

Abstract

The goal of this thesis is to examine president Bush's policy after 9/11 and its implications for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The shock of 9/11 attacks resulted in "war mentality" manifesting itself in the pressure of the public and media for swift radical actions. This resulted in ad hoc decisions taken without proper analyses and consideration of consequences. After 9/11, Bush Administration used black-and-white rhetoric and simplified the war on terror into war between good and evil. The U.S. under Bush did not consider international institutions to play significant role in international politics and preferred bilateral cooperation. By omitting the Alliance, Washington, however, undermined NATO. Europe was sympathetic to the U.S. and proclaimed its support for Washington since day one but European NATO members and the U.S. had different threat perception regarding Iraq, and could not agree on a common solution. The actions taken by Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq and the reluctance of European allies in supporting the U.S. war against terrorism resulted in escalation of relations in the Alliance. As the U.S. headed toward engagement in two conflicts, it increasingly appreciated the value of NATO. On the other hand, Europe never forgot that the United States is its main ally. Most visibly, the Alliance fell behind the mission in Afghanistan in the most escalated time of conflict over Iraq, which actually freed American capabilities to be redeployed from Afghanistan to Iraq.