

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE**

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of International Economic and Political Studies

**Master thesis**

**2017**

**Vugar Bayramov**

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

Institute of International Economic and Political Studies

**Vugar Bayramov**

**Keynesian Politics: The Nature of Political  
Intervention Policies-Case Study Iraq War  
2003**

*Master thesis*

Prague 2017

**Author:** Vugar Bayramov

**Supervisor:** PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.

**Academic Year:** 2016/2017

## **Bibliographic note**

Bayramov, Vugar. *Keynesian Politics: The Nature of Political Intervention Policies-Case Study Iraq War 2003. 2017*, page count 97. Mater thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of International Economic and Political Studies. Supervisor prof. PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.

## **Brief Abstract**

**This Thesis analyzes the nature of US political market, where principles of expansion/intervention resemble Keynesian version of intervention policies. Keynes argued that expansion is the way to ensure security and stability of the market, while J. L. Gaddis made a similar remark, though subjecting it to politics, where expansion is the path to security. Expansion being a state-initiated activity, that is supposed to serve the purpose. The prerequisite for this is Stimulation of Demand for the consumption, hence the expansion. This study does not argue for identical nature of Keynesian Economics in political field, rather I insist on common process that sets the platform for production and expansion. In this study, I analyze the nature of Political Intervention Policies that are akin to Keynes Economic Intervention Policies, hence the discourse of Keynesian Politics. Both in AM and PM-alike, the crisis forces state to intervene. In AM, products are capital-based, while in PM they are idea, belief and value-tailored for the end used, i.e. audience. Key theme of the thesis is that the Demand for Power and Political goods and services is artificially generated so that state can expand or intervene. There is a polar relationship between threat and identity, policy and terrorism with the former coming into shape due to latter and vice-versa.**

## **Keywords**

**Ideas, Beliefs, Applied Market (AM) Political Market (PM), Keynesian Politics, Expansion, Threat, Terrorism, Market, Intelligence Community, Intelligence Agency, President, US, Intervention.**

**Range of thesis 97 pages app. 26.397 words**

## **Declaration of Authorship**

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 18 of May 2017

Vugar Bayramov .....

## **Acknowledgments**

I am grateful and thankful to my family for their support and love in my life endeavours. Also, I am thankful to my professor Vít Střítecký for his insights, guidance and more so patience with me. Lastly, I am thankful to life for providing me with all material and immaterial resources to do what I like.

## Content

I.	<b>INTRODUCTION.</b> .....	2
1.	Thesis and Motivation behind Research. ....	2
2.	Research Question .....	4
3.	Argumentation and Structure of The Study.....	5
4.	Literature Review.....	7
II.	<b>THEORY: US PM AS A REPRODUCTION OF IDENTITY.</b> .....	8
	Methodology Part 1 .....	13
	Methodology Part 2 .....	18
III.	<b>INTRO TO KEYNES</b> .....	22
IV.	<b>MANUFACTURING “ANIMAL SPIRITS’ AND INTELLIGENCE ‘FAILINGS’: PRELUDE TO WAR.</b> 36	
V.	<b>CASE STUDY. FRAMING THE IRAQ WAR 2003: ENGINEERING ANIMAL SPIRITS.</b> .....	40
VI.	<b>INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FABRICATION: ASSESSMENT OF PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.</b> .....	52
VII.	<b>FINAL STAGE OF AD=EXPORTING THE POLICY AND MAINTAINING EXPANSION. NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN IDENTITY AND THREAT.</b> .....	63
VIII.	<b>COCNLUSION.</b> .....	75
IX.	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.</b> .....	78

## **Abstract**

This Thesis analyses the nature of Political Intervention Policies or Political Expansion Policies by applying Keynes' key concepts on how market ought to expand or how state intervenes. Keynes argued that state has to expand/intervene by stimulating demand for goods and services in applied-market (AM) in order to ensure stability and security of the capitalistic market. Similar remark was made by historian J. L. Gaddis, who said that US has to conduct expansive intervention policies in order to ensure stability and security that of political. In political market (PM), where goods and services are ideas, beliefs, values, cultures, identities ought to be stimulated for subsequent consumption in order to sustain stability and order of the political market. In this paper, I argue that Iraq War 2003 was a US deliberate intervention policy done for purpose of expanding its political market. However, I look at the ways how products such as threat/terrorism/war is engineered and sold to American public and how demand for those products are maintained as a result of political expansion policy. I scrutinize how demand for intervention is fabricated by producing specific intelligence. As a result, we can see how identity and threat are interrelated, and how the former shapes the nature of the latter and vice-versa. In Keynesian Economics, it is the crisis that enables the state to intervene, which is similar to PM, where the crisis such as existence of threat/terrorism allows state to intervene and subsequently to expand. I analyze the extent of how production of false intelligence is necessary to justify political intervention policies and how it is related to state's political expansion. I refer to it as Keynesian Politics not as if it is identical to Economics, but because systematically political intervention policies are undertaken for the same reasons that economic intervention polices are; namely, to expand US version of the market.

*Freedom of all is important to my freedom - M. Bakunin*

## **I. Introduction.**

### **1. Thesis and Motivation behind Research.**

This research applies some elements of Keynesian Economics by using its two main concepts called ‘demand-side stimulation of economy or aggregate demand stimulation’ and ‘animal spirits’, thus providing argument for Keynesian Politics. Keynes advocated *State’s economic intervention policies* or *economic expansion policies*, thereby stressing authority’s role in keeping capitally-applied market (AM) stable and in order. This study applies similar logic by providing evidence that in political market there are *state’s political intervention policies* akin to *political expansion polices* that are by-product a result of state’s deliberate production. In an AM of goods and services (g/s), consumption of those is artificially stimulated hence market expands. It holds true for political market (PM) of g/s as well, where the demand for beliefs, ideas, values and ‘political’-based products and services is stimulated by state as means to expand the market, hence the Self. Keynes argued that consumption is the sole end in AM, where g/s are purchased based on their merit. PM is also concerned with consumption of its products such as state policies, national interest, ideas and beliefs. However, while in AM they are many producers willing to sell g/s, in PM, there is only one producer and that is a state/authority, which bears the legitimate capacity to produce/exercise political products.

In this research, I develop further on that assumption, where the demand for political g/s is induced artificially in a thesis of state being engaged in an expansion of its version of PM. The main aspect of this study is analyze the production of intervention policies as means to further state identity. In AM, there is technique of conveying information and convincing buyers to purchase g/s, namely there is marketing industry that frames the

message through advertisement, television and media, thus furthering consumption. Then in PM, there is Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Intelligence Community (IC), State Department that imposes the message in order to induce consumption of future policies (products). Here comes the term ‘animal spirits’ (disinformed individuals) which is irrational human behaviour *with an urge to action rather than inaction*, since individual behaves his/her instincts, rather than the reason, hence animal. In AM, ‘Animal spirits’ is the result of lack of information, where buyers make irrational choices in regards to (several) sellers; hence it is a negative. While in PM, there is one producer that is the state, hence ‘animal spirits’ is a positive, since authority can legitimize certain policies that otherwise would not have been. As this study proceeds, we provide evidence for intentional production of ‘animal spirits’ and information on threat/terror at the expense of stimulating a demand for future consumption of policies both domestically and abroad. We elaborate further by providing evidence for deliberate production of misimpression by US State Department, CIA and IC, which led to the so-called ‘Intelligence Failings’, which were not failings as we now know. This is production of ‘animal spirits’, namely misinformed citizens speaking of their survival instincts. Keynes concluded that *expansive economic policies is the key to sustain stability* in the AM, while in PM, J.L. Gaddis made a similar remark, namely *Expansion is the path to security and stability* (he wrote this in the context of US domestic and foreign policy). Both AM and PM share intervention policies; in both case those interventions are necessary to maintain the stability and order of the market; in both markets state intentionally expands for the purpose of future consumption; both rely on demand for those g/s that have been produced; both use techniques of communication with the AM *straight* and the PM *diffuse* methods to persuade buyers; both expand as way to ensure growth; in both AM and PM, the crisis creates a possibility for intervention. In both fields, creating a demand for products is the most significant element of inducing consumption, hence justifying the expansion as well

as the existence of the market itself. That is the core of this study, where Aggregate Demand (AD) is the sum of consumption, investment, net exports and government spending. Bear in mind that AD is the prerequisite for state intervention policies, where the crisis creates a possibility for existence of identity. In PM, those intervention policies can be artificially stimulated and produced, which is the underlining motivation of this study. The goal is to analyze political intervention policy as the state's deliberate activity done for the means of expanding its interest and identity. State can invest into production of particular products, like policies, that Intelligence Community supports, which in turn legitimizes the demand for intervention/expansion. We analyze a case study on engineering specific intelligence that provides a basis for production, consumption and intervention policies. The case study is the Iraqi War 2003, which is prelude to the upcoming expansions in Libya and Syria. We found out those political intervention policies, similar to economic intervention policies, are the state's deliberate actions taken to expand its version of the market. We study the nature of 2003 intervention in Iraq as a US intention to expand its political identity. Crisis enables the expansion, and in PM, the crisis is a War/Terror/Threat itself. Therefore, we analyze threat not as something independent of solution that of the intervention policy, but on contrary it is important to allow the terrorism, so that policy can be sold. Policy is the product produced domestically, thus we turn to the Keynes who explains how products are produced and rationalized domestically, while their impact is embraced abroad, *calling this process economic expansion policy*. Take into account that Keynes intervention policy is state deliberate action to strengthen economical, it is therefore, we scrutinize political intervention policy as the state's direct participation in production of 'political'.

## **2. Research Question**

Keynes explained the nature of economic intervention policies. In this study, we analyze US political market and the manner in which political intervention policies are

engineered. Crisis is the reason behind state intervention, thus in PM, the threat/terror constitutes the existence of crisis. The first research question is as following: *How Keynesian Politics is embraced in a discourse of US Political Market?* It is essential to underline how Keynes is related to a point of investigation, therefore we pose the question in way that discusses how Keynes' two concepts are integrated into political science. Here we analyze Keynes' contribution on stimulation of consumption, or how to make people consume products (policies). Intuitive answer is through dispelling of information. It is therefore, we explore how intelligence behind polices is produced by Intelligence Community and State Department.

Next question is: *How the power is (re)produced, stimulated and legitimized in US political discourse within the concepts of identity and threat?* Here we analyze how that which has been produced domestically frames the nature of intervention polices externally, or put is simply how intervention policies are reproduced and legitimized in anew market. Significant difference is that in AM, state intervenes and exists the market allowing other sellers to contribute the expansion, while in PM there is one seller and that is the state itself. Therefore, it cannot exit the market since it is the only seller of the product (policy). Thus, state itself must ensure expansion of the policy, which is an equivalent of guaranteeing constant demand for policy. In PM, terrorism creates possibility for the expansion, therefore, policies ought to bring expansion of threat, which justifies the intervention in the first place. State behaviour is the main difference between AM and PM, where for the former state exists and for the latter state stays in the market.

### **3. Argumentation and Structure of Study**

Keynes thought of intervention policies as means to further security and stability of the market, which is similar in PM. The Iraq War 2003 was not chosen randomly because

2000s has seen a new period of intervention polices. Academics have produced extensively on War on Terror since 9/11 however, it is important to reflect on the nature of intervention not just as an observer, but as an active participant; namely, from state's point view. This is what this research aims to do and the reason of '*why bother bringing Keynes into perspective*', because Keynes laid foundation for and justification for the economic intervention polices. But, this is not to confuse economics and politics as a same field of inquiry, but rather see the polar nature of them, where polarities are identical in nature, but vary in a degree. And the degree that we explore is political.

Iraq War 2003 showed that intelligence failures are not failures, as we know them, but rather intentional policy production. Misinformation penetrates consumption of future products, like policies, which in turn justifies expansion/intervention. In order to avoid confusion, we explain in chapter called *Intro to Keynesian Politics* on how one goes about using Keynes in the study of PM and what the relevance of Keynesian Economics in political science is. In the third chapter, we look how intelligence is produced, since it is the state investment into product. The production of intelligence is an indispensable tenet of policy. Then, the forth chapter, we show how policy is Exported as well as a direct link between policy and expansion of threat, which only contributes to further expansion in the market. In final chapter, we draw the conclusion and review initial formula on AD stimulation.

The working hypotheses are: *A) In Keynesian Politics, Intelligence Community and State Department deliberately creates 'intelligence failures' and (animal spirits) in order to ensure consumption of (state's)/political goods and services. B) Political intervention policies, similar to Economic intervention polices, is state's demand-stimulation policy or deliberate expansion of its Political Market.* There are several case studies dating back to 1950s, though our focus is on Iraqi War 2003, which was US production of 'animal spirits' and Demand-side stimulation of US PM, where IC and State Department on purpose had

created the false intelligence and the very enemy that they consequently fought against. But this is the necessary connection between crisis and expansion, terrorism and identity, with former integrating the purpose of the latter and vice-versa.

#### **4. Literature Review**

Research makes use of primary and secondary sources of information with the qualitative and, occasionally quantitative method of compiling data. For primary sources, we look through the official reports and documents of CIA, State Department, Congressional Research Service, Public Hearing Records, Resolution and Bill Tracking Records, Defence Intelligence Agency, CIA Archives, Declassified documents, Selective Committee Reports, WikiLeaks etc. For public speeches, statements and announcements, we review White House speech records, News agency interviews, media outlet transcripts. In addition, we employ Selective Senate Commission and External Commission reports conducted under international and regional regulatory body. We will assess pre and post intelligence analysis as well as CIA and IC executive stance on policy, intelligence and national security. The main document provided by CIA is the National Intelligence Estimates 2002 (NIE), that we will discuss and review. NIE was not selected by accident, because it is the most referred document by public officials regarding the Iraq War, while also providing a platform for media and Congress. Selective Committee Reports provide assessment of CIA analysis and their subjective production that misled the Congress and American public about the threats posed by Iraq.

For secondary sources, we use scholarly articles, Jstor, Sage Journal Articles, books and academic reviews of those topics that are discussed. Last but not the least, we use WikiLeaks data on declassified documents on Iraq War, US support for ‘opposition’ and

radical Islam, archives on National Security Directives, plus data on unauthorized spending and cooperation; which is a combination of primary and secondary data.

However, the core of this study is borrowed from Keynes' Macroeconomics, where he explains how the AM functions. We look at Keynes' key concepts of "Animal Spirits" and "Demand-Side Stimulation" as Demand for Polices/Identity/Power, which we will apply to political market of goods and services. Keynes provided an analysis on how Economic Identity exists, then we will embrace how Political Identity manifests itself. Though, main inspiration for the research is taken form the David Campbell's book *Writing Security*, which explains how threat and identity is interlinked, even more so how one cannot be formed without the other. We develop further on this book by suggesting macro-political variables peculiar to PM. The main reason we consider D. Campbell's insights is that they do not contradict the material and immaterial laws of experience/life, namely the polarity of 'I' (Self) and the 'other', but on the contrary one prerequisites the other in order to 'be'.

Next, *Tracing the Discourse of Terrorism: Identity, Genealogy and State* by Ondrej Ditrych, where we will look at 1990s and 2000s' discourse of terrorism/threat. We will use several books by Noam Chomsky among others is *Necessary Illusions*, where author claims that state should produce political goods and services that would justify its existence as it we know it. The research also applies extensive literature on philosophy of science, nature and language. We delimit out case study to particular times from 2000s to 2003 and in some instances from 2000 onwards, where we will look at particular patterns of demand stimulation for political expansion polices, peculiar to Iraq War 2003.

## **II. Theory: US PM as a Reproduction of Identity.**

This study integrates *Social Constructivist theory, or rather some tenets of it*. As with most theories and laws, the clarity and explanatory power of theories is bound to obvious and

non-obvious exposure of them for the perceiving organism(s), thus the depth of the theory and law is dependent upon the depth of the internal faculties and properties of the listener as well as the speaker. Since the unit of exchange is immaterial (in soft science), theory stands more so for a perspective unravelling its appropriateness. From constructivism, sociologists draw their implications that immaterial construct of ideas, beliefs, identities-alike are apt to bring forward the subjective experience/awareness/knowledge of the world in/out-side of human consciousness (Peter Ludwig Berger and Thomas Luckmann, 1966, p. 194-5). Ideas and identity as a construction are being penetrated into social world via the medium of communication out of language, discourses, policy-prescriptions etc. thus constituting the choice and social existence (Georg Sørensen and Robert Jackson, 2015, p. 176).

As Peter J. Katzenstein points out ‘identity is a label for varying construction of nation and statehood’, which is projected internally and externally (Peter J. Katzenstein, 2002, p. 3). Crucial implication is that the projection must be internalized in order to legitimize the inner and outer faculties of identity. However, due to US global commitment, the legitimization can be either way from external to internal and vice-versa, which underlines specific nature of construction as opposed to generalization of it. Construction is compiled out of the elements of shared knowledge, material resources and practices that ought to ground identity, thus express it (Georg Sørensen and Robert Jackson, 2015, p. 165).

It is not that the physical elements are secondary, but they are the subsequent outcome of constructive process and vice-versa (ideas-actions-ideas); and the relationship between ideas and actions is *cyclical in nature* as opposed to linear. Therefore, power is not an end in itself but rather is a mean to something else, which keeps cyclical nature of it. Famous chicken (A) and egg (B) problem that should not be seen as  $A \rightarrow B$ , but rather as   $A \rightarrow B$ . Where at final stage of *cycle* power takes form and shape of physical, and process repeats again by producing another version of ‘expression’ of power into physical (action). We will

relate to that as a cyclical nature of production. This allows communication especially between theories (and processes of creation), where at the each end of arrow the *power* has been materialized, i.e. psychically manifested, thus allowing an interrelation/alliance between realism, liberalism, constructivism, (post)-structuralism etc. in cyclical fashion. In hard science, this would be equal to physics, chemistry, electromagnetism etc. being in communication rather than in opposition towards each other, therefore proving evidence for orderly creation, where immaterial takes the form and shape of material (material that has physical, chemical, magnetic etc. properties, and not merely physical), which in turn activates another cycle. This is not a metascience, but a quantum physics at its purest form, where the fabric of universal and earthly creation has a pattern and design of existence, which replicates itself in hard and soft sciences-alike, because that is what natural environment does and produces, and man being part of that environment, nor an alien element of it. To conclude this point, science is not only a discovery (material) but also inventive (immaterial) process of production out of a cycle. This is the main relevance of social constructivism, it enables to 'ground' the idea, beliefs and identities into the realm of power manifestation. This is how J. Derrida's Deconstruction might have been done for the sake of Construction anew, where new construction finds connection rather than separation and the process cycles again until the loss of meaning. The result is the withdrawal/deduction of a value/meaning, hence reaching point of liberation/emancipation in one's mind and body or in relation to environment. Which is the purpose of scientific inquiry, namely to devalue that which is considered most valuable.

In addition, this study does not considers ideas and beliefs devoid of element of (national) interest; on the contrary, the former shapes the nature of the latter (Ibid, 2015, p. 166). Ideas and beliefs give rise to meaning/value of physical power, in the same way that identities entail certain preferences and actions (Ted Hopf, 1998, p. 175). Thus, one should

not underestimate the power of knowledge, language and discourse(s), cultures, beliefs etc., that people are exposed to (Ted Hopf, 1998, p. 177). Which leads to the following paragraph on Power as a Reproduction.

Stefanno Guzzini (2005) analysed that power is apt to politicize issues, through the constructed knowledge about social environment, thus exposing people to reality (p. 499). Communication at the very root of power, where it furthers coupling of the 'external' that is included into internal reproduction of power (S. Guzzini, 2005, 505). Author claims that power can denominate the will, direct it by superimposing it on individuals, however, we ought to understand that power and will are not separate concepts with priori- and post-interrelation, but power constitutes the will and vice-versa, hence the word will-power (Ibid, 506). Power is rationalized via politics, while the relevance of power is valued once there is a demand for it; therefore power entails constant value-creation process, so that it can justify itself (Ibid, 513). In PM, those values are political g/s that constitute state identity. The wider the scope of state AM/PM's global commitment, the more illusionary g/s ought to be created, which in PM stimulates the demand for policy/authority. For M. Bernett and R. Duvall (2005) power is a reproduction of certain realities, identities, self and the other; likewise, there are compulsory, structural, institutional, and productive types of power (42, 48). The focus of this study is on the *productive power*, which is embraced via 'the systems of knowledge and discursive practices through which meaning is produced, lived and experienced' (Bernett and R. Duvall, 2005, 55). The fundamental difference, though, between structural and productive power is that productive power utilizes *diffuse* methods of reproducing itself, whereas structural has it directly (this is different from S. Guzzini's classification of it) (Ibid, 55). Productive power would entail mobilization, fixing the meaning of the self, drawing the edges of identity by mobilizing it for an action; this occurs under the discursive context empowering *policies* and *practices* that are desirable (Ibid, p 57).

Those would qualify as diffuse (indirect) methods of production, and that is a primary focus of this research, since in PM the unit of exchange/communication is immaterial.

Consequently, when one contemplates of anarchist idea that *power is always illegitimate unless it proves itself to be legitimate*<sup>1</sup>, then he/she realizes that legitimacy is inasmuch internal as it is external prerequisite for the very existence of power/authority. For instance, given the US's expansive policy and practice, it is the domestic public/citizen who bears the capacity to delegitimize state and its global commitment. Thus, it becomes an imperative to construct a social reality that would justify the very identity that US embraces, namely to create 'Animal Spirits' (misinformed individuals) that would facilitate to consumption of polices. It is in this sense, power is reproduced through the diffuse methods of stimulating consumption, which leads to a demand for policies/authority. As 'Max Weber pointed out, authority/state requires legitimacy' first and foremost for an internal acceptance, since it is an internal reproduction of subsequent power, which is to be integrated externally and internally, or both (Guzzini, 1993, 464). That is the cyclical nature of production, where construction of reality stimulates political g/s, which in turn launches another cycle of construction with distinct identities, values and meanings manufactured for a purpose of exercising 'political', and by default imposing 'identity' on people. In addition, the relation is transactional, and there is term for it called 'reciprocal typification' (also referred to as reciprocal-interaction) by A. Wendt (1992), who assumed that we generate particular social structures in a way matching our identity and interest (p. 405-6). Due to US's scope of interaction, expansive political polices are natural product of specific identities, meanings, beliefs and ideas, which are crucial for justification of its version of PM. CIA, State Department, IC, media and TV, utilizes those diffuse methods gradually imposing a will on

---

<sup>1</sup> Harry Kreisler, 2010, *Political Awakenings: Conversations with History*, (the New Press, USA) p. 11

people. Unlike in AM, Animal spirits is thus a ‘must-have’ prerequisite in PM for the sole producer of political g/s., i.e. the state. It justifies certain state policies/interests, which in turn creates a demand for specific actions/inactions that are provided via US identity both domestically and foreign.

### **Methodology Part 1**

As for methodology, this study advances Iver B. Neumann’s *Discourse Analysis* in order to conceive perception that is being represented and imposed as a pattern of social existence (Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, 2008, p. 61). It is a discursive analysis that unravels diffused methods of producing power. Will-power is in superposition, hence authority exercises dominance through unequal distribution of resources of reproduction (both material and immaterial) (Teun A. van Dijk, 1993, p. 249). As in Keynes’ AM, resources are distributed unequally ranging from corporations to small firms with the former having greater share of the market/capital, hence the production. In PM, authority stands for the creation/fabrication. Therefore, we look at particular methods of production of both identity and enemy, policy and intelligence, knowledge and action. Discourse analysis helps us to conceive social constructivism by detailing of what we mean by what we are via an act of expression be it physical, verbal, symbolic or any other.

In political science, words contain two meanings: a) *technical*-in papers, official documents, statements, reports and b) the *actual*-the one that is used, but not implied in those papers (Chomsky Info/Stephen Marshall, November 2001). Therefore, we look back at history of US political discourse under particular context. However, that is not to say we are to discover a new history, knowledge or meaning, in opposite, it is a process of cutting the unnecessary (M. Foucault, 1977, p. 154). According to Foucault, discourse has more in common with the effect than one might think of:

Discourse battle and not discourse reflection . . . Discourse—the mere fact of speaking, of employing words, of using the words of others (even if it means returning them), words that the others understand and accept (and, possibly, return from their side)—this fact is in itself a force. Discourse is, with respect to the relation of forces, not merely a surface of inscription, but something that brings about effects.<sup>2</sup>

Hence, discourse analysis enables to comprehend the diffuse method of generating knowledge, practices and experiences, thus misinformed-‘animal spirits’. By doing so, we will connect theory and methodology with practice; and that is a process of how ‘diffused’ takes a form and shape of the produced.

Study intertwines Economics, Politics as well as hard and soft sciences in manner not contradicting, but rather resembling each other, where natural and not-natural are still a part of productive/creative process, hence both are natural. Therefore, one has to be clear on employment of those fields of inquiry with the subsequent relevance to the investigation. This is not an inclusion of various notions that would complicate the very phenomena that we are aiming to analyze, but rather is a discovery of pattern, shedding a light and attaching an awareness to the powers being actually used, but not implied (David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, 2013, p. 2). The difference, between AM and PM, is that former is form-fixed while the latter form-changing, namely economics is confined to the methods of reasoning and rationalizing, while the politics is open to diversities that it can encapsulate (Ibid, 2013, p. 19-20). For instance, this means that in AM, there is a straight relationship between product produced and consumed without further evaluation; while in PM, the bonds are diffused and there is a need for further analysis and evaluation, hence discourse. However, both share a focal point that they meet and later diverge again, and that is the rationalization and justification of product for subsequent use. Both in AM and PM, there has to be a demand/consumption for that

---

<sup>2</sup> M. Foucault (1775-6) *Society Must Be Defended*, ed. Arnold Davidson (Picador NEW YORK) p. xx, [http://rebels-library.org/files/foucault\\_society\\_must\\_be\\_defended.pdf](http://rebels-library.org/files/foucault_society_must_be_defended.pdf)

which is supplied, otherwise market would self-destruct. Thus, using similar analogy, this study integrates two concepts from Keynesian Economics with first one is ‘animal spirits’ and second one ‘(aggregate) demand stimulation’. Term animal spirits is defined as the particular *irrational* human behaviour with the ‘*urge to action rather than inaction*’, where uncertainty and poor information is at the root of irrationality.<sup>3</sup> Whilst, aggregate demand is the sum of consumption, investment, government spending and net exports (of policy/products); where the formula is as following:  $AD=C+I+Gs+Nx$ . Keynes made it clear in *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*<sup>4</sup>, that the ‘*Consumption-is the object and the sole end of all economic activity*’(J. M. Keynes, 1936, p. 56). In AM and PM-alike, consumption is an indispensable element of procreation, otherwise state identity dissipates/deconstructs itself. Thus, we investigate those patterns as construction identity.

Another crucial point on details of discourse is that in political science not only words have two meanings, but also choices we make. Political discourse of state is conducted not only through actions but also inactions, topics discussed and the ones’ that are ignored, underemphasized, or exaggerated (Teun A. van Dijk, 1998b; 2000, p. 11-13) This is relevant to the research, when discussing intentional ignorance of US Intelligent Agencies on producing (narrated) research, along with baseless assumption on threat.

As mentioned, political goods and services are value, identity, idea and belief-based products. Unlike economics, consumption for those products is endorsed through diffuse methods of communication. It is through those means, we are able to withdraw a pattern of social creation that stimulates policies, (in)actions, preferences, practices culminating into formation of national interests. As Jutta Weldes (1996) argues, before generating the notion

---

<sup>3</sup> Roger Koppl , 1991, *Animal Spirits*, American Economic Association. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), pp. 205-6. Last accessed March 2017.

<sup>4</sup> This research makes use of the version provided by **International Relation and Security Network** (February, 1936, Zurich, Switzerland). There are many publications of the book, so for citation, hereafter, please follow the link: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125515/1366\\_KeynesTheoryofEmployment.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125515/1366_KeynesTheoryofEmployment.pdf)

of national interest, state has to construct a concept of national interest through communication to whom interest is subjected or imposed to, namely public and then abroad (276-277). This is the initial stage, where we focus on construction of policy or Animal Spirits. In addition, in PM, state is the sole seller, hence authority has a unique stance on choosing methods, practices, contents, interpretation, actions/inactions, which all lead to the state's way of utilizing its power-resources (Ortrun Zuber-Skerritt, 1996, p. 106-7). Therefore, we analyze Keynes' term 'animal spirits' not as an end product but rather as a combination of representation of social reality in order to boost Nx-exports of policy. In ordinary discourse of communication, the IC and media sector represents a market with goods and services, buyers and sellers. One wonders who are the sellers?-IC, Media outlets, news agencies etc.; – what about buyers?-Corporations and States; what is the product/commodity IC and media are aiming to sell?-the people, the audience, public mind; thus we have IC and media that buy audience and sell it to authority and private sector respectively.<sup>5</sup>

First, it is the process engineering investment, consumption and animal spirits. For instance, economically, US government spending has been increasing exponentially from 877 billion USD in 1970 to 3.2 trillion USD in 2017 with the overall consistency of 55-67 % on Defence and Social Security (Federal Budget Fiscal Year 1970-2017/ Overview, para 1-9). After the end of Cold War, the most significant consumption of AM/PM g/s was observed 1990s and in 2000s summoned by nuclearization of Iraq's Threat and WOT respectively (USAGOVSPENDIG, 12/28/2016). While economically this meant the provision of goods and services, where consumption adds up to demand and hence legitimizes the economic growth/expansion; then politically this implied the 'future expectations', or as it was explained previously, this would be 'rational expectations' on future good and services such

---

<sup>5</sup> Z Maqazine/Chomsky Infor October, 1997, paragraph 15-6. <https://chomsky.info/199710/>

as protection of values like democracy, human rights but also protection from insecurities, dangers and terrors that could unfold. However, the problem of power is that it ought to be able to market and sell that which it stands for as an identity. If in an economic market, there is marketing industry, where goods and services promoted/endorsed based on their merits; then in political market there is a Public Information Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Media and TV, State Departments, most crucially State-endorsed Intellectuals who must ensure a sale/disposal of political goods and services, hence the state interest. Thus, it is their responsibility to create ‘animal spirits’ and integrate ‘political intervention policies’, or Keynes’ economic intervention policies so that market can expand.

For instance, in a leaked memo in 2004, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who held office 1990s, wrote *‘keep elevating the threat of terrorism... and develop bumper sticker’ statements’ to rally public support for an increasingly unpopular war”*.<sup>6</sup>

Undoubtedly, fighting terrorism is a powerful cause mobilizing near-all material and immaterial resources. However, as with any discourse of the word, the threat needs to be exposed so that one can grasp it. As for instance, a child learns a word not but primordial knowledge of letters and prior-existing meanings, but rather anticipates exposure of the word to circumstances. And such a circumstance appears in recent history, namely in prelude and aftermath of Iraqi War 2003. Consequences of this event are significant because it depicts how a) State is being linked to terrorism and assistance to it and b) Use of concept of Nuclear Terrorism and c) Result is the externalization of threat in an evolutionary way, politicizing issues of weapons of mass destruction and use of peculiar rhetoric. Specifically, this discourse had started from 1970s but the pattern we discuss is that of 1990s, where threat would qualify as a threat to international order, threat being associated with the state and

---

<sup>6</sup> Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Brigitte L. Nacos, *News and Entertainment Media: Government’s Big Helpers in the Selling of Counterterrorism*, vol 8, no 5 Perspective on Terrorism  
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/375/html>

‘regime’, nuclearization of threat etc. (O. Ditrych, 2014, p. 57-9, 74). In addition, we employ the notion of threat that of David Campbell’s, who said that threat is non-existent by itself, which means there is no threat without the presence of the opposite.<sup>7</sup> *‘Threat gives the state its identity’*, thus discourse of threat is not a detriment to identity, on the contrary it is a *possibility of its existence* (ibid.). Thus, identity and meaning is a communication with the one coming into form and shape in regards to the other (D. Campbell, 1998, p. 23). We integrate the concept of terror used from 1970s to 2000s as a ‘characterization of intent (political) and method (arousing terror)’, which allows us to link theory with practice (O. Ditrych, 2014, p. 58). Therefore, we use discourse analysis in order to scrutinize those patterns of re-production, characterization and representation. First, we start with animal spirits then proceed to demand-side stimulation of the PM.

## **Methodology Part 2: The logic behind analysing Linguistics.**

*Words do not take a man to understand. It takes a man to understand the words*<sup>8</sup>

Language as a means of communication is more than a tool of verbal expression. The essence of it is structured upon a *meaning* that is sent across. Language is the structure, order and pattern that is dependent on our awareness of it, but by itself it is independent (F. de Saussure, 1983, p. 9-10). The linguistic structure manifests itself in the mind of a speaker making him/her an observer and subjectively a creator. However, this type of reasoning has been applied to other fields of inquiry throughout the history, where the main issue is the dual or polar nature of experience. Then, what is the importance of language or how does the one go about studying the language? Before we answer, let us consider following. It is a commonsense among scientists and scholars to assume of physical properties of nature as

---

<sup>7</sup> This is a Revised Version of the book. David Campbell 1998 *From Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, revised edition, by David Campbell. University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted by permission of University of Minnesota Press and Manchester University Press, Manchester, UK. P 349/353

<sup>8</sup> Old Chinese saying taken from philosophical studies of Zen (not to confuse with Japanese Zen of Suzuki)

bearing utmost importance. After all, one has ‘the queen’ of all sciences like Quantum Physics to explore the smallest structures of matter (B. Greene, 2011). However, the problem arises, when one understands that this world is inasmuch physical, as it is chemical, electromagnetic, etc. among other forces/laws, that represent fields of communication (*communicare*-meaning to share) (Noam Chomsky, 2016, p.105). Likewise, to claim that international relations world is governed solely by realism, is like saying only physical laws do govern the nature, which is so obvious, but incomplete claim. Furthermore, if the nature is composed of laws, namely structured fields of communication/languages, then each domain of science, like physics, chemistry, electromagnetism etc. is the *language of nature*. Interestingly, these are patterns, orders, structures and forces all along operating without the destructive effect on the other, hence constituting wholesome existence. And it takes a mind to not separate those languages as if there is an ultimate judgement/truth, but to apply a discourse of apprehension. Understanding first, as opposed to explanation, because any act of explanation ignores more information (reality) than it actually takes in (that is also a problem of choice; when one chooses something, he ignores all the possible rest). That is a common paradox of a learning process, the more you explore, the less you know. However, relating man to nature, likewise hard science to soft science in cyclical fashion is nothing new. As for instance, philosopher Protagoras once said ‘*man is measure of all things in nature*’<sup>9</sup> (we can add to it ‘...*but himself/herself*’); man being part of nature with all the laws embodied in him. Nature requires expression through the languages of science. Thus, language is the general field bearing material and immaterial laws that embrace, first nature, then mental, cognitive, psychic, intellectual, emotional, physical, chemical and other aspects of the nature and man, but also a mind. As gravity is dependent upon the exposure, namely heavy objects falling

---

<sup>9</sup> Ancient History Encyclopaedia/Sophism/Protagoras by Joshua Mark, January 2012  
<http://www.ancient.eu/article/61/>

down, approving one among several laws of physics; verbal language is dependent upon the exposure provided by signs, words, circumstances, and in our case constituting the law(s) of language (O. Ditrych, 2014, p 10). Language is the field of science having its laws, that become so, once exposed, agreed, and accepted. It is then more of a mind-nature as opposed mind-body problem, since we cannot separate man from nature/environment, where the exposure occurs. It is therefore, vital to study *soft science* or social sciences, because it is not obvious, straightforward and saturated with fixed substance as is the hard science that of physics, chemistry, electromagnetism etc.; by doing so we can expose the world not by obvious alone, but also by underlying energy and structure that moulds it in to that 'obvious'. Hence the question, on how does one go about studying the language, can be reiterated as how one studies the law? The answer in both cases, among other methods, lies in the exposure. Thus, the language is a tenet, through which the consciousness defines itself in act of expression, but by itself, it has no meaning (O. Ditrych, 2014, p. 10). In this sense, language embraces the exposure through statements endowed by signs, figures, marks etc. (M. Foucault. 1997, p. 84). For instance, there is an old philosophical puzzle that is if the tree falls when no one is around, does it make a noise/sound? (Robert Lanza, 2007, p. 19). Philosopher George Berkeley's argued *no*, suggesting absence of perceiving entity (R. F. Austin, 2015, p.2; Robert Lanza, 2009, p. 19). In truth, as far as physics is concerned, falling tree creates vibrations in the air and it becomes noise/sound *Only* if there is a central nervous system that digests the vibration, which mind attaches a *meaning* calling it a sound.

For the purpose of this research, this signifies that the understanding reality of Terrorism/Threat unfolds via our exposure to it. If a state produces no exposure to perception, then no value/commodity is created in PM and for identity. Then the obvious question is how is the perception framed? To those, the answer originated in traditional mind-body problem, in the philosophy of Rene Descartes and Newton. Descartes, for instance, delivering on

material/immaterial, divulged that experience of *I think, therefore I am* is first and foremost an ‘I’ as a thought-form (N. Warburton, 2011, p. 66). Descartes was certain on existence of a mind, but not a body, because one can imagine absence of a body, but not a mind (N. Warburton, 2011, p.67). Hence, the mind defines the meaning/perception, in the same way it is the central nervous system (body) that determines the vibration that mind values as a sound. Thus, idea of a book is inasmuch important as the actual materialization of a book itself.

One also, might counter argue that *thought* is simply something that brain does by cause, by nature being projective and receptive [brain]. To this, Isaak Newton, who probed into matters of universal gravitation and causation, replies by putting forward a concept of ‘action at a distance’-the movement of atoms without external force or put it simply without a *physical cause, at least material, but not immaterial* (N. Chomsky, 2016, p. 30-31). Thus those who claim, that there is no ‘action at a distance’ in social science, are simply ignorant to immaterial laws/causes of nature. He then postulated that mind-body problem does not exist since separate things in nature does not exist (N. Chomsky, 2016, p. 33). However, this is due to the property of a mind being mysterious, but not mystical. Great scientist would have suggested that the world in a sense is in our minds (perception-wise). If the world/experience is in my mind (inside of my scalp), then the problem is that my scalp and mind is inside of this world (cyclical relationship); thus allowing the presupposition on existence of mind-nature problem with the language being a medium between the mind and nature.

Intertwining the hard and social science is nothing new of its kind. Alexander Wendt in a book *Quantum mind and Social Science* attempted similar logic of reasoning, where author made a claim that the properties of Quantum Mechanics/Physics resembling interaction among people, agent and structure; hence, human beings are quantum systems (A.

Wendt, 2015, p. 3-4). Denominating mind-body problem, he refers to consciousness as a *'transaction between the mind and its environment, understood not just as a causal relationship'* (A. Wendt, 2015, p. 277). It is rather a communication of mind with the isomorphic language of nature, akin to communication of cells with the structure of a human body (A. Wendt, 2015, p. 280). Therefore mind creates the brain, so that mind can act, in the same way when one contemplates, the movement first occurs in the brain-the term called *Biocentrism* by Robert Lanza (Robert Lanza , 2009, p. 36; S. Pinker, 2009, p. 31). Therefore, the value of language to this research (or in general) is substantial, as it forms the awareness or consciousness of Identity, Terror/Threat, Us versus Them. Thus, granting Descartes analysis on *matter* (means measurable)<sup>10</sup>, immaterial simply means non-measurable by physical means, but not by electromagnetic, chemical or any other languages of science.

That is the significance of language to this research, where the language is a consciousness-determining apparatus. If we have not gotten a language (as a law/science), we would have been limited to conscious-subjective experience. Therefore, we are to discourse the language of identity, threat, production and consumption within the US PM.

### **III. Intro to Keynesian Politics**

So, if an individual claims to believe in truth, then the logical question is what is the truth? If we define the truth broadly enough, the truth is whatever really the *case* (Bryan Magee, 2010, p. 6, 20-1). Then, the determining factor is the method through which the truth may be discovered. Method can be twofold with the a) truth being what one is convinced it to be (rational way) and b) Truth being defined subjectively by people themselves (critical thinking) (Bryan Magee, 2010, p. 6, 20-1). However, one common pattern is, in either case, information/intelligence is central with an individual, passively or actively, consuming and

---

<sup>10</sup> Rene Descartes in *Philosophical Letters* by Anthony Kenny 1970, **penultimate** paragraph at <http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/vol1/eustac1.html>

producing it. So, if, for instance, one takes seriously Kant's statement that '*science is organized knowledge, wisdom is organized life*'<sup>11</sup>, with the knowledge constituting force and power, then power is an organized knowledge. The emphasis here is on '*organized*', as analogically the existential revelation that of Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism etc. is an organized knowledge, hence it is powerful. Therefore, from this method of reasoning, we compile that the a) power that is organized, stands for an (b) knowledge and once tested/observed is a (c) truth. In either method, we have a a) concept of truth and b) concept of truth not being a concept, but the truth (which is in itself still a concept); thus, the truth in either case is a concept. So, in PM, identity is (re)produced through the concept.

Thus, it is crucial to analyze US PM and its rendition on macro-system through the concept of shared knowledge. The historical record of identity unravels the sources that unite us under the concepts of 'common good or cause'; likewise, the same source diffuses the very essence of identity (M. Foucault, 1977, p. 161). Along the process, the substance of exchange is linked to ever evolving human nature that generates value-laden inquiry. Questioning those values that shape us, requires being critical of oneself and other(s), which implies to being critical as being political towards inner and outer affairs of experience. So, we are to question, since by questioning 'commonsense' and ordinary one may achieve an *enlightenment/awareness*. Giving J. Derrida's analysis on deconstruction<sup>12</sup>, deconstructing 'commonsense' is not an end to power process, but on the contrary, any deconstruction is done for the sake of construction of something else; where the method ought to follow into a path of *simplification* that is the point of liberation and loss of meaning; as for instance, death is point of liberation out of any illusion or real. Simplification/liberation must be followed to

---

<sup>11</sup> Bahattin Karagözoğlu *Science and Technology from Global and Historical Perspectives*, Springer International Publishing, 2017,( New York, USA) p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> Saul Newman (2001) *Derrida's Deconstruction Of Authority*, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol 27, no 3, p. 4 <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-derrida-s-deconstruction-of-authority.pdf>

a point, where it no longer carries a meaning or value, hence naturalized. For instance, the fact that people debate democracy implies that they are yet to obtain the desired version of it (this logic especially applied to a religion; the fact that people talk about God is not due to faith and trust in divine, but rather lack of it). Therefore, no deconstruction is an end in itself, but a mean to an end for something else. In US PM, identity will dissipate if the values and meanings that it contains are emancipated/liberated. That is the essence of power being always illegitimate. What if the market, capital, security, protection, expansion, idea of growth both political and economic are no longer an object of demand? Then there is no need for the market as it is now, thus no need for power as it is now.

Power is an art, but any art has a message regardless of presence or absence of audience. Hence, being critical here is an attempt to comprehend political, thus the artist; in this case legitimate power, state/authority. Noam Chomsky (1989) in *Necessary Illusions* asserts that in democratic societies (stressing Western ones) upper classes and leaders indulge themselves in engineering consent for particular values, goals and social reality at the expense of subverting lower classes to ‘a marketplace of ideas’ (p. 7, 16-17). In PM, production of illusionary g/s implies the production of ‘animal spirits’, a misinformed human being. Understanding the PM here, is the quest towards the truth through the will to know; knowledge not as bearing the capacity of ultimate truth, but rather as an ability to demolish those illusionary tenets that unify us, but also subject us to power/political (M. Foucault, 1977, p. 163). Consider the following statement by former National Security Advisor S. Huntington:

Power Paradox: effective power is unnoticed power; power observed is power devalued. At times Americans have gloried in the conspicuous consumption of wealth, but never in the conspicuous employment of power. The architects of power in the United States must create a

force that can be felt but not seen. Power remains strong when it remains in the dark; exposed to sunlight it begins to evaporate.<sup>13</sup>

‘Architects of power’ who/what are they? Who granted them capacity to produce ‘history’ and knowledge? Providing the previous example on artists, then architects are people who control the means of production and the public mind, (in)directly exercising power (E. Bernays, 1955, p. 17, 20, 49). The capital in PM is information/intelligence; thus, Architects in PM are those who utilize information (or knowledge) as means of production, namely CIA, State Department, Presidents, IC are all producers of intelligence and public products. In AM, Adam Smith raised same concern on ‘architects’, private ownership and authority, which we do in PM. He distinguished merchants, landlords and manufactures whose interest would be favoured at the expense of consumers, when framing state policies; then they (producers) ‘by far the principal architects’.<sup>14</sup> Nowadays, those ‘producers’ in AM are corporations, multinational conglomerates, huge financial institutions, people who own the means of production (N. Chomsky, 2016, p. 157-8). While in PM, those are current *intelligence and consciousness producers*, who own political means of production. Providing the scope of economic potency, then this requires economic (re)production so that Keynes’ AM can maintain and justify itself; then, the extent that of PM entails equal, if not further intensity of (re)production so that it can develop, expand, legitimize itself.

As Stefano Guzzini (2005) assumes, power tends to ‘politicize issues’, which in turn requires justification (p. 495-9). Though, one might ask the question justification to whom? Democratically speaking, to informed citizens. Typical answer by emeritus of economics is

---

<sup>13</sup> S. Huntington (1983) *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, Belknap Press (Massachusetts, USA) p. 75.

<sup>14</sup> Adam Smith *An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations*, ed. by MetaLibri (2007) Glasgow. p. 513. (There are many editions and versions of the book, hence for citation please follow link below) [https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA\\_WealthNations\\_p.pdf](https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf)

that in AM *informed individuals make rational choices*, thus furthering liberal process, whilst ensuring predictable behaviour of citizens (Stephen Ansolabehere, 2006, p. 43). Even though there is a common denial by some intellectuals on the voters 'being fooled', in PM the actual situation is that *(mis)informed individuals make irrational choices*, thus empowering 'desirable' policies; which supports out argument on Keynes' 'animal spirits'. In AM, Keynes was against 'animal spirits', since people would purchase instinctively leading to profits for few and losses for many sellers. But in PM, there is only one seller/producer and that is a state/authority. Thus, animal spirits are only welcomed so that population and Congress would consume any political intelligence, which will lead to a demand for expansion policies. Thus in PM, animal spirits do not hurt the market, on the contrary it serves it. Bear in mind that the purpose of media, intelligent agencies and scholars at the Public Information Department are to not only mediate but also form public opinion, and the latter in greater proportion. There have been plenty of studies done on media and its role, but one in particular worth mentioning. Study, called *A Model of the Effects of Self-efficacy on the Perceived Ethicality and Performance of Fear Appeals in Advertising*<sup>15</sup>, confirms the effectiveness of use of fear/threat as means of communication in order to advance certain behaviour, such as persuasion (Simon Manyiwa, 2012, p. 5). Or put it plain sight, *'there was an optimal level of fear appeal at which the behavioural response would be maximized; below this level fear arousal was insufficient to initiate action'* (Simon Manyiwa, 2012, p. 6). In this regard, we analyze the concept of threat/terror as being effective in maximizing certain behaviour, hence in consumption of 'intelligence' and in stimulation of demand for political intervention policies. In addition, author distinguishes between negative and positive messages; for instance, a negative message would entail the costs if the action is not taken, whilst positive indicates benefits, provided that there was an action to back it up with (Simon

---

<sup>15</sup> Discussed in an article 'Fear Appeals in Anti-Smoking Advertising: How Important is Self-Efficacy?'

Manyiwa, 2012, p. 13). That is the role of IC, namely to produce intelligence to emphasize the positive aspects of action, while expanding on negative ones if the action to be ignored. In either case, in PM, there is supply and demand, where state is obliged to ensure the consumption through both creating a demand such as intelligence and supply such as policy. PM is where state identity is embraced as it is and as in comparison to others: because ‘it is the strategy of otherness that disciplines the self’ (D. Campbell, 1998, p. 58). The fact that the powerful state engages in production of tangible (industries, corporations, g/s) and intangible (intellectual production of political g/s), implies the guarantee of demand for those goods and services, otherwise there would be a crisis (of identity). A country such as US, that has been spending from 3.1 to 2.9\$ trillions annually on growth/expansion for the past decade<sup>16</sup>, must ensure that there is a demand for its global commitment, hence expansion. That is the essence of this study, where the pioneer of the demand-side stimulation of economy and of the term ‘animal spirits’ J. M. Keynes fits in.

First, starting from the later, ‘animal spirits’ is the particular *irrational* human behaviour with the ‘*urge to action rather than inaction*’, where instability is at the root of irrationality.<sup>17</sup> Bear in mind, that Keynes introduced macroeconomic variables, among other means, in order to explain how the world works; we use those variables to explain similar process in PM. Irrational human behaviour with an urge to act indicates lack of insight in economics; but the same irrationality exists in political domain, where citizens/State invest into (national interest) policies driven by their ‘urge to action’; like animal would be driven by their survival instincts, the IC, much like Media and Advertisement agencies in AM, enforces those instincts in political realm by producing specific intelligence. But the labour class being

---

<sup>16</sup> Trading Economics/US Government Spending/last updated March 2017  
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-spending>

<sup>17</sup> Roger Koppl, 1991, *Animal Spirits*, American Economic Association. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), pp. 205-6. Last accessed March 2017.

reminiscent of ‘animal spirits’ is nothing coincidental rather than planned. Take for instance former US Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John Jay’s account, in the book called *Profit over People*, where he maintained that people who own the state are meant to govern it; likewise, British fundamentalists related to a ruling class as rational, and to ordinary men as irrational and ‘the great beast’ that is to be tampered (N. Chomsky, 1999, p. 46). Thus, ‘animal spirits’, while hardly authentic term peculiar to economics, is a manifold notion, serving the consumption in PM. Or put it differently:

..in its late modern form of ‘rational security policy’, Foreign Policy is a discourse of power that is global in scope, yet national in its legitimization... Foreign Policy creates the very danger to which we are supposed to accommodate ourselves.<sup>18</sup>

‘Animal spirits’ ought to be accommodated for ‘rational’ political consumption and reproduction. The unit of production is intelligence that is to be consumed by citizen, thus shaping the end product, which is the policy and its integration. This is one among few instrument of power that is in search of public legitimacy, thus implying the threat is not only external but also internal. It is the local ‘animal spirits’, who has the capacity to delegitimize the ruling class or the government. Consider the book *Because We Say So*, where author asserts, “state security’ is threatened by public awareness of private tyranny, allowing power being exposed to ‘sunlight’; hence architects of power know who is the real threat, namely domestic public (N. Chomsky, 2015, p. 158). Due to nature of US global supremacy, it is almost by default, it has to create environment and circumstances that would justify its role, the need for it, and more so the economic, political, informational, intellectual relevance in domestic and world affairs; because that is what the *Self* stands for, hereby quoting former NSA advisor S. Huntington:

---

<sup>18</sup> David Campbell, 1998, *Writing Security*, Manchester University Press, UK, p. 70.

You may have to sell it {interventions or any other military action} in such a way as to create misimpression that it is the Soviet Union that you are fighting. That is what the United States has done ever since the Truman Doctrine.<sup>19</sup>

This is the nature of *misimpression* that state/power has thrived on in order to exercise itself. US IC was deliberately engaged in creating misimpression or intelligence failings that would serve the consumption, hence production. Which brings me to the second point on Keynes, which is demand-side expansion.

This study utilizes the concept of Demand-side stimulation, which is not a trivial issue and it should not be taken lightly. Demand-side Stimulation is the state intervention policy done for the economic expansion, hence keeping economy orderly and stable. Similarly, in PM, there are the state political intervention policies produced to integrate demand-side stimulation of the market. But the demand for what? In Keynes AM, this has been a demand for market expansion for the Export (Nx) of economic g/s leading to economic advantage; similarly, in PM demand-side stimulation is done for the sake of expanding the Export of political g/s (like state policy/interest, hence the Self) resulting in political advantage. Supply/demand, input/output, investment/returns on value, consumption/production are terms that Keynes had integrated at the time with the consumption and investment being the cornerstone of economic circulation. In PM, state invests into interest, hence intelligence is the interest-mediated unit. Keynes made it clear in *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*<sup>20</sup>, ‘Consumption-is the object and the sole end of all economic activity’ (J. M. Keynes, 1936, p. 56). Similar to PM, consumption of policies/interest is the sole end of political activity. It has been a puzzle for some scholars to guess consumption, though not for

---

<sup>19</sup> Joel Rogers, Joshua Cohen, 1986, *Inequity and Intervention: The Federal Budget and Central America*, Library Congress Cataloguing Data, US, p. 10.

<sup>20</sup> This research makes use of the version provided by **International Relation and Security Network** (February, 1936, Zurich, Switzerland). There are many publications of the book, so for citation, hereafter, please follow the link: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125515/1366\\_KeynesTheoryofEmployment.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125515/1366_KeynesTheoryofEmployment.pdf)

Keynes. He stresses the significance of aggregate demand for any good or service, but more importantly *consumption* is linked to previous and current investments, namely '*whenever an object is produced within the period with a view to satisfy future consumption, subsequently, an expansion of current demand is set up*' (Ibid, p. 56). Which is in PM, as we argue, *whenever intelligence is produced with the interest to satisfy future consumption, then an expansion of current demand is set up*. State investments are made into national interest that is global in US PM. In PM, state's national interest is an investment both material and immaterial, which sets the expansion of current demand. In PM, investments must be accommodated by local population, hence first comes engineering 'animal spirits' by the IC for the future intervention policy. In AM, an expansion policy must bring an expansion of demand for products, hence the market. Similar in PM, *the expansive policy must lead to an expansion of demand for it, namely of 'threat/other'; otherwise, there is a crisis (of self/identity) due to low consumption in the market*. That is the essence of Keynesian Politics. Therefore, US cannot indefinitely depend on the current consumption hence, on current aggregate demand; thus, a new investment into capital has to be taken constantly, otherwise AM/PM would self-destruct along with its (US) identity. New-capital/intelligence/investment is reminiscent of proving a consumption in advance for future goods and services, and that can only originate if one expects increase in future consumption out of that capital/intelligence investment (Ibid, p. 56-7). Since ordinary man is irrational/misinformed, while authority is rational, using Keynes' term on 'rational expectations' of investor/businessman, we understand it as a creation of those future expectations, expansions and consumptions, hence future aggregate demand. Thus, capital/intelligence/interest investment is the future policy production, which in turn is the future expansion production; it is the same in AM/PM-alike. So, if in AM, aggregate demand is determined by following formula:

**a) (AM)  $AD=I+C+Gs+Nx$**

(Original Formula) Where C-Consumption, I-Investment/capital, Nx- Net Exports out of policy, Gs-Government spending

(New Keynesian Economics AD is also dictated by amount of income and by expected income of firms and individuals<sup>21</sup>)

**b) Then hypothetically in (PM)  $AD=I+C+Gs+Nx$**

Where I-interest/investment/intelligence, C-consumption, Nx-*political g/s to be exported as result of the policy/expansion*, Gs-government spending

...then in PM for authority and intelligence producers, this has little to do with citizens' liberal intentions to consume, but rather with what state intelligence-investors decide to generate, hence expect/make people to consume. In Keynes' AM, the higher the investment (I) is, the more intense consumption (C) must be generated in order to stimulate the demand for product. Similarly in PM, the more extensive national Interest (investment) is, the more global C must be in order to stimulate the demand for policy. Therefore, Terrorism/Threat as we know it, is a result of deliberate aggregate demand stimulation by US PM, or expansion of its identity/interest. More importantly, Investment and Consumption are affecting Exports (Nx). The higher the Nx out of policy is, the broader the expansion is, and that is the case, since the terrorism has expanded exponentially in 2000s. Both in AM/PM, Net exports are significant, since they reflect the global demand for product/policy, thus the expansion. Therefore, the higher the Nx is, the higher the AD is, reminiscent of Keynes AM. Therefore, we have an AM/PM, where investments (interests) can be negotiated and initiated instantly, Gs is ratified once justified, Nx is consumption dependent, while the creation of consumption (animal spirits, the demand for g/s) is the most crucial part of engineering AD. *Because it*

---

<sup>21</sup> Mark Hayes *The Economics of Keynes: A New Guide to the General Theory*, (Cheltenham, UK), 2006, p. 70 <https://www.postkeynesian.net/downloads/MGH2006.pdf> . ALSO for Formula look at Khan Academy/Aggregate demand in Keynesian analysis. <https://www.khanacademy.org/economics-finance-domain/macroeconomics/aggregate-supply-demand-topic/keynesian-thinking/a/aggregate-demand-in-keynesian-analysis-cn/x>

*involves media, conversation, invention, production, persuasion, justification, legitimization, communication and process of accommodation of that which has been produced intelligence-wise, both domestically and abroad.* The main concern for Keynes was how to maintain expansion within the market, *which is akin to PM's predicament on how to keep expansion of interest (sphere of influence) within the market.* In AM, responsibility for that lies on (several) sellers' shoulders, while in PM it is on to State's shoulder as the sole seller. Moreover, in AM, if people opt for an excessive savings that leads to a low consumption of goods and services already delivered into the market, then the crisis will emerge (Allan H. Meltzer, 1996, p. 39-42). Therefore, from that formula, Keynes assumed that a finished product is ready for a consumption, when there is demand for it (M. Hayes, 2006, p. 79). Similarly, in PM, national interest/policy is a finished product to be consumed, once there is a demand for it. While those terms are ordinary in economics, a finished product is peculiar label when considering politics and values created by power game. For instance, if there is no demand for US interest/expansion, then she has to engineer it. Intelligence behind and product itself like Policy, Threat/Terrorism, 'Others', Fear, Security and the need for Security are political g/s stimulating the (future) consumption leading to anew AD for the expansive polices. Thus, one needs to scrutinise sectors that US government invests in as intelligence or 'knowledge' production. *Therefore, we study IC that is deliberately producing intelligence 'failings', which are not 'failings', but a process of creating consumption.* In PM, whenever there is a CIA Report, IC Report, State Department statements then those are an intelligence investments made for future consumption. That is why we focus on intelligence reports as a fabrication and generation of animal spirits, i.e. of 'accommodation' of C+I+(Gs).

In addition, governments cannot constantly increase spending with a given level of output. And that is because of Multiplier effect-defined as ration between income and investment (Keynes, 1936, p. 60). With each *investment*, people would have a different ratio

of marginal propensity to Consume (MPC) and marginal propensity to Save (MPS). Eventually, with each investment people will have lesser MPC and higher MPS. With people saving more than they consume implies Leakage Effect, which damages the market (Mark Hayes, 2006, p. 125-6). *Excessive savings ignites recession and fall of AD, thus there is a crisis in AM, hence Keynes advocated Economic Intervention Policies that is an expansion of state's economic activity so that new goods and services would change the nature and structure of market, thus causing expansion and growth, while solving the AM crisis (Keynes, 1936, p. 63).* That is a substantial statement! This means that expansion is done for the sake of the capitalistic Self at the expense of other country. In AM, state intervenes to create a new economic activity that would make people to consume; equally, in PM, there are political expansion/intervention polices or new political activity that is manufactured by state so that people would consume and adjust to anew AD, which solves the US PM crisis or US identity/interest crisis. This study focuses on those activities. Ultimately, any economic and financial crisis/recession and war can change the structure of the market and lean people off their savings and stimulate new consumption. Otherwise, it is a vicious circle, where the US is obliged to stimulate and invent (good and bad) new goods and services expanding its political and economic activity, or face the deterioration of its version of self. It is in this 'obvious' sense, realism is embraced at its purest form, where primordial form of identity has been built around and has thrived on survival instinct (which in itself can be a big topic). Which brings me to Hypotheses and elaboration on Case study.

Keynes concluded that excessive savings and fall of AD are culprits of recession/crisis, thus there is a need to stimulate AD and make people consume products, and when stability is restored, tax them (Allan H. Meltzer, 1996, p. 39-42). In AM, even though investments were made, the end-user might not purchase a final product, which means a loss of stock value due to low consumption and high savings; thus, there is a need for state

intervention to stimulate consumption. In PM, if state policies are not consumed, then there is a loss of state's stock value that are political in itself. Similarly, in PM, there is one producer, who must ensure consumption or reproduction of its power, otherwise there would be a crisis (...of identity, something similar to EU). If US has global policy imperatives, then she has to stimulate consumption (domestically) and demand (abroad) for polices externally. *Keynes' Economic intervention policies are similar to Political intervention polices, where expansion of state activity has to be undertaken in order to keep order and stability of the market and the Self.* Political intervention polices are reminiscent of economic intervention policies, namely both are built on an ideas of expansion and security, both require stimulation of demand for new g/s and both depend on consumption, both are running the danger of facing the loss of stock value. Then in our case (even though it can be generalized along the spectrum of other countries), identity is based on (material and immaterial=systemic) reproduction both economic and political, since Keynes rationalized the former, we focus on the latter as it is correlated with the power, which has been an ever-evolving feature of US power-structure ever since Truman Doctrine. Under illusionary pretence of capitalism and democracy, populace are subjugated to the very system they constitute. With those ideas in mind, Terrorism/Threat and Insecurity, is not a puzzle to solve at the global level, but on the contrary is the US reproductive activity to experience.

*Therefore, the working hypotheses are: A) In Keynesian Politics, Intelligence Community and State Department deliberately creates 'intelligence failures' and (animal spirits) in order to ensure consumption of (state's)/political goods and services. B) Political intervention policies, similar to Economic intervention polices, is state's demand-stimulation policy or deliberate expansion of its Political Market. There are several case studies dating back to 1950s, though our focus is on Iraqi War 2003, which was US deliberate production of 'animal spirits' and Demand-side stimulation of US PM, where IC and State Department*

*on purpose had created the false intelligence and the very enemy that they consequently fought against.* When they invest into capital/intelligence production for future policy consumption, they set up a possibility for existence of market, hence ‘possibility for identity’ as argued by D. Campbell. These are AM/PM expansive policies done for the stability and order of the system. In addition, this means that IC’s production of intelligence ‘failings’/disinformation/animal spirits is a part of engineering political consumption, similar to AM’s advertisement/marketing, where consumption of g/s must be generated.

Case for Iraqi War 2003 dates back to fabrication of Gulf War (GW) in 1990s, which framed the plot of anew expansion in 2000s. GW is much smaller in an extent of simulation, but GW showed the possibility of how to expand anew by linking Iraq (state) to Terrorism from 1990s onwards. As in Keynes AM, first comes an investment into future products that later would entail inducing consumption through information, thus following into an expansive policy, which adds up to AD for those g/s and maintains the AM. Similarly, in PM, first, there is an interest or investment into intelligence, then accommodation of it domestically through disinformation (animal spirits), which leads to a policy of anew AD or framework for the expansion policy. GW and Iraqi War was a fabrication engineered by State Department and IC involving political expansion policies for the purposes of maintaining the order and stability of the market.

However, in order to delimit study, we focus on the production of Iraqi War 2003 and analysis of intelligence behind it. Here we analyze how the war was sold to public on global scale, then we explore intelligence failures that made the war possible. We find that production of particular intelligence is a prerequisite for future policy consumption. In a post-war intelligence assessment, those are called intelligence ‘failures’, but they are not the failures in ‘*producers’ eyes*’, rather are shortcomings in ‘*public eye*’.

Finally, we link the expansion of the policy with the exportation (Nx) of the policy, which is maintained via the expansion of terrorism/threat. We clearly see that the policy only increases the very danger it struggles against (which is intentional, planned), since anew AD is supposed to expand the market and create the possibility for the existence of the self. This again suggests that expansive policies ought to be followed by expansive demand for them, which is the case since threat of terrorism has expanded exponentially; and that is the structure of US PM or Keynesian Politics (expansion of the Self= $AD=I+C+Nx+Gs$ )

All in all, extensive introduction part was meant to explain how one goes about integrating Keynesian Politics, now let us proceed into case study.

#### **IV. Manufacturing “Animal Spirits’ and Intelligence ‘Failings’: Prelude to War**

One of the leading CW historians John L. Gaddis in a book called *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* stated ‘*The United States, safety comes from enlarging, rather than contracting, its sphere of responsibilities... emphasis is made on “enlarging”... Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security*’ (J. L. Gaddis, 2004, p.13). As mentioned previously, in AM-alike, Keynes advocated expansion as a means of keeping stability and order of the market. Overall, in 2000s the agencies’ mission was successful in engineering political intervention policies for the White House (WH), but not for the Congress, thus leading up to failings and shortcomings in being accountable.

Nowadays, there is an extensive literature on what threat/terror is, but also what it is not. As with any definition of the word in political science, there is a dual-use of this word, where practices may contradict definitions. As such, that ‘dual-use’ is present in discourse and interpretation by state administrations, defence agencies, international bodies and organizations. For instance, during WWII, Germany defined the term terrorism as ‘resistance

to its rule'.<sup>22</sup> Anything threatening authority is terrorism, which resembles the very nature of contemporary use of the word, where judgement is derived from an analogy of 'when we do it, it is not a terrorism, but when they do it, it is a terrorism'; which indicates that there is only one *virtue* that can use the 'sort of techniques' of producing power (Dissident Voice/ Sunil Sharma/July 28, 2002). It is similar to saying 'when we expand, then it is not a terrorism, but when they expand then it is a terrorism'. This also depicts the pattern/style of methods and practices that US can subscribe itself into in order to preserve national/global commitment or the legitimacy of the PM. Nevertheless, we provide State Department and Defence Department's definition of the word terrorism that is used in context of 'threat': *The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.*<sup>23</sup> Strangely, this matches to the US foreign policy that has been pursued since the 1990s (Or ever since the Truman Doctrine), namely use of threat of violence in order to instil fear and coerce governments or societies to pursue particular political objectives'. Another interesting definition is provided for the word intelligence and strategic intelligence; with the former being an '*Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels*' and the latter, '*1. The product of intelligence resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations* (Ibid.). As we see intelligence, is a constant substance shaping and forming actions, namely policies. In addition, intelligence is quite multifaceted term that has been used subjectively for objective means. President's and intelligence agencies' role in shaping senate's and public opinion is

---

<sup>22</sup> O. Ditrych 2014 *Tracing the Discourses of Terrorism: Identity, Genealogy and State*. Central and Eastern European Perspective On International Relations, (Palgrave Macmillan, US) p. 34.

<sup>23</sup> Department of Defence: Dictionary p. 241 [https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1\\_02.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf)

beyond doubts. There is a relationship in between policy and intelligence, where intelligence gathering establishes the framework for policy formation. Therefore, there have been a connection between identity and threat in the same way there was between policy and ‘particular intelligence’. Threat/Terrorism was located in the discourse of 1990s (starting from 1970s), however in 2000s it has known no boundaries and nationalities, thus stretching across spatial platform (O. Ditrych, 2014, p. 81). Given the pretext of 2000s, US public mind was given constant suggestion on external enemy, thus justifying political intervention policies. After 9/11 terrorist attack this pattern of social construction of local ‘animal spirits’ and stimulation of demand for political interventionist policies have magnified in scale, which had gone hand in hand with a threat expansion, or what we refer as market expansion. There is data in Global Terrorism Index (GTI) study indicating that there has been nine-fold increase in terrorism fatalities since 9/11 (GTI, 2015, p. 4). Largest number of deaths are private citizens in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria amounting for 80% of total, while 0.5% are form Western Countries, excluding 9/11, and 2.6% with 9/11 (ibid, p. 4-5). Terrorism threats have been booming everywhere across the globe, but in USA.

The intuitive question is how the intelligence is produced for a final end-user, namely President, State Department, Congress policy makers etc., and eventually private/public arena? To this Senate Committee provided the logical answer during the Congress 108 Session 2nd S. Report 108-301 July 9, 2004, there by stating: *According to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), **The National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)** are the IC’s most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues; the process by which the IC produces NIEs -including the one on Iraqi (p. 8). NIE is the final product compiled by IC analysts for officials to make their national security policy-decisions. ‘Analysts (CIA analysts) create their products for intelligence consumers, including policy makers and war-fighters, to name two of many. IA*

*(intelligence agency) products are generally intended for the Secretary of Defense, and CIA products are for the White House, and the State Department's Bureau Intelligence & Research products for the Secretary of State, most products are available to policy makers at each of these agencies regardless of the author's organization (ibid, p.7).* So, in PM NIE/intelligence is the product to be offered to the consumer such as President, policy-makers, executives. However, how is it produced? If in AM, suppliers adjust to buyers behaviour, then similarly in PM, it is the supplier who adjusts to buyer, like IC to State, rather than the opposite; plus there is only buyer/purchaser of IC analysis, that is a state. There is even an agency, called Kent School, conducting training and intelligence preparation for future analysts, whose main analytical goals are: *providing timely, credible, and relevant intelligence analysis for the consumer; a warning and identifying opportunities maintaining analytic integrity and objectivity; and using all source intelligence (ibid, p. 6).* One sees that IC holds a key role in framing, shaping and delivering NIE information to officials, who in turn shape the public discourse of national policy/security. IC, much like privately-functioning media and broadcasting agencies with their reporters and journalists, as analysts, are conducting a research for the buyer, in this case for the state. But even in case of Media, there is a narrative that agency follows. Therefore, because of possible bias, Committee outlined *'There is also a separate section on the issue of objectivity which addresses whether analysts were pressured to reach specific conclusions to support a particular policy objective (Ibid, p. 8).* Which happened to be case multiple times, to name one, such as when CIA analysis confronted experts from Department of Energy by denying them access to their Iraqi samples on nuclear material (ibid, 28). IC analysts' response was *'because we funded it. It was our testing. We were trying to prove some things that we wanted to prove with the testing'*; while Committee objected by reminding that the CIA analyst should not try to prove what it wants to prove, but be objective (Ibid). The latter incident was about Iraqi Nuclear

Weapon Program (NWP), which later on happened to be a false analysis. So, we see that NIE are crucial in shaping entire intelligence for policy imperatives. Not only misjudgement of Intelligence Community (IC) can result in local ‘animal spirits’ driven by their urge to action’, but also follow into ‘bad policies’ (we name them bad, if CIA failings are not intentional). Which brings me to the analysis on how the NIE intelligence created animal spirits and how it was sold as a product to citizens.

#### **V. Case Study. Framing the Iraq War 2003: Engineering Animal Spirits.**

The most important authoritative report on Iraq was CIA NIE delivered in 2002 October on Iraqi threat and WMD program called *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction* (NSA Archives, October 2002-16HC). Report was supervised under Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and National Intelligence Officer (NIO) on Strategic and Nuclear Programs, Robert Walpole, thereby stating: “*We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions*” (ibid, p. 5). In addition, paper outlines Saddam’s attempts to acquire magnets, high-strength aluminium tubes, and fissile materials, which provide a compelling evidence that Iraq targets enriching uranium for Nuclear Weapon Program (NWP) (ibid, p. 6). It continued that Iraqi intelligence to conduct clandestine operations against US homeland security and their regional allies in the Middle East; Iraq would likely to use CBW on US; plus, Saddam, if desperate, might opt for organization like Al-Qaida in order to penetrate such actions worldwide (ibid, p. 8). Furthermore, analysts added that Iraqi government fears exposure of its WMD and CBW programs, as it could draw US into the war (Ibid). The research itself goes blanket half way through in showing actual material tests by CIA inspectors and analysts, though claiming high level of confidentiality and accountability. The access to a report was made available to all members of Congress only in 2004; also, access to Iraqi

nuclear tests were denied to other agencies, a nuance that we mentioned previously (Senate, Report 108-301, July 9, 2004). However, it has been a primary source of reference by President, Defence executives and State Department officials, and some Congressional Representatives. In addition, intelligence was shared with allies, particularly Britain. So, NIE was the main document that framed the Presidential and executive rhetoric on Iraq and Threat. General populace is quite sensitivity to war news, rhetoric and statements, because the matter of issue involves threat/insecurities to survival, ‘urge to action’; which K. H. Jameson and P. Waldman described as *‘those who control the language control the argument, and those who control the argument are more likely to successfully translate belief into policy’*.<sup>24</sup> According to NIE, the belief/argument was that Iraq had possessed CBW, WMD and close ties to Al-Qaida, which threatens entire ‘civil’ society. Yet, another crucial point was raised by Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld who said that US is facing another totalitarian evil, namely Radical Islam, which is to be confronted and defeated as SU was (Department of Defence, Sept. 2004, p. 34-5). Thus, let us first look at how NIE was produced and then what followed afterwards.

CIA reports amounted to 30,000 pages of intelligence on Iraq and terrorism since 1990s, while additional 15,000 had been researched from 2000 to 2003 by intelligence analysts associating Saddam, WMD, CBW and Al-Qaida (the Congress 108 Session 2<sup>nd</sup>, Report 108-301 July 9, 2004). Especially, after 9/11, the commission, initiated by CIA, worked on compiling data on 9/11 terrorist attacks in relation to Iraq (9/11 Commission Report). For example, former CIA agent John Nixon said in an interview that 9//11 was a death warrant for Saddam Hussein, which was agreed by State Department from day one (Independent, 6 January 2017). Furthermore, State Department went on underlining some

---

<sup>24</sup> Jameson and Waldman, 2003, *Press Effect*, (Oxford, University Press) p. XIV  
<http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5264S.pdf>

aspects of the intelligence report in order to make a case for a war (WP, December 13, 2016). Due to extensive accountability of President in public 'eye' as well as his predisposition to CIA sourcing, we provide the technical analysis of Bush speeches from 2001 to 2003 available at White House Record. We do not include all of them scripturally, but rather use analytically by observing patterns. So, the first Bush speech called *Addressing the Nation* was on September 11 and 12 of 2001, where he condemned the terrorist attack, comparing it to a threat to our democracy and freedom, values and principles; required a country to unite against 'evil' (White House, Sep. 11/12, 2001). By this time, the evil was Al-Qaida that IC associated with Iraq. Even though the official Commission Report on 9/11 has yet to come, Bush administration 3 month after the 9/11 decided that US would wage a war against Iraq, as reported by Army General Tommy R. Frank (WP, April 17, 2004). In an interview General Frank said that the President, Pentagon and intelligence agencies started to work on planning Iraqi War even before the link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda was produced (ibid). Then, he continued, the CIA inspectors were trained for gathering evidence for the war and CIA Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin would make a presentation to president on evidence at hand; later, President reiterated intelligence for his speeches, like did C. Powell in his speech for the UN Security Council in 2002 (ibid). Most importantly, according to General, in February 2002 President Bush approved unauthorized 700 million USD into CIA's Iraqi war-effort report, which produced October 2002 NIE Report, while keeping Congress unaware of those funds (Ibid). Consequently, there was gradual draw of Iraq into a discourse of terrorism/threat. Funds, that produced CIA's October 2002 NIE Report, provided the intelligence for President's first speech linking Iraq/Saddam, WMD, 9/11 and Al-Qaida. The speech took place the same month NIE Report was delivered to President. He gave the speech by divulging the following:

*"Tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace and America's*

*determination to lead the world in confronting that threat. The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime's own actions, its history of aggression and its drive toward an arsenal of terror. Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons and to stop all support for terrorist groups”.*<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, in his speech President indicated that US IC provided the evidence for his claims (Ibid). The speech associated Iraq with imminent threat to international order, likewise penetrating bonds of terrorism and support for terrorism by Iraqi Administration; information was taken from CIA's October 2002 NIE Report. While president was establishing grand coalition in global affairs, intelligence inspectors and analysts were engineering 'urgency to act' or evidence for future consumption. There was a pattern of associating Iraq, threat, terrorism, WMD and Al-Qaida, which had continued until the actual initiation of the war in March 2003 (Guardian/Data/Refine Research) The following chart displays data on president's use of words in key speeches given from 2001.9.11 to 2003.3.17. The chart integrates content/speech variables such as *Iraq Index* and *Terrorism Index*. Iraq Index would imply the number of occasions the word Iraq and Saddam Hussein was made use of after/under a context of 9/11, while Terrorism index stands for the Al-Qaida, Terrorism, Osama bin Laden. (Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, 2005, p. 527). We see from the chart, that in around December 2001 the Terror index has been pinned around 60 times with the gradual shift towards usage of Iraqi Index 80 times in June 2002 (ibid). Bear in mind that NIE is yet come, but president already used Iraq in relation to terrorism and 9/11.

---

<sup>25</sup> The Guardian October 7 Transcript: George Bush's speech on Iraq <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/07/usa.iraq>



Saddam's regime (Guardian, 17 march 2003). He continued on threats posed by Iraqi CBW and NWP to US homeland security as well as to entire Middle East region (Ibid). Finally, he concluded his on air message by associating terrorist organization Al-Qaida with Saddam, there by claiming Iraq is harbouring terrorists who are the threat to all nations of free world (Ibid). Media and TV developed on NIE evidence and President's rhetoric, which only empowered disinformation and fabrication.

Media reacted synchronically on CIA report regarding the threat and the war. From 2001 up to 2003, the media coverage of war was extensive and supported by Public Information Department. Take for instance, the big three TV and broadcasting agencies like ABC, CNN and NBS. ABC TV channel, from 9/11 to May 2003 made 647 video reports tying Iraq to terrorism with the very first one dating to September 17, 2001.<sup>26</sup> Second biggest broadcasting outlet NBS used the same combination and produced 246 on air stories, similarly focusing on Iraq, 9/11 and terrorism; while CNN covered 306 pieces reflecting similar scenario (ibid). All three news agencies had a particular pattern of presenting news to an audience, namely they had linked 9/11, Iraq and terrorism (ibid).

What about the impact factor and the perception, and support for actual war? Same month, Gallup provided a study reporting that in March 2003 60% of Americans were in favor of the war and 71% were positive on President's job (Gallup, 23 March, 2003). Likewise, at the end 70% of US citizens believed that 9/11 relates to Iraq and personally to Saddam Hussein (USATODAY, 9/6/2003). This is the way to produce animal spirits and an 'urge to action' or put it simply, a way to induce future consumption. As a result of intelligence analysis, which is in PM a state's investment, the future consumption was set up.

---

<sup>26</sup> Television News Archives/ Advanced Search  
<https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&query=saddam+2001&button=>

Which brings me to an assessment of data provided by Congressional Research Service and WH, where we will analyze October 2002 Congressional debate and see how Senators picked up on CIA's Iraqi threat and NIE Report, on President and State Department's rhetoric; thus, completing the animal spirits process and went on ratifying the intervention policy.

October 2002 is quite special month in US History. That month in 12 days, US Congress passed a bill H.J.Res.114 called *Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Resolution of 2002* (Congress/Track Bill, H.J.Res.114). As indicated previously, this month CIA Report on Iraq and Terrorism was delivered to the State Department and Congressional representative, likewise President used particular rhetoric that we discussed. Another coincidence was that September-October had seen an unprecedented growth in *Iraq Index* in public discourse, which we displayed. This resolution was not about Congress declaring a war against a threat, rather it was a resolution that would pass authority to President Bush to conduct military operation against Iraq as he deems it necessary.<sup>27</sup> So, let us start with New-York representative, Hilary Clinton who used only NIE and IC reference. During the public hearing Senator at the time H. Clinton said that Saddam obtained WMD in addition to CBW that he used against own population, thus violating the UN resolutions since 1991 (Clinton/Senate/Gov/Speeches/Iraq S.J. Res. 45). She directly pointed out that CIA intelligence reports had confirmed that Saddam provided 'safe heavens' for terrorists and assisted Al-Qaida organization in the past (Ibid). Thus, Saddam is a threat not only to our allies in the region such as Israel, but also to whole world (ibid). She repeatedly reminded

---

<sup>27</sup> Congress/Speeches/Ron Paul House Floor Speech on Iraq (October 8, 2002)  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TZ5cpaPlf4>

senators on atrocities of 9/11 and Saddam's involvement in that attack while insisting on evidence gathered by intelligence.<sup>28</sup>

Next, Senator John Edwards spoke on Saddam's use of CBW, enrichment of nuclear energy, thus posing a threat to US and the values that she stands for.<sup>29</sup> The main concern was that Saddam provides aids and comfort to terrorists, while developing WMD (ibid). Later, Senator admitted that he consulted with Hilary administration on intelligence reports thus was convinced on the credibility of his arguments over Saddam's NWP (NYT, December 29, 2007). In addition, Senators admitted that there is a lack of international will by UN to '*balance action rather than inaction*' against Iraq (Clinton/Senate/GOV/Speech October 08, 2002). The nature of the hearing was around issues that had been all over the news and White House agenda a month prior to hearing. From the congressional record, we can track whole pattern of the Resolution on Iraq, where the theme was around Iraq, WMD, CBW, 9/11 and Al-Qaida (Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 133, October 10, 2002). Furthermore, there was high reliance on intelligence information provided by CIA, which reflected on speeches given by representatives from respected districts. For instance, Senator from Mississippi, Mr Cochran was persuasive when he presented personally-acquired CIA documents on Iraq's WMD, there by stating that Congress should support President's strategy with the bill on joint action against threat (ibid). He shared data with congressional committee naming them facts about Iraq's NWP, materials of CBW, short and long-range ballistic missiles program. Immediately, an amendment was purposed from No. 4865 to No. 4586 by Senator from Illinois, thereby stating '*To amend the authorization for the use of Armed Forces to cover an imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass*

---

<sup>28</sup> House/Speeches, Iraq Resolution Transcript 2002 October 10 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-10-10/html/CREC-2002-10-10-pt1-PgS10233-7.htm>

<sup>29</sup> John Edwards HOUSE FLOOR SPEECH ON IRAQ OCTOBER, 2002 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HY6BZgkI0kI&list=PL9C9897F1AB949DF6&index=2>

*destruction rather than merely the threat posed by Iraq* (Ibid). Which means the phrase WMD and Iraq was now core theme of the debate, rather than simply a threat. Another Senator Schumer expressed his discontent with UN's incompetence of developing cohesive action against Iraq (ibid). Relying on intelligence reports, he specified Saddam's assistance to Al-Qaida, thereby insisting on the *'urge to act, rather than face the consequences of inaction'* (ibid). This, yet again, was another use of phrase identical to definition of animal spirits, thus proving instinctive behaviour by representatives. Senator from Pennsylvania even stated *'it is lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill'* (Ibid). The irrationality of the public hearing was around the topic of nuclear exchange and Iraqi threat, which was due to intelligence fabrication.

Next, Senator Ms Collins took the floor<sup>30</sup>, who happened to be a member of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, and the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security and Proliferation. She convinced the congress that she had conducted her own research on the Iraqi issue by doing in-depth briefings on Iraq from the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defence, the State Department, and the White House; Senator have questioned experts such as former Defence Secretary James Schlesinger and former National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, as well as Donald Rumsfeld, at the public hearings before the Armed Services Committee (Ibid). So far, she had referred to executives and experts who had retrieved information from IC and State Department offices. Her argument, while being comprehensive, factual and consistent with CIA and WH's statement, was mere continuation of 'more of the same', namely reciting fabricated intelligence. She even emphasized the fact that she obtained an

---

<sup>30</sup> House/Speeches/Record-Transcript 08-10 October 2002 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-10-10/html/CREC-2002-10-10-pt1-PgS10233-7.htm>

access to classified intelligence reports as well as talked to DCI and C. Powel (ibid); which made no factual difference.

Next, Senior Senator from California made use of CIA classified and declassified documents even invested an additional effort by attaching his personal email/internal document record with DCI Mr Tenet. He provided an internal document record channelled between him and CIA Director, where the latter argues that if Saddam becomes impotent to US-led attacks, then he will turn to terrorists for help, namely opt for an extreme option of supplying terrorists with WMD to perpetuate an attack on US soil (ibid). The character of debate had changed half way through into the public hearing point where no senator would doubt Iraqi threat, therefore aim shifted from 'not going to war, to working with UN and pushing them on Iraq, which was one step away from passing the actual intention of resolution. So far, Senators from Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Arizona Minnesota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Michigan, New Mexico, California, Maryland, Delaware, Hawaii, Vermont, Texas, New York, Illinois, Alabama, Washington, North Dakota, and Ohio had spoken in favor of resolution (some of them we have discussed). In addition, they all employed intelligence data thereby using words threat, action, WMD, Iraq and terrorism. Main source of reference were CIA documents called NIE of October 2002 as well as senators' personal record/research conducted under Department of State.

However, the debate had started from 2<sup>nd</sup> of October and thus had not proceeded without marginal opposition from other representatives. As such, Senator Ron Paul stood up against resolution arguing that there is no hand-on evidence on Iraqi NWP and connection with Al-Qaida, let alone with 9/11.<sup>31</sup> This is the same Congressman who two

---

<sup>31</sup> Congress/Speeches/Ron Paul House Floor Speech on Iraq (October 8, 2002)  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TZ5cpaPlf4>

weeks earlier questioned Colin Powell on urgency of declaring a war. He stated that ‘there is no imminent threat and no act of aggression, commenting on Bush’s idea of Iraqi threat and Saddam’s aggressive policy stance (ibid). Another Senator, Mr Kyl, who initially opposed the intervention but ended up supporting it as the nature of debate had shifted, expressed his discontent with the CIA reports and their intelligence gathering.<sup>32</sup> Next Senator, Mr Biden, followed the same path as Mr Kyl, criticized the intelligence for failing Congress and American public to produce solid report (ibid). Later, he quoted Brent Scowcroft, President George Bush's National Security Adviser, and chairperson of President Bush's foreign intelligence advisory board, by stating *‘there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the September 11 attacks. Indeed, Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us . . . and he is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as a return address’* (Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 133, October 10, 2002). Furthermore, he continued that IC appears to be rather deliberately ignorant to research by external panel of analysts, while pushing forward particular political objective (Ibid). As we see there was a suspicion on Intelligence gatherings being used for pushing resolution on war. Specifically, this nuance was mentioned by Daniel Benjamin, former Director of Counter-terrorism on the National Security Council staff, and co-author of the book, ‘‘The Age of Sacred Terror,’’ who stated in Congress: *Iraq and Al Qaeda are not obvious allies. In fact, they are natural enemies. . . .To contemporary jihadists, Saddam Hussein is another in a line of dangerous secularists, an enemy of the faith. . . .Saddam Hussein has long recognized that Al Qaeda and like-minded Islamists represent a threat to*

---

<sup>32</sup> House/Speeches/Record-Transcript 08-10 October 2002 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-10-10/html/CREC-2002-10-10-pt1-PgS10233-7.htm>

*his regime. Consequently, he has shown no interest in working with them against their common enemy, the United States... However, Mr. Hussein has remained true to the unwritten rules of state sponsorship of terrorism: never get involved with a group that cannot be controlled, and never give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who might use it against you* (Ibid, B. Daniel). So, those sort of statements were considered irrelevant and lacking in competence to embrace the nature of ongoing debate, since they were not backed up by ‘intelligence’. That is the difference between a truth and lie. Person speaking of truth is limited to truth, while a lie is open to the use of all kind of data, statistics, sources. In addition, studies that were provided by International Institute of Strategic Studies, concluded that Saddam’s aptitude towards use of CBW is less now than it was in an aftermath of GW (Ibid). Despite those, senators ignored analysis provided by other than CIA. Because as cited previously, those who control the language-control the argument, and those who control the argument may successfully translate belief into policy. And the argument was that there had been a threat coming from Iraq, which translated into policy. Eventually, majority voted in favor of the resolution by 296 to 133, thereby approving *H.J.Res passed resolution. 114 (107th): Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Resolution of 2002* (Gov/Track Bill, 2002).

This is a pure fabrication of ‘animal spirits’ making irrational choices based on the instinctive behaviour and information at hand. Likewise, we saw how NIE was a product of Bush’s unauthorized investment into intelligence production. Idea of and the possibility of threat led to the consumption of intelligence, which followed into policy that is a particular kind of policy endorsed by President’s Administration and CIA, while picked up by Congress and the public. We have analysed how intelligence frames the future consumption, now let us provide Pre-War Intelligence Assessment Report, which is a follow up on Intelligence failings/fabrications. Afterwards, we will proceed on how

(policy) political expansion/intervention policy relates to expansion/threat/terror, thus closing our cycle on US's PM expansion or anew AD for policy-products.

## **VI. Intelligence Community and Fabrication: Assessment of Pre-War Intelligence by Senate Select Committee.**

In 2003, Senate Select Committee (SSC) On Intelligence conducted a formal review of US Pre-War intelligence into the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his violations of human rights including the actual use of weapons of mass destruction against his own people, as a part of assessment of US Pre-War Intelligence activity, namely NIE.<sup>33</sup> Those assessments were crucial in number of ways, first, SSC wanted to ensure that IC reports were credible; second, analysis would clarify how intelligence had reached consumers, namely Policymakers, State Department officials and other executives, since the Bush's war aims were based on CIA Intelligence Report NIE October 2002, which greatly shaped the nature of congressional debates as well; thirdly, SSC hearing would elaborate on possible contribution of CIA to shape *particular* policy objectives (Ibid, p. 4).

SSC chose to focused on report *October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*; this document has not been selected randomly, because the data encompassed Iraq's armament programs since 1980s; furthermore, this document is the most referred and quoted by policy-makers, as we

---

<sup>33</sup> Report, On US Pre-War Intelligence Assessment On Iraq, that had started June 2003 and delivered July 2004. [https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004\\_rpt/ssci\\_iraq.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/ssci_iraq.pdf) p. 1-2.

emphasized. Even SSC judges pointed out that fact, namely high employment consistency of CIA NIE report 2002 (Ibid, p. 8)

First sign of failure, is that CIA was selective when it comes to meeting Congress' inquiries regarding the Iraqi NWP (ibid, 12). Several Congressmen sent emails to intelligence analysts, experts and DCI urging them to supply material evidence for Iraqi NWP (ibid). This took place in September 2002, when CIA did not react to Congress' requirements, while at the same time 'few selected senators' held claims that they had received positive answer from CIA regarding WMD and CBW (Ibid). This delay had continued up until Resolution was passed in October 2002, which means in a span of 10-12 days, Congress was convinced that they would grant the president an authority to declare a war. This is quick, considering the fact that earlier in the sessions Congress debated Elementary and Secondary Education Act for 21 days, Trade Promotion Act for 19 days, Farm Trade Bill for 18 days and Energy Bill for 21 days, while Resolution on Iraq took just 10-12 days as indicated by senator from Louisiana Mr Kennedy (Joint Resolution on Iraq/Public Hearing-Transcript 08-10 October 2002). This is the result of instinctive behaviour, which is an indicative of animal spirits. Also, the impact that fear can have on decision-making as displayed by study on effectiveness of fear arousal in enforcing a choice.

SSC scrutinized CIA's factual analysis on Iraqi NWP, Iraq's Support for Terrorism, Iraqi CBW, Iraq's Delivery Systems. Second failure was with CIA assessment of Iraqi NWP, thereby SSC concluded: *Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic tradecraft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence* (SSC, 2004, 14).

*The major key judgments in the NIE, particularly that Iraq “is reconstituting its nuclear program,” “has chemical and biological weapons,” was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents,” and that “all key aspects-research & development (R&D), production, and weaponization -of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons (BW) program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War,” either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting provided to the Committee* (Ibid, p. 14). More importantly, the assessment that Iraq “is reconstituting its nuclear program” neither was supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee nor intelligence analysts had enough information to state that Iraq ‘has’ those weapons; nevertheless, intelligence was distributed to policy-makers, State Department and later to Congressmen (ibid). Which means, intelligence was pure assumption passed further to the President, Colin Powell, Senators and others. But we now know, this was the aim of intelligence, which means it was not ‘passed’, but rather ‘produced for’. Furthermore, CIA ignored intelligence by other inquiry panels such as *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2002 (2002)*, *The Intelligence Community’s Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (The Jeremiah Report, 1998)*, and *the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*; all of whom drew a distinct conclusion to CIA report (ibid, 15).

Third failure was that *The Intelligence Community did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate* (ibid. 16). Intelligence Analysts did not examine the raw material upon which they built up their estimations, which led to mischaracterization of issue to policy makers and executives.

Forth failure, *The Intelligence Community (IC) suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This “group think” dynamic led Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs* (Ibid, 18). Which means, not only had alternative evidence been ignored, but also intentionally minimized. In addition, CIA analysts disregarded the UN and IAEA’s reports in 2002, that were conducted by their inspectors, thereby stating *‘Iraq’s claims that the aluminium tubes were intended for artillery rockets was completely consistent with the evidence on the ground in Iraq’* (ibid, 20). In turn, CIA agency started to work on its own report that later discredit the IAEA report; in addition, no evidence were given to IAEA experts other than your *‘inspectors were fooled by Iraq’* (Ibid, 20). Not only CIA refuted external panel reports, but they also produced their own reports that would defy any finding on Iraqi NWP other than positive. Result is the total fabrication, the production of particular narrative that serves the future policy, this is the process of engineering *‘animal spirits’*, thus ensuring consumption of future policies or put it simply expansion of PM, which is also expansion of interest.

Furthermore, the failure comes from the leadership chain as Fifth disruption indicates that *in each instance where the Committee found an analytic or collection failure, it resulted in part from a failure of Intelligence Community managers throughout their leadership chains to adequately supervise the work of their analysts and collectors. They did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or counsel analysts who lost their objectivity* (ibid. p. 23). However, as indicated by SSC in *‘fourth failure’*, a *‘group think’* produced specific intelligence. That is similar to saying it was the CIA managers’ *‘failure to*

*adequately supervise*’; which was not a group failure, but a teamwork. It is not that the intelligence report lacked in supervision and incompetence; rather it had served the intention or interest of producing consumption. SSC admitted, that it is not the leadership that failed to analyze the raw materials for reports, but rather intelligence analysts and leadership chain had the same ‘group think’ perspective on this particular topic (ibid, 24). For AM of Keynes, misinformation and uncertainty about the market is base of ‘animal spirits’, hence there is an irrational human behaviour resulting in an urge to action, rather than inaction. Same misinformation about the PM of goods and services produces the equal level of urgency for an action rather than inaction. The only difference is that Keynes AM implied that this is a negative circumstance for the market, since people would make choices that are not in their best interest, known as instinctive or random choices, which will also hurt most sellers. While in PM, it can encourage consumers to make particular choice/consumption, given the fact that there is only one producer of state interest-products and that is the state itself.

Next is the Sixth failure, which is very different from other short-comings, namely SSC admits that it is not that experts, analysts and personnel incompetent to the position, but rather failures are the result of ***broken corporate culture and poor management***, that will not be solved by additional funding or recruitment (ibid, p. 24). *Corporate culture* is quite specific label to attach in PM. *The Committee found significant short-comings in almost every aspect of the Intelligence Community’s human intelligence collection efforts against Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction activities, in particular that the Community had no sources collecting evidence Against weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after 1998* (Ibid, p. 24). This suggests that the CIA had left no chance for argument *against Iraqi NWP*, but rather specifically worked on producing the evidence for *in favor*. The SSC have found shortcomings almost in all aspects of operation, as we mentioned, thus it appears as if there is ‘all-failure intelligence report’. The National Security Act of 1947 shaped CIA’s purpose and

that is ‘*to coordinate the nation’s intelligence activities and correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence that affects national security, provides the CIA with a unique position in the Intelligence Community towards policy makers*’ (p. 27). This is exactly the unique position that the state possess as the sole seller in PM. Scholars support that authority has a unique stance on choosing methods, practices, contents, interpretation, actions/inactions, which all lead to state’s way of utilizing its power-resources (Ortrun Zuber-Skerritt, 1996, p. 106-7).

However, in practice, SSC found that the intelligence community reports actually undermined the provision of objective analysis by hampering accurate intelligence sharing and allowing CIA analysts to control the presentation of information to policymakers, and exclude analysis from other agencies (SSC, 27). Not only information was engineered and controlled, but also access to some analyses were limited to policy makers; thus, *these restrictions, in several cases, kept information from analysts that was essential to their ability to make fully informed judgments* (ibid). However, this is the nature of PM, namely creating an environment that puts consumers into a position of ‘less informed judgement/choice’, i.e. ‘animal spirits’. This penetrates consumption of products, that otherwise would have been not accepted/legitimized.

Next, we analyze January 2003 CIA report called *Iraq’s support for terrorism* that was used to link further Iraq and Terrorism. Main document that SSC suggested to explore was CIA’s report referred *Iraqi Support for Terrorism*, that was published in 2002 for limited executive audience along with NIE October 2002 (ibid, 29).

First failure was that *Intelligence Community analysts lack a consistent post-9/11 approach to analysing and reporting on terrorist threats* (ibid). After 9/11 CIA made claims on relationship between September terrorist attacks and Iraq that were inconsistent with other

panels' reports. When asked by other panel analysts about the evidence, CIA kept principle of "Source Protection Policy" that is to subject their own intelligence experts and analysts to hide details of their sources and raw material of the investigation (Ibid). As a result, greater portion of analysis was labelled as a "source protection policy". Consequently, other intelligence panels would fail to provide policy makers with information other than CIA's, regarding Iraq and Terrorism. Thus, assumptions would be labelled as Source Protection Policy leaving no judgement of evidence.

Second failure, IC produced as much unfunded information as possible in order to compensate 'the intelligence gaps/loops' in linking Iraq and Al-Qaida (ibid, p. 32). For instance, when intelligence analysts could not test the evidence, they would source the argument as 'Scope Note' meaning acquired from intelligence agencies abroad such as British, French or CIA European headquarters (ibid). This led to production of analysis that was out of intelligence experts' direct supervision, thus no further assessment was conducted on initial source; which is nothing but argumentation on assertions. SSC concluded that intelligence analysts had *purposefully taken aggressive approach to interpreting available data in order fill in the intelligence gaps* (ibid).

Furthermore, CIA provided information to Secretary of State Colin Power and supported his speech to the UN Security Council. SSC interviewed CIA analysts, who drafted and prepared the speech, and they said that they had not supported with evidence/reference some of the points outlined in the speech (ibid, p. 67). It became especially problematic, when C. Powell himself told to the UN Security Council- *'every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence'* (Ibid. p. 239). It turned out to be assertions even by standards of the time when analysts were preparing the content of speech. Actual

paper of the speech was hand-written thus excluded from Congressional access prior to the address. Later, after questioning process, it became clear that sources indicated in the speech were taken from reports containing baseless evidence (Ibid, 247). C. Powell speech was another example of deliberate intelligence production.

Before the speech, CIA was working on preparing document that would tie Iraq, Al-Qaida and weapon enrichment program; thereby insisting that Saddam acquired materials from Nigeria and Africa. For this reason, CIA analyst flew to Nigeria and met former US Ambassador to Nigeria Owens-Kirkpatrick (ibid, p. 42). In Nigeria, they met local officials who convinced them that there were not any trade deals with Iraq or any sort of uranium enrichment program by Nigerians themselves, outside of IAEA (ibid). However, CIA experts took this information and delivered completely opposite analysis, stating that the Nigerian officials would not admit that there were sales between Nigeria and Iraq, thus discrediting ambassadors report that was graded as 'good' by committee panel itself (p. 46). So, CIA reiterated ambassador's report as further evidence confirming Iraqi NWP (ibid).

Moreover, the report also elaborated on Iraqi Nuclear Weapon Program that we discussed. Since 1998, IAEA and UNSCOM provided their assessments of Iraqi nuclear threat that would contradict CIA's. CIA was warned and informed about their reporting issues and data analysis, thus asked to review and modify their data (ibid, 77). The warning was ignored, which reflected in State Department Official's rhetoric, statements, and speeches with the CIA being aware of ambiguity of their analysis (Ibid). CIA did not bother to correct them nor re-publish those documents for broader executive audience, but State Department.

Same holds true for Iraqi CBW program which was noted as 'Iraq had biological weapons' is an overstatement and not supported by intelligence (p. 188). This part of the

assessment was the most extensive, since CIA has comprehensive data on Iraqi CBW from the 1990s GW. Despite data, statement that ‘*research and development, production and weaponization-of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the GW*’ is not supported even by CIA own intelligence analysis, let alone the one provided to SSC (Ibid, p. 187). Not only, CIA ‘failed’ to produce proper analysis, but also to supply the raw evidence upon which these judgements were built, which implies *assertions* rather than analysis (ibid, 188).

Statement on Iraqi delivery systems, similar to previous failings, was not supported by intelligence and was an overstatement (235). Though the judgement of Iraqi medium-range ballistic missiles program was reasonable, Iraq did have those in ‘N’ quantity (ibid).

All in all, SSC assessment of Pre-war Intelligence Report is a detailed analysis that revealed over 80 negative estimates out of 117.<sup>34</sup> Few years later, second part was introduced called *Senate Intelligence Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Pre-war Iraq Intelligence* that outlined instances of subjective use of intelligence analysis by State Department, there by arguing that officials and executives *deliberately* misinterpret intelligence as a fact, when in reality it was not supported or non-existent.<sup>35</sup> Around this time article called *Iraq War was not an Honest Mistake* was published, where several senators criticized Bush Administration for knowingly misleading the Congress and American Public.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Former CIA Deputy Director and intelligence briefer Michael Morell later admitted that *the Iraq War was not the result of an intelligence goof— rather, the country’s*

---

<sup>34</sup> Some Conclusion pages are coloured in black, thus exact number is between 80-90

<sup>35</sup> Intelligence/Senate/Gov/ Wendy Morigi (202) 224-6101 <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/senate-intelligence-committee-unveils-final-phase-ii-reports-prewar-iraq-intelligence>

<sup>36</sup> Slate/ Article/ Jamelle Bouie *Iraq War was’t an honest mistake*, 19 May 2015 [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/politics/2015/05/the\\_iraq\\_war\\_wasn\\_t\\_an\\_honest\\_mistake\\_republicans\\_are\\_still\\_defending\\_the.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/05/the_iraq_war_wasn_t_an_honest_mistake_republicans_are_still_defending_the.html)

*top office systematically misled the public about Iraq's non-existent WMD program, as well as Saddam Hussein's link to Al Qaeda.* <sup>37</sup>

To sum up, as we see from the analysis CIA and President provided intelligence that would stimulate consumption of particular intelligence so that expansive policy could be ratified. Animal spirits, as it happened to be, is an indispensable element of inducing consumption of state products, which led to generation of actual expansion policy. So far, in AM/PM alike, we gathered data for the formula on  $AD = \text{Intelligence/Investment/Interest} + \text{Consumption (Animal Sprits)} + Gs + N_x$ -export of policy, which closes the cycle on the demand-side stimulation; which we will discuss in later part.

It is also worthwhile to consider CIA analyst confession. This is a following passage from a 25 years in-service CIA agent, Ralph McGehee who admits that “*The CIA is not now nor has it ever been a central intelligence agency. It is the covert action arm of the President's foreign policy advisers. In that capacity it overthrows or supports foreign governments while reporting "intelligence" justifying those activities. [Ralph says he has never once seen a CIA official tell the truth to Congress. Instead comes a steady stream of lies. - Ed.] It shapes its intelligence, even in such critical areas as nuclear weapon capability, to support presidential policy. Disinformation is a large part of its covert action responsibility, and the American people are the primary target of its lies*”. <sup>38</sup> So, as we read from former CIA agent, not only CIA creates a misimpression on policies, but also it consciously aims at Congress and domestic population as to a ‘animal spirits’ in order to stimulate consumption of political g/s, which leads to a growth of AD for political expansion

---

<sup>37</sup> Salon/ Joanna Rothkopf/George W. Bush's CIA briefer admits Iraq WMD “intelligence” was a lie, MAY 20, 2015

<sup>38</sup> Ralph McGehee 1983/1999 *Deadly Deceits*, (Ocean Press, USA)  
<https://books.google.cz/books?id=EOcsBgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false> Chapter 14- Conclusion (there is no paging due to copyrights, so please scroll down to CH. 14/ 1<sup>st</sup> Paragraph)

policies, i.e. demand-side stimulation. So, it is necessary to create misinformed ‘animal spirits’ so that PM can expand; thus guarantee the stability and security. The production in PM encompasses intelligence, which allows power to shape and form itself, calling it national interest/policy. Therefore, we address those intelligences in power-production, which we later relate to as engineering political intervention policies and Nx.

In addition, other intelligence panels were willing to assist in intelligence gathering, but their intelligence was ignored. Particularly, prior to publishing October 2002 NIE, the head of CIA’s headquarter in France, William D. Murray was informed that the senior member of Saddam’s Administration, namely Naji Sabri wants to defect and flee with his family (Telegraph, 18 Mar 2013). He was willing to share some intelligence information with the CIA and French Intelligence Agency, since the latter had developed substantial ties with Iraq (Ibid). Naji Sabri would be given 200,000 USD in return for intelligence that he did share. Particularly, he stated that Iraq had not developed weapons of mass destruction (ibid). Then, Murray would pass this intelligence along others to DCI Tenet, who used this information *again selectively* by reporting the opposite ‘picture’ on Iraqi NWP (ibid). By September 2002, Sabri Information was distributed, which is a month prior to CIA’s official October 2002 NIE Report, though had been included into report as a positive evidence on Iraqi NWP. Three month before the war, in January 2003, MI6 officer met another member of Saddam’s office, the head of Iraqi intelligence, Tahir Habbush Al Tikriti, who like Sabri confirmed Iraqi incapability to develop NW under current circumstances (ibid). This information, despite being shared by MI6 for CIA, was deliberately ignored, let alone misinterpreted.

Therefore, we conclude this part with supporting hypothesis that *In Keynesian Politics, Intelligence Community and State Department deliberately creates ‘intelligence*

*failures' and (disinformation) in order to induce consumption of political goods and services, or of particular intelligence/knowledge. We have found evidence on how intelligence was fabricated as means of creating a consumption of. Moreover, we have found that IC ignores information that does not support its stance, while reformulates/expands on the ones that partially do so. Now, we will proceed on demand-side stimulation or how policy legitimize/justifies market expansions, namely how political expansion/intervention policy relates to the expansion of threat/terror, thus closing our cycle on Net exports of the policy and PM expansion. If the consumption of intelligence by animal spirits results in policy, then state must sell this policy in a new market and sustain the expansion. But How?*

## **VII. Final Stage of AD=Exporting the Policy and Maintaining Expansion.**

### **Necessary link between Identity and Threat.**

It is due to threat, the demand for political interventionist policies are justified. It is due to threat, expansion can take place; similarly in AM, it is the crisis that forces the state to intervene. This chapter outlines the connection between US Policy and Terrorism/Threat, policy and its rendition (Net exports) in a new market. In AM and PM-alike, policy is designed for the expansion, not contraction, hence *we assume that policy must be exported in a way that would increase the very demand that creates it, namely if our formula is correct, then policy ought to stimulate more of the threat/terror so that it can expand, thus constituting out Cyclical loop of identity/power reproduction.* In AM, state would intervene, and then leave the market by allowing other (ordinary or state subsidized) producers or sellers to provide g/s, however, in PM, there are no other sellers, there are better not to be, thus the state (as a seller) itself must guard/police the expansion and maintenance of it. Therefore, we should find a link between policy and threat, i.e. identity and the other. In fact that was the case, Global Terrorism Index (GTI) study suggest that

there were nine-fold increase in terrorism fatalities since 9/11, 80% of whom are from Middle East (discussed below) (GTI, 2015, p. 4).

So, we start with the report of the Secretary of Defence, Donal Rumsfeld called *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication of 2004*. Bear in mind that Donal Rumsfeld had held State Department office 1970s, 1990s, and now 2000s. The report was part of the briefing and advisory insight to the Congress and Defence Department set under independent super-visionary board on intelligence, which was introduced after the first intelligence failings of 1990s. Rumsfeld answered the question on exponential growth of terrorism and ‘hate towards US in Arab world’ (Department of Defence, Sept. 2004, p. 39-41). Statement concluded the following: <sup>39</sup>

*‘Muslims do not “hate our freedom,” but rather, they hate our policies. The overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, even increasing support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Gulf states.*

*Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy.*

*Furthermore, in the eyes of Muslims, American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering. U.S. actions appear in contrast to be motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in order to best serve American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim self-determination.*

---

<sup>39</sup> Department of Defence, Sept 2004. P. 40-41. <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/commun.pdf>

*Finally, Muslims see Americans as strangely narcissistic — namely, that the war is all about us. As the Muslims see it, everything about the war is — for Americans — really no more than an expansion of American domestic politics and its great game. This perception is of course necessarily heightened by election-year atmospherics, but nonetheless sustains their impression that when Americans talk to Muslims they are really just talking to themselves’.*

So, as we see there is nothing about the threat of terrorism that has not been subsequent by-product of US policy. Thereby suggesting a link between policy and threats of terrorism being a result of internal production of power. Therefore, we did address how policy formation occurred and under whose guidance; because Congress and the public could be misled as we have witnessed it.

Next, Michael F. Scheuer who was a former CIA intelligence officer, in his book *Imperial Hubris* stated that *U.S. forces and policies are completing the Radicalization of the Islamic world, something Osama bin Laden has been trying to do with substantial but incomplete success since the early 1990s. As a result, I think it is fair to conclude that the United States of America remains bin Laden's only indispensable ally*, in a sense that US policies only furthered terrorism.<sup>40</sup> This is the essence of Nx of policy thus the demand side stimulation, where the *self* is defined by the circumstances that demand the *self*. Sudden uprising and radicalization is no coincidence in Middle East. In fact, CIA and British intelligence analysts knew at the time that invasion would be ‘attack on Islam’; thus, it would only increase the threats and terrors posed to ‘free world’, but the analysis was ignored (N. Chomsky, 2011, p. 32). Moreover, in Islamic world, the most extreme and radical Islam, apart from Taliban, is exercised by Saudi Arabia (SA) and Qatar (N. Chomsky, 2001, p. 5).

---

<sup>40</sup> Michael F. Scheuer 2004, *Imperial Hubris*, Brassey's INC, Washington D.C. p. XV  
<https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/Imperial%20hubris.pdf>

In Arab World, the term 'extreme fundamentalists' is rarely used phrase, though applied to SA and Taliban (Ibid). This also happen to be a reason behind suicide bombing that grew in numbers. Thus, one might want to look at a logic behind 'evil acts of terrorism' by O. bin Laden's Al-Qaida. Political scientist in international security Robert Pape (2005), who explored logic behind suicide bombings, in his book *Dying to Win* concluded that suicide bombing has a pattern and a message, namely it is directed towards democracies, it is against US occupation and intervention policies in Arab World, against US ally Israel's occupation of Palestine, against US support for Radical Islam though regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, also against US 'style' of combatting terrorism like supporting terrorism exporting states. Also, O. bin Laden in his video message to Al Jazeera said US support to Islamic fundamentalists such as SA, support for Israel's policy towards Palestine and US intervention in Middle east is the ultimate evil act against Muslims (Al Jazeera, 1 Nov, 2004). The statement was supported by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who stated that *American direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to single-digits in some Arab societies* (Defence Department, Sept 2004 Report, p. 40). Which country is the most radical?-Saudi Arabia, Qatar, who are US regional allies 'in crime'. There is evidence that Saudi government officials, not simply wealthy individuals, export terrorism and radical Islam, but not without US help. In interview with DCI John Brennan speaking on CIA declassified documents and 9/11 Commission Report, said that Saudi involvement in terrorist financing should be kept out from public domain, because report stated '*few Saudi government officials may have supported terrorists*' (CNN, June15, 2015; Also, Independent, 2 May 2016). Much of the text on Saudi Arabia was edited, analysts report (ibid). It is also known that 15 out 19 hijackers on 9/11 were from SA. After 9/11 Commission report were declassified, there was a public debate over possibility to sue Saudi government over 9/11

and support for terrorists, as they had prior knowledge of the attack; likewise, Saudi officials knew that funds from charities are being redirected to terrorists, thus providing 'safe heavens' (Independent, 22 March 2017). Despite the fact that Administration had been aware of upcoming Commission Report on 9/11 by 2002, yet they have continued their cooperation with SA, especially in military.

SA has tried to ensure that Islamic world is primarily Sunni, by grounding a movement that set Sunni-Shia conflict among Muslim societies (The Week, 8 August 2015). The SSC was suspicious on Saudis being a terrorist donor state, but CIA official stance was that the report about SA was inaccurate. The topic was highly sensitive since US has bilateral relationship with SA since 1950, and strategic and multilateral since 1970s (US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2 February, 2017). Gradually, the trade between the two grew forming an 'oil for weapons' - pattern of cooperation (besides using SA as strategic deterrence against Iran) (CFA, 21 April 2016; Also, WarOnTheRocks, 26 October 2016). Middle East is the 40% military aid receiver, while SA are among top five military recipients (SIPRI Fact Sheet, February, 2016). Obama for instance, extended US-SA military cooperation by signing 42 authorized deals, while offering 115\$ billion worth arms sale (Reuters, September 6, 2016).

The main issue with US ally, is that SA was known for spreading radical Islam, a concern that some Arab States raised previously. Moreover, State Department official H. Clinton, who was exposed by WikiLeaks in document called *Clinton Emails*, admits: *Qatar and Saudi Arabia are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and other radical Sunni groups in the region* (WikiLeaks, John Podesta, *Subject: Congrats!*). Despite the fact that the administration was aware of their allies' support for terrorism, they continued their cooperation. Like during the GW, (un)authorized shipment of munitions would take

place. The difference though, a registry named Clinton Foundation would purchase and sell weaponry worth of 29\$ billion in one deal and 163\$ billion over the course 3 years (IBTimes, 05/26/15).

Another leak, that has been made public by WikiLeaks, was Citizen's Commission Report on Benghazi (CCB, 2014/2016) conducted under international regulatory body and monitored by Former CIA operative Clare Lopez, whereby concluded:

- *'The U.S. facilitated the delivery of weapons and military support to Al-Qaida linked rebels in Libya' (p. 3).*
  
- *Even more disturbingly, the U.S. was fully aware of and facilitating the delivery of weapons to the al-Qa'eda-dominated rebel militias throughout the 2011 rebellion. The jihadist agenda of AQIM, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and other Islamic terror groups represented among the rebel forces was well known to U.S. officials responsible for Libya policy. The rebels made no secret of their al-Qa'eda affiliation, openly flying and speaking in front of the black flag of Islamic jihad, according to author John Rosenthal and multiple media reports. And yet, the White House and senior Congressional member deliberately and knowingly pursued a policy that provided material support to terrorist organizations in order to topple a ruler who had been working closely with the West actively to suppress al-Qa'eda (Ibid, 4).*

So, as CCB report underlines, US has assisted the very enemy against whom expansion policy was rendered. But that is the whole purpose of the market, that is the essence and nature of AM/PM, one has to create the demand so that supply can be provided. That is an important example generated through same pattern in Iraq. Libyan pretext directly

relates to Iraq War and US policy on Iraq. According to WikiLeaks' WH record and Amnesty International Report (AIR) called *Tracking Stock: Arming of Islamic State*, Libyan Al-Qaida dominated rebel militias are successors of Al-Qaida dominated rebels group from Iraq and are predecessors of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).<sup>41</sup> Same US trained rebels that had affiliation with Al-Qaida in Libya, came from Iraq and later will join ISIS; likewise, Report revealed that the self-proclaimed rebel/opposition group supported by US, Turkey, Gulf States and western coalition group trades munitions and weaponry with radicals and terrorists (AIR, 2015, p. 5). Around the same time, WikiLeaks published a Report by US army general under State Department of Defence, whereby DIA mission analysis reporter/Gen. states: *the West, Gulf countries and Turkey support the opposition...Opposition is driven by Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) whose operation name Jaish Al-Nusra, the Salafist (Considered Jihadists in West, but supported by SA) and Muslim Brotherhood... AQI declared the Syrian regime as the spearhead of Forefront the Shiites because of Syrian Regime's declaration of war on the Sunnis...AQI is calling for Sunnis to wage war against the Syrian Regime... AQI consider Sunni issue is being linked to the fate of Arabs and Muslims...Those Opposition forces, which are trying to control the Eastern Areas (Hasaka and Der Zor) similar to our (western) Iraqi provinces (in Mosul and Anbar), are supported Western Countries, The Gulf States and Turkey. Most notably, this hypothesis is in accordance with data from recent events, which will help prepare Safe Heavens under international sheltering, similar to what transpired in Libya when Benghazi was chosen as the command center of the temporary government.*<sup>42</sup> As

---

<sup>41</sup> Amnesty International Report, December 2015

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/2812/2015/en/> Also, for WikiLeaks see

<https://stream.org/will-next-wikileaks-release-show-hillary-clinton-armed-jihadists/>

<https://counterjihadreport.com/tag/citizens-commission-on-benghazi/>

<http://www.aim.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/AIM-Citizens-Commission-on-Benghazi-FINAL-REPORT-June-2016.pdf>

<http://www.aim.org/benghazi/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CCB-Additional-Information-Inserts.pdf>

<sup>42</sup> Department of Defence and the State 14-812. Release 10.04. 2015 <http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10-final-version11.pdf> p. 3-5

we see from internal record, State Department was aware of the opposition being under guidance of terrorists, under guidance of Sunni extremists aided by SA Qatar, UAE. Moreover, western coalition provided temporary 'safe havens' for the trainings and recruitments of the 'opposition group', similar to previous circumstances in Iraq and Libya. US supported the Sunni-movement against Shiite. Moreover, DIA Reporter admits that there is a chance of establishing Sunni Salafist Principality thus dividing Syrian regime, which is what the Western powers needed (ibid. p 5). In addition, *In Iraq... this creates the ideal atmosphere for AQI to return to its old pockets in Mosul and Ramadi, and will provide a renewed momentum under the Presumption of Unifying the Jihad among Sunni Iraq and Syria, and the rest Sunnis in the Arab world against what is considered One enemy, the Dissenters* (ibid). This pretext is crucial for showing how threat and identity is interlinked, and more so fabricated for mutual benefit; also, this pattern repeated in Iraq, Libya and Syria. This is how policy justifies the economic/political expansion, or put it simply a demand-side stimulation. Besides production of domestic animal spirits, the state/Self has to ensure Nx of policy or expansion of interest, which is done via state's rogue/complicit involvement into expansion of the 'Other'/terrorism. As in AM, in PM, there ought to be a demand for g/s already produced, which is initiated through the simulation of it. Unlike AM, in PM, the state cannot intervene and then exit the market for the benefit of (other) sellers because the state is the only seller. If US intends to maintain expansion, she will have to stay in the market, hence subscribing to the basic principles of growth/expansion that of AM/PM-alike. It is in this sense the self cannot go without the other both directly and indirectly.

AIR concluded that ISIS acquired weapons from Iraqi and Syrian opposition group that are supported by USA, Gulf States and Turkey (AIR, 2015, p. 5). Moreover, an interim CCB report in 2014 claimed that weapons were delivered by Qatar and UAE to the

Transitional National Council (TNC) supported by western coalition forces.<sup>43</sup> Those weapons were sold to Sunni Islamists under the Muslim Brotherhood lead, which had a link to Al-Qaeda-affiliated Iraqi militia (Ansar al-Shariah) (ibid). Later this incident was summarized as: *'The Intelligence Community (IC) knew that AQI [Al-Qaeda in Iraq] had ties to the rebels in Syria; they knew our Gulf and Turkish allies were happy to strengthen Islamic extremists in a bid to oust Assad; and CIA officers in Benghazi (at a minimum) watched as our allies armed rebels using weapons from Libya. And the IC knew that a surging AQI might lead to the collapse of Iraq'* (Stream, 29August, 2016). In addition, since 2003 the new Iraqi government had purchased tens of thousands of small arms and ammunition from US, with the US government being informed of poor control of arsenal in Iraq, which led to ISIS's acquisition of them (AIM, 2015, p. 5-6). This contributed to the growth of the threat known as Islamic State from the Iraq.

Likewise, commission experts requested a report from State Department, CIA, British and French Intelligence agencies in collaboration with European and regional analysts group, there by compiling data on US Ambassador Christopher Stevens' meetings from 2007 to 2012 with jihadists and any other 'opposition/rebel group' leaders such as:<sup>44</sup>

- Ahmed Abu Khattala a commander of Libyan Ansar al Shariah that we linked to Al-Qaida.
- Mustafa Abdul Jalil Chairman of the Libyan National Transitional Council.
- Wissam bin Hamid, (jihadist) a Libya Shield Brigade commander, supporter of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Justice & Construction Party, and jihad fighter of Iraq &

---

<sup>43</sup> WikiLeaks release on Citizen Commission Report, 2014. Interim Report p. 5

<http://www.aim.org/benghazi/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CCB-Interim-Report-4-22-2014.pdf>

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

Afghanistan, who provided security for US representatives in Benghazi and was tentatively identified by the Library of Congress as the head of al-Qa'eda in Libya.

- Abdelhakim Belhadj (aka Abdallah al Sadeq), veteran jihad fighter of Iraq & Afghanistan, commander of the AQI franchise militia, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) (aka Libyan Islamic Movement for Change), post-revolution military commander of Tripoli, and Libyan delegation leader to the Syrian Free Army in late 2011.
- Ismael al-Sallabi (brother of Ali), commander of the Al-Qaeda linked al-Sahati Brigade during the revolution, and Benghazi Military Council commander afterwards, close ally of Abdelhakim Belhadj and Mustafa Jalil.
- Ali al-Sallabi (brother of Ismael), called the 'spiritual leader' of the Libyan revolution, Muslim Brotherhood links, led effort with Seif al-Qaddafi and US Embassy Tripoli to gain release of jihadi detainees from Libyan jails.
- Mohammad al-Sallabi (jihadist), father of Ali and Ismael, among the founders of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s.
- Abu Sufian bin Qumu, veteran jihad fighter in Afghanistan from Derna, Libya, captured in 2001, detained at GITMO, sent back to Libyan jail, released in 2010, led jihad vs Qaddafi in 2011, and led Benghazi Mission attack in Sep 2012.


This again indicates the connection that US government kept with the 'other' side, as a way to export the policy (Nx). That is the pattern of fabricating a threat, thus stimulating the *demand* in the region, thus closing our *cyclical* production of power in PM or AD stimulation. We also provide data on the actual expansion of Terrorism because of AD

expansion. This embraces the chapter on Engineering Threat/Identity, here by indicating connection between construction of threat and identity, policy and rendition/expansion. We demonstrated that US foreign policy and the rise of terrorism had much more in common than one would think of. We also now understand that this is how things ought to be if the state wants to penetrate its policy, interest, thus the power. This is the demand-side stimulation of politics, where the expansion creates opportunity for existence of identity or for products engineered by it; thus leading to order and security of the political market. In PM, akin to AM, the investment into consumption of ‘intelligence’/capital’ produces policy (product), which sets the pattern of expansion; in AM/PM-alike, policy must result in a usage of it in new market. However, it is much more complicated to justify expansion in PM than in AM, hence there are *diffuse methods* that are incremental to immaterial faculties and properties of Political Science. US deliberate support for ‘opposition/rebels’ and radical Islam is way to maintain expansion and Nx. The following chart shows that terrorist attacks/threats have increased exponentially since 9/11, which is not accidental, but rather a principle of the market. (GTI, 2015, p.15).

The following chart completes residual part of Keynes AD formula, where  $Self=AD=I+C+Gs+Nx$ , where state itself responsible for maintaining growth/expansion. It is therefore, expansion of the *Other/threat* is an impact factor for an expansion of the Self; it is via those diffuse methods, immaterial manifests into material thus constituting AD of PM or Keynesian Politics. Chart shows the increase of terrorist attacks since 2000s, which is the period of increase in intensity of political intervention policies.

**FIGURE 2** TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2000–2014

The majority of terrorist incidents are highly centralised. In 2014, 57 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries; Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.



Source: START GTD

(Source: <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf> p. 15)

As one conceives, maintaining AD for policy, hence identity is not cabbalistic interpretation. Similarly, Terrorist incidents are centralized, *that is not to confuse with terrorism being localized, but rather expansion is being centralized*. Therefore, we suggest hypothesis that is *Political intervention policies, similar to Economic intervention polices, is state's demand-stimulation policy or deliberate expansion of its Political Market*. The more global national interest/investment is, the more aggressive the intensity of demand stimulation must be. This is the AD and the success of it in political sense of this word.

## VIII. Conclusion

This study used Keynesian Politics utilized as such in US political discourse. We have integrated Keynes macro-economic/political variables on boosting AD and consumption thereof. Consumption is the most important variable of economic/political activity furthering the subsequent economic/political expansion. We now know how  $N_x$  is balanced out by state/seller. We now understand how Keynesian Politics is featured in US PM through the stimulation of consumption via ambiguous means. We now know that IC can and must deliberately produce intelligence in order to induce particular consumption of political  $g/s$  for Congress and the public. We now have an insight into process of policy/market expansion and how it is stimulated within the concepts of identity and threat. We now know how AD for power and state's  $g/s$  is exported into the market. The initial part of the study dwelled into matters of Keynesian notion of Animal Spirits and how it relates to consumption. We found out that President and Intelligence Community had worked together in making the case for specific intelligence. This also explain that in Political Market, there political owners of means of production who utilize information as it serve the interest. We employed diffused methods of discourse since in political science the substance of trade is immaterial like idea, belief and value. We see the unique position that authority stands on when choosing methods of production. Intelligence Community Reports were crucial in determining national policy that goes hand in hand with state interest. War is the choice that brings forward the experience such as installing the state interest. Once Congress and population had been misled into accommodating policy against Iraq, it was a matter of time of when to launch the intervention. Animal Sprits is embraced through the intelligence production that shaped particular policy stand. Misinformed populace is perquisite to produce products or policies that otherwise would have been produced and consumed. This is due nature of US global commitment that by

default requires certain intensity of public engagement. In the initial part, we assessed investment made into policy production, which is an incremental part of state national interest. Existence of threat leaves no choice but to act since it triggers survival instinct, which constitutes the consumption of intelligence. Once policy is produced and consumed domestically, it is matter of export to apply it globally.

As a part of stimulating demand, State has to guarantee reproduction and legitimization of its power in anew market. It is done by contributing to the very thing that stimulates the demand, namely threat and terrorism. Recall that the very existence of crisis legitimizes state intervention, which in PM, terrorism contributes to. We have witnessed that the rise in terrorism index interlinked with US intervention or US policy. We have also found evidence that US government intentionally supports terror-donoring states. This creates additional demand for exporting the policy, hence integrating state interest.

This study used diffuse methods of reasoning via the discourse analysis that embraces freedom of understanding in political science. Which is an incremental piece of political science, since the unit of exchange is immaterial and limitless in itself. As explained in methodology, fields of languages/sciences are not supposed to contradict each other, but rather to complete. Thus, we used Keynesian Economic in order to analyze how Political Intervention Policies resemble Economic Intervention Policies, where both have been used to establish stability, security and order for the market.

We realize that political intervention policies are state deliberate expansion policy brought into global arena. Without it state interest, hence the identity dissipates. Because there is a competition, state has to engage in a production of supply and demand.

One may contemplate on how to shift this pattern of reproduction, how to terminate expansion. The obvious answer is to not expand the Self or to not participate in terrorism/threat expansion. In AM of Keynes, if we have guarantee that nobody wants growth, then there is an assurance that nobody aims to expand. However, Capitalism is naturally competitive or put it simply, capitalism is expansive by nature. AM and PM expands unless there is no room for expansion, then the crisis occurs which changes the structure of market and cycle starts again.

## IX. Bibliography and references

- A. van Dijk, Teun 1993, Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. SAGE (London. Newbury Park and New Delhi), vol. 4(2): 249- 283  
<http://discourses.org/OldArticles/Principles%20of%20critical%20discourse%20analysis.pdf>
- A. van Dijk, Teun, 1998b, Discourse, Knowledge and Ideology: Reformulating Old Questions and Proposing Some New Solutions. British Library Cataloguing, UK.  
<http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Discourse,%20Knowledge%20and%20Ideology.pdf>
- A. van Dijk, Teun, 1998b, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. SAGE Publications Ltd., British Library Cataloguing in Publication data, UK
- Al Jazeera 1 November 2004; Bin Laden Speech  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html>
- Amnesty International Report, December 2015  
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/2812/2015/en/>
- Ancient History Encyclopaedia/Sophism/Protagoras by Joshua Mark, January 2012  
<http://www.ancient.eu/article/61/>
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, 2006, Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Willey Online Library.
- Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond, 2005 Power in International Relations. International Organization Vol. 59, No. 1, MIT Press, USA  
<http://www.rochelleterman.com/ir/sites/default/files/Barnett%20and%20Duvall%20005.pdf>

- Berger, Peter Ludwig and Luckmann, Thomas, 1966, The social construction of reality. Penguin books, UK <http://perflensburg.se/Berger%20social-construction-of-reality.pdf>
- Bernays, Edward, 1955, Propaganda, Ig Publishing; First Paperback Edition Used edition (September 1, 2004)
- Bible/King James Version John 1:1-14, <https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+1%3A1-14&version=KJV>
- Campbell, David 1998 *From Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, revised edition, by David Campbell. University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted by permission of University of Minnesota Press and Manchester University Press, Manchester, UK. [https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Campbell--Writing\\_Security.pdf](https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Campbell--Writing_Security.pdf)
- Campbell, David, 1998, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Published September 1st 1998 by University Of Minnesota Press, USA
- CFA, 21 April 2016 WHAT A REAL REVIEW OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD SAY <https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/what-a-real-review-of-u-s-military-assistance-to-saudi-arabia-would-say/>
- Chomsky, Noam, 1989, *Necessary Illusions*. South End Press, Pluto Press, USA. Chomsky, Noam 2001, *9/11- Was There an Alternative*, Open Media Production, USA, Interview with Manifesto, Italy. <http://faculty.mu.edu.sa/public/uploads/1333600597.1405Noam%20Chomsky%20-%209-11.pdf>
- Chomsky, Noam, 2015, *Because We Say So*. Penguin, UK

- Chomsky, Noam 2011, *9-11 was there an alternative?* Open Media Production, USA  
[https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0542/4573/files/9-11\\_Extract.pdf](https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0542/4573/files/9-11_Extract.pdf)
- Chomsky, Noam, 1999, *Profit Over People*. Seven Stories Press, USA
- Chomsky, Noam, 2016 *What Kind of Creatures are we*, Columbia University Press, USA.
- Citizen's Commission Report on Benghazi 2014/2016 <http://www.aim.org/benghazi/>  
<http://www.aim.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/AIM-Citizens-Commission-on-Benghazi-FINAL-REPORT-June-2016.pdf>
- CNN, June 15, 2015 CIA declassifies inspector general's report on 9/11 shortcomings. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/12/politics/cia-inspector-general-report-declassified/>
- Congress 108 Session 2nd S. Report 108-301 July 9, 2004, NIE 2002 and Iraqi Pre-War Intelligence Assessment <http://web.mit.edu/simsong/www/iraqreport2-textunder.pdf>
- Congress/Speeches/Ron Paul House Floor Speech on Iraq (October 8, 2002)  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TZ5cpaPlf4>
- Congress/Speeches/Ron Paul House Floor Speech on Iraq (October 8, 2002)  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TZ5cpaPlf4>
- de Saussure, Ferdinand (1983) *Course in General Linguistics* Chicago: Open Court.  
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~drrussel/www548/20Saussure.pdf>
- Department of Defence, Sept. 2004, Donald Rumsfeld Report: Report of the Defence Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication.  
<https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/commun.pdf>

- Department of Defence: Dictionary. Last Accessed 21.1.2017  
[https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1\\_02.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf)
- Dissident Voice/ Noam Chomsky-Sunil Sharma/July 28, 2002  
[http://dissidentvoice.org/Articles/Chomsky\\_DV-HotType.htm](http://dissidentvoice.org/Articles/Chomsky_DV-HotType.htm)
- Ditrych, Ondrej, 2014 Tracing the Discourses of Terrorism: Identity, Genealogy and State. Central and Eastern European Perspective On International Relations, (Palgrave Macmillan, US)
- Executive Office of the President of the US, Federal Budget Fiscal Year 1970-2017/ Overview. <http://federal-budget.insidegov.com/l/120/2017-Estimate> , <http://federal-budget.insidegov.com/l/72/1970#Spending&s=47xnQz> , <http://federal-budget.insidegov.com/>
- F. Scheuer Michael 2004, *Imperial Hubris*, Brassey's INC, Washington D.C. p. XV  
<https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/Imperial%20hubris.pdf>
- Foucault, Michel, (1775-6) Society Must Be Defended, ed. Arnold Davidson (Picador NEW YORK), [http://rebels-library.org/files/foucault\\_society\\_must\\_be\\_defended.pdf](http://rebels-library.org/files/foucault_society_must_be_defended.pdf)
- Foucault, Michel, 1977, *Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse On Language*. Pantheon Book, USA  
[https://monoskop.org/images/9/90/Foucault\\_Michel\\_Archaeology\\_of\\_Knowledge.pdf](https://monoskop.org/images/9/90/Foucault_Michel_Archaeology_of_Knowledge.pdf)
- Foucault, Michel, 1977, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in Language, Counter-Memory, practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, edited by D. F. Bouchard: Cornell, University Press.  
<https://is.cuni.cz/studium/eng/predmety/index.php?id=dbe77012416198b9c45d5f79e3a9827e&tid=&do=download&did=90639&kod=JPM505>

- Gaddis J. Lewis, 2005, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. Harvard University Press; 1st Paperback edition (October 31, 2005)
- Gallup march 23 2003 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/8038/seventytwo-percent-americans-support-war-against-iraq.aspx>
- Gershkoff, Amy and Kushner, Shana, 2005, Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration's Rhetoric. Articles/Shaping Public Opinion September Volume 3 No 3, 2005  
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/shaping-public-opinion-the-911-iraq-connection-in-the-bush-administrations-rhetoric/FBF0272D582863800F770F1AEE276593>
- Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2015 Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. Institute For Economics and Peace. <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>
- Greene, Brian 2011, The Hidden Reality, Alfred A. Knopf, USA
- Greene, Brian, 2005, The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality, Vintage, USA
- Guardian, 18 march 2003. Full Text: Bush's Speech  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq>
- Guerrilla News Network, Noam Chomsky interviewed by Stephen Marshall, November 2001 [https://chomsky.info/200111\\_04/](https://chomsky.info/200111_04/)
- Guzzini, Stefano, 1993, Structural Power: the limits of neorealist power analysis. International Organization 47, 3, MIT, USA
- Guzzini, Stefano, 2005, The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis. Journal of International Relations Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 495-521

- H.J.Res. 114 (107th): Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/107-2002/h455>
- Hayes, Mark, 2006, The Economics of Keynes: A New Guide to the General Theory, (Cheltenham, UK) <https://www.postkeynesian.net/downloads/MGH2006.pdf> ; ALSO for Formula look at Khan Academy/Aggregate demand in Keynesian analysis. <https://www.khanacademy.org/economics-finance-domain/macroeconomics/aggregate-supply-demand-topic/keynesian-thinking/a/aggregate-demand-in-keynesian-analysis-cnx>
- Hilary Clinton Speeches (Senate/Gov/Speeches/Iraq S.J. Res. 45). [http://clinton.senate.gov/speeches/iraq\\_101002.html](http://clinton.senate.gov/speeches/iraq_101002.html)
- Hopf, Ted, 1998, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 171-200, MIT, USA <https://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/IntPol/Hopf%201998.pdf>
- House/Speeches, Iraq Resolution Transcript 2002 October 10 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-10-10/html/CREC-2002-10-10-pt1-PgS10233-7.htm>  
<http://www.aim.org/benghazi/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CCB-Additional-Information-Inserts.pdf>  
<http://www.aim.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/AIM-Citizens-Commission-on-Benghazi-FINAL-REPORT-June-2016.pdf>  
<http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/1/12/435624/>  
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-spending>  
<https://counterjihadreport.com/tag/citizens-commission-on-benghazi/>  
[https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA\\_WealthNations\\_p.pdf](https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf)

- IBTimes, 05/26/15. Clinton Foundation Donors Got Weapons Deals From Hillary Clinton's State Department <http://www.ibtimes.com/clinton-foundation-donors-got-weapons-deals-hillary-clintons-state-department-1934187>
- Independent Wednesday 22 March 2017, Saudi Arabia faces largest ever 9/11 lawsuit - accused of prior knowledge over terror attack  
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/saudi-arabia-911-victims-lawsuit-prior-knowledge-world-trade-center-terror-attack-twin-towers-a7644016.html>
- Independent, 2 May 2016 CIA Director John Brennan says secret '28 pages' of 9/11 report about Saudi Arabia should remain secret  
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/cia-director-john-brennan-911-report-september-11-censored-secret-a7009586.html>
- Intelligence/Senate/Gov/ Wendy Morigi (202) 224-6101  
<https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/senate-intelligence-committee-unveils-final-phase-ii-reports-prewar-iraq-intelligence>
- J. Betz, David and Stevens, Tim (2013) 'Analogical Reasoning and Cyber Security', Security Dialogue 44, no. 2: 147-164, King's College, UK.  
[https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/files/25502982/BETZ\\_STEVENS\\_Analogical\\_Reasoning\\_and\\_Cyber\\_Security\\_2013.pdf](https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/files/25502982/BETZ_STEVENS_Analogical_Reasoning_and_Cyber_Security_2013.pdf)
- Jameson and Waldman, 2003, *Press Effect*, (Oxford, University Press)  
<http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5264S.pdf>
- Joel Rogers and Cohen, Joshua, 1986, *Inequity and Intervention: The Federal Budget and Central America*, Library Congress Cataloguing Data, US.
- John Edwards HOUSE FLOOR SPEECH ON IRAQ OCTOBER, 2002  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HY6BZgkI0kI&list=PL9C9897F1AB949DF6&index=2>

- Katzenstein, Peter J. 2002 *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, USA <http://www.fb03.uni-frankfurt.de/45503391/Introduction-from-Katzenstein-1996---The-Culture-of-National-Security.pdf>
- Keynes, J. Maynard , 1936, *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* ,this research uses the version provided by International Relation and Security Network (February, 1936, Zurich, Switzerland). please follow the link: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125515/1366\\_KeynesTheoryofEmployment.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125515/1366_KeynesTheoryofEmployment.pdf)
- Klotz, Audie and Prakash, Deepa, 2008, *Qualitative Methods in International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan, UK
- Koppl, Roger , 1991, *Animal Spirits*, American Economic Association. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer, 1991). Last accessed March 2017.
- Kreisler, Harry, 2010, *Political Awakenings: Conversations with History*. New Press (the New Press, USA)
- Lanza, Robert, 2009, *Biocentrism: How Life and Consciousness are the keys to understanding the true nature of the Universe*. Benbella Books, Inc., USA
- Manyiwa, Simon, 2012 *Fear Appeals in Anti-Smoking Advertising: How Important is Self-Efficacy?* (Springer Link) <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1005822414588>
- Meltzer H. Alan 1996, *The General Theory after Sixty Years*. *Journal Of Post Keynesian Economics* Vol. 19 , Iss. 1,1996, Taylor and Francis Online. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01603477.1996.11490094?journalCode=mpke20>

- McGehee, Ralph 1983/1999 *Deadly Deceits*, (Ocean Press, USA)  
<https://books.google.cz/books?id=EOcsBgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false> Chapter 14-Conclusion (there is no paging due to copyrights, so please scroll down to CH. 14/ 1st Paragraph)
- NSA ARCHIVES, *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*  
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie.pdf>, 2002 October
- NYT, 29 December, 2007 Edward Talks about his war Vote  
<https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/29/edwards-talks-about-his-war-vote/>
- Pape, Robert, 2005, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. Random House, New York, <https://inkyfada.com/wp-content/themes/inky/assets/pdf/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AA%20%D9%85%D9%86%20%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%84%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%20%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%20%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9.pdf>
- Pinker, Steven, 2002, *the Blank Slate*. Penguin Books, UK
- Pinker, Steven, 2009, *How the Mind Works*. Penguin Random House, UK
- Public Hearing, Iraq Resolution. (Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 133, October 10, 2002) <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-10-10/html/CREC-2002-10-10-pt1-PgS10233-7.htm>

- Rene Descartes in Philosophical Letters by Anthony Kenny 1970, penultimate paragraph at <http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/vol1/eustac1.html>
- Report, On US Pre-War Intelligence Assessment On Iraq, that had started June 2003 and delivered July 2004. [https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004\\_rpt/ssci\\_iraq.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/ssci_iraq.pdf)
- Reuters, September 6, 2016. Obama administration arms sales offers to Saudi top \$115 billion: report <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-security-idUSKCN11D2JQ>
- S. Huntington (1983) American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, Belknap Press (Massachusetts, USA)
- Salon/ Joanna Rothkopf/George W. Bush's CIA briefer admits Iraq WMD "intelligence" was a lie, MAY 20, 2015
- SIPRI Fact Sheet February 2016 <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1602.pdf>
- Slate/ Article/ Janelle Bouie Iraq War was't an honest mistake, 19 May 2015 [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/politics/2015/05/the\\_iraq\\_war\\_wasn\\_t\\_an\\_honest\\_mistake\\_republicans\\_are\\_still\\_defending\\_the.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/05/the_iraq_war_wasn_t_an_honest_mistake_republicans_are_still_defending_the.html)
- Smith, Adam An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, ed. by MetaLibri (2007) Glasgow.
- Sørensen, Georg and Jackson, Robert, 2015, Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, UK
- Stream/ 29 August 2016, Will Next WikiLeaks Release Show Hillary Clinton Helped Arm Jihadists <https://stream.org/will-next-wikileaks-release-show-hillary-clinton-armed-jihadists>
- Telegraph, SABRI Haji Mar 18 2013 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9937516/Iraq-war-the-greatest-intelligence-failure-in-living-memory.html>

- Television News Archives/ Advanced Search  
<https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&query=saddam+2001&button=>
- The Guardian October 7 Transcript: George Bush's speech on Iraq  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/07/usa.iraq>
- TheWeek/ 8 august 2015 How Saudi Arabia exports radical Islam  
<http://theweek.com/articles/570297/how-saudi-arabia-exports-radical-islam>
- Trading Economics/US Government Spending/last updated March 2017
- US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2 February, 2017  
<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm>
- USA GOV/SPENDING <http://usgovernmentspending.blogspot.cz/2009/03/table-of-data-sources-by-year.html> UPDATED: 12/28/2016
- USATODAY, 9/6/2003 [https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-09-06-poll-iraq\\_x.htm](https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-09-06-poll-iraq_x.htm)
- Warburton, Nigel 2011, A Little History of Philosophy. Yale University Press, USA
- WarOnTheRocks, 26 October 2016, US-Saudi Relations <http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/us-saudi-relations/p36524>
- Washington Post, WP April 17, 2004 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17347-2004Apr16.html>
- Weldes, Jutta, 1996, Constructing National Interests. Sage Publication, European Journal of International Relations 1996; 2; 275.  
<https://ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/Pol272/Weldes.pdf>
- Wendt, Alexander, 1992, Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-

425,

[http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1341873.files/Week%201/Wendt\\_1992.pdf](http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1341873.files/Week%201/Wendt_1992.pdf)

- Wendt, Alexander, 2015, *Quantum Mind and Social Science, Unifying Physical and Social Ontology*, Published April 23rd 2015 by Cambridge University Press, UK
- White House, Sep. 11/12, 2001. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>
- WikiLeaks Declassified Documents <https://stream.org/will-next-wikileaks-release-show-hillary-clinton-armed-jihadists/>
- WikiLeaks release on Citizen Commission Report, 2014. Interim Report <http://www.aim.org/benghazi/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CCB-Interim-Report-4-22-2014.pdf>
- WikiLeaks release on Department of Defence and the State 14-812. Release 10.04. 2015 <http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10-final-version11.pdf>
- WikiLeaks, John Podesta, Subject: Congrats! <https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/3774>
- Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Brigitte L. Nacos, News and Entertainment Media: Government's Big Helpers in the Selling of Counterterrorism, vol 8, no 5 Perspective on Terrorism <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/375/html>
- Z Magazine, Noam Chomsky Info October, 1997, paragraph 15-6. [https://chomsky.info/199710\\_\\_\\_/](https://chomsky.info/199710___/)

- Zuber-Skerritt, Ortrun, 1996, New Directions in Action Research. Falmer Press, London, UK. <https://www.questia.com/library/103466365/new-directions-in-action-research>

**x.**