures between the years of 1993 and 1995 (Fisher, 2001: 316). The Turkish Cypriot community accepted the Confidence Building Measures to build mutual trust between the communities during the Vienna Talks in 1994, whereas the Greek Cypriot community rejected to continue negotiations on Confidence Building Measures (Müftüler-bac, 1999: 563). On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots rejected the Set of Ideas and the Confidence Building Measures in the early 1990s (Müftüler-bac, 1999: 563). Denktash stated that the Confidence Building Measures are unacceptable there was unbalance within equities in CBMs.

5.4. The EU Catalyst and Annan Plan at the beginning of the 2000s

The level of violation has been very low in Cyprus. The UN efforts in Cyprus has managed to prevent the further escalation in Cyprus. According to ICG Report (2014), nobody has been killed on the Green Lines since 1996 (ICG, 2014: i). Thanks to UN Secretary-General's efforts, the indirect talks were started after direct talks between the communities under the control of the UN auspices in 1997 (Migdalovitz, 2007: 6). Special Advisor Alvaro de Sato began to proximity talks with both leaders of Cyprus. (Migdalovitz, 2007: 6; Fisher, 2001: 317). But intercommunal talks did not last long. In 1997, The Greek Cypriot community decided to apply the European Union. Denktash clarified that its application to EU ended the intercommunal talks (Müftüler-bac, 1999: 571). At the same time, Turkey and the TRNC signed an economic agreement to cope with the economic problems of the Turkish Cypriot community (Müftüler-bac, 1999: 571). The negotiations between the EU and The Greek Cypriot community had started in 1998. In November 1999, the UN Secretary General called for Confidence Building Measures again (Migdalovitz, 2007: 5). The CBMs had created a place for the new mediation policy in the UN, which is called as the Annan Plan. In Cyprus, before the establishment of the Annan Plan, there were five rounds of proximity talks beginning in 1999 under the UN mediation (Migdalovitz, 2007: i).

In 2002, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a settlement plan for the Cyprus problem which referred as the Annan Plan. The Annan Plan aimed to resolve disagreements over the level of governance of the federation (Loizides, 2012: 5). Annan focused on improving the confidence between the parties. In order to that, Kofi

Annan submitted a report, which is 'Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,' for improving intercommunal talks and dealing with the conditions in November 2002 (Michael, 2007: 596). The Annan Plan aimed to establish the united Republic of Cyprus. The Annan Plan sought to reunite two Cyprus communities into a federal state together with two equal constituent states (Georgiades, 2007: 575; Ladich, 2006: 113). The meeting between Annan, Clerides, and Denktash on March 10, 2003, was concluded with a failure (Migdalovitz, 2007: 9). The Hague Summit on March 10, 2003, put an end to continuing negotiations under the control of Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Michael, 2007: 596). Until 2003, the buffer zone under the supervision of the UN closed its gates to almost any human passage (Avraamidou & Kyriakides, 2015: 2). The checkpoints at the borders were opened in April 2003 (Braynt, 2009: 2; Migdalovitz, 2007: 9). Moreover, Braynt (2009) stated that since the early 1990s, Greek Cypriots had used transnational courts as a political tool, for instance, the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey until 2003 (p. 6).

The negotiations reached a deadlock in 2003. Denktash and Papadopoulos rejected to resume the talks with Annan (Schiff, 2011: 138). According to Michael (2007), the negotiations in 2003 were incapable of bringing a resolution to the Cyprus conflict (Michael, 2007: 587). The second round of Annan initiative started in January 2004 (Michael, 2007: 596). The negotiations from February to March 2004 under the UN control failed. In March 2004, Papadopoulos and Denktash refused to sign an agreement. Denktash and Papadopoulos did not trust the United Nations' role as a mediator during the negotiations under the control of Secretary General Annan (Schiff, 2008:405). "Both parties perceived the UN as a non-neutral mediator" (Schiff, 2008: 405). They were not willing to agree to the Annan Plan without any changes that it

demanded (Schiff, 2011: 139). Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders focused on different perspectives when Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked for their demands for the redrafting of the plan. During the Annan Plan, there were 12 working groups in Cyprus (UNITAR, 2010: 32). Annan aimed to encourage the parties to discuss their drafts together with the working groups. But, both sides failed to find common ground; their demands were different than others. Moreover, there was no mutual trust between the parties during the pre-negotiation of the Annan Plan (Schiff, 2011: 141). Papadopoulos believed in that the agreement would not be beneficial for the Greek Cypriots if it would not reflect their interests (Schiff, 2011: 140). Greek Cypriots believed that there is an absence of their vital interests in the plan. On the other hand, Denktash thought in that the Annan Plan did not offer protection for the rights of Turkish Cypriots and mentioned that the importance of status quo (Schiff, 2011: 140). The Greek Cypriot community did not support the Annan Plan. Greek Cypriots believed that if they accept the Annan Plan, their life simply would never some like before (Braynt, 2005: 33). In fact, they thought that the EU membership would empower the Greek Cypriots' position in the negotiations (Braynt, 2005: 30).

> The Annan Plan provided for a constituent state for each community, and a common state later renamed the federal state in response to Greek Cypriot representation on the subject. The federal state was composed of two elected legislatures, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The electorate separately elected them in each constituent state, and each house had 48 members. In the lower house, at least 12 seats had to be filled by those elected by each community.
>
> Dodd, 2010: 225

Due to refuses of both leaders of Cypriot communities, the Secretary General Kofi Annan changed his policy for Cyprus. Annan drafted the final document to a referendum in the island on April 24, 2004 (Schiff, 2008: 395). Papadopoulos rejected the revisions for the Annan Plan regarding the Greek Cypriots' interests (Braynt, 2005: 31). He defined the Annan Plan as a legal and political limbo (Avraamidou & Kyriakides, 2015: 10). Furthermore, Papadopoulos asked from the Greek Cypriots to vote 'no' in the referendum (Avraamidou & Kyriakides, 2015: 10; Kovras, 2012: 416). The Annan plan was voted by referendum between both Cypriot communities on April 24, 2004. In the Referendum, the Turkish side accepted it, but the majority of Greek Cypriots rejected it. While 76% of Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, 65% of Turkish Cypriots accepted it. The 'Annan Plan' was the well-known effort for ending the conflict regarding support from many Cypriots, Greece, and Turkey. The plan was the most significant effort in producing a solution (Georgiades, 2007: 575; Avraamidou & Kyriakides, 2015: 2; Yılmaz, 2010: 50). The Secretary General Annan clarified that the lack of intercommunal talks during the negotiations was one of the reasons for the failure (Michael, 2007: 587). Solomonides (2008) examined that the Plan was the largest effort to put an end the Cyprus problem (Solomonides, 2008: 63). Diez et al. (2006) stated that "the rejection of the Annan Plan by both the Southern Cypriot government and the popular referendum in April 2004 showed the limits of the compulsory approach" (p. 576). It failed to eliminate the fear and security concerns of the Greek Cypriot community (Michael, 2007: 599). The failure of the Annan Plan was perhaps the most painful failure that the island had experienced (Schiff, 2008: 390). ICG Report (2014) described the Annan Plan as the closest attempt to resolve the conflict since the

breakdown of the state in 1963 (p. 1-2). Moreover, Kyriakou and Kaya (2011) described the plan as a missed opportunity for a settlement in Cyprus (p. 25).

5.5. The last attempts of the UN and the intercommunal talks

After joining the EU, the Republic of Cyprus began to block implementation of many promises that the EU has made to Turkish Cypriots (Hatay & Braynt, 2011: 10). According to Kyris (2012), the EU integration helped the Greek Cypriot community to strengthen its position on the negotiations (p. 95-96). The Republic of Cyprus gained veto power to stalemate the TRNC in the negotiations. The Republic of Cyprus used its right of veto to stop improvement in the economic relations between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU (Kyris, 2012: 92). The aim of the reaching a power against the other increased the intractability of the conflict in Cyprus. The deep feelings of the hatred and the fear had continued between the Cypriot communities. Moreover, Denktash did not stand for election. In April 2005, Mehmet Ali Talat won the elections and became the new president of the TRNC. On July 8, 2006, the United Nations Secretary General for Political Affairs Gambori presented a joint statement of 'Set of Principles' which have known as 'the July 8 Agreement' (Migdalovitz, 2007: 13). Together with the agreement on July 8, 2006, the leaders of both communities repeated to search for the bizonal, bicommunal federation as a basis of solution (Kyriakou & Kaya, 2011: 20).

Demetris Christofias was elected as a president of Republic of Cyprus in February 2008. After that, a new round of talks started between Christofias and

Mehmet Ali Talat. In the meeting, they agreed on the principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality, political equality, single international identity, single sovereignty, two equal constituent states and issue of settlement, which were mentioned in previous negotiations throughout the history of conflict (Erhürman, 2010: 36). The ongoing problem of the issue of sovereignty was ended together with this agreement. Moreover, Christofias and Talat also negotiated about the power of the constitution regarding a federal based solution. 2008 talks were based on the equal status of two constituent states (Morelli, 2017: 4). Moreover, the wall between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Nations' buffer zone was demolished in March 2008 (Bora, 2013: 40; Yılmaz, 2010: 50). Ledra Street was reopened on 3 April 2008.

Their communities criticized Christofias and Talat because of the principle of single identity and single sovereignty in the international arena (Erhürman, 2010: 36). After the local pressure on both Christofias and Talat, the principle of the establishment of two constituent states became a problem in the talks. According to Erhürman (2010) "Christofias preferred to use the terminology of 'two autonomous regions' instead of 'two constituent states' in 2009 (p. 37). The Turkish Cypriot community desired a strong constituent state, whereas the Greek Cypriot community wanted a strong central government in federal basis (Erhürman, 2010: 38). Talat and Christofias failed to produce a federal solution model. In 2009, the UN Secretary-General Ki-Moon desired a quick fix because of the elections. But, the mediation process should not offer short-term, quick fix (Apakan, 2013: 41). Also, the Greek Cypriot community stated that if Talat lost the election, there would be a new perspective on negotiations (Morelli, 2017: 4).

On April 18, 2010, Derviş Eroğlu won the elections against Talat, and a new era had started in Cyprus. Together with Turkish Cypriot leader Eroğlu's letter to the UN Secretary General Bon Ki-Moon to resume negotiations under offices of the UN, formal talks continued between Christofias and Eroğlu in May 2010 (Morelli, 2016: 5). In September 2010, Christofias and the UN Secretary-General met and discussed the talks in Cyprus. Christofias explained that they were not close to producing a settlement in Cyprus (Morelli, 2017: 6). In 2011, the talks between Christofias and Eroğlu resumed including two meetings with the UN Secretary-General Bon Ki-Moon (Morelli, 2016:7). At the end of 2011, "both Cypriot communities seemed to have lost an apparent urgency to achieve a final solution" (Morelli, 2017: 7). According to UNDPA (2011), the responsibility of the parties to decide an outcome and reach a satisfying agreement is necessary for the mediation process (p. 12). Mediators must focus on the establishment of this responsibility. The unwilling between the Cypriot communities exemplified that the failure of the UN mediation policy in Cyprus during the beginning of the 2010s. In order to eliminate this problem, Ban Ki-Moon invited both leaders to New York. On January 22, 2012, there was a meeting in New York regarding discussing regulatory issues (Morelli, 2017: 7). The UN initiative failed to contribute a new agreement between both communities and Christofias and Eroğlu continued to direct talks in Cyprus. Talks between Christofias and Eroğlu under the UN sponsored were formally suspended in May 2012 (Morelli, 2016: 8). Although Christofias and Eroğlu were willing to find a solution again, they could not make any progress and after Eroğlu's rejection of giving up the TRNC's flag or sending mainland Turks in the Northern Cyprus back to Turkey, Christofias mentioned to the UN that the settlement was not possible and Turks were not ready to solve the Cyprus problem in September

2010 (Morelli, 2016: 6). The direct talks between the leaders were interrupted by the Eurozone crisis and Christofias' intent to EU presidency (Morelli, 2017: 8).

On 28 February 2013, Nicos Anastasiades became a new president of the Republic of Cyprus. In June 2013, Turkey improved its relationship with Greece and Republic of Cyprus for its EU accession process (ICG, 2014: 2). But, public opinion in Cyprus between two communities has not changed overly. The Turkish Cypriot side has insisted on the solution with partition, on the contrary, the Greek Cypriot community has insisted on the strong central government in a federal system. Furthermore, the question of Varosha had continued in 2013 negotiations. The Greek Cypriot community brought the issue of Varosha and clarified their demands on confidence building measures and restoration of the city in the summer of 2013 (ICG, 2014: 2). In the negotiations between Anastasiades and Eroğlu, the question of Varosha and economic sanctions to the TRNC became major issues again. The Greek Cypriot side proposed agreement, including the return of Varosha to Greek Cypriots and the establishment of direct trade links between the EU and the TRNC (Morelli, 2017: 10). The Turkish Cypriot side rejected the proposal. On 11 February 2014, a new round of intercommunal talks had started again. "The talks between Anastasiades and Eroğlu seem to aim for a lighter federation" (ICG, 2014: 6). Anastasiades and Eroğlu continued to direct talks, but both leaders rejected each other's proposals for an agreement.

In April 2015, Mustafa Akıncı won the election against Derviş Eroğlu. Together with the presidency of Akıncı, the negotiations had restarted. Anastasiades and Akıncı were willing to continue to negotiations and find a solution. According to UNSC Report

on January 2016, the talks between the leaders of both community, Anastasiades, and Akıncı, have continued (p. 1). Together with the beginning of 2016, UNFICYP increased its support to the talks between Anastasiades and Akıncı (UNSC Report, Jan. 2016: 12). UNFICYP continues to engage with the authorities, local community representatives and civilians (UNSC Report, June 2016: 3). The Turkish Cypriot forces have assured the UNFICYP in order to remove the mines in the north of buffer zone (UNSC Report, Jan. 2016: 3). Mediation Support Unit of the UN has established working groups in Cyprus (UNITAR, 2010: 32).

Moreover, leaders of the both Cypriot communities have supported to the establishment of the Committee on Missing Persons. The Committee continues to work today. "As at 15 June, out of a total 2.001 persons on the official list of missing persons, the bi-communal teams of archaeologists of the Committee had exhumed the remains of 1.112 missing persons on both sides of the island" (UNSC Report, June 2016: 7). The latest negotiation between the conflict parties started on 9 January 2017 (between Anastasiades and Akıncı in Geneva). According to Morelli (2017), the talks in Geneva began with a positive atmosphere (p. 17). "Both parties proposed maps for territorial adjustment to the UN" (Morelli, 2017: 17). The parties did not accept each other's demands in the territorial base. Due to that, the negotiations were suspended until April 2017. On 11 April 2017, the negotiations resumed in Geneva regarding principles of the presence of Turkish military in Cyprus, the security guarantees according to 1960 Treaties, political equality between the communities (Morelli, 2017: 21).

6. The future of United Nations role of mediation in Intractable conflicts

United Nations helps conflict parties to discuss terms and options to end the dispute and to produce a sustainable peace. Moreover, United Nations mediation includes an establishment of understanding and analyzing of parties' vital interests regarding their demands, fear, and concerns. Due to the UNDPA statement (2011), mediation is a beneficial method which corresponding to the prevention of the continuity of the violence in conflict (p. 14). It is also a beneficial way regarding assisting conflict parties in accordance with the establishment of an agreement in the conflict. The United Nations' peacekeeping support, including confidence building measures, power-sharing agreements, electoral supports or economic and social aids, aims to build or assist in reaching a mutual settlement (Yılmaz, 2012: 3). Moreover, political and social challenges of the conflict and its intractability should be understood and comprehensively analyzed for the establishment of a mediation strategy (UNDPA, 2011: 25).

United Nations has managed to end the violence in the Cyprus conflict (Yılmaz, 2010: 60). ICG Report (2014) clarified that UNFICYP should stay on the island until the settlement, although the conflict and the UN mediation efforts are frozen (p. 11). Yılmaz (2012) stated that "UNFICYP has been a necessary element of conflict management on the island for nearly half a century" (p. 10). "The UN has a key role, UNFICYP is one of its oldest peacekeeping operations, and waves of representatives have tried to broker a settlement" (ICG, 2014: 23). Moreover, Greece and Turkey support the UN mediation efforts for solving Cyprus. According to Michael (2007), the United Nations' mediation efforts in Cyprus have clarified that Greece and Turkey have been flexible and supportive to the UN mediation (p. 598). Moreover, since the partition

in 1974, only ten people have died because of the conflict (ICG, 2014: 11). "The United Nations peacekeeping operations can prevent physical violence and conflict escalation" (Yılmaz, 2012: 15-16). According to Mirbagheri (1998) "UN peacemaking role in Cyprus was essential" (p. 82). It is clear to see that, the UN mediation efforts in Cyprus was successful in preventing further escalation violence after the partition in 1974.

Peck and Westheim (2014), stated that "the United Nations has the advantage of more institutional experience in mediation than any other organization" (p. 62). "For the past sixty years, the United Nations (UN) has played a central role in the management and resolution of the conflict in international affairs" (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 147). Mediation has become one of the core missions of the UN for conflict management and resolution to achieve a mutual peaceful settlement (Apakan, 2013: 39). The UN decided to establish a support unit for mediation to develop its capability in the interest of eliminating the frustration and protractedness of the conflicts such as Cyprus. In 2006, the United Nations' Mediation Support Unit was established. According to IPI (2009), "the Mediation Support Unit of the UN Department of Political Affairs should be further developed to serve as a helpdesk that connects mediators in the field" (p. 2). According to the White House Memorandum (2015), the United Nations must improve its capacity for conflict prevention and resolution, including through mediation (p. 7). The United Nations peace operations seek to promote confidence building measures to help to stakeholders (The White House, 2015: 1).

The cost-effectivity and the importance of mediation were underlined by Security Council (Apakan, 2013: 40). Together with the increasing of the UN expenditures regarding its rising cost of peacekeeping operations and the emergence of the global financial crisis have led to new conflict resolution and conflict prevention methods (Apakan, 2013: 39). Mediation is a cost-effective method for conflict management. Due to that, mediation is the most commonly used technique of intervention in inter-state conflicts (Beber, 2012: 397). But, it is clear to see that, United Nations mediation policies in Cyprus failed to produce an efficient model. Mediation efforts of the UN have become protracted in the Cyprus case. "Given the approach of the parties, the UN mediation process has been an exercise in frustration and futility, in which underlying concerns how rendered reasonable discourse and concession are making extremely difficult" (Fisher, 2001: 322). "For the UN or any other third party, mediating an intractable conflict is an exercise in frustration" (Hampson, 2003: 15). United Nations role as a mediator is limited because of the failure, the continuity of failures in negotiations and deadlocks because of the intractability of the conflicts. United Nations mediation policies are not enough to produce a mutual trust, collective dialogue, and confidence between the countries. The Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community have democratic, constitutional systems in their regions. Even though they continue to negotiations and there is absent of violence in the area, they failed to produce an agreeable solution because of the complexity of the conflict.

Since the breakdown of constitutional order in Cyprus, the United Nations has been trying to produce a settlement for the Cyprus conflict (Ladisch, 2006: 113). The United Nations' mediation has failed to find a peaceful solution in the Cyprus case. Leaders of both Cypriot communities agreed on the continuity of negotiations, although

there is no change in nature throughout the history of conflict (Schiff, 2011: 149). Although the relationship between the Cypriot communities has improved since the breakdown of violent conflict, all attempts to produce a peaceful settlement failed (Yılmaz, 2012: 8). While the violence was quelled together with the partition, it did not end the problem (Solomonides, 2008: 68). The UN has continued its peacekeeping operations on the island regardless of the fact that its mediation effort has been limited. The UN has protected its purpose of the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus (Reilly, 2003: 453). Since the partition in 1974, the negotiations were always ended with a deadlock regarding intangible issues such as sovereignty, territory, identity. Schiff (2011) stated that ""In the Cyprus case, the parties did not consider the status quo unbearable" (p. 150). Furthermore, negotiations throughout the conflict history have focused on the matters of governance and power sharing, property, territory, economic affairs, EU affairs and security and guarantees (Psaltis, 2016: 21). United Nations has failed to produce innovative strategies for the negotiations to promote common interests or mutual benefits for both Cypriot communities (Michael, 2007: 594). Moreover, the UN mediation efforts failed to analyze the conflict interests and main concerns and fears of the both communities. Throughout the conflict history, the Greek Cypriot community has considered a possible solution, only if there is a guarantee for three freedoms, the return of Varosha to them and demilitarization; whereas the Turkish Cypriot community has considered a possible solution, only if there is a guarantee for their local authority, political equality.

Throughout the conflict history, the UN mediation efforts always try to promote the common understanding in Cyprus together with the confidence-building measures. The UN states that the establishment of the consensus between the Cypriot

communities is essential for the solution (UNDPA, 2011: 12). Moreover, although the United Nations have played a vital role in Cyprus conflict, a peaceful settlement can only be produced by the consent of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Fisher (2001) stated that "formal mediation, primarily by the United Nations, has consistently failed to produce a settlement by which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities could rebuild their fragile political relationship" (p. 307). In addition to Fisher, UNDPA (2011) stated that "mediation may not be appropriate in cases where conflicts are 'frozen,' i.e. where the fundamental strategic factors that caused the conflict in the first place have not changed" (p. 13).

The UN mediation policies had faced with several problems in Cyprus. For instance, different perceptions of both communities on the subject of 'sovereignty' become the biggest problem in the UN sponsored negotiations. There are complicated issues in intractable conflicts such as sovereignty. The talks in Cyprus always in deadlock because of the issues like sovereignty. There is an asymmetry between the parties' power on the subject of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus (Müftüler-bac, 1999: 563; Schiff, 2008: 390). Moreover, leaders of the both Cypriot communities stated that their understanding of bi-zonality and bi-community is different (Hatay & Braynt, 2011: 16). They failed to find common ground in the light of possible solution.

Furthermore, there has been a lack of mutual trust and lack of direct contacts between the communities (Hadjipavlou, 2007: 363). In Cyprus, mediators had failed to consider the role of historical dilemmas between the Cypriot communities (Michael, 2007: 597). Cypriot communities believe in that there is a need for building trust and

mutual dialogue between each community (Ladisch, 2006: 123). In addition to systematic inabilities of the UNFICYP, the UN failures in the elimination of primary concerns of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in the building of trust, mutual dialogue and confidence between the communities have questioned the role of the UN mediation policies role in intractable conflicts depending upon the Cyprus conflict. First of all, UNFICYP's capacity has failed to cover demands of peace (Yılmaz, 2012: 11). In Cyprus, preventing of fighting, the contribution of the maintenance and restoration of law and order are UNFICYP's primarily works (Findlay, 2012: 90). Unfortunately, the United Nations had faced with a lack of economic and military power for implementing an effective mission on the island (Michael, 2007: 594). "Between 1964 and 1974, UNFICYP's total strength, including civilian police, never exceeded 6275" (Findlay, 2012: 91). Lack of sufficient strength of UNFICYP caused a failure to prevent inter-communal violence between the years of 1964 and 1974. Moreover, the size of UNFICYP was reduced by 28 percent in 1992 (Yılmaz, 2012: 11). Due to the continuity of failed attempts to end the conflict, most of UN members became unwilling to support UNFICYP (Yılmaz, 2012: 14). In 1993, Russia blocked a resolution on financing UNFICYP (Yılmaz, 2012: 14).

The second problem of the UN mediation in Cyprus is related to lack of communication, trust, and confidence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the intractable conflicts, the level of communication eventually became non-exist, and there are deep-rooted mistrust and non-confidence. The island of Cyprus is consisted by two homogeneous ethnic and religious communities. "In Cyprus, there are no cross-cutting cleavages, but two homogenous groups" (Solomonides, 2008: 71). Turkish and Greek nationalism in each Cypriot community caused the continuity of the non-

communication era for years (Anastasiou, 2002: 584). According to Hadjipavlou (2007), a high percentage of Greek and Turkish Cypriots believed in that nationalism was one of the primary cause of the creation and the continuity of the conflict (p. 355). Moreover, education also creates a problem in the conflicts. Education is a very important to figure in Cyprus conflict regarding creating the continuity of animosity between the conflict parties or establishing of common dialogue (Ladisch, 2006: 120). In order to achieve a bi-communal peace in Cyprus, the creation of direct communication between the citizens of both communities is essential. In Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriots constitute stereotypes to identify both parties such as 'us' and 'them,' 'good' and 'evil' (Anastasiou, 2002: 590). According to Michael (2007), the lack of communication between the conflict parties is one of the factors that what lay behind the failure of the negotiations (p. 600). There has been no communication between the Cypriot communities since the partition of the island (Bahcheli, 2000: 216). The memory of the suffer in each community is defined as an ongoing effect of the non-communication between the Cypriot communities (Anastasiou, 2002: 581-582). According to Broome (2004), the research for collective vision statement shows that people in Cyprus believe in the necessity of communication and work with the other community for the peacebuilding (p. 199).

In addition to the lack of communication, the continuity of mistrust and fear between the Cypriot communities is one of the problems in the conflict, which the UN mediation and conflict parties failed to solve. Because of the mistrust between the communities, they are reluctant to compromise new arrangements (Michael, 2007: 589). Distrust and mutual suspicion among the communities still exist. Mistrust between the Cypriot communities was intensified together with the 1960 Constitution

(Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993: 343). An establishment of a strong federation is not a possible solution for the TRNC because of that the fear of the past as a minority between the years of 1963 and 1974 (Michael, 2007: 593). Mistrust and fear because of the presence of the Turkish troops and the memory of 1974 events still exists in the Greek Cypriot community. "Collective memory of conflict shapes the perspectives of individuals and groups in a way that symbolic and realistic threats are exacerbated, sustaining prejudice and distrust" (Psaltis, 2016: 19). During the third-party negotiations, there was no focus on the frustration and fear between the Cypriot communities which started in the 1950s together with the paramilitary groups in Cyprus (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993: 343). There was no mutual trust between the Cypriot communities during the pre-negotiation process (Schiff, 2008: 404). Tolerance and compromise amongst the leaders are essential for the establishment of the federation (Khasman, 1999: 6). The next problem is the lack of confidence building measures between the communities. Trust between Greek and Turkish Cypriots must be established. Campbell-Thomson (2014) argued that the United Nations approach in Cyprus conflict abstracted the building of confidence between communities (p. 72). Although leaders of the both Cypriot communities always mention about that the importance of a solution, they have not build a harmonious relationship between the communities (Hadjipavlou, 2007: 363; Peck & Westheim, 2014: 105). Confidence building measures can improve the relationship between the conflict parties. Although the UN mediation aimed to build trust between the communities, its efforts rarely are achieved in the negotiations (ICG, 2014: i). In Cyprus, there is a need for building collective dialogue, trust and confidence between each community (Ladisch, 2006: 123).

Thirdly, United Nations failed to produce a policy to eliminate the most significant challenges for the Cypriot communities with the aim of establishing an acceptable solution for both sides. For instance, the existence of Turkish troops on the island is the biggest problem for the Greek Cypriot community (Michael, 2007: 593). The continuity of presence of Turkish military in Cyprus has caused to an unwillingness of Greek Cypriot to negotiate with Turkish Cypriots for a solution (Coufoudakis, 1985: 206). The Greek Cypriot community examined that Turkey violated the Treaty of Guarantee due to its second military operation (Camp, 1980: 59). According to Camp (1980), Turkish military intervention turned to the strategic action rather than aiming the protection of Turkish Cypriots (p. 59). The only solution for Greek Cypriots must contain the return of the Turkish military and Turkish settlers to Turkey and the reconstruction of the Greek Cypriot community (Braynt, 2005: 34). Together with the Turkish military intervention, the Greek Cypriots had faced with the experience of injustice including refugee problem (Anastasiou, 1996: 80; Fisher, 2001: 311). There was a huge refugee problem for the Greek Cypriots after the Turkish military intervention on the island in 1974. The questions of the refugees and the withdrawal of Turkish troops in Cyprus have been primary subjects of the Greek Cypriot leadership in the negotiations. Moreover, According to Anastasiou (1996), there were 1619 missing persons from Greek Cypriots and 483 from Turkish Cypriots (p. 80).

The other challenge for the UN mediation efforts in Cyprus is the continuity of political and social isolation of the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriot community has been faced with economic and political isolation from the international arena and dependent on Turkey which has recognized the North Cyprus as an independent state (Hatay & Braynt, 2011: 17). The Greek Cypriot government has applied economic embargo on

the Turkish side (Bahcheli, 2000: 208). The TRNC is unable to set up official political and economic relations in the international arena and depended on Turkey's financial aids (Khasman, 1999: 1; Michael, 2007: 592; Reilly, 2003: 451; Ozyigit, 2008: 186). Although the Greek Cypriot community has high living standards, the Turkish Cypriot community was not counted even in the UN Human Development Index (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 70). Northern Cyprus wants to be tied to the world and be represented politically equal in the international arena (Braynt, 2009: 3). Campbell-Thomson (2014) stated that Turkish Cypriots' rights, including the freedom of movement, self-determination, the right of economic development and equal political representation, were denied by the United Nations (p. 73). In Cyprus, because of the political isolation of the TRNC, there were no international communication services such as telephone lines or postal addresses, and there was no membership in international institutions (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 71). There is a lack of international support for recognition of the TRNC. Turkish Cypriots are deprived of all services and benefits from the European Union (Reilly, 2003: 450). Turkish Cypriots have isolated from the international community.

6. Conclusion

Cypriot communities were reluctant to the Republic of Cyprus, and it caused a crisis after three years of the Republic. Solomonides (2008) stated that "the 1960 Constitution provides an example of a failed attempt at consociational democracy" (p. 61). Moreover, Castleberry (1964) examined that the return to the 1960 Constitution is not possible for the establishment of resolution (p. 125). According to Castleberry (1964), understanding and analyzing of the inter-communal violence between the years of 1963 and 1964 is essential to provide a resolution (p. 119). Since the outbreak

of violence in 1963 and partition in 1974, both Cypriot communities have negotiated over an establishment of a federal or a confederal solution (Burgess, 2006: 224). Together with the partition in 1974, the reunification of all island became the primary aim of Greek Cypriots. "Typically, the Greek Cypriots were asked to prepare proposals with concessions on the constitutional aspects of the problem, and the Turkish Cypriots on the territorial aspects" (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993: 346). Both Cypriot communities had tried to utilize their position in the international arena for gaining support during the negotiations (Coufoudakis, 1976: 468). Negotiations between the Cypriot communities to reach a possible settlement always be considered with the federal solution after 1974 (Avraamidou & Kyriakides, 2015: 2).

In the island of Cyprus, the Greek government is internationally recognized, and the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU as a whole island; on the other hand, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized as an independent country only by Turkey. The Greek Cypriot community prefers a solution regarding a unitary state or a federation with a strong central government (Michael, 2007: 593; Solomonides, 2008: 71-72). The subject of a 'unitary state' was faced with the Turkish resistance (Fisher, 2001: 314). The Turkish Cypriot community suffered between the years of the 1963 inter-communal violence and the wars of 1974 (Anastasiou, 1996: 80). Turkey authorized its military intervention in 1974 according to the Treaty of Guarantee (Camp, 1980: 57). Turkish intervention was caused by Greek coup d'état. Turkish Cypriot community has aimed to protect administrative structure after the partition in 1974 (Michael, 2007: 592). UNFICYP has been to maintain the ceasefire between the Turkish military forces and the Greek National Guard after the interventions in July-August 1974. The establishment of the buffer zone helped the UN Peacekeeping Force

in Cyprus to prevent and manage incidents efficiently (Lindley, 2007: 225). The Turkish Cypriots had demanded bi-communal, bi-zonal federation between the years of 1974 and 1998 (Müftüler-bac, 1999: 564). But together with the continuity of the failures in negotiations according to a federal solution, Turkish Cypriot perspective started to shift. According to Ker-Lindsay (2009), together with the end of the 1990s, Denktash focused on a solution with loose confederation rather than a federal solution (p. 156). On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot community always concentrated on the solution together with the strong central federation demilitarization of the Turkish part, and return of Turkish civilian settlers to Turkey. Together with the High-Level Agreements, Greek Cypriots renounced Enosis and pointed out the importance of the bizonal, bicommunal federation.

From the partition of the island in 1974 to today, there have been numerous UN-sponsored negotiations in Cyprus (Morelli, 2016: 2). United Nations' sponsored talks aimed to reconcile the interests of both communities in Cyprus and re-establish a central government (Morelli, 2016: 2). All attempts to solve the problem has failed. According to ICG Report (2014), there were five essential UN-sponsored negotiations (the High-Level Agreements, the Draft Framework Agreement, the Set of Ideas, the Confidence Building Measures, and the Annan Plan) to produce a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution in Cyprus (p. i). Although there have been five serious attempts by the UN, the Cyprus conflict remains unresolved (Kyriakou & Kaya, 2011: 19). Previous agreements on the principles of negotiations became an obstacle for new rounds of talks (Michael, 2007: 589). Although there are repeated to produce a peaceful solution, the negotiations have not ended in Cyprus (Bahcheli, 2000: 212).

In 1977, four points guidelines of Denktash-Makarios Agreement were a significant milestone which puts forward that both communities would reunify in the future agenda, but the talks were suspended because of the continuity of disagreements in territorial adjustments and the withdrawal of Turkish troops. In 1986, the UN Secretary-General offered a Draft Framework Agreement to Cypriot communities. The Agreement focused on the subjects of sovereignty, demilitarization, and territorial percentages. Greek Cypriots refused to continue negotiations in 1986 Draft Framework Agreement because of the lack of guarantee of three freedoms and territorial aspects. The Set of Ideas focused on a framework, including bi-zonal, bicommunal federation, the issue of sovereignty, the refugee problem and territorial adjustments between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was rejected by Turkish Cypriots generally because of the constitutional matters in the negotiation. According to Myint-U (2006), "especially, when conflicts are internal, sovereignty arguments raise, and it seems UN involvement becomes particularly distasteful" (p. 92).

Due to continual failures in the UN-sponsored talks, the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali aimed to improve confidence building measures. They intended to build trust, but both parties rejected to continue the CBMs. After that, the Annan Plan was a very significant milestone in the Cyprus conflict. United Nations' working groups guided leaders of both communities on the economy, governance, property, security and territory subjects to reshape the Annan Plan. The Plan is called as the biggest opportunity throughout the history of conflict, but the Greek Cypriots rejected it at the referendum. In 2004, the EU decided to accept the Republic of Cyprus to membership even though there has been no solution to conflict (Kovras, 2012: 414). Together with the election of Talat as a president of the TRNC in 2005, intercommunal talks between

the Cypriot communities had restarted. Although negotiations had restarted several times, conflict parties have little hope for solving because of previous failures in the meetings (Hatay & Braynt, 2011: 5).

Cyprus conflict has been faced with mistrust, fear and non-communication problems between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities. According to Psaltis (2016), the distrust and the lack of the communication between the Cypriot communities could not be eliminated because of different social representation of memory by the communities (p. 22). In addition to Psaltis, Hadjipavlou (2007) stated that "post trauma, fears and animosity, mistrust, exclusion, and victimhood contribute to intractability and deep rootedness of ethnonational conflicts such as in Cyprus" (p. 362). There are a mistrust and fear between the Cypriot communities. Moreover, according to Broome (2004), national extremist movement, intolerance between cultures and use of violence between communities, have been key drivers in the case of Cyprus (p. 191). The systematic use of national symbols, education or the media has caused the continuity of the struggle and create a different social representation of memory (Psaltis, 2016: 21). Regional hostilities between the Cypriot communities and the memory of the violent conflict have prevented the construction of a negotiation (Broome, 2004: 191). Religion has created the 'Us' and 'Them' mentality and has caused the continuity of hostility between Cypriot communities (Dietzel & Markides, 2009: 70).

The withdrawal of Turkish troops in Cyprus is one of the primary demand of Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots have believed that the existence

of Turkish soldiers provides insurance against the domination of Greek Cypriot majority (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993: 348). "UN peace-keeping efforts in Cyprus have fallen squarely within the realms of traditional mediation" (Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 160). Resolution and reconciliation processes in deep-rooted conflicts are regularly faced with complexity and multifacetedness (Hadjipavlou, 2007: 363). Cyprus is one of the most protracted conflicts which UN has attempted to resolve. Müftüler-bac (1993) identified the Cyprus problem as a political conflict between two ethnic communities to protect their identities and common interests (p. 560). Although, the UN is successful to prevent the escalation risk of the tension in the island after the partition. The mediation capability of the UN has limited power to help conflict parties to produce a peaceful settlement of intractable conflicts. It is clear to see that United Nations has an essential role in the protracted conflicts. It's mediation efforts could provide a stabilization in the tension of the conflict, but they are limited to produce an agreeable solution and always reach a deadlock in the intractable conflicts like Cyprus.

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