

Abstract

This diploma thesis examines the prospects of the Islamic State's expansion to Libya. Using the method of process tracing, the author assesses the campaign of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and establishes 6 factors he calls 'enablers' that played key roles in facilitating its success – the ideology, exploitation of state breakdown and governance, funding, combat know-how, propaganda, and sectarianism. He dedicates special attention to the problematics of sectarianism and the way the Islamic State made instrumental use of it in both of these countries. The author then proceeds to assess the viability of the IS enterprise in Libya, examining whether the conditions and circumstances in the country are conducive for an IS insurgency. He identifies 8 structural conditions that underpinned the relevant enablers in Syria and assesses their relevance in Libya. Comparison of the two cases shows that except for sectarianism all the structural conditions are relevantly present in Libya which, according to J. S. Mill's method of a difference of J. S. Mill's method of a difference, should explain the stalling campaign of IS in Libya. The author proceeds to confirm this hypothesis by assessing the actual campaign of the Islamic State in Libya. He contends the Islamic State tried to follow the successful blueprint of the Syrian enterprise but the missing enabler of sectarianism precluded it from aggravating the societal divide and galvanizing sufficient support in the country. In the end, the author claims the organization cannot be written off as of yet as it has bounced back from near-death experience before and is likely to make a comeback, but the structural conditions in Libya will not allow it to gain the prominence it did in Syria and Iraq.