

In the 1990's appeared new relevant documents from archives in Moscow, which bear testimony, that the Red Army was being prepared for an attack on Germany in 1941. There are two basic hypotheses:

1. The war preparations of the Soviet Union in spring 1941 had an offensive character.
2. The Red Army was ready to start a large-scale offensive military campaign in the West already in summer 1941.

The aim of this rigorous thesis is either to confirm such hypotheses or to deny them. The topic is divided into four chapters.

The first chapter deals with Mobilization Plan MP-41, which was approved in February 1941. This plan is presented as a basic document for reorganisation and rearmament of the Red Army. It would have required around five years to provide the Red Army with weaponry called for by the MP-41. However there was no need to achieve full combat strength according to this ambitious plan to launch an attack on Germany. Soviet mobilization in spring 1941 was carried out secretly and covered by large training exercises.

The second chapter speaks about the war planning in the period 1940-1941. All modifications of Operational Plans (Strategic Deployment Plans), which were worked out in the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, were thoroughly analyzed. In the centre of my analysis there was an Operational plan from May 1941, which is also called "Zhukov's Plan". It is an essential document for understanding the Soviet aims. The texts of all modifications of Operational plan (with only one exception - the plan from March 1941) had already been published, what enables us to present a reliable reconstruction of the aims of Soviet general staff.

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