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The development of National Institutes for Culture: The Case
Study of the French (Institut Français) and Russian (Russian
Centre of Science and Culture) Cultural Centres

Master's Thesis

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Abstract in English

This study of the *Institut Français* (IF) and the Russian centre of science and culture (RCSC) is significant because it reveals different models of functioning for a cultural centre in an international global context. The main purpose of the paper was to analyse the differences between the two cultural centres (IF and RCSC) and figure out in which way these differences influence the development of the cultural centres abroad. According to our main goal we operate within conceptual and theoretical framework: the national culture and soft power (as reasons of the development of national cultural centres), the globalization (as a condition of their development), the nation branding (as the result of their functioning). Moreover, this paper supports the hypotheses that national cultural centres abroad define their cultural strategies whilst facing the realities of other countries and that the roles of managers of cultural centres are fundamental.

This work is divided into three main chapters. The first explains why the IF and RCSC centres were created by analysing the history of their transformations. We examine the reasons for the increasing amount of national cultural centres to provide the most efficient soft power. The second chapter addresses the question of where they are located. We compare the networks of both centres by explaining their strategic positions influenced by globalisation. After presenting the reasons for development and the actual network of centres in the last chapter, we figure out what images (brands) of the nations they are presenting. As a result, the research determined the strategies and practices of national cultural centres by comparing two cultural institutions. Furthermore, our thesis discovers some of the difficulties and weaknesses in the development of the IF and the RCSC abroad.

Key words: national cultural centres, Institut Français, Russian Centre for Science and Culture, soft power, glocalisation, nation branding.

Résumé en français

Cette étude de l'*Institut Français* (IF) et du Centre de Russie pour la science et la culture (RCSC) est pertinente car elle révèle différents modèles de fonctionnement pour un centre culturel dans un contexte global international. L'objectif premier de ce mémoire était d'analyser les différences entre ces deux centres culturels (IF et RCSC) afin de considérer dans quelle mesure ces

différences influent sur le développement des centres culturels à l'étranger. Sur la base de notre objectif principal, nous opérons dans le cadre d'un modèle conceptuel et théorique précis: la culture nationale et le "soft power" (en tant que moteurs du développement des centres culturels nationaux), la mondialisation (en tant que condition de leur développement), le marketing pays (comme résultante de leur activité). En outre, nous avons soutenu les hypothèses que les centres culturels nationaux à l'étranger définissent leurs stratégies culturelles tout en faisant face aux réalités d'autres pays et que le rôle des directeurs d'institut culturels est fondamental.

Ce travail est divisé en 3 chapitres principaux. Le premier chapitre explique pourquoi l'IF et le RCSC ont été créés suite à l'analyse de l'histoire de leur transformation. Nous considérons les raisons d'ajuster le nombre de centres culturels nationaux pour optimiser le "soft power". Le second chapitre répond à la question des lieux où ils disposent d'une représentation. Nous comparons les réseaux des deux centres en expliquant leurs positions stratégiques influencées par la mondialisation. Après avoir présenté les raisons du développement et le réseau réel des centres dans le dernier chapitre, nous explorons les images ("marques") nationales qu'ils représentent. En conséquence, l'étude a déterminé les stratégies et pratiques des centres culturels nationaux en comparant deux institutions culturelles. De plus, notre thèse dévoile certaines difficultés et faiblesses dans le développement de l'IF et du RCSC à l'étranger.

Mots clés: centres culturels nationaux, Institut Français, Le Centre de Russie pour la science et la culture, soft power, glocalisation, marketing national.

Abstrakt v českém jazyce

Diplomová práce analyzuje Francouzský institut (IF) a Ruské středisko vědy a kultury (RCSC) a je přínosná proto, že odhaluje odlišné modely fungování kulturních center v mezinárodně globálním kontextu. Hlavním cílem textu je analyzovat rozdíly kulturních center (IF a RCSC) Francie a Ruska a identifikovat v čem tyto rozdíly ve fungování ovlivňují rozvoj center v zahraničí. V souladu s tímto cílem operujeme v jasně vymezeném konceptuálním a teoretickém rámci: národní kultura a soft power (jako příčina rozvoje národních kulturních center), globalizace (jako podmínka jejich rozvoje), národní branding (jako výsledek jejich fungování). V konečném důsledku tato studie podporuje hypotézu, že národní kulturní centra v zahraničí

definují svou strategii v reakci na situaci v dané zemi a že role manažerů kulturních center je v tomto procesu klíčová.

Studie je rozdělena do tří hlavních kapitol. První kapitola vysvětluje proč IF a RCSC byly vytvořeny a analyzuje historii jejich utváření. Zkoumá důvod nárůstu jejich počtu pro uplatnění efektivnější soft power. Druhá kapitola se zaměřuje na rozmístění center po světě. Srovnáváme síť francouzských a ruských center a to z hlediska strategické pozice ovlivněnou globalizací. Po představení důvodů k rozvoji center a představení aktuální podoby sítě center se v poslední kapitole zaměříme na obraz (brand) národa který centrum prezentuje. Jako výsledek výzkum popsals strategie a praktiky národních kulturních center. V konečném důsledku diplomová práce odhaluje některé obtíže a slabé stránky v rozvoji IF a RSCS v zahraničí.

Klíčová slova: národní kulturní centra, Institut Français, Ruské Středisko Vědy a Kulutry, soft power, globalizace, národní branding.

Аннотация на русском языке

Сравнительное исследование Французского института и Российского центра науки и культуры имеет существенное значение, поскольку оно демонстрирует различные модели функционирования национальных культурных центров в международном глобальном контексте. Основная цель работы заключается в анализе различий между двумя культурными центрами и того, каким образом эти различия влияют на развитие культурных центров за рубежом. Согласно главной цели исследования выполняется анализ трёх основных концептов: национальной культуры и мягкой силы (как причины развития национальных культурных центров), глобализации (как условия их развития), национального брендинга (как результат их функционирования).

Кроме того, мы валидировали две гипотезы: первую, что национальные культурные центры за рубежом адаптируют свои культурные стратегии к реалиям других стран; вторую, что роли руководителей культурных центров имеют основополагающее значение при выборе стратегии развития центра.

Представленная работа состоит из трёх основных разделов. Первый раздел содержит объяснение, почему культурные центры были созданы, на основе истории их трансформаций. Второй раздел сравнивает сеть обоих центров, объясняя формирование их стратегических подходов под влиянием глобализации. После представления причин возникновения, краткого описания развития и текущего состояния сети центров, в последней, третьей главе мы определяем, какие образы (национальные бренды) они представляют. В результате исследования были рассмотрены стратегии и практики национальных культурных центров путём сравнения двух культурных учреждений. Кроме того, в результате исследования выявлены определённые сложности, как в развитии Французского института, так и Российского центра науки и культуры за рубежом.

Ключевые слова: национальные культурные центры, Французский институт, Российский центр науки и культуры, мягкая сила, глокализация, национальный брендинг

Анотація українською мовою

Дослідження Французького інституту і Російського центру науки і культури є важливим, оскільки воно показує різні моделі функціонування культурних центрів в міжнародному глобальному контексті. Основна мета роботи полягала в аналізі відмінностей між двома культурними центрами і з'ясувані, яким чином ці відмінності впливають на розвиток культурних центрів за кордоном. Згідно нашої головної мети ми три основні концепти: національної культури і м'якої сили (як причини розвитку національних культурних центрів), глобалізації (як умови їх розвитку), брендинг нації (як результат їх функціонування). Крім того, ми підтримали дві гіпотези: першу, що національні культурні центри за кордоном адаптують свої культурні стратегії до реалій інших країн: другу, що ролі керівників культурних центрів мають основоположне значення.

Ця робота складається з трьох основних розділів. Перший розділ пояснює, чому культурні центри були створені на основі їх аналізу та історії трансформацій. Другий розділ порівнює мережу обох центрів, пояснюючи їх стратегічні позиції під впливом глобалізації. Після представлення причини розвитку і фактичної мережі центрів, в останньому розділі ми з'ясуємо, які саме зображення (бренди) нації вони представляють. В результаті дослідження були визначені стратегії і практики національних культурних центрів шляхом

порівняння двох культурних установ. Крім того, наше дослідження виявляє деякі труднощі і недоліки в розвитку Французького інституту та Російського центру науки і культури за кордоном.

Ключові слова: національні культурні центри, Французький інститут, Російський центр науки і культури, м'яка сила, глокалізація, брендинг нації

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Hereby I declare that I worked out this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature, and I did not present it to obtain another academic degree.

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Introduction

The function of national culture centres is directly related to national policy, culture, economic development and international relations. This research focuses on the development of cultural centres, especially on the French (*Institut Français*) and the Russian (Russian Centre of Science and Culture) cultural centres. We examined the areas where the countries' policies are most evident which are in the cultural values and programs of the centres being analysed.

The importance of policy as an influencing towards culture has significantly increased in recent years. The *Institut Français* (IF) and Russian Centre of Science and Culture (RCSC) both have the task of constructing positive diplomatic relations. They represent national cultural diplomacy through their activities but they are also influenced by local culture. The national centres' cultural activities support the objectives of national development and cultural diplomacy but at the same time they must respect the rules of local government. This balance plays the principle role in the development of national cultural centres abroad. The strategy of a cultural centre represents the interests of two different actors: national government and local society. The government (national diplomacy) determines what the cultural centre should promote and local society (visitors of centres) influences how this promotion is carried out. The main activity of external cultural policies and cultural diplomacy of France and Russia is their support of national culture through the establishment of national cultural centres abroad. However, the cultural policies of these centres must adapt to new global challenges. The Russian cultural centre has gained power over Asia (especially in India) and of post-soviet territories. At the same time, *Institut Français* has continued to provide huge cultural diplomacy and influence in Europe and Africa (especially in the French ex-colonies).

At the first glance, The RCSC and the IF have the same cultural objectives and huge networks abroad. Yet, they differ remarkably in their methods of developing their institutions abroad. Therefore, the problem is not about the differences between the cultural policies of France and Russia but the differing strategies that they use to adapt their centres (cultural institutions) to their respective local societies.

The study of the *Institut Français* and the RCSC is significant because it reveals a different model of functioning for a cultural centre in an international context. The purpose of this study is to reveal the difficulties in developing the IF and the RCSC abroad, while also finding the best practices in the development of national cultural centres abroad. The goal is to see the differences between the two cultural centres and analyse in which way these differences influence the development of the cultural centres. This requires the identification of directors' characteristics, differences between national cultural centres of France and Russia and the influence of different locations on the cultural centre. To conduct this study, the basic theoretical context includes: the cultural diplomacy and globalization; national culture and nation branding; inter-cultural mediation and cultural development.

Our master project seeks to determine the strategies of support and promotion of the national art-sectors and cultural practices abroad. One way to approach this issue is through a comparative case study that analyses Russian and French centres. They have a high level of involvement in international diplomacy where the cultural element plays a huge role in the promotion of their national image (brand). The study is not about national identity but rather focuses on the national image that the countries construct through their cultural centres abroad. By identifying the differences and common characteristics between these two centres, we hope to illustrate the different strategies by which to construct a nation brand abroad and the opportunities to develop national culture abroad by selecting and organizing art-related events.

Our hypothesis is that the programs and development of cultural centres abroad depend on the cultural policy of the recipient country, rather than the original national culture policy. It supports the idea that there is a diffusion of cultural policy, which represents a hybrid culture. In the age of globalization and information, state cultural policies are becoming increasingly significant factors in the determination of the image of the country abroad. Thus, while the cultural centres of France are under the influence of the European National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC, established in 2006), the Russian centres have become more active due to military actions in Ukraine. It is possible to hypothesise that national cultural centres abroad define the cultural strategies facing other countries' realities. However, far too little attention has been paid to the art programs of cultural centres abroad, though several attempts have been made concerning the cultural diplomacy of Russia and France.

This research looks at the role and strategies assumed by French and Russian centres abroad in presenting national culture by asking what are the strategies in the promotion of a national image abroad? In order to answer our research questions we used a qualitative and quantitative comparative case study, a research design that aims to find the significant factors influencing the development of national culture institutions, especially abroad.

In reality, the development of national art and culture abroad by cultural centres is the main issue of our research. It includes and addresses the following questions. What are the strategies for the development of the cultural centre abroad? Does the cultural centre change its program according to the host country's cultural policy? Who are the cultural centres' directors? The thesis then addresses how the directors choose cultural centre's arts programs and what the most popular activities are for the visitors. This account seeks to compare the history of the development of the *Institut Français* and the Russian Centre of Science and Culture and examines how the cultural centres change their programs according the host country's cultural policy.

Questions have been raised about the differences in the development of cultural policy at French and Russian cultural centres. In this section, the proposed research indicates the social characteristics of the directors, instances of exchange between the centres and the local culture through the construction of cultural programs, and the influence of the local cultural policy on the centres.

The literature review

Before to compare strategies of the *Institut Français* and the Russian Centre of Science and Culture abroad we need to analyse the basic definitions of national culture. The definition of culture offered by different disciplines is diverse. For this research we prefer to use the anthropological and socio-political approaches. In "The Long Revolution", Raymond Williams proposed the three definitions of this term: 1) Like a civilization, where culture combines spiritual, intellectual and social developments, 2) Culture as a life style, 3) Art and its role in everyday life¹. Similarly, we can use this approach to define the role of

¹ R. Williams, *The Long Revolution*, London 1961, pp. 57-70.

culture in cultural centres in three ways: 1) Culture centres as the representation of national values and traditions of their civilization; 2) Culture as a way of life in France and Russia, in the sense of “high culture and low culture”²; 3) National art: paintings, cinema, literature, music and traditional dances.

Samuel Phillips Huntington proved the importance of national culture by stating that culture supports the cohesiveness of a nation because it reveals a common outlook of society (practices, values, institutions, relationship between members of different groups). The research of the cultural activities at cultural centres is related to the “democratization of culture” of Russia and France. The author who proposed to differentiate between the terms “democratization of culture” and “cultural democracy”³ was Yves Evrard in 1997. While “cultural democracy” is built on the freedom of citizens to choose their cultural practices, “democratization of culture” refers to the circulation of cultural goods that were not accessible to society. Our research suggests that the goal of French and Russian cultural policies is “democratization” of national art to societies that do not have access to their native culture abroad. In this process, their goal is to provide access to the works of a single culture and to the means of cultural production.

However, “democratization” is just one of the processes that build the strategy of cultural centres abroad. The national cultural centres are also influenced by globalization. The level of influence of globalization on national culture has been a central topic of social sciences discussion in recent years. Thomas L. Friedman stated that global context increases the homogeneity of culture⁴. Are the national cultures in danger because of globalization? Fukuyama refutes this point of view. He thinks that although some aspects of the economy and the society may be influenced by homogenization, at the same time, communication technology has allowed different nations to see each other more clearly, and it turns out they have very different cultural values⁵. Immanuel Wallerstein in some degree supports this position, by saying that there is no economic and political homogeneity, rather there is a

² C. Kramersch, *Culture in Language Learning: A View from the United States*, in K. de Bot, R.B. Gingsberg, C. Kramersch (eds.), *Foreign Language Research in Cross-Cultural Perspective*, Amsterdam, 1991, p. 218.

³ Y. Evrard, *Democratizing Culture or Cultural Democracy?*, in “Journal of Arts Management”, 1997, 27 (3), pp. 167-176.

⁴ T. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York 1999, p. 8.

⁵ F. Fukuyama, *Economic Globalization and Culture: A Discussion with Dr. Francis Fukuyama*, in “Merrill Lynch Forum: Globalization”, 1998, available online at <http://www.oocities.org/rpallais/Fukuyama.htm>.

single polarized system which resists this homogeneity by creating “rebellious cultural forms”⁶.

To understand the development of analysed centres we need to look at not just their cultural diplomacy in the globalized world but also the differences of their nation branding. As we indicate in the introduction, the purpose of our research is not to talk about national identity but rather the national images that cultural centres construct abroad. According to the study of Nadia Kaneva (186 reviewed publications about “Nation Branding”), the “nation branding” is the term more often used in marketing than in social sciences as a strategic tool in a global market to promote a national image⁷. Simon Anholt stated that nation branding must be seen as a long-term concept that does not yield immediate results. He emphasizes that there are “communication-based” and “policy-based” brandings, and that the latter gives us useful results⁸. This political viewpoint sees nation branding as a type of propaganda, or as a form of management for the nation.

This paper gives an account of the concept of nation branding without connecting it to national identity from the work of Ying Fan “Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion? Place Branding and Public Diplomacy”. He proposes the definition of nation branding as “a cross-cultural communication process that very much resembles the advertising process: awareness-attraction-preference” with three sub-brands: political brand, economic brand and cultural brand⁹. Y. Fan emphasizes the possibility of plural answers depending on diverse brand receivers’ interpretations and cognitions by nation’s sources: “people, place, culture/heritage, history, food, fashion, famous faces, global brands, etc”¹⁰.

Studies of national cultural policies and national branding continue to emerge, but the question of their cultural centres’ development abroad is investigated in only a few of these works. The Greek researcher Gregory Paschalidis outlines four periods in the historical development of national cultural centres abroad from 1870s to 2009: cultural nationalism,

⁶ A. Kumar, F. Welz, *Interview with Prof. Immanuel Wallerstein*, Paris, Maison de Sciences de l’Homme, June 25, 1999.

⁷ N. Kaneva, *Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical research*, in “International Journal of Communication”, 2011, 5, pp. 117- 141.

⁸ S. Anholt, *From nation branding to competitive identity – The role of brand management as a component of national policy*, in K. Dinnie (ed.), *Nation branding: concepts, issues, practice*, Oxford, 2008, pp. 22-23.

⁹ Y. Fan, *Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion? Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2008, 4, p. 155.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

cultural propaganda, cultural diplomacy and cultural capitalism¹¹. This analysis is methodologically coherent to understanding the history of French cultural institutions abroad but has no connection to the historical development of Russian cultural centres. While there haven't been any previous studies on the RCSC, I obtained some information on its cultural programs abroad in a report by the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (2014), which I received personally from the director of China Russian Centre of Culture. Some Russian studies (Zhuravleva 2007, Majewski 2002, Razlogov 2005) on information policy and external cultural policy are also useful in defining the dissemination process of Russian culture abroad, but overall, the analysis of the Russian Centre of Science and Culture is underrepresented in the social sciences.

Methodology

Our research is based on the methodology that enables to understand the development of national culture centres abroad. The purpose of our study is to describe, explain, and validate the findings. It uses diverse research methods: 1) document analysis, 2) semi-structured interviews with directors of culture centres, 3) cartographic analysis with geographical information system (GIS) 4) participant observation in Russian and French cultural centres, 5) online survey.

Using our five methods, this paper seeks to answer the question: how do strategies for the development of cultural centres change abroad? This research methodology concerns how the artistic activity of a culture centre can be used to build a nation's cultural capital in a foreign country. This cultural capital can improve diplomatic relations between countries and foster mutual international understanding.

All these methods aim to examine and compare cultural programs and cultural promotions to develop national cultural centres abroad. The document analysis related to the establishment and operation of centres can show the general structure and principal differences in the historical development and functions of the *Institut Français* and the Russian Centre of Science and Culture. Semi-structured interviews with directors of cultural centres in Paris, Beijing and Prague addressed the question of strategy making abroad and the

¹¹ G. Paschalidis, *Exporting national culture: histories of Cultural Institutes abroad*, in "International Journal of Cultural Policy", 2009, 15 (3), pp. 275-289.

influence of local culture on the centres. The interviews also define the profiles and social characteristics of the directors of the cultural centres. The participant observations¹² serve to verify the directors' answers about the structure and the difficulties of developing cultural institutions abroad, and aim to analyse the visitor make up at the cultural centres.

The guide of semi-structured interviews has four main blocks: the introduction (general profile of respondent), the specific characteristic of the centre (its differences from the network of cultural centres), the financial block (focus on economical development, partners and promotion) and the cultural block (about art program and communication with artist).

The last method is an online survey to investigate French and Russian cultural centres that are located far from their native countries, specifically in Asia and Latin America. There are more than ninety *Institut Français* and seventy RCSC in the world. For our online survey we have chosen four or five institutes from five different regions: Europe, Asia, America, Africa and The Commonwealth of Independent States to verify the hypothesis about the influences of local cultural policies on the strategy of national cultural centres. In conclusion, we analysed the strategies of French and Russian cultural centres to find an effective model for the development of national culture abroad.

The structure of the master thesis

This study is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter provides the general overview and the reasons for the creation of the national cultural centres abroad. The main focus of historical analysis is the transformations of Russian cultural centres and *Institut Français*. This chapter gives the basic definitions of national culture and opens the historical comparative perspective on Russian and French cultural institutions abroad during the Twentieth century. This historical approach shows us that after the four periods of cultural nationalism, cultural propaganda, cultural diplomacy and cultural capitalism¹³, both institutions are now operating under the conditions of a globalised world. We describe the influence of cultural globalisation in the second chapter, answering the question of how the *Institut Français* and the Russian cultural centre adapt their cultural policies in this globalised

¹² Appendix 3.

¹³ G. Paschalidis, *Exporting national culture: histories of Cultural Institutes abroad*, in "International Journal of Cultural Policy", 2009, 15 (3), pp. 275-289.

context. The second chapter also answers questions about how globalisation has changed the strategies of the *Institut Français* and the Russian Centre of Science and Culture. We verify in this part the hypothesis that national cultural centres abroad define the cultural strategies facing other countries' realities. We focus here on the three main cultural strategies: cultural assimilation, cultural mediation and cultural propaganda which influence construction of a national image or "brand" abroad.

The promotion of national image (or "brand") has been more prominent in recent years due to the influences of both globalization and democratization. The *Institut Français* and the Russian Centre of Science and Culture determine the image of their respective countries that are disseminated abroad. In the third chapter the proposed research discusses the process of branding by examining the social characteristics of the centres' directors and the differences between Russian and French centres in the construction of their programs in art and culture abroad.

1. The history of the development of national culture abroad in the case of France and Russia.

The *Institut Français* and the RCSC are in charge of implementing cultural activities around the world. The analysis of official documents shows that the cultural centres of Russian and France have some common characteristics. They are under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, placing their diplomatic role within the framework of government cultural policies. The cultural institutes try to promote their own cultures abroad by greater exchange with foreign cultures. Both centres have had a long history of transformations throughout the twentieth century, which posed some difficulties for our comparative approach. The RCSC replaced the USSR Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and received the legal status of an organization in 1988. The *Institut Français* is a younger institution, formerly known as the “Culturesfrance” association until 2010. Though both institutions seem completely new according to their official websites, the scientific literature reviews testify to their long history under the status and names of other organizations. The purpose of the first chapter is to explore the history of development of cultural centres abroad, especially the *Institut Français* and the RCSC. But first, we need to identify the definition of “national culture” and of “cultural institution”, which have been established in various disciplines.

1.1 National culture, cultural institutions and soft power: the foundation of national cultural centres abroad.

We can define the three main elements to understand the creation and development of cultural centres abroad: national culture, cultural institution and soft power, which are related to one another. The cultural institution is the actor, national culture is the means, and soft power is the aim. That is why it is important to start here with analysing of these three basic concepts.

Some scholars strongly support the idea that “despite globalisation, the nation remains a key unit of shared experience and its educational and cultural institutions shape the values of almost everyone in that society”¹⁴. However, the concept of national culture is often criticised by academics because of existence a huge amount of subcultures in contemporary

¹⁴ R. Inglehart, W. E. Baker, *Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values*, in “American Sociological Review”, 2000, 65 (1), p. 37.

society. For example, in *Encyclopedia of World*, the Middle East has 14 nations but 35 different cultures¹⁵. S.H. Schwartz (1994) and G. Hofstede (2001) statistically improved the existence of different national cultures that influence our everyday decisions. According to Geert Hofstede, culture can be analysed at several levels: meta culture (for instance global culture), national culture, micro culture (for instance organisation culture)¹⁶. He states that national cultures belong to the field of anthropology and are rooted in values. The national values are created during the human childhood, the period during which we learn the very basic values. Hofstede elaborates that this is the period when we can acquire a huge amount of implicit diffuse information, everything we need in human life. So with this knowledge of values we become who we are today because national culture “is embedded totally in human life” and “relatively impervious to change”¹⁷.

National culture can determinate the personal system of values, the “need of achievement”¹⁸, the habits, the economic and consumption models. The analysis of national policies shows the multiple strategies of cultural organization and in the same time “a problem of the heterogeneity of modes of intervention” (“*un problème d’hétérogénéité des modes d’intervention*”)¹⁹.

To some extent, we can say that the national culture, on the one hand, owes its existence to the long history of different development of the people, but on the other hand, the “national” forms itself due to the changes taking place in society in the process of nation building, in the transition from pre-modern to modern times. Culture becomes national not only in the planar process of unification, but it also acquires social structure while losing the main features of ethnic culture (mainly the division into “his and others”). As the nation embraces society, it develops stratification and social structure. The concept of national culture and subculture encompasses all large social groups, including ethnic groups. Ethnic cultures are part of the national culture. Patriotism, nationalism and love of country also became the parts of the national culture. This means that we can compare national culture because they have different characteristics and variables. Though quantitative researches are often used in cross-national studies, I prefer the qualitative comparison of French and Russian cultural centres because the cross-national statistics has significant methodological problems.

¹⁵ R. F. Baskerville, *Hofstede never studied culture*, in “*Accounting, Organizations and Society*”, 2003, 28(1), 6.

¹⁶ G. Hofstede, *Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind* (2 ed.), New York 2005.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ B. Boudon, *Dictionnaire critique de la sociologie*, Paris 1982.

¹⁹ F. Benhamou, *Les dérèglements de l’exception culturelle*, Paris 2006.

Philip M. Parker indicated several problems with cross-cultural study in his book “National Cultures of the World: A Statistical Reference”: insufficient variances in either dependent or independent variables, or both; a failure to control for sample heterogeneity; unidentified simultaneity; positive spatial autocorrelation, and measurement problems²⁰.

At the institutional level, culture is embodied in different institutions: government, education, economic institutions, cultural centres and business organisations. Social practices, national policy, traditions and cultural institutions produce national cultures. Each country has its own national political program that is supported by different institutes. That is why the existence of national cultures also is strongly supported by cultural institutes. In this respect, the cultural institutes are responsible for promotion of arts, languages, education, sciences, intercultural mediation and sciences development. The importance of institutional history of culture is increasing here. “Culture, in this specialising and improving sense, existed not just as a set of ideas: in the cultural development of public libraries, museums, concert halls, and art galleries, it also informed the practices of new set of cultural institutions which aimed to combat the shortcomings of civilisation by diffusing the higher standards of culture throughout society”²¹.

There are two main definitions of the “institution” in the dictionary. We can take an example here from the *Oxford English Dictionary*: the first definition as “a society or organisation founded for a religious, educational, social, or similar purpose” and the second one as “an established official organisation having an important role in the life of a country”²². However, the biggest part of cultural institutions bases on two general concepts. The first concept is the idea of culture centre (as cultural community). The second concept is the commercial “mall” because they give visitor access to a cinema, a library, workshop rooms, digital library and so on.

National cultures diffused by cultural institutions influence cultural, economical values and relationship inside of a society. They shape the different types of business management, labour characteristic and organisational structure. National history and cultural institutions create the national borders. In many ways cultural institutions are the most

²⁰ P. M. Parker, *Cross-cultural statistical encyclopedia of the world*, Westport 1997, p.11.

²¹ T. Bennett, L. Grossberg, M. Morris, *New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, New York 2013, p. 66.

²² http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ru/определение/американский_английский/institution, consulted 1 March 2016.

effective formal actors in cultural relations, especially when we are looking on cultural diplomacy, and they are accountable to the public through funding agreements and governance structures. They are by definition inspired by cultural concerns and support in the inherent value of the national arts and culture. Mark Leonard (British political science and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations) determined the strategic goals of cultural diplomacy as: increasing familiarity, increasing appreciation, engaging people, influencing people's behaviour²³. The same aims have the cultural institutions abroad, we saw later on the case study of the RCSC and *Institut Français*. They promote the opinion about the nation and its image and propose the positive view of country by conducting art events, promoting languages and their university educations. The cultural institutes prefer to use the term "cultural relations" or "cultural mediation" for their own activities, serving the national idea indirectly by means of trust-building abroad.

One of the last EU study about cultural institutions proposes to differ them according the organisational sizes: small, medium-sized, and large²⁴. According this division *Institut Français* is inside the group of large institutions, it has more than 171 employees, the largest network of 819 offices and big financing (more than one hundreds million euros). The type of the RCSC is more difficult to determinate. On the one hand, it also has the huge network abroad but on other hand the budget of this cultural institution is significantly smaller (less than ninety million euros).

Simultaneously cultural institutions play an important role in the foreign policy because they have the soft power capabilities. Soft power, a concept invented by Harvard academic Joseph Nye, it's essentially the ability of a country to attract others because of its culture, its political values, its education and language²⁵. The main contribution of national cultural centre is to influence abroad without military action by providing cultural events. The role of soft power is increased with development of new technologies. The biggest part of cultural institutes uses Facebook and Twitter to promote their activities. How countries can use cultural institutions to obtain soft power abroad? Joseph S. Nye wrote that countries that are likely to be more attractive in postmodern international relations are those that help to frame issues, whose culture and ideas are closer to prevailing international norms, and whose

²³ M. Leonard, *Diplomacy by other means*, in "Foreign Policy", Sep/Oct 2002.

²⁴ Y. Smits, C. Daubeuf, Ph. Kern, *Research for cult committee - european cultural institutes abroad*, European Union 2016.

²⁵ J. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York 2004.

credibility abroad is reinforced by their values and policies²⁶.

Tim Rivera proposes to add three mechanisms to understand how countries can use soft power in international context: public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and cultural relations²⁷. This study will not enter into the academic discourse to distinguish cultural diplomacy and cultural policies. We mentioned them in the first chapter because they can be useful to analyse the general external cultural policy of France and Russia and probably will be more described in our future doctoral thesis. However, the concept of soft power is the main one to understanding the strategy of the RCSC and the *Institut Français*. In our thesis, the cultural relationship is the practice and the method of soft power. As Jan Melissen mentioned “cultural institutes prefer to keep the term “cultural relations” for their own activities, serving the national interest indirectly by means of trust-building abroad”²⁸.

France tries to avoid the use the term of soft power by replacing it with “diplomacy of influence” (“diplomacie d’influence”), while the British Council use this term in a positive light in their main official reports. This linguistic difference is also connected to the competition between British and French institutions that have been started and never finished since the period of colonialism. Nowadays, the soft power of France is stronger than the soft power of Russia. However, we see in the first chapter that before the USSR was a great example of soft power. If France develops the soft power since creation of *Alliance Française* in 1883, Russia has preferred hard power to soft power the last ten years. Hard power is economically maintained to support the huge armed force. One of the examples of Russian hard power is the military action in Ukraine. The time criterion plays an important role in characterizing the two types of power. The soft power needs time (France established first centre abroad at the end of nineteenth century), while hard power is immediate; the results of soft power have a long duration, while the hard power from economical and military actions give a fast outcome but of short duration.

There are more than two thousand national cultural institutions in the world that represent the soft power of different countries²⁹. Just the European national cultural centres

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ T. Rivera, *Distinguishing cultural relations from cultural diplomacy: the British Council's relationship with her Majesty's Government*, Los Angeles 2015, p. 7.

²⁸ Ibid, p.11.

²⁹ Y. Smits, C. Daubeuf, *Research for cult committee - european cultural institutes abroad*, 2016, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/563418/IPOL_STU\(2016\)563418_EN](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/563418/IPOL_STU(2016)563418_EN), consulted 1 March 2016, p. 27.

have more than nine hundred offices in European Union and near 1250 abroad, employing more than 30000 inside and outside and the budget of 2.3 billion per year³⁰:

“France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain together account for more than three quarters of the total number of Cultural Institutes around the world. If we add the Russian and Chinese agencies, the number comes close to 90% of the total!”³¹

Moreover, there are four, the mostly known and the oldest national institutions: *British Council* (Great Britain), *Institut Français/Alliance Française* (France), *Dante Alighieri* (Italy) and *Goethe Institute*. Nowadays, they are also younger but fast-developing networks of institutions: *King Sejong Institutes* (South Korea), *Confucius Institutes* (China), Indian Cultural Centres (India), Brazilian Cultural Centres (Brasilia). How and why they were created?

Greek scholar Gregory Paschalidis wrote one of the best academic articles regarding the history development of national cultural centres abroad in 2009. G. Paschalidis proposed the four period of historical development of national cultural centres abroad: “cultural nationalism”, “cultural propaganda”, “cultural diplomacy” and “cultural capitalism”. He shows that the original reasons of creation are quite different. The first German institutions were created to support the German emigrants; Italian centres were founded in the commercial ports to promote the role of Italian traders. They have the same goal, according Paschalis, to maintain national identity and support the languages in foreign state for the political nation- building project. Notwithstanding, Britain and France developed their cultural centres abroad by colonial expansion. According Paschalis, since 1817, the two nations were competing to economically and politically control the disintegrating territories of the Ottoman Empire³². Furthermore, our interviews conducted with the director of *Institut Français* in China proved that this competition is still in place today.

Nowadays, there are three main activity of soft power conducted by cultural institutions:

1) Language courses and promotion of national education; 2) Nation branding (we analysed this term and social phenomena in the third chapter of this master thesis); 3) Artistic exchange and cooperation, where cultural institution plays the role of cultural mediator.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Gr. Paschalidis, *Exporting national culture: histories of Cultural Institutes abroad*, in “International Journal of Cultural Policy”, 15:3, 2009, p. 286.

³² Ibid.

The cultural institutions try to build the intercultural dialogue with local population. Are they connected with each other? In 2006 EUNIC was created to the cultural cooperation between the European cultural centres but it doesn't influence on the competition between the national cultures. The migration crises also influences on the functioning national centres abroad. There were created several exhibitions, conducted research conference on the base of cultural institutions. Moreover, Goethe Institute started a special programme about the actual crises to make an exchange with Egyptian, Ukrainian and Russian artists³³.

Logically, the strategy of cultural institution depends on national cultural diplomacy, that determinate first of all the geographic location of institutional network and the budget. The area of interests to build cultural relations differs on cultural policy of country. Where this interest is in priority, there is an increased emphasis on the soft power strategies of a country. The three basic cultural concepts (national culture, cultural institutions and soft power) of this chapter are the component of the all-national cultural centres abroad, and a part of the development of both the *Institut Français* and the RCSC.

1.2. The association *Culturesfrance* and its transformation to the *Institut Français*.

France has always had external cultural promotion as one of the priorities in its cultural policy. As the ex-director of French Association for the artistic action (J. Digne) stated:

“Notre diplomatie, plus que toutes les autres, met en avant la culture et les arts, non seulement parce que notre génie national, selon l'image que nous renvoie le miroir des peuples étrangers, nous y ménage une place à part, mais aussi parce que nous sommes convaincus qu'ils fondent les conditions d'un dialogue profond et solide.”³⁴

The *Culturesfrance* was created to do this “deep dialogue” with other cultures to promote French national art and culture products. It was created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Communication. The main goals of this Association were not just to distribute French national culture products, but create an exchange (mediation) between French artists and external cultures and find the financial partners for

³³ T. Lanshina, *The Goethe Institute and Soft Power*, in “International organisations research journal”, vol. 10, 1, 2015, pp. 118–142.

³⁴ P. Allies, *Pratiques des échanges culturels internationaux: les collectivités territoriales*, Paris 1994, p. 7.

culture development and cooperation³⁵. These tasks were established due to the structure of *CulturesFrance* that integrated *Association française d'action artistique* (AFAA) and *Association pour la diffusion de la pensée française* (ADPF).

AFAA - the French association of artistic action was established in 1922 to promote creative and artistic exchange of France and other part of world. It was the strongest actor of French cultural diplomacy and French international cultural policy. The main missions of AFAA have been the organisation of international festivals, the biennales and the exhibitions in France, the support of visual French artists abroad, and the organisation of cultural projects with foreign countries. Nevertheless, AFAA prepared the French cultural employees for missions abroad and accommodation of foreign artist in France. At the end of the First World War, the Third Republic embarked the dissemination of what was then called the “French thought” in order to establish its symbolic power in the world. The AFAA was supported by the national government, especially by the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs according the convention of November 2000³⁶.

The *Association pour la diffusion de la pensée française* (ADPF) was established after AFAA in 1949 by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This organisation on the one hand was a platform of observation and analysis of intellectual production and on an other hand it was the network of institution of intellectual production. To promote French ideas and culture the main activities of the ADPF were publishing, edition and diffusion of French intellectual works. For example, the ADPF provided the support for the field of education, of research and of communication by sending the books to cultural French institutions all around world. Moreover the actions of the ADPF were not only to protect and support the literature heritage but also to publish catalogues for exhibitions, documental reports and booklets³⁷.

Obviously, the AFAA and the ADPF were not singularly responsible for diffusing French art and culture around the world. There are also private agencies, offices of agents or show-producers, critics that have had an influence in the development of French culture

³⁵ Raport of French Senat, *CulturesFrance : des changements nécessaires*, <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r06-061/r06-0612.html>, consulted 12/03/2016.

³⁶ The declaration of Mr. Hubert Védrine – ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997-2002), on the role of central operator of international cultural relations of France now assigned to the French Association for Artistic Action (AFAA) by agreement between the Ministry of Culture the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this association, Paris on 17 November 2000.

³⁷ Senate session of 2006-2007, Appendix to the meeting of the 8 November 2006, <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r06-061/r06-0611.pdf>, 2006 P.46

abroad. However, both associations represented well the first attempt to institutionalise this development of dissemination of French culture when the private entrepreneurs could not³⁸. In 2006, the AFAA took the mission of the ADPF to promote the French books overseas. The the AFAA and the ADPF created the new transformed to the new organisation and changed the names to *Culturesfrance*.

The Culturesfrance became a new centralized cultural operator of French culture abroad. This association as the AFAA was formed by the ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Culture and Communication, but it took on more responsibilities than previous organisations. For example, it obtained the function to train the agents of the French national culture network and the search for location for the establishment of the cultural institutions. Furthermore, *Culturesfrance* started its commitment in cinema since 2009, when it took this responsibility from the Ministry of Foreign Affaires.

The importance of *Culturesfrance* was supported by special status of a public industrial and commercial organisation (or “EPIC,” the French category of statutory corporation under spatial law controlled under state), which it received from the government in 2007. To support this official status *Culturesfrance* accepted the contract that formed the main goals of *Culturefrance* presented by Monique Cerisier-ben Guiga in Senat on May 2007:

“...la promotion à l'étranger de la création contemporaine française dans le domaine des arts visuels, des arts de la scène, de l'architecture, du patrimoine, de la cinématographie, de l'écrit et de l'ingénierie culturelle ; l'organisation de saisons culturelles en France et à l'étranger ; la mise en œuvre de la politique d'aide au développement dans les secteurs de la culture, au travers des actions de formation, des échanges avec les cultures du monde et de l'accueil des artistes et des auteurs; la contribution à l'émergence d'une Europe de la culture...”³⁹

Culturesfrance also received strong support from *Alliance Française*, which in that same period had more than one thousand offices in the world. Hervé de Charette, a former French foreign minister, stressed that “...France can weigh in the world just if it keeps spreading its language and culture ...”⁴⁰. As we know, the French language, spoken on five continents with over one hundred million French speakers worldwide, remains an indispensable instrument of the cultural and intellectual influence of France. Even though

³⁸ B. Piniau, R. Tio Bellido, *L'Action artistique de la France dans le monde*, Paris 1998.

³⁹ Avis n°94 (2007-2008) sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2008, Tome II : “Action extérieure de l'État (action culturelle et scientifique extérieure)”, *Sénat*, 2007, p. 24.

⁴⁰ The citation taken from the official session of Senat on 29 November 1995 http://www.senat.fr/comptes-rendus-seances/5eme/pdf/1995/11/s19951129_3333_3409.pdf, consulted on 20 February 2016.

it is no longer the universal language, French is still an international language of great importance for cultural, economic, scientific and political development. Above all, there were two foreground zones of activity of *CulturesFrance*: Africa since 1999 and Caribbean since 2007. Nowadays these two priorities are still kept by *Institut Français*.

The transformation and integration of *CulturesFrance* into a newly labelled organisation “Institut Français” was introduced by the reform in French cultural policy. The main idea of this reform was to change the policy of “rayonnement culturel”⁴¹ to the “diplomacy of influence”⁴². Beyond this semantic change is a revolution that has taken place. Indeed, the “rayonnement”- induced logic means that cultural diplomacy should seek above all to spread French culture without worrying unduly about other cultures. On the other hand, the “diplomacy of influence” implies enrichment resulting from contact with other cultures and adaptation to local realities. A good example of this approach is the support of cultural diversity that France conducts during the weeks of *Francophonie*.

The policy of influence that became the basis of reformation of *CulturesFrance* to *Institut Français* also means that *Institut Français* now occupies not just about the promotion of national culture but makes an impact in creation of national contemporary art outside of France. Indeed, this reform had the idea to integrate the other culture into the local national perception (especially, the program “Caraïbes en Créations” and Africa programs). The reformation of *CulturesFrance* to *Institut Français* was one link on the chain of changes in French culture policy abroad. There were also created *France expertise internationale* (for the promotion of French national expertise) and *CampusFrance* (for promotions of French universities and students mobility to France). Furthermore, on the March of 2009 in Ministry of Foreign Affairs were established the Direction of the globalisation, development and partnership that integrated the department of international cooperation and development and the Department of economic and financial affairs. This new Direction has values to cross-different dimensions of public action in its apprehension of globalisation, global phenomenon, which included France’s prospects for cultural actions.

⁴¹ “Rayonnement culturel” is a specific French term that means the cultural transmission, influence and diffusion that spreads by joining the foreign culture. According Benjamin Pelletier, the actual meaning of the term was created at the end of nineteenth century. We use it in thesis without translation because it has no direct synonyms in English. The term became more common in the cultural diplomacy during the government of Andre Malraux. On the 17 March of 2016 the search of term “reayonnement” on the official site of the Ministry Of Culture and Communication gave more than 800 results.

⁴² J. Legendre et J. De Rohan, *Rapport d’information n°458 sur la réforme de l’action culturelle extérieure*, Paris 2009.

The transformation to *Institut Français* was quite intensive: huge amount of cultural centres and Institutions changed their titles and logos. During the Press Conference for the creation of the *Institut Français* on 21 July of 2010, it was announced that there existed 143 centres outside of France⁴³. As a result, each *Institut Français* has its own history and development of structure before its integration to *Institut Français*. Indeed, this unification was provoked by the total diversification of the names and titles of French networks of culture centres abroad⁴⁴.

Before the creation of *Institut Français*, French cultural system abroad was described as a “mille-feuille bureaucratique”⁴⁵: in 2010 it had 161 services for cooperation and cultural action, 132 cultural centres and institutes, 30 centres for studies in France, 445 French alliances under agreement (on the existing 920) and 27 research centres⁴⁶.

Frédéric Martel (2010) noted at least three different influence strategies that can be used by French national institutions abroad:

- a “Western” approach to North America, the countries of Western Europe and Australia, which would be based on “independent cultural structures” and on the market, limiting the use of cultural diplomacy;
- an “influence diplomacy” more proactive to the major emerging countries (excluding China), in which the role of the market will be decisive;
- a diplomatic approach suited to authoritarian regimes and for developing countries, where the cultural network should remain “fully embedded in our diplomacy.”⁴⁷

In our opinion, these strategies are a good description of the activities of *Institut Français*. *Culturesfrance* was transformed to *Institut Français* on 1 January 2010, with the same status of “EPIC- *An établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial*”. The *Institut Français* not just received the special status but it carried out the double mission to

⁴³ J. Legendre et J. De Rohan, *Rapport d'information n°458 sur la réforme de l'action culturelle extérieure*, Paris 2009.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ J. Kristeva-Joyaux, *Le message culturel de la France et la vocation interculturelle de la francophonie. Avis présenté par Mme Julia Kristeva-Joyaux*, in collection “Avis et Rapports du Conseil économique, social et environnemental”, July 2009.

⁴⁶ A. Besson, *L'Institut français: un nouveau modèle pour l'action culturelle extérieure de la France*, the thesis supervisor M. Philippe Teillet, July 2011, p.23

⁴⁷ F. Martel, *Culture: pourquoi la France va perdre la bataille du 'Soft Power'*, in “Note de la Fondation Terra Nova”, the 31 March 2010.

promote French literature in 2006 and French cinema in 2009. These are two main steps to economic, strategic development of French culture industry. These two fields (literature and cinematography) support French cultural diplomacy all around world and became a part of French brand (we return to this terminology in the third chapter of thesis). Furthermore, *Institut Français* took the opportunity in the fields of human sources for the Ministry of foreign affairs to prepare and control the employers for foreign missions ⁴⁸.

Above all in some countries *Institut Français* also gives languages courses. As a result the institution received some economic input like *Alliance Française* from language education. This fact turns us to the question: which are the relationship of *Institut Française* ? On 1st October 2010 *Alliance Française* signed nine pages of convention with Ministry of Foreign Affaires included the important precisions about the cooperation between *Alliance Française* and *Institut Français*⁴⁹. This document indicated that two institutions could not be in concurrence (Appendix 1). Consequently, they must avoid coexistence is one of the two already exists and plays the main role. Moreover, the document states that they both have the same goal of supporting each other's visibility and try to bring closer their visual identities. As a result, there is a huge network of French national culture centres abroad (fig.1).

Cultural Institution	<i>Goethe Institut</i>	<i>British Council</i>	<i>Instituts français</i> 12 (1)	<i>Alliances françaises</i> (2)
Evolution 2002/2012	-23,6 %	-13,6 %.	-31,9 %	+8,2 %
2012.	149	191	145.	486.

Figure 1. The size of some national culture centres abroad⁵⁰

However, we can see according the official sources there is a decrease in the number

⁴⁸ From the information report of National Assembly, deposit pursuant to article 146-3, paragraph 6 of the regulation by the evaluation committee and control of public policy on the evaluation of the cultural network of France abroad. Presented by François Loncle and Mme Claudine Schmid: “L’Institut français aura une mission de formation des personnels français et étrangers qui concourent à l’action culturelle extérieure de la France. Il sera associé au recrutement de ces personnels et à la gestion de leurs carrières, qu’il devra contribuer à améliorer”.

⁴⁹Appendix 1.

⁵⁰ The data was taken from: “Article 1 132-5 du code des juridictions financières, Communication au president de l’assemblee nationale pour le comite d’évaluation et de controle des politiques publiques, “Le réseau culturel de la France à l’étranger”, p. 24.

of French institutes. The reasons for this are related to the economic situation and the cultural policy. According to the official document there is a positive perception of creation of *Institut Français*, because it integrated heterogeneous institutions into one nation brand, which became a strong international actor. Nevertheless, during our interview with directors of *Institut Français* I heard strongly negative opinions about this reform⁵¹. According to them, French cultural institutes on different continents of the world are still authentic cultural centres, and the “label” of *Institut Français* doesn’t really improve their function.

Some directors support the reform of *Institut Français* by the fact that it created a huge network and unified the French cultural centres. This reform also is more useful at the regional level. In countries with more than two French institutions it helped to coordinate the network (for example, in Algeria). During our interview⁵² with the ex-director of *Institut Français* of Oran told that there are no interactions with all the directors of the entire network of French centres. However, strong regional connection is present between the five *Institut Français* in Alger. They contact artists together and coordinate cultural programs together as well. In addition, the *Institut Français* in Algeria organises meetings with Algerian directors. I need to underline here that each *Institut Français* has a different scheme to finance their cultural activity. That is why the income of the *Institut Français* in our opinion depends on the activity of the team inside the centre and the strategy of director.

In conclusion, The *Institut Français* as we could see, has a long history of transformation: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was founded during the V Republic and the first *Alliance Française* was created in 1883. As J.M. Djian states French cultural policy was founded on the historical national freedom, artistic heritage and national promotion⁵³ and in our opinion they stay to be the main part of French “rayonnement”. The *Institut Français* was officially created in 2010 on the base of *CulturesFrance* but each French cultural centre has its own long history and strategy that it formed before to receive the name “Institut Français”. Is this a real unification of French cultural centres abroad we will analyse in the next chapters. In our thesis we compared *Institut Français* with Russian Centre of Science and Culture. This cultural centre seems to be as young as *Institut Français* but it also has a long story of historical development.

⁵¹ During our interview with Max Baquian, the director of Portuguese *Institut Français* told that this reform is “totalement bête” (in eng. “totally stupid”), the interview conducted in Lisbon on 10 March 2010.

⁵² Interview conducted with Gaëtan Pellan- ex-director of the IF Oran, 23/03/2016.

⁵³ J.-M. Djian, *Politique culturelle : la fin d’un mythe*, Paris 2005.

1.3. The “Rossotrudnichestvo” and the foundation of Russian Centre of Science and Culture.

The history of the RCSC and its transformation is related to the development of the cultural diplomacy during the USSR. The first organisation that started to increase international cooperation of USSR was Central Executive Committee created on the basis of the Commission for Foreign Aide and USSR Office of Information in 1923. Two years later, The USSR Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries⁵⁴ (VOKS) was created. The cultural policy and the cultural diplomacy of USSR was centralised on planning, on economic budget, and on cultural administration⁵⁵. We can illustrate it by an example of VOKS activity, a scan of Certificate of VOKS of 1949 (Figure 2) for photojournalist to conduct shooting in Leningrad (now Saint- Petersburg) on the topic “Why the Soviet people want peace”⁵⁶.




Figure 2. The scan of Certificate of VOKS for a photographer (1949)

⁵⁴ *Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnoi Sviazi s zagranitsei* (VOKS) [All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries] was created the 8 august 1925.

⁵⁵ V. Tchurbano, “*Federalnaja kulturnaja politika i “mestnye” kultury v Rossii*” [CHURBANOV, VADIM. "Federal Cultural Policy and" Local "Cultures in Russia"]. 2007, http://www.rau.su/observer/N03_93/007.HTM, consulted on 19 February 2016.

⁵⁶ The scan of the document downloaded from the official site of Rossotrudnichestvo, <http://old.rs.gov.ru/sites/rs.gov.ru/files/voks.jpg>, the 11 March 2016.

We decided to introduce this document in thesis because it shows that the name and the address of VOKS on the top of the certificate were translated in three international languages: English, French and Spanish. This document also proves the centralisation of soviet power, where in order to make a photo-shoot in the street of Leningrad, the photographer needed a special document from Moscow.

In 1958 from the VOKS was created the Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts (SSOD). According the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, in 1975 the SSOD included 63 Friendship Communities with foreign countries, including 12 societies of friendship with the socialist countries. Moreover, there were the communities (societies) of “USSR - France”, “USSR - United Kingdom”, “USSR - Finland”, “USSR - Italy”, “USSR - Arab Republic of Egypt”; the three Association of Friendship and Cultural Relations (with the Arab countries, Africa, Latin America)⁵⁷. In addition to these cultural partners, Soviet Encyclopaedia mentioned 11 associations and sections of science and culture, 14 national associations, 25 thousand enterprises, collective and state farms, schools, institutions of science and culture. As a result, the authors of Soviet Encyclopaedia stated that all SSOD network included more than 50 millions persons involved in its activities⁵⁸.

According to the historical publications of R. Saakov, each year SSOD conducted near the 25 thousand cultural event devoted to history, science, art, memorable dates, as well as the days of solidarity with the peoples of the Middle East, Africa, and Chile⁵⁹. The author also noted that SSOD maintained contacts with 7.5 thousand organizations of science and culture in 134 countries. This activity was supported by 108 public associations and institutions abroad (as example, the USSR had the friendship societies with the Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Finland, France, Vietnam, North Korea and India)⁶⁰.

⁵⁷ A. Prokhorov, Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Moscow 1969-1978, http://biblioclub.ru/?page=dict&dict_id=63.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ R. Saakov, Soyuz sovetskikh obschestv druzhby I kulturnoy svyazi s zarubezhnymi [Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries], http://enc-dic.com/enc_sovet/Sojuz-sovetskikh-obschestv-druzhb-i-kulturno-svjazi-s-zarubezhnmi-stranami-84145, consulted 13 February 2016.

⁶⁰ Ibid.



Figure 3. Photo⁶¹: An Indian singer performs an Indian song on the evening of Indian music and dance, held at the House of Friendship of SSOD with the representatives of the Moscow musical community and Indian Embassy. Date: 1959. Author: B. Paramonov.

Furthermore, The Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts started to publish their own newspapers in Russian, English, French, German and Spanish languages. Officially, SSOD was a public organisation, but it was totally under the control and direction of soviet government. The first attempts of decentralisation and several democratisation of cultural system started in 1980 by the beginning of the policy of ideological liberalism. However, the total change of the cultural relations was done just in 1991 after the dissolution of USSR. The Russian Federation at the beginning had a lot of problems in the international relationship not just in the cultural field, but also in social and economic activities. After the liquidation of the USSR, the new government of Russia first of all needed to solve the internal political, demographic, economical problems in order to support the security during the period of transformation. As a result, market reconstruction became the priority of the State and the cultural field was placed on the second plane. On the one hand, the total control of the government in the cultural field was destroyed and artists received the freedom to create, on the other hand, the financial support of artists by government became minimal. However, the decentralisation in cultural policy of Russia in some way improved its international relationship with other countries in cultural field. “The cage” of Soviet Union,

⁶¹ The photo archive is also accessible on-line, http://www.casaderusia.org/fechas_R9.php, consulted 15 March 2016.

that held artistic freedom and creativity, was totally opened. The cultural institutions, the art groups and the cultural organisation received the possibility to collaborate with other countries independently. The main sources for this cultural exchange came usually from private or foreign funds, however Ministry of Culture also gave some economic or administrative support. This transition from total control to cultural democratisation was conducted also in institutional level. The Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts was replaced with Russian Association for International Cooperation in May 1992. In August of the same year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Russian Agency for International Cooperation, which in two years after was transformed into the RCSC (the second name of organisation is “Roszaroubejcentr”). This public organisation for the cultural international relationships, like *Institut Français*, became the central network of the ex-cultural centres that existed abroad. Furthermore, it included the all-soviet science centres established in foreign countries. So Russian Federation took the control of all ex-soviet cultural and scientific centres abroad by a decree signed by Boris Yeltsin, the first president of Russian Federation, on May 1993⁶².

The Russian Centre of Science and Culture established in 1994 as a governmental organisation. The goal of this organisation is similar to Institut Français, that is, to create the positive cultural and scientific relationship by establishment centres in foreign countries. In 2002 the President of Russia (Vladimir Putin) signed the new decree about Russian cultural centres and they became to be under the control of Ministry of Foreign affairs (look Annexe 1). We can summarise the main purpose of functions of Russian centres mentioned in this document that are similar to Institut Français:

- The participation and the realization of scientific, cultural, economic and humanitarian activities and events with/in foreign countries;
- The dissemination of the traditions of Russia and its development in the field of science, culture and art;
- The creation and development of contacts with governmental and non-governmental foreign and international organizations;
- The strengthening of international cooperation and relationship;
- The organization of the business forums;

⁶² The scan of Decret is in open access, online: http://www.vcom.ru/cgi_bin/db/zakdoc?_reg_number=%D09302403, consulted 15 March 2016.

- The formation of Russian libraries abroad;
- The promotion of the status of the Russian language in the world;
- The distribution to the population residing in foreign states, in an objective and authentic information on Russian history, socio-economic, cultural and spiritual life.⁶³

This document also proves that soft power was integrated to the Russian policy, because the goal of Russian Centre is “strengthening the international authority of the Russian Federation, the promotion of the rich spiritual traditions and the achievements in science, culture and art”⁶⁴. However, there are two activities specific to the Russian Centres that are different from French Centres:

- The support of Russian compatriots abroad, developing links with the Russian organizations of compatriots abroad;
- The choice of student for education mobility in Russia, promotion of Russian universities (this activity in France is conducted by *Campus France*);
- The support of heritage (for example, the historical monuments consecrated to the Russian history).

It is important to precise that during the interview with Director of Russian Centre in China he told that Russian diplomatic organisation as well as Russian Centre doesn't use the term “migrants”. They replace it by “compatriots” not just in conversations abroad, but also in all official documents. Finally, if Russian Centre emphasize the support of their Russian citizens abroad, *Institut Français* is more interesting in engagement in theirs activities the local population. Generally, according the official documents, the functions of Russian Centre seem to be broader but less specified than the obligations of *Institut Français*. In addition to this varied functions, the *Roszarubajcentr* (RCSC) has the inter-departmental board formed from the representatives of different ministries: the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Edition, Television and Media, etc. Despite the diversity of its members, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains the main

⁶³ The resolution of July 23, Moscow 2002, N 551 “Approving the Regulations on Russian Center for International. Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation”, <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102077370&rdk=&backlink=1>, consulted 27 February 2016.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

manager in this group of representatives of Centres for Science and Culture. The 6 September 2008 the “Rosszarubejcentr” was transformed into the “Rossotrudnichestvo” (also subordinated to the Russian Foreign Ministry) in accordance with the decree of the President Dmitry Medvedev⁶⁵. The name *Rossotrudnichestvo* is the abbreviation “the federal agency for the commonwealth of independent states affairs, compatriots living abroad and international humanitarian cooperation”. Nevertheless, the “Rossotrudnichestvo” has the same functions as “Rosszarubejcentr”. The only exception is the fundamentally new direction of work - the interaction within the CIS in the field of innovative technologies. In this area, the Federal Agency implemented a number of unique projects⁶⁶. *Rossotrudnichestvo* actively modernizes and expands the network of cultural centres that has evolved over decades. Today, the 79 countries have the 69 RCSC and the 23 representative offices of *Rossotrudnichestvo*⁶⁷.

In conclusion, the *Institut Français* has increased and developed its network since the twentieth century. The network of Russian Federation is less powerful than the communities of USSR, however it is more democratic system than huge centralised network of USSR. In other words, the French cultural policy decreased since the period of colonialism, and the Russian cultural policy lost some forces after the economical crisis and the dissolution of USSR. The RCSC lost its power in comparison to the cultural exchange conducted by USSR. Both *Rossotrudnichestvo* and *Institut Français* have been created from pre-existing cultural centres to one united network. *Institut Français* united already existed French cultural centres abroad, whereas the Russian centre of Culture and Science integrated the cultural and scientific centres of the former USSR. Apparently, the budget and the soft power of French network are more progressive. We demonstrated in this chapter that in French policy, cultural diplomacy has played the one of the most important roles. The French cultural institutions and theirs “rayonnement” are the strong actors internationally.

In addition, both national networks (French and Russian) are well spread out globally, and both countries have the centres in more than seventy foreign countries. The principal difference of Russian and French centres is that France addresses its cultural activities mostly

⁶⁵ Presidential Decree of September 6, 2008 №1315 “On some issues of public administration in the field of international cooperation”, <http://rs.gov.ru/about/document/2010>.

⁶⁶ <http://851et.rs.gov.ru/taxonomy/term/14>, consulted 23 March 2016.

⁶⁷ <http://rs.gov.ru/en/node/305>, consulted 25 March 2016.

to the local population of foreign countries. Instead Russian centres pay a lot of attention to support their “compatriots” abroad. Probably, it is a weakness of Russian soft power. In this chapter, we look through the historical development of cultural centres abroad, as well as today’s condition of cultural globalisation. The next chapter is focused on contemporary development of RCSC and *Institut Français* in the global context. In addition, in the next chapter we will verify whether both national centres have the same global strategy, or if their functioning changes according the territorial location of the centre.

2. The influence of cultural globalization and democratization on cultural institutions abroad.

Nowadays, globalisation has become one of the most commonly studied concepts in the social sciences, which influences on the development of national cultural centres:

“...the globalization of culture highlights the challenges globalization poses to national states and institutions. Although some cultural fields (e.g., visual arts) have always been internationally oriented, media and culture are traditionally strongly linked to national institutions.”⁶⁸

The national cultural centres try to take part in the globalisation to provide the soft power that we described in the first chapter. Does globalization increase cultural diversity or does it lead to the homogenization of culture? We prefer the approach of Viviana Zelizer to answer to this question in which the globalisation “differentiates and proliferates culturally in much the same way as other spheres of social life do, without losing national and even international connectedness”⁶⁹. The Russian Centre for Science and Culture and the *Institut Français* try to become global actors while simultaneously saving their national cultures. In some way, the national cultural centres are global institutions, which are responsible for the cultural globalization of national cultures.

Cultural globalisation and cultural diplomacy are two phenomena that increase the development of national cultural centres. In this chapter we analyse their significance in relation to national culture centres by analysing the diffusion and difference in strategies of IF and RCSC in different parts of the world.

2.1. Cultural globalization: indices and world-maps of the IF and of the RCSC.

The national cultural centres are a part of a huge network, which collectively contributes to cultural globalisation. The RCSC and the IF have become more active in the globalised age using the media. Social networks (as Facebook and Twitter) have especially become strong tools to make national cultures more visible. We want to stress that the term

⁶⁸ S. Janssen, G. Kuipers, M. Verboord, *Cultural Globalization and Arts Journalism: The International Orientation of Arts and Culture Coverage in Dutch, French, German, and U.S. Newspapers, 1955 to 2005*, in “American Sociological Review”, 2008, 73(5), pp. 719–740.

⁶⁹ V. Zelizer, *Multiple markets: multiple cultures. In Diversity and Its Discontents: Cultural Conflict and Common Ground in Contemporary American Society*, 1999, Princeton, pp. 193–212.

“global institution” in our research does not have an influence on the disappearing of national dimension. We use this term to highlight the fact that the spread of national cultural institutions has a global character. In other words, the national cultural centres use the phenomenon of cultural globalisation to increase their soft power. Researchers in the social sciences have come up with different definitions of cultural globalisation. We have chosen to use the one which best reflects the connection between national cultural centres and globalisation:

“Cultural globalization means the opening of various national art fields to international competition and the emergence of transnational fields. Cultural valorization and artistic recognition are then seen as emanating from power struggles not only within national art fields, but also between art fields in different countries. In this global constellation, some countries and cities increasingly set the standard...”⁷⁰

Over the last century, scholars have provided not just a theoretical framework of globalisation but have also created the empirical determination of globalisation by different statistical indices. The most commonly known is the KOF Index of Globalization⁷¹, which analyses the three important areas of human life: economical, political and social. In the KOF Index, the cultural dimension is taken as sub-area “cultural proximity”. Is there a difference between French and Russian involvement in cultural globalisation according the KOF Index?

Country	2011	2012	2013
France	92.05	92.05	91.9
Russian Federation	80.51	80.68	81.72

Figure 4. KOF Index: Data on Cultural Proximity of Russia and France

The KOF index demonstrates that France is more involved in the process of cultural globalisation than Russia, nevertheless the French global involvement has been decreasing, while the Russian cultural globalisation is rising (fig. 4). We decided to verify this information by consulting another source - the Maastricht Globalisation Index (MGI). In

⁷⁰ S. Janssen, G. Kuipers, M. Verboord, *Cultural Globalization and Arts Journalism: The International Orientation of Arts and Culture Coverage in Dutch, French, German, and U.S. Newspapers, 1955 to 2005*, in “American Sociological Review”, 2008, 73(5), pp. 719–740.

⁷¹ <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch>, consulted 12 September 2016.

2008 it compared counties by different fields of globalisation, one of which is cultural and social globalisation:




Figure 5. Maastricht Globalisation Index (MGI): social and cultural globalisation 2008⁷²

As we can see from the Figure 5, the data proves the results obtained by the KOF Index. France has a higher involvement level in cultural globalisation than Russia has. We should, however, underline that previous research (Dreher 2008⁷³; Saich 2000⁷⁴) suggest that the index of cultural globalisation is the most difficult to construct. Usually, the indices are made using the export and import of books and press to analyse the exchange of national ideas. Nevertheless, American culture remains dominant in the world because of the high proliferation of American goods, Hollywood films, and McDonald’s fast food franchises. However, the cultural globalisation in terms of the spreading of ideas and beliefs is an important element in the development of national cultural centres and nation-states in general:

“The transmission of cultural capital across cultures has a significant impact on the economic, political, and social development of nations. For example, the growth of Buddhism among American celebrities such as Steven Seagal or Richard Gere ultimately aids in the development of certain political attitudes towards China’s relationship with Tibet. Likewise, the spread of individualistic or consumeristic attitudes among Chinese youth has

⁷² <http://pimmartens.info/research/globalisation-index/>, consulted 2 April 2016.

⁷³ A. Dreher, N. Gaston, P. Martens, *Measuring Globalisation – Gauging its Consequences*, New York 2008.

⁷⁴ T. Saich, *Globalization, Governance, and the Authoritarian Westphalian State: The Case of China*, J. Nye, R. Keohane, *Globalization and Governance*, Brookings 2000, pp. 208-228.

significant implications for the future of Chinese politics and social organization.”⁷⁵

The analysed indices describe the general difference between the cultural globalisation of Russia and France. To see the real differences in the globalisation of national cultural centres, we constructed the cartographical data representations of *Institut Français* and Russian Centre of Science and Culture offices. Over the first year of master’s studies we compared the globalisation of the RCSC and the IF by using SIG software provided by EHESS. We took the databases of *Institut Français* departments and offices from the *IFmapp*⁷⁶ and those of the Russian Centre of Science and Culture from the official sites of *Rossotrudnichestvo*⁷⁷ to merge them to one Microsoft Excel-database. Once the databases were obtained, we integrated them using SIG software with the World Borders Dataset⁷⁸ extra package to see in which countries the centres have been involved.




Figure 6. The representation of the IF and of the RCSC in the world

⁷⁵ R. Kluver, W. Fu, *The cultural globalization index*, in “Foreign Policy”, 2004 (Online edition), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2494).

⁷⁶ <http://www.ifmapp.institutfrancais.com/les-if-dans-le-monde>, consulted 5 October 2016.

⁷⁷ <http://rs.gov.ru/en/missions>, consulted 1 October 2016.

⁷⁸ Provided by Bjorn Sandvik, http://thematicmapping.org/downloads/world_borders.php, consulted 2 November 2016.

As a result of the cartographical representations of the RCSC and the IF in the world, we have arrived at the comparative data of the spreading of cultural centres in the world (Figure 6). The results show that there are some countries where both cultural centres are represented: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, China, Europe, etc. However, there are differences, for instance, that France has more centres in Africa, or that the Rosstrudnichestvo are represented more in post-soviet states. These facts are supported by the state policies of Russia and France. To some extent, the map we have created reflects the cultural diplomacies of these countries. Additionally, there are some countries where the IF and the RCSC have more than one centres. For instance, the Russian Centre for Science and Culture has multiple offices in India (Figure 7).




Figure 7. The representation of the RCSC in the world

Why is RCSC more represented in India than in other countries? India and Russia have enjoyed friendly international relations since the Cold War and the existence of the USSR. During the last 16th annual India-Russia Summit (December of 2015) the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, voiced his support of this diplomatic relationship, stating that:

“India and Russia have a long history of cultural relations. And now we have a strong and reliable friend on the political and international arena — Russia. Russia has always been with us in hard times.”⁷⁹

While the *Institut Français* has more offices in Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco, Spain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Indonesia, and Germany, which houses its biggest network (Figure 8).




Figure 8. The representation of the IF in the world.

The higher IF presence in European countries (Italy, Greece, Germany and Spain) and Ex-colonial states (Morocco, Lebanon and Alger) is due to historical and economical connections between France and the aforementioned countries. For example, the higher presence of IF in Morocco can be explained by the fact that they are big economical and trading partners in export and tourism activities. Another example of this is the huge representation of IF in Algeria. This is more because of historical reasons of colonial period (French Algeria) and the popularization of French culture in Algeria despite of Arab mass... On the contrary, the reasons for having big networks in Indonesia and Japan appear to be less clear. Indonesia and Japan are not former French colonies, nor are they countries in the European Union. How, then, can we explain their larger numbers of *Institut Français*? It is probable that France is interested in developing cooperation with Indonesia in the fields of

⁷⁹ From the video of the meeting of V. Putin and N. Modi provided by “The Times of India”: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Russia-a-strong-reliable-friend-of-India-PM-Modi-tells-Vladimir-Putin/articleshow/50314545.cms>, consulted 2 September 2016.

economy, education and tourism. In addition, the Prime Minister of France (François Fillon) has agreed to a strategic partnership with Indonesia in 2011⁸⁰. A lot of French companies are present in Indonesia, additionally, the French Development Agency (AFD) works and invested money on Indonesian climate projects. Above all, the French language is also well promoted because the local population prefer rather Japanese, Mandarin, English and German as foreign languages. The foundation of IF can promote French language and as result increase the touristic and academic cooperation with Indonesia. The foundation of the five *Institut Français* in Japan has similar reason: economic, strategic and trade partnership, cultural exchange (art, education and cooking). Additionally, Jacques Chirac (the president of France 1995-2007) was a “Japanophile”. He organised many visits and improved the relationship between two countries. To sum up, the promotion of French culture in Indonesia and Japan probably is related to development of cooperation with these countries in the field of economy, culture, climate and innovation. In conclusion, the maps are not just representation of the IF and the RCSC they are the reflection of the soft power of Russia and France. However we need to precise that in the countries where the national cultural centres are not represented the embassies play the role of national cultural development abroad.

2.2. Glocalisation of the IF and of the RCSC.

Robert Holton (a professor of sociology at the University of South Australia) proposed to analyse the influence of globalization of culture in terms of: homogenization, polarization and hybridization⁸¹. The relation between these three tendencies is the main topic of discussion in globalisation theory and helps us to understand the role of the national cultural centres. Do the IF and the RCSC provide the homogenisation, the polarisation, or the hybridisation on the global scene? There is not one clear answer to this question because the cultural centres promote the model of national cultural (as hominization) and they create collaborative project with local culture (as hybridization). Moreover, we can provide the hypothesis that national cultural centres reflect all three processes. Firstly, the IF and the RCSC support the homogenisation of their national cultures by promoting their national languages, art and traditions. Secondly, they propose something new and different to the local culture, especially we can see the polarisation in the process of colonisation. Thirdly, the

⁸⁰ The information has taken from the site of “France Diplomacie”: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/>, consulted 16 August 2016.

⁸¹ R. Holton, *Globalization's Cultural Consequences*, in “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol. 570, *Dimensions of Globalization*, 2000, p. 140.

hybridisation is also involved in global development of national cultural centres because the centres make collaborative project with local countries (for example, the IF of Portugal works with Portuguese theatre and the IF of Ukraine made the exhibition “ILLUSTRART” of Young Ukrainian and French Illustrator). Probably that different dimension of globalisation (the homogenisation, the polarisation and the hybridisation) are presenting in the national cultural centres in different degree according to historical and political relationship with the local societies. There is one economical and marketing term “glocalization”, which we propose to apply in the analysis of the functioning of all national cultural centres abroad. The glocalization is the common used term in market and business coming from Japan. The term “glocalization” was introduces in social science by Roland Robertson and George Ritzer, according them, it describes the global institutionalization of local and concerns the homogeneity and heterogeneity at the same time:

“We consider glocalization to be a highly fruitful concept for analysing the sociocultural dimensions of globalization (see Robertson and White, 2003). We have focused here on the social construction of ‘the local’, as understood in deterritorialized terms, with reference to the interplay of cultural identities.”⁸²

We can use this phenomenon to explain the functioning of national cultural centre abroad. The national cultural centres represent the same national culture (the national culture as brand or as a national product) at the global area but each national cultural centre adapt some activities to the local society. In economical way the national cultural is a “product” and we need to know the preferences of local population to “sell” it well. Ulf Hannerz (the social anthropologist) looks on the global culture as an interconnection of local cultures⁸³, the same way the discussion of local and national have become a global phenomenon. We support the opinion of Roland Robertson, that the local is not opposite of the global, it is inside of the global. In this way, national cultural centres are not working against cultural globalisation - they are the part of it. Furthermore, the creation and development of national cultural centres is the one tendency of globalisation. Over the last year, for example, Chinese, Spanish, Indian national cultural centres have been increasing quickly. The national cultural centres construct national images using the international and global cultural stage, “national cultural fields

⁸² R. Giulianotti, R. Robertson, *Glocalization, globalization and migration: The case of scottish football supporters in North America*, in “International Sociology”, 21 (2) 2006, pp. 171-198.

⁷⁶ U. Hannerz, *Cosmopolitans and locals in world culture*, in M. Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture*. London 1990.

⁸³ S. Janssen, G. Kuipers, M. Verboord, *Cultural Globalization and Arts Journalism: The International Orientation of Arts and Culture Coverage in Dutch, French, German, and U.S. Newspapers, 1955 to 2005*, in “American Sociological Review”, 2008, 73(5), p. 721.

have become embedded in transnational systems of exchange, influence, and competition”⁸⁴. The IF and the RCSC have art-programs in different countries that they need to create and promote according the local cultural policy and cultural diplomacy. The semi-structured interview was conducted with the secretary-general of *Institut Français* (Nathalie Lemaire) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the winter 2016. This interview was important because she had been working in IF of Moscow, Prague and Budapest. During the interview she told us that her administrative and accounting work was the same in three countries, while the cultural activities, the team involvement, and the work conditions varied between the different countries. According to her experience, the activity and successful development of *Institut Français* abroad depend on the team activity and local population interest in language and culture.

The IF as a global institution tries to structure its work to main pole: cinema; artistic exchange; development and partnership; French language; and digital. The RCSC has not this structure of team however the program is totally controlled and financed by the centre office in Moscow. The IF has a general structure, but it changes in different countries. The result of this interview was that the activity and successful development of *Institut Français* abroad depend on the team activity and local population interest in language and culture. This empirical result support our thesis that national cultural centre abroad (the IF and the RCSC) are involved in the process of glocalisation.

The glocalisation is also reflected in the concurrence between national cultural centres. The global conditions suppose the concurrence between the centres however it differs in different countries. According the interview⁸⁵ with director of IF in China: there is a concurrence between the IF and British Council, just with Goethe Institute the *Institut Français* organizes some cultural events. Further, the role of EUNIC is absolutely invisible in China. There is probably a concurrence in Asia because of European diplomacy of influence, the desire of each European country to have more soft power and create economical cooperation. When I asked the same question about the presence of concurrence the director of Portuguese *Institut Français* he told that the concurrence doesn't exist but rather, that there is a “healthy concurrence”⁸⁶. At the same time, the Director of Spanish IF gave us the total

⁸⁵ Interview was conducted the 27th of January 2016 with the director of *Institut Français* of China Fabrice Rousseau.

⁸⁶ “La concurrence saine” is the term used by Director of IF. Interview was conducted the 10th of March 2016 with the director of *Institut Français* of Portugal Max Baquian.

opposite statement from the one we received from the director of the Chinese IF: there is collaboration and involvement of institutions in EUNIC network⁸⁷. Logically, we can draw the conclusion that if inside the European Union the Institutes and Cultural centres try to collaborate however outside and far of EU this connection became weaker. It's possibly that this concurrence has existed since the previous century as we saw at the first chapter the IF and British Council have been under influence of their policy of cultural colonisation since the 20th century.

To some extent, the foundation and the glocalisation of nation cultural centres also depend on their economical conditions and sources. The biggest economical source of the IF are language sources, but some the IF do not have this activity (the *Alliance Française* sometimes takes the role of offering French language courses instead of IF). The cultural spreading of the RCSC and the IF activities is quite different because they have different economic models. The RCSC received 100% of its budget from the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the IF is an independent economic structure that can earn money from Ministry, language courses, art-events, partners and sponsors. In some respects the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports the IF, however it gives just from 10 to 40 presents of general income of the each IF, this amount various according the different parts of world. According to the interview with the ex-director of IF of Oran⁸⁸ the most financed *Institut Français* is in Morocco. The amount of income from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the IF varies greatly for different countries. For instance, the Spanish IF receives just 10% of its budget from the French Ministry of Foreign affairs, while the IF of China receives approximately 35%⁸⁹. Why are different organisations interested in the funding for the national cultural centres? Probably, the national cultural centres conduct not just the soft power by cultural activities, but also they support the ideas of cultural democratization and cultural diplomacy.

2.3 Cultural democratization and diplomacy in the development of the IF and the RCSC

As we mentioned in introduction to this research the term the “cultural democratization” and “cultural democracy” have the different meanings:

⁸⁷ Interview was conducted the 6th of April 2016 with the director of *Institut Français* of Spain Pascal Moulard.

⁸⁸ Interview conducted with Gaëtan Pellan- ex-director of the IF Oran (23/03/2016).

⁸⁹ Information provided by the directors of IF during the interviews, Appendix 3.

“Cultural democracy is making democracy through culture; cultural democratization is making culture available to the demos. From this distinction arise ideological differences to approaching cultural policy, namely embodied by the cultural/sociocultural dialectic.”⁹⁰

Our research about the IF and the RCSC is related to the “democratization of culture” in Russia and France. Pierre Moulinier (a specialist in French culture) suggests several differences between cultural democratization and democracy. Using his approach⁹¹ we can define the main characteristics of cultural democratization which are provided by the RCSC and the IF:

- 1) They are promoting high culture (according P. Moulinier, “imposition du modèle de la culture de qualité”⁹²)
- 2) The national cultural centres promote the artists who are known in their countries and have experience in art-exhibition.
- 3) Both national cultural centres aimed to facilitate and mediate the national culture to the local population;
- 4) The use of marketing strategies to provide art and cultural programs to all local groups;
- 5) The use of large equipment and partnerships to provide the best cultural activities: concerts, conferences, exhibitions, etc.
- 6) The focus on creating and on the content of artwork and its relationship to the culture. For example, the RCSC of China published the calendar of the Russian landscape by a Chinese photographer; the IF of Ukraine organised the performance provided by a French Producer with Ukrainian artists.

We need to precise here, that the democratization of culture is not just the goal of national cultural centres but also the aim of Nation-State policies:

⁹⁰ P. Moulinier, *Abstract of Madeleine Planeix-Crocker* “Territorial implications of cultural democratization”, 25 February, <http://chmcc.hypotheses.org/1068>, consulted 1 May 2016.

⁹¹ P. Moulinier, *La dimension territoriale de la démocratisation culturelle*, in “Comité d’histoire du ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, Centre d’histoire de Sciences-Po Paris, La démocratisation culturelle au fil de l’histoire contemporaine”, Paris, 2013, available online: <http://chmcc.hypotheses.org/389>, consulted 24 June 2016.

⁹² Ibid.

“In sum, democratization of culture and cultural democracy are both, in essence, policy objectives: the first focuses primarily on access to the works of a single culture and the second focuses on inclusion, diversity and access to the means of cultural production.”⁹³

To provide the efficient cultural democratisation, the national cultural centres used to apply the strong methods of cultural diplomacy to provide the soft power in the global world. According to the “Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary” edited by Dr. Kishore Chakraborty (2013) the cultural diplomacy “may be best described as the means through which countries promote their cultural and political values to the rest of the world”⁹⁴. The multilateral understanding of cultural diplomacy was provided by Richard Arndt in his book “The Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century”. He annualized the outcome of cultural diplomacy on national policy and wrote the conclusion that cultural diplomacy provides trust and partnership between people on the basis of shared interests, national values and access to influential members⁹⁵.

Cultural diplomacy is the support of the IF and the RCSC development; it can provide the favourable conditions for perceiving the RCSC and the IF abroad. Cultural diplomacy is not just the basis for the positive perception of national cultures; it is also meant to create the best cultural mediation between the RCSC/IF abroad and the local population: “the projection of French culture abroad thus became a significant component of French diplomacy”⁹⁶. Nevertheless, there are some weaknesses in cultural democratization of the RCSC and the IF. The relationship of the *Institut Français* with the *Alliance Française* is not clear and changes according to the different countries. For example, in Portugal the IF can't make and receive its main income from language courses because its role was attributed to the *Alliance Française*. As a result, the IF of Portugal lost their historical location for economical reasons. Furthermore, the IF Ukraine in Kharkov was replaced by the *Alliance Française*. Moreover, the director of the IF in Madrid told us that they have the economical income because of the absence of *Alliance Française*. The official partnership between the IF and the *Alliance Française* was signed in 2010 (Appendix 1), however the agreement from this document was

⁹³ M. Gattinger, *Democratization of Culture, Cultural Democracy and Governance*, the Canadian Public Arts Funders (CPAF) Annual General Meeting, *Future Directions in Public Arts Funding: What Are The Shifts Required?*, November 16-18, 2011, http://www.cpafoopsac.org/fr/themes/documents/AGA_OPSAC_2011_Democratisation_de_la_culture_democratie_culturelle_gouvernance_08mars2012.pdf, consulted 02/03/2016.

⁹⁴ K. Chakraborty, *Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary*, 2013, available on-line: http://www.cd-n.org/content/pdf/Cultural_Diplomacy_Dictionary.pdf

⁹⁵ R. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twenties Century*, Washington 2005.

⁹⁶ R. Pells, *Not like us*, New York 1997.

still partly supported by both French institutions. In addition to this, there is the fact that the visual identities of the two institutions have never been adapted to each other despite the obligations in the official document (Appendix 1). The weakness of the RCSC in its cultural democratization and cultural diplomacy is very broad and an unspecific definition of the responsibilities of the RCSC. At the same time it tries to promote national culture for foreigners and support the Russian migrants abroad using the same types of art and cultural activities.

The cultural diplomacy stimulates the national culture centres to find the best ways to represent national culture to the foreign population through the available means: music festival, art and book fairs, scientific conferences, and art-biennales. Consequently, the IF and the RCSC also try to support, participate and organize mentioned events in the countries where they have not the representative offices. Inspired by cultural diplomacy, the national cultural centres avoid the conflict between the cultures and, as we saw in this chapter, they support the idea of exchange and integration of national values in the foreign countries:

“Cultural diplomacy implies reciprocal cultural exchanges between peoples to promote national cultures. It is believed that cultural diplomacy would inspire people over the world despite political differences and national borders as soft power would be enhanced through cultural diplomacy. Further, it is expected to enhance engagement in people-to-people diplomacy based on mutual understandings of cultural interests.”⁹⁷

We should mention that some researchers (Dr. Professor Zenebe Kinfu Tafesse⁹⁸, Dr. Kishore Chakraborty⁹⁹) propose to distinguish the two forms of cultural diplomacy: positive and negative. The negative cultural diplomacy is limited by national government of interaction with the foreign countries to provide the protection of national image¹⁰⁰. In contrast the positive cultural democracy, according Zenebe Kinfu Tafesse¹⁰¹, is the cultural exchange supported by the state to promote national interests.

⁹⁷ H. Kim, *Cultural Diplomacy as the means of Soft Power in an Information Age*, 2011, available on-line <http://studylib.net/doc/8710447/cultural-diplomacy-as-the-means-of-soft-power-in-an-infor>, consulted 21/01/2016.

⁹⁸ Z. Kinfu Tafesse, *Cultural diplomacy: through mass communication, education and cultural exchanges*, access online: <http://en.etnolife.net/d/400420/d/culturaldiplomacy.pdf>., consulted 01/03/2016.

⁹⁹ K. Chakrabort, *Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary*, 2013, available on-line: http://www.cd-n.org/content/pdf/Cultural_Diplomacy_Dictionary.pdf, consulted 11/02/2016.

¹⁰⁰ Z. Kinfu Tafesse, *Cultural diplomacy: through mass communication, education and cultural exchanges*, access online: <http://en.etnolife.net/d/400420/d/culturaldiplomacy.pdf>., consulted 01/03/2016.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Do Russia and France have the similar approach to the cultural diplomacy through the national cultural centres? The cultural diplomacy of USSR was built on the personal relationship and meetings of Stalin with the members of international inelegancy¹⁰² and on the construction of positive image of the URSS during these meetings. The “high point” of the Soviet cultural diplomacy, according A. Golubev, was the period of 1929-1939, when cultural diplomacy was provided by the state to achieve political, diplomatic, propaganda goals of existing or to establish cultural, social and scientific relations¹⁰³. Nowadays, in Russia the culture is presented as a tool of external policy. These the main difference in cultural diplomacy of Russia and France we can see from the definitions that replace this term in official documents. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation uses the term “external cultural policy”. When French administration prefers the term “diplomacy of influence”. In contrast to Russian official documents one of the French priorities is the cultural diversity. Obviously, the French model is more developed by the huge financing of the cultural programs comparing to the Russian policy.

The differences in cultural diplomacy of two countries we also discovered during our research of an internship in the IF and the RCSC. We send near one hundred letters to the RSCS and the IF worldwide. As a result, we received a lot of answers from the French institutes of different countries with various proposals. For examples, in United States the minimal period for internship is six month, the IF of Morocco can't accept interns during the period of Ramadan, the IF of Chilli is more interested in the internes who speak better Spanish than French, etc. However, the biggest part of them had some trends in answers: the summer is the break in activity of centres and they really appreciate the member of team with multi-languages knowledge. Oppositely, we received just some answers from the RCSC of Cuba and Chilli. The representative director of the RCSC of Cuba stated¹⁰⁴ that there is no more Russian cultural centres just the representative office of *Rosstrudnichestvo* and he advised to contact the main office in Moscow. While the Director of Chilli answered: “The RCSC building will soon begin major repairs, so in July and August, our activities will focus

¹⁰² G. Kulikova, *Prebyvanie v SSSR inostrannyih pisateley v 1920-1930h godah* [Presence of foreigner writers in USSR during 1920-1930], in “Otechestvennaya istoriya” [Soviet History], 2003, p. 49.

¹⁰³ E. Vasilenko, *Kulturnaya diplomatiya kak instrument “myagkoy silyi” gosudarstva* [Cultural diplomacy as an instrument of “ soft power” of state], http://www.perspektivy.info/oykumena/azia/kulturnaja_diplomatija_kak_instrument_magkoj_sily_gosudarstva_2015-11-23.htm, consulted 23/11/2015.

¹⁰⁴ The e-mail received from the Deputy representative of office in Cuba A. Egorov, 13 April 2016.

on partner sites”¹⁰⁵. We used more than half official mails from the site of *Rossotrudnichestvo* and just two Directors answered. That is why we decided to send a request about the internship to the central office in Moscow. We received the answer just in three weeks, it was an automatically generated e-mail and sent by the server system SDOU “*Rossotrudnichestvo*” with a pdf-attachment (Appendix 4). The letter was printed and signed by Mr. Medvedev (the head of the office of the RCSC of multilateral cooperation in the CIS space) and stated that the internship is possible just for the students from the some Russian Universities that have partnerships with the *Rossotrudnichestvo*. Consequently, we can see that the IF and the RCSC have totally different systems of personal recruitment. The choice of employers for the RCSC is under the control of central office of *Rossotrudnichestvo*, when the recruitment to the IF is often conducted by the Directors of the IF in different countries. As a result, the IF has partly decentralized system when the RCSC has totally centralized system on the main office in Moscow.

The goal of cultural diplomacy is to create an effective and positive image of national country to construct better international relationship in influence. In other worlds, the IF and the RCSC are the actors and the instruments of cultural diplomacy, which are creating nation brands. The importance of nation branding for the development of national cultural centres we discover in the third chapter.

¹⁰⁵ The e-mail received from E. Kolupaeva, 18 April 2016.

3. Nation branding by cultural activities of the RCSC and the IF

*The way to gain a good reputation is to endeavour
to be what you desire to appear*

Socrates

The concept of nation branding is very important for our research. There is a strong connection between the process of nation branding and the development of national cultural centres, which will be discussed in this chapter. First, we will focus on the definitions nation and national brands then justify why they are important for the development of the IF and RCSC. Secondly, we will see the structure and formation of the nation brand of Russia and France by comparing three different national brand indexes. The indexes will further explain what the nation branding is and how the national cultural centres can use them. Finally, in the last part of this chapter we will discuss the visual patterns, cultural programs of IF and the RCSC which are all significant parts of their brands.

The French and Russian cultures are well known on the global level. For example, we can find the exhibition of French impressionism and the performance of Russian ballet all over the world. The IF and the RCSC are responsible for the support and diffusion of these cultural activities. In addition the functioning of national cultural centres depend on nation brand and country because they create the stereotypes about countries abroad. Moreover, the IF and the RCSC are the part of nation brands. The commonly used definition of brand “name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of competition” was proposed in 1960 by the American Marketing Association.

National cultural centres are promoting nation brand to gain a positive reputation. In particular, cultural institutes support cultural management and sustainable differentiation. We support the idea proposed by Simon Anholt (who is one of the most famous writers on the subject of nation brand) that cultural and artistic activity are successful component of nation brand.

3.1. The connection between nation branding and national cultural centres.

To start this chapter we should highlight that there is a difference between the nation brand and national brand definitions, which influence cultural centres development. If national brands are more in commercial sense national images of products, the nation brand is an image of the country in the eyes of international communities. We prefer to use the term of nation brand in the sense of national image perceived by a local community. In our opinion, Keith Dinnie proposed one of the best definitions of this term as “the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences”¹⁰⁶. The “target audience” is very important component because the nation brand is a complex image to promote to “audiences” and it is not the national identity itself (as we can see on the fig. 9).




Figure 9: The structure of Country image by Keith Dinnie¹⁰⁷

Nation brand answers to the question “how does the nation look?” when the national identity asks the question “what is the nation?”. Some authors (Anamaria

¹⁰⁶ K. Dinnie, *Nation Branding: Concept, Issue, Practice*, Oxford 2008.

¹⁰⁷ The graphic from the presentation of Keith Dinnie “Nation branding and country image: Opportunities and limitations of a media-centric approach”, http://www.powershow.com/view/ae0fb-ZmU4Z/Nation_branding_and_country_image_Opportunities_and_limitations_of_a_media-centric_approach_powerpoint_ppt_presentation., consulted on-line 22 October 2016.

Georgescu and Andrei Botescu) believe that brand is a reflection of our identity construction while we argue about the brand is the image promoted to target a group of people. In some sense we can relate the development of brand to the concept “the looking glass self”¹⁰⁸. Consequently, despite the fact that nation brand is not the synonym of national identity, the perception by others of nation brand can influence identity formation and vice versa. That is why we state at the beginning that our paper focuses in the brands of Russia and France, and not in their identities. The term of “national brand” was long criticized by scholars in social sciences¹⁰⁹, however, it is now incredibly important. They are attractive not just for tourism, but also for cultural exchange, economic investments and technological communication:

...just like brands, strength or weakness of perception of a country can influence peoples' decisions to choose them as places to visit, live or invest in. This was assumed to provide a competitive advantage in a global market for tourism, education and investment, and built evidence for proactive country brand management¹¹⁰.

Each nation brand is unique hence when we are speaking about nation branding the comparative perspective becomes significantly important. The processes of globalisation and glocalisation, which we discussed in the second chapter, influence the diversifications of nation brands and on their cultural dimensions. By following the global trends, they visibly preserve and highlight their differences and specialities globally. Consequently, the development of global social media also changed the strategies of national cultural centres as a part of nation branding. Particularly, S. Anholt stays that “rapid advance of globalisation means that whatever countries try to *pull in* (investors, aid, tourists, business visitors, students, major events, researchers, travel writers, and talented entrepreneurs) and whatever countries try to *push out* (products, services, policies, culture, and ideas) is done so with a discount if the country's image is weak or negative and at a premium if it's strong and positive”¹¹¹. Certainly globalisation is just one factor of nation brand formation. Each nation brand has a very long history of construction in which not just the government but also associations, NGOs, and private companies were engaged.

¹⁰⁸ The concept was proposed by Charles Cooley in «Nature and the Social Order. New York: Scribner's», 1902, pp. 183–184.

¹⁰⁹ W. Olins, *Branding the nation – the historical context*, in «Journal of Brand Management», 9:4-5, 2002, pp. 241-248.

¹¹⁰ Report of FutureBrand, *Country Brand Index 2014-15*, http://www.futurebrand.com/uploads/CBI-14_15-LR.pdf, consulted on-line 10 October 2016.

¹¹¹ S. Anholt, *Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations*, in «Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy», Vol. 2 [2013], Iss.1, Art. 1, pp. 6-12.

As we mentioned, nowadays nation brand construction takes a very important place in the national cultural centres development. The IF and the RCSC can produce income and reinforce the position of a nation in cultural diplomacy. Moreover, the national cultural centres can find and highlight the cultural values reflected in international communities. The *Institut Français*, as an operator of French cultural diplomacy, functions as a creator and diffusor of the nation cultural brand, and the RCSC supports the creation of a brand of Russia abroad. As nation brands they have the competitors – British Council, Goethe Institute, Institute Cervantes and others. These competitors and partners are complex perceptions of different elements such as location, population, language, food, culture, celebrities, global brands and history¹¹². Nowadays, the promotion and support of these elements became the main part of national cultural centres' program. However how are the national cultural centres involved in nation branding? And why is the connection between the nation brand and national cultural centre is so important for our research?

The national cultural centres and nation brand are interconnected on both sides. It means that the strong nation brands simplify the development of national cultural centres and at the same time the good functioning of national cultural centres abroad increases the stability of the perception of national image in foreign countries. “It is through organizations such as the British Council, the French Institute, the Goethe Institute and so on that nations incorporate the cultural expressiveness into their nation-brands”¹¹³. We should mention that this connection functions not just in positive way but in the negative as well. Consequently, the decrease of popularity of nation brand provides some difficulties to the national centre development. For example, in the case of the Russia conflict with Ukraine the cultural activities of the centres have decreased. Furthermore, if the centre provides the events that are boring and unattractive from the point of view of local society it makes weaker the nation image. This connection between national cultural centres and the national brand is one of the reasons why the centres are partly controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The role of national cultural centres as the part of the brand is to improve the nation brand in foreign countries. We can summarize that nowadays *British Council*, *Institut Français* and *Instituto Cervantes* are national brands, which are the strong constructs of the nation brand.

¹¹² Y. Fan, *Branding the nation: towards a better understanding*, in «Place Branding and Public Diplomacy», 2010, 6, pp. 97-103.

¹¹³ K. Dinnie, *Nation Branding: Concept, Issue, Practice*, Oxford 2008, p. 148

We can also make a comparison between national cultural centres and national branding (fig.10) by using the model of Gyorgy Szondi of similarities between public diplomacy and branding¹¹⁴.

	National cultural centre	Nation branding
<i>Goal</i>	Promoting mostly cultural interest	Promoting mostly economic interest
<i>Context</i>	Politicized, focus and priorities may change with change of government	De-politicised, general agreement among actors and political parties (but in some cases it is politicised)
	Image driven	
	Driven by international relations and culture	Driven by marketing and consumerism
<i>Direction</i>	Foreign publics	Both foreign and domestic audiences. Without the consent of domestic audiences it is doomed to fail
<i>Role of government</i>	Initiator as well as sender of messages government has more control over message	Government could be the initiator but rarely the sender (danger of propaganda) less:
<i>Main Actors</i>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	National tourist boards, travel agencies; investment promotion and export agencies; trade boards, chambers of commerce, multinational organisations,
<i>Strategies</i>	Decentralised approach, in different target countries different strategies and activities tailored towards local audiences	Centralised approach, driven by the brand essence (one-size-fits all) tailored towards a global and homogenous audience
	Focus on positive and marketable elements of a country's culture and people	
<i>Tactics</i>	Exhibitions, international film festivals, exchange programmes, language learning promotion, networking, anniversaries,	Country advertisements in leading international TV channels, sponsored pages in leading international magazines;
	Logo and slogan; e- marketing, web portals; press tours, brochures, pseudo-events	
<i>Media</i>	Mass media are less significant, their main role is in presenting and interpreting information. Social media are getting more important	Relies heavily on mass media as the main channel. Media are passive, usually carrying paid advertisements
<i>Budget</i>	Sponsored by government	Public and private partnership
<i>Time frame</i>	On-going, continuous	Campaign-driven
<i>Evaluation</i>	Short-, middle- and long term	Mostly long-term

Figure 10. A comparison between national cultural centres and national branding by the model of Gyorgy Szondi¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ G. Szondi, *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences*, in «Discussion papers in diplomacy», pp. 17-18.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

To this analytical table we can add one additional similarity in structure of functioning of national cultural centres from the Anholt approach to nation branding: strategy, substance, and symbolic actions¹¹⁶. Where the strategies determine the functioning of national cultural centres, the substance formats their success and symbolic action makes national cultural centres remarkable and memorable. We shouldn't forget that cultural centres are not just a part of the process of national cultural diplomacy, they are part of the process of the development of global cultural market. In both of the processes in which national cultural centres are enrolled, the nation branding plays a crucial role. Moreover, the position of nation brand is dependent on the national policy of Russia and France:

We see that governments can use culture to boost its performance internationally in an alternative way. In other words, they can formulate a foreign policy that focuses on national and cultural identity. They can, at the same time, turn these elements into vehicles for development, including economic development¹¹⁷.

For example, the success of France in nation branding can be connected with the governmental strategy "The New France. Where the smart money goes", the campaign organized by Invest in France Agency (IFA) started in 2004. This campaign had a goal to create a positive image of business in France (as IF has a goal to create a positive image of culture of France). The methods used in changing the French image were various: articles in global newspapers and journals, advertising in international airports, participation of French actors in international conferences and publishing of multi-lingual communications materials. There were five target countries for this campaign: the USA, the UK, Germany, Japan and China. According to *TNS Sofres'* survey the result of the campaign was strong increasing investments and positive perception¹¹⁸. Does Russia have the same type of international brand promotional activity as France?

For instance, there are no the fundamental works on nation brand of Russia, however several articles were written by Russian academics (Vasilenko I.A., Vasilenko E.V., Lyaporov V.N., Lyul'ko A.N.). E. Bazenov stated there are few attempts to create

¹¹⁶ S. Anholt, *Places: Identity, Image and Reputation*, London 2010.

¹¹⁷ P. Luz Rodrigues, *The Construction of Cultural Softpower and Nation Branding through the Promotion of Language: The cases of the American Binational Centers and Chinese Confucius Institutes*, accessible on-line : https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=ACEI2014&paper_id=257, consulted 20 November 2016.

¹¹⁸ K. Dinnie, *Nation Branding: Concept, Issue, Practice*, Oxford 2008, p. 242.

nation brand of Russian territories: Saint Petersburg as a cultural capital of Russia and Great Ustyug region as a birthplace of Santa Claus¹¹⁹. Despite these works, there is the lack of centralized over-national policy that can unify different regions of Russia under one strong national image. The biggest problems of the Russian nation brand development can be defined as: corruption, military activity and the absence of a unique image unifying the regions across the huge territories. During soviet time, stereotypes and symbolic brands about the Russian nation were created.

Such well-known brands and products as Pravda, Bolshoi Ballet, Sputnik, Kalashnikov, Faberge and vodka tend to reinforce the symbols of culture and aggression.¹²⁰

These national products became the part of Russian national image with which national cultural policy should deal. As France, Russia also established a campaign for nation branding launched by Kremlin commission formed by ex-President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009. Mikhail Margelov (the Russian politician and the ex-Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia) did a concrete description of this nation branding strategy in the press:

...to push “the image of a ‘good’ rather than a ‘strong’ Russia” as part of the “soft-power” approach that is now so popular. And to do that, it must have a coordinated plan, one that will be “pro-active rather than defensive” in order to ensure that Moscow gets in the first word in any dispute.¹²¹

As we can see from the above quotation, the national policy of Russia has also recognised the important power of culture. Moreover, Anholt claimed that cultural interaction and cultural approach are “the only demonstrably effective form of nation branding”¹²². This is why national centres are so important as an instrument of soft power in the process of nation branding. They can reconstruct existing stereotypes about culture. For example, the IF in China actively promote contemporary art in order to destroyed the stereotypes in China about France as country of impressionism and romantics and create a new image of contemporary and modern developed nation. Hence the nation branding by national cultural centres aims to create a positive reputation of country, design the

¹¹⁹ E. Bazhenova, *Brand Territory: Content Of Forming Model, Construction Practices In Russian Regions*, in «Terra Economicus», № 3-2, 11, 2013, p. 124.

¹²⁰ G. Simons, *Nation branding and Russian foreign policy*, in “UI OCCASIONAL PAPERS”, April 2013, p. 10.

¹²¹ P. Goble, *Kremlin assumes control for promoting Russia’s image abroad*, available on-line: <http://www.moldova.org/en/kremlin-assumes-control-for-promoting-russias-image-abroad-201549-eng.>, consulted 1 November 2016.

¹²² S. Anholt, *Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations*, in “Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy”, Vol. 2:1, 2011.

program, which makes it different from the other centres. The nation cultural centres can use a set of technics to have an effective nation branding: festivals, exhibitions, gastronomy promotion, book-fairs and etc. They can spread their reputation abroad and promote positive cultural values by adapting it to the local demand.

Evidently, there are three concepts interconnected between each other that influence and define the strategies of national cultural centres: soft power, globalization and national branding. According to Pilar Luz Rodrigues (Brazilian Researcher) the promotion of language is the main element of cultural soft power and nation branding:

Along with soft power, countries have started to adopt the concept of “Nation Branding”, with which marketing and business strategies are used by countries as a new way to improve their image worldwide.¹²³

Consequently, the nation branding relates first of all to the reputation of nation. The national cultural centre is a part of this promotion of nation’s reputation. Furthermore, the cultural promotion is one of the most influential components of nation branding. If the cultural centres want to be successful and be a part of the process of nation branding it should focus on mutuality. As we saw during our interviews, the cultural mediation is more stronger strategy for cultural centre development and branding than the direct promotion of national culture. If nation want to be attractive it should replace the nation-centrism and nation promotion by cultural mediation because *“people who like culture like to engage in culture, so rather than being expected to admire another nation’s culture, it is much more rewarding, much more exciting, and much more effective for two nations to do culture together. Engagement is invariably more productive than promotion; listening an indispensable adjunct to talking; and if you want something from somebody, it is only reasonable to ask what they want from you”*¹²⁴. The isolation and protectionism of culture can’t be a base for positive branding. That is why we consider the orientation of Russian cultural centres to the Russian migrant population as the weaknesses of Russian soft power and nation branding. National cultural centres to achieve the best nation branding should adapt their strategies to the local population. They can use the cultural diversity as the

¹²³ P. Luz Rodrigues, *The Construction of Cultural Softpower and Nation Branding through the Promotion of Language: The cases of the American Binational Centers and Chinese Confucius Institutes*, accessible online : https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=ACEI2014&paper_id=257, consulted 20 November 2016.

¹²⁴ S. Anholt, *Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations*, in “Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy”, Vol. 2:1, 2011.

source of promotion for the cultural cooperation. When the cultural centre creates the project with local culture they achieve the negotiation of cultural conflict and it can help to establish cultural and business partnerships. Moreover, the cultural partnership is the base for the economical and technological cooperation. It is less expensive to be attractive to the other nation by culture than try to invest millions in the economical partnership because the positive cultural relationships are the source for business loyalty.

The cultural mediation can be a solution to several international conflicts and “...it seems to me so much safer and more valuable a way of increasing understanding between nations than the rather risky game of reducing a country’s history, culture, and population to an infantile stereotype, and then discharging it at other nations as if from a gun”¹²⁵.

All these arguments show that the development of national brand is closely associated with the development of national cultural centres. Their promotion of the country influence on the perception of both (the nation brand and national centres), because culture is a part of one nation brand. Obviously, the national cultural centres as countries have different brand images. What are the differences between the Russian and the French nation brands and are they parts of brands of the IF and the RCSC? What are the components of the French and Russian national brand, can we analyse and compare them empirically?

3.2. Russian and French nation brands – the indexes comparison

In our opinion, the best way to answer what are the contemporary components of Russian and French nation brands is to use not just theoretical but empirical way. We propose to look on three main nation brand indexes: the *Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index*, The Country Brand Index and Country Brand Ranking by Bloom Consulting. The first index that we should consider when we are speaking about the French and Russian nation brands is the *Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index*. Simon Anholt (independent policy advisor) created the National Brand hexagon combined six main criteria:

- 1) Governance – the perception of national government as the provider of peace, environmental protection, poverty elimination, etc.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

- 2) Culture and Heritage – the image of each nation’s heritage and its value for contemporary culture and art
- 3) People - the perception of national population by friendliness, tolerance, openness of mind
- 4) Tourism - the amount of tourist engaged in national tourism and visiting of tourist sights
- 5) Investment and Immigration – people attracted to live, work or study by perception of quality of life and business conditions.
- 6) Exports – the amount of public interest of consumer activity and avidness of goods from each nation




Figure 11. The Nation Brand Hexagon by Samon Anholt (2010)

Nowadays, this index is applied by GfK to provide the consulting to governments, organizations and business companies; where the annual research covers only 50 countries. GfK (*Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung*¹²⁶) is German market research organisation created by of university teachers in 1934. The official GfK press release¹²⁷ of the research on nation brand of 2015 includes 23 national attributes structured by six indicated field of hexagon with the sample of 20,000 adults (18 years old and older) balancing on by generation, gender, and education criteria. Moreover, the race and ethnicity were included as the sample formation for some countries. Each section of hexagon has from three to five questions; rating was made on the scale form (from one-

¹²⁶ In English «Society for Consumer Research».

¹²⁷ Press realise published on November 17, 2015. Responsible under press legislation: GfK SE, Global Communications -Jan Saeger.

worst to seven-highest). Each of six field of study had an open question with the choice of the worlds to have deeper look on the nation perception. The leader positions according to this index have US, Germany and UK. France is on the 5th place and Russia is on the 22nd position (fig. 12).

2015 rank	Country
1	United States
2	Germany
3	United Kingdom
4	France
5	Canada
6	Japan
7	Italy
8	Switzerland
9	Australia
10	Sweden

Figure 12. Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands IndexSM Overall Brand Ranking 2015 (Top 10 of 50 Nations)

According to this particular index and its parameters the nation brand of France is more developed than Russian one. However, we should mention here that Russia improved its position since 2014 when it had the 25th ranking position. Apparently it can be explained by media support of Russian policy in Asian mass media or several promises of Russia to sign peace agreement with Ukraine. In the same time, according to the GfK (press report by Frank Manna) this improvement of Russia position related to government dimension of index:

Looking outside the top 20 nations, both Russia and Ukraine have seen impressive gains on all six indices that make up the overall NBISM ranking. Russia has risen from 25th last year to 22nd this year, overtaking China, Singapore and Argentina, while Ukraine has moved from 48th to 46th, overtaking Kenya and Qatar. This change follows a slowing of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, with both nations seeing their greatest boosts coming from their governance scores and – in particular – improved perceptions of their behaviour in the areas of international peace and security¹²⁸.

¹²⁸ Press release of GfK, *USA regains position as top nation brand from Germany*: <http://www.gfk.com/en-in/insights/press-release/usa-regains-position-as-top-nation-brand-from-germany-1/>, consulted on-line 22 October 2016.

We should mention to this point that the team of creators of this index believe that the conflict situation increased the position of nation brand in the ranking. Moreover, the same agency (GFK) mentioned in the city brand research that Paris took first place despite of terrorist attacks.

The second index that we are presenting in this chapter is County Brand Index by *FutureBrand*. Future brand is a creative company founded in 1999 working in five different continents. They are creating strategies, designs and innovations for brands. This company is a part of Interpublic Group (IPG) working in the different fields of marketing: consumer advertising, digital marketing, communications planning and public relations.

In comparison with *Anholt Index*, County Brand Index by *FutureBrand* is a wider study including the perception of 118 countries and conducted during two years (the last one 2014-2015) analysing countries reputation, their strengths and weaknesses. However, the sample is smaller than in *Anholt index*, but it includes more than 2,500 opinion-formers and travellers balanced on the gender, age (21-65 years old) and international travels or business experience criteria. The strong side of this index methodology is that it includes the variable of “country of origin” as an extra-factor of country brand strength¹²⁹. Furthermore, the research combines both qualitative and quantitative methods by involving an outsourcing company QRI Consulting (to construct methodology and conduct the research) and international experts from Asia, Europe and Americas.

This investigation by *FutureBrand* has interesting hypothesis that not all countries can be classified as a nation brands. According to them, some nations can be better described as “status countries” or “experiences countries”¹³⁰(fig. 13). To be the nation brand for the team of *FutureBrand* means to have a high perception by audience in six categories: life quality, system of values, business potential, culture, tourism and “made in” (the international consume of national products). On the base of these six dimensions *FutureBrand* proposed a new nation brand typology to define an image of nation (fig. 13).

¹²⁹ Report of FutureBrand, *Country Brand Index 2014-15*, http://www.futurebrand.com/uploads/CBI-14_15-LR.pdf, consulted on-line 10 October 2016.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.34.

Type of nation-country	Characteristics
Experience countries	Nations with the high results in the following dimensions: culture and heritage, tourism and “made in”.
Status countries	Nations with the strong results with the following attributes: value system, quality of life and business potential.
Countries	Nations with less than average perceptions in both the experience and status dimensions
Country brands	Nations with higher than average perceptions in both the experience and status dimensions

Figure 13. Four types of countries by Courtiers Brand Indexes 2014-2015 from official report

The idea of unbranded nations is not new before the *FutureBrand* Melissa Aronczyk also wrote in her book “Branding the nation” the differences between the culture of branded and unbranded nations. According to her opinion a culture unbranded nations has several characteristics: old, political, antagonistic, divisive, backward-looking, abnormal, untrustworthy, traditional and lazy. When a culture of branded nation has different traits: young, neural, progressive, friendly, peaceful, normal, authentic, transforming and innovative. The biggest part of the culture of branded nation we can in the brand of *Institut Français*, when the traits of unbranded nation are represented in the policy of Russian cultural centres.

In the conclusion of *FutureBrand* index report, France took the 17th position and Russia is on 31st position. According to this research Russia’s position was improved due to the Sochi Olympic Games, while France is strongly associated with fashion. The main three positions were taken by Japan, Switzerland and Germany. It turns out that the two indexes propose different rates of nation brand. However, the position of French nation brand is higher than the Russian brand.



Figure 14. The positions of country according to typologies by FutureBrand¹³¹

Finally, the third important index that we propose look at in this chapter is Country Brand Ranking by Bloom Consulting. Bloom Consulting is Spanish consulting company funded by Portuguese entrepreneur specialised in strategy consulting and nation branding projects in 2003. It focuses mainly in two fields: tourism and trade. Country Brand Ranking by Bloom Consulting is quite different from two previous based on on-line economical data. Moreover, it looks on different dimension as country, region and city by five objectives (fig.15).

¹³¹ Ibid.




Figure 15: Bloom Consulting's Branding Wheel¹³²

In contradistinction to two previous indexes Bloom Consulting have not used traditional interview, it created its own algorithm and based its methodology on digital data and economical development of countries (Foreign Direct Investment). The main areas of investigation of this index are trade and tourism that is why we focus less on it than on previous indexes. However, the Bloom Consulting provides interesting results and assumptions about France and Russia. According to this rating Russia has the third position in Europe: "...Russia is the best-performing country, edging out Germany for the 11th position... Also notable is Russia's jump to third place in this ranking, although sanctions recently imposed by the EU will likely affect Russia's achievement in the future"¹³³. The results of Bloom Consulting and Anholt Index are quite similar perception of the French position. France is sixth worldwide and second in Europe after United Kingdom:

There are only two European countries in the Top 10 globally – United Kingdom and France both appear – maintaining the overall ranks of third and sixth worldwide, but the continent as a whole seems to be suffering from a combination of economic crises and the rise of stronger competitors outside the region.¹³⁴

As we can see from our analysis all three indexes use different methodologies and have various assumptions about France and Russia (fig. 16).

¹³² Bloom Consulting's Branding Wheel from the report Bloom Consulting «Country brand ranking 2014-2015», p. 3

¹³³ Bloom Consulting, *Countries Regions and Cities*, Country Brand Ranking 2014-2015 Trade Edition, p.12 and p. 19.

¹³⁴ Ibid, p. 20.

Name of Index	<i>Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index</i>	<i>Courtiers Brand Index by FutureBrand</i>	<i>Country Brand Ranking by Bloom Consulting</i>
Analysed Countries	50 countries	75 countries	180 countries (focus on country, region or city)
Time period	2015	2014-2015	2014-2015
Attributes and fields	Governance, Culture and Heritage, People, Tourism, Investment and Immigration, Exports	Value System, Quality Of Life and Business Potential, Heritage & Culture, Tourism and Made In	Increase of Exports, Attraction of Investment, Attraction of Tourism, Attraction of Talent, Increase national Prominence
Type of research/ number of respondents	Quantitative/ 20,000	Quantitative and qualitative/ 2,530 opinion-formers and frequent international business or leisure travellers from USA, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, UK, Germany, France, Russia, Turkey, South Africa, UAE, India, China, Thailand, Japan and Australia	Quantitative/On-line/ 63.000.000 online searches: 43 brand-tags, 7,000,000 keywords in 9 languages
Age of respondents	18 and older	21-65	---
Sample formation	By age, gender, education (sometimes the race and ethnicity)	By familiarity with all the countries covered, interest in travel abroad, international travel experience at least once in business and/or leisure, gender.	Different on-line data (as FDI statistics) on companies, tourists, investors, general publics and workforces
Specific differences of index sample or variables		Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM): Awareness, Familiarity, Preference, Associations,	4 variables: economic performance, digital demand, Country Brand Strategy Rating, Online

		Consideration, Decision/Visitation and Advocacy.	Performance
Top 5 countries	US, Germany, UK, France, Canada	Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Canada	In trade: USA, China, UK, Hong Kong, Singapore. In tourism: USA, Spain, Germany, Hong Kong, France
Position of Russia	22	31	11
Position of France	5	17	5 in tourism/6 in trade

Figure 16: The Nation Brand indexes comparison

It is difficult to say which of the three nation brand indexes has more validated results. In our point of view, the index of Anholt has huge sample but we feel it lacks qualitative methodology and should include more countries in the panel analysis. *FutureBrand* methodology looks more developed but in our point of view it should include not just people with international experiences but as well the local citizen that formed their perception by national media and local accessible information. Moreover, in Anolts index the respondents age starts at 18, whereas *FututeBrand* works with a generation older than 21, this factor may influence the differences in results. As we saw, the total different approach was proposed by Bloom Consulting to highlight the importance of nation brand online engagement and its economic performance of country. The analysed position of France and Russia proposed by indexes are important to the further development of theirs cultural centres abroad.

3.3. Visual identities and cultural programs of the IF and the RCSC as a part of a nation branding

At the beginning of this chapter we explained what is a nation brand and why is the nation brands of Russia and France influence on the national centres development. We came to the very important analysis of theirs cultural programs, which are involved in the nation branding. As there is a difference between the terms "national brand" and "nation brand" (which we discuss at the beginning of this chapter) we should also clarify the differences between terms "brand" and "branding". The definitions are important to avoid etymological disconnection because the nation branding is not about

to "selling" the nation. Nation branding is connected to innovation, it creates values and integrate it into societies and cultures. According to Nadia Kaneva nation branding aims to reconstitute nations at the different levels of ideology and of praxis, of governmental policy and of cultural diplomacy¹³⁵.

Consequently, the national foreign policy should focus on the integration of national cultural centres in the international diplomacy: "In truth, culture play an essential role in the process of enriching a county's reputation, in driving public perceptions towards a fuller and more durable understanding of country and its values"¹³⁶. Culture, as Anholt stays, is an entirely unique feature of nations. Adapting our topic to his theory, the national cultural centre should consider two sides of culture to be successful: represent historical heritage and contemporary engagement. Moreover, he argues that it should be balanced between the present and past in order to conserve two target groups: older generations and attract the youth one. That is why *Rossotrudnichestvo* should improve its cultural image and start to fight with corruption because "culture can often play a critical role in moving the current image of a country towards a more useful one"¹³⁷.

We believe that the cultural centre becomes a part of the nation brand when it develops into the national brand. The cultural centres as brands should have a unified visual identity, defined target audience, precise strategy and clear national image to promote. The network of *Institut Français* corresponds to brand criteria and became well know worldwide during last five years. When the image of Russian cultural centre abroad is less unified and recognizable. The visual patterns are very important in social science, especially as a part of visual sociology and visual anthropology. Hence we can compare the visual representation of both cultural institutes to explain their differences in strategies and try to see the representation of cultural patterns in everyday visual representations. As with the case of branding of nation, in the case of cultural centres we should first discover what the reputation and perception of national cultural centre is and after develop the strategy to manage it. Sometimes the problem of national cultural centres is the general disharmony of national strategy between different institutions, when the country needs a positioning and a reputation management integrated between different actors. The national

¹³⁵ N. Kaneva, *Nation Branding: Toward an Agenda for Critical Research*, in "International Journal of Communication» 5, 2011. p. 118.

¹³⁶ S. Anholt, *Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 97.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p.101.

cultural centres should create “competitive identity” of national culture. *The competitive identity* is an approach proposed by S. Anohlt means the "synthesis of brand management" for "enhance national competitiveness in a global world "¹³⁸. How and why do the IF and RCSC create their visual images, and do they consider this “competitiveness”?

The visual image of French cultural centre (a logo of *Institut Français*) was created by *Luciole*, it is a French agency of creation and visual communication. Nowadays, this logotype is a strong part of the brand identity of IF. It supports the singularity of the brand, with a guarantee of consistency and visibility. According to the idea of creative agency, the "i" in the logo of IF lost their points and are height to announce the dynamics of an institution (fig.17). The minimalist modernity of the logo was highlighted to state that French Institute has always existed, through a network very well established in the world¹³⁹.



Figure 17: The visual identity of the IF created by Luciole¹⁴⁰

The French graphic designers developed the biggest part of illustrations and promotional materials of *Institut Français* that become recognizable over the world.

The strong point of this visual strategy is interconnection between the visual materials and the foreigner departments of IF. Each department of IF (artistic exchange and cooperation, cinema, development and partners, French languages, books and ideas) has their own promotional campaign according to the united brand identity. The cultural program of IF has an exact structure: visual arts and architecture, music and performances,

¹³⁸ Ibid, p. 3.

¹³⁹ Electronic source: <http://www.luciole.com/identite-visuelle/#institut-francais>, consulted 5 November 2016.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, pictures from the official site of creative agency.

cinema, books and language. This structure helps manage the centre because each of the field has its own responsible work group. However, all of these different work destinations are unified by the same visual identity. The visual identity of centre should be represented in all activities to support the recognition of the brand. Moreover, the visual image of national cultural centres should take in account the visual nation brand identity because they are interconnected. Before the reform of 2010 the French cultural centres don't have the same visual identities in its activities, the creation of IF unified them. The good example is the designs of a non-commercial distribution of film by IF and of its book fair, because they use elements of main logo with few new elements (fig. 18).



Figure 18: Unification of communication material of IF for cinema and book promotions.

During our analysis of visual advertising we recognized some logical cultural pattern that reflects the main fields of functioning of French institutes: French language learning, French books and literature, theatres, dances, visual art, festivals, cinema, architecture and music. To conclude in the case of IF the visual materials are important tools of French soft power which highlighted the main challenges of cultural diplomacy (fig. 19).



Figure 19: Example of the communication material for IF by G. Chazel

In the case of RCSC, the visual unification stays to be less visible. First of all, it is connected to the fact that the cultural centres are under the management of

Rossotrudnichestvo (The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation). As a result, *Rossotrudnichestvo* was united by one logo, however its departments -the 69 RCSC centres under this Agency still to be totally disorganized in their visual identities. Obviously, this fact confirms the visual weakness and invisibility of Russian centres in the world.



Figure 20: Logo of *Rossotrudnichestvo*



Figure 21: Logo of RCSC in Tunisia and in Ethiopia

To have a visual force national cultural centre need unify their visual representations. Their logo should become an iconic brand image to have most efficient soft power. A strong example of this possible force for nation and city branding is the well-known campaign «I love New York» created in 1976 which still recognizable worldwide by huge amount of t-shirts with the same content as heart and two letters “NY”. When cultural centres are developing their visual identity they may take in account the colour and shape psychology. The absence of unified visual image of the RCSC is the lake of general Russian nation brand policy. Even the tourist brand of Russia didn’t exist until the on-line

competition¹⁴¹ for its creation in 2015. The competition was organized by the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism in cooperation with the Russian Association of branding companies. It was the first attempt to create a visual brand of Russia which still to be invisible. Moreover, the creation of *Rossotrudnichestvo* (from Russian Centre for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in 2008) extended the functioning of cultural centres and its orientation to Russian migrants living abroad decreases the soft power of cultural centres. Consequently, we can mention the negative results of this power's decrease: the attacks of Ukrainian radicals on the RSCS building in Kiev during the night of the 27th of August in 2016, the scandal with the Director of RSCS in Washington, who was suspected by FBI in trying to recruit US citizens in 2013¹⁴². Doctor of Political Sciences Tatiana Poloskova presented this kind of problems of "Rossotrudnichestvo" in her publications. She was working three years in "Roszarubezcentr" (actually *Rossotrudnichestvo*) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2005 to 2008. Nowadays, she is a Director of fond "OKA" focused on the development of cultural and business cooperation with Latin America. Moreover, she became one of the main editors of information agency REGNUM in 2014. In her book she argues that in "Rossotrudnichestvo" the Russian diplomats try to have a residence abroad and stay in foreign countries by using their employments; some of them are drugs and alcohol depended; they have a lack of organisational system but there is a huge competition between the workers of centres:

A "corporate" - a myth because when the main task of employee "Roszarubezcentr" ("Rossotrudnichestvo") was and still to be to go abroad to work in the Russian Embassy and the most long stay there, colleagues, by definition, are not perceived as partners by the corporation. But as competitors and even enemies.¹⁴³

Moreover, the problem of brand and cultural program of the RCSC are connected to the huge corruption of the cultural system under the Ministry. We can summarise the

¹⁴¹ The link to the results of on-line competition: <http://www.турбрендроссии.рф>., consulted 27 December 2016.

¹⁴² The scandal between RSCS and FBI appeared in several national medias and Facebook, available journalistic research on-line: <http://www.svoboda.org/a/25150002.html>, consulted 5 March 2017.

¹⁴³ From the book in Russian: «А «корпоративность» - миф потому, что когда основной задачей сотрудника Росзарубежцентра (Россотрудничества) был и остается выезд за рубеж на работу в российское посольство и максимально долгое пребывание там, то коллеги, по определению, воспринимаются не как партнеры по корпорации. А как конкуренты, а то и враги.», accessible on-line: <http://www.iarex.ru/articles/45085.html>, consulted 3 January 2017.

problems of RCSC from the book of Doctor of Political Sciences Tatiana Poloskova "Bydlo na parkete"¹⁴⁴ and several articles¹⁴⁵:

- 1) The centres try to gain illegally money from the rent of building.
- 2) Some employees (diplomats) try to get out of Russia and stay to leave abroad by applying for residence permit.
- 3) A part of budget of centre goes to the private use of its work-team.

Furthermore, the development of the visual identity and the cultural program promotion IF and the RCSC is very visible within the framework of social media. We want to cite famous quote of McLuhan: "We become what we behold. We shape our tools and then our tools shapes us"¹⁴⁶ to highlight the importance of social media to increase of power of national cultural centres. During our interviews of the first year of Master we understood that Facebook became the main source for the promotion and advertising of national cultural centres in a practical framework. In a theoretical framework of social sciences Van den Bulte and Wuyts state the great significance of social networks in brand development. They argue that the strong social connection to consumers can affect how consumers will perceive brand, how consumers will participate in the activities of brand, and eventually how companies should manage their branding strategies¹⁴⁷. The reputation of the both centres partly is reflected in their social media representations. According to our content analysis of visual pages of IF and RCSC in social media, the effectiveness of the programs are reflected online. The stagnation of RCSC is visible because they don't have much for promotional activities and followers are rarely visiting their pages. We analysed the 12 social pages of RSCS and the 33 pages of *Institut Français* in October 2016. The Moscow Kremlin, flags and photos of cultural centres buildings represent the main iconography of RSCS pages in Facebook. When the IF represents itself by information about actual cultural events that are going on (fig. 22). The results of this visual and promotional work were that the biggest part of IF pages have on average 10000

¹⁴⁴ The presentation of the book of Tatiana Poloskova "Cattle on the parquet" (rus. "Быдло на паркете») was at the hotel "National" in October 2015. The auteur was working several years in Rossotrudnichestvo and wrote a critical book about her employment.

¹⁴⁵ We used different articles of Tatiana Stanovaya, Grigory Trofimchuk, Ruslan Gorevoy, an example online: <https://versia.ru/na-chto-rossotrudnichestvo-tratit-sotni-millionov-rublej-iz-byudzheta>, consulted on 11 December 2016.

¹⁴⁶ McLuhan, Marshall, *Understanding Media- The Extension of Man*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1964, p. 9.

¹⁴⁷ S. Genslera, F. Völckner, Y. Liu, C. Wiertz, *Managing Brands in the Social Media Environment*, in "Journal of Interactive Marketing", 27, 2013, p. 249.

likes from users (sometimes this number can be near 1 000 in Jerusalem or near 192 000 in Alger). However, the number of subscribers of Russian cultural centres is significantly lower than a French one on average near 1000 subscribers and often lower.




Figure 22: The visual representation of the RCSC and the IF in Facebook.

As a great comparative example of the functioning of the both centres (the RCSC and the IF) we can take the second biggest city in Indonesia- Surabaya. In Surabaya we had an interview with the Director of the IF Veronique Mathelin who shared her experience in management of cultural centre and her adaptation to Indonesian society through the previous work of *CampusFrance* in Indonesia. We had the chance discover the brand materials represented in the IF of Indonesia.



Figure 23: The brand production of *Institut Français* in Indonesia.

The totally opposite situation has Russian Centre for Culture and Science in Jakarta and Surabaya. *Rossotrudnichestvo* has a house of 645 squares in an expensive area of Surabaya city but it was closed for visitors and there were not official representatives of RCSC¹⁴⁸. Hence the perception and reputation of national cultural centres can vary not just by country but also on the regional/city levels and they depend on the local population. As Melissa Aronczyk mentioned: “perspectives on weather there is a difference between urban, regional, national, and supranational branding vary depending on the interlocutor”¹⁴⁹. This fact we perceived in the social media during the content analysis of Facebook pages. The reflections and representations of the cultural programs are not the same even in the framework of the same country. As we mentioned during our interviews, there is a communication between the centres in one country and the artist travel within the network its network. However, each city tries to adapt the content according to the needs of the local society.

The centres need to unify the communicational materials for the nation brand among these diverse levels of promotions in the different cities to have impact on the

¹⁴⁸ The information about the size of house we took from the article of Vlad Krymski, Cut in Russian, in «Наша версия» №21, 08.06.2015: <https://versia.ru/rossotrudnichestvo-tranzhirit-sootechestvenniki-oblizyvayutsya-proveryayushhie-v-shoke>, consulted 7 January 2017.

¹⁴⁹ M. Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity*, New York, 2013, p. 10.

national level. Furthermore, the national cultural centre's can focus on collaboration with tourism, investment and trade to become visible and create unified attractive image of country. As S. Anholt mention the brand image is the "context in which message are received, not the messages themselves"¹⁵⁰. This statement also supports our thesis of the importance of the target country of the cultural centre and the crucial influence of it on the centre development. The target countries always have different stereotypes about Russia and France. That is why the connection in cultural relationship of Russia with China and India are more easily going than with Czech Republic or Great Britain as we mentioned in the second chapter.

In making an effective development of national cultural centres the roles of managers are essential. We believe that the national cultural centres should have the transnational promotional class (TPS). The “transnational promotional class” is a term proposed by Melissa Aronczyk for various expert and organizations which transfer nation branding¹⁵¹. In RCSC the workers don't have special education for management of cultural centre, the biggest part of them are just specialists in local language. In contrast the IF employees usually have special education in social sciences or diplomacy, culture or management of institutions. That is why we believe that not just created brand is important but the working team is one of the core elements of success: “...the nation brand may be augmented and made visible through its logos, slogans, and promotional campaigns, but these are not effective forms of communication without the wholehearted participation of its representatives”¹⁵². That is why the managers of the centres plays the crucial role in the nation branding. The new director takes the model of cultural management from the previous team but he also introduces his own methods, social connection and personal cultural preferences. It follows that the influential difference in functioning of IF and the RCSC is the profiles of their directors. The directors of the *Institut Français* usually have a background in Ministry of Education, Culture or Foreign Affairs. In the Russian case, the majority of them don't have an education for the field of cultural diplomacy but simply have good local language knowledge. Even if we keep look on the Agency executive of *Rossotrudnichestvo* (Lyubov Glebova) she had working for the lottery organization, political party “United Russia” and Ministry of Health. According

¹⁵⁰ Anholt, *Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.14.

¹⁵¹ M. Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity*, New York, 2013, p. 129.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

to the opinion of Tatiana Poloskova, the director of *Rossostrudnichestvo* were not chosen by rational criteria of work competencies and professional experiences but according to their personal connections to the managers of the Ministry in Moscow¹⁵³.

The culture managers' profiles are not just one characteristic of the significant difference in the management of cultural programs of these two cultural institutions. The RCSC and the IF also have various cultural patterns. The *Institut Français* is more oriented to contemporary art where as the RSCS tries to highlights the important subjects from their past and cultural heritage. Consequently, the IF has a lot of new ideas, debates and conferences when the RCSC supports the anniversaries of different authors and historical events. The IF puts effort into organizing events with local artistic networks when the RCSC works dependent on the Ministry. The IF has the structure of a cultural field with work groups for each field instead the RCSC has multitasked employment and there is not any proportion between the focuses on various kinds of art. The IF also likes to organize longitudinal projects (*Days of Francophonie, French Spring, Nights of ideas*) when the RSCS changes its program of cultural events each year.

In conclusion, this third subchapter highlights that the brand images of products (cultural programs), companies (cultural centres) and the reputation of countries (nation brand of Russia and France) are equally important. As brand management is a part of national policy, strategy and development it should be a part of management of national cultural centres. Simon Anholt created the approach of competitive identity of nation branding. We proposed to use the same approach for national cultural centres by theirs own aims, resources and competences.

To summarize the third chapter, the brand is not just historical construction; it is the cooperative work of institutions, government and private sector of country to the creation of new positive stereotypes and national images about it. To develop an effective brand, as we saw in the French case, we need a common integrated longitudinal campaign. When the Russian case shows us that the regional and city promotion without unified strategy don't provide the effective results (conforming to two different indexes). We defined just one example of strong city brand creation in Russian case - the Saint

¹⁵³ T. Poloskova provides this information in her book "Bydlo na parkete" [Cattle on the parquet], accessible on-line: <http://www.iarex.ru/articles/44905.html>, consulted 5 January 2017.

Petersburg city. Probably, the important factor of its development is that the image of the city supported by all regions of Russia on local and international levels. The Olympic Games has also improved the nation brand of Russia. However, the military action, the danger to the peace and corruption provided by country stigmatized its nation image. The strong connection between nation brand and cultural centres somehow explain why the centres are under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The governments should give to the centres the image of countries that they should represent. After the national cultural centres should find the best methods of this image creation and support it in foreign countries. It is clear from the past chapter that we should have a deep knowledge of foreign country to make the best practices for promotion of our image and cooperation to establish the view of "us" by "others".

Conclusion

Over this Master's thesis have shown the significance of the study of the Russian Central of Science and Culture (RCSC) and the *Institut Français* (IF) as it reveals the different strategies employed by cultural centres in an international context. The goal was to observe the structural differences between two cultural centres and analyse how these differences have influenced their development. We compared the economic models of the IF and the RCSC, the main functions of national cultural centres of France and Russia, and the influence of location on the cultural centres. To conduct this study, the basic theoretical framework included soft power, cultural globalisation, national culture, cultural development and glocalisation. To construct the theoretical frames, we consulted books and articles that reviewed the institutions being analysed, and included fundamental books concerning the methodologies of the social sciences. We determined the strategies and practices of soft power which were conducted by studying cultural institutions: language courses and promotion of national education, nation branding, artistic exchange and cooperation (where cultural institutions play the roles of cultural mediators).

Throughout our research we collected theoretical data specifically focusing on the history of the development of national cultural centres abroad in the case of France and Russia. We looked at the transformation of both these cultural centres during the 20th-century to answer the question of why soft power is so important in the process of globalisation. Moreover, we analysed the archive documents of the USSR and Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Our analysis of the historical development of national cultures explained the reasons for the creation of cultural centres abroad. By examining these official documents we learned that the IF and the RCSC share some common characteristics. The first chapter proves that the IF and the RCSC are institutions with long genealogies; they changed their names several times during the 20th century. The *Institut Français* took over *Culturesfrance* (2006-2010), which was the main actor of "rayonnement français", and was created by combining the *Association française d'action artistique* (1922-2006) and the *Association pour la diffusion de la pensée française*. Before the creation of the Russian Federation, the RCSC was known as VOKS (1925-1958), SSOD (1958-1994) and *Roszarubejcenter* (1994-2002). As we saw in the first chapter, the cultural centres have some shared goals and somewhat similar periods of development. However while the IF has increased its soft power over the last decade, the

soft power of Russian cultural centres abroad has declined significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is an important difference in functions of the RCSC and the IF: the French centres mostly devote their cultural activities to the local populations of foreign countries whilst Russian centres direct their energy more towards “compatriots” (fellow Russian migrants).

To answer the question “how have strategies for the development of national cultural centres adapted to local contexts abroad?” we used the four following methods over the Master course: 1) document analysis, 2) semi-structured interviews with the directors of culture centres, 3) observations in Russian and French cultural centres, 4) maps-construction by software GIS. As a result of geographic information system (GIS) analysis software we constructed the comparative geographic distributions of representations of the RCSC and the IF in the world. We created colour-coded maps of countries where both centres are represented: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, China, most of Europe, etc. This also helped us to uncover some differences between the two, such as that France has more centres in Germany and its ex-colonies, whilst the *Rossotrudnichestvo* (the RCSC) has more offices in India and post-soviet states. The state policies of Russia and France explain why their cultural centres are represented more in certain countries than in others. The IF and the RCSC have huge networks around the world, which represent their national and cultural policies and diplomacies.

The first step in our comparative analysis was to visit both national cultural centres in China alongside attending a conference organised by the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Paris where we discussed the role of cultural institutions abroad and the importance of soft power in national development. Later we analysed various locations of the IF and the RCSC leading us to the conclusion that they do not function in the same way across different countries. Furthermore, during the Master’s research we conducted interviews and observations in the offices of the IF of Madrid, Lisbon, Prague, Surabaya, Paris, Tel Aviv, Palermo, Beijing, and Kiev, as well as the RCSC of Paris, Prague, Beijing and Madrid. The interviews with directors and workers revealed the different strategies and economic models between the IF and the RCSC¹⁵⁴. While the IF is economically independent from the Ministry and can gain money from its program, the RSCS is

¹⁵⁴ The list of interviews conducted during Master 1 is in Annex 3.

dependent on the Ministry's funding.

We included the term “glocalisation” in our analysis of these national cultural centres which, according to the results of our observations, explains, to some extent, the development of the IF and the RCSC. Our hypothesis that national cultural centres abroad define their cultural strategies whilst facing the realities of other countries was supported by the idea of glocalisation. During the interviews with the aforementioned directors (Appendix 3) we discovered many differences in their management styles that affect the development of cultural policy at the IF and the RCSC. In this process of analysis, our research indicated that instances of exchange between the centres and their local cultures evolved through the development of art-programs, and the influence of the local cultural policies on the centres. Moreover, during the interview with the general secretary of the IF, we learned that the activity of cultural centres depends upon its team's efficiency and involvement.

Over the first year of the master study we discovered some of the difficulties and weaknesses in the development of national cultural centres abroad. The complication in the case of the IF is its relationship with the *Alliance Française*, which is not clear in several countries. Moreover, The official partnership between the IF and Alliance was signed in 2010 (the Appendix 1) and is still only partly supported by both French institutions. Secondly, the relationship between the French Embassy and the *Institut Français* is not well established. While the RCSC also has some weaknesses in its development, they are totally different from the problems faced by the IF. The first one is its total economic dependence on the central office in Moscow, which provides 100% of the budget for each RCSC. The second problem is the very wide definition of the responsibilities of the RCSC: the national culture promotion, the “compatriots” support and the protection of their heritage. Having this very different function for the local and national population in these countries the soft power of Russia has decreased. Probably one of the reasons for the IF's more successful development compared with the RCSC is its precise orientation towards the local population. As we stated in the first chapter soft power is the ability of a country to engage a foreign population in its own national culture, not to support their emigrants abroad.

As was stated at the beginning of this thesis, this study is not about national

identity, but rather focuses on the national image that countries construct through their cultural centres abroad. The proposed research explored the process of nation branding in the third chapter by examining the nation brand indices of Russia and France, the characteristics of the centres' directors and the comparison of nation branding of the IF and RSCS. We analysed the cultural brand of the IF and the RCSC, and examined the areas where a countries' branding are most evident: the cultural programs and visual promotional materials of the centres. The second year of Master revealed different models of functioning for a cultural centre in an international context and the difficulties in developing the IF and the RCSC abroad.

We proved that the IF and the RCSC are the constructions of the nation brand, and that they can produce an income for a nation whilst reinforcing the nation's positions in cultural diplomacy. We did a comparison between national cultural centres and national branding. The role of national cultural centres as part of the brand is to improve the nation branding in foreign countries. As a result, the *British Council*, *Institut Français* and *Instituto Cervantes* are national brands, which are strong manifestations of the nation brand. Each nation brand is unique, and so when we are speaking about nation branding the comparative perspective becomes highly significant. The processes of globalisation and glocalisation, which we discussed in the second chapter, influence the diversification of nation brands and their cultural dimension. We supported the hypothesis that national cultural centres, which achieve the best nation branding, should adapt their strategies to the local population. When the cultural centre creates projects with local culture they achieve the negotiation of cultural conflict, and can help to establish cultural or business partnerships and economical cooperation.

According to Melissa Aronczyk's definition of a culture of branded and unbranded nations, Russia is unbranded, whereas France is branded. This means that the cultural activities of Russia have the following characteristics of an old, political, antagonistic, divisive, backward-looking, abnormal, untrustworthy, traditional and lazy culture. In comparison, the French culture has different traits: it is young, neural, progressive, friendly, peaceful, normal, authentic, transforming and innovative. We see more clearly the characteristics of a branded nation in the case of the *Institut Français*, while the policies of the Russian cultural centres are more representative of an unbranded nation. We are convinced that sometimes the problem of national cultural centres is the general

disconnect between national strategy and different institutions, when the country needs to take a position and to manage its reputation between different integrated actors. We confirmed that the roles of managers of cultural centres are thus fundamental. In RCSC the workers don't have special education for the management of the cultural centre. The majority is just specialists in the local language. In contrast the IF employees usually have special education in social sciences or diplomacy, cultural studies or the management of institutions. The new directors take the model of cultural management from the previous team but they also introduce their own methods, social connections and personal cultural preferences.

We demonstrated the connection between three concepts that influence and define the strategies of national cultural centres: soft power, globalization and national branding. Moreover, we examined three main nation brand indexes: the *Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index*, The Country Brand Index and Country Brand Ranking by Bloom Consulting. All three indexes use different methods and have various assumptions about France and Russia. Overall, the position of France is better than Russia, and this fact facilitates the development of IF. The positions analysed by countries proposed by indexes are important to the further development of their cultural centres abroad. The national cultural centres should create "competitive identity" of the national culture. According to our content analysis of the IF and RCSC's social media presence, their programmes are advertised online with varying success. The visible weakness of the RCSC is their lack of promotional activities, and followers rarely visit their pages. The Moscow Kremlin, flags and photos of the buildings of cultural centres represent the main iconography of RSCS pages on Facebook. In comparison, the IF presents itself with information about actual events and cultural activities. We proved that the centres should try to unify the communicative materials of the nation brand among these diverse levels of promotion in the different cities, so as to have an impact on the national level. Furthermore, the national cultural centre's can focus on collaboration with tourism, investment and trade to increase their visibility, and create a unified, attractive image of the country.

We showed that the cultural centre becomes a part of the nation brand when it develops into the national brand. The cultural centres as brands should have a unified visual identity, defined target audience, precise strategy and clear national image to promote. The network of *Institut Français* corresponds to brand criteria and has become

well-known worldwide during the last five years. In contrast, the image of the Russian cultural centre is less unified and recognizable abroad. The national cultural centres can use a set of techniques to enhance an effective nation branding: festivals, exhibitions, gastronomic promotion, book-fairs, etc. According to our set of interviews, the cultural centres should spread their reputation abroad and promote positive cultural values by adapting to local demand. We demonstrate that national cultural centres should consider the two sides of culture to be successful: one side representing historical heritage, and one representing contemporary commitment.

We justify Anholt's statement with the example of the IF and RCSC which says that the cultural interaction and the cultural approach are "the only demonstrably effective form of nation branding". The success of France in nation branding is connected with the governmental strategy "The New France. Where the smart money goes" organized by Invest in France Agency (IFA). In contrast, the weaker nation branding of Russian cultural centres is connected to factors such as the corruption, military activity and absence of a unified image across the huge territories of Russia. The soviet period created stereotypes and symbolic images about the Russian nation. However, cultural centres can reconstruct existing stereotypes about culture, and this is why national centres are so important as an instrument of soft power in the process of nation branding.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: The three-year agreement (2011-2013) between the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the *Fondation Alliance Française*



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RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET EUROPÉENNES



FONDATION ALLIANCE FRANÇAISE

**CONVENTION TRIENNALE
(2011-2013)**

ENTRE LE

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET EUROPÉENNES

ET LA

FONDATION ALLIANCE FRANÇAISE

Préambule

La politique culturelle extérieure constitue une composante essentielle de l'action internationale de la France. Elle poursuit cinq grands objectifs :

- 1- Accroître la part qu'occupent les productions françaises sur le marché des industries culturelles et sur les scènes artistiques à l'étranger.
- 2- Promouvoir le dialogue entre les cultures et la diversité culturelle, en particulier au bénéfice des pays en développement.
- 3- Renforcer la présence française dans le paysage audiovisuel mondial.
- 4- Assurer la présence de notre pays dans les débats d'idées.
- 5- Diffuser la langue française.

Pour mettre en œuvre cette politique, la France s'appuie sur un dispositif public constitué des instituts et centres culturels français à l'étranger. Elle s'appuie également sur le dispositif associatif des Alliances françaises. Ces deux dispositifs, placés au service d'un objectif commun, sont complémentaires. Ils font la richesse et la valeur ajoutée de l'action culturelle française dans le monde, qui bénéficie de l'engagement de l'Etat mais aussi de celui des sociétés civiles françaises et étrangères. La spécificité de ces dispositifs doit être maintenue en même temps que doit être renforcée l'unité du réseau dont ils sont les composantes.

Avec la loi du 27 juillet 2010 relative à l'action extérieure de l'Etat, le ministère des Affaires étrangères a décidé de réformer et moderniser son action culturelle extérieure et, en conséquence, de confier la mise en œuvre d'un certain nombre de missions à un Etablissement public à caractère industriel et commercial (EPIC) dénommé Institut français. Dans ce cadre, les établissements issus de la fusion entre les SCAC et les instituts et centres culturels français, qui adopteront, pour une meilleure visibilité, la même dénomination d'institut français, auront vocation à développer des liens très étroits avec l'EPIC éponyme. A l'issue d'une expérimentation de trois ans qui sera menée dans au moins dix postes, leur rattachement à l'Institut français sera éventuellement décidé.

Cette réforme implique qu'une relation renouvelée s'institue entre le ministère des Affaires étrangères et la Fondation Alliance française, qui prend en compte la création de l'Institut français, les évolutions du réseau culturel et de coopération à l'étranger, et le souhait d'un rapprochement encore accru avec le réseau des Alliances françaises.

L'Alliance française est un mouvement international créé à Paris en 1883, qui bénéficie du soutien de comités locaux établis hors de France pour développer l'enseignement du français et la diffusion de la culture française dans le monde. Cette formule est fondée sur les capacités d'initiative de la société civile et sur la coopération entre partenaires internationaux égaux. Ce mouvement est l'un des principaux acteurs qui contribuent à la mise en œuvre de la politique culturelle extérieure de la France.

La Fondation Alliance française, créée en 2007 et déclarée d'utilité publique, reprend, sur une structure institutionnelle actualisée, l'intégralité des objectifs définis par les fondateurs du XIX^{ème} siècle.

Dans ce contexte, le Ministère s'engage à soutenir financièrement la Fondation dans les missions définies au chapitre I et en annexe 1 de la présente convention, notamment en

apportant son soutien aux actions mises en œuvre par les Alliances françaises dans le cadre de la politique d'influence portée par les représentations diplomatiques françaises à l'étranger.

Dans l'hypothèse enfin où le Ministère, au terme des trois années d'expérimentation de l'Institut français, décidait de lui rattacher le réseau des instituts français de l'étranger, il est entendu que la gestion des personnels détachés mis à disposition des Alliances françaises, ainsi que des subventions de fonctionnement attribuées aux Alliances, restera du ressort direct du Ministère.

C'est pourquoi les soussignés :

Le ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes,
Direction générale de la mondialisation, du développement et des partenariats
27, rue de la Convention CS 91533- 75732 PARIS CEDEX 15
représenté par son Ministre, Monsieur Bernard KOUCHNER,
désigné sous le terme « le Ministère »

d'une part,

et

La Fondation Alliance française,
reconnue comme établissement d'utilité publique par décret du 23 juillet 2007,
101, boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris
représentée par son Président, Monsieur Jean-Pierre de LAUNOIT,
désignée sous le terme « la Fondation »

d'autre part,

Considérant le rôle d'animation et de coordination joué par la Fondation au sein du réseau mondial des Alliances françaises constituées à l'étranger sur initiative locale, dans le respect de leur autonomie (désignées ci-après sous le terme « Alliances françaises »),

Considérant que le conseil d'administration de la Fondation est seul autorisé à conférer leur légitimité aux Alliances françaises qui se sont constituées ou projettent de le faire à travers l'approbation de leurs statuts,

Considérant que la Fondation contribue à la politique culturelle internationale de la France, telle qu'elle est menée par le ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes,

Considérant que le Ministère a contribué à la dotation de la Fondation par le versement en 2007 d'une subvention unique et non renouvelable,

Considérant la loi du 27 juillet 2010 relative à l'action extérieure de l'Etat, portant création d'une Agence pour l'action culturelle extérieure sous forme d'établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial dénommé Institut français (désigné ci-après sous le terme « Institut français ») ;

Sont convenues les dispositions suivantes :

CHAPITRE I : MISSIONS DU MOUVEMENT ALLIANCE FRANÇAISE.

Article 1

Le mouvement Alliance française (constitué par la Fondation et les Alliances françaises dans le monde) se donne pour mission de :

- proposer à des publics diversifiés des cours de langue française de qualité, dans un contexte culturel enrichissant ;
- promouvoir la création française et francophone à l'étranger ;
- offrir au public des ressources documentaires sur la France historique et contemporaine et participer à la politique de promotion des études supérieures en France ;
- contribuer à renforcer l'influence de la France à travers le débat d'idées et la promotion des savoirs.

Article 2

L'Alliance française favorise les échanges culturels bilatéraux et multilatéraux :

- elle contribue à la diversité culturelle par le dialogue des cultures ;
- elle participe à la valorisation des cultures locales sur place et à un meilleur accueil des cultures étrangères en France, tant d'un point de vue contemporain que patrimonial ;
- elle favorise la dimension européenne par les échanges et la coopération avec ses partenaires européens en Europe et dans les pays tiers.

Article 3

§ 1 : La Fondation s'engage, à son initiative et sous sa responsabilité, à réaliser les actions et projets dont le contenu est précisé dans l'annexe 1 à la présente convention et à mettre en œuvre à cette fin, avec le soutien du Ministère, tous les moyens nécessaires à leur bonne exécution.

§ 2 : La Fondation s'engage à signaler, dans sa communication, le soutien apporté par le Ministère à son action.

CHAPITRE II : DES RELATIONS ENTRE LES DEUX PARTIES.

Article 4 : Relations de travail entre les deux parties.

§ 1 : Les représentants du Ministère (DGM) et de la Fondation se rencontrent régulièrement, et au moins une fois tous les deux mois, pour se concerter sur les actions qu'ils conduisent dans les domaines culturels et linguistiques et pour examiner toutes questions concernant les parties, y compris celles ayant un caractère juridique ou financier. L'Institut français participe à cette réunion.

§ 2 : La Fondation est invitée à participer aux réunions régionales organisées par le Ministère.

§ 3 : Le Ministère et la Fondation se communiquent mutuellement les correspondances et pièces importantes et non-confidentielles concernant les Alliances françaises. Les fiches de l'Inspection générale des Affaires étrangères, en tant qu'elles concernent les Alliances

françaises, sont communiquées à la Fondation sous couvert de la DGM. La Fondation adresse au Ministère les comptes rendus des missions qu'elle effectue.

Article 5 : Relations entre la Fondation et l'Institut français, opérateur du Ministère.

§ 1 : Le président de la Fondation est membre de droit du conseil d'orientation stratégique de l'Institut français et le Ministère désigne le secrétaire général de la Fondation pour occuper un siège au sein du conseil d'administration de l'Institut français, en tant que personnalité qualifiée.

Dès que les conditions statutaires seront réunies par la Fondation pour le faire, l'Institut français sera représenté au conseil d'administration de la Fondation.

§ 2 : Un représentant de la Fondation est systématiquement associé par l'Institut français aux comités de sélection des fonds destinés à soutenir les initiatives du réseau culturel à l'étranger.

§ 3 : La Fondation et l'Institut français s'efforcent de mettre en œuvre des actions communes.

§ 4 : Une convention tripartite annuelle est conclue entre le Ministère, la Fondation et l'Institut français.

Article 6 : Organisation du réseau culturel extérieur.

§ 1 : L'évolution de la carte du réseau des Alliances françaises conventionnées est étudiée conjointement par le Ministère et la Fondation au cours de deux réunions annuelles. Ces réunions s'efforcent de renforcer la complémentarité entre les deux composantes du réseau. Toute décision pouvant avoir des conséquences sur l'organisation de la carte du réseau des Alliances françaises, en particulier pour ce qui concerne la création, le redéploiement ou la suppression de postes d'expatriés, doit être validée par les deux parties, en tenant compte de la nécessité où le Ministère peut se trouver de faire évoluer le total et la répartition de ses postes, en fonction notamment de l'évolution de son plafond d'emploi ou de contraintes diplomatiques.

§ 2 : Le Ministère prévoyant, dans un certain nombre de pays, de créer des Instituts français résultant de la fusion des services culturels avec les établissements à autonomie financière (EAF), il est convenu, afin d'éviter les « doublons », que dans les villes où le rôle de centre culturel français est tenu par une Alliance française, les compétences de l'Institut français ne pourront entrer en concurrence avec les activités propres de l'Alliance française, en particulier l'enseignement du français. Inversement, dans les villes où le rôle de centre culturel français est tenu par un Institut français, les compétences de l'Alliance française ne pourront entrer en concurrence avec les activités propres de l'Institut français et la Fondation ne pourra autoriser la création d'une Alliance française. Ces dispositions n'obèrent pas la possibilité pour les deux parties de réviser, d'un commun accord, la cartographie des établissements existants.

§ 3 : Le Ministère et la Fondation s'engagent à reconnaître dans leur communication l'existence de deux types d'établissements formant un réseau travaillant à une cause commune : les Alliances françaises et les Instituts français. Un rapprochement de l'identité visuelle et des logos sera mis en œuvre, tout en préservant la visibilité des deux établissements.

CHAPITRE III : DES ALLIANCES FRANCAISES A L'ETRANGER.

Article 7

§ 1 : Le Ministère collabore, à travers ses postes diplomatiques, avec les Alliances françaises à l'étranger sur la base de conventions annuelles d'objectifs et de moyens. Ces conventions sont élaborées sur la base du modèle figurant en annexe 3 de la présente convention et sont négociées et signées en son nom par le chef de poste diplomatique compétent.

§ 2 : En cas de nécessité, la Fondation pourra se substituer à l'Alliance française locale pour définir, en liaison avec le poste, les termes de la convention annuelle d'objectifs et de moyens, et la signer.

§ 3 : Les postes diplomatiques sont en relation avec les Alliances françaises locales. Ils encouragent et soutiennent leurs actions dans le cadre des orientations qu'ils définissent en accord avec le Ministère.

Article 8

La Fondation s'engage à veiller à la cohérence de l'action menée par les Alliances avec celles développées par les postes diplomatiques :

- elle n'approuve les statuts des nouvelles Alliances qu'après avis des postes diplomatiques et, si nécessaire, examine avec eux l'opportunité de retirer son label ;
- elle donne mandat à des délégués généraux pour la représenter dans un pays ou une région et pour coordonner et développer des réseaux nationaux ou régionaux ;
- elle recueille, auprès du chef de chaque mission diplomatique, son appréciation de l'activité des Alliances dans son pays de compétence. Si celui-ci lui signale une difficulté, tenant au contexte politique et social local, la Fondation s'engage à intervenir auprès du conseil d'administration de l'Alliance concernée et à contribuer de bonne foi à la résoudre.
- elle facilite, à travers ses délégués généraux, l'accès de l'IGAE aux Alliances françaises qui reçoivent une aide de l'Etat.

CHAPITRE IV : DES PERSONNELS.

Article 9

§ 1 : Une commission de sélection mixte (Ministère-Fondation) instruit les candidatures aux postes d'expatriés sous contrat du Ministère à pourvoir dans les Alliances françaises (Directeurs, directeurs-adjoints, chargés de mission pédagogique, chargés de mission culturelle). Le Ministère peut, à l'issue de cette sélection, nommer et rémunérer des personnels affectés dans les Alliances françaises dans le cadre des conventions annuelles d'objectifs et de moyens mentionnées à l'article 7 ci-dessus.

§ 2 : La fonction de délégué général de la Fondation Alliance française dans un pays donné, voire celle de délégué général régional si la situation le nécessite, exercée sur mandat du conseil d'administration de la Fondation, pourra être remplie, d'un commun accord entre le Ministère et la Fondation, par un agent exerçant des fonctions en Alliance française. Les missions types de l'agent auquel un tel mandat a été confié sont décrites en annexe 4 à la présente convention.

§ 3 : Le Ministère ne peut nommer un agent expatrié dans une Alliance française à l'étranger, ni mettre un terme prématuré à sa mission, sans l'accord de la Fondation, sous les réserves énoncées à l'article 6 alinéa 1 ci-dessus.

Article 10

§ 1 : Les personnels affectés dans les Alliances françaises relèvent, comme tous les agents émergeant au budget du Ministère et nommés dans un pays étranger, de l'autorité de l'ambassadeur, assisté du conseiller de coopération et d'action culturelle. Ils exercent leur activité :

- dans le cadre de la politique culturelle extérieure générale de la France, définie par le ministère (DGM) ;
- dans le respect des principes et des orientations de la Fondation, dont les délégués généraux sont les représentants auprès des fédérations et des conseils d'administration d'Alliance française ;
- conformément aux priorités fixées dans chaque pays par les postes diplomatiques ;
- suivant les responsabilités qui leur sont confiées par les fédérations ou les conseils d'administration à la disposition desquels l'administration française les a mis.

§ 2 : Une lettre de mission cosignée par le ministère (DGM) et la Fondation, établie à partir d'une proposition élaborée par le poste diplomatique après consultation du conseil d'administration de l'Alliance française concernée, est remise à chacun de ces personnels. Outre une description des missions des intéressés, la lettre comprendra notamment des informations sur les modalités selon lesquelles ces agents devront rendre compte de leur action (Cf. modèle type de lettre de mission en annexe 5).

§ 3 : Les personnels concernés présenteront, au plus tard six mois après leur prise de fonction, un plan d'action pour la durée de leur mission. Elaboré, pour ce qui concerne les directeurs, dans le cadre d'une concertation avec le poste diplomatique et le conseil d'administration, ce plan d'action sera transmis au Ministère et à la Fondation pour avis. Les agents expatriés transmettront également au Ministère et à la Fondation, par la voie hiérarchique, un rapport de fin de mission. Des informations sur le contenu des lettres de mission et des rapports figurent en annexes 5 et 6 à la présente convention.

CHAPITRE V : DES SUBVENTIONS.

Article 11

§ 1 : Au titre de la présente convention, le Ministère attribue à la Fondation une subvention annuelle destinée d'une part à soutenir son action d'animation du réseau des Alliances françaises, leur modernisation et leur professionnalisation, et d'autre part à participer aux frais de fonctionnement et de coordination de ses délégués généraux à l'étranger. Le montant arrêté par le Ministère est communiqué par courrier à la Fondation avant le 1^{er} janvier de l'année concernée par la subvention, afin que la Fondation puisse établir son budget. La subvention fait l'objet d'un avenant annuel à la présente convention qui confirme son montant et fixe ses modalités de versement. Le Ministère s'efforce de soumettre cet avenant à signature avant le 15 février de l'année concernée par la subvention.

§ 2 : Par ailleurs, le Ministère peut attribuer à la Fondation des subventions pour la réalisation d'opérations ponctuelles d'intérêt commun. Ces subventions et leurs montants seront alors définis par voie d'avenant.

Article 12

§ 1 : La Fondation s'engage à développer une gestion par objectifs et à disposer d'instruments de gestion tels que tableaux de bord et indicateurs analytiques.

§ 2 : L'évaluation des conditions de réalisation des projets ou des actions auxquels l'Etat a apporté son concours, sur un plan quantitatif comme qualitatif, est réalisée dans les conditions définies d'un commun accord entre le Ministère et la Fondation et en fonction des indicateurs figurant dans l'annexe 2 à la présente convention.

§ 3 : L'évaluation porte, en particulier, sur la conformité des résultats à l'objet mentionné à l'annexe 1 à la présente convention, sur l'utilité sociale ou l'intérêt général des actions réalisées et, s'il y a lieu, sur les prolongements susceptibles de leur être apportés dans le cadre d'une nouvelle convention.

CHAPITRE VI : DISPOSITIONS FINALES.

Article 13

§ 1 : La présente convention, conclue pour une durée de trois ans, prend effet au 1^{er} janvier 2011.

§ 2 : Les parties établiront un bilan annuel des actions entreprises et examineront l'opportunité et les conditions de sa poursuite. La conclusion éventuelle d'une nouvelle convention est subordonnée au dépôt des conclusions de l'évaluation prévue à l'article 12.

§ 3 : Toute modification des conditions ou des modalités d'exécution de la présente convention, définie d'un commun accord entre les parties, fera l'objet d'un avenant. Celui-ci précisera les éléments modifiés de la convention, sans que ceux-ci ne puissent conduire à remettre en cause le cadre défini en préambule et à l'article 3.

Si nécessaire, un avenant à cette convention pourra être signé afin de permettre la mise en œuvre de l'expérimentation prévue dans au moins dix postes par la loi du 27 juillet 2010 relative à l'action extérieure de l'Etat. Cet avenant ne pourra concerner que les postes désignés pour participer à l'expérimentation.

§ 4 : En cas de non-respect par l'une ou l'autre partie des engagements inscrits dans la présente convention, celle-ci pourra être résiliée de plein droit par l'une ou l'autre partie à l'expiration d'un délai de trois mois suivant l'envoi d'une lettre recommandée avec accusé de réception valant mise en demeure.

§ 5 : Les conventions annuelles mentionnées aux articles 11 et 12 ci-dessus, lorsqu'elles seront postérieures à la notification de la présente convention, devront y faire explicitement référence. Les conventions de partenariat antérieures demeurent valides.

Article 14

Les six annexes mentionnées font partie intégrante de la présente convention. Elles devront être établies et signées dans un délai d'un mois par le Directeur général de la mondialisation, du développement et des partenariats du Ministère et le Secrétaire général de la Fondation. La liste de ces annexes s'établit comme suit :

Annexe 1 : Projets, actions ou programmes d'actions conformes à l'objet social de la Fondation.

Annexe 2 : Evaluation et liste des indicateurs.

Annexe 3 : Modèle de Convention annuelle d'objectifs et de moyens liant le Ministère aux Alliances françaises.

Annexe 4 : La fonction de Délégué général de l'Alliance française.

Annexe 5 : Lettres de mission remises aux agents affectés auprès des Alliances françaises.

Annexe 6 : Rapports d'activité des agents affectés auprès des Alliances françaises.

Fait à Paris, le 1er octobre 2010,
en deux exemplaires

Le Président
de la Fondation Alliance française

Le Ministre
des Affaires étrangères et européennes

Appendix 2: Regulations on Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

УТВЕРЖДЕНО постановлением Правительства Российской Федерации от 23 июля 2002 г. No 551. Во исполнение Указа Президента Российской Федерации от 5 февраля 2002 г. No 146 “О Российском центре международного научного и культурного сотрудничества при Министерстве иностранных дел Российской Федерации” (Собрание законодательства Российской Федерации, 2002, No 6, ст.565)

ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ О РОССИЙСКОМ ЦЕНТРЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО НАУЧНОГО И
КУЛЬТУРНОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА ПРИ МИНИСТЕРСТВЕ ИНОСТРАННЫХ
ДЕЛ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ⁽¹⁾

1. Российский центр международного научного и культурного сотрудничества при Министерстве иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Росзарубежцентр) является государственным органом при федеральном органе исполнительной власти и осуществляет свою деятельность под руководством и контролем Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации.
2. Росзарубежцентр руководствуется в своей деятельности Конституцией Российской Федерации, федеральными конституционными и федеральными законами, указами и распоряжениями Президента Российской Федерации, постановлениями и распоряжениями Правительства Российской Федерации, настоящим Положением, а также правовыми актами Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации.
3. Росзарубежцентр взаимодействует в пределах своей компетенции с федеральными органами исполнительной власти, органами исполнительной власти субъектов Российской Федерации, российскими организациями и общественными объединениями, а также сотрудничает с зарубежными и международными организациями.
4. За пределами Российской Федерации Росзарубежцентр по согласованию с Министерством иностранных дел Российской Федерации осуществляет свои функции через российские центры науки и культуры за рубежом - представительства Росзарубежцентра (далее именуются - представительства) либо

через представителей Росзарубежцентра в составе дипломатических представительств Российской Федерации.

Порядок создания, функционирования и ликвидации представительств, а также работы представителей Росзарубежцентра определяется Правительством Российской Федерации.

5. Основными задачами Росзарубежцентра являются:

а) содействие укреплению международного авторитета Российской Федерации, пропаганда богатых духовных традиций, достижений в области науки, культуры и искусства;

б) участие в осуществлении научных, культурных, экономических, информационных и гуманитарных связей Российской Федерации с зарубежными странами, установление и развитие в этих целях контактов с государственными и неправительственными структурами иностранных государств, международными организациями, включая региональные, содействие деятельности российских и зарубежных общественных организаций, выступающих за укрепление международного сотрудничества и взаимопонимания между народами;

в) участие в осуществлении государственной политики, направленной на поддержку соотечественников за рубежом в целях обеспечения их социально- культурных, образовательных и иных законных прав и интересов, содействия их дальнейшей консолидации, сохранения русского языка, национально-культурной самобытности, развития всесторонних связей российских организаций с соотечественниками за рубежом и их объединениями;

г) распространение объективной и достоверной информации о российской истории, социально-экономической, культурной и духовной жизни, внутренней и внешней политике Российской Федерации среди населения иностранных государств.

6. Росзарубежцентр в соответствии с возложенными на него задачами выполняет следующие функции:

а) участвует в осуществлении программ и проектов, направленных на поддержку соотечественников за рубежом, развитие всесторонних связей с ними, реализацию

их законных прав, а также взаимодействует с объединениями соотечественников за рубежом, при этом приоритетной является поддержка соотечественников в государствах - членах СНГ и странах Балтии;

б) участвует в информационном обеспечении (в том числе через средства массовой информации) внешнеполитических акций Российской Федерации, проводит в соответствии со своей компетенцией общественные мероприятия, посвященные актуальным вопросам внешней и внутренней политики, двусторонним отношениям Российской Федерации с зарубежными странами;

в) участвует в планировании, организации и проведении гуманитарных, научных и культурных акций Российской Федерации, координирует усилия российских и зарубежных организаций по подготовке таких акций;

г) содействует развитию связей между российскими и зарубежными неправительственными организациями, выступающими за укрепление международного сотрудничества и взаимопонимания между народами;

д) содействует развитию международных связей Российской Федерации в сфере образования, продвижению на мировой рынок образовательных услуг российских учебных заведений, расширению межвузовского сотрудничества;

е) содействует подбору и направлению на учебу в Российскую Федерацию иностранных граждан и соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом;

ж) организует работу за рубежом с выпускниками советских и российских учебных заведений и их объединениями, способствует использованию потенциала указанных выпускников в интересах расширения российского культурного и научного присутствия за рубежом, развития делового и научно-технического сотрудничества Российской Федерации с зарубежными странами;

з) организует работу по популяризации, продвижению и поддержке русского языка за рубежом, осуществляет контакты с государственными органами зарубежных стран с целью укрепления позиций русского языка в их национальных системах образования, организует курсы и центры по изучению русского языка на базе представительств, оказывает методическую помощь иностранным языковедам и

преподавателям русского языка, проводит научно-практические конференции, семинары, творческие встречи, содействует внедрению российской системы государственного тестирования по русскому языку, участвует в организации и проведении национальных и международных конкурсов и олимпиад по русскому языку и литературе;

и) формирует библиотечные фонды представительств и комплектует их справочной, научной и художественной литературой, учебно-методическими материалами;

к) осуществляет программы и проекты, направленные на пропаганду, продвижение и поддержку российской культуры и искусства за рубежом, организует выступления художественных коллективов и исполнителей, теле-, видео- и кинопросмотры, выставки, в том числе фотовыставки, проводит мероприятия, посвященные памятным датам отечественной истории и культуры, и иные акции;

л) содействует поддержанию и развитию международных контактов субъектов Российской Федерации в сфере научно-технического, культурного, экономического сотрудничества и образования;

м) координирует сотрудничество между породненными городами;

н) участвует в мероприятиях по сохранению находящихся за рубежом объектов, имеющих для Российской Федерации историко-мемориальное значение;

о) содействует развитию международных экономических и научно-технических связей и контактов посредством организации деловых форумов и выставок с целью привлечения инвестиций в российскую экономику и продвижения на мировой рынок российских технологий, товаров и услуг;

п) в пределах своей компетенции поддерживает контакты с органами и организациями государств - членов СНГ, а также со структурами ООН и других международных организаций.

7. Росзарубежцентр имеет право:

а) запрашивать в установленном порядке у федеральных органов исполнительной власти, органов исполнительной власти субъектов Российской Федерации и

организаций материалы и информацию, необходимые для решения вопросов, входящих в его компетенцию;

б) создавать на базе своих представительств необходимые информационно-справочные фонды и банки данных;

в) использовать в установленном порядке государственные, в том числе правительственные, системы связи и коммуникации;

г) созывать совещания по вопросам, входящим в его компетенцию, с участием представителей заинтересованных федеральных органов исполнительной власти, органов исполнительной власти субъектов Российской Федерации, организаций и средств массовой информации;

д) готовить предложения по вопросам, входящим в его компетенцию, для внесения их в установленном порядке в Правительство Российской Федерации;

е) участвовать в установленном порядке в подготовке, проведении переговоров и реализации международных договоров Российской Федерации по вопросам, входящим в его компетенцию;

ж) участвовать в установленном порядке в работе российских частей межправительственных комиссий по сотрудничеству с иностранными государствами, а также в работе международных организаций, в которых представлена Российская Федерация, по вопросам, входящим в его компетенцию;

з) создавать в установленном порядке организации для решения задач, возложенных на Росзарубежцентр, и выступать в качестве их учредителя;

и) выпускать в установленном порядке печатные издания по вопросам, входящим в его компетенцию;

к) командировать в установленном порядке в регионы Российской Федерации и за границу своих сотрудников для решения вопросов, входящих в его компетенцию;

л) обращаться за получением виз для сотрудников Росзарубежцентра и членов российских делегаций, выезжающих за границу для решения вопросов, входящих в его компетенцию, непосредственно в дипломатические представительства

иностранных государств в Российской Федерации.

8. Росзарубежцентр осуществляет организационно-техническое обеспечение работы Межведомственного совета Российского центра международного научного и культурного сотрудничества при Министерстве иностранных дел Российской Федерации.

Положение о Межведомственном совете Российского центра международного научного и культурного сотрудничества при Министерстве иностранных дел Российской Федерации и его состав утверждаются Правительством Российской Федерации.

9. Росзарубежцентр возглавляет руководитель, назначаемый на должность и освобождаемый от должности Правительством Российской Федерации по представлению Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации.

Руководитель Росзарубежцентра является членом коллегии Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации.

Руководитель Росзарубежцентра имеет заместителей, назначаемых на должность и освобождаемых от должности Правительством Российской Федерации по представлению руководителя Росзарубежцентра, согласованному с Министерством иностранных дел Российской Федерации. Количество заместителей руководителя Росзарубежцентра устанавливается Правительством Российской Федерации.

10. Руководитель Росзарубежцентра:

а) осуществляет руководство деятельностью Росзарубежцентра и несет персональную ответственность за выполнение возложенных на Росзарубежцентр задач и осуществление им своих функций;

б) издает приказы и распоряжения, подлежащие обязательному исполнению сотрудниками Росзарубежцентра;

в) распределяет обязанности между своими заместителями;

г) утверждает положения о структурных подразделениях центрального аппарата Росзарубежцентра, устанавливает обязанности и определяет ответственность

руководителей структурных подразделений центрального аппарата Росзарубежцентра, по согласованию с Министерством иностранных дел Российской Федерации назначает их на должность и освобождает от должности;

д) в установленном порядке назначает на должность и освобождает от должности сотрудников центрального аппарата и представительств, а также представителей Росзарубежцентра в составе дипломатических представительств Российской Федерации;

е) обеспечивает необходимые условия для функционирования представительств и представителей Росзарубежцентра;

ж) решает в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации о государственной службе в пределах своей компетенции вопросы, связанные с прохождением федеральной государственной службы в Росзарубежцентре;

з) утверждает структуру и штатное расписание центрального аппарата Росзарубежцентра в пределах установленных Правительством Российской Федерации предельной численности и фонда оплаты труда работников, смету расходов на его содержание в пределах ассигнований, предусмотренных в федеральном бюджете на государственное управление;

и) утверждает по согласованию с Министерством иностранных дел Российской Федерации структуру и штатное расписание представительств и представителей Росзарубежцентра;

к) утверждает смету расходов на содержание представительств и представителей Росзарубежцентра;

л) представляет по согласованию с Министерством иностранных дел Российской Федерации в установленном порядке особо отличившихся сотрудников Росзарубежцентра к присвоению почетных званий и к награждению государственными наградами Российской Федерации;

м) учреждает ведомственные награды и награждает ими сотрудников Росзарубежцентра;

н) осуществляет другие права в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации.

11. В Росзарубежцентре образуется совет в составе руководителя Росзарубежцентра, его заместителей, входящих в совет по должности, других руководящих работников Росзарубежцентра и иных лиц.

Члены совета, кроме лиц, входящих в его состав по должности, утверждаются Министром иностранных дел Российской Федерации по представлению руководителя Росзарубежцентра.

Совет на своих заседаниях рассматривает вопросы, связанные с выполнением задач, возложенных на Росзарубежцентр.

Решения совета оформляются протоколами и проводятся в жизнь, как правило, приказами руководителя Росзарубежцентра.

12. Порядок финансирования Росзарубежцентра (в рублях и иностранной валюте) устанавливается Правительством Российской Федерации.

13. Росзарубежцентр является юридическим лицом, имеет бланк и печать с изображением Государственного герба Российской Федерации и со своим наименованием, счета, в том числе в иностранной валюте, открываемые в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации.

14. Местонахождение Росзарубежцентра - г. Москва.

Appendix 3: The list of interviews

Date of interview	Name of respondent	The position of respondent
24/12/2015	Victor Kononov	The Director of the RCSC of China
27/01/2016	Fabrice Rousseau	The Director of the IF of China
06/02/2016	Nathalie Lemaire	The Ex-General Secretary of IF in Russia, Hungary and Czech Republic
10/03/2016	Max Baquian	The Director of the IF of Portugal
23/03/2016	Gaëtan Pellan	The Ex-Director of the IF of Oran
06/04/2016	Pascal Moulard	The Director of the IF of Spain
06/04/2016	Tatiana Dombrovskaya	The Leading Specialist of the RCSC of Madrid
19/04/2016	Pascal Sliwanski	The Director of the IF of Ukraine
14/06/2016	Eric Biagi	The Director of IF of Palermo
25/08/2016	Veronique Mathelin	The Director of IF of Surabaya
19/10/2016	Alexandre Pajon	The Director of IF of Prague
22/10/2016	Veronika Voroncova	Manager of Cultural Department of RCSC of Prague
27/11/2016	Julie Kestenberg	Accueil - IF de Tel-Aviv
11/02/2017	Oleg Soloduhin	The Manager of the RCSC of Prague

We don't present in the appendix a content of interviews to save private information about diplomatic relationships.

Appendix 4: The letter from the Rossotudnichestvo about the internship in RCSC (received 20/05/2016)



МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ АГЕНТСТВО ПО ДЕЛАМ
СОДРУЖЕСТВА НЕЗАВИСИМЫХ
ГОСУДАРСТВ, СООТЕЧЕСТВЕННИКОВ,
ПРОЖИВАЮЩИХ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ, И ПО
МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМУ ГУМАНИТАРНОМУ
СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВУ
(РОССОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО)

125009, Москва, ул. Воздвиженка, 18/9
Тел. (495) 690-1245, факс (495) 609-9210, 609-9242
E-mail: rossotr@rs.gov.ru

20. 05. 2016 № 09/01957

На № _____ от _____

А.ЗАХАРОВОЙ

phozanet@gmail.com

Уважаемая г-жа Захарова,

Федеральное агентство по делам Содружества Независимых Государств, соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом, и по международному гуманитарному сотрудничеству рассмотрело Ваше обращение от 27 апреля 2016 года по вопросу возможности прохождения стажировки в одном из Российских центров науки и культуры и сообщает следующее.

Россотрудничество (центральный аппарат и представительства за рубежом) относится к федеральным органам исполнительной власти Российской Федерации, прохождение практики и стажировки в которых предусматривается исключительно для студентов российских высших учебных заведений при наличии договорных отношений между Россотрудничеством и учебным заведением, а также официального обращения руководства российского университета об организации стажировки студентов.

В целях нахождения возможного формата взаимодействия рекомендовали бы Вам связаться с руководителем представительства Россотрудничества во Франции Шпыновым Игорем Александровичем (тел.:+33144347979, факс:+33147271245, france@rs.gov.ru).

Начальник Управления РЦНК
и страновых программ


С.Ю.Медведев

Appendix 5: Guide of interview (an example applied in IF of Madrid)

Guide d'entretien avec les directeurs des centres culturels (cas de Madrid) :

- Pouvez-vous vous présenter ? (âge, parcours universitaire et expérience professionnelle)
- Pourquoi avez-vous décidé de diriger l'Institut culturel ?
- Pouvez-vous décrire le portrait idéal du directeur d'un Institut Français : quel âge, formation et expérience professionnelle doit-il avoir ?
-
- Quelle est la spécificité de fonctionnement d'un Institut Français en *Madrid* ?
- Quelles sont les difficultés de développement d'un centre en Espagne?
- Est-ce que le programme du centre culturel dépend plutôt du gouvernement espagnol ou du gouvernement français?
- Y a-t-il des formes de communication et d'échanges culturels avec les autres instituts culturels?
- Selon vous, quels aspects de la France donnent une image positive à un Institut Français ?
- Est-ce que l'Institut s'occupe de la protection du patrimoine culturel en Espagne?

- Comment est structuré le financement de l'Institut Français ? Recevez-vous chaque année le même budget ? Comment trouvez-vous les partenaires nécessaires (sociaux et économiques) afin de démarrer un projet ?
- Avez-vous des partenaires économiques?
- Combien de gens travaillent dans votre équipe et quelles sont leurs formations?
- Quel type de publicité utilisez-vous pour trouver et attirer des nouveaux visiteurs?
- Quels sont vos projets de développement futurs?

- Comment votre centre culturel choisit-il les programmes artistiques?
- Est-ce que votre centre s'adresse plutôt aux français ou essaie-t-il au contraire d'engager la population locale?
- Quels sont les critères de choix d'évènements?

- Comment trouvez-vous les artistes?
- Quels sont les thèmes d'évènements organisés le plus souvent par le centre?
- Quels événements ont eu un grand succès?
- Aviez-vous les événements qui n'ont pas eu de succès?