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Marlene Breier

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HONG KONGERS ADDING OIL
A Critical Analysis of the SAR's
Pro-Democracy Movements

Author	Marlene Breier
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Supervisor:	PhDr. Vít Strítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.
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Abstract

Since its transition from British colonial rule to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong has undergone extensive developments, resulting in the emergence of a vibrant civil society. With thousands of agitated people, mainly students, taking to the streets, voicing their dissatisfaction with the governments' continued disregard of the demanded direct elections by universal suffrage, 2014 marked a turning point in Hong Kong. Whilst most citizens supported the pro-democracy movements, the Chinese government labeled it as a threat to national security, ignoring the fact that Beijing itself can, at times, be seen as a threat. With Hong Kong now facing its first high-level elections since the abrupt conclusion of the 79-day sit-in, now better known as "Umbrella Movement", it will be interesting to see whether its citizens are still "adding oil"¹ two years later, resulting in a high voter turnout and support of the pro-democracy camp.

¹ "Add oil" is a transliteration deriving from the Cantonese "Ga Yao" (加油), used to encourage an individual or group. Initially being used during sports event, it now turned into a symbolic expression of support, after having been extensively used during the Umbrella Movement in 2014 (Bland 2015).

Keywords

Hong Kong, China, Social Movements, Umbrella Movement, Democracy, Participation

Declaration of Authorship

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 130,640 keystrokes long (including spaces), i.e. 61 manuscript pages – or 73 standard manuscript pages à 1800 keystrokes each.

Date

Name

Signature

Hong Kongers Adding Oil: A Critical Analysis of the SAR's Pro-Democracy Movements

Recently, the typically politically low-key city of Hong Kong has been covering newspapers worldwide, whilst raising eyebrows and thus concerns within the Chinese Communist Party. Never before have had the pro-democracy movements gained as much attention as they did in late 2014. Not only the media and politicians, but even individuals from all over the world were captured by the scenes of Hong Kong citizens starting an uprising against their own and the Mainland Chinese governments, coining the terms “Occupy Central” and “Umbrella Movement”.

Before the beginning of 2015, however, the Hong Kong protesters' camps were dissolved and every single occupied zone in Hong Kong was cleared. By now, newspapers have long moved on to cover more pressing issues and the once so important and interesting Umbrella Movement has calmed down again. “The movement for democracy has largely been relegated to online forums and abstract discussions”, but there's also still “a handful of tents that remained [...]”¹, preserving and maintaining the idea the thousands and thousands of protestors started to spread last year. Furthermore, there have been ongoing negotiations between Hong Kong and People's Republic of China officials, aiming at finding a suitable solution for both sides, satisfying the pro-democracy activists calling for “real democracy”, as well as Beijing officials fearing to lose power if one of their Special Administrative Regions now became more democratic.

Despite media's decreasing interest in the issue, the situation continues to be critical, especially due to the upcoming elections of the Legislative Council and Chief Executive, in 2016 and 2017 respectively. This elections, other than promulgated, will not be held providing and respecting “genuine democracy”. Instead, direct elections by universal suffrage continue to be shelved indefinitely, further agitating Hong Kong citizens, who have been aiming at achieving “genuine” democratic elections for the past years, or even decades.

¹ Iyengar, Rishi (2015). Hong Kong's Umbrella Revolutionaries Are Slowly Coming Back to the Streets. In: *Time*, 14 April 2015. URL: <http://time.com/3814943/occupy-hong-kong-china-umbrella-revolution-democracy/>

Given the continued importance of the issue, the master's thesis will focus on Hong Kong and its pro-democracy movements, particularly the Umbrella Movement, highlighting the city's attempt at encouraging democratization, which, however, is generally threatened by external factors, primarily the People's Republic of China's influence.

In order to be able to assess the Umbrella Movement as important pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, the theory of social movements will be presented and analyzed. One of the main works to be used is Claus Offe's 1985 publication "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics", which, however, may not fully apply to Hong Kong's case due to the work having been published thirty years ago, as well as it being a "Western" work. Taking this into consideration, other works on social movements may be included in order to better understand and present the case of Hong Kong.

Given the topicality of the issue, the amount of directly related literature is quite limited, underlining the importance of newspaper articles and journal publications, which will be used to assess the more recent events and developments. Main news outlets concerned with Hong Kong's development include, amongst others, its local South China Morning Post, Britain's Guardian, as well as The New York Times.

Moreover, as part of the thesis, a survey will be conducted, aiming at assessing the Hong Kong citizens' opinion on the Umbrella Movement and pro-democracy movements in general. The results of the survey will be contrasted with existing works, as well as articles, on the matter, further highlighting the continued importance of Hong Kong's pro-democracy movements.

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1 Introduction

Since its transition from British colonial rule to Chinese sovereignty two decades ago, in 1997, the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong has undergone extensive economic, political and social developments, ultimately resulting in the emergence of a vibrant civil society, whose members frequently participate in protest and social movements. With thousands of agitated people, mainly students, taking to the streets of Hong Kong's central districts, voicing their dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong and Chinese governments' continued disregard of the demanded direct elections by universal suffrage, which should have been provided by 2017, the year in which the elections for the city's next Chief Executive will take place, September 2014 marked a turning point in Hong Kong's political structure and history, in general. Whilst the majority of Hong Kong citizens supported the pro-democracy movements, better known as the now infamous "Umbrella Movement", the Chinese government, as well as pro-Beijing forces, immediately condemned the Movement, labeling it as a threat to national security, ignoring the fact that Beijing itself can, at times, be seen as a threat to Hong Kong security.

Recent incidents, reconfirming the People's Republic of China's predominance, despite Hong Kong's alleged high degree of autonomy, have added to the fact that Hong Kongers' demand for and attempt at pushing for further democratization, amongst others, is constantly threatened by China's growing influence on the Special Administrative Region. Thus, the Hong Kong-Mainland relationship continues to influence and define events and developments in both, Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, while the impact on Hong Kong and its society is typically stronger, given China's predominance in a variety of ways. Whilst China continues to be portrayed as rising, potentially threatening, global power, Hong Kong is generally seen as the People's Republic of China's "door to the West". This, however, might change if the Chinese government continues its strategy of bluntly disregarding the Hong Kong citizens' demands, reassessing the city's status as Special Administrative Region with a high degree of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, or even authority.

With Hong Kong now facing its first high-level elections since the abrupt conclusion of the 79-day sit-in, in late 2014, it will be interesting to see whether the citizens are still “adding oil”² almost two years after the Umbrella Movement, thus, resulting in a high voter turnout, as well as the pro-democracy camp receiving the majority of the votes.

There is a variety of reasons, why the developments in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong are interest to scholars of social sciences. Besides its special status under the principle of “One Country, Two Systems”, allowing for a high degree of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong and especially its civil society are now awakening to the fact of China’s increasing interference in its affairs, condemning its impact on Hong Kong’s political and social spheres. Furthermore, after realizing the Chinese, as well as Hong Kong, governments’ disregard of previously stipulated agreements, allowing for direct elections by universal suffrage to take place by 2017, the situation in Hong Kong is now more heated than ever, which makes an analysis of social movements, particularly pro-democracy movements, in consideration of the city’s history, as well as relationship with the Chinese government, particularly interesting.

Given the topicality, the existing literature on the Umbrella Movement, and social movement in Hong Kong in general, is rather limited. Besides a number of journal articles, the majority of information on the matter was obtained from articles of both, local and international newspapers. In order to create a theoretical framework, suitable to analyze new social movements in Hong Kong, using the Umbrella Movement as case study, theoretical approaches of a variety of scholars from, both, inside and outside of Hong Kong were used. This led to an analysis of the Umbrella Movement in line with a relatively wide range of theories and findings on new social movements, in general. Additionally, a small-scale online survey was conducted to further analyze Hong Kong citizens’ perception and understanding of the incident, as well as current situation. Together with the books, articles and documents, the survey’s results help paint a picture of the events leading up to and following the new infamous Umbrella Movement, which will be the main focus of this critical analysis.

² “Add oil” is a transliteration deriving from the Cantonese “Ga Yao” (加油), used to encourage an individual or group. Initially being used during sports event, it now turned into a symbolic expression of support, after having been extensively used during the Umbrella Movement in 2014 (Bland 2015).

In an attempt to reveal the main reasons behind the Umbrella Movement and the amount of attention it received, the city's political history, as well as its previous movements, will be thoroughly discussed, before undertaking an extensive analysis of the Umbrella Movement's organization, actors involved and issues raised, concluding in presenting the results of the conducted survey. Using all data and information collected, a final conclusion will elaborate on prospects for 2017, the year Hong Kong will elect its next Chief Executive, and 2047, the year the principle of "One Country, Two Systems" will expire, finally concluding this work with several final thoughts on the subject matter.

This thesis aims at putting pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong, particularly the most recent Umbrella Movement, under critical analysis. The goal is to find out the main reasons behind the Umbrella Movement and why it got that much attention, especially compared to previous movements in Hong Kong. In order to be able to assess the Movement, as such, the theory of new social movements along the lines of Offe (1985) and Della Porta & Diani (2006) was chosen as theoretical background, enabling a thorough analysis of the Movement's organization, actors involved, as well as issues raised. As the general idea of new social movements was developed by Western scholars, other publications, dealing with East Asian, or even Hong Kong, social movements, were used in addition to the main works of Offe and Della Porta & Diani.

Additionally, the work also puts democratization, as an important issue in connection to Hong Kong's pro-democracy movements, at the center of analysis, focusing on its process in the Special Administrative Region, whilst also taking into consideration the People's Republic of China's role.

2 Methodology

Following the theoretical approach, this work will give a short overview of Hong Kong's political history, starting with its colonization by Britain, followed by the transition from British colonial rule to Chinese sovereignty and, finally, the post-transition period. Throughout this chapter, political happenings will be presented alongside important legal documents, as for example the Basic Law, also known as Hong Kong's "mini-constitution", and principles, like the "One Country, Two Systems" approach, which continue to influence the Special Administrative Region's political and social system to this day.

Along the lines of the theory of new social movements, as it will be presented in the following chapter, previous movements in Hong Kong will be introduced and analyzed. This is not only important in relation to the political and social development in Hong Kong, but also enables a comparison with the 2014 Umbrella Movement, which will be critically analyzed in the subsequent chapter. The Movement, as such, will be put under scrutiny by thoroughly analyzing its organization, actors involved, as well as issues raised and goals aimed at. Hence, this part of the thesis will especially assist in approaching the hypotheses, which were previously mentioned.

Chapter 6 will deal with the various issues and aims, in connection to the Umbrella Movement, which are also permanently influencing a Hong Konger's everyday life. Besides the often mentioned universal suffrage and direct election, other important issues include democracy, autonomy and identity, to name but a few. These will be dealt with using, both, existing literature and newspaper articles, in order to combine the issues' theory with their occurrence and handling in today's Hong Kong.

Finally, the relationship between the Special Administrative Region and the People's Republic of China will be broken down, discussing the Chinese government's stance on the Umbrella Movement, its aftermath and Hong Kong's current status quo, followed by a presentation of prospects for 2017, the year in which direct elections by universal suffrage during the Chief Executive election should have been guaranteed, and 2047, the year the concept of "One Country, Two Systems" will be

in its final stage, concluding the transitional phase and inducing the end of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, as we know it.

In the course of this work, scientific contents of various primary and secondary sources will be presented and discussed thoroughly. Amongst the primary sources are books, articles in journals and newspapers, whilst secondary sources mainly include legal documents and papers. Additionally, data was collected in form of an online survey, which will be further elaborated on later on.

2.1 Hypotheses

In order to be able to answer the rather broad research question, these four hypotheses have been chosen:

Hypothesis 1: The actors involved were concerned with different issues, and thus, aiming at different goals.

Throughout the Umbrella Movement, it didn't seem to be clear what issues the participants tried to focus on. Given the diversity of participants, from high school students to long-time activists, it seemed to be almost impossible for a seemingly leaderless movement to organize itself and to choose specific issues and goals.

Hypothesis 2: The aim for universal suffrage was the main cause for participation.

The Umbrella Movement seemed to take its form after the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress's decision to disregard a previously stipulated decision to offer direct elections by universal suffrage of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council, in 2017 and 2020 respectively. With the demand for direct elections by universal suffrage still apparent and the movement losing its momentum, it is interesting to find out if universal suffrage was actually the cause for participation.

Hypothesis 3: The Umbrella Movement's actions haven't led to any specific changes.

After the protesters' last tents were dismantled in late 2014, one could read posters saying: "We'll be back". This promise was made after the Umbrella Movement seemed to end with demands unanswered and issues unresolved. Due to the diversity

of actions attempted or implemented and actors involved, however, it is to be assumed that the Movement's actions have, indeed, led to certain outcomes – an assumption that will be tested in the chapter dealing with the aftermath of the Umbrella Movement of 2014.

Hypothesis 4: The Movement was generally perceived as positive.

Throughout the weeks of occupation and active actions carried out by the participants of the Umbrella Movement, the Movement seemed to not only have gotten a lot of attention, but also appraisal from all sides. The intensive media coverage, as well as the many reactions from, both, internal and external actors, have led to the assumption that the Movement has definitely left an impression on many, with the impression being of generally positive nature.

These four hypotheses were chosen corresponding to the relatively general research question in order to facilitate a thorough analysis and enable a deeper understanding of the matter. Thus, in order to assess the main reasons behind the Umbrella Movement and the amount of attention it attracted, it is of utmost importance to analyze the actors involved and issues raised (See Hypothesis 1 and 2), the outcomes achieved (See Hypothesis 3), as well as the general public's perception (See Hypothesis 4). Unlike discursive analyses, the chosen hypotheses will be tested not only taking into consideration existing literature, but also a large number of newspaper articles, as well as the results obtained from the conducted survey. The information and data gathered from all these sources will be used in order to either verify or falsify the four hypotheses, with the results being presented at the end of the thesis.

2.2 Online Survey

The last chapter will focus on the perception of Hong Kong's current and future situation. In order to present those results in the clearest picture possible, it didn't seem sufficient to analyze existing literature and recent news articles, which is why an online survey was conducted. This survey included a number of questions divided into several sub-groups dealing with democracy, security and participation in Hong Kong. For its distribution, the principle of the snowball effect was chosen, meaning

that the link to the survey was sent out to a relatively small number of people in the attempt to convince them to further share and spread it with others.

For the survey, the questionnaire was integrated into the "SurveyMonkey" platform, with it being made available online, for up to four weeks, accessible to anyone with the link. Apart from the completely functional and successful operation of the survey, the use of this instrument was of great advantage, due to its clear and transparent presentation of the results obtained. Given the fact that online surveys may bring about certain problems, due to potential limited accessibility, it should be clear that this does not apply to this survey, as it was conducted in Hong Kong, where almost 75 percent of the city's population are regular internet users.³ Furthermore, as the main focus was put on the *youth's* perception and opinions, the percentage of internet users was even higher.

Limiting the age range to "young adults", answers from people over 30 were excluded from further analysis. According to a statistical profile by the University of Hong Kong, youth in Hong Kong, with this study focusing on those aged between 15 and 24, amounted to around 870,000 young people, in 2012 (University of Hong Kong 2012). Since it was not feasible to directly approach them, the previously mentioned distribution strategy better known as "snowball effect" was chosen, asking those who participated to further spread the survey.

As it is a rather small-scale online survey, it shall not be understood as representative summary of public opinion in Hong Kong, but rather as an attempt to provide an insight into young adults' perception of the situation, as well as bigger concepts, primarily democracy, in present-day Hong Kong.

³ China, Hong Kong SAR Internet Users. URL: <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/china-hong-kong-sar>

3 Theoretical Approach

This chapter will present an explanation of the social movement theory, offering an introduction to and overview of both, social movements and new social movements. The latter one was chosen as a comprehensive theoretical framework, as Hong Kong's most recent movements are better explained using the theory of *new* social movements instead of its predecessor. Before delving into the theory behind social movements, however, another important issue in connection to social movements in Hong Kong has to be dealt with. Democratization has long been referred to as important part of Hong Kong policies, with both, internal and external actors stressing their stance on democratization in Hong Kong in order to clarify their political direction and line. Furthermore, democracy movements, aiming at achieving further democratization in Hong Kong, have, for a long time, been the primary form of social movements within the territory. Thus, it is of utmost importance not to leave out the concept of democratization, when dealing with and analyzing social movements.

3.1 Democratization

Democratization can be described as a process of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states or political systems transitioning to democracy. It concerns “institutional transformations of undemocratic states” (Zhang 2011: 643) and is affected by a variety of factors. As the case of Hong Kong seems to show, for example, “[...] democratization is not purely a political phenomenon because it is embedded in the economy and the national reunification process” (So 2000: 379). This also relates to the Modernization theory, which suggests that economically successful nations are more likely to become democracies and, thus, often uses Hong Kong as an exception to the rule, questioning its lack in democratization despite its success as financial center and global city, as a whole (Boniface/Alon 2010: 788).

One of the predominant issues, when it comes to the lack in democratization, is the continued introduction and implementation of reforms upholding or leading to undemocratic elections, thus, ruling out the adoption of direct elections by universal suffrage in the near future. Furthermore, Hong Kong is affected by and dependent on

a number of external actors, including its former colonial ruler, Britain, its current sovereign, the People's Republic of China, and even the United States, a global power eager to push democratization worldwide. With this in mind, new social movements, mainly being concerned with social issues, seem to be a suitable process to continuously push (for) democratization, as it is currently being attempted in Hong Kong.

3.2 (New) Social Movements

Since the concept of social movements, as such, is not a new one, it has undergone a number of changes and developments throughout the past decades, leading to the introducing of new, or at least other, understandings of this theory. When talking about social movements, one usually associates them with labor movements, mostly taking place in Western societies. New social movements, however, diverge from being motivated by economic factors, like the decrease in economic growth or the increase in unemployment, and instead focus on movements motivated by social factors, usually seeking an improvement for the entire society, instead of limiting the focus on a certain class or group. The hereby mentioned cleavages, old vs. new and West vs. East, are important when working with social movement theories and will, therefore, be looked into even further on the following pages.

3.2.1 Definition

Given the fact that social movement studies offer a wide range of theories and understandings of the concept's very idea, it is of utmost importance to present the definition chosen to be used throughout this thesis. Generally speaking, social movements can be understood as a conglomeration of individuals or smaller groups, focusing on a single issue and carrying out certain actions, including, but not limited to, protests, strikes and demonstrations, amongst others.

Offe (1985: 817) suggests here, that the more impact a change in policy has on the public, the more control the public wants to have. Following his idea, social movements can be viewed as a platform for people to voice their opinion, or more

specifically, their concern, on a certain issue. In other words, it is a “collectivity acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside institutional channels for the purpose of promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order of which it is a part” (Lui/Chiu 2000: 3).

3.2.2 *Old vs. New*

Before elaborating on the differences between social movements and new social movements, it should be mentioned here that new social movements are often criticized for not being new at all. With the main argument being that new social movements are concerned with post-materialistic values and issues, like human rights or the rule of law, instead of more materialistic values attached to previous labor movements, it should be clear that even before the development of the theory on new social movements, certain movements were concerned with social issues, whilst, labor movements are still occurring today. Having said that, more distinctions between old and new movements should be mentioned at this point, in order to legitimize the existence of social movements in their new form.

Since new social movements are generally concerned with social issues, social change can, at any time, affect its effectivity, success in mobilization and durability, as a whole. As issues, that once motivated individuals to start or participate in a movement, may be resolved one day, the movement may lose its very purpose. Social movements that are not concerned with social values, but are instead built on economic issues, won't be affected by social change. What will affect them, however, is a change in relation to the specific issues, for example as soon as a solution to the problem is found. Another factor concerns the movements' organization. Whilst old movements were generally organized, new movements' organization is more loose and may appear in form of an ad hoc movement, which often begins as spontaneously and quickly as it disperses again.

One last point to be made concerns the actors of the two forms of movements. Given the loose organization of new social movements, it is not surprising that the actors involved are not eager to follow and adapt to given structures. Instead they embrace the fact that they are not restricted in any way, enabling and allowing for a wide range

of issues to be raised and discussed, actors to be involved and actions to be carried out. The wider the range of issues, the higher the number of people concerned. This is why new social movements are issue-based movements without limiting the movement to one single issue. Instead a variety of issues will be dealt with, attracting and affecting society as a whole, focusing on “general societal-wide values” including the promotion of civil rights and the rule of law, amongst others (So 2008: 241).

3.2.3 *West vs. East*

With the social movement theory originating in the Western part of the world, primarily in Europe and the United States, scholars concerned with the increasing number of social movements in Asia were eager to adapt the existing theory to fit Asian movements’ uniqueness. Basing it on ideas of Western philosophers and policy makers, Asian scholars thus continued developing an Asian approach, even though “Asian” itself is too big of an approach, given the diversity of the continent. Having said that, even the Asian approach, as it was developed, will not be applicable to every situation, reconfirming the fact that “as an object of study, movements remain hard to grasp” (Broadbent 2011: 3), which is why many scholars diverted from the traditional line of research and instead decided to create detailed case studies in order to facilitate and enable a better understanding of the concept itself. Agreeing with those scholars, this thesis will attempt the same approach, choosing Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement of 2014 as a case study.

4 Historical Background

Hong Kong has come a long way from being a fishing village with an approximate population of 6000 people, to becoming a global metropolis and important financial center in the twenty-first century. It took until 1841, when the British made their first steps on their newly seized territory, for the small island, or rather conglomeration of rocks, to be on anyone's radar (Carroll 2007: 1f). Realizing its potential, the British soon used the "village's" strategic geographical location and introduced it as a new, important trading post – a label that is still true today (Sing 2004: 36). Britain's presence as influential colonial power slowly decreased in the twentieth century, leaving only a few colonized territories by the late 1960s, with Hong Kong being one of them. The decolonization, however, did not occur "by full democratization, possibly to avoid provoking the national claimants into drastic action for their recovery" (ibid.: 35). Here should be clear, however, that the Chinese government, despite its focus on sovereignty and national (re-)unity, never tried to regain control over Hong Kong by force, even though this would have been and still is a relatively easy undertaking, given the city's lack of military resources, amongst other reasons.

During British colonial rule, the British empire used its power to highly influence the territory in various ways, leading to a rapid development, not only economically, but also politically and socially. In order to do so, the colonial government often had to cooperate and collaborate with its Chinese counterpart, as its rule over Hong Kong was limited to 99 years, with Hong Kong's return to China due in 1997. Even though the transfer at the end of the twentieth century was to be prevented by the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China's government succeeded in reintegrating the former colonial territory, thus regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong. This, however, was only possible after a certain transition period, which started in the early eighties, when the "threat" of return first came up in the political, as well as social, arena. At the end of this period, the handover of Hong Kong back to China took place on 1 July 1997, marking the beginning of the annual 1 July protests, which will be elaborated on in a later chapter.

As China's "most critical link to the rest of the world" (Carroll 2007: 3), Hong Kong's development since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and more importantly, the 1978 liberalization reforms, often coined as

“opening”, has been followed by scholars from a wide range of disciplines. Throughout Hong Kong’s history it has often been reiterated that, both, the lack of conflict, as well as the general political apathy, are surprising, or even shocking. This is particularly interesting in connecting to civil society, particularly social movements, in Hong Kong, an issue that needs more attention and further analysis, which will follow in Chapter 5.

Besides sharing a great amount of its history with two external actors, the British colonial government and the Chinese government, Hong Kong does also have its own developments that continue to shape this unique city. Throughout the next pages, important changes throughout the past few decades will be explained by the means of several policies in the form of declarations, laws and principles.

4.1 Hong Kong Under British Colonial Rule

In order to understand anything related to Hong Kong, one has to study and be aware of the main events in the city’s history, at least starting from the mid-20th century. After having been under British colonial rule for more than eighty years, with the “ultimate political authority rest[ing] entirely with the British [...]” (Boniface/Alon 2010: 793), the “consultative colonialism”, as it was in practice during the colonial rule, slowly came to an end, giving platform to several democratic developments in the years preparing for, as well as the decade following, the handover in 1997.

“As in other colonies, colonialism in Hong Kong could be repressive and yet offer opportunities” (Carroll 2007: 33). With Hong Kong’s increasing success in trade and economy, in general, Britain was convinced that its 99-year lease would not only pay off, but could also be extended after its expiration in 1997. To guarantee good living standards for the citizens of Hong Kong, mainly to be able to maintain stability within the territory, the Governors generally tried to implement reforms, mostly concerning existing socio-economic problems. With the provision of public housing, for example, and increase in social spending, in general, its reactive character came to the surface (Lam 2003: 35), aligning with the development of a vibrant civil society in Hong Kong during that time.

Leading up to the creation and enactment of the Joint Declaration, which will be dealt with on the next page, at the end of 1984, both external powers, Britain and China, produced Green and White papers on the process and details of democratization in Hong Kong. With Britain still trying to push the development and increase of democratic elements in Hong Kong's political system, it issued a Green Paper on "The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong" in July 1984. By suggesting the Legislative Council's indirect election by an electoral college, it was of no surprise that the Chinese government reacted with a condemnation of the Green Paper. With the Green Paper's proposals not being definitive, one had to await the publication of the government's White Paper, presenting the government's definitive intentions for the further development. Even though it didn't deal with all proposals made, the White Paper's decisions included the introduction of elections by the means of the previously proposed electoral college, as well as limited direct elections to take place in 1988 (Sing 2004.: 75ff). According to the White Paper (1984), "there was little evidence of support in public comment on the Green Paper for any move towards direct elections in 1985", which is why the proposal was to gradually increase the number of directly elected seats starting in 1988, "building up to a significant number of directly elected members by 1997" (ibid.).

The decision on future direct elections was welcomed as an important and successful breakthrough to many, especially after a conference with more than fifty organizations on that very issue took place only two months before (Sing 2004: 81). One month after the publication of the government's White Paper in November 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration, resulting from a number of formal talks between the two sides since 1979, finally came into being.

4.1.1 Sino-British Joint Declaration

Until the signing and publication of this document, the British and Chinese governments, aimed at the same outcome, from their own perspective: each party wanted to control Hong Kong (Ma 1997: 739). For the Chinese, a continued British rule over Hong Kong was never a possibility – a fact the British side still had to acknowledge, leading to it relinquishing its claim of sovereignty. By signing the

Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984, the governments of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the People's Republic of China laid down certain regulations of the legal and political situation of Hong Kong, to be valid starting from the date of its enactment in mid-1985. According to Ming Sing (2004: 64), this was done "in order to reduce the crisis and preserve Hong Kong's stability and prosperity [...]" – an undertaking that will turn out to be more difficult than envisaged at the time of the declaration's creation and formulation.

Here, some important points should be emphasized: First, it was made clear, again, that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, as it will exist starting from mid-1997, will be under the People's Republic of China's authority, whilst enjoying a high degree of autonomy (see Article 3 (2)). Secondly, the future government of the Special Administrative Region will consist of local Hong Kong citizens, instead of British inhabitants, with the Chief Executive to "be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally" (Article 3 (4)). Finally, the rights and freedom, as Hong Kong citizens were enjoying them before the handover, shall continue to be protected after the return (see Article 3 (5)). These three promises were chosen for further emphasis and analysis, because each and every one of them has been under scrutiny throughout the years following the transition. Neither a high degree of autonomy, as mentioned in Article 3 (2), nor a directly elected Chief Executive, as mentioned in Article 3 (4), or the guarantee and protection of certain rights and freedoms, as mentioned in Article 3 (5), have been put into practice as promised. Having said that, this declaration continues to be an important legal document used by both sides in a conflict, understanding and interpreting its meaning as it fits either side best.

Hence, despite the governments' attempts to stabilize the situation in Hong Kong, through the implementation of concepts and principles stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, Hong Kong already saw a new "phase of emerging political conflict and polarization [...]" at the end of the decade, in late 1986 (Sing 2004: 94).

4.1.2 Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC

Even more emphasis should be put on the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, the quasi mini-constitution of Hong Kong. With its first draft published in 1988, causing a vast number of criticizing reactions, hence, leading to another draft in 1989, the Basic Law was finally “adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on 4 April 1990 and shall be put into effect as of 1 July 1997” (Basic Law 1990), the day of the handover of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China.

The idea of the Basic Law was to create a mini-constitution to stipulate what form the political system and structure in Hong Kong was supposed to take following its return to the People's Republic of China. As it was previously guaranteed a high degree of autonomy, as stated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, as well as limited democracy, Hong Kong citizens were now hoping for the Basic Law to introduce laws and regulations guaranteeing those rights and principles. Especially in connection to Hong Kong's democratization process, it was important for the Basic Law to be drafted and written with Hong Kong citizens' future in mind, as “[...] the future of democratization in Hong Kong would depend on who controlled its drafting” (So 2000: 369). The Basic Law, as it is known today, however, has not been drafted in Hong Kong, where it was put into force – it was drafted in the authoritarian People's Republic of China. And as we know today, what followed was that the “Chinese position soon appeared to suppress the community's demand for democracy” (Cheng 1989: 444), diminishing the previous developments in Hong Kong, which aimed at and pushed for further democratization, which now seemed to be out of the picture. Nevertheless, around the same time, a very unique and influential event took place at Tiananmen Square, changing China's, but particularly Hong Kong's, landscape of mobilization and participation.

4.2. Transition Phase

Even though the transition of Hong Kong's sovereignty (back) to the People's Republic of China took place on 1 July 1997, the transition phase, as a whole, is considered an essential formative period, when it comes to understanding both, Hong Kong's history, as well as current status quo. One could say that the period started with the drafting of the Sino-British Joint Declaration or even before, in the early eighties, as soon as the end of the 99-year lease was deemed imminent and, thus, quickly became a highly discussed topic in Hong Kong, within the political, but also social realms.

Throughout the years succeeding the publication of the Joint Declaration, more and more political unrests, incidents and conflicts, in general, are appearing in both territories. With the idea of the development and increase of democratic elements not prevailing, the upsurge of protests, under the framework of new social movements, is not all too surprising. Shortly before the promulgation of the Basic Law, a unique and formative incident occurred at Beijing's Tiananmen square. Following a number of demonstrations and protests, as well as hunger strikes, preceding the now infamous June 4th massacre, the People's Republic of China government abandoned its non-interference stance and instead actively and violently reacted to peaceful students, demanding democracy, freedom of speech and other civil liberties, which up to that point were not guaranteed by the Chinese government. After a few weeks of peaceful protest, the incident ended with an, until this day, unknown number of casualties and left behind outraged spectators and observers. In the wake of this cruel suppression of peaceful actions, hardly anyone dared to revolt under Chinese authority.

Even before the incident, in May of that year, more than a million citizens of Hong Kong, motivated by the city's new status of "semi-democracy" (Boniface/Alon 2010: 794), as well as their general dissatisfaction with the situation, took to the streets to participate in a "march for democracy and freedom in China" (Cheng 1989: 443). This protest is considered to have been of the first large-scale indigenous movements, with "90 per cent marching for the first time in their lives" (ibid.). As there have been no larger movements up to this point, it was especially surprising that it came into being as a reaction to a situation concerning the People's Republic of China and not the Special Administrative Region itself. Even though democracy movements have

already been emerging before this large-scale event (Ma 1997: 744), from this point on, democracy has been the main issue of the majority of movements in Hong Kong, especially since “public demands for faster and greater democratization had begun to sky-rocket since May 1989” (Sing 2004: 116).

4.2.1 One Country, Two Systems

The principle of “One Country, Two Systems” goes back to Deng Xiaoping, the former statesman of the People’s Republic of China, who initiated the country’s “opening” starting in 1978. With its idea stipulated in the Basic Law and consistent with the Joint Declaration, the principle offers guidelines for the functioning of “One China”, acknowledging and reiterating the People’s Republic of China’s sovereignty and authority, whilst approving of and allowing Special Administrative Regions, like Hong Kong or Macau, to co-exist alongside the supreme Chinese ruling power.

Generally, this concept is to be understood as a separation of two powers, the Central government in Beijing, as well as the government in Hong Kong, whilst maintaining only one sovereign power. At the same time, it seems to be a “win-win outcome” following many lengthy talks between the parties. As with documents like the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration, for example, the language of this concept, being part of the Basic Law, leaves room for interpretation. Therefore, the Chinese government sees its claim of sovereignty confirmed, while Hong Kong citizens understand it as a guarantee of freedoms and liberties previously and currently enjoyed in the Special Administrative Region. This, however, will not work out in the long run. As the “One Country, Two Systems” idea was created as supporting principle for the transition period, as well as the remaining years of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region, its validity will expire the same time as Hong Kong’s integration with the People’s Republic of China is supposed to be completed, fifty years after the handover, in 2047 (Chan 2008: 3, Wong 2004: 9ff).

4.2.2 Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong

As soon as the idea of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” came up, people believed it to be along the lines of the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, in terms of providing Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy and supporting the process of democratization (Pepper 2008: 125). This, however, turned out to be inaccurate. Even trying to find the six words, “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” turns out to be a time-consuming process, leading to no results, as the very idea of Hong Kong citizens ruling Hong Kong is no longer prevailing. Instead, page 138 of the Basic Law reveals the “session’s” insistence on implementing “resolutely and firmly the principles of ‘one country, two systems’, ‘Hong Kong people *administering* Hong Kong’ and a high degree of autonomy [...]” (Basic Law 1990). Hence, since “ruling” could’ve been understood in the “wrong” way, the word was simply replaced with the more diplomatic “administration”.

4.3 Post-Transition Period

There has been growing criticism by the general public towards its government following the transition from British colonial rule to Communist Chinese sovereignty over the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Whilst in the 1970s and 80s, when Britain was still in power, citizens’ demands for a prosperous and stable Hong Kong were generally respected, the post-transitional government was often blamed for not responding accordingly to public demands and opinions (Sing 2004: 44f). Despite the first Chief Executive’s reaffirmation of the government’s intent to proceed with democratization (Porter 2003: 81), people grew concerned over the future of their hometown, fearing a decrease in autonomy, freedoms and liberties, whilst having to deal with increased external interference, as well as corruption, to name but a few. The latter issue was soon disregarded after declaring it not a problem for Hong Kong, however many other issues remained to be dealt with (DeGolyer 2003: 128f).

One issue, in connection to the Special Administrative Region’s autonomy, is the possibility of reinterpretation, especially when it comes to Basic Law articles. Even before the handover, the last governor of Hong Kong used the right of reinterpretation

of certain Basic Law articles in his favor, trying to enable the creation of democratic elements before Hong Kong's return to the People's Republic of China. Even though his thereby created reforms greatly impacted Hong Kong society, for example by reducing the voting age or allowing direct elections for district councils, they, at the same time, undermined the Basic Law's legitimacy (So 2000: 373f, Sing 2004: 124f). Unfortunately, this wouldn't be the only time. Throughout the following years, the Basic Law was interpreted three more times. With the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress being the sole committee eligible for interpretation, its power was first used two years after the transition, in 1999, in relation to a case about the right to abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which won't be elaborated any further at this point. The second interpretation dealt with the consequences of the then ruling Chief Executive Tung's resignation before the end of this term. The third, and most important interpretation, at least in connection to democracy and pro-democracy movements, took place in 2006. As previously stated, there has always been the possibility of direct elections in 2007 and 2008, of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council respectively. Trusting previous ruling powers promising future direct elections, the citizens of Hong Kong were anxiously awaiting the government's announcement concerning the procedures of direct elections in 2007 and 2008. Instead of meeting the citizens' expectations, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress decided to reinterpret the stipulated commitment to potential direct elections, rejecting their implementation by 2007, whilst further delaying direct elections until 2017 and 2020, for the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council respectively (Chan 2008: 2ff).

Following the decision to disregard the set timeline and, thus, further delay direct elections, Hong Kong citizens were, more than ever, aware of the fact that democratization in their city was far from an easy task. Despite the Special Administrative Region's economic success and general stability, the process of democratization continues to be slow-paced and full of obstacles. Even though this lack in democratization is often attributed to the opposition from the Chinese government, given that the People's Republic of China reversed a great amount of pre-transition reforms and limited democratic elements in Hong Kong's political structure, it should be clear that it is not the sole reason at hand. Other problems include a weak civil society and democratic movement, a low number of political leaders and parties, and little to no public support (Sing 2004: 13ff). Public support,

as it was visible after the 1989 Tiananmen incident in Beijing, was, like in many other movements, limited to a short period of time and quickly dispersed as soon as the issue was not apparent anymore. Furthermore, according to Sing (2004: 222), “Hong Kong people seem to believe that avoidance to conflict with the Chinese Government and the preservation of stability are of greater importance than an elected government”, further challenging the democratization process in Hong Kong.

When it comes to the Umbrella Movement, however, the opposite seems the case, as pro-democracy advocates took to the streets voicing their discontent with the lack of progress in Hong Kong’s democratization, mainly demanding genuine direct elections, by universal suffrage, of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council, in 2017 and 2020 respectively. To better understand the background of the Movement, the following chapter will introduce the Umbrella Movement as a new social movement, influenced by a variety of factors, which will be elaborated on throughout the following pages.

5 New Social Movements in Hong Kong

After having introduced new social movements, as a general theory and concept, in a previous chapter, this chapter now concentrates on social movements in Hong Kong. These have been subject to thorough analysis since the late nineties, even though some movements have already been active two decades before. Here, a short overview of the large-scale movements in Hong Kong, up to this point, will be given, before the largest, most influential pro-democracy movement in the Special Administrative Region's history, the Umbrella Movement, will be put under scrutiny, analyzing its organization, actors involved, as well as different issues raised, finalizing this chapter by painting a picture of the movement's immediate aftermath.

Before the first large-scale social movements took place in Hong Kong, political powers tried to establish themselves in forms of alliances, with the democratic alliance being a form of "social movement alliance" and the People's Republic of China acting as "counter-social movement groups" (Sing 2004: 97) – this being only one out many examples of Chinese opposition in relation to democratization in the Special Administrative Region.

Even though, the majority of scholars suggest 1989 as the turning point for participation and action in Hong Kong, the origin of powerful and influential social movements in Hong Kong can be set in the 1970s, with student movements being the predominant form of collective action. This was also the period when Hong Kong activists and movement participants recognized and acknowledged the power of using law as a weapon, in their favor, leading to a rise of social movements, as well as in participation, in general. Throughout the following years, one could notice the continuous development of and increasing attention towards social movements, ultimately leading to new forms by the early 1990s, thus explaining the general acknowledgement of 1989 as starting point for new social movements (Kuah-Pearce/Guiheux 2009: 10ff, Ma 2009: 47ff, Chen 2009: 66f).

Hence, with new social movements being a relatively new phenomenon in Hong Kong, the current state of research on the subject matter is still very limited, leaving ample room for further research. Furthermore, despite the existence of "Asian" approaches to the concept of new social movements, Western ideas and principles

continue to highly influence the actors' strategies and actions – an important fact when it comes to analyzing and understanding new social movements in Hong Kong (Cheng 2014: 222). Other important factors, not to be forgotten, include the movements' organization, actors involved, as well as issues raised, all of which will be focused on throughout the following pages.

5.1 Previous Movements

Throughout Hong Kong's last decade under British colonial rule, one could notice an increase in the number of social movements, the most common form being democracy movements. Those movements, however, were never restricted to a single group or small part of the society. In fact, they dealt with society-wide issues, trying to promote the movement's openness and inclusivity. One unique example for Hong Kong democracy actions took place shortly before the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. Earlier that year, activists and protesters in the People's Republic of China were already active in various forms, including hunger strikes and sit-ins. Due to the increasing number of events and participants, these movements were soon perceived as a potential threat to the Chinese government, who, for the first time, violently interrupted the peaceful movements. With the suppression of the 1989 student movement asking for more democracy, Hong Kong citizens seized the opportunity and used their right to participate in a movement in support of the People's Republic of China's democracy movements, as well as democracy and freedom, in general (Porter/Hook 2003: 2). As previously mentioned, despite the inclusivity and wide scope of social movements in Hong Kong, this reaction was still rather surprising, as the issue at hand didn't directly affect the citizens of Hong Kong themselves. Nevertheless, this large-scale movement had a great effect on the public's perception of and participation in social movements in Hong Kong, in general, leading to increased public support and participation. Hence, learning from and being inspired by previous social movements, the late nineties saw an upsurge in public support of, and thus participation in, democracy movements, the paramount form of social movements in the Special Administrative Region. Alongside growing concern over Hong Kong's future after the handover back to China in 1997, the democracy movement was now seen as "effective means to build up a highly autonomous Hong Kong to safeguard its own interests and lifestyle" (So 2011: 365).

Following the handover back to the People's Republic of China, the Special Administrative Region, which was now under Chinese sovereignty, continued to be the predominant platform for social movements. Due to persistent concerns and dissatisfaction with Hong Kong's governance, annual protests on the day of Hong Kong's return were held, starting in 1998. Throughout the first few years, those protests were rather low-key and small-scale. Starting on 25 June 2000, however, one could notice "the explosion of social protest in post-colonial Hong Kong" (So 2008: 238). On this day, five significant protests took place, each dealing with different issues.

Moreover, in 2003, after five years of small-scale protests, on 1 July, a large-movement protest with more than half a million participants, marching to fight against a proposed national security bill, emerged. The bill, formerly known as Article 23 of the Basic Law, was created by the People's Republic of China with the goal, of protecting China's national security, in mind. The idea was to increase protection in and for China by, simultaneously, decreasing the freedoms of Hong Kong's citizens (ibid.: 240). According to the proposed article, the Chinese government demanded for the Hong Kong government to introduce anti-subversion laws to decrease and ultimately completely prevent foreign actors to intervene in local politics, even if it was just to conduct research in the area. Appalled by this suggestion and the government's attempt to enact this undemocratic law, Hong Kong citizens went to the streets to participate in the "largest anti-local administration protest" the city has ever seen (Chan 2008: 9, So 2008: 240). With the motivation behind the protests behind solely post-modernist and post-materialistic, this unique 1 July protest can be seen as a prime example for Hong Kong's new social movements. Especially, because it highlighted several recurring characteristics of new social movements, including values and solutions trying to attract and please not just individuals, but the whole society, the diversity of participants, and, finally, the loose organization of the movement itself (So 2008: 241). Finally, it is also unique in the sense that it had an immediate, positive outcome for the participants, as their efforts were rewarded by the indefinite shelving of the proposed anti-subversion law. At least, that was the case until another successful outcome, almost ten years later, in 2012.

For Hong Kong, governed under the “One Country Two Systems” principle as envisaged by the Chinese Communist Party, demonstrations or protests are in no way a new phenomenon. Especially when talking about the involvement of youth, it should be clear that this city has seen incidents of that kind several times before. Even before its return to the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, as British colony, was supposed to become democratic, long before its decolonization – a change that would’ve happened a long time ago if it weren’t for the Chinese powers, amongst other reasons, which, until today won’t accept a fully, legitimate democratic Hong Kong (Ortmann 2015: 34ff). Besides this reoccurring issue, the people of Hong Kong also had to deal with, and at times fight, other intrusions by external actors like the Chinese government – one of which led to the now infamous anti-MNE protests.

MNE itself stands for “Moral and National Education”, a controversial policy that aimed at introducing a new subject to be taught in Hong Kong’s primary and secondary schools. The proposed curriculum, according to the Chinese government, includes civic education, as well as lessons “appreciat[ing] and lov[ing] the motherland”, mainland China – a fact that quickly led Hong Kong citizens to raise questions and concerns about potential “brainwashing” efforts by the Chinese government (Liu 2012). Since “until the dying days of British rule in Hong Kong, there was no place for politics or controversy in education”, Hong Kongers were now more than ready to raise their concerns, as well as voices, concerning their children’s, as well as their own, education and, thus, future. Run by student-led “Scholarism”, an alliance of secondary school students founded in 2011 specifically to fight the proposed MNE curriculum, and a parent concern group, namely National Education Parent Concern Group (NEPCG), a massive protest “leading youth activists in chants and even pre-protest prayer” (M.A. 2014) was organized in early September 2012. “Tens of thousands of protesters against the allegedly ‘brainwashing’ national education flooded the plazas outside the Tamar government headquarters [...]” (Zhao 2012), as well as many other important sites in downtown Hong Kong, highlighting the people’s disapproval of Chinese influence and intrusion in Hong Kong people’s everyday lives.

The motivation behind the general public’s and, more importantly, the students’ involvement in the anti-MNE campaign has been analyzed by many, with some concluding by saying that “the uproar over the national education subject is reflective

of anxieties being aggravated by the new government under Leung [...]” (Lai 2012), whilst one should not forget about the fear of losing one’s “Hong Kong identity”. C.Y. Leung, Hong Kong’s current Chief Executive, has in fact more than once been in the center of public debate and concern, with the potential MNE introduction only being one out of many issues that have led people onto the streets of a seemingly peaceful Hong Kong. Having said that, the 2012 protests, or rather their impact, were a surprise to many, especially government officials in, both, Hong Kong and Beijing. Given the persistent pressure by Hong Kong citizens, the government soon had to back down from its plans, announcing “that schools did not have to adopt a China-backed curriculum”, but could still do so voluntarily (Al Jazeera 2012). Whilst “the administration now appears to have caved in to public opposition amid rising anti-Beijing sentiment”, giving youth activists reason to celebrate their victory, saving their education and future, the fear that “Hong Kong will gradually become closer to China” (Ko 2012) persists, motivating many more young activists to get politically involved in order to fight against further and future Chinese oppression and intrusion.

Thus, this development didn’t only lead to a stronger and more active anti-government and pro-democracy movement, which recently peaked with its September 2014 Umbrella movement, but additionally “revealed the development of a strong Hong Kong identity especially among the youth” (Ortmann 2015: 44).

5.2 Umbrella Movement

Eleven years after the large-scale 1 July movement in 2003, the annual rally has, yet again, attracted a high number of participants. This time, on 1 July 2014, the high participation seemed to be due to the fact that 2017, the year in which the Special Administrative Region’s next Chief Executive was to be directly elected by universal suffrage, was coming closer, but Hong Kong citizens were still awaiting the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’s decision on specific procedures for fair, direct elections. Inspired by the 2003 rally, which led to the shelving of a government proposal Hong Kong citizens deemed unconstitutional and undemocratic, a wide range of actors started to gather for its annual protests. With the Committee’s decision to further delay the implementation of direct elections by universal suffrage, citizens used the 1 July rally as an opportunity to voice their

dissatisfaction with the slow-paced democratization process (Tiezzi 2014). Using the impetus of this large-scale protest, a variety of actors tried to loosely-organize and, thus, create a new movement aiming at achieving further democratization, amongst others, which was soon to be known as the now infamous Umbrella Movement.

Before analyzing the Movement's characteristics any further, it should be explained, at this point, how the Umbrella Movement, as such, came about. Before thousands of protesters took to the streets and occupied parts of the city, starting in late September 2014, some smaller actions took place, ultimately resulting in the creation of the Umbrella Movement, as we know it today. It was in early 2013 that Benny Tai, a law professor at Hong Kong's prestigious Hong Kong University, suggested the creation of an "Occupy Movement" aiming at increasing public support to push for democracy. "Occupy Central", as advocated by "Occupy Central with Love and Peace", soon became one of the central powers in the early stages of Hong Kong's new social movement, joining other actors, including student federations and movements, to name but a few. One of the predominant student movements is "Scholarism", a group of students previously mentioned in connection to the 2012 protests against the introduction of Moral and National Education in Hong Kong (BBC 2014). Together with other forces, which will be introduced and elaborated on throughout the next chapter, the early beginnings of the movement revolved around meetings to discuss issues Hong Kong and its citizens were facing at that time, whilst also trying to develop and define possible electoral reforms. As Occupy Central was already in the process of organizing some kind of protest to be held in late 2014, it wasn't all too surprising when it decided to join students, who were already demonstrating on the streets of the Central district since mid-September 2014 (Hilgers 2015).

With Hong Kong previously having been labeled as the "capital of protest" following the increasing number of collective again, with protests on a variety of issues taking place quite regularly, the outburst of protests initially wasn't received with too much criticism or condemnation. As the number of participants and supporters kept growing, however, the protests were soon lamented as disturbance of and potential threat to the city's, and possibly the People's Republic of China's, stability. With the majority of participants initially being high school and university students, the protests were quickly defined as student movements aiming at pushing for further

progress in democratization in Hong Kong. This was, unlike the protests in mid-September, quickly criticized for being a threat to stability, the rule of law, as well as both, Hong Kong and Chinese governments directly. With the Movement's similarities to the "Arab Spring", as discussed by Cheng (2014: 222), it was quite clear that condemnation would not be enough of a reaction to the events transpiring in Hong Kong, which is why the governments' general policy of non-interference was soon quashed and replaced with active interference of various kinds.

Using the impetus of the annual 1 July protests, the actors involved were successful in constantly increasing participation and maintaining a positive and peaceful atmosphere, "[...] likely buoyed by the fact that previous mass movements have proved successful in preventing or at least delaying controversial government policies" (Tiezzi 2014). Driven by previous successful movements, and with small-scale protests developing into a large-scale mass movement, but given the lack of active reactions by either the Hong Kong or the Chinese government, protesters became increasingly eager to push for progress, and reactions, in general. This explains incidents including the storming and attempted occupation of government buildings, as well as the disregard of police barriers – actions that ultimately led to the arrest and prosecution of several activists. These incidents, however, were limited to a very small number, and can therefore be understood as exceptions to the generally peaceful movement.

This leads us to the term "Umbrella Movement". Initially, the movement was coined as "Occupy Movement" giving credit to only one of the main actors involved, the leaders and participants of "Occupy Central". Only after the "Occupy movement braved police violence as well as political pressure and intimidation on and offline from Hong Kong and mainland Chinese" (Hong Kong Free Press 2015b), the movement received its now infamous name "Umbrella Movement". This was due to the fact that umbrellas were used as defense and protection against tear gas and pepper spray attacks, carried out by police forces as a response to provocations and threats, as perceived by the Hong Kong and People's Republic of China's governments. Despite its initial purpose, the umbrella was soon used in another way: as a symbolic force, representing the movement, now better known as Umbrella Movement (McCarthy 2014).

5.2.1 Organization

“[...] although the civil society in Hong Kong is vibrant and pluralistic, it has relatively weak organisational resources and horizontal linkage” (Ma 2009: 60). The Umbrella Movement, however, has been generally praised for its sophisticated and effective organization and coordination. Given that the Movement wasn’t planned and instead resulted from several groups’ urge to take their issues to the streets, hoping to finally attract the government’s attention, no one anticipated how well organized it would be carried out. Especially when taking into consideration that the Movement itself was basically leaderless – a fact often ignored by most media outlets. Instead of acknowledging a functioning, yet, at times, confusing, movement, as leaderless as it was, most news outlets decided to “appoint” their own leader, who would then cover the front pages of every issue concerned with the protest movement.

Furthermore, “technology played an important role in the movement’s organization and coordination, becoming a critical channel for communication with the public” (Hong Kong Free Press 2015b) and media. Especially social media and instant messaging services were essential in organizing and managing events, crowds and resources, amongst others. Through the use of social networks, it was guaranteed that the message sent, question asked or request made would immediately reach a wide range of readers and potential supporters, which is why the majority of coordination in relation to the Umbrella Movement took place online (Buckley/Ramzey 2014). “This virtual and leaderless mobilization allows disgruntled individuals, used to personal freedom and chafing at new restrictions, to voice their criticisms while escaping the heavy hand of repression” (Broadbent 2011: 14).

5.2.1.1 Leaderlessness

The term “Occupy Movement” continues to be mentioned either alongside, or as an alternative to, the Umbrella Movement, which gives the impression that those terms may be used synonymously. With the term tracing back to a particular group, namely “Occupy Central”, this is not quite the case. Even though the very beginning of the Movement leads back to Benny Tai’s idea to use the 1 July protest’s impetus to

continue demanding further democratization in form of a sit-in, it was not the only group preparing to protest for a bigger cause. Other groups, including student federations and movements, as well as other organizations, were just as active, proving that there isn't one leader. In fact, there wasn't a leader at all, making the Umbrella Movement a leaderless movement.

This leaderlessness was often criticized for causing confusion and complicating the organization, coordination and general performance of the Umbrella Movement, in its entirety. Contrary to this assertion, however, the Movement's leaderlessness actually produced several positive effects. Firstly, it allowed for the inclusion of a wide range of actors and groups, giving each of their issues the same attention, because every individual was treated as equal participant, working towards achieving a greater cause. Secondly, it complicated any kind of suppression or dismantling of the Movement, as an arrest of a leading power – an act that might've led to the Movement's downfall, bringing protests and other actions to a sudden close – wouldn't have been an effective act (Buckley/Ramzey 2014).

5.2.1.2 Cleanliness and Politeness

Despite the Movement's lack of a leading power and the general loose organization, the Movement's participants were able to efficiently, successfully and peacefully organize and coordinate. During the occupation of Hong Kong's central districts, a large number of participants, mainly students, exchanged their crowded, but cozy, apartments with tents, which were placed in the middle of usually busy streets and would become their new home for up to three weeks. Throughout these weeks, the occupied streets turned into an expansive community space, where the principle of "sharing and caring" was predominant. Especially after the police's violent reactions towards protesters, protective gear, which mainly included hats, glasses, scarfs, and umbrellas, was meticulously and extensively distributed amongst all participants. As one volunteer on site stated, this was due to the fact that they "can't protect them, but at least [they] can ask them to protect themselves [...]" (Hilgers 2015).

Moreover, what was often reiterated by participants of the Movement was that the Movement itself was somewhat of a reflection of Hong Kongers' values. By

continuously cleaning the area, introducing and using a recycling system and sharing available resources amongst each other, whilst also apologizing for “causing inconvenience”, participants wanted to highlight that peaceful, polite protest, even if the chances of a successful outcome are relatively low, can still leave a positive mark (Buckley/Ramzey 2014). And the Umbrella Movement has become a prime example for that.

5.2.1.3 Role of (Youth in) Social Media

Since the invention of the World Wide Web and its introduction to the general public in the early 90s, generations have no longer been understood in the general sense, but instead “marked in terms of social relationship to information technology” – f.e. 1.0 or 2.0. – (Patton 2012: 124), where the latter one is used to describe the generation growing up with social media as an essential and important part of their everyday lives. Since the Web 2.0’s introduction, people of any age and origin, as long as internet was available and accessible, have come to know the power of this invention, using social networks to connect, share and lately, mobilize. This has been no different when it comes to the Hong Kong pro-democracy movements, particularly the Umbrella Movement. During these movements, similar and like-minded “young adults” in Hong Kong came together, motivated and mobilized by recently published information on the Hong Kong and Beijing government’s refusal of “fair” elections by 2017 – intensively spread and shared on social media platforms. Unlike previous protest movements, the participants, mostly belonging to the generation 2.0, were able to quickly mobilize, gather and share information, and organize everything on- and subsequently offline. Even though social media has already played an essential part during the Arab Spring in 2011, Hong Kong protesters have been especially praised for their engagement on social media platforms to organize and manage their “clean and polite” protest (f.e. Buckley/Ramzey 2014).

“Given that millennials are now one-fourth of the population, they’re tough to ignore” (Kingsbury 2015) – and ignored they should not be. And even though the young adults’ presence has apparently been declining throughout the past decades (Aspinall/Weiss 2012: 281), their influence and potential power should not be undervalued. “Chalking up the millennial attraction to social change through social

medias is extremely ignorant” (Whitfield 2015) and only one amongst a long list of issues today’s youth has to deal with, pushing them towards an inevitable dichotomy. As stated by now nineteen-year-old Joshua Wong, a media-made key player in Hong Kong’s recent Umbrella Movement, not only the wants and needs, but also the challenges to be faced by people of “his” generation – often described as “millennials” – are very different to those of their parents’ generations. “In a world where ideas and ideals flow freely, we want what everybody else in an advanced society seems to have: a say in our future” (Wong 2014), whilst having to deal with declining prospects and opportunities, all at the same time.

With social media, young adults seem to have found a platform that allows them to finally have that say, enabling previously quieted voices to be heard and spread throughout a variety of social networks. This spread of ideas and information in general, however, has often been viewed as a potential or apparent threat to the ruling government of said active online actors. As “young people are shaping the face of 21st Century activism” (Whitfield 2015), more and more political actors are getting concerned with the youth’s and their potential actions’ influence in the political arena, as well as on future political happenings. More than once has social media been used for – often particularly successful – online activism and campaigning, much to the dismay of ruling parties or people in general. As Rosen (2009: 368f) stated half a decade ago, even though “[...] it appears unlikely that Chinese youth will pose any immediate threat to the regime [...] [,] party leaders will be monitoring [...] closely, seeking to ensure that ‘idealistic’ youth do not link up with disgruntled migrant and other laid-off workers”. Since then, however, the number of “incidents” has been increasing constantly, leading up to several protests in different parts of the country – most recently in form of the HKSAR’s Umbrella Movement, which was obviously understood as a threat to the regime, both in Beijing and Hong Kong itself.

5.2.2 Actors

According to Offe (1985: 831ff), actors of new social movements are neither concerned with “established codes”, hence, given structures, nor with the individual’s background. Despite the majority of participants stemming from middle class households (Della Porta/Diani 2006: 11), many others can be understood as

belonging to a kind of “decommodified” group, which he describes as category comprising of students, retirees and unemployed, amongst others. This is, in fact, quite accurate and applicable to Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, which mainly consisted of students, but also included numerous individuals and groups from academia, who used every free minute to support the Movement in any way possible.

The Umbrella Movement generally accepted and appreciated the diversity and different backgrounds of its participants, as it is often the case in new, post-modernist movements (So 2011: 371). This appreciation of diversity, however, didn’t necessarily apply to citizens of the People’s Republic of China, as the typical Hong Konger’s resentment towards Mainland Chinese seemed to be prevailing. Until this day, it is not uncommon for Hong Kong citizens to stress and underline the paramount differences between themselves and the “Mainlanders”, criticizing them for their behavior and blaming them for negative impacts on Hong Kong’s economy and society, for example (Kuo 2014). This subject matter will be analyzed even further in Chapter 8, whilst the following pages will introduce the main actors involved in the Special Administrative Region’s 2014 Umbrella Movement.

Taking into consideration that the Umbrella Movement is a very young movement with young participants, most of them being high school or university students, some of the actors mentioned here belong to generation Z. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, with it being a leaderless Movement and most newspapers not accepting that fact, several actors have been chosen, by media, as faces and, thus, leaders of the Movement, which is why some, particularly Occupy Central and Joshua Wong, received much more attention than other activists, like Ma Jai. At this part, however, it will be attempted to present all major parties involved, summarizing their issues raised and actions taken.

5.2.2.1 Occupy Central and Benny Tai

Occupy Central, a campaign introduced by Benny Tai, a Hong Kong University law professor, was created in an attempt to push democratic reform in the Special Administrative Region, aiming at achieving genuine universal suffrage in the long run. After joining protesting students in September 2014, it soon became one of the

central figures during the Umbrella Movement. Despite Benny Tai who was generally being put in the spotlight, Occupy Central's other leaders also include co-founders and pro-democracy activists Chan Kin-man and Chu Yiu-ming. Despite being actively involved in the early days of the Movement, Occupy Central soon started to drift away and lose its role in the Movement. Stating that "surrender was a silent denunciation of the heartless government", they soon surrendered and turned themselves in, in order to "take legal responsibility for participating in unauthorized public assemblies" (BBC 2014). Despite their surrender, however, the leaders and organizers of Occupy Central continued their attempt to motivate and mobilize Hong Kongers to "stay on the course" and continue their aim at achieving democracy, amongst others (SCMP 2015). Hence, Occupy Central can be understood as essential actor in giving the Movement its impetus, whilst other actors continued to be essential in maintaining the momentum.

5.2.2.2 *Scholarism and Joshua Wong*

"Scholarism", the student activist group, founded by then 15-year old Joshua Wong, was established with the purpose of protesting against the Chinese government's attempt to introduce patriotic and national education in Hong Kong's schools. After initiating large-scale protests, mobilizing more than a hundred thousand participants, the proposed reform was shelved, offering schools to decide themselves whether the course on nationalism was to be introduced or not. Using the impetus and "fame" gained, Wong soon turned his and Scholarism's focus elsewhere, once again organizing protests (Branigan 2014). Together with the leaders of Hong Kong's "Federation of Students", Scholarism actively reacted to the decision to continuously deny genuine universal suffrage and direct elections by organizing sit-ins and protests, leading to the occupation of the Special Administrative Region's central districts. With Joshua Wong seen as one of the Movement's leading figures, he, together with the founders of the Federation of Students, was arrested for their role in the protests. After having been detained for almost two days without being charged, "he later returned to continue rallying the crowds" (BBC 2014).

Throughout the following months, he would be arrested a few more times, with finally being convicted on 21 July 2016, for storming a government building – the

very action he was initially arrested and not charged for (Siu 2016). Since then, there has been a lot of change: After the Movement was broken down by police forces in late 2014, Scholarism continued to be actively involved in the attempt to push democratic reforms. In early 2016, however, it was announced that the leaders of Scholarism would create a new political party and, thus, provide candidates for the upcoming Legislative Council elections. With the main actors becoming involved in “Demosisto”, the new pan-democratic party established in April 2016, Scholarism ceased to exist (Lam 2016). The party’s future, however, is unclear at this point, as its main figures are currently awaiting their sentencing in mid-August, which may lead to prison sentences of up to five years (Siu 2016).

5.2.2.3 League of Social Democrats and Ma Jai

When Ma Jai was 15 years old, he became politically active, supporting the League of Social Democrats, one of Hong Kong’s left-wing parties. Initially focusing on more radical campaigns than other activists, he soon turned to less radical actions, whilst Joshua Wong, on the other hand, became more radical. Other than most prominent figures in the Umbrella Movement, Ma Jai preferred to stay in the background, representing those whose voices were not heard by other parties involved. Due to that very fact, Ma Jai became the subject of a documentary “exploring the roots of dissent” (Hui 2014), which aimed at underlining that Joshua Wong is, indeed, not the leader of the Umbrella Movement, but instead of a group of people involved in the Movement. Ma Jai, therefore, was chosen to represent the other groups and individuals involved, who didn’t support or simply didn’t agree with Wong. This again shows the diversity of participants, as well as issues, that influenced the Movement as a whole. Thus, “their very different trajectories demonstrate the extent to which dissent in Hong Kong isn’t limited to a single voice or agenda” (ibid.) and neither was the Umbrella Movement, even though it was often portrayed that way.

5.2.2.4 Hong Kong Government and C.Y. Leung

From the very beginning of the protests, it was evident that the Hong Kong government shifted from its general principle of non-interference to active reaction and action. After realizing the Movement's power and potential impact on the city's stability, in general, the government opted for a quick, potentially violent, breakdown of the Movement. Often criticized for the police's harsh and violent actions, as well as the government's relationship with and dependence on the People's Republic of China's government, the Hong Kong government, particularly the current Chief Executive, C.Y. Leung, continuously condemned the protests, underlining their negative impact on the citizens' wellbeing and city's stability. This added to the fact that C.Y. Leung's public support was constantly decreasing, ultimately leading to protesters' demand for his resignation, which was bluntly rejected (BBC 2014).

Here, it is important to acknowledge, however, that the Hong Kong government is not the sole actor when it comes to reacting to and deciding on protest activities and general actions potentially destabilizing the Special Administrative Region. It is, indeed, dependent on the Chinese government's opinions and decisions, especially in relation to the main issues raised during the Umbrella Movement, which would prompt constitutional changes or policy reforms, which would have to be decided by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, whose seat is, of course, in Beijing (Bush 2014). This adds to the fact that the Hong Kong government is not only dependent on the Chinese government, it also continues to lose its autonomous aspect, discrediting the very idea of the "One Country, Two Systems" principle. (Democracy Digest 2016a). In reaction to previous events, the government is now, more than ever, seeking to "build strong public opinion" and regain the public's trust, especially with the upcoming elections in mind (Deva 2015). At the same time, however, the convictions and sentencing of several prominent figures in the Umbrella Movement have recently made the news, further widening the gap between political actors and the public.

5.2.2.5 PRC Government and Pro-Beijing Actors

In support of the Hong Kong government, particularly applauding C.Y. Leung for its role during the protests, the government of the People's Republic of China has always condemned the Umbrella Movement and its actors for causing distress in the Special Administrative region (BBC 2014). This condemnation can be led back to a number of reasons. Firstly, the Chinese government sees any form of protest against the government as direct threat to China and its governance. Secondly, the government's is anxious about the potential impact the Umbrella Movement, as well as other pro-democracy movements, could have, as a spread of democratic ideas and principles, for example, to China is definitely in the realms of possibility (China Daily Asia 2016). Finally, external actors, as for example the United States, were often condemned for their role in the Movement, as their influence was also understood as a potential threat to Chinese sovereignty over the Special Administrative Region (Zweig 2015).

Given the fact that the Chinese government, itself, is the very cause for the Umbrella Movement, since it was the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress that decided not to answer to the general public's demand for genuine universal suffrage by 2017, its role in the Movement should not be undermined. In early 2016, the Chinese Communist Party presented a new policy similar to the Moral and National Education program proposed five years ago. This "directive" called for "further effort to foster patriotism in young people nationwide, including Hong Kong, to maintain national unity [...]" (Wong 2016) and can be seen as an attempt to silence dissent and further increase the Chinese government's influence on Hong Kong matters. This move again led to a growth in concern and distrust by Hong Kong citizens, condemning the apparent "Mainland-ization" and growing influence on Hong Kong policies, amongst others (Democracy Digest 2016a).

The "Mainland-ization" was also quite apparent during the Umbrella Movement, as many pro-Beijing actors got involved, organizing protests against the protesters. Besides being actively involved, pro-government forces also joined the digital movement, "flood[ing] online forums, blogs, and social media networks similar to the paid online commentators working for the government elsewhere" (Hong Kong Free Press 2015b), thus, making use of the same channels as their opponents.

5.2.2.6 Foreign Actors

One of the main foreign actors in the Umbrella Movement was the United States government, even though it was not actively involved. Instead, it voiced its support of genuine universal suffrage and direct elections in Hong Kong, encouraging protesters to demand for its implementation, whilst reiterating the stipulation that was supposed to guarantee those electoral conditions (Zweig 2015). This encouragement, however, was condemned by the People's Republic of China's government, as it understood the United States' involvement as a direct threat to China's sovereignty over the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, as well as its position as rising global power, in its entirety. Even though the United States government was just one among a wide range of foreign actors, it should be mentioned that the foreign actors' involvement was generally limited to opinions published in newspaper articles, thus diminishing their influence and impact on the Umbrella Movement, its participants and other actors involved.

News outlets, in general, were especially active in covering the Umbrella Movement, continuously giving the Movement fresh impetus. Due to extensive media coverage from September up to the Movement's dismantlement in late 2014, the Movement soon became a unique phenomenon, followed by people all over the world. Especially after the outbreak of violent conflict, one could notice outcries and an increase in support from parties that were in no way involved in or influenced by the events taking place in the Special Administrative Region. As the Movement particularly concerned the demand for democracy, it soon garnered a tremendous amount of global support, most of it being symbolic, for example in form of a "Lennon Wall" with positive messages for the protesters actively "fighting" for their right to participate in genuine, direct elections.

5.2.3 Difference in Issues Raised and Goals Aimed At

Offe (1985: 841) supports Galtung's assertion that new movements can be described as "federation of issue-movements", working together for the greater cause. Due to the diversity of participants, the Movement itself consisted of several issue-movements, raising and discussing a variety of issues, which will be shortly discussed here.

Generally speaking, the main issues voiced included the aim for universal suffrage, direct elections, democratization, in general, and even independence. Whilst *The Guardian* (McCarthy 2014) presented "electoral freedom" as main demand, Wong, as media-chosen leader of the Movement, concentrates on continuing autonomy as "the ultimate goal for Hong Kong", whilst reiterating that "the various strands of the pro-democracy movement have not had a clear or identifiable goal", further complicating the Movement's organization and realization (Lo 2015). Following other sources, the main motivation behind the Umbrella Movement, as a whole, was the "continuous indifference shown by Beijing and the local government to demands for genuine universal suffrage", an assertion that seems to be supported by the majority when asked about the motives and purpose of the Umbrella Movement of 2014 (Deva 2015).

Nevertheless, the pro-democracy movement is sometimes also interpreted as being motivated by economic factors – a fact that would discredit the Umbrella Movement as a new social movement (Hilgers 2015). It would be wrong to argue that dissatisfaction with Hong Kong's current economic environment did not play in the cause and motivation to some degree, but it was certainly not the main reason for participants to become part of the Umbrella Movement, which, after all, can be described as a pro-democracy movement, supporting the idea of further democratization in Hong Kong, often neglecting the causes this development would have on the city's economy, which is already troubled by increasing prices, a lack in social welfare and affordable housing, to name but a few (Deva 2015).

Despite Occupy Central's early attempt to push for democratic elections, the group soon lost momentum and even "called for protesters to retreat after violent clashes" (BBC 2014). Student activists, however, continued to stick to and spread their stance,

splitting into several groups, most of which had different goals in mind. With some asking for the Chief Executive's resignation and others becoming eager to divert to more radical actions, the diversity of strategies was clearer than ever. This diversity, however, "could be a source of strength in Hong Kong's post-Occupy movement" (Hilgers 2015).

5.2.4 Aftermath

With ad hoc movements usually being of a short duration due to the lack of organization and resources, it wasn't all too surprising when the Umbrella Movement lost momentum after the last tents occupying important Hong Kong streets were dismantled seventy-nine days after the Movement began.

"The ad hoc alliance format is effective as a short-term means to fend off encroachment on civil society, as it can coordinate CSOs of similar persuasions with relatively low costs, and allow them to mobilise their own respective publics with due respect to their differences. It is, however, difficult for this organisational form to accumulate enough resources, experience or mutual trust to build a strong and sustained movement. Social movement in Hong Kong is bound to be sporadic, spontaneous, and dependent on the initiative of individual participants, which makes it difficult to effect institutional changes" (Ma 2009: 61).

Whilst many understood this dismantlement as the Movement's failure, participants reassured those who questioned the Movement's very purpose, that it is indeed a successful outcome, as history has been written, marking the Umbrella Movement the most influential event in the Special Administrative Region's history.

Events that transpired immediately after the Movement's end in late 2014 included, for example, the resignation of Apple Daily's editor-in-chief, as a result of his arrest in connection to the Umbrella Movement, which caused plenty criticism (Master 2014). Other arrests of pro-democracy activists and leading figures during the Movement were met with even more agitation. After a two-day long detention in September 2014, three prominent students, Joshua Wong, as well as Alex Chow and Nathan Law, representing Scholarism and the Federation of Students, respectively,

were sued in August 2015 for participating in an unlawful entering into the Hong Kong government's headquarters in Hong Kong's Admiralty district. (Wong 2015). In June 2016, all three were charged, with their sentencing, which may conclude in a prison sentence of up to five years, to be determined by August 2016.

Despite the police's and government's reactions to the Umbrella Movement, which were highly criticized in the international arena, pro-democracy activists did not capitulate after the Movement's abrupt conclusion in late 2014. On February 1 of the following year, another large-scale protest took place, slightly resembling previous protest movements, despite its low number of participants (Hilgers 2015). This low number, however, should not be understood as growing political apathy, as it was the case after the failure of previous movements. Instead, it underlines the existence of a political, and social, divide in Hong Kong, which was recently reconfirmed by the foundation and introduction of new political players, most of them seeking to field candidates for the upcoming Legislative Council elections, to be held on 4 September 2016.

The district-level elections, which took place in November 2015, may be understood as a first success of pro-democratic forces. With a higher voter turnout than usual, the pro-democracy movement "got a boost" with almost ten candidates, who were previously active during the Umbrella Movement, chosen as representatives at the city's district-level. The election of these "Umbrella soldiers" further strengthens the Movement and the general attempt at pushing democratization in the Special Administrative Region (Forsythe 2015, Kwok/Baldwin 2015). Using the impetus of those elections, several new parties and alliances are eager to participate in the upcoming Legislative Council elections. Among those is a party called "Demosisto", seeking greater autonomy and launched by the two of the three previously charged students, Joshua Wong and Nathan Law, now acting as the party's Secretary-General and Chairman, respectively. Despite supporting two lists of candidates for the Legislative Council elections, the party "has pledged to advocate self-determination for Hong Kong [...]", whilst stressing the importance of acknowledging and including the "China factor" (Lam 2016). This new party will be met by a range of other new actors, including the "Path of Democracy", a think tank aiming at forming a new alliance in an attempt to achieve genuine universal suffrage in the long run, and "Hong Kong Indigenous", a radical localist group, that deemed violence

acceptable as a last resort to push back Beijing's influence – a strategy opposed by the majority of other actors (Wurzel 2016).

The turn to more radical actions was also noticeable during this year's Chinese New Year festivities, as a clash between demonstrators and police took form. Despite its irrelevance in connection to pro-democracy movements, it still had a great impact on Hong Kong society, due to the conflict's timing, being the most important holiday in the year, and its connection to violent police intervention, as it was already apparent during the Umbrella Movement. In this case, however, activists were trying to defend merchants selling local snacks and treats for the festivities, whose businesses were abruptly stopped by police due to lacking licenses. Activists reacted violently, using trash and fire to "rebel" against police forces, ultimately leading to more than twenty participants detained (Die Welt 2016). Incidents like these have become more apparent and regular since the outburst of the Umbrella Movement in 2014, showing the growing dissatisfaction with the government's ignorance and policies itself.

With the recent District Council elections resulting in a successful outcome for pro-democratic parties and leading to C.Y. Leung's "invitation" for those elected to "engage with the government to explore solutions to the city's local issues" (Chui 2015), as well as the upcoming Legislative Council and Chief Executive elections, in 2016 and 2017, respectively, focus should be put on the different issues raised and discussed during and after the Umbrella Movement, in order to better understand the current and potentially future situation in the Special Administrative Region, which continues to be under Chinese sovereignty under the "One Country, Two Systems" principle, which will be upheld for, at least, thirty more years, until 2047.

6 Conceptualization of Issues Raised

“In the recent years, Hong Kong people have been complaining in unison about local politics as their frustrations grow” (Cheng 2014: 223). These complaints have been based on a variety of issues and aims that have been regularly discussed and started to attract even more attention since the very beginning of the Umbrella Movement in September 2014. Out of all issues raised and aims presented, six prominent principles have been chosen for further analysis, which will be summarized on the following pages.

6.1 Universal Suffrage

According to the principle “One Country, Two Systems”, Hong Kong is free to govern itself in all aspects, except when it comes to deciding on foreign relations and defense strategies and policies. Furthermore, the Special Administrative Region’s Basic Law promises to respect and push the process of democratization, ultimately leading to universal suffrage by democratic means. Having said that, however, “it must be noted that within international law, universal suffrage is not an entitlement” and that it is “not a binding obligation for attaining internal self-governance, nor does it create a political right” (Lone 2016). This, however, did not stop the Umbrella Movement’s participants to demand for genuine universal suffrage to be provided to Hong Kong citizens by 2017, the year when the city’s next Chief Executive is to be elected.

Half a year after the Movement ended, the very issue of universal suffrage raised during the Umbrella Movement, was brought to a vote in the Special Administrative Region’s Legislative Council. There, all elected representatives of the Legislative Council had to decide on whether to approve or reject the Chinese government’s proposal that would provide the demanded universal suffrage starting from the 2017 Chief Executive election, with a minor adaptation. The candidates, who would be up for direct election by universal suffrage, would be pre-chosen by a committee, composed of mainly pro-Beijing members. This proposal, thus, was quickly deemed as introducing “fake” democratic, direct elections, given that the committee itself would not be chosen by genuine direct vote. Hence, it was not all too surprising when

the legislators voted against the proposal, forfeiting universal suffrage in exchange for potentially achieving genuine democratic elections in the future. That move was welcomed by many other pro-democracy actors, while others, both local and Chinese actors, challenged the pro-democracy camp's decision, marking it as an undemocratic move, since the rejection of this proposal also meant the continuance of undemocratic elections of the Special Administrative Region's Chief Executive (Kwok/Lee 2015). This, amongst other conflicts, led to the revival of the "battle between the government and pro-democracy supporters", possibly allowing for a revival of the Umbrella Movement itself (Deva 2015).

6.2 Democracy

Democracy has always been on the forefront of the Umbrella Movement and its many actors. In fact, there has been "a wide range of views in Hong Kong about the value of democratic elections" (Bush 2014), but with the pro-democratic camp constantly growing, the public support for democratization in Hong Kong is "alive and kicking". Furthermore, following Merkel's assertion of democracy in Asia, it is hardly possible to rule modern democracies without political parties (Merkel 2003: 46), which constitute an essential part of a functioning democracy. Moreover, he establishes the existence of an active civil society as promising factor in relation to democratization – an assertion that was definitely verified in the case of Hong Kong (ibid.: 160).

As the process of democratization in Hong Kong has been thoroughly discussed throughout the previous chapters, some final assumptions should conclude the issue at this point. When taking the principle of "One Country, Two Systems" into consideration, the confusion when it comes to democracy is relatively understandable, as it allows for interpretations, that can be fitted according to the interpreter's preference. Thus, those following the idea of one country are more likely support Beijing in its efforts to prevent Hong Kong from introducing genuine democratic elections, if that could mean a growing dissatisfaction and distrust of the People's Republic of China's government and its actions. On the other hand, the principle of "Two Systems" can be understood as being in line with the opposite's idea, where "full and fair democracy could guarantee [Hong Kong's] autonomy", upholding the current system without having to challenge the Chinese government

(Lo Alex 2015). The China factor, however, should not be undermined when talking about democratization and democratic developments in Hong Kong, as the Special Administrative Region's dependence on the People's Republic of China and its economic development continues to be a significant factor in deciding Hong Kong's further development.

6.3 Autonomy

The dependence on the People's Republic of China, itself, is not the issue. The problem is that the principle was supposed to guarantee the Special Administrative Region's highly autonomous character. This, however, has come under scrutiny, as recent conflicts and events even led to Hong Kong citizens considering to leave their hometown, as they "no longer see their home as a safe haven from mainland politics" (Yu 2015). Many fear that the Chinese government no longer respects the "One Country, Two Systems" principle, as it was guaranteed in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, and constantly increases its influence on Hong Kong's political, as well as social structures. This fear was strengthened after one of the city's independent newspapers was bought by Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba and prominent Beijing supporter, leading to assumptions that this move was a direct strike against Hong Kong's general freedom of press (Müller 2016).

Unlike many, Joshua Wong, does not see the main goal of Hong Kong to achieve direct elections by universal suffrage. Instead he considers the "continued autonomy" much more important – a line of thought he continues to follow as Secretary-General of the newly established political party, "Demosisto" (Lo Arthur 2015). Autonomy in Hong Kong, as previously mentioned, is currently, more than ever, challenged and threatened by external, mostly Mainland Chinese, interference, which adds to the fact that the Umbrella Movement did not disperse, but instead develop into a Movement far bigger than anticipated, with its main players now engaging in "real politics" by preparing themselves, as well as their newly created parties or alliances, for the upcoming Legislative Council elections, in an attempt to preserve, or even re-establish, a highly autonomous Hong Kong.

6.4 Independence

To some actors, neither of the previously mentioned issues or goals were sufficient. With some opting for a “city-state solution”, which could only be reached by Hong Kong becoming independent, representatives of China, alongside pro-Beijing actors in Hong Kong, grew concerned (Hilgers 2015). Preparing for the upcoming Legislative Council elections, two parties, aiming at Hong Kong’s independence, were recently created. The “Hong Kong National Party”, established earlier this year, does indeed strategize in line with a “city-state solution”, whilst the other party, namely the “Alliance to Resume British Sovereignty over Hong Kong and Independence” clearly has another strategy in mind. The party’s leader, Chiu, who was previously sentenced to community service after being charged for occupying a government building, underlines the party’s decision to disregard the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, in an attempt at achieving “genuine independence” (Ng 2016).

In reaction to the parties’ creation, representatives of the People’s Republic of China reminded parties and actors aiming at undermining Chinese sovereignty that their outcries would not be tolerated, if pursued any further (Reuters 2015). Nevertheless, the number of supporters of the push for independence continues to grow, giving rise to new alliances and even parties, mobilizing the general public to support their idea. “The idea of Hong Kong independence is anathema to Beijing, which fears any separatist or sweeping democratic demands spilling into China to undermine its rule” (Pomfret/Baldwin 2015). This fear is part of the reason, why the People’s Republic of China recently stepped up its security policies – a move that also had an immediate effect on Hong Kong, as will be shown now.

6.5 Security

In relation to pro-democracy movements, like the Umbrella Movement, in Hong Kong, security can be understood in two ways. Firstly, with China’s power continuously rising, it is often seen as a potential threat to Hong Kong and its stability. Its growing influence in the Special Administrative Region is mostly received as a problem, threatening the social and political systems, by trying to

implement “unconstitutional” pro-Beijing reforms, causing an increase in prices – due to Mainland Chinese’s growing capital –, and even challenging the city’s own dialect, Cantonese, by spreading Mandarin as predominant language. To many, these changes feel like an attempt to turn Hong Kong from a Special Administrative Region into “just another Chinese city”, with “police using tactics against activists that resemble those used in China [...]” (Yu 2015).

The growth in violence is one of the main reasons for Hong Kong citizens to question and doubt Chinese sovereignty, as they see their stable and secure Hong Kong threatened by Chinese influence. Recently, the Chinese government even decided on a new law that highly resembled the proposed anti-subversion law that, in 2003, led to the large-scale protest that ultimately resulted in the shelving of the law. Twelve years later, in July 2015, however, the People’s Republic of China’s government enacted the newly drafted national security law that is now effective in the entire country, supposedly including Hong Kong (Human Rights Watch 2015). With the Chinese government continuously condemning Hong Kong’s attempts at seeking democracy, or even independence, as (potential) security threats, this law now represents a legal document, not only demanding Hong Kong people to contribute to protecting national security, but also endangering any form of alliance committing any “act endangering the security, honour or interests of the State” (State Security Law 2015) – yet another article allowing for a wide range of interpretations. Furthermore, “Article 18 of the Basic Law gives Beijing the authority to declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong if ‘turmoil’ there endangers national unity or security is beyond the control of Hong Kong government” (Bush 2014), leaving plenty of room for the Chinese government to “legally” intervene in its Special Administrative Region’s affairs.

With peaceful protesters labeled as “violent criminals” or “security threats”, both the Hong Kong and Mainland governments, subject these “criminals” to “sanctions enacted in a variety of ways that reflect national and regional security and policing strategies” (Chesters 2009: 63). In doing so, the Hong Kong government provokes its citizens and potential reactions, especially by pro-democracy activists, whilst the Chinese government bluntly disregards the high autonomy it once promised the people of the Special Administrative Region.

Having said that, it is to be expected that the situation in Hong Kong, will continue to worsen as long as neither autonomy nor security is guaranteed.

6.6 Identity

With the handover of Hong Kong from British colonial rule to the People's Republic of China's sovereignty in 1997, the governments involved were in high hopes of an eventual rapprochement of Hong Kong and the Mainland. According to a survey recently conducted by the University of Hong Kong, however, the opposite seems to be the case, as only every third person asked described him/herself as "Chinese" or "Hong Kong Chinese", whilst the remaining, majority of, 67% labeled themselves as "Hong Konger" (Ricking 2015). This only adds to the fact that identity continues to play an important role in the Hong Kong-Mainland relationship, as well as in every Hong Konger's daily life.

"Because identity is so powerful, resistance to a country that threatens a particular culture or religion or way of life is always the strongest and fiercest" (Sharansky/Weiss 2008: 203). Thus, China's interference in Hong Kong directly affects Hong Kong citizens, who fear to lose their Hong Kong identity, which they, following and imitating their previous generations, nurtured and preserved for decades. The recently identified growing "emphasis on Hong Kong identity as something separate or different from Chinese identity" (Summers 2016), thus, confirms the divide between Hong Kong and Mainland citizens, which has been recently politicized by actors involved in pro-democracy movements and are now involved in party politics, trying to protect the Hong Kong identity from any further interference.

7 Hong Kong-Mainland Relationship

The relationship between Hong Kong and Mainland China has always been subject to an interdependence of various kinds. Beginning with the transition of Hong Kong to Chinese authority in 1997, the People's Republic of China always concentrated on the economic benefits this unequal relationship would entail. Despite its own economy constantly growing, underlining its impressive progress as rising global power, the Chinese government has always seen the economic potential in its Special Administrative Region, constantly trying to protect its role its sovereign and authoritarian ruling power. Throughout the past decades, however, this focus on economic development has become a two-way street, with Hong Kong's local economy becoming dependent on China in various ways. One the one hand, it relies on Chinese tourists and immigrants, intensively investing in the city and its development as a financial metropolis. One the other hand, Hong Kong has to constantly monitor economic developments in China, as any change may affect its own, local economy.

Besides their economic interdependence, the two parties are also interconnected politically, with the Chinese government constantly reaffirming its, constitutional, authority (Cheung 2011: 717). This was particularly apparent during the most recent incidents, including the Umbrella Movement, the arrest of activists who supported Hong Kong democracy protests and the disappearance of Hong Kong booksellers. With the former having been thoroughly analyzed, the other two shall be shortly introduced at this point.

The first case concerns Wang Mo, one amongst five people sentenced by the Chinese government in Guangzhou, a South Chinese city close to Hong Kong, for the "subversion of state power". This apparent attempt at subversion took the form of Wang Mo holding a poster supporting the Umbrella Movement, which was reason enough for the Chinese government to sentence him, alongside four other activists, to more than four years in prison. This harsh crackdown on activists, or civil society, as a whole, is part of the People's Republic of China's policy in line with its new state security law aiming at protecting the country's national security and stability, and does not only affect China. In fact, this crackdown has also been felt in Hong

Kong, whose citizens now also have to face the new national security law (SCMP 2016).

The second case revolved around the disappearance of five booksellers from their Hong Kong store, which was a massive shock to Hong Kong citizens, as the city, up to this point, was considered a free and safe place. At first, it was unclear what had happened to the five people, even though their disappearance was believed to be a consequence of their publication and distribution of critical books, who are understood as threatening to the People's Republic of China, where the majority of these books were already forbidden. Despite plenty of public, as well as global, uproar and outcry, it took months until the first sign of life by one of the booksellers was shown, portraying him in a recording, clarifying that his disappearance was, in fact, voluntary and due to a previously committed offense in Mainland China. On 16 June 2016, however, one of the booksellers, Lam Wing-kee, came back to Hong Kong describing his abduction and month-long detention, affirming that all previous statements were, indeed, fabricated by his captors. Until today, he is the only bookseller, out of the five abducted, who is back in Hong Kong elaborating on his unlawful detention. The others continue to be "detained" in China, even though it can't be understood as a detention in a legal sense, as most of the booksellers actually returned to Hong Kong to drop the case concerning their disappearance, only to return to the People's Republic of China a few days later. This case is particularly interesting in connection to the Hong Kong-Mainland relationship, as many saw the incident as "expansion of China's authoritarian legal system beyond its borders", clearly violating the principle of "One Country, Two Systems" and further threatening Hong Kong's autonomy (Democracy Digest 2016b).

With the Hong Kong public's growing resentment of the Chinese government, especially as a response to its recent undemocratic and unlawful crackdowns, Hong Kong citizens are now, more than ever, concerned with the implications of China's interference in Hong Kong's political and social spheres. Following the Umbrella Movement, which was harshly criticized by, both, local pro-Beijing forces and the Chinese Central government, and the National People's Congress Committee's decision to indefinitely shelve the issue of genuine direct elections by universal suffrage, that were supposed to take place in 2017, the year Hong Kong citizens will vote for their new Chief Executive, Hong Kong's pro-democracy forces are now

creating their own alliances and parties, hoping to be elected in this year's Legislative Council poll and eventually influence policies. The increase of pro-democracy forces' involvement in local politics is anathema to the Chinese government that previously controlled Hong Kong's political system "so that the final outcomes are largely prescribed in Beijing's favor [...]" (Boniface/Alon 2010: 804) – a strategy that will no longer prevail in the Special Administrative Region. In China, however, this continued crackdown on dissidents, despite the citizens' general freedom of expression, continues to be a regular occurrence, with "Chinese local officials frequently employ[ing] relational repression to demobilize protesters" (Deng/O'Brien 2013: 533). Relational repression, as Deng and O'Brien explain, is a "control technique" using "social ties" for the demobilization of protesters (ibid.: 534), illustrating yet another strategy Hong Kongers are appalled by, further strengthening the fear of Chinese policies crossing the "border", eventually affecting Hong Kong and its citizens.

Hence, despite the apparent interdependence, the "interaction between China and Hong Kong is not an interaction of equals" (Boniface/Alon 2010: 802). Hong Kong's influence on the People's Republic of China is enormously limited, whilst the Chinese government's impact on Hong Kong is ever-growing. This is not only due to China's geographical, demographical and economic predominance, but also the possibility of interpretation of Hong Kong laws by the Chinese government, as well as Hong Kong government's relations to and dependence on the Central government. With the National People's Congress's Standing Committee, seated in Beijing, being the sole legitimate organ able to interpret Hong Kong's Basic Law, it is questionable, however, if an interpretation could be taking place on the Committee's "own initiative" instead of as a result of a Hong Kong government's "request" (Wesley-Smith 2003: 167). Here, the People's Republic of China's authority would, again, prevail, despite the "One Country, Two Systems" principle supposedly attributing the Special Administrative Region with a high degree in autonomy and an independent judiciary.

Finally, in connection to the pro-democracy camp's continued attempt at achieving direct elections by universal suffrage, it should be clear that the China factor is not to be undermined, which is why elected forces will have to use the established relationship with the People's Republic of China in their favor. This will in no way be an easy task, but it will be of paramount importance in order to guarantee a successful outcome for pro-democracy forces and Hong Kong citizens, in general.

8 Participation and Perception

“Socio-economic and political changes in the last few decades have turned Hong Kong from a politically apathetic to a politically active society” (Lam 2003: 34). This active participation, however, is only apparent as long as a proposed policy or reform is deemed unsatisfactory. Hence, it is true to say that political activism in Hong Kong never really disappears but instead becomes latent until a new issue catches the public’s attention (Lee/Chan 2008: 101). This explains why the number of incidents during the two major large-scale protests, the anti-subversion law protest in 2003 and the Umbrella Movement in 2014, was relatively low, despite a fairly vibrant civil society.

According to Groshek (2009: 115), “the internet has been lauded as a potent democratizing agent [...]”. This is especially true when it comes to the Umbrella Movement, where social media and instant messaging services were used as the main form of communication and organization. This, in fact, was also a reason for the Movement’s quick mobilization and effective organization on- and off-site. Furthermore, the online sphere is also used as a source of information and “learning space”, educating mainly youngsters about prevailing issues and events, highly influencing their opinion on and perception. Hence, with young adults playing an essential role in the Umbrella Movement, it is not only interesting, but also particularly important, to rigorously analyze and delve into their perception of the current situation in Hong Kong.

8.1 Hong Kong Students’ Perception

As previously mentioned, the survey conducted is a rather small-scale online survey and should therefore not be understood as representative summary of public opinion in Hong Kong, but rather as an attempt to provide an insight into young adults’ perception of the situation, as well as bigger concepts, primarily democracy, in present-day Hong Kong.

The focus of this survey was put on Hong Kong’s youth, limiting the age range to “young adults”, thus excluding answers from people over 30. According to a

statistical profile by the University of Hong Kong, youth in Hong Kong, here focusing on those aged between 15 and 24, amounts to around 870,000 young people (University of Hong Kong 2012). Since it was not feasible to directly approach them, a distribution strategy better known as “snowball effect” was chosen, asking those who participated to further spread the survey.

By the time of this summary of results, forty-eight people completed the survey. Due to ten people not completing or meeting the criteria of the survey, their answers unfortunately could not be used for further analysis, leaving a more concentrated accumulation of results than anticipated. Nevertheless, the results obtained through conducting this survey still give an insight into Hong Kong youth’s opinions on and perception of the situation in their hometown. The following summary will be limited to the most interesting, and surprising, results, as the presentation of the survey’s results, in its entirety, could be subject to a thesis itself.

The survey consisted of several sub-categories including “questions” concerning democracy, security and participation as general concepts, as well as in direct relation to Hong Kong. Except for the segment concentrating on participation, all sub-categories displayed a number of statements the survey’s participants were supposed to agree or disagree with. The chosen response type demanded the participants’ judgement, offering them five response categories including: “Strongly agree”, “Slightly agree”, “Neither agree nor disagree”, “Slightly disagree” and “Strongly disagree”. Despite the regularly voiced criticism of including a neutral response category, which may increase the tendency to choose the middle category, it was chosen to offer the possibility of choosing “Neither agree nor disagree” as a response. The reason for doing so, was to be able to show which statements would result in clear, “extreme” answers, with the majority of respondents choosing either “Strongly agree” and “Strongly disagree”, providing an insight on the youth’s interest in specific issues.

Examples for “extreme” results include, for example, the statement about freedom of participation as an essential element of a functioning democracy, 68.42 percent of the respondents agreed with, whilst 23.68 percent at least slightly agreed. Another clear trend towards the category of “strong agreement” also focused on the participation, at large. 65.79 percent of all people questioned strongly agreed with

the statement that people, and their voices (freedom of speech, freedom of participation etc.), in Hong Kong should be protected by law. Another 23.68 percent chose the category of slight agreement. The majority of participants further agreed to the three following statements: 1) “China’s power in and over Hong Kong is increasing” (55.26 percent strongly agreed, 36.84 percent slightly agreed); 2) “Pre-choosing candidates makes Hong Kong a ‘fake democracy’” (52.63 percent strongly agreed, 28.95 percent slightly agreed); and finally 3) “I am concerned about my future” (55.25 percent strongly agreed, 26.32 percent slightly agreed). Furthermore, there is general agreement on the freedom of participation and respect of equal rights, no matter what origin, ethnicity etc., with 52.63 to 60.53 strongly agreeing and 26.32 to 39.47 percent slightly agreeing to statements on these issues.

Statements with the most unclear answers concerned the concept of democracy. There was no clear trend towards either category concerning statements about the concept of democracy being “flawed” or the democratic system bringing about more challenges than benefits. Moreover, the responses to whether or not “freedom of participation is given in Hong Kong” were just as equally distributed throughout the categories. Similar results were shown in connection to statements about Hong Kong being a politically stable, peaceful and free (from internal and external threats) city. With the whole sub-category focusing on security not showing any clear results, due to the equal distribution of results throughout the five response categories, one might think that security, itself, has not been subject to thorough discussion amongst Hong Kong’s youth, despite some respondents’ clear agreement or disagreement.

Despite the Umbrella Movement having taken place in Hong Kong less than two years ago, the respondents clearly decided that even though “Hong Kong’s youth is politically active” (7.89 percent strongly agreeing, 60.53 percent slightly agreeing and 18.42 percent neither agreeing nor disagreeing), it definitely “should be more politically active” (28.95 percent strongly agreeing, 47.37 percent slightly agreeing). As the Movement didn’t only involve young actors, but also participants of older generations, one statement addressed both generations’ involvement by asking whether “young Hong Kongers are just as involved in political happenings as the older generation”. While the majority of the respondents, 42.11 percent, neither agreed nor disagreed, more than 36 percent slightly disagreed. This response, as it is subject to ambiguity, needs to be further analyzed, which, however, is not within the

realms of possibility with the resources available. This, however, is a great example for the potential ambiguity of terms and statements that may, at times, lead to blurred results.

Concerning the perception of participation, and the Movement itself, another form of response retrieval was chosen. Instead of providing participants with five response categories, this part showed sixteen statements that would or wouldn't apply to the respondent. Thus, the participant had to tick every of the statement that he/she deemed correct or applicable. The statement "I know someone who has made use of his/her right to participate" applied to the majority of respondents, with 86.84 percent agreeing. Out of the total respondents, 78.59 percent also confirmed knowing someone "who participated in the Umbrella Movement" or having participated themselves (42.11 percent). Participation, itself, was generally deemed as "important in a democracy" (63.16 percent), with 71 percent of the respondents confirming that they have made use of their "right to participate (no matter in what form)". The statements receiving the least support were: "I believe there is enough political participation in Hong Kong", with none of the participants agreeing, and roughly 8 percent asserting that "participation has, at times, be violent".

Generally speaking, this survey provided an interesting insight into the young adults' perception of not only the Umbrella Movement, but also concepts including, but not limited to, democracy, security and participation. Despite the relatively moderate number of participants, it resulted in the presentation of some "extreme" answers, while the indifference with others was just as clear. Therefore, it should be considered to further delve into the subject matter, by conducting a large-scale survey, eventually leading to a representative presentation of Hong Kong youth's opinion and perception.

9 Conclusion

In 1985, Offe (1985: 830f) suggested that new social movements are “incapable of negotiation because they do not have anything to offer in return for any concessions made to their demand”. This certainly does not apply to the Hong Kong case, as negotiations between different parties, representatives of the Hong Kong government and the different groups active during the Movement, took place on several occasions. Those meetings were, in a way, useful for both sides. The government used these opportunities to try to sway the activists’ and protesters’, mostly negative, perception of the government, as well as their commitment to the Movement, in its entirety. The groups’ representatives, on the other hand, tried to initiate cooperative talks leading to the shelving of unsuitable and undesired policies, as well as the development of new, more democratic policies. Even though the success of either side leaves much to be desired, the Hong Kong government did, in fact, allow for negotiations to take place, hoping that cooperation would also lead to stability.

Furthermore, despite assertion that the “Hong Kong case shows that democratization is not purely a political phenomenon because it is embedded in the economy and the national reunification process” (So 2000: 379), Hong Kong’s recent movements have shown that the focus definitely isn’t on economic, but instead on social factors, highlighting the Umbrella Movement’s characteristics of a new social movement. This is also supported by the fact that the actors involved didn’t seek one sole outcome, but instead were concerned with a variety of issues, including, but not limited to, universal suffrage, independence, Chinese interference and the general dissatisfaction with either the Hong Kong or Chinese government, or both. Of course, economic factors added to the public’s general dissatisfaction, but it certainly wasn’t a predominant issue in Hong Kong.

Moreover, it was also clarified that the aim for universal suffrage can not be understood as main cause for people to participate, as the movement itself was both, leaderless and loosely organized, which, in fact, is rather typical for a new social movement, and thus concerned a variety of actors interested in a wide range of issues. Even though the push for universal suffrage, as it was previously stipulated and guaranteed can be considered important, it should be reiterated that there was not any predominant issue raised or goal aimed at.

Concerning the third hypothesis, assuming that the Umbrella Movement's actions haven't led to any specific changes, it was established that this wasn't the case at all. With many previously active "Umbrella soldiers" now creating new alliances and parties, in order to be fielded as candidates in the upcoming Legislative Council elections, one has to acknowledge the impact Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement had, economically, but more importantly, politically and socially. The demand for democratization is now stronger and louder than ever, with Hong Kong's civil society "alive and kicking". Having said that, one might assume that the movement, itself, was generally perceived as positive. In reality, however, the Umbrella movement has been viewed and met with ambiguous responses. On the one hand, there was general support from the public, especially the younger generation, encouraging participants of the movement to use the impetus to continue their push for further democratization. These positive reactions were also noticed in international media, with leaders of democratic nations, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, applauding the movement's participants. On the other hand, however, the movement was immediately met with criticism by the Chinese government, and the Hong Kong government itself, both feeling threatened by the potential impact of the movement. Thus, while the Umbrella movement left a relatively positive impression internationally, it wasn't the case in its own "backyard".

9.1 What Will Happen until/in 2017?

Following the Legislative Council elections in September 2016, the highly discussed Chief Executive election will take place in 2017, the year in which genuine direct elections by universal suffrage should be introduced. As this will not be the case, it remains to be seen what the outcome of this year's election will be and what impact it will have on the Chief Executive election in the following year. Another issue that Hong Kong citizens will have to deal with is the introduction of the People's Republic of China's new state security law, which supposedly also applies to the Special Administrative Region, despite its high degree of autonomy and alleged independent judiciary.

9.2 What Will Happen until/in 2047?

With the “One Country, Two Systems” principle expiring in 2047, it is unclear what the future, after the following 30-year transitional phase, will look like. At least one of the newly established parties, however, already used its manifesto to call attention to the general ignorance and disregard of this issue. With the principle, itself, continuously being undermined by the Chinese government and its introduction of “unconstitutional” and interfering policy reforms, it is questionable whether it will even be upheld for thirty more years, as many already see it falling apart. Taking all things into consideration, it is expected for more new social movements to arise and challenge, both, the Chinese and Hong Kong government in an attempt to safeguard Hong Kong’s unique status as Special Administrative Region with a high degree of autonomy and independent judiciary, amongst others.

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