Abstract

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed comprehensive trade and investment agreement between the European Union and the United States of America. This Master’s thesis applies Robert D. Putnam’s *Two-Level Game Theory* to the TTIP negotiations, as well as analyses the activities and influence of various stakeholders and factors within the EU and USA that have put pressure on the chief international negotiators and contributed to the freeze of the TTIP negotiations process. This thesis reveals that the anti-TTIP arguments of the second-level stakeholders in the European Union and United States differed. The European stakeholders opposed to TTIP because they thought that it would harm EU’s relatively higher standards; consumer safety; environment; and agricultural market. They also claimed that TTIP’s negotiations process was non-transparent, and they protested against the inclusion of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ISDS). Their anti-TTIP campaigning was also supported by the presence of anti-American sentiments in the EU. In the USA, the main barriers to TTIP negotiations started with decision of the Congress to grant President Barack Obama the so called Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), because it is frequently designated as unconstitutional and non-transparent. The American anti-TTIP interest groups protested mainly against the convergence of financial regulations; EU’s proposals for TTIP’s energy chapter; and EU’s requirement for full access to the U.S. procurement market. The recent anti-trade sentiments in the United States contributed to the collapse of TTIP negotiations.