

The diploma thesis attempts to present a consistent conception of matter in the philosophy of Plotinus. Its first part therefore contains a presentation of his own ideas about matter employing the interpretation of three key treatises dealing with this topic (Ennead II, 4 (12) "On the Two Kinds of Matter", Ennead III, 6 (26) "On Impassibility of Things Without Body" and Ennead I, 8 (51) "On What Are And Whence Come Evils"), the second part is dedicated to the overview and criticism of major modern interpretations of Plotinian matter. The third part then introduces my own approach, consisting of splitting Plotinus' hypostasis of soul into two hypostases, and identifying matter with the procession (i.e. proodic aspect) of the ontologically lower of the two. Arguments are offered for these nonstandard interpretive choices; the resulting conception is shown both as self-consistent as well as consistent with Plotinus' metaphysics as such, and it is demonstrated to be able to reconstruct the features that Plotinus attributes to matter.