

Summary in English:

In the first half of the book Theta of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle discusses *dunamis* as a property of a being. In this sense, *dunamis* is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself *qua* other, thereby exercising itself in its *energeia*. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses *dunamis* as a way of being. In this sense, a being is *dunamei* another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being *energeiai*.

The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of *dunamis* and *energeia* as they appear in the chapters 1, 2, 6 and partly 7 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of *dunamis* and *energeia* in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are *dunamis* in the sense of a principle of change and *dunamis* as a way of being mutually dependent? Are *energeia* as change and being *energeiai* related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics?

Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of *dunamis* in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the interconnection of both concepts of *dunamis*: in the course of the exposition of the *dunamis* to produce a change, Aristotle elaborates on *energeia* which then allows him, by means of analogy, to broaden the scope of the concept to include further meanings. Consequently, he shows that each meaning of *energeia* correlates with a certain meaning of *dunamis*, not all of which however correspond to the *dunamis* to produce a change. In this way Aristotle broadens the concept of *dunamis*, yet also demonstrates that having the *dunamis* to produce a change is a way, but not the only one, of being *dunamei*.