

## **Abstract**

In this theoretically focused thesis I make use of the example of vaccination against infectious diseases to show how expert institutions define value of its products through constructing a continuity of its rational and moral dimensions. This continuity allows rational and moral arguments to naturally complement themselves in a coherent discursive and procedural frame which I call an institutional regime of the value of vaccination. Regarding general public, its crucial products are sanctions in the form of imputing decisional competence to those who vaccinate and decisional incompetence to those who do not. This competence is understood as both sign of optimal rationality and morally responsible behaviour which takes into account the common good. But besides external imputation, a decisional competence is also acquired through individual activity, which takes on a special importance for those who reject vaccination. They manage the imputations of incompetence through constituting alternative definitions of the value of health care in which they stress the importance of natural treatment and individual responsibility. These definitions of value manifest both on the level of narrowly focused rational discussion of expert recommendations and the level of more general ideas about legitimate ways to handle one's health. It is, to some extent, possible, to put them in accord with the institutional regime of the value of vaccination, which, in turn, undergoes partial modifications (as in enforcing vaccinations becoming increasingly a matter of voluntary policies), the foci of consensus remain, nevertheless, fundamentally limited by categorical differences between institutional and contra-institutional criteria of value.