Border Walls: The Case of Saudi Arabia

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will work on implementing the Political Economic Theory of Wall Construction on the case of Saudi Arabia. To further contribute to the study of border walls, the PETWC is applied to a different methodology than in the original paper where it was first introduced, taking into consideration neighboring countries without border walls into analysis. Ultimately, the thesis will show that PETWC sets good foundation for further development of a broader border wall theory, and that border walls concerning Saudi Arabia are consequence of low regional integration and internal instability at home and abroad.

KEYWORDS
border walls, Saudi Arabia, political economic theory of wall construction, civil wars, territorial dispute, cross-border economic inequality, state fragility

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 31/07/2016

Mensur Hamzić
Over 40 world states set up walls/fences on the border with 60 neighboring states from the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. There are multiple rationalizations given but majority is related to security, prevention of illegal immigration and trafficking. The growing signal has become apparent in the last few years as, 30 of those decisions came after 9/11, while 15 of those just last year. Even though most know border wall/fence, through the influence of media, has been the one between the United States and Mexico, few people are aware of the rising trend in other global regions and particularly in Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). By the time Israel finishes the wall/fence with bordering Jordan, it will be completely, and physically cutoff from all neighboring countries. As in most other area and issues, Israel is a sui generic case with complex social and political situation, internally and externally. However, the region has another champion of “border walls” and that is Saudi Arabia – an Arab country in the middle of the Arab world with stable economy, political system, and even foreign policy. Saudi’s border fence market, valued at $20 billion for the period between 2009 - 2018, is larger than U.S./Mexican & U.S./Canadian border fence markets put together. It is, in fact, the largest border fence market in the world!

This thesis will focus on the rising phenomena of border walls/fences and testing of the Political Economy Theory of Wall Construction on the case of Saudi Arabia.
Hypotheses:

This thesis will address evaluate the following two hypotheses:

• PETWC can be used to explain border walls in Saudi Arabia.
• Saudi border walls are consequences of low regional integration and prolonged state fragility.

Methodology:

The first part of the thesis is devoted to the theoretical analysis, discussion of the theoretical material, and descriptive material in context of their applicability. Within, both qualitative, as well as quantitative research methods (simple statistical data) are implemented to evaluate theoretical claims on the case of Saudi Arabia. The empirical and theoretical analysis will be combined to further help establish the validity of the hypotheses.

As this is a case study research on Saudi Arabia in particular, it will also use therefore use qualitative, as well as quantitative methods (simple statistical data etc.) of primarily secondary sources to prove or disprove above stated hypothesis. Both empirical and theoretical analysis will be combined.

Outline:
1. Introduction
2. Literature Overview
3. Political Economic Theory of Wall Construction
4. Middle East and Saudi Arabia
5. Main Findings
6. Conclusions
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1. Introduction

This work aims to implement the Political Economic Theory of Wall Construction (PETWC) proposed by David B. Carter and Paul Poast in the paper *Why do States Build Walls* by analyzing the case of Saudi Arabia. Based on observations this work will also suggest small supplement to the theory. Carter and Poast’s theory suggests that, even though there are various reasons as to why states build walls, cross-border economic inequality is the most important indicator that a border wall can be constructed. The theory is a result of an overarching statistical study, which takes into consideration borders walls built between 1800 and 2013. The authors also suggest two alternative reasons – civil wars and border disputes – for which their analysis found mixed support as predicaments for border wall construction. The findings with regards to the case of Saudi Arabia – the primary focus of this thesis – show that causes of the wall construction are a bit more complex and, as the theory perfectly suggests in its name, they are both economic and political in nature. Therefore, the current theory is overly focused on economic inequality measured by GDP per capita indicator, while putting other indicators (political and economic) in the background. The findings in the case of Saudi Arabia also suggest that country’s perceived internal stability, which includes political, social, legal, and economic parameters. This could be a good indicator of the likelihood for border wall construction applicable to other cases as well.
Even though border walls have existed for centuries, it is only recently that awareness for this topic among general population, journalists, and political scientists alike has grown. This can be attributed to the rise in construction along with the influence of mass media, which developed interest in the topic once it became a hot political issue in the 2016 in both the US presidential election and in European politics given the ongoing migrant crisis. As a result, available literature on the topic itself is limited, uncategorized, and usually merely tries to answer the questions of the rise of border walls with a broad brush by studying all of them together in a holistic approach. Very few border walls have attracted enough attention to have multiple academic works dedicated solely to them such as the US-Mexico and Israel-Palestine border walls. As Reece Jones of University of Hawaii – one of few pioneers whose work will be addressed in this paper – puts it: "The construction of border walls and the violence of borders is a significant development globally over the past twenty years and one that is not well documented (Campbell-Dollaghan, 2015).

The side that initiates wall construction will be referred to as a constructing country, while the other will be referred to as a targeted country. Though it is not case in all languages, the word wall has a broad meaning in English, and can mean an external wall and the internal sides of a room. The origins of the word are from the Latin word vallum meaning line, barricade, earthen wall, rampart, while murus means defensive stonewall. For this thesis, border fence/wall/barrier will all be used as synonyms and interchangeably and shall refer to any man-made barrier built or set
up on political borderlines. Border hardening will refer to process of trying to control
the borderlines between countries which became particularly intensified in the last
few decades. Therefore, border fences and walls are one of many tools to implement
border hardening with examples of others being internal immigration policies,
increased border patrols etc. International actors (countries, nations, empires) had
been relying on fences/walls on the borderlines for a long time with some of the most
knows and oldest examples being the Chinese Wall, Hadrian’s Wall, and the Berlin
Wall.

Ibrahim Al-Hajjri (2007) from the Naval Postgraduate School in California in his
thesis claims that “after reading extensive literature on the topic of security threat in
GCC region, it is author’s opinion that the real security threat stems in the border
disputes (Al-Hajjri, 2007). On the other hand, in previous work, the author of this
thesis (Hamzic, 2014) has argued that border disputes are usually easily resolved if
neighboring countries are well integrated with common political and economic goals.
However, if neighboring countries are not well integrated, border disputes are usually
used as tool in internal politics, especially in non-democratic countries where regimes
use such opportunities to as a means to demonstrate strength, propagate a sense of
patriotism, and promote unity in the nation.

This thesis will address evaluate the following two hypotheses:

- PETWC can be used to explain border walls in Saudi Arabia.
• Saudi Border walls are consequences of low regional integration and prolonged state fragility.
2. Methodology

The first part of the thesis is devoted to the theoretical analysis, discussion of the theoretical material, and descriptive material in context of their applicability. Within, both qualitative, as well as quantitative research methods (simple statistical data) are implemented to evaluate theoretical claims on the case of Saudi Arabia. The empirical and theoretical analysis will be combined to further help establish the validity of the hypotheses. The thesis will mainly relay on secondary sources, while primary and tertiary sources, such as news web articles, will be also used.

While border walls are a new and broad phenomena happening in different parts of the world, this thesis is a case study of one particular country designed to provide concise and illustrative findings to the field. To further contribute to the study of border walls, the PETWC is applied to a different methodology than in the original paper where it was first introduced. There are two reasons for this. First, it is to test the theory with a qualitative analysis as its evaluation mechanism. Secondly, and most importantly, focusing on Saudi Arabia with this kind of analysis will take into consideration the relationship of Saudi Arabia has with countries it shares border walls with (Yemen, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates), but also with neighboring countries with which it has no border walls. This will shed more light on this underexplored topic. Furthermore, the use of Saudi Arabia as case study is highly relevant and not accidental. Saudi Arabia is a main geopolitical actor in its region, as
it shares its borders with a total of eight neighboring countries, of which it has border walls with three of them (Iraq, United Arab Emirates and Yemen).

Economic cross-border inequality will be measured comparing GNI per capita of each country. Two sets of data will be used in the interest of accuracy: GNI per capita both in nominal terms, and in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP allows us to eliminate the distortions caused by relative price difference measured in foreign currency.

Fragile State Index (FSI) will be used for the comparing internal stability of each country. FSI is created and developed by Fund for Peace (FFP) and is a tool that uses proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical platform. CAST scores are based on 12 political, social, and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators coming out of years of research in social science, making it very important and helpful in examining complex multi-disciplinary topics such as border walls. Even though in the literature, the concept of fragile states usually refers only to the most endangered and dysfunctional countries in the world, the Fund for Peace in this index rates 178 countries across the world making it an optimal tool to study phenomena happening across the globe.¹

Metadata regarding bilateral trade between the countries of interest has been created using original data gathered from The Observatory of Economic Complexity,

¹ For more information please see: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/
which contains detailed profiles for almost all world countries regarding trade and diversity of economic systems.²

One of the major challenges is the lack of directly applicable literature on the topic of border walls in general, with little to no concrete discussion on the topic of Saudi border walls being done to date. Moreover, as Saudi Arabia and Middle East in general are not known to be very transparent with developed academia, therefore there are limited literature and news sources in English from the countries available on the topic in particular. Sources sometimes even provide contradictory information and reports.

² For more information please see: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/
3. Literature Overview

Considering that the topic is very new in the academic circles, there is little systematized work addressing particular aspects of the border walls. In terms of geography, much of the literature is focused on the US and EU case studies, while most of the literature is very recent. Below we will use some of most relevant literature (Vallet, 2014; Biger, 2013; Rosière & Jones, 2012; Hassner & Wittenberg, 2009; Carter & Poast 2015) present introduction into the topic of border walls from geographical, political, historic and social perspective. Literature overview related to theoretical part will be presented in the next chapter.

3.1. Borders and Border Walls

Currently in the world, there are over three hundred land-based political borderlines dividing some two hundred countries. Those lines mark areas of territorial sovereignty for each of those countries. Borders usually follow natural obstacles, such as swamps, mountains or rivers, but can also be man-made and artificial (Biger, 2013). The most illustrative example of an artificial border is the one between South and North Korea, roughly following 38th parallel. Different political, economic, and military influences converged to cause people to erect physical barriers on some of these borders, regardless of whether they followed natural or artificial lines. The purpose and characteristics of those same barriers evolved with time, along with purpose and characteristics of borders in general. Usually, border walls are used only
as last resort due to high cost of construction, maintenance, and surveillance, while the construction is usually a unilateral project and rarely supported from both sides.

Naturally, the topic of border walls is closely connected to that of borders themselves and their characteristics, which are more complicated than it seems. The current characteristic of borders have only been in existence for the last few centuries and are primarily an invention of the European powers, exported through colonialism and often drawn to fit their administrative, political, and economic needs, disregarding local conditions. This is how sovereign countries across the globe were created with borders that have very little historic foundation. It is even the case in Europe, where the population of every single country includes a significant percentage of minorities as a direct result of border disputes. In the Middle East and particularly the Arabian Peninsula, even after WWII and the declaration of independence, border demarcations were not considered priorities due to the people’s nomadic culture, lifestyle, and values. However, following the discovery of oil, border demarcations eventually it did become a priority and is increasingly so (Hensel, Allison and Khanani, 2003).

It is hard to estimate the total length of the physical border barriers in the world today. Michel Faucher and Chaire Raoul Dandurand of the University of Québec, estimate this number to be around 20,000 km. Others, such as Ballif and Rosière (Rosière & Jones 2012), estimate it at 41,000 km. However, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the hardening of borders in a very recent phenomena. Hassner
and Wittenberg (2009) showed in their paper that three quarters of all post-World War II barriers were initiated after 2000. Moreover, out of 68 border walls built since 1800, 28 were built after 2000. (Hassner & Wittenberg, 2009). This can also be seen on a graph published by Washington Post (Noack, 2014).

Different authors today used different typology of borders and there is no unified consensus. The two broad groups of borderlines fences are defined as (Vallet, 2014:

- Fences/walls which prevent cross-border passage of people (immigrants, labor force etc.) and goods. The majority fences existing today belong to this group, such as fences build between the US and Mexico, Morocco and Spanish enclaves in Morocco.

- Fences/walls which prevent cross-border passage of terrorists and armed groups. Examples of this group include border between India and Pakistan, the fence set up by Morocco in Western Sahara or North and South Korea.

Geographer Giden Biger (2013) divided border walls into seven different types:

- A wall that creates a border by its existence (example: Great Wall of China).

- A boundary fence – A barrier built by one side over the existing boundary (example: India and Pakistan).
Double fence – a barrier built by both sides along the common border (example of double fence on border between Malaysia and Thailand in addition to more famous example between South and North Korea).

Fence constructed within the area of one side, near the border but not parallel to it – a fence built in north Palestine during the Mandate period.

Fences in areas whose status is not agreed – Morocco in Western Sahara.

Partial fences – Egypt versus Libya.

City walls and fences – Jerusalem.

A fence or wall can belong to more than one type at the same time.

Appropriate to the twenty-first century, there is an additional non-physical type of border hardening – a virtual wall. Virtual fences/walls are monitored by drones and satellites and the best example of this is the Brazilian virtual wall through its thick Amazon forest.

Stéphane Rosière and Reece Jones have proposed additional typology (2012) where they differentiate between Frontlines, Fences and Walls, and Closed Straights. The oldest of the three types are frontlines, which primarily had military goal of protecting states. The other two types are most symbolic artifacts of border hardening and more common in twenty-first century. Even though the two are very similar, there are some important differences.
First of all, a wall has a more negative connotation than a fence. The difference between the two might be best expressed by the different terminology used to describe the same border barrier built on the borderline between Israel and Palestine, in which Palestine is the targeted entity. While Israel calls it security fence or the anti-terror fence, in Palestine it is known as the wall or even worst the Apartheid wall. As Robert Frost noted in his poem *Mending Wall* - “good fences make good neighbors”. Even though he used the word wall in the title itself for this particular verse he used the word fence, as it required a more positive connotation. From a more materialistic view, the difference between a fence and a wall is important as the word wall indicates a higher level of protection and is more expensive to build. For example, the Israeli barrier is estimated to cost approximately 2 million USD per kilometer (Bard, 2016), while the Botswana/Zimbabwe fence cost in total approximately 3.2 million USD or 6,330 USD per kilometer (Mukumbira, 2005) In short, fences are perceived as temporary while walls are perceived permanent. However today, technology is playing an increasingly significant role in efficacy of the border barriers, no matter if the barrier is a wall or a fence. Some high-tech barriers include devices such as radars, ground sensors, remote control cameras, etc. to ensure efficacy. The best example of this kind of a barrier is the one being built by Saudi Arabia on its border with Iraq (Spenser, 2015), also widely known as the Great Wall of Saudi Arabia. The estimated price of the barrier stands at 3 billion USD (3.33 million USD per kilometer) and the complex will include five fencing layers, as well as watchtowers, night-vision cameras,
and radar. Finally, Rosière and Jones (2012) suggest third type – hardened maritime border strait, which can be compared to the virtual wall. Scholars tend to ignore this type of border walls, but they are significant when studying the control of international migration flow of people and goods. They give the example of Saudi Arabia basing much of its foreign policy in securing safe and secure passage of tanker ships leaving from their ports to reach global markets through the Bab-al-Mandab and Hormuz straits. Another good example of a hardened maritime border is the strait of Gibraltar in the Mediterranean Sea between Spain and Morocco.

Since the fall of the Berlin wall and communism in general, a widespread euphoria was winning over the scholars who declared the end of history and thought that through globalization the world will become flat, borderless and promote economic development through free flow of capital, goods, and people. In the nineties and early two thousands, borders were seen only through the prism of globalization and according to most of the scholars and theorists, their main characteristics were their slow disintegration and disappearance. There were also voices of caution, such as Newman and Paasi (1998), who observed that “not all authors agree with the ideas that suggest the disappearance of boundaries” (Newman & Paasi, 1998).

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3 To read more, please see Ohmae (1990; 1995) and Moore (2003).
The changing point seems to be the terrorist attacks on September 11th in New York, for since those events, borders appear to be hardening again instead of opening. This is not only visible through practical government policies, but also through the increased presence of the topic in academic discourse. This process of re-hardening of borders is not to try and completely halt the flow of movement, but more to direct it to desired entrance points. Rosière and Jones (2012) introduced a new term to describe long sections of closed borders and the hardening of crossing points - teichopolitics. The word teichopolitics comes from ancient Greek, where the word τειχος (teichos) means city wall. Therefore, teichopolitics is the politics of building physical barriers on international borders for different purposes and can be best explained as an antithesis of the world without borders presented in globalization.

3.2. Sovereignty and Emergence of Teichopolitics

In the past, mutual recognition of sovereignty and territoriality between empires did not exist. Physical barriers were not set up along borderlines, but instead were constructed on strategic locations in order to stop potential movement of enemy forces into the heart of the empire. With introduction of sovereignty in global politics, countries started recognizing each other’s borders which until this day stayed the foundation of the modern international political system, also known as the Westphalian order (Caporoso, 2000). However, the role of the borders did not stop evolving with introduction of the mutually recognized territoriality, and has changed significantly over the last three hundred years.
The creation of the United Nations and its Charter has played important role in stopping member countries from starting expansionary wars and accept sovereignty and territorial integrity of other UN members permanently. This is why when superpowers today, like the United States for example, wage war it is not a conquering war, but one to support nation building, introduce democracy, etc. Once neighboring countries recognized the territorial integrity, military significance of borders started to deteriorate, while its role in differentiating internal systems of law and economic regulation between neighboring counters became more important. However, these developments go hand in hand. Acceptance of sovereignty and territorial integrity between states did not allow for the development of legal and economic regulation, but rather the development of economic systems through the industrial revolution also allowed for the rise of territorial integrity as a country’s power and wellbeing were no longer determined solely by size of its territory and population.

Result of this raising global stability resulted also in rising of economic inequality in the world. At the twilight of the nineteenth century, Baldwin calculated that the richest countries were approximately nine hundred percent richer than the poorest at the time. This number rose to four thousand five hundred percent by the end of the twentieth century (Baldwin, et al., 2001). The combination of the large economic inequality, as well as rise of communication technologies which can be used as a window into life of others, gave birth to a large wave of both internal and
international migrations (from rural to urban areas, and migration between countries). Thus, resulting in the modern role of the international borders – a place from where the privileged are protected and the undesirables are prevented from entering as some see it (Rosiere and Jones 2012).

The French historian Fernand Braudel (1984) divided the contemporary era into three different stages. First, the era of colonialism during which European powers spread their influence across the globe. Second, from nineteenth century to the end of WWII characterized by industrial revolution kicking off economic competition among countries in addition to territorial and political competition. Third, is the era of geoeconomics (Luttwak, 1990) characterized by the end of colonization and the rise of soft power with Bretton-Woods agreements following the end of the World War II.

In this era, the dual influence of developmentalism and neoliberalism created significant inequality in wealth, but economies also became interconnected and interdependent. The economic theory of developmentalism encouraged developing countries (or Third World countries as they came to be known since they did not belong neither to the capitalist or communist world) to impose high import tariffs in order to develop internal markets working on the principles of free market. Countries used different versions of import substitution strategies to achieve this goal. Despite initial success of this theory in practice, it ultimately failed causing deep economic and political crisis in third world countries which as result started to lag even further
behind the developed world following neoliberalist school of supporting privatization, deregulation, and reductions in public spending to enhance the role of the private sector (Grosfoguel, 2000).

Rosière and Jones (2012) now consider that we are entering a new, fourth age which was named Era of Teichopolitics. The era is characterized by a decrease of soft power, and a return to hard power as a response to failure by previous schools of economics (developmentalism and neoliberalism) to reduce the gap between rich and poor countries. It is seen as an act of the privileged and selected few to protect their accumulated wealth from the initial three stages of the contemporary era. However, teichopolitics does not aim to completely stop the flow of people and goods, which is needed to maintain the global economy, but to limit and select the movement from the periphery, i.e. developing countries. The objective of this new policy is to create an effective system that will allow only desired mobility. The tension created is not a war, but an ongoing low intensity struggle between richer and poorer, and the physical barriers can be seen as first step of digging trenches in this potential conflict. It most certainly is not a preemptive step, as the migration has been on the rise for decades. The rise of teichopolitics underlines the paradox of the globalization and a new borderless world we assume was coming as positive an external effect and byproduct.
4. Theoretical Framework

The following pages will be used to present in more details theoretical framework of PETWC, including mechanism in which it works, as described by David B. Carter and Paul Poast. The second part of this chapter will cover additional theoretical framework which will be examined in this thesis on the case of Saudi Arabia.

4.1. Political Economy Theory of Wall Construction

There are many reasons that are officially given for construction of a border walls. When the Soviet Union started building the Berlin Wall in 1961, then US President Kennedy stated: “A wall is a hell of a lot better than war” (Freeman & McDonnell, 2009). In other cases, countries and country officials often name different security threats as a reason for the construction of the security wall, such as civil war in the neighboring country, trying to limit the spillover effect. Countries can also erect a border wall for military reasons. A historic example is the Maginot line in France constructed during the buildup of the WWII, which serve as a defensive tool against potential invasion from neighboring countries.

The topic of borders is well researched, including many different areas and aspects of borders. For examples, there is significant literature which discussing the importance of border during conflicts between two nations.(James, et al., 2006; Huth & Allee, 2002a;; Luard, 1986; Vasquez, 2000; Senese, 2005; Mitchell & Hensel, 2007;
Mitchell, 2002; Vasquez, 1993; Huth, et al., 2011). Or even the importance of the border on trade (Simmons, 2005) and onset of internal conflict or even civil wars (Salehyan, 2007; Gleditsch, et al. 2008). On the other hand, there is limited literature available on the impact of the economic factors and questions on the stability of international borderlines.

As already mentioned, the purpose of borders is to mark a shift in legal responsibilities of countries sharing a border. The border is considered stable if the legal shift is done in a steady and efficient manner in which governments and population on both sides acknowledge and honor the partition. A border is considered instable when it is regularly trespassed by agents of at least one side, i.e. a substantial flow of goods and people is not wanted by at least one of the countries. The border stability is not necessarily only connected to the flow, and can be considered instable if it’s formally contested by one or both sides, regardless of the flow of people and goods. Naturally, the most unstable borders are the ones where the lines are formally contested and trespassed on a regular basis. For example, the Indian and Bangladeshi border is not being formally disputed, but Indian government considers it highly unstable due to claims of weapon trafficking on a regular basis.

It is a similar case between the borders of Iraq and Saudi Arabia; it is not formally contested, but it is considered instable due to constant illegal trespassing. On the other hand, borderlines can be formally disputed, but not necessarily considered instable. Examples of this are in abundance, including the one between
Montenegro and Croatia in the Bay of Kotor. The conflict has been ongoing since Croatia declared independence from Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and even 23 years later is still unresolved. However, the border dispute did not prevent countries from having friendly and cordial cooperation politically and economically. An example of the worst case scenario in which a borderline is formally contested and trespassed on a regular basis is the border line between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which even escalated to an ethnic conflict (Bond, Roch, 2010). PETWC tries to explain how economic factors affect the stability of the borders and ultimately lead to policies to build physical barriers on the continental borderlines.

4.1.1. Economic Inequality

If we take into account the neo-classical model of an economy, described by Krugman and Obstfeld (2015), states with a large labor force in comparison to their capital have small wages. On the other hand, if countries have limited availability of labor in comparison to capital, they have large wages. If two neighboring countries have this exact difference, the cross-border inequality will encourage border instability created by illegal immigration and illegal smuggling of goods from low wage country to high wage country.

Understanding each of the two cases contributes to strengthening the argument that that neighboring countries with significantly different level of economic development are prone to border stability, and vice versa. In the first case,
an individual living in a low-income country can make an independent analysis more easily, especially today in the internet age when information is easier to acquire, and conclude that the benefits outweigh the risk. Naturally, even economic theorists gave up on the idea that humans are perfectly rational beings who are only looking to improve economic standing, i.e. they are not *homo economicus* (Kahneman, 2011). Nonetheless, humans are incentivized by economic factors and if those are strong enough, they will act on them. Moreover, collective societies, such as Arabic societies where the extended family often shares the same household, are able to *diversify their portfolio* by only sending one or two members to countries with higher standards of living for them to help support the family at home (Massey, et al., 2002). If the wage difference is big enough, people can consider even the cost of illegal entry into the country.

The second case is related to incentives for non-tradable illegal goods because they are outlawed in one or both countries. This creates the perfect environment for a black market to develop and if neighboring countries have high levels of income inequality, consumers in the country with higher wages will be able and willing to pay higher price for those products on the black market. This incentivizes individuals to find ways to illegally traffic a product from low-income to high-income countries (Parkin, 2005). A good example of two neighboring countries with high economic inequality are Saudi Arabia and Yemen. A case even more known to the general public is the one between the US and Mexico, which created the ideal circumstances for the
flourishing of drug trafficking. Economic incentives on both sides are key to understanding rational and action of agents involved (Levitt & Dubner, 2009). Having this in mind, we come to conclusion that neighboring countries with similar level of economic development are likely to have high border stability.

When borders are instable, governments undertake measures to secure them. This hardening policy can have different manifestations, from increased number of border patrols to the most aggressive strategy of building actual walls and fences along the borderline. Construction of such walls is a clear signal that the governments of the neighboring countries are not able to cooperate efficiently, or in some cases, governments of targeted countries are not even able to implement law on their side of the borders. This becomes particularly important in cases when neighboring countries, which contain one of the global failed states or something close to it (Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen). George Gavrilis (2008), from University of Texas, did point out that the rise of different border management policies is the result of different state building policies of countries once they became independent. The argument is not inconsistent with the idea that the border wall policies are primarily due to economic disparities, as the economic disparity can also result from different state building policies.
4.1.2. Civil Wars

Internal conflicts and territorial disputes expand on the political side of the theory that explains construction of border walls. Studies and analyses have shown that there is a positive correlation between a civil war and the increased likelihood that a conflict might arise in one of the neighboring countries as well. The explanations for why this is happening are numerous: from decline in trade leading to deteriorating economic conditions (Collier et al. 2003; Sandler & Murdoch, 2004), to the spread of infectious disease in countries torn by civil war leading to a decline in standard of living and general dissatisfaction (Ghobarah, et al., 2003). More recently, however, econometric analysis of civil war data exposed a strong correlation between presence of refugees and war conflict (Sambanis, 2002; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). A refugee is “anyone who flees a country of origin or residence for fear of politically motivated harm” (Salehyan, 2007). Finally, refugees are being studied as something else in addition to being a civil war consequence, but as one of possible causes as well (Loescher, 1993; Teitelbaum, 1984), through four mechanisms:

- Significant influxes of refugees into a neighboring country can significantly alter the ethnic structure of the host state;
- Worsen economic competition;
- Refugees often have different ideologies from citizens of the host nation.

Moreover, due to domestic instability they are often more conducive of
violence, in possession of arms or even participants of different military or paramilitary organizations;

- Mobilize opposition directed at their country of origin as well as their host country.

Even though these arguments have appeared in the sphere of political theory since over two decades ago, they were only put to empirical test by Salehyan and Gleditsch in 2006. Their results have confirmed tendencies for civil wars to form clusters and that the likelihood of internal conflicts almost doubles when a neighboring country is in civil war. Moreover the study found that GDP per capita decreases this risk, while greater ethnic heterogeneity increases the risk. The findings do not refer to refugees in general, but only to refugees in neighboring countries, e.g. an increase of Iraqi refugees increases the likelihood of conflict in Saudi Arabia, but not in the United States for example.

Naturally, when a country is in a civil war, civilians have incentives to leave the country. Fighters involved in the civil war, usually coming from the rebel side against the government, often look for safe havens in neighboring countries for multiple reasons: regrouping, support, and the avoidance of opposite/government forces. One of the best example of this is the Turkish city of Reyhanli where tens of thousands Syrian refugees and rebel forces are currently located. Once two car bombs killed 51 people in 2013, the local population had no doubt that the ultimate responsibility lies with forces across the border in Syria. “The government should never have allowed
refugees to live in the towns and least of all so close to the border," said a local newspaper editor (Economist.com, 2013). Sometimes it can get even more complex, as in case of Kurds in Iraq at the moment, who are one of most reliable Western allies against ISIS, but who are considered as enemy by Turkey (another key Western military ally). A country has two options, it can either harden borderlines in order to increase migrating cost for refugees or it can intervene directly (militarily) in the country under the civil war. Usually, it does not make sense to perform these two options simultaneously, as construction of a wall significantly increases the cost of moving troops and supplies across the border (unless only aviation is involved). Due to high costs of direct interventions, countries sometimes find it simply more feasible to deal with refugees than to try and cure the disease in the source.

4.1.3. Border Disputes

The final argument of the PETWC is that physical borderline barriers are more likely to be built between neighboring countries when there is a territorial dispute between the two – reminiscence of the border’s military purpose. Historically, it has been demonstrated that neighbors are particularly prone to war and fighting, while this was true almost exclusively in the past, even in the 21st century, it holds to be true in most of the conflicts (Bremer, 1992; Kocs, 1995; Vasquez, 1995; Senese, 2005) and territorial disputes between the neighbors is one of most common reasons for initiation of the war (Vasquez, 1995; Huth, 1996; Hensel, 2000; Senese, 2005). Even though this has been known for some time, more recently, Gibler even suggested that
*democratic peace* is actually better thought of as a territorial peace. As he rightly points out in his first sentence:

“If we were asked to choose a state that is likely to transition to democracy in the future, the best guesses would probably include any of the remaining non-democracies in the America or Europe (...) because while one of the best predictors of democracy and democratic transitions remains per capita, wealth the proximity of other democracies seems to be one of the most robust indicators of which states are likely to democratize, moreover we argue that the likelihood of a country transitioning to democracy is not driven so much by potential demonstration effects and support by the regional democratic community. Rather, building on our previous work showing that democratic transitions are likely following the peaceful resolution of a country’s territorial issues with its neighbors, we maintain that democratic transitions depend heavily on the level of territorial threats affecting the state” (Gibler & Tir, 2014).

When all this is put together one can conclude that the presence or absence of territorial disputes plays an important role in determining if relations between two neighbors are going to be hostile or peaceful. When a country has hostile relations with its neighbors, it naturally has higher levels of external threats which can take different forms, from neighbors amassing its military spending to forming alliances
with other rival states. Construction of border walls can be an attractive tool to deter the spillover effect.

4.2. Additional Theoretical Framework

4.2.1. State Fragility

A wide range of international threats and concerns have been associated with state fragility among which mostly cited, in no particular order, are: armed conflicts, diseases, organized crime, mass migration environmental degradation, and finally, only in last few decades, terrorism (Mclaoughlin & Idris, 2016). Besides the environmental degradation and spread of diseases, all other threats are being used as excuses for the announcement of wall constructions against a neighboring country. Cases of fragile states causing problems to their neighbors, as well as entire regions, have been well documented and studied in different areas (Chauvet, Colllier, and Hoeffler 2007; Iqbal and Starr 2008; Patrick 2006; Hoeffler 2013; Makovsky, Misztal, and Ruhe 2011) from an economic to a political perspective. Border walls are usually unilateral projects of the building country, without support from the targeted country, and there are very few examples of double-fenced international borders as mentioned (Biger, 2013). This signals that the building country is not relaying on its neighbor to fully control illegal activities on its side of the border due to unwillingness or inability. This is particularly true in the today’s globalized world when a single individual can pose a threat for entire communities, i.e. terrorism. When it comes to state fragility, it can be a relative term because even though a country such as Israel
perceives Egypt to be unstable, Egypt can perceive Libya also as unstable compared to their situation. Or even though Turkey considers itself stable country compared to Syria, Greece and Bulgaria surely are not as certain about that.

4.2.2. Bilateral Trade

In the mid 20th century, widespread acceptance of theory by political scientist stated that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, this theory was altered towards the end of 20th century by scholars who stated: “Instead [democracy] a more fundamental factor in causing bilateral cooperation is trade. Countries seek a peaceful means to dispute in order to protect wealth gained through international trade. Thus trading partners are less combative and more competitive than nontrading nations” (Polachek, 1997). A different, yet related study showed that there is not much difference in volume of trade between a pair of democratic and pair of autocratic countries, suggesting that trade policy is formed by internal institutions and the preferences of decision makers (Mansfield, et al., 2000). Therefore, autocratic countries are able to have the same level of trade as democracies leading to bilateral cooperation. A study testing cooperation between bilateral trade and political conflict and cooperation has concluded that: “Trade and conflict appear to be truly interdependent, [since] neither pure economic models of trade nor pure political models of conflict are able to fully explain the trade and conflict relationship between countries” (Reuveny & Kang 1998).
In the PETWC, the authors said: “Theoretically, economists have noted that open trade should help equalize prices and reduce this dynamic. In practice, trade has not had this effect, as sharp differentials in prices still exist among states, even those that border and trade relatively intensively with each other.” While this holds to be true in cases that only consider trade effect on cross border income inequality, when it is taken into account that trade does not only play an economic role, but can also signal better political and cultural relation (Polachek, 1997). The lack of bilateral trade, therefore, could signal lack of political cooperation explaining the construction of border walls in the case of Saudi Arabia.
5. The case of Saudi Arabia

The topic of economic development and political development is important to consider, as the root of wall construction according to the PETEC is economic cross-border inequality. As the political and economic systems of a country are intertwined, a short overview of the two can be found below. Saudi Arabia (See Map 1) is bordering seven countries for a total of 4,272 km borderlines. The longest border is with its southern neighbor, Yemen, at 1,307 km, followed by Iraq 811 km, Jordan 731 km, Oman 658 km, the United Arab Emirates 457 km, Kuwait 221 km, and finally Qatar with only 87 km of total continental border line (CIA, 2016). Saudi Arabia is particularly good case study as it has border walls with three out of eight of its neighbors. As Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, two leading scholars on the topic noted in their article for Washington Post noted: “Of 34 barriers built worldwide since 1990, 29 were constructed to keep out citizens from Muslim-majority nations. This is not just rank Islamophobia, however. Muslim-majority states built 17, or 59 percent, of those 29 barriers against Muslim-majority targets. Put differently, half of all fortified boundaries worldwide since 1990 separate Muslim states from other Muslim states” (Hassner & Wittenber, 2016).

5.1. Political System

Unlike the Kingdom of Spain, whose official name is deceiving as the head monarch only has ceremonial power, or even more misleading the Democratic
People’s Republic of North Korea, in the case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the name perfectly represents the political system of the country. Saudi Arabia is an absolute and hereditary monarchy ruled by the Al Saud dynasty since its foundation in 1932. However, the governing monarch does not rule alone, and decisions within the dynasty are often made through consensus. This is especially true for most important decisions, such as the selection a new monarch after the death of the old one. The country’s constitution is the religious holy books - the Qur’an and Sunnah, while government’s rights and responsibilities are also defined through a Basic Law of Governance introduced only in 1992 through King Fahad’s reform (Ansary, A., 2008).

In Saudi Arabia, the executive branch of the government is the dominant one. The king acts as prime minister, head of government, head of state, and also head of military. Below him is the King’s Cabinet, also known as the Council of Ministers, which is appointed by the king every four years. The main legislative body is Consultative Council consisting of 150 members (divided in committees based on personal experience) appointed by the king every four years. As with the name of the country, the name of the main legislative body is also not deceiving. The Council only advises the king on the issues of significance to the country.

In terms of the judiciary, the country’s legal system recognizes “the supremacy of divine sovereignty”, consisting of three main courts. All judges are appointed by
the king on recommendation of the Supreme Council of Justice. The king, naturally, acts as the highest court and can receive appeals and has the power to pardon.⁴

5.2. Saudi Economy

Saudi Arabia was a subsistence economy until the 1930s. The story of Saudi Arabian oil goes back to 1933 when King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud granted Standard Oil of California (Socal), later renamed Chevron, the right to prospect for oil in the new Kingdom. In 1938, Socal discovered large quantities of oil in the Dammam Dome near the Arabian Gulf. Limited exports began in 1939, and picked up significantly after World War II. By the 1970s, Saudi Arabia had become the top producer and exporter of oil in the world.

There certainly are no perfect examples of free market economies in the world, only a mixture of laisse-fair and centrally planned economies. However, Saudi Arabia is considered a country with a free market economy with strong government involvement as it can be presumed from the description of the political system. The oil industry, run by the government, is responsible for nearly 80% of budget revenue, 45% of the GDP (whole industry sector contributes 46.9%), and over 90% of total exports. On the other hand, the service sector contributes 50.8% to GDP composition, even though it employs almost 72% of the workforce. The agricultural sector only contributes with 2.3% of the GDP. Around 80% of the labor force are non-Saudi and

⁴ To learn more on political and legal system of Saudi Arabia, please see Ansary, A., 2008, A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System. Available at: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Saudi_Arabia.html
come from neighboring countries such as Yemen, Pakistan, Jordan and others, which can add to spillover effects of regional conflicts into Saudi Arabia (CIA, 2016).

It’s important to note, that in the last few years Saudi Arabia has been running a budget deficit as it requires oil market price to reach over 100 USD per barrel to balance its budget. In 2015 the budget revenue was $193 billion while expenditures were $318 billion. This was not the case during the Arab Spring, when Saudi Monetary Agency, or central bank, had $481 billion in foreign assets, more than enough to cover the needed rise in state spending to calm the internal political situation as well as support some neighboring governments in doing the same (Gause, 2011). However, the issue of budget deficits is ever more concerning for the country and its citizens have gotten used to a certain standard, which the government will not be able to afford for much longer if the oil prices stay the same.
6. Middle East and Saudi’s Neighborhood

The Middle East is a vague term and there is no clear definition of this word from a geographical scope. Even though it is usually associated it with Asia, it’s considered a transcontinental region which includes Southwestern Asia, Asia Minor, parts of North Africa and Southeast Europe (Cyprus). Some consider Iran, Libya, and even Sudan to be part of the Middle East. However, most agree that Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are not, despite geographical proximity and shared history which undoubtedly facilitated cultural exchange and interdependence. The reason, most likely, is due to recent historic divide during much of the twentieth century when the three countries were part of the Soviet Union and on the other side of the iron curtain. This resulted in prolonged isolation from the region and in the process lost many of the shared cultural characteristics.

This thesis primarily discusses about a particular part of the Middle East; the Arab peninsula and Gulf region. These are the regions which are globally associated with Middle East, and rightfully so. It is also commonly known as GCC after the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. However, the Gulf region and GCC are not synonyms even though they are often used as such. The Gulf region refers to all countries surrounding the Persian Gulf, while GCC stands for Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. The difference, therefore, are Iran and Iraq which are part of the Gulf Region but not of the GCC. Besides Saudi Arabia, countries of interest
and which are part of the analysis are: Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, as well as Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.

Saudi Arabia, arguably of course, is one of countries with most interesting political, cultural, and economic position in the contemporary world. With a territory of approximately 2.15 million km², it is not a small country, but still ranked as number thirteen in the world with a major shortfall compared to the top seven. Population wise, Saudi Arabia has approximately 27.75 million people (out of which approximately 8 million are foreign workers), ranking 47th globally, which means that the population density is only 12.9 people per km², ranking 192nd globally. Despite this humble global ranking, the facts are that it is a birthplace of the world’s second largest religion, as well as ranked second in proven oil reserves (some 16% of the total global reserves). This gives Saudi Arabia an unprecedented regional and even global influence for a country of that size (CIA, 2016).

No matter how difficult it is to draw borders in areas such as Europe, it’s even more difficult in the countries whose population until only a century ago was still living a nomadic life style, as it was the case in the Arab peninsula. In addition, nomads and pan-Islamic movements are the cornerstone of foundation of Saudi Arabia, which does not have the same view of international borders as most other global actors today. In the 30s, under the rule of Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi state, territorial expansion success would be hard to imagine without the support of Ikhwan, a religious group organized from a number of Bedouin tribes. Ikhwans were not happy
with Ibn Saudi’s plans to stop further expansion and organize a modern state on the territory which it already possessed. This internal struggle persists even today between badw (nomad) and hadr (settlers) people of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the struggle is also present between two branches of Wahhabism – one represented by the pragmatic ruling Saud dynasty preferring to maintain rule on the already established territory and the other represented by clergy which wants to continue to expand the influence of Wahhabism and the only border they recognize is between Islamic population and non-Islamic population. Over time, the tension between those two branches kept growing and reached new heights during the first Gulf War when the Saud rulers, again lead by pragmatic self-interest for survival, invited the US Army to bring troops on Saudi territory as protection against Iraq which had just moved into Kuwait and was posing an existential threat to Saudi Arabia. The clergy and decedents of Ikwans, many of which just came back from Afghanistan where they were fighting godless Soviets, found that the presence of infidel army, so to say, on the holy land is against the Islamic law.

6.1. Ethnic and Religious Integration in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia

There are three dominant groups in the Middle East: Turks, Arabs and Persians and many minorities: Isma’ilis, Druze, Armenians, Baludis, Kurds, Circassians, Qahqa’is, Christians, Jews, Alawis, and others are different from one another as much as from the dominant groups (see Map 2). It is important to note that the dominant groups have their own language, homeland and history, but each dominant group in
its home country has a minority of other dominants groups within the home country. For examples Persians have Turk and Arab minorities inside Iran, and vice-versa. Moreover, in the region, we have some minority groups, which lived alongside a dominant group, but within a specific and separate geographic region. Kurds are probably the best and most known example, as they have been living in a geographically compact region of Kurdistan, which is today divided between four sovereign countries of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. This is very common in the Middle East, where minority groups can live for centuries within a larger dominant group, never completely assimilating, integrating and dispersing among the larger population. Until this day the mentioned distribution patterns remains intact (Ibrahim, 1998).

Specifically to Saudi Arabia, even though it is considered to be ethnically and religiously one of most heterogenic states in the world, it is not possible to simplify it to that extent. Even though almost 99% of the population are Muslims, 10-15% actually belong to Shia branch of Islam (See Map 3). Moreover, the Shia population is not dispersed countrywide, but is usually located in smaller regions where they make up significant percentage or even majority of the local population. Tensions between the two groups rise, often due to the fact that Saudi are followers of Wahhabism, a strict interpretation of Sunnis Islam, whose followers do not even consider Shias to be true Muslims.
In terms of ethnicity, 90% of Saudi citizens are Arabs but there is 10% of population with Afro-Asian origins, many of which are descendants of former slaves which in the kingdom was only abolished in 1960s under pressure from then US President Kennedy. Even today this minority if often discriminated and without the full protection of the legal system. To this is added over 8 million foreign workers of which some come from European and Asian countries and are not significant political players. However that number of 8 million is made up of some 2.1 million Syrians, 900,000 Egyptians, 900,000 Pakistanis, 800,000 Yemenis, 250,000 Jordanians and Palestinians who can form strong internal communities (Kapiszewski, 2006).

To add to social division in the country, recent studies have noticed the reemergence of tribalism in Saudi’s internal political system. Members of one tribe believe they are all part of the same bloodline with common heritage going back to pre-Islamic times in the region. Tribes have had positive and negative effects on the internal and regional stability. For example, tribal connections of the Muslim Brotherhood within Libya have been thought to play major role in organizing internal struggles against the incumbent government, and while tribal influence has first been used by the Bashar family to establish control in the country, it was the same tribal communities that initiated the Syrian uprising due to drought by destroying their communities and economic mismanagement in general (Dukhan 2014). Scholars argue that that one of main differences in internal stability of the countries in the Middle East is in their integration process of tribal communities into modern lifestyle.
While countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates have spent significant funds on education and incentivizing tribal communities to give up old style of life and settle in cities. Others, such as Libya, Iraq and Yemen often used force and fear to influence them (O’Leary, Heras 2011). Despite being a dominant form in social organization in the past, tribes have been trying since the Kingdom’s foundation to find a place in the national hierarchy dominated by the royal family and clergy. The tribal scene in Saudi Arabia today is made up of hundreds of tribes and sub-tribes each of different size, origin as well as influence. Even if tribes abandoned nomadic lifestyle members of a same tribe still tend to live among themselves in the areas which used to be their tribal homeland in the past (dira), despite the concept of dira being officially abolished in the 1960s. For example, the region between Afif and Dawadimi is the former dira of the Utayba, many of whom are still considered social elite in the region dominating all aspects of daily life: business, clergy, and government officials. Even when this is not the case, and tribes often move to larger cities, more often than not, whole neighborhoods and quarters are dominated by particular tribe members. This shows that urbanization did not make tribalism disappear, only evolve (Maisel, 2015).

Anazeh is the name of the biggest tribal group that is not only present in Saudi Arabia but also in neighboring Jordan and Iraq. Some other are al-Shammar, al-Anza and Dalim (Maisel, 2015). Larger tribes are usually located in the north, while the south has a larger number of smaller tribes, which are often shared with neighboring
Yemen. In the last couple of decades, tribal identification and culture on the Arab peninsula has started its revival in different areas of public life, such as the legal sector, the local political scene, and the intellectual sphere. Government response has been primarily positive, as the tribal agenda is less of a threat to the ruling dynasty than liberals or clergy. Governments primarily try to point out positive aspects such as common values and heritage. "Tribalism plays a key role in modern-day Saudi foreign policy," was said in a U.S. diplomatic cable sent from Riyadh in March 2008 and released by WikiLeaks, noting examples of how blood ties affected relations with neighboring Yemen and Iraq (McDowall, 2012).

6.2. Political and Economic Integration of the Middle East and Saudi Arabia

One of the characteristics of the global political and economic system in the second half of the twentieth century is the integration in both political and economic terms. Globally, countries are trying to associate national economies into larger economic blocks, usually through bilateral and multilateral (regional) scope first. The result today is that the developed world is characterized by high trade volume between member states. Moreover, countries that are trading extensively with each other have better political and cultural ties as well (Polachek, 1997). This idea is supported by number of studies of which Polachek is a pioneer, but more importantly we have a best practical example in terms of successful project of the European
Union. Economic integration in the developed world is usually accompanied by political and legal integration.

However, Middle Eastern integration in general has proven to be a difficult job, and even Africa has higher intraregional trade volume and political integration. In the Middle East, the most ambitious attempt of regional integration came in the form of the Arab League in 1945. It was an attempt at a federation amongst Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Besides the political union, it also envisaged cooperation in economic policy, healthcare, and cultural and social affairs. The project ultimately failed due overambitious goals of complete political union in form of the United Arab Republic (UAR), with very limited economic integration and harmonization between member states (Kalaycioglu, 1998). How ambitious and unrealistic the goal was is best shown in the example of the EU which even after a 60 year process is still not able to achieve the level of integration equivalent to complete political and economic union. To achieve this, all parties involved need to make significant sacrifices and compromises, which is something that is very hard to expect from states with limited exposure to democracies.

More recently, the Middle East has seen more attempts to ignite at least initial economic integration of the region which is certainly a more appropriate and achievable first step. So far, unfortunately, they have also been largely unsuccessful starting with 1998 Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA). Some scholars even
argue that the low intraregional trade in Middle East is a natural cause due to low complementarity of trade, meaning that all regional countries have similar production capabilities. Others believe that the main culprit lies in unharmonized policies and lack of liberalized domestic regulatory environments (Fawzy, 2003). The major reasons identified by scholars and summarized by Nasser M. Suleiman (2000) are subsequently presented. It is easy to see how all these cause can actually be traced back to the first point:

- “Easy” revenue from oil allowed countries to keep status quo without need for constant competition as in other markets.
- After longer period of status quo, trade liberalization also bring short-term costs which were destroying even further the political will for reforms.
- Even if some initiatives were started, unclear time frames for conclusion, ratification and implementation made the whole process inefficient.
- Noncompetitive markets influenced by state intervention, distorted prices, lack of transparency discourages entrepreneurs from trade.
- The general set up of the economic system did not encourage countries to develop industries in which they have comparative or competitive advantage. Leading to development of similar industries.
- Political tensions and its impact on trade can’t be underestimated. Best example is trade with Israel which is very limited.
Recent studies (Powell & Rickard 2010) have even showed that Islamic law has significant effects on the level of trade. The data showed that on average, everything else being equal, volume of trade between two states with Islamic law is lower. The result was very surprising considering accepted wisdom says that shared institutions have positive effect on total trade volume.

Moreover, today the Middle East as whole is not the same region it was fifty years ago. Politically, economically, and socially, the picture was very different. At the time, most of the countries in the region were experiencing rapid economic growth, with limited number of regional conflicts such as a Soviet attack of Afghanistan (even if not part of the Middle East, it has had a significant effects in the region), the start of Iranian revolution, and the everlasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, in 2016 the picture is quite different. Today much of the region is involved, directly or indirectly, in one or several regional conflicts with the realistic threat of redrawing internationally recognized borders, rise of failed states, and conflict spillovers into neighboring countries. The region now includes open civil wars or significant internal struggles in Libya, Egypt, Palestine and Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Even economically advance countries are not immune to these conflicts such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and even Turkey, which is struggling to maintain stability and peace in the southeastern part of the country, due to the proximity of conflicts hot zones. Lead by political crises which started in Middle East since 2011, the region has also experienced a significant economic downturn, with destructive effects on many
Middle Eastern nations. Adding the currently low price of oil on the world’s markets, the main source of revenue for many governments of the regions, it is easy to understand why the entire region is having poor economic performance recently. Even though in the last two decades, the region has performed worse than the average developing country with only 4% real GDP growth per year (compared to 5.5% average for developing countries), the recent situation is even worse with average 2.8% a year growth since 2012 (Fardoust, 2016). This has additionally weakened many of regional economies which were not performing on par to begin with, resulting in increased poverty and unemployment, particularly among unsatisfied youth which provide manpower for the regional conflicts.

This level of chaos has not been seen in the region since the early 1900s and the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the time. Fardoust (2016) provides an overview of some of factors contributing to the current state of affairs in the region:

- Economic growth too slow to create enough jobs.
- The slow economic growth which does not create enough jobs in return created high unemployment among youth (15-25 year group).
- Since food and oil prices rose rapidly, wages stagnated or even its purchasing power fell.
- Wealth inequality grew more between high, middle and low income citizens, making it more visible.
• The recession of 2008-2009 had significant effects, as well as its aftermath which influenced significant decreases in oil prices already mentioned, main income for many of region’s countries.

• Influence of social media and television networks, in particular Al Jazeera, increased awareness of political and economic realities across the region and elsewhere in the world.

• Bad record of human rights and corruption.

With exception of some policy coordination within GCC and OPEC, there is little else there. The lack of effective institutional and policy framework, the intra-regional trade amounts only to 7-8% of total exports and imports as it can be seen in table 1. (Same as Saudi average - see in Tables 5 and 6). If we compare that with over 60% in EU, or even 30% in Asia we get a good understanding of the situation.

A good indicator of the regional integration is also the transportation infrastructure and network between countries. In the next two years Saudi Arabia and Oman will be connected for the first time via new road which will cut the distance by around 800 km. In the past, a passenger from Saudi Arabia could travel to Oman only via UEA (Ali Khan, 2015). Infrastructure is one area in which the governments are currently involving more funds. Good indicator of those is ambition project announced by governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt to build a bridge across the Red Sea physically connecting maybe two most influential Arab counters. Since overthrow
of Morsi’s government by Sisi’s coup d’etat in 2013, Saudi Arabia and Egypt has been enjoying a kind of renaissance in bilateral relations. The new Egyptian government has largely been supported by the Saudis financially, which resulted even in Egypt handing over two strategic islands of Tiran and Sanafir in the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia, currently contested by the Egyptian opposition (Aljazeera.com, 2016). Other transportation channels have also not been developed sufficiently, with a number of ports such as Port Said, Safaga, Suez, Alexandria, Jeddah, Yanbaa needing expansion to take full potential of their strategic location, not just in terms of regional, but global location between the West and the East. To increase the interdependence and integrate the region, one of the most important task is to develop an integrated infrastructure as prerequisite for increased trade. Increased trade does not bring only economic benefits but political also, as governments are encouraged to cooperate and work together on making the pie bigger instead of seeing relation with the neighboring countries as zero-sum game. The end goal being a single, integrated socio-economic entity (Ives, et al., 2013).
7. Bilateral Relations between Saudi Arabia and Neighboring Countries

7.1. Yemen

Saudi and Yemen have particularly complex neighborly relation. The fact that some eight hundred thousand Yemenis live in Saudi Arabia, some of them being prominent figures and successful businessmen, adds to the complexity. Only two years from formation, Saudi Arabia fought a short war with its southern neighbor resulting in the Treaty of Ta’if which set the first border demarcation. Needless to say, the border did not mean much to nomadic tribes living on both sides of it. Following long periods of instability in Yemen, things have started to finally settle down in the early 1990s when northern Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic, ruled by Ali Abdullah Saleh) and southern, left oriented, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen united to form the Republic of Yemen. Or so it seemed. In the long run, the unification actually worsened the relation between the two countries, as Saudi did not look favorably upon establishment of a democratic Yemen which put political pressure on Saudi government to at least relax and liberalize its internal political system. Moreover, there was a legitimate fear that the Yemeni government would provide support to Saudi opposition groups because of the extensive Saudi involvement in internal Yemeni politics. This was one of main factors which caused deteriorating relationships between the two countries resulting with the Kingdom completely halting economic assistance and withdrawing of special privileges Yemenis had in the kingdom. As a
result some 750,000 Yemeni’s had to leave Saudi Arabia and sell their businesses (Al-Enazy, 2002).

The original Treaty of Ta’if clearly demarcated only the western part of the border with Saudi Arabia near the Red Sea. The remaining 1000 miles of the border remained poorly demarcated and even more poorly respected by the tribes living in its vicinity. However, as with the rest of the life in the Middle East, the situation became complex with the discovery of oil in the region. Countries needed to have clear border demarcation to be able to claim the oil on its territory. In the 1990, unification of the Yemen meant easier negotiation as there was only one government which could represent Yemeni people (by 1992, Yemen already clearly agreed the only other remaining land border with Oman). The final agreement was reached in 2000 with the Treaty of Jeddah. Despite the agreement the border remained too hard to control.

As response to the activities, which Saudi Arabia deemed illegal, it started building a security barrier on the border to stop illegal activities on the border. The construction begun in 2003, but was halted by 2004 already. In this short period, Saudi Arabia only built a border barrier on a tiny part of the borderline along the western region of Harad District close to the Red Sea, part which was clearly demarked since the Ta’if Treaty of 1934 (Glon, 2005). After the new uprising in Yemen during the Arab Spring and onset of new civil war, Saudi Arabia restarted construction on the wall with a plan to have it in the entire length of the border (Cordesman, 2009).
7.2. Iraq

The relationship with Iraq is as complex as the one with Yemen. The main difference is that the two sides see each other often as equals and in competition for regional influence, while in the bilateral relationship with Yemen, the dominant side is clear. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as when two sides see each other as equal or at least comparable, there is a balance of power and a more cautionary approach (Naser & Amin, 2011).

During strained relations between the two countries, Saudis often tried to contain the spread of Iraqi influence by solidifying relationships with Kuwait, Syria, the United States, and even Iran who all were distrustful towards Baghdad in first half of 20th century. The relation turned warmer in the 70s with Iraq’s moderation of the foreign policy with the overthrow of monarchy and the creation a republic (thus losing ideological competitiveness with Saudi Arabia). At the time, the two countries even found common language to resolve longstanding border disputes dividing in half a diamond shaped neutral zone set up by British in the 1920s. The relation was taken to the next level in 1979 along the Islamic revolution in Iran. Both Saudis and Iraqis started to see Iran as source of ideological competition although for different reasons. Even though Saudi Arabia was officially neutral during the Iran-Iraq war in the 80s, in the background, it provided support to Iraq through loans and grants, reserved oil production of Iraqi needs and even construction of a pipeline for safe transportation of Iraqi oil. Seventies and eighties were period of calm and cordial relations between
the two countries but problems started to appear as early as 1990 when Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait. Saudi considered this action as threat to its own security and intertwined directly, dragging along its long standing international partner, the United States, and starting the first Gulf War. This was first the Saudi war against another Arab state since the war with Yemen in 1934. Ultimately, the coalition lead by the Americans defeated Iraq, but the relationship in the Gulf Area was never to be recuperated to date. However, Saudis were prudent enough to recognize the fragility of Iraqi society and opposed the coalition lead, again, by the US in 2003. Those fears were proven correct (McMillan, 2003).

Today, the Saudi foreign policy towards Iraq can be described with only three words – pursuit of stability. In 2003, representatives expressed their concerns for possible erosion of the Iraqi state. Saudi official Adel al-Jubeir, who was the foreign affairs adviser at the time said: “We are concerned that the situation in Iraq, unless we deal with it in a positive way, could erode and unravel” (Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 2003). The shared tribal land between Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq became a beehive for illegal activities i.e. trafficking of goods and people. Not just from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, but the Kingdom was also worried of the possibility for domestic radicalized individuals to enter Iraq to support different factions. Along with few border incidents this caused the government of Saudi Arabia to announce construction of the border wall with Iraq in 2006 (Krane, 2006).
In recent years, the major issue in relation has certainly become ISIS, which controls parts of the Iraqi territory. Both governments have the compatible stand on ISIS, how but in the problem the two countries have similar goals, however, the problem seems to be that Iraqi government is not in position to secure internal stability and peace. The more immediate problem is not the danger that ISIS posts for Saudi Arabia, but that radicalized Saudi citizens are joining ISIS to fight in both Syria and Iraq. Foreign Jihadists are small in absolute numbers, but very often they are most passionate and dangerous, with some analysis even estimating that 75% of suicide attacks are carried out by Saudi nationals (Glasser, 2005; McMillan, 2006). Ultimately, Saudi Arabia announced a plan to build a new state of the art border wall in the entire length of the border with Iraq, which according to them, will provide full protection against the insurgency in Iraq. The wall will be made of two feces, watch towers, fiber optic cable and underground movement detector. Bolder attacks by ISIS in the border area killing 4 guards seem to have triggered the plan into motion (Campbell-Dollaghan, 2015).

7.3. UAE

The rivalry with UAE started even before the foundation of the Saudi Arabia. The two royal families, al-Saud and al-Nahyns, were competing dynasties. Even though the al-Nahyns were ready to acknowledge al-Sauds as dominant side, they were not willing to accept Wahhabi Islam. The main political disagreement today is the territory of Buraimi oasis. In the 1970s, in order to gain support from Saudi Arabia
for international recognition of the new state, the United Arab Emirates gave up on the disputed territory. However, it reopened almost immediately after new UEA’s Sheikh bin Zayed al-Nahayan took control of the country and declared the agreement from 1974 as invalid (Voltairenet.org, 2009). Along its borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman, UAE has total of 525 miles of security wall equipped with iris scanners, observation posts, cameras as well as infrared technology. It’s not on the same level of security as the wall of Saudi Arabia with Iraq, but the investment is nonetheless significant (GlobalSecurity.org, 2012).

7.4. Jordan

Bilateral relation with Jordan is a long one and goes back to the foundation of the Saudi state. Sharif Hussein ibn Ali (brother of the great-grandfather of Jordan’s present-day ruler) led revolt against Ottoman Empire in his Hijaz province (today western part of Saudi Arabia on the coast of Red Sea) and declared independence in 1916. In the end, he was overthrown by King Abdulaziz, which led off Sharif’s exile in Jordan. Despite complex historic relations and even realty, the two countries today have similar international interest, but different means at its disposals. While Saudi Arabia has monetary means to support its interests, it is limited by internal political and cultural structure; Jordan on the other hand, is suffering from limited financial capacities, but has a more coherent internal political structure. Historically both countries have been heavily reliant on the US in terms of international politics, but the recent change in the US policy when it comes to Middle East is forcing the two
countries to work even closer together (Patrick, 2013). Some of the common goals the two countries share is stability in Syria and Iraq, countering Muslim Brotherhood, the question of Palestine, and Iran. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is one of main trading partners of Jordan with at value of 5.3 billion in 2015, and increase of 40% since 2009 (Jordantime.com, 2016).

7.5. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar

Bahraini has close political relations with Saudi Arabia since its complete independence from the United Kingdom in 1971. As Saudi Arabia was an established country with demarked borders for decades, there were no political tensions. Moreover, Bahrain’s ruling dynasty is Sunni, while the majority of the population is Shia and therefore, it always relied on Saudi support. Never so as much as in recent few years when Saudi military entered Bahrain to suppress an uprising of Bahraini Shia majority inspired by regional Arab Spring (Bronner & Slackman, 2011).

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have long enjoyed amicable relations which especially came useful in the 90s when Saudi Arabia and the United States sided with Kuwait against Iraqi invasion. It is one of highest ranking Arab countries using both economic and human development index parameters. Unlike in case of Bahrain, the majority of the population is Sunni with significant Shia minority, but this fact alone is secures internal peace as it’s relatively immune from potential Iranian influence (Katzman, 2016).
Qatar is one of most active international players from the GCC regions, especially when we consider its small size. It does this by trying to influence international scene through its soft power, such as the state funded news channel Al Jazeera and international organizations and frameworks. The long border dispute with Saudi Arabia has finally been settled in 2001 (Albawaba.com, 2001), but the relation has been uneasy in recent years due to Qatar’s support for fractions in other Arab countries not to liking its GCC neighbors (Reuters.com, 2016).

Oman had strong relations with its neighboring countries for long time due to border disputes which were finally resolved towards the end of 20th century. Unlike the member countries of the GCC, Oman is trying to keep friendly relations with its Arab neighbors as well as Iran who has significant influence in Oman largely based on common economic interests. Since Oman is not as rich in oil as other neighboring countries, Iranian natural gas is considered one of long term solutions for increased energy demand (Cafiero, 2016).
8. Main Observations and Findings

8.1. Political Economy Theory of Wall Construction

Border inequality between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors is measured by comparing GNI per capita of each country. The table 2 lays out the data for the year 2014 in both atlas and PPP. Countries included in the table are (according to the value in descending order): Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen. These countries are considered in order to have a complete review of cross border economic inequality of Saudi Arabia with all of its neighbors, and not only the ones it has border walls with. Next to the GNI per capita, value for global ranking of each country is included in brackets.

The table clearly shows that there is high cross-border inequality between Saudi Arabia compared to Iraq and Yemen. Saudi GNI per capita PPP is 14 times the size of Yemen, while it’s GNI per capita PPP is 3.5 times higher than Iraq’s. However, timing of the wall construction by Saudi Arabia targeting both Iraq and Yemen also supports the PETWC reasoning that civil war in neighboring countries encourages wall construction. The border wall with Iraq was first initiated in 2006 (Krane, 2006), at the same time when sectarian violence in Iraq was on a rise. The extended plan for construction of wall for the entire length of the border has reemerged in 2015 at the time when ISIS was gaining ground in both Syria and Iraq, even killing several Saudi border officers (Campbell-Dollaghan 2015). The case of Yemen is very similar. The first border wall was started in 2003, even though Treaty of Jeddah has just been signed.
However, it matches the beginning of US lead War on Terrorism which was also taking place in Yemen where Al Qaida had a strong presence and in 2010 (Burns 2000) was responsible for a suicide attack on US Navy Ship killing 17 soldiers. Same as in the case of Iraq, Saudi Arabia decided to reinforce and expand the already existing wall in 2013, after years of consistent instability in the country (Cordesman, 2009).

The border wall built by the United Arab Emirates targeting Saudi Arabia is something very different. Economic inequality between borders is marginal (UAE’s GNI per capita PPP is only 30% bigger), which is not sufficient to justify significant economic migration taking into consideration that both countries have very high GNI absolute value. United Arab Emirates is also not in a civil war. However, border dispute explains this border construction well, especially when the territorial dispute that reemerged in 2005 is taken into consideration. That same year bin Zayed al-Nahayan became UAE’s new monarch, and coincidentally the border wall was announced and construction started that same year.

8.2. Bilateral Trade

Resulting tables 3 and 4 related to bilateral trade were compiled using online database for international trade - The Observatory of Economic Complexity. Bilateral trade between Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries from 1995 to 2014 is presented; the period of largest surge in border wall construction. Bilateral trade is more volatile than GNI which changes only few percentages a year usually (in case of
GCC some 4% in average as mentioned above). For this reason, yearly data have been presented. Observation of the tables confirms that the economic integration is very low between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors. On average only 9% of Saudi trade (including import and export) a year has been exchanged with 8 neighboring countries during this period. Even though UAE is the biggest Saudi trade partner in term of volume, this is not surprising considering that UAE’s GDP is 370 billion USD. That’s more than double compared to third place Iraq at 169 billion USD with whom Saudi Arabia has almost nonexistent trade (see table 5 and table 6). After Iraq, the lowest trade value is with Yemen, another country with whom it has border wall.

8.3. State Fragility

While table 2 does answers some questions, it also raises an important one. If Saudi Arabia built a wall against both Iraq and Yemen, why did it not build a wall against Jordan whose GNI per capita PPP is even lower than Iraq’s? To partially answer this question we will look into table 4 to compare internal country stability, i.e. fragility.

State fragility is compared using already mentioned FSI developed by FFP. Table 4 contains the FSI value for each country of interest for this thesis. Total number of points representing country’s ranking on fragility scale have been presented for the period from 2005 to 2016. Maximum possible score is 120 points, and country is considered more fragile higher the score.
Ranking for years before 2005 are not available, however, FSI ranking for early 2000s is not need to conclude that Yemen and Iraq were already highly unstable. In 2003, the US had just invaded Iraq and even though it was in ruins, in the short run it was initially held stable by the US ground troops. By the time Saudi Arabia decided to build the wall in 2006, Iraq scored 109 out of 120 points for that year, making it one of most unstable countries in the world. Ten years later and Iraq is still one of most unstable countries in the world, and the decision to build an even more advance border wall was not a surprise. Having in mind that the estimation of only 33,000 Iraqi’s living in Saudi Arabia, compared to 100,000 living in small Jordan, the wall is not constructed to stop illegal immigration, but paramilitary troops (relifweb.int, 2003). Moreover, in the past, Iraq had internal struggles on internal religious, ethnical, ideological conflicts between Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurds, religious and secularists without threat of spreading to other countries. Since 2014, the new threat is ISIS lead by a religious leader, caliph, whose eyes are set not on Baghdad but Mecca and Medina. Yemen is even in a worse position than Iraq. Although it started a little better off in 2005, instability in the country only increased and by 2016 its fragility index is at 111.5/120. The plan for the expansion of the existing wall between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is caused by longstanding internal instability of Yemen. These two findings are no surprise. FSI point difference between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Yemen is between 25-30 points. Moreover, economic development is impossible in
Yemen and Iraq with this high score on FSI, resulting in high cross-border economic inequality with Saudi Arabia.

However, this table gives useful insight into the situation when Jordan is taken into consideration. Despite significant cross-border inequality with Saudi Arabia (Jordan’s GNI per capita is even lower than Iraq’s), Jordan does not have a border wall with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Jordan not only is not in a civil war, but its internal stability is on par with Saudi Arabia. Considering that the two countries have close trade relations, share similar cultural and ethnic heritage, without history of border disputes it is evident that even if significant economic cross-inequality exists, border walls can be avoided, even in an unstable region such as Middle East.

The FSI table is just as insightful when it comes to case of UAE. Despite insignificant cross-border inequality between the two countries a wall has been constructed nonetheless. Analyzing the timeline of the wall construction and reemergence of the border conflict certainly confirms PETWC. However, FSI also adds a significant input in showing that just like there is significant difference in internal stability between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen, there is also significant difference between UAE and Saudi Arabia.
9. Conclusion

Borders have been a complicated question for Middle Eastern countries, particularly in the Arab peninsula, due to historic culture of nomadic lifestyle whose views of borders and territoriality was quite different than the one introduced by Westphalian order and European powers. At the start, newly independent countries were too busy with nation building process to put border demarcation on priority list of matters to attend. This changed, however, once foreign companies discovered black gold.

The conclusion of the thesis is that PETWC suggestion regarding effects of cross-border inequality on border instability increasing the likelihood of border wall construction is correct. This was illustrated by comparing Saudi GNI per capita PPP with neighboring countries and noticing significant difference between Saudi Arabia and two of its neighbors with whom it has border walls – Iraq and Yemen. The fact at least a third of eight million foreigners living in Saudi Arabia (there are different estimates) come from neighboring and regional country only adds to this finding. However, in case of Saudi Arabia, political reasons for construction of border walls also suggested by PETWC – civil wars and territorial disputes – play significant role. Moreover, as mentioned, economic cross-border inequality is closely related to civil wars and nation state building process. The third wall built by United Arab Emirates with Saudi Arabia being the targeted country also fits the theory’s alternative cause of border dispute between two countries. Even though it should be noted again, that
the authors of the PETWC have found mixed results supporting the claims regarding effect of civil wars and territorial disputes. Regardless, PETWC can be used to describe the walls of Saudi Arabia.

The Middle East today truly is a region of extremes. It has some of the richest countries in the world (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE), right next to some of the poorest countries in the world (Yemen, Iraq, Jordan) in terms of GNI per capita. This thesis has presented that the countries of this region are notoriously disintegrated, in political, social and economic terms. This is paving the way for countries to search of unilateral solutions (such as border walls) instead of cooperation. Trade, besides being an economic indicator, is one of main indicators of cooperation in general, is rising but still very low. While opinions differentiate to why this is the case, fact remains that the region is one of most disintegrated in the world. The case for putting more emphasis on the political causes of the border walls is more emphasized when we take into consideration Jordan. Country with significant cross-border inequality compared to Saudi Arabia but with stable internal system and relatively high trade volume.

The research completed within this thesis indicates that in case of Saudi Arabia political factors played, and continues to do so, significant role in construction of border walls. Considering all different influences that are affecting Saudi domestic and foreign policies, such as: terrorism, tribalism, influence of religious clergy, poor economic and political integration, PETWC sets an excellent foundation for future
development of a broader border wall theory. FSI which takes into consideration different social, economic, and political factors and has shown to be an excellent tool when explaining existence of border walls in this case.
Bibliography


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- Websites/Databases:
  - http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/
Appendix

Table 1. Comparison of regional integration: % of intraregional trade to total trade

Source: UNCTAD statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eurozone</th>
<th>NAFTA</th>
<th>GCC</th>
<th>Arab League</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>45.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>55.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNCTAD statistics; Arab Monetary Fund statistics, 2005.

Table 2. Gross National Income Per Capita in 2014 (Global Ranking)

Source: World Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Atlas Methodology</th>
<th>Purchasing Power Parity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>92,200 (5)</td>
<td>134,420 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>49,300 (21)</td>
<td>79,850 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>44,600 (28)</td>
<td>67,720 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>25,140 (45)</td>
<td>51,320 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>16,870 (63)</td>
<td>33,690 (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6,530 (110)</td>
<td>15,100 (98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5,160 (120)</td>
<td>11,910 (111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1,300 (176)</td>
<td>3,650 (166)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Gross Domestic Product in 2013

Source: World Bank

Table 4. Fragile State Index in 2005 - 2016.

Source: Fund for Peace

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7 Complete information available at: [http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/](http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/)
## Table 5. Percentage of Total Saudi Exports into Neighboring Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Average</th>
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</thead>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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Source: The Observatory for Economic Complexity
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Table 6. Percentage of Total Saudi Imports from Neighboring Countries

Source: The Observatory for Economic Complexity
Map 1. Physical Map of Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries.

Source: Ezilon
Map 2. Ethnic Map of the Middle East

Source: Jewish Virtual Library
Map 3. Religious Map of Saudi Arabia and the region

Source: Jewish Virtual Library