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Institute of Political Science

Department of International Relations

International Security Studies

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**Insurgent Governance Systems: The
Effectiveness of the Taliban and the Islamic State**

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Abstract

The master's thesis *Insurgent Governance Systems: The Effectiveness of the Taliban and the Islamic State* is a qualitative comparative analysis of Islamic Jihadist rebel governance systems in the cases of the Islamic State and the Taliban. Using Mampilly's framework for effective rebel governance systems, I analyze the various factors, stemming from 'below', 'within', and 'above' that negatively and positively affect an insurgent government, its leadership, and the civilians that dynamically interact with the rebels. This thesis' aim is three part. First, it aims to show that variations between conventional rebel governments and Islamic Jihadist governance systems do exist. Second, that variation also exists between different Islamic Jihadist rebel governments, and that the challenges and opportunities presented by civilians and international actors are dealt with differently. Third, that the effectiveness of these rebel organizations is dependent on the factors presented by Mampilly, yet is not static as effectiveness of a rebel governance system changes throughout a conflict. This thesis found that significant variation, as well as some similarities, exists between conventional and Islamic Jihadist organizations; through analyzing the two cases presented, we can see variation does exist between the cases analyzed by Mampilly and the two Islamic Jihadist organizations. This variation also exists between the two Islamic Jihadist governance systems themselves. It also found that effectiveness of Islamic Jihadist rebel systems did change throughout conflict. This thesis not only furthers inquiry into the phenomenon of rebel governance, but it also provides a micro-level lens that policy-makers and security/counterinsurgency specialists may seek to utilize when dealing with these organizations.

Keywords

Insurgent governance systems, rebel governance effectiveness, Islamic jihadist governance, civilians, the Taliban, the Islamic State

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Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague

Joshua Wayne Kent

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Introduction

On April 4th, 1996, Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, appeared on the rooftop in the center of Kandahar, donning the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammad. The scene marked an occasion that hadn't occurred for over 60 years and carried with it political, religious and strategic ramifications. The mullahs that had assembled were shouting 'Amir-ul Momineen' or 'Commander of the Faithful', giving their oath of allegiance, similar to when Caliph Omar was elected leader of the Muslim community after The Prophet Mohammad's death some 1,300 years prior. Mullah Omar had just become the leader of more than Afghans, Pashtuns, and devout followers; he had become the leader of all Muslims. This scene is a well-known one. But what is less known is prior to Omar's election were the more than two weeks' worth of secret meetings in Kandahar between over a thousand mullahs and ulema from all over Afghanistan. Night and day they discussed the future of Afghanistan, its politics and military, which way to impose Sharia law, and education for females. The meeting ended "with a declaration of jihad against the Rabanni regime" (Rashid 2000, 42). The beginnings of a rebel governance system began to take shape, and with Kabul in sight, Omar needed to establish his legitimacy as a leader of more than just the Pashtuns.

When the Taliban captured Kabul on September 27th, 1996, strict Sharia law was imposed and a Shura consisting of six Pashtuns (none having ever lived in a large city) were set by the Taliban to rule Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. For the next five years, the rebel government deemed it's territory the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, covering over 90% of Afghanistan. But was it effective? Is the rebel regime's governance system an effective one that was able to provide goods and services for its citizens? If so, how? And if not, why? What

factors affected its governance abilities in both negative and positive ways? What implications does this present to the field of politics, policy making, and security studies?

These are the research questions guiding my analysis of two cases of rebel governance systems. By utilizing Mampilly's (2011) framework for effective rebel governance systems, I will apply two cases in order to determine their effectiveness and analyze the variations. As I will discuss later, the two cases I present are different to the cases Mampilly analyzed. The two I present, The Taliban and The Islamic State (ISIS) proclaim themselves as Jihadist organizations, with their actions and goals being guided on their own interpretations of the Quran. How will Mampilly's theory work when analyzing Jihadist insurgent organizations?

In the cases of the Islamic State, President Obama deemed the group "a terrorist organization, pure and simple". But while the group has committed acts of terrorism, deeming them as such without looking deeper into the Islamic State creates a gap in policy and academic study, limiting the understanding of the organization. The Islamic State doesn't fit into the category of 'terrorist organization' held by groups such as Al-Qaeda. The Islamic State holds territory, has over 30,000 fighters, a command structure, and engages in military strategy and tactics. Cronin (2015) explains that it resembles more of a 'pseudo-state', creating an issue for the Obama Administration's current counterinsurgency strategy, which was developed to end Al-Qaeda. Treating the organization as a rebel government and understanding its governance system may be a first step towards developing a strategy to defeat the Islamic State. How does the governance system of one Islamic jihadi organization differ from another? Is there variation, if any? Why does this variation exist? Can understanding the effectiveness of varying Islamic Jihadist rebel governance systems have an impact on policy making and overall strategy?

A large amount of academic literature has been written about civil war, the causes and the effects, and the rebels and state actors that engage in violence during civil war. Unfortunately, a majority of this literature comes from state-centric perspectives where a micro-level focus might provide more explanations. As well, a growing amount of academic research is focusing on rebel governance, encompassing the interactions between the civilian and the rebel, and the interactive relationship that occurs at this level. Empirical secondary resources will be utilized throughout this paper as journalists and media outlets have reported on occurrences of insurgent actions, rebel governance, and the interactions with civilians and the rebel organizations where academic studies lack.

First, I will discuss the current literature surrounding rebellion and rebel governance. Then I will go over the framework and methodology used in this paper. Next, I will analyze both cases of the Islamic state and The Taliban in line with Mampilly's (2011) style of analysis by looking at the background of the conflict, the organization and its civil administration structure, and the education and health systems provided by the organization. Finally, I can conclude whether or not the two cases were effective, partially effective or noneffective cases of rebel governance. This analysis will also provide a view on the variations between the systems despite both being Islamic jihadist insurgent organizations.

Literature Review

Rebels and Rebel Governments

What is a rebel and an insurgent? Are they bandits and warlords or heroes and freedom fighters? Can they be both? Academics have written a large amount of information on the discussion of classifying insurgencies, how insurgencies are formed and the mobilization of the populace, the strategic use of violence, the ideology of the rebel organization, the economic incentives involved in the conflict, and various other issues. For rebel governance, we look at the academic trends of labeling rebel governments and the areas they operate, mobilization, and focus on the phenomenon of rebel governance itself.

Labeling a Rebellion

Terrorist, anarchist, bandit, warlord: These are just few of the labels given to those who lead and take part in insurgencies and rebellions. Though the term derives from the warring factions of the Qing Dynasty in China, the warlord label became famous during 1916-1927 period of China's Civil War (McCord 1993, 1). Warlords are seen as "self-interested actors out for their own wealth and power, who avoid acquiring fixed assets that they have to guard, and who fail to provide any public goods...interested only in providing goods and services to recipients who have been carefully chosen" (Marten 2006, 47). Somewhat differently, McCormik and Fritz (2009) view warlord politics through a political economy lens, defining warlords as "A: an autocratic authority, based on a local monopoly of violence that B: has achieved the positive sovereignty of coercive control without the negative: sovereignty of international recognition, against a state that C: retains negative sovereignty without a corresponding degree of positive sovereignty"(83). Their assertion recognizes that warlords may gain a form of sovereignty but

not through international recognition. This may be in some cases, but there is no elaboration on warlords who change their strategies throughout the war, as war often pressures rebel rulers to do.

Schetter and Glassner (2012) point out that in the state-centric view of Afghanistan “international observers heavily stressed the lack of physical security, circumscribing it with the term ‘warlordism’” and that in 2002-2006 “virtually no influential political figure in Afghanistan could elude this label, which subsequently became the category for all actors spoiling or even casting doubts on the international agenda of the Afghan peace process.” Adapting this label not only hampers peace efforts and negotiations, but may deter the international observers from understanding the social and political dynamics within Afghanistan.

Olsen (1993) discussed the role of the roving and stationary bandit, where the roving bandit will eventually settle down, take control of a population, and garner income through taxing the civilians under its control (568). This “monopoly on theft” comes from the bandit’s rationale that roving banditry makes it more difficult to steal in the long run, therefore taxing rather than stealing outright is the more successful venture. Over time the civilian population can provide for the stationary bandit and a government is formed. Olsen (1993) argues that it is self-interest rather than social contracts that influences “bandits” (568).

Embryonic state, blackspot, and lawless and ungovernable areas are the labels given to the geographical spaces that these rebels inhabit and utilize as their own. Labels such as these create negative connotations which hinder further analysis into rebellions and insurgencies, as well as the rebel governance aspect. These create a type of view that further postulate stereotypes of lawless and ruthless men seeking pillage and plunder.

It also assumes that these bandits and warlords have limited abilities in governing a civilian population as well as governing the territory they are in, which is one that is “ungovernable” by the state and international institutions (Rabasa and Peters 2007, 1). It views states as the holders of international order, sovereignty and jurisdiction, stemming from the Westphalian system, being the current ‘world order’ (Kissinger 2014, 3) and non-state actors as lacking the legitimacy, ability to govern, and hostility towards state actors. These “ungovernable” territories have three main impacts: “borders becoming even more porous, tribes, clans, and ethnic groups drifting further away from government control, and challenged governments having diverted resources away from much needed socio-economic projects” (Karasik 2013). If these so called “ungovernable” territories begin to form, should we not first look towards the state to answer why; perhaps this occurs because of the state’s inefficiency of governance in the first place, creating these territories where tribes, clans and ethnic groups may govern themselves (Matfess 2015)

But to the state and the international system, these spaces are “ungovernable”, somewhat implicating that those within the territories have little chance of doing better. Governance from rebel organizations upset the status-quo, delegitimizes the state actors it is either separating from or fighting against, and often leads to violent confrontations. Adding the bandit label creates a typical analytical trend among academics; assuming that these areas are created through bandit-derived state formations and viewing these rebel groups through a state formation lens might be counter-intuitive as Mampilly (2011) argues:

“it is impossible to disaggregate judicial sovereignty- and the international recognition it bestows- from the ability of a political actor to develop a system of governance.

Recognition provides any political actor access to the international system and has direct

implications for its governance efforts. Juridical statues if therefore an essential distinction between state and rebel modes of governance” (34-35).

The state has the legal right (juridical) to implement governance and commit violence within its own territory, while the rebel government “must always compete with the state which has a far greater standing in the international community...” even though they may be able to occupy territory and govern a population; two aspects of empirical sovereignty (Mampilly 2011, 37). Ottoway (2002) also discusses the differences between *de jure* and *de facto* states, where a state may be both but one that is not internationally recognized, lacks strong institutions yet exerts and enforces power is not *de jure* (1003). This ‘raw-power’ state may consist of “a warlord who is busy negotiating peace deals among warring factions and appointing ‘administrators’ to various districts, despite the fact that he does not have...either an official position or international recognition” (Ottoway 2002, 1003).

Insurgencies and rebel organizations ought to be analyzed devoid of labels and assumptions of their nature and character. This also has an impact on rebel governance, a newly studied phenomenon that deserves attention minus the labels, since these ‘bandits’ may provide civilians with good and services more effectively than the current state, devoid of the benefits of sovereignty. (Kasfir 2015, 24). Though rebel governments are often designated to hold ‘ungovernable’ territories “this very terminology undermines attempts to understand the phenomenon” (Matfess 2015).

Mobilization

What makes a rebel want to be a rebel? What convinces a seemingly average person to pick up arms and fight along others who share a similar interest? Mobilization has been a topic of debate

for quite some time, pointing to various levels of influence that mobilize nations, communities and individuals. Peterson (2001) explains that there are three important variations when analyzing rebellions. First, between units of ‘nation’ and ‘people’, which can be observed at the community and individual level. Second, within the roles individuals uphold during rebellion (collaborators, neutrals, locally based rebels, mobile fighters, and gradations in between). Third, the occupation of individuals throughout a conflict change as the conflict evolves (8). The author also notes that current literature composes rebels as either ‘rebels; or ‘not rebels’, which “obfuscates the actual choices being made during the rebellion” (Peters 2001, 8).

This view suggests an important notion, one that objects to some current analyses of rebellions: individuals have a choice; some join rebellion early on, others may wait and join mid-conflict, and some may fall out of rebellion or demobilize from the cause. Peters (2001) questions, “Why would the individuals composing two villages in the same region exhibit different patterns of rebellion behavior?” (10). Individuals of one village may mobilize and protest against a regime, while the other may remain neutral or conversely support the regime. Why? The author posits that it is not the influences of ‘institutions’ or ‘ideology’, large concepts that are difficult to analyze, but “relatively small differences in community structure can create different signals for potential rebels that, in turn, produce different rebellion dynamics” at the individual-level (10).

Gurr and Moore (1997), when discussing mobilization during ethnopolitical rebellion, contends that mobilization is influenced by “group coherence; the level of grievances among group members; and the severity of state repression” (1083). Arcand and Tranchant (2007, 2) builds upon Gurr and Moore’s (1997) model by adding the impacts of the institutional environment, where GDP has a statistically significant impact on the type of mobilization where

“the richer the country is, the less groups organize themselves into violent organizations” (Arcand and Tranchant 2007, 11). Both Gurr and Moore (1997, 1102) as well as Arcand and Tranchant (2007, 11) find that grievances do not have a significant impact on rebellion but do impact mobilization. In Saxton (2005)’s similar study analyzing ethnopolitical rebellion during the period of 1977-1996 in Spain, the author finds that mobilization “is more extensive the stronger the identity, the harsher the repression, the smaller the population, the less extensive the grievances, and the greater the democratic regime change” (18).

Gurr and Moore (1997), Saxton (2005), and Arcand and Tranchant (2007)’s findings are important to the aspect of mobilization during rebellion. These studies show that mobilization is affected by multiple factors such as the institutions of the state, grievances of the people, population size, and GDP. As well, and most significantly, these studies show that mobilization has a direct impact on rebellions; an implicit phase that can either make or break an uprising.

Wickham-Crowley (1987), pointing to evidence from Cuba, Venezuela, Columbia and Guatemala, argues that ideological conversion doesn’t cause peasants to join guerilla movements, but rather the peasant’s interests are the basis for the mobilization: “If conversion to Marxist ideology ever comes, it comes after membership, rather than before” (494).

As rapid urbanization throughout the world occurs, technology, mainly ICT and social media, also can be used for mobilization through recruitment. Since the rise of ISIS, foreign fighters has become a hotly debated subject, as estimates between 27,000 and 30,000 of its fighters are foreign (Guardian 2015). One explanation for the mass amounts of foreigners who want to join the Islamic state is due to their heavy social media presence as well as their professionally-edited videos of graphic beheadings, murders, and immolations. Berger and Morgan (2015) found that between September and December of 2014, The Islamic State had at

least 46,000 Twitter accounts (maximum estimate of 90,000) that supported the Islamic state in some way, where the average follower per account was around 1,000, and where one in five selected English as their primary language using Twitter (2-3).

There is an obvious connection between mobilization and rebellion. But this also carries over into rebel governance. Insurgent governance is a dynamic phenomenon: it needs civilians to provide goods and services too, with it being effective if the civilians regularly utilize these goods and services. Mobilizing civilians occurs through dynamic processes where repression and grievances come into full force and mobilizes a population. These civilians may protest non-violently or violently, join an existing rebel organization as a fighter or supportive role, or simply demobilize and flee. The point of this section was to highlight the importance of the individual in the relationship between rebel government and civilian.

The aspects I just covered are key to understanding rebel governance. The academic literature that labels rebellion can help us to understand what insight is lacking into the phenomenon of rebel governance. Often, rebels are labelled as terrorists, bandits, and warlords. The territories they control become blackspots and ungovernable territories, often labeled by those with state-centric views. But analyzing insurgency requires a more precise understanding, as state-centric views will simply lack the correct tools to truly garner knowledge from the subject. Mobilization is key to the aspect of rebel governance, as it treats civilians as influencers rather than accepters: civilians are an undeniably dynamic part of rebellion and rebel governance.

Rebel Governance

A long lasting rebellion requires more than just forces to fight. It requires structure, strategy and resources in order to promote survivability; the primary mantle of an insurgent¹ group. Rebel governance is a phenomenon recently studied that goes beyond the ideas of simple banditry strategies, the generalized ‘ungovernable’ rhetoric, and the reluctance to view the impact of civilian interaction in civil war. In this section, I will discuss the various aspects of rebel governance, such as the variation between rebellions, the civilian interaction, violence, and territory and domination. But first, a definition of the area of inquiry is necessary.

Kasfir (2002, 4) defines the term “governance” as “the range of possibilities for organization, authority, and responsiveness created between guerillas and civilians” and that rebel governance “at a minimum, means the organization of civilians within rebel held territory for a public purpose” (24). But these possibilities are not linear, as they can be “elaborately patterned relationships” or “the absence of any patterned activity”. Mampilly (2011,4) points out that “providing security from violence orchestrated by the government, its allies or rival militias; meeting the education and health needs of the populations, including establishing a system of food production and distribution; allocating land and other resources to provide opportunities for civilians to engage in their regular livelihood activities (agriculture, small business, etc.); providing shelter to civilian populations, including those displaced by fighting; regular market transactions; resolving civil disputes and addressing other social problems such as theft, drug use, prostitution that commonly accompany situations of internal war” are just some of the governance activities that rebel organizations engage in. Essentially, if there is an occurrence of

¹ I interchangeably use the words “rebels”, “rebel groups”, “rebellion” and “insurgent”, “insurgent groups” and “insurgency” in line with Mampilly (2011) which distinguishes them from “militias” and “guerillas”. As well, avoiding terms such as “revolutionary”, “freedom fighter” and “terrorist” is important in order to detract from political notions and connotations

rebel encouragement of civilian participation, provision of civilian administration, or organization of civilians for significant material gain, then there is sufficient evidence to indicate governance (Kasfir 2015, 24).

But engaging in aspects of rebel governance and actually asserting governance are separate, where the former may not garner inclusion. According to Kasfir (2015), in order for an insurgent group to engage in rebel governance it must meet three conditions: control of territory within the state it is rebelling against, civilians must reside in this territory, and the group must commit some act of violence to become rebels then continue violence or threat of violence (25). With these three scope conditions in mind, we will first look at the aspect of territorial control and dominance.

Continuing his notions, Kasfir asserts that conceptualizing territorial control and domination differently is key to understanding how rebel govern during civil war. Even an incumbent government can control territory yet fail in providing the necessary goods and services to the populations. Domination, on the other hand, “refers to the degree of civilian compliance an insurgent government can elicit within territory it controls” (25).

Civilians

Civilians present rebels with both opportunities and challenges (Arjona et al 2015, 4). Opportunities may come in the form of legitimization from the populace, income in the form of taxation, and the acceptance of progress towards the rebel government’s goals. Wickham-Crowley (1987) theorizes a ‘social contract’ between rebel and civilian, or in his case study “guerilla and peasant” (473). Guerillas may build their authority and legitimacy by carrying out three contractual obligations: defense of the people from external enemies; maintenance of

internal peace and order; and contributing to material security of the populace, mostly by increasing income, providing health services, education, etc (473). Where the state and its authority has more decay, the rebel authority has the ability to come in and provide these obligations, asserting its authority among the populace. This increases opportunities for both the rebel authority and the civilian populace, creating an effective and successful scenario for rebel governance, shown in the case of Cuba by Wickham-Crowley (1989, 487).

Another analysis of rebel governance and the opportunities between civilian and rebel is shown by Förster (2015) where the rebel governance system in Côte d'Ivoire “involved some coercion, but also took the expectations of the local population into account to a considerable degree. The interaction with civilians affected both sides. The local population adapted to rebel governance practices, while rebel governance took a more ‘civilian’ form” (221). Here, the norms and values shared between civilian and rebel allowed for ‘dialogue direct’, characterized by a new social order and new modes of governance. The author describes that ‘segmentary governance’ was developed in northern Côte d'Ivoire, which is when “actors...perform similar modes of governance in different sectors of society or in different spaces while remaining integrated through how they relate to shared norms and values” (222). In this case, both the rebels and civilians needed each other rather than one dominating or resisting the other. This interactive and reciprocal basis allowed for there to be a sort-of balance between civilians and rebels based on shared norms and values, creating opportunity for both actors.

Challenges by the civilian populace will occur during rebel conflict, whether it's because they disagree with the rebel rulers and their agenda or they are being treated unfairly by the current insurgent government. With challenges to rebel governance, it is easier to observe the civilian actor's transcendence from the static actor to one of importance and influence: “Civilians

are never passive or invisible actors and can manipulate the tenor of rebel governance efforts through the explicit demands they make on insurgent command, usually in line with their own local preferences” (Mampilly 2011, 67). Resistance by civilians is one of the major challenges rebel governments have to face.

Arjona (2015) theorizes that in all rebel governance systems there will be some form of resistance, known as ‘partial resistance’ which is against certain aspects of the insurgent government, adding that there can also be ‘full resistance’ which emerges when rebels try to establish interventionist rule and the pre-existing institutions were both effective and legitimate (180). Essentially, the author argues that when rebel governments expand beyond taxation and security, civilians will respond with increased resistance; the type and severity of the response depends on the quality of the local institutions prior to the rebel actor’s arrival (198). These notions affect the very ideas behind civil war and conflict dynamics, where civilians directly affect outcomes of rebel governance. As well, this presents new and interesting fields of inquiry when analyzing political order and institutional abilities.

The effect of civilians on rebel governance cannot be overstated and vice versa: “Understanding rebel governance systems is...important for ensuring the protection of civilians during war” (Mampilly 2013). Academic literature on the subject is growing more increasingly towards the idea of the civilian being a staple part of rebel governance and conflict dynamics. Peterson (2001) created a mechanism-based approach in order to answer why ordinary civilians would resist and rebel against powerful regimes (314), often varying across cases presented but with the offered idea that civilians can and will react to rebel organizations. Mampilly (2011) notes that “ the essential dynamic to recognize is that the decision by the population to either embrace or reject a specific rebel organization is a strategic one” which can affect “the behavior

of insurgent leaders, who must partially structure their governance systems to respond to civilian demands” (67). To understand civilian demands effect rebel governance, analyzing preconflict relationship between the people and the state is necessary as it affect the structures used by insurgent organizations as well as their behavior (67). This subject will be covered later on as it is instrumental in the analysis of rebel governance effectiveness.

Violence

Violence within civil war is most certainly not a lost theme. In order to rise against regimes or take territory for their own, rebel organizations resort to violence as a means of fulfilling their objectives. As well, violence can result in unintended deaths, famines, disease and generally horrid conditions facilitate in the deaths of civilians. Violence is not a random act but is a strategic endeavor that comes from both the state and the rebel government. Kasfir (2015) points out that “insurgent decisions on governance usually rest on strategic calculations that presume the presence or threat of violence... where the rebel organization causes most of the civilian violence, it may not create any civilian governance or it may establish highly coercive civilian administration” (31). Gutiérrez-Sanín (2015) analyzes the case of the urban militias in Medellín, Colombia and finds that coercion and violence continued throughout their rule despite the reasons for violence changing; from seeking justice to enforcing laws and collecting rent, violence occurred. (246).

Weinstein (2006) argues that “high levels of indiscriminate violence are committed by insurgent groups that are unable to police defection within their ranks...” which creates resistance from civilians and, in turn, generates even more coercion. On the other hand, if rebel governments have institutions in place tend to target their violence by selectively carrying out

attacks, then lower intensity levels occur (198). Violence may also not only be caused by the political actors and rebel governments but also civilians. Kalyvas (2006) posits a theory where violence in civil war is a joint process, where information and violence are key resources in throughout this process:

“Political actors need information in order to be able to target selectively, to distinguish from among the sea of civilians those who are abetting the enemy. Civilians have information, which they provide through denunciation, which can be either political, or, more likely, malicious, in hopes that the violence of the political actors will be directed against those denounced. There is, significantly, a great potential for abuse in such a system, but violence need only be perceived as selective in order to avoid the pitfalls of indiscriminate violence” (209).

Kalyvas argues that the more control, the less defection but more denouncement of the regime, therefore political actors will not utilize violence where it’s most needed; the absence of information makes it difficult for selective violence to take place (209). This is important research, and helps better understand selective violence by political actors, but doesn’t it explain some other factors that affect variation in violence among differing rebel governments.

Strategically, rebel governments may provide for certain areas and neglect or attack other due to their geographical location. This comes in the form of the presence of transnational actors, where areas that can be accessed or viewed by transnational actors may see less violence due to the rebel government’s want for legitimacy, providing provisions for the accessible and harsh violence for the inaccessible (Mampilly 2011, 238).

An important factor in the variation of violence is strategic geographical location. Key cities (Kabul, Baghdad, Lagos, etc) will see high rates of violence due to their strategic necessity;

strategically to benefit the rebel organization or that it is still controlled by the incumbent state or regime. Pressure and coercion may be applied to some key areas more than others.

Another factor in the variation of violence is that of ideology. The Islamic State has targeted Yazidis, an Iraqi ethnic and religious minority, due to their beliefs and being deemed “infidels” by Al-Qaeda, the group which ISIS originates from (Jalabi 2014). Carrying this same belief, the Islamic state has carried out genocide against the Yazidis among other groups (Myre 2016). In 1998, immediately after the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif, the Taliban went door to door, targeting the Hazara (a Shi’a ethnic group) civilians due to their religious identity as well as their opposition to the Taliban (HRW 1998). Both the Taliban and the Islamic State also destroyed idols and statues of different religions, schools that did not follow their own teaching methods, and arts and culture that was not in line with their view of Islam (USDOS 2001; Rashid 2001; NPR 2015; Williams 2016; Kandasamy 2015). Areas that follow a rebel organization’s ideologies may see less violence against civilians (but not particularly less coercion) as there are following the rebel’s rule and ‘law of the land’.

In summary, violence and coercion is a strategy used by rebel rulers, not a random and indiscriminate event. Though type and intensity of violence may change depending on certain factors, there will always be some form of violence, for it is violence that deems it a group that has rebelled (Kasfir 2015, 30).

Territory and Domination

The last of Kasfir’s three scope conditions for rebel governance is territory, the area in which rebels control and govern, providing good and services for the civilians that populate the area (27). As well, it is important to repeat the assertion that for the basis of effective rebel

governance, civilians must regularly utilize these goods and services. According to Kasfir (2015) territorial control is often ambiguous due to the constant gain and loss of territory between the incumbent state and the insurgents. As well, control comes in stages, from the guerillas secretly operating in villages to eventual military capabilities to provide security for its citizens, where governance only occurs at the latter stage (27-28).

It is also important to note the difference between territorial control and domination. Kasfir (2015) conceptualizes them differently since rebel can hold territory without actually governing its residents: “Domination refers to the degree of civilian compliance an insurgent organization can elicit within territory it controls...territorial control refers to the capacity of a rebel group to keep its enemies out of a specific area” (26). Kalyvas (2006) also proposes that when an actor exercises higher control over a territory there will be higher levels of collaboration with the actor and lower rates of defection, where geography is a major factor in the distribution of control, trumping popular preferences (132). As well, the author argues that “control has a clear territorial foundation: rule presupposes a constant and credible armed presence” (132).

Taking both Kasfir’s (2015) and Kalyvas’ (2006) arguments into account, rebels will tend to control territory where it is geographically strategic and control is easier to implement (being further from cities where the incumbent control is higher), but this does not necessarily mean a rebel organization will dominate these areas. The territorial control may be of military strategic value, overshadowing their necessity to implement civilian services and provisions. Kasfir argues that there are two ways to test for the capacity to govern: one is whether the degree of territorial control is adequate enough so that insurgent leaders organize structures that civilians actually utilize and participate in. The second is the overall safety that the civilians feel in following rebel orders and participating in these structures (28).

These strategic choices by a rebel organization can also protract the conflict, depending on not just factors of geography but also of military capabilities and the natural resources or minerals present in the territory (Buhaug et al. 2009, 544-545). Effective governance of territory, where there is positive domination and positive territorial control, may also be a factor in the extension of a conflict. If a populace is compliant with the rebel government, utilizes their institutions and structures, and in return complies with rebel rules, then it is safe to say the incumbent state's forces and ideals would not be welcome in some territories, increasing fighting and the compliance of civilians towards the rebel's cause. We need only to return to Wickham-Crowley's social contract theory to understand that this is a possibility, where the rebels become the new legitimate authority of a territory, as long as they fulfill the three requirements. (Wickham-Crowley 1987, 473).

To summarize, it is important to distinguish territorial control from domination. A rebel organization may have control over territory but may choose not to actually govern (provide governance structures) the civilians within the territory. Civilians may act out in protest or other various methods to show their discontent for the administration, which may cause the rebels to change their strategies. Rebels tend to choose territory to rule where it is difficult for transnational actors and the incumbent state's forces to reach. There they have more freedom to operate, control, and dominate the territory to how they see fit.

Rebel organizations must meet three scope conditions to engage in rebel governance. First, the insurgents have to hold territory within the state it is rebelling against. Second, the territory must have civilians residing within. Third, the insurgency or rebellion must engage in a violent act against the incumbent state to initialize their rebellion, then continue fighting or threaten in the territory that it controls. Only if an actor meets these three scope conditions then

they are capable of rebel governance (Kasfir 2015, 25). It is extremely important to the study of rebel governance to understand these conditions. There are various rebellions across the world, but only a few truly manage to engage in rebel governance. This also adds to the difficulty of analyzing rebel governance. Often insurgent organizations will hide their governance structures, take and lose territory constantly during the course of the conflict, and operate in areas where it is difficult for media, researchers and NGOs to travel to. Therefore, finding rebel governments that truly engage in governance is not an easy task.

Jihadi Governance

Academic literature focusing on Jihadist governance is slim but is garnering new interest with the success of the Islamic State's ability to gain and control territory. Most secondary sources focus on the types of services, governing acts, and the ever-popular establishment of Sharia law that jihadist groups carry out but less so on the effectiveness of the jihadist government.

Kopchick (2015) looks at three cases of jihadi governance to evaluate their ability of state-building in context to what the modern state represents. The author explains that the 'modern state' is based on their territorial claims, convey structures of power, and the leadership structure which is comprised of impersonal institutionalized structures.

Unfortunately, the author misses the mark by trying to analyze rebel groups in a modern state context. First, rebel groups (jihadist or non-jihadist) lack a main ingredient to become a state: sovereignty. Legitimacy among the populace towards the rebel group can occur since a state may treat its citizens poorly (see: social contract theory) and the insurgency takes up the mantle as legitimate. But the state is still internationally recognized and maintains sovereignty, unlike the rebel group. Therefore, trying to convey a rebel group's (in this case, Jihadist) ability through a state-centric lens lacks credibility since they are not states themselves.

Second, the modern state context doesn't allow for deeper analysis in the provision of services from the rebel government. We can observe that the Islamic State has established courts and humanitarian aid as it is reported by media outlets and organizations. But are the civilians utilizing these services and is there a positive feedback? This is key in understanding true rebel governance ability.

Lia (2015) presents a characteristic-driven analysis of Jihadist rebel groups in what the author dubs as "jihadi proto-states". The author looks at jihadi protostates (both established and attempted) between the years 1989-2015. Here, Lia (2015) find that these jihadi protostates share four distinct characteristics: "they are intensely ideological, internationalist, territorially expansive, and irredentist" and also "devote significant resources to effective, if harsh, governance". Here, the author also argues that jihadi organizations face a sort of 'marketing dilemma' and using this metaphor is a "useful avenue to understanding jihadi movement's behavior...". Support and mobilization for the organization relies on the visibility in media outlets, denoting the heavy presence of jihadi online propaganda. Lia argues it's easy to see which "market leaders" receive the most "resources": "the flow of foreign fighters is a clear indication of which jihadi front receives most funding and media attention". Therefore, Lia (2015) argues that the Islamic State is the "market leader of jihad", a claim that comes with merit as thousands of foreign fighters flock to Syria and Iraq.

Cronin (2015) discusses the Islamic State's status as a terrorist group, and argues it should be treated as a rebel government for various reasons. One reason is that the same counterterrorism policies and operations utilized by the US government against Al-Qaeda won't have a similar affect against IS. IS's message and use of recruitment differs from Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, therefore previous "counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, or conventional

warfare isn't likely to afford...a clear cut victory against the group" (Cronin 2015). Though this literature focuses more on policy implications in the face of a new threat, it represents the importance of understanding jihadi governance organizations: different measures in policy and security ought to be taken in order to understand and ultimately contain or eliminate the organizations.

Since groups like the Islamic State and the Taliban differ from the conventional terrorist groups (though they may carry out attacks of terror), then analyzing and trying to understand the nature of these Islamic Jihadist organizations through a different lens should shed some light on the phenomenon. There are various differences between Jihadi governance and 'conventional' rebel governance. Ideologically, Islamic Jihadist rebel governments differ from other rebel governments in a variety of ways. For one, these groups base their goals on their interpretation of Islamic values and principles, and do so to the point where it may undermine their relations with citizens, such as the example of both the Taliban and the Islamic state implementing harsh social policies against women. Added to this, international actors and the incumbent government must take this into account when dealing with Islamic Jihadist rebel groups.

The various structures that these organizations try to build differ from other rebel groups. For example, the Islamic Court systems established by both the Islamic State and the Taliban provide judiciary measures based on Islamic morals, rules, and principles. Punishments and fines would differ in a non-Islamic court system established by a different rebel group. Both the Taliban and the Islamic State created structures to enforce their Islamic laws, such as the religious police of the Taliban. Other rebel groups that have a security administration would enforce laws, but these Islamic Jihadist groups have specific resources devoted solely for the enforcement of Islamic laws. Also, as we will see later in this paper, jihad is a mobilization tool

that non-Islamic jihadist groups lack. An ethnocentralist rebel group calls upon those of its specific ethnicity to rebel. A jihad (in the rebellion sense) goes beyond ethnicity and nationalism, extending to all Muslims who would fight for their ideals. This can be seen in the case of the Islamic State, who has recruited thousands of foreign fighters from Western and non-Western countries.

Variations from preliminary research do exist, but analyzing these two cases will be able to show if variation exists within Islamic Jihadist governance as well. I will now discuss the framework utilized in this paper as well as the methodology.

Framework and Methodology

In this chapter, I focus on discussing the framework that will be implemented as well as the methodology that will be used to analyze the two cases I have selected. Before delving into the framework, it must be noted first that for purpose of this thesis I will be following Mampilly's framework and methodology as closely as possible in order to prevent from detracting from the overall viability of the argument. One of his concerns was if the framework is applicable beyond his three cases; I address these concerns by providing two new cases: The Taliban and the Islamic State.

Using Mampilly's theoretical framework, I analyze the two cases in order to assert their effectiveness. In *Rebel Rulers* Mampilly lays out a framework for an effective governance system for insurgents. He states that:

“Effective governance denotes a case in which an insurgent group in control of territory demonstrates the following three capacities. First, it must be able to develop a force capable of policing the population, providing a degree of stability that makes the production of other governance functions possible. Second, the organization should develop a dispute resolution mechanism, either through a formal judicial structure or through an ad hoc system. Civilians must regularly utilize this system to resolve disputes against other civilians as well as those that might arise within the rebel organization itself. Third, the organization should develop a capacity to provide other public goods beyond security.” (17)

In the book, the author focuses on education and health care but asserts that in other cases other public goods may be worthy of analysis such as “a system to ensure the production and distribution of food”. Also, it is important to “understand to what degree civilians make use of

these insurgent-derived systems and how capable they are in meeting civilian needs” (Mampilly 2011, 17) when distinguishing between effective and ineffective governance.

Mampilly (2011) continues to distinguish effective governance from what he deems as ‘partially effective’ and ‘noneffective governance’. Partially effective is where the rebel group “is able to provide security but no other public goods” and ‘non effective’ “could result from an insurgent group’s deciding not to devote and resources to questions of civilian governance which would produce a paucity of structures for managing a captive population. More commonly, efforts by the insurgent organization to develop a governance system may be ignored or even rebuffed by civilians and other societal actors...” (18)

Mampilly continues to generate nine hypotheses that test the factors in the development of civilian governance at three levels: below, within and above the organization. Below, is where the “rebel groups face pressure from the denizens of the areas under their control. The civilian population is as important for its own actions and beliefs as it is for its general composition on racial, ethnic, religious and ideological grounds”. From within, a focus on “individuals or factions representing oppositional perspectives (cultural, ideological, greed, etc.)” And with the above factors “rebel groups interact with transnational actors (UN, World Bank, Amnesty International, NGOs, etc) other religious organizations, diasporas, and states”. These factors at all three levels are interactive rather than exclusive, which is central to Mampilly’s analysis.

Within the ‘below factors’ category, which focuses on civilian demands, Mampilly (2011) asserts that “...it must be recognized that preconflict preferences can have an important effect on civilian acceptance of various insurgent organizations” (68) and argues that “the preconflict relationship between the state government and the civilian population has a

determinative impact on the effectiveness of rebel governance systems...”. I will now present the hypotheses I will use and discuss why I am leaving out some others.

From Below: Civilian Demands Affecting Insurgent Governance

Civilians have demands, and for an effect governance system to occur, insurgents should (though some might not) take heed and answer these demands. It is an interactive and necessary relationship. But what demands will civilians make? Mampilly (2011) states that “examining the history of the penetration of the state into society is one method for distinguishing between the types of demands likely to be made by different populations that insurgencies come into contact with...in order to understand the type of relationship a local community is likely to have with a rebel government, it is important to understand how and to what degree that community was integrated politically into the preconflict state through the expansion of the government bureaucracy”(70-71). Mampilly’s use of ‘state penetration’ refers more to the extent in which the government control resources, activities, and populations within the government’s territory. (71)

Mampilly (2011) separates state penetration into two categories: 1. Habituation, where civilians are unaware of their ability to influence the political authority and 2. Cooptation, where the preexisting government had more social control and intuitional success; ‘higher penetration’ into society. In short, habituation is low penetration and cooptation is high. Mampilly summarizes this notion, asserting that “the nature of the state is determined by its fiscal prerogatives” and that “two types of civilian populations will emerge in response to the fiscal strategy adopted by the specific state” (71). If civilians are politically habituated by rentier state fiscal policies and unaware of their ability to influence the political authority, then this condition carries over to political formations that develop in conflict-produced state withdraw. If it is in a

state where bureaucratic structures penetrate deeply into the public psyche, the state collects taxes, and provides public goods to its civilians, then civilians are habituated to having a say in political affairs (71). What Mampilly is specifically arguing here is that in order to understand what type of relationship a community will have with a rebel government, it is important to first understand “how and to what degree that community was integrated politically into the preconflict state through the expansion of the government bureaucracy” (71). This brings us to the first hypotheses and its causal mechanisms.

State Penetration: Habituation and Cooptation

H1a: If an insurgency emerges in a state with minimal penetration into society, it is less likely to develop an effective governance system than one that emerges in a state that is penetrated deeply into society

In alleviating the problems faced when dealing with civilians, “rebel leaders must often tap into and even co-opt preexisting institutions and networks of power, which are themselves the direct product of the preconflict relationship between the incumbent state and political actors” (Mampilly 2011, 72). A dysfunctional state can end up in a split of central authority, where “political and social order is likely to be provided by an ad hoc array of political actors, including religious institutions, charitable organizations, private corporations, trade networks, and traditional authorities” (72). This divided structure presents difficulties for the rebel organization while trying wsto develop their system of governance. Conversely, a state with more social control and interactive structures for their citizens are marked by cohesive institutions and networks of power (72). This provides Mampilly’s hypothesis 1b:

H1b: If an insurgency emerges in a state with high penetration into society, it is more likely to be able to co-opt preexisting institutions and networks into its civil administration, thereby improving governance provision.

Mampilly continues to summarize the argument by stating “the design of rebel governance systems is the least likely to depart from preexisting patterns and institutions when the preconflict society is characterized by a high degree of state penetrations...this is done primarily through replacement of government bureaucrats with personnel selected by the insurgency. Much of the bureaucratic framework will remain the same, with only specific changes made to accommodate the needs and desires of the new rulers”. (73). However, if the previous regime failed to penetrate into society, rebels will create innovative structures and practices to govern a civilian population, but in turn will be less effective.

Three mechanisms work together to support the related hypotheses H1a and H1b. Mampilly (2011) identifies them as follows:

Civilian Expectations: H1a has to do with ingrained political behavior of specific civilian populations regarding the political regime in power. If this mechanism does influence insurgent governance decisions, then we should observe evidence that:

1. Civilians made demands on the rebel political authority consistent with their prior relationship to the state authority
2. The Insurgent organization was concerned with civilian feedback, either through overt proclamations by the insurgents or, more directly, through the efforts by the rebellion to solicit civilian input.

State Capacity: Both H1a and H1b address the preconflict capacity of the state in areas under rebel control during the war. If the mechanism is operational, then we should expect to see:

1. Evidence of meaningful interactions between the state and civilians living in rebel-controlled areas *before* the conflict
2. Evidence that the insurgent organization sought to use these preexisting state institutions to provide civilian governance or to supplement their own efforts

Multiplex Governance: H1b is concerned with the difficulty of negotiating the broader political environment for a budding insurgent organization. If the mechanism is at work in the cases, then we should see evidence of:

1. A multifarious political environment with multiple nodes of power *before* the outbreak of conflict
2. Unsuccessful efforts by rebels to negotiate with these multiple political actors

From Within: Internal Dynamics Affecting Insurgent Governance

In this section, the author argues that there is both internal and external messages that the command adopts which affects the development of their governance system. For the purpose of this paper, I will only focus on the external dimension. There are a few reasons for this choice which will be discussed in the ‘issues’ sections.

The first hypothesis looks at the distinguishing what ‘type’ of organization the insurgency is composed of by looking at the strategic objectives. Mampilly (2011) states “strategically, there are two base objectives...overthrowing the central government or carving out a discrete territory from the state shell that corresponds with the aspirations of the target population” (75).

Leaders will also frame their objective in order to provide the greatest gains towards their military objectives, and may proclaim their objective to internal and external actors. As well, rebel organizations “must frequently choose between various strategies in deciding how to interact with the different communities...” where one community they could provide goods and services successfully, but in another they may use violence for coercion and treat them poorly. (Mampilly 2011, 76). Those with secessionist or ethnocentralist agendas have a more defined target audience. Ethnocentralists will try and convince their kin of the benefits while secessionists face a small group of those who agree with their ideals and agenda; both have a significantly small margin for error and limited support. These organizations will most likely devote more resources to the communities they govern compared to insurgencies that are center-seeking. Therefore, Mampilly argues:

“insurgent organizations with a secessionist or ethnonationalist agenda have a vested interest in proving their ability to serve as de facto governments in areas they come to control as their ability to garner support from a specific population will be directly shaped by their government performance.” (Mampilly 2011, 77).

H2: If the Insurgency is a secessionist or ethnonationalist it is more likely to develop an effective system of governance than groups that seek to capture power at the center.

Mampilly (2011) identifies two mechanisms that both have converse scenarios which are as follows:

Strategic Objective: The proposition posits that the strategic objective of an insurgency will affect its ability and desire to address civilian needs. There are two contrary scenarios for how a “strategic objective” mechanism could unfold. First, reformists (center seeking) insurgent leaders

in charge of the allocation of resources within the organization believe that devoting resources to civilian governance is counterproductive as it diverts resources from the military objective of capturing power at the center. Conversely, an insurgency with a secessionist agenda shows the mechanism is correct.

If a reformist agenda is occurring, we should observe evidence that the organization:

1. Does not devote financial or human resources to the civilian governance system at the outset of the rebellion as they have no intention of making any long-term claims to territory
2. Does not attempt to operate within a specific territory but rather allows military strategy and conflict dynamics to determine its area of operations

Conversely, if an insurgency has a secessionist agenda occurring, we should see evidence:

1. That a particular territorial space has significance beyond its military utility
2. That the organization devotes resources to portray itself as the “national” government among a target segment of the population

Insurgent Promises: Essentially the inverse of the “civilian expectations” mechanism. If relevant, we can expect:

1. Promises made by reformist insurgencies to improve conditions of civilians are worded in a way to condition inhabitants of rebel territory to expect an improvement in their living conditions only *after* the organization takes power at the center.
2. Conversely, for secessionist insurgency, efforts are made to condition civilians to view the insurgent organization as already constituting *the* government during the war itself.

Ideology

The next hypothesis centers around the ideology of the rebel leadership and how “rebel leaders publically position themselves ideologically” (Mampilly 2011, 77). What is important to understand for the next hypothesis is that ideology may be professed one by an organization, such as claiming religious principles influencing their actions, but Mampilly argues that “ideology is salient for an insurgency only when it shapes the internal organizational strategy adopted by the leadership” (78). Mampilly argues a Maoist organizational structure (based on Mao ZeDong’s principles of insurgency) requires a large amount of resources towards their governance efforts. The Taliban and The Islamic State are both Islamic Jihadists groups that utilize religious principles to profess their stated goals . Their internal organizational strategy, at first glance, would seem to follow Qur’anic principles. But these are also based on interpretation, following some rules more strictly than others. A deeper analysis is necessary to observe if they have some sort of implemented Maoist strategy, innate in their religiously influenced governance structure.

The author essentially argues that Maoist organizational strategy requires large amounts of provisions for governance and services to the population. Therefore:

H3: If an insurgency chooses to implement a Maoist organizational structure, it is more likely to develop an effective governance system

Here, Mampilly (2011) identifies two general and two specific mechanisms that explain the effect of the hypothesis, which are “all drawn from Mao’s theory of guerilla warfare” (217). The mechanisms for this hypothesis work together to improve civilian governance outcomes. Mampilly asserts official ideological proclamations are “of little concern” and that the focus

should be on the internal organizational strategy implemented by the rebel leadership and “its ability to put that strategy into practice” (218).

The first ‘general mechanism’ is that the insurgents develop effective civilian governance capabilities to win the support of inhabitants in the territory they control. The second is that the rebel organization can conduct conventional warfare against the incumbent forces which required the marshaling of substantial resources and the holding of territory from which to launch such an attack. The two specific mechanisms are the as follows:

Political Mobilization: Mao emphasized the need for a prolonged period of political mobilization to educate the population on the goals of the insurgency. If the mechanism is valid, we should observe:

1. Evidence in the organization’s propaganda and public rhetoric that popular support was indeed an important organizational concern
2. Structures put in place to foster noncoercive participation with the insurgent organization

Cadre Discipline: Mao emphasized the importance of disciplined troops who did not behave in ways that ostracized the civilian population. If the mechanism is functioning, then we should see:

1. Evidence that indiscipline by rebel cadres was an important concern for the command.

Conflict Intensity

Moving to discuss conflict intensity, Mampilly (2011) argues that the development of insurgent governance systems responds directly to shifts in conflict, where gains and losses are a continuous occurrence. Insurgents “tend to focus on civilian needs according to the degree of active conflict with the incumbent state” (81). Therefore:

H4: If a civil war exhibits periods of relative peace- through either a stalemate or a ceasefire- the insurgents are more likely to devote resources to the civil administration, and this results in a more effective governance system

Mampilly (2011) identifies three mechanisms that account for the effectiveness of hypothesis 4. They are as follows:

Resource Allocation: This primary mechanism has to do with the organization's distribution of resources during this period. If the mechanism is at work, we should see:

1. Increase in resources, both material and personnel, devoted to civilian governance structures as a result of lulls in fighting

Stability: This supplemental mechanism addresses the impact of reduced fighting on relief and developmental efforts. If the mechanism is at work during pauses in fighting, we should observe:

1. An influx of actors, both national and international, engaging in humanitarian activities in rebel-controlled areas.

Peace Dividends: This mechanism is a variation of the 'civilian expectations' mechanism.

Civilian populations enjoying a reprieve from fighting are likely to make additional demands on the insurgent organization to improve governance provisions. If the mechanism is in effect, we should observe:

1. That the civilian population or societal leaders articulate explicit demands for improvements in their material conditions.
2. That the insurgents make efforts to address these demands.

It is understood that rebel military needs trump civil administration during active conflict, but if military conflict is diminished then "governance efforts are more likely to become more

sustained...” (Mampilly 2011, 82). This can occur in a few ways. Low intensity of conflict allows for civilian administration to flourish to levels that were not previously allowed; goods can be traded among civilians and services, not matter how small or large, can be provided by the rebel government. Conversely, when there is high intensity, “security concerns also make it far more difficult for transnational actors to access rebel-held territory” (82) Having calm in rebel held territories allows for international actors to access areas that they were unable previously, as well as interacting with insurgent political structure.

From Above: Transnational Actors Affecting Insurgent Governance

The next factor affecting insurgent governance comes ‘from above’ in the form of transnational actors. These consist of international state actors as well as nonstate actors such as “aid organizations, internal agencies, diasporas, religious institutions, and corporations” (Mampilly 2011, 82). It is important to analyze the influences from transnational actors, as their very presence within the territories that rebel organizations control “serves to link such spaces to the formal world system” (83). Engaging with these actors are beneficial for the rebels as they may receive supplies, funds and weapons from some actors, but conversely they can be delegitimized by other actors who oppose insurgent governance practices of violence and forceful coercion. Mampilly addresses these factors by separating them into two categories, supporters and competitors, which “affect the behavior of rebel leaders” (88).

Supporters

When Transnational actors act as supporters, they do so by “providing resources that impact their [rebel organizations’] ability and desire to grapple with civilian governance concerns” (89). The

two primary supporters that insurgencies attract are private corporations and state actors. These actors have their own specific goals and gains to be had, and utilize the rebel organization to achieve these goals (89). Providing materials to the rebels Mampilly hypothesizes here that:

H5: If an Insurgency is able to co-opt humanitarian organizations into its governance project, then it is more likely to develop an effective system of governance

Mampilly (2011) identifies one mechanism involved with hypothesis 5:

Co-optation: This mechanism has to do with the insurgent organization's efforts to co-opt various aid organizations concerned with relief and development efforts into its broader political program. If the mechanism is present, then we should see evidence that:

1. The insurgent organization develops structures within its civil administration able to coordinate the activities of aid organizations
2. Humanitarian organizations accept direction from the insurgent administration

Competitors

On the other hand, if an insurgency cannot get transnational actors to work in their interest, they may view them as competitors (90). Negative impacts can occur in various ways, but Mampilly argues that in certain cases "such pressure may push the insurgent command to take more seriously the task of addressing civilian needs, particularly if it perceives that such a change in behavior will produce positive coverage for the rebellion in national and international circles" (91). Therefore:

H6: If an insurgent leadership faces challenges to its rule from local and transnational civil society actors, then it may develop a more effective system of governance under certain conditions.

Mampilly (2011) identifies two mechanisms that are relevant for understanding the impact of competitors on insurgent governance efforts:

International Pressure: In regards to transnational human rights networks, this mechanism accounts for the impact of such networks on insurgent behavior. If this mechanism is operating, we should see:

1. Evidence of pressure from human rights activists or religious institutions on an insurgent group regarding civilian treatment
2. Evidence that the organization responded to such challenges without resorting to coercive means

Switching Sides: In relation to the previous mechanism, this mechanism addresses insurgent efforts to respond to criticism from local society actors. If the mechanism is valid in this context, we should observe:

1. Efforts by insurgents to incorporate *critical* society actors into their broader political project
2. That such actors willingly cooperate with insurgents

This hypothesis is worded slightly different than the others because “it relies on idiosyncratic factors that may push the organization to take more seriously the task of civilian governance” (90). Similar pressures may cause differing reactions depending on the situation of the rebel organization and the civil war. In some cases, rival organizations and transnational

actors may push the insurgents to focus more attention towards civilians, but if insurgents have complete control, the presence of these actors may cause the rebel organization to imprison or expel competitors.

These six hypotheses and their causal mechanisms will be the framework of my thesis for understanding the effective, noneffective, or partially effective Islamic Jihadist governance systems of the Islamic state and The Taliban. Mampilly provides this framework in order to understand the complex dynamics that affect behavior of rebel leaders in regards to the provision of civilian governance. Using these hypotheses designed by Mampilly, I will be able to analyze the governance of the two insurgent organizations and try to conclude whether they are indeed effective, partially effective, or noneffective systems. In doing so, a better understanding of these governance systems can be useful in various fields of academic study and policy making; further detail will be focused on later.

Limitations

One of the main limitations with this paper is the omission of the ‘Internal Cleavages’ section that Mampilly uses in his framework. There are a few reasons for this choice. First, it requires a large amount of dedicated research to analyze the internal cleavages or internal dimensions of a rebel organization. Mampilly conducted field research in multiple areas, which took a large amount of resources, dedicated time, and a knack for employing interesting and useful research methods. I have neither of these at my disposal. To analyze the internal dimensions of a rebel organization would require not only a large amount of resources, but also that these resources be readily available in some form. Both the Islamic State and the Taliban are notoriously secretive

organizations, and their leaders are widely known for lack of public appearance and reverence from their followers. There is only a handful of photographs of Mullah Omar, and al-Baghdadi has only gave one recorded speech. This highlights the secretive nature of these organizations; finding information and sources to use would be too few and far between.

Acquiring the information needed for the internal cleavage analysis section could be done in person through interviews, much like journalists use. But these are dangerous organizations that target westerners (especially Americans) and I would not be welcome among their communities they govern, nor among the internal leadership. I have not the funds nor the internal fortitude to travel into rebel held areas to seek interviews or information. I leave that to the professionals.

As well, specifically for the case of the Islamic state, the conflict continues and dynamics change. Finding some sources this week that discuss the internal cleavages of the organization may change and be obsolete next week. Much has changed in the conflict in Syria since I began researching for this paper, and may have changed even more so for whomever is reading this. Though it is important, it is beyond the scope of this paper to utilize this section of Mampilly's framework and incorporate his hypotheses. But the external dimension, that is the strategic and the ideological components, is necessary in analyzing the governance systems of the Taliban and The Islamic State, hence its presence in my analysis.

Another major issue surrounds the case of the Taliban. The Taliban controlled Afghanistan from 1996-2001, a time where the internet was relatively new and information did not flow as freely as it does now. Acquiring information of micro-level interactions, such as civilian demands to the organization or the preconflict relationship between state and citizen, has proven extremely difficult due to the secretive nature of the organization, the absence of

representative parties within Afghanistan, and tribal culture that had historically had minimal interaction with the government. Cornell (2006) states:

“Afghanistan under the Taliban was isolated, ostracized, and practically cut off from the outside world. Very few journalists and academics were given access to the Taliban leadership or had a thorough understanding of the regime's inner structure, power relation and policies; information on the organization is still deficient” (265).

Overall, this analysis only breaks the surfaces of rebel jihadist organizations and their governance systems. The framework presented will allow for a micro-level look into the processes and interactions that affect rebel governance. More research questions begin to manifest after this analysis, yet are beyond the scope of this paper. This specific area of inquiry to the two cases is a justifiable beginning in researching the rebel governance systems of Islamic Jihadists rebel organizations.

Methodology

In line with Mampilly (2011, 18) I will be conducting a comparative case analysis of cases that meet the preconditions of rebel governance. The two cases, one still ongoing, will be analyzed to understand the micro level processes that connect “specific factors with actual outcomes...” (18). Mampilly’s framework was tested using three cases: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) in D.R. Congo, and the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Sudan. Mampilly chose these groups to showcase the range of effectiveness that varying rebel governance systems have and the variations in the systems themselves (5). For this paper, I will be using Mampilly’s theoretical framework to analyze the Taliban and the Islamic State’s governance systems, eventually concluding their level of effectiveness as proposed by Mampilly (effective, partially effective, or non-effective).

Since I am using Mampilly’s framework I will be utilizing his methodology as well, in order to diverge from the analysis as little as possible. The independent variable in the study is the insurgent governance system. The range of outcomes on the dependent variable are the cases which have exhibited effective, partially effective, or noneffective governance systems (Mampilly 2011, 19). This paper seeks to use this methodology, applying it to two cases of Islamic Jihadi governance systems to understand the variation and what factors affected each governance system.

Case study research brings about some advantages. Ruzzene (2014) asserts that “case-based reasoning locates the ultimate source of our epistemic and moral intuitions in the concreteness and idiosyncrasy of particulars” (13). Application of case study research consists of a range of a phenomenon, and can be used in a variety of fields. Case studies essentially “enable a researcher to closely examine the data within a specific context” and give advantage in this

sense by their “ability to accommodate complex causal relations” (George and Bennett 2005). Disadvantages occur within case studies, as “Actors may provide inconsistent or conflicting accounts, because of either a desire to manipulate results or inconsistency of private and public opinions” (Schell 1992, 8). As well, if there is a lack of a clearly defined research objective, then a case study would be obsolete, covering a range of phenomenon, adhering to no parameters, and effectively obscuring the analysis.

Some advantages of conducting case studies within the realm of rebel governance systems is how deeply analytical they can become. This is necessary when looking at the micro-level interactions between civilian and rebel organizations, rather than the large, statistical datasets that do not focus on cause and effect (Mampilly 2011, 18). Case studies are useful in this regard as they illuminate local dynamics and provide insight into specific factors that shape the observed outcomes as well as shed light on the intermediate factors that mediate between and independent variable and the dependent variable. Large datasets make it difficult to see the relational aspects of conflict, often leave out key details of analysis, and treat features as a 1 or a 0. This is all well and good in some studies, but when analyzing the rebel-civilian interaction and the outcomes from these processes, a case study methodology is useful (18).

Some disadvantages of this methodology is the lack of academic resources, since the field of rebel governance has not seen as much study as conflict studies, and even less so with comparative studies of rebel governance. Much of the academic resource is relied on through a few academics who have pioneered this area of study. As well, I lack the interviews and field visits carried out by Mampilly, which greatly added to his case studies analyses’. Much of my research will be derived from secondary sources such as media outlets, news stories, international organizations, press releases, and narrative-based research books. Another

disadvantage is within the implementation of case study research, where small sample sizes are often disregarded and argued against due to lack of scope.

Why specifically choose the Islamic State and the Taliban? Of course there are many other insurgent organizations across the globe, some more prominent and researched than others. A recent book, which I utilize in my literature review quite a bit, consists of various case studies of rebel governance which are used to explain aspects of the phenomenon of insurgent governance systems. “Rebel Governance in Civil War” looks at the various aspects of rebel governance such as civilian interaction and resistance, the use of symbolism by rebel governments, rebel diplomacy, and other facets by using cases to facilitate the explanation and analysis (Kasfir et al 2015).

Throughout the entire book, The Taliban is only used as a passing example a handful of times and the Islamic State is not mentioned. But more importantly, none of the cases focus on any self-proclaimed Islamic Jihadist organizations. As discussed in the literature review, there is a small amount of real academic research into jihadi governance and even less so at a micro-interaction level. There is a lack of study in this specific regard, and since there is evidence that variations exist between rebel governance systems (Mampilly 2011) then researching the Islamic Jihadist organizations I have chosen would be an important addition to this field of inquiry.

Why is there a lack of study in regard to Islamic insurgent rebel governance? Maybe it is more difficult to analyze a rebel government’s goals and decisions which are based on their interpretation of Islamic religion. Secession and nationalism are heavily studied topics in the realm of civil war and rebellion while theological concerns are left alone. Nonetheless, this paper focuses on Islamic Jihadist governance systems and their effectiveness.

As well, there are other self-proclaimed Islamic Jihadist rebel groups such as Boko-Haram and al-Shabaab. But the cases of the Taliban and the Islamic state were chosen because of their relevance to foreign policy, national security, international security, and general security policy. The Taliban is a good case to compare to the Islamic state to due to their successful rebellion and abilities; so much so that they are still a detrimental fighting force in Afghanistan today. The Islamic State is still active and engaging in rebel governance activities. Seeing the variation in their governance structures, what factors affected these structures, and provisions of services may provide information as to where policy planners, post-conflict state building, security and counterinsurgency specialists went wrong with the Taliban. Hopefully, analyzing these two cases of rebel governance can shed new light on the phenomenon of insurgent governance and Islamic Jihadist governance.

Pashtun Warriors, Islam, and Governing Afghanistan

The Taliban

O Babrak! Son of Lenin

You do not care for the religion and the faith

You may face your doom and

May you receive a calamity, o! son of a traitor.

O! son of Lenin.

-Popular Pashtun poem during Soviet occupation

Afghanistan: A Brief History

Afghanistan is often considered the ‘Graveyard of Fallen Empires’ (Beardon 2001; Nield 2009; Boot 2014). And though this title does come with merit, the label often turns one’s idea of the country as being forever war-ravaged and beaten upon. But empires fall: a fact long understood by societies, historians, and academics throughout time. Afghanistan was more of a ‘gateway of empires’, haven been ruled by some of the most well-known and prolific rulers in history such as Alexander the Great and Chenggis Khan. But whether ‘Gateway’ or ‘Graveyard’, the geographical location “set the course of Afghan history for a millennia” (Barfield 2010, 1). Afghanistan’s history of invaders and occupiers is extensive, deeply complex, and historically fascinating. We start with Afghanistan’s Durrani rulers, who controlled the country dynastically from 1747-1978, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan.

Originating from a Pashtun tribal system, the Durrani rulers decided on a “hierarchal model of governance to maintain power and exclusivity within their own dynastic lines” which

essentially became the autocracy that would hold power for over 200 years, yet it strained relations between Pashtun tribes and the Durrani dynasty (Barfield 2010, 4). This structure lent to strong establishment of legitimacy and authority over the smaller, spread out tribes and created less competition for the ruling elite (Barfield 2010). But outside competition came in the form of British invasion. The First Anglo-Afghan war occurred from 1839-1842, influenced by “The Great Game” where the British and Russian empires vied for power across central Asia (Fromkin 1980). Eventually defeated by Afghan tribal warriors, the British retreated having lost a substantial amount of men. But the British eventually returned, sparking the Second Anglo-Afghan war from 1878-1880.

Barfield (2010) discusses that the consequences of these two wars was that Afghanistan formed into a national state, with a centralized government and army. It also changed the role of the Afghan people, where they fought for their nation but also became more oppressed by their government (110). Moving into 20th century Afghanistan, Barfield breaks down this time period into three main ones: 1901-1929, 1929-78, and 1978-2001 (169). The first period is of note due to Amanullah’s attempts to modernize Afghanistan, but failed when civil war broke out and Amanullah Khan fled the country. The 1929-78 period is of utmost importance. It was in the time period that Afghanistan experienced peace and stability, internally and externally; it was considered the ‘golden age’ of Afghanistan (170). Since much of Afghanistan in the 1978-2001 period consists of war and anarchy (170) it is appropriate to analyze the government penetration into the Afghan society in the 1929-1979 period.

The Pre-Pre Conflict State: Local Governance under the Musahibans

Afghanistan was and is a predominately rural country, with densely populated cities throughout. Under the Musahbins, there were two distance power structures: provincial and subprovincial administrations. These administrations never tried to change the deep-seated social structure of tribal areas. The tribe or ethnicity trumps the individual in Afghanistan, where the rural areas consist of *qawm* (kin, village, tribe, ethnic group) and are not fixed “nationalities” (Barfield 2010, 17-18). *Quam* groups supported each other outside the government, being stronger in the rural, mountainous regions and weaker in the cities, perhaps influenced by the government officials’ denial of its influence and existence (221).

Institutions did vary between region and ethnicity though, with Pashtuns receiving special treatment from the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and Hazaras experiencing contempt from government officials among others. But most interaction between locals and the government was conducted between mediators, known as *arbab*. The *arbab* was often chosen by the people and confirmed by the government, but were also known to be corrupt. Therefore, strong local leadership came in the form of landowners and merchants who had established reputation for being trustworthy and honest. This ad hoc style of governing attributed to the isolation of tribal activities and affairs. Even the most sensitive cases were given to the informal mediators by government officials to take care of. The local court systems took too much time, bribes were necessity, and often civilians wanted to keep their matters private within their own villages. Conversely, villagers and tribes stayed out of the central government matters, finding them and the officials corrupt and sacrilegious (Barfield 2010, 222-224).

Soviet Occupation, the Mujahedeen, and Najibullah

The Soviet invasion of December 1979 did irreparable damage to Afghanistan. The ten year occupation led to the death of one million Afghans and the displacement of four million externally (fleeing to Pakistan and Iran) and one million internally. War urbanized the cities, with Kabul tripling in population. The agricultural economy “was so disrupted that Afghan people became dependent on imported food aid, particularly in the cities.” (Barfield 2010, 242). The PDPA pro-communist government officially established through Soviet intervention and the occupation itself created a massive opposition, especially from rural areas. This opposition would become a *jihad*; a holy war against the invaders. This jihad meant that the various tribes and villages, despite ethnicity and culture, could come together under one banner and fight in the name of Islam and for their country Afghanistan, with the ultimate goal of Soviet troop withdrawal (242-244).

The Mujahedeen fought viciously and peaked in numbers of 85,000 by 1988-1989 (Barfield 2010, 244). They were funded by the United State, Saudi Arabia, and by mid-1980s “nearly two decades of Soviet arms aid to the Afghans had gone over to the resistance with mutineers” (Tanner 2002, 244). When the Soviet’s withdrew in 1989, Najibullah took the reins of Afghanistan, but was only standing because the government was supplied with Soviet funds and aid. Najibullah negotiated with Mujahedeen factions for ceasefires and offered them positions in the government. But Najibullah was corrupt, with some 80-90% of populace-intended Soviet aid being taken by the government. When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, aid stopped and caused Najibullah to seek UN-brokered conference for a new government (Barfield 2010, 247-248).

Mujahedeen factions changed their tone, and began to align themselves ethnically and regionally. When Najibullah sought refuge in the UN compound in Kabul and the government

dissolved, the Mujahadeen civil war broke out over control of territory and key cities: “The country was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed” (Rashid 2000, 21). The fighting between traditionalist factions and the Islamicists would virtually eliminate the traditional leadership in Kandahar, giving rise to a new form of Islamic extremists. It is here where the Taliban would make their mark on Afghanistan.

The Rise of the Taliban

The Taliban, meaning ‘*the students*’, took advantage of void that was left from the fighting mujahedeen groups. The core of the group came from the Pashtun refugee camps located mainly in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia had invested in the *madrassas* in these regions of Pakistan, which taught their strict form of Wahhabi Islam. It was here that many Pashtun refugees would study and train in the Deobandi *madrassas*, built by Pakistan’s Jamiat-i-Ulema Islami Party, where they were disciplined in the strict and ultra-conservative form of Islam (Mason & Johnson 2007, 73). When many of the Pashtun refugees returned to Kandahar, the state was in a virtual freefall, banditry and corruption was rampant, and the Mujahadeen factions were still vying for personal interest. Kandahar had been ripe with orchards and green grasses, but upon returning, the locals had to resort to cultivating opium, which would become a major resource for the Taliban (Rashid 2000, 20).

Mohammad Omar, who fought under the Hizb-e-Islami mujahedeen faction against the soviets, began to organize the students (talibs) in Kandahar, where he taught at a madrassa (USDOS Document PTQ 1440). His rhetoric separated the Taliban from the current mujahedeen

factions, and presented the group as one that would cleanse Afghanistan, fighting the corruption of the factions in Kandahar province. Pakistan, originally backing Hikmeytar, gained interest in the Taliban as their ambitions aligned (Barfield 2010, 255) and allowed them to take control of an arms depot where they gained access to thousands of rifles, ammunition, and many vehicles (Rashid 2000, 28). With strong leadership, well-organized units, and backing from Pakistan (Barfield 2010; Rashid 2000; Mason & Johnson 2007) the Taliban was able to take Kandahar from the Mujahedeen factions at the end of 1994. At this point in time, over 12,000 Afghan and Pakistani students had joined the Taliban and in the next three months, took 12 of 31 provinces, opened previously blocked roads and disarmed the population along the way (Rashid 2000, 30).

As stated in the introduction, The Taliban went on to capture Kabul in 1996, slating their victory of Afghanistan and its instability, adorning the title as “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” with Mullah Omar as the Amir. What follows in this chapter is the analysis of the governance system of the Taliban, comprising of the civil administration and its governance, the structure, and the group’s service provision, consisting of security, health and education systems.

Taliban Civil Administration Structure

Mullah Mohammad Omar is the Amir: all decisions political, military and socially go through him. Omar was known to micromanage and as his legitimacy grew later on, as did his hold on total power over decision made within the government. Institutional structure of the Taliban are in *Figure 1* and *Figure 2*². According to Embassy cables from NSA, the Shuras lack real

² I add two versions of the structure of the Taliban in order to highlight the secrecy and the difficulty of actual knowledge of how the organization worked. *Figure 1* comes from a declassified Embassy cable in the NSA archives which discussed the role of the Shuras as well as Mullah Omar and other leaders. *Figure 2* comes from Ahmed

authority (USDOS Document PTQ5729) and are mainly advice-based structures (Semple 2014, 19). Decisions, military strategy, and policy of the Taliban is all finalized by Mullah Omar.

Figure 2 also lists descriptions of each Shura, with the Inner Shura being the most predominant in the 1994-1997 period. The Supreme Shura in *Figure 2* represents the council of the Taliban while fighting the Mujahadeen factions and moving to take Kabul (1994-1997). There is also a list of governors for each province, most of them Pashtun origin despite governing over a province with Tajik or Hazaras majority. The number of governors and who governed was always in flux and changed constantly (Semple 2014, 19)

In the 1994-1997 period, the Taliban's main goal was to rid the country of these factions, the corruption they brought and establish Sharia law across Afghanistan; the Taliban had no set political structures nor goals for these structures at the time (Rashid 2000, 43). Both the Military Shura and the Kabul Shura reported to the Supreme Shura. Rashid states that "The Kabul Shura deals with the day-to-day problems of the government, the city and the Kabul military front, but important decisions are conveyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually taken" (98). In essence, the Kandahar shura is where real decisions took place: this is where Mullah Omar resided. This often led to discrepancies, as a decision made in Kabul would be denied by Kandahar sometime later. As the conflict continued and the Taliban gained more territory, Omar gained more autonomy and became more stringent with leaders within the Taliban (USDOS Document PTQ5728, PTQ2419).

Some issues developed due to this type of structure. One issue of structure came from the military aspect. All military decisions went through Mullah Omar, even if he was not out in the

Rashid's book (Rashid 2000, 221) and personal contact with the Taliban. Most likely Rashid's version is truer to form.

field. This made for difficult decisions on behalf of the commanders that were hundreds of miles away. As well, many of the ministers that made up the Kabul and Kandahar shura served as military commanders at some point. Rashid (2000) cites that the minister of health, Mullah Mohammad Abbas, had left his position for six months for a military offence, leaving UN aid workers with no one to work with (100). What the local commanders are responsible for are recruiting men and providing them with salaries, aid, food, and transport which comes from the military shura. Often, the military shura is regarded most important by researchers (Semple 2014, 18), as the Taliban is a primarily military social movement. This is because one of their main goals was to rid Afghanistan of all soldiers that were un-Islamic, and had continued their confrontation with the Northern Alliance until US invasion in 2001. Revenue and leadership, as shown, often went to the military first and the public last.

Another aspect of this structure is the monoethnicity and religious fundamentalism that was established within the Taliban. The Taliban “rejected intellectuals and technocrats” on the basis of their western links. The Islam-based legitimization of their governance allowed for strong unification, but they lacked a “mechanism by which they include representatives of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups” (Rashid 2000, 98), creating ethnic tensions and distancing certain groups.

One of the most notorious ministries was “The Department to Propagate Virtue and Prevent Vice” headed by Mullah Qalamuddin. This department reinforced and protected the rules of the Taliban’s interpretation of Deobandi Islam, where religious police made sure the rules were being followed, such as proper beard length and dress code. The department is said to have had “substantial altitude” in implementing policies and enforcing them (Goodson 2001, 117). This department also had direct connection to the Kandahar Islamic Supreme Court, which was

“the most important court in the country because of its proximity to Omar” (Rashid 2000, 102). This court was the deciding factor on application of Shaira law and where most of the Taliban’s laws were made. The Taliban’s attorney general stated “all the laws are being Islamicized. The laws repugnant to Islam are being removed” (103).

Added to this, there were 11 provincial governors in 1998 (which fluctuated throughout the years), but many of them were not of ethnic origin to the provinces they presided over, where the governor may have been Pashtun-Kandahari in a Dari speaking province. This highlighted Omar’s insistence of Pashtun elites despite the problems that it brought. The governors also lacked the funds to carry out any meaningful development within their respective provinces and lacked any real social or political role due to Omar’s strict control (Rashid 2000, 99).

In summary, Mullah Omar had direct authority and power over every aspect of the Taliban’s administration. Nothing was decided upon until it went through the Amir. Goodson (2001) quotes Maulavi Ahmed describing the Taliban system as:

“an emirate system, which means government power is based on a shura, which selects the amir. Then the government [i.e., its executive and administrative functions] is [the] second rank. Shura members are spread around in different provinces. The majority are in Kabul but meet here [Kandahar] and advise Mullah Omar, and then decrees are issued” (116).

This system is shrouded in secrecy and misinformation, but what is understood is that though the Shuras devote advice to Mullah Omar, no decision was actually made unless Mullah Omar gave the ‘say-so’.

Figure 1. Administrative Structure of the Taliban based on US Embassy cables in 1997-1998




Figure 2. Rashid's (2000) formulation of the Administrative and Military structure of the Taliban

SUPREME SHURA OF THE TALIBAN'S FOUNDING MEMBERS 1994-1997	
Mullah Mohammed Omar. Amir-ul Momineen. Leader of the Faithful. Head of Taliban Movement	
Mullah Mohammed Rabbani Akhund	Chairman Ruling Council and Deputy Head of Taliban
Mullah Mohammed Ghaus Akhund	Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1997
Mullah Mohammed Hassan Akhund	Military Chief of Staff
Mullah Mohammed Fazil Akhund	Head of the Army Corps
Mullah Abdul Razaq	Head of Customs Department
Mullah Sayed Ghiasuddin Agha	Acting Minister of Information
Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa	Acting Minister of Interior
Maulvi Abdul Sattar Sanani	Acting Chief of Justice of Afghanistan
Maulvi Ehsanullah Ehsan	Governor of State Bank
Mullah Abdul Jalil	Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs after June 1997

MILITARY COMMAN STRUCTURE OF THE TALIBAN: MILITARY SHURA
Commander in Chief: Mullah Mohammed Omar
Military Chief of Staff: Mullah Mohammed Hassan
Chief of Army Staff: Mullah Rahmatullah Akhund
Head of the Army Corps: Mullah Mohammed Fazil
Army Division chief: Mullah Jumma Khan
Army Division chief: Mullah Mohammed Younas
Army Division chief: Mullah Mohammed Gul
Army Division chief: Mullah Mohammed Aziz Khan
Armoured Force No. 4: Mullah Mohammed Zahir

KABUL SHURA OF ACTING MINISTERS 2000	
Mullah Wakil Ahmed Mutawakkil	Foreign Minister
Mullah Mohammed Abbas Akhund	Public Health
Mullah Abdur Razzaq	Interior
Mullah Obaidullah Akhund	Construction
Mullah Tahir Anwari	Finance
Mullah Qodratullah	Information and Culture
Mullah Abdul Latif Mansur	Agriculture
Mullah Mohammed Essa	Water and Power
Maulana Ahmadullah Muti	Communications
Mullah Nuruddin Turabi	Justice
Maulvi Hamdullah Numani	Higher Education
Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani	Frontier Affairs
Maulana Abdur Razzaq	Commerce
Qari Din Mohammed	Planning

Taliban Civil Administration and Governance

The first thing that must be understood when discussing the Taliban's governance is that their administration is shrouded in secrecy, cloudy understanding, and sometimes misinformation due to the nature of the leadership and administration. Mullah Omar himself is a figure of secrecy, only first meeting with a UN Diplomat four years after the Taliban's creation in 1998. The second notion is that the Taliban was born out of Islamic ideals; everything that the Taliban does or will do is in the name of their interpretation of Islam. This is underlined by Mullah Omar's decision to summon only religious leaders to discuss the future of Afghanistan in 1996 (which also solidified his position as the Commander of the Faithful) (Rashid 2000, 41). Rashid quoted Mullah Wakil saying "The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes and weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1,400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet..." (43). To be precise, their religious ideology was "a mixture of Salafi Islam and Pashtunwali, the cultural code of Pashtuns" but also differed from adhering to total cultural influence, shown in their hostility towards shrines and Sufism (Barfield 2010, 261).

The Taliban's insistence on strict Islam and implementation of Sharia law led to squandered provisions, alienation and mistreatment of women, and hostility towards the West. But this wasn't the only major change that the Taliban implemented within Afghan governance. The rebel organization would come to replace many of the existing government's elites with their own choice of madrassa-educated Pashtuns:

"The Taliban increased the confusion by purging Kabul's bureaucracy, whose lower levels had remained in place since 1992. The Taliban replaced all senior Tajik, Uzbek

and Hazara bureaucrats with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not. As a result of this loss of expertise, the ministries by and large ceased to function (Rashid 2000, 101).

The ministries within the major cities also limited their operations. Offices in Kandahar and Kabul were only open for four hours a day (8 am-12pm) despite political, social, or military crisis. (Rashid 2000, 101). Policies of proper dress code, prayers, and beard length was enforced but government offices where complaints were to be filed were often empty, leading to the public to rely on the Taliban's governance less and less (101). Officials in Kabul were not paid for eight months in 1997 and continued to be irregular (Goodson 2001, 117). In 1999, Mullah Omar announced a reorganization of the government, solidifying the Taliban's intent on being the true government of Afghanistan. After the reorganization, the two sections of the Taliban that displays most efficiency in governance is the religious police and the military, with the religious police having access to Gulf funds and the military being restructured to have proper military corps in each major city (117-118).

Some social policy was implemented, albeit controversial. Liebl (2007) asserts that "tribal rivalries have had a great influence on the 'governing' of Afghanistan" (498). This notion does not detract from the Taliban's governance. In order for the public to conform to more tribal Pashtun-norms, policies were implemented that aimed at ethnic minorities, which caused further grievances and divisions of ethnicity within Afghanistan (Goodson 2001, 120).

When the Taliban first took Kabul in 1996, there was "no administration and no foreign policy, no public services and no economic plan" (Brahimi 2010, 4). As stated before, their intent primarily focused on destroying all opposition and reinstating Afghanistan as a virtuous Islamic nation. The institutions that had been in place to them would not suffice, basing their governance on the principles of morality, jihad and strict Sharia law, and reverence to the

Amir al-Mu'minin (Brahimi 2010). Now we move on to discuss service provision by the Taliban administration.

These policies extended not only from the Taliban's interpretation of Islam but also from the Pashtun culture (Barfield 2010; Goodson 2001; Rashid 2000, 110). Their reasoning for such policies were stated to be of security concerns and lack of infrastructure to segregate males and females, therefore the women had to be banned from public until the Taliban had the ability to secure (Rashid 2000, 106). Their lack of provisions and services towards women also lead to reluctance of international actors and aid organizations to work with the Taliban, decreasing their legitimacy among the Western nations and NGOs.

Service Provision

Health

The Taliban never established an institution for a healthcare system and much of the aid given to the Afghan people came from international organizations. The policies against women did not help: If a child was sick, a woman alone could not take the child to the doctor (USDOS report 2001). Due to the edicts put in place in 1996, it was also difficult for women to receive proper healthcare. In line with the Taliban's interpretation of morality in Islamic law, a female had to see a female doctor. If a female doctor was not present, the patient was to cover herself fully before seeing a male doctor and the husband had to be present (Rashid 2000). Of the 22 hospitals in Kabul, only one was allowed for female workers; the facility only contained 35 beds and lacked proper medical equipment and cleaning (Dubitsky 1999, 10).

International actors and organizations had a large part to play in the healthcare of Afghan citizens. In the late 1990s, the UN delivered more than 94,000 tons of food aid to over 1.13 million people and vaccinated 5.3 million children against polio (UN.org). Unfortunately in the late 1990s, one in four children were dying of preventable diseases before the age of five, Afghan women were five times more likely to die at childbirth than in other developing countries, and rampant epidemics were on the rise (UN.org). According to aid worker reports, in 1997 there were 150 aid workers in Kabul and harassment of female aid workers was common, yet could be resolved through dialogue (Reyburn et al. 1997, 1916).

According to international reports, “only three out of 133 hospitals, clinics, and TB centers in Kabul visited by the World Health Organization were deemed suitable”, “More than 60% of all childhood deaths and disabilities are due to respiratory infections, diarrhea, and vaccine preventable deaths, especially measles.”, and “Only 19 percent of people living in urban areas have access to clean water. In rural areas, the figure is less than that, hovering around 11 percent” (PBS.org).

Security

Initially, there wasn't much of a security apparatus in place as the Taliban continued to march north. But their forces grew stronger with time and, as stated before, after the 1999 reorganization there were military corps stationed in each major city. Local security was a different matter. In areas where Taliban presence was most saturated, such as Kandahar, small businesses thrived. On the other hand, where the Taliban didn't provide security as much as persecution, such as Herat, businesses would fail. This included Kabul, which had around 30%

unemployment, unpaid government employees, and shortages of vital supplies (Goodson 2001, 122).

Food security was also unsatisfactory. Due to the past 20 years of war, much of the agricultural land in Afghanistan was destroyed. Irrigation ditches and fertile land was mostly destroyed by the Soviets in the 1980s (Rashid 2000, 117). By mid-1998 “the World Food Programme fed 25 percent of Kabul's population, and by December 1999 more than two-thirds of Kabul's population was relying on humanitarian assistance to survive” (Goodson 2001, 122). Fertile lands predominately were located in the north of Afghanistan, and in turn farmers began to cultivate opium, an easy and lucrative crop. Rashid cites an interview with a local who was happy the Taliban provided security for his crop, as he was able to feed his family from the revenue (117). By 1999, a farmer could make a gross income of \$2700 per hectare, though some of this was paid as wages and taxes. This allowed farmers to make a substantial amount of money to support their families, villages, and the Taliban whom provided security.

With respects to a judicial system, Goodson (2001) states that “violators of certain laws have faced traditional *hudud* punishments (penalties prescribed in the Koran, such as amputations for robbery and stoning for adultery)” but some these punishments were changed in respects to Pashtun customs, including honor killings, amputating specific limbs of thieves, stoning, burying homosexuals alive (Barfield 2010, 262) floggings, and public humiliation (123). If a crime was carried out in rural areas, then most likely the village would decide the consequence of the crime. This was more of an ad hoc and rudimentary judicial system and the punishment depended on who committed the crime (male or female) and what the crime was. But in the major cities such as Kabul and Kandahar (and for major crimes), the Islamic courts in Kabul and Kandahar had the final say in cases. According to multiple reports, theft in major

cities throughout Taliban rule was almost non-existent, whether a product of deterrence or strict adherence (Rashid 2000; Goodson 2001; Barfield 2010).

As stated before, the laws of the land were to be Islamized and therefore crimes were to be punished under Islamic law. The Kandahar Supreme Court had the true final say in all matters as this is where Mullah Omar resided. But Mullah Nuruddin Turabi, the Attorney General, was noted to have had immense power within the legal system and was one of the most prominent and influential members of the Taliban (CNN.org, 1999).

Education

After the Taliban took control of Kabul in 1996, a decree³ was announced by the President of the Religious Police that stated women were not to leave their residence unless covering themselves in accordance to Sharia law, and that family elders should reinforce these laws to prevent women from being threatened or severely punished as well as the family and its elders. (Rashid 2000, 218). Though announced that females can attend school and in some cases did so, Goodson (2001) reports that the general trend was that women did not attend school and did not work (119) and that in his 1997 visit to Kabul University, there were no females where they had originally made up 60% of the student and teacher body (129).

The policies that the Taliban implemented on women had unintended yet detrimental effects. First, women ended up creating private schools in their homes for children when they were banned from public and education in 1997. But in 1998, the Taliban released another edict

³ Rashid (2000, 218) translates the entire decree, as well as listing many of the Taliban's policies that were implemented over the years.

restricting these teachings to solely focus on the Koran, shutting down 100 private school in Kabul as a show of force (PBS.org 2007). This led to extremely low literacy rates for women.

Goodson (2001) summarizes Afghanistan's education predicament at the time:

“The attack on the Afghan educational system, first by the communists and later by the Islamists, has led to curriculum changes, school closings, a decline in teacher quality, and a host of other ills that have combined to lower literacy rates in Afghanistan, especially among females. Female literacy is now estimated to be only 3 to 4 percent” (129).

According to Rashid (2000), some parts of Afghanistan defied the Taliban and allowed girls to continue to go to school: “When Pashtun tribal elders demanded education for girls, Taliban governors did not and could not object” (110). They would either conduct village schools or send their children to Pakistan to receive an education. In the late 1990s, the UN also provided education to some 300,000 children including home school projects for girls, but only one in twenty Afghan girls received an education (UN.org).

The Caliphate

The Islamic State

If you see that I am wrong, advise me and put me on the right track, and obey me as long as I obey God in you... God gave your mujahedeen brothers victory after long years of jihad and patience... so they declared the caliphate and placed the caliph in charge. This is a duty on Muslims that has been lost for centuries.

- Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's address in Mosul, 2014

Background to the Conflict

During the Arab Spring in 2011, President Bashar Al-Assad was met with fierce protests to enact reform. However, only days after removing a state of emergency that had been in place for decades, Assad's forces began cracking down on civilians and opened fire on protestors. Much of this violence and discontent created opposition in the form of "political groups, longtime exiles, grass-roots organizers and armed militants, divided along ideological, ethnic or sectarian lines" (iamsyria.org 2016). UN estimates that by June 2013 there had been over 92,000 killings in relation to the conflict, a number that would rise to 250,000 by 2015 (Price et al. 2014; BBC.org 2016). As the conflict continued, it became more and more dynamic and dimensional. The conflict began to take on "sectarian overtones" where Sunni majorities aim to destabilize Assad's Shia Alawite sect (BBC.org 2016). Foreign intervention has taken shape, though for differing reasons. Russia supplements the Assad regime with advisors and military capabilities, aiming to destroy not only IS but the US-backed "moderate" rebel groups that also fight Assad.

Turkey has also provided weapons to rebel groups, and Hezbollah fights alongside the Assad regime (Aljazeera.com 2016). In total, deaths caused by the Syrian war are estimated around 273,520, with civilians taking majority of the casualties (Aljazeera.com 2016); added to that are more than 6.6 million people that have been displaced inside of Syria (IDPs) with another 4.8 million refugees created by the conflict (UNHCR.org 2016).

Iraq has had a staple diet of conflict and chaos since the US-led invasion in 2003. The invasion and occupation created a Sunni-led insurgency, comprised of “Ba’athists, ex-military, and nationalists” and saw a rise in Shiite militias, where “Shiite and Sunni militias began to clash and carry out revenge attacks” (insightonconflict.org 2016). An escalation of violence in 2006 by Shia and Shiite militias, al-Qaeda, and occupying forces led to civil war, followed by a surge of US troops in 2007 that suppressed much of the violence and jihadist groups. Jump to 2013: US presence is at an all-time low, the Syrian conflict is peaking, and oppressive policies towards Sunnis by the Maliki government are in place, marginalizing many civilians. It is here where civil war would again break out, in the form of ISIL “addressing the discontent” of the Sunni population. Using tactics of unequalled violence and continuous military pressure, much of the Iraq forces that encountered ISIL either dropped their weapons and ran or gave up (Chulov et al. 2014).

At the time of writing, both conflicts are ongoing. In Iraq, IS recently lost Fallujah to Iraqi government forces, being “fully liberated” from the organization’s presence (Mortimer 2016), but still controls Mosul and others. In Syria, IS faces the Assad regime, rebel offshoots, PKK and Peshmerga forces, and Russians yet controls some key cities. The battlefield and dynamics are constantly changing as the conflict continues.

Preconflict Governance in Iraq and Syria

Syria

In 2000, Bashar al-Assad took power in Syria after his father's death. There was an election, but since no opponent ran against him, Assad was able to take control becoming the president of Syria under the ruling Ba'ath party, an Arab-socialist party. The election itself was legitimization tactic and Assad, much like his father, took on the authoritarian philosophy towards citizens: "Run your own lives privately and enrich yourselves as you wish, but do not challenge my government" (Polk 2013). Assad's regime essentially took on the identity of the state, thus any pressure or challenge towards the regime was a challenge to the state itself. Darwisheh (2013) present's Assad's three pillars for preservation of the regime's power: 1. "Construction of a cohesive elite structure" where Assad "shared power the party apparatus, military-police establishment and ministerial bureaucracy" creating interlocking institutions that interworked and relied on each other's maintenance and viability (5). Essentially, "The Ba'ath Party penetrated all state institutions and civil society organizations while the party's military organization exercised political control over military members" (Darwisheh 2013, 5).

2. "The construction of a cohesive and loyal business class" where "influential business class became totally dependent on its relationship with state officials to get benefits and privileged contracts" via selective liberalization, creating a "mafia-like pro-regime alliance of capitalists and bureaucrats" (6). Through this, those tied to the regime through family got wealthier, and eventually protests from working class and rural civilians forced Rami Makhlouf, Assad's cousin and "symbol of corruption and impunity", to quit business. In turn, this led to "an

increase of the security services in state institutions and popular organizations, heightening open repression to keep the civil-society threat at bay” (Darwisheh 2013, 7).

3. “Institutionalizing fear and violence” where “everyone in Syria, regardless of sect or race, activist or Islamist, is in danger of physical disappearance once he/she utters anything in opposition to the political or ideological orientation of the Ba‘thist regime or even to discuss the freedom of expression” (Darwisheh 2013, 8). Before the 2011 uprising, torture, arrests, and disappearances were common place, institutionalizing violence and polarizing civilians between “those wholly loyal and totally submissive, and the opposition” (Darwisheh 2013, 9).

In summary, the Assad regime ran Syria with an iron fist, cracking down on anyone or anything that challenged its rule: “the lack of political participation, fear of public demands, and severe police measures made the regime appear to be a tyranny” (Polk 2013). This led to civil unrest, sparked by the Arab Spring, with Assad regime security forces turning violent, eventually leading Syria into civil war.

Iraq

Conflict has plagued Iraq for over 13 years, beginning with US-led invasion in 2003 to oust Saddam Husain. During occupation, insurgent groups and jihadist organizations fought against US occupation, but fighting was ‘toned-down’ after a surge of US troops in 2007. The US, throughout its presence in Iraq, installed a democratic government, one of their staples of Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to reports, \$1.82 billion went towards “measures specifically designed to strengthen democratic institutions, such as support for elections, drafting a new constitution, and promoting the growth of civil society groups” (Caryl 2013). Eventually in 2006,

Nuri Kamal al-Maliki was elected as Prime Minister of Iraq under the Shiite Dawa party, and kept power through elections ever since. Though the democratic process of elections went peacefully and overall democratically (Caryl 2013), Maliki has been accused of taking to authoritarian methods of rule, comparing his rule to that of Saddam Hussein (Katzman 2009, 12). When American's began to pull out of Iraq in 2011, Maliki "obtained an arrest warrant for Iraq's Sunni vice president" and his anti—Sunni policies led to unrest and protests, especially after his arrest of the security of Sunni deputy prime minister Raffa Issawi (World Policy blog 2015).

Much like Assad, Maliki ruled Iraq with an iron fist. Using "de-Bathification" laws in 2010, Maliki targeted his opponents but not the Ba'ath allies he had in the ruling elite, where this formation process "turned out to be yet another opportunity for politicians of all stripes to grant themselves senior positions which they could use to plunder the state" (al-Ali 2014). Protests in early 2011 were met with beating from security forces and hired thugs, as the protestors were branded terrorists, being arrested and tortured. The election in 2010, Maliki actually lost by two parliamentary seats (Parker and Salman 2015), but demanded a recount and eventually "circumvented the chain of command" by forcing officials out of their positions, and created a new government in November 2010. Maliki bypassed the constitution by appointing "senior military commanders directly, instead of seeking parliamentary approval" (al-Ali 2014). Maliki began to target "Former Army officers, members of the Awakening, activists who complained too much about corruption, devout Iraqis who prayed a little too often at their local mosques" ending up in arbitrary arrests and disappearances. Corruption of the very institutions that were designed to operate democratically undermined the legitimacy of Maliki's government.

Eventually armed groups of insurgents, including the Islamic State, began to take hold of the Arab Spring's chaos and weak governance of Iraq. The weakness of Maliki's government

often led to the welcoming of insurgents, who brought security and stability to cities that had been prone to banditry and corruption.

Origins and Rise of the Islamic State

The origins and rise of the Islamic state stem from opportunities taken at crucial times. The US invasion of Iraq began a long process of interactions that would eventually promote the necessary circumstances for the Islamic State's rise. Though it may seem that the Islamic State came out of nowhere to kill thousands and control territory in parts of Iraq and Syria, the opposite is the case. Members of the organization had tried this once before.

It began with Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, along with his militants in the Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad (JTJ), which was composed of foreign fighters from Jordan, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kurdish regions. In 2004, the group and Zarqawi would pledge their allegiance to Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, becoming Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Hashim 2014). Differences between Zarqawi and heads of Al-Qaeda of the *modus operandi* of AQI came about in 2005, with Zarqawi utilizing mass casualties of civilians instead of solely targeting the Americans. This led to the establishment of the Mujahedeen Shura Council, an offshoot that tried to unify Iraqi insurgents, but was undermined by AQI's indiscriminate violence (Hashim 2004).

On October 15th, 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) declared an Islamic State, controlling parts of northern Iraq. Though the group organized themselves in a bureaucratic manner and had financial sophistication, they were not able to provide security over the territory they controlled and ultimately failed in their governance efforts. The group then "faded into obscurity for several years" after the US military surge in 2007, but then reemerged when tensions rose during the

Arab Spring in 2011, where millions of civilians took to protesting their governments, and did so in Iraq after the Egyptian revolution. Taking advantage of the anarchy, ISI seized territory in Syria, established a base of operations and in May of 2013, ISI rebranded its name as ISIS, merging with the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nursa. In just over a year, ISIS would push their campaign to take Fallujah, Raqqa, Mosul, and Tikrit. Eighteen days after taking control of Tikrit, on June 29, 2014, the Islamic State would claim their caliphate with al-Baghdadi at the helm as Caliph, successor to Prophet Mohammad (John 2015).

Though the Islamic State carried out mass killing in Tikrit (Rubin and Nordland 2014) and would continue violent and barbaric acts, some areas welcomed the Islamic State. Proctor and Tefaye (2016) argue that “de-Baathification and anti-terrorism laws systematically marginalized Sunni communities...Sunnis were harassed by security forces...deprived of functioning public services”. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki’s pro-Shiite agenda alienated Sunni Arabs during conflict (Cronin 2015). It was this government repression and these discriminatory policies that influenced civilians to choose the new insurgents over the Iraqi government, making capturing territory a smooth transition in some areas.

The Islamic State Administration and Leadership

At the head of the Administration sits Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Known as the “invisible sheikh”, al-Baghdadi is a recluse and surrounded by a large amount of uncertainty and misinformation. Reports say al-Baghdadi is “a highly organized and ruthless battlefield tactician” (BBC profile, 2015). Al-Baghdadi is the Caliph and has the sworn support of every recruit and member of the organization. Supporting al-Baghdadi are his Cabinet advisors and two deputy leaders who

oversee Iraq and Syria. The Caliph, the Cabinet and the two deputy leaders make up the executive branch of the Islamic State, known as the ‘Al Imara’ (Shubert and Thompson 2015).

The Cabinet ministers, appointed by al-Baghdadi, oversee the various aspects of the organization. There are varying posts that the Cabinet members oversee in the Islamic State: “managing prisoners and detainees, the transportation of suicide bombers to their deployment, operations using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and looking after the families of "martyrs", jihadists who fell in battle” (Sherlock 2014). The two deputy leaders oversee 12 governors respectively, issuing them orders and instructing local councils on how to implement decrees from “media relations and recruiting to policing and financial matters” (Shubert and Thompson 2015). This division of territory in Iraq and Syria is known as the *Wilayat* system, *wilayat* meaning “state” or “mandate” in Arabic (Reynolds and Caris 2014, 14). This can refer to either the territory controlled exclusively by IS or territory where IS⁴ is active (Reynolds and Caris 2014, 14).

Almost all of the members of the executive branch are Iraqi and former Ba’athists; information that surfaced from a raid on the then military chief’s home in June 2014 (Patel 2015, 3). At the time, 19 of the 20 known IS leaders were Iraqi and one-third of that were officers Saddam’s military (Patel 2015, 3). The two deputies who oversee Iraq and Syria are Abu Muslim al-Turkmani and Abu Ali al-Anbari respectively. Al-Turkmani was at least a lieutenant colonel of military intelligence under Saddam, having also spent time in Special Forces in the Special Republic Guard. Al-Anbari was a major general in the Iraqi military. (Patel 2015, 3).

⁴ From here I will refer to the Islamic State as ‘IS’ for convenience.

A Shura council exists that deals with religious and military affairs. This council reports directly to the executive branch and ensures the Islamic State's religious laws are being followed by governors and their councils (Shubert and Thompson 2015). Al-Baghdadi leading the council, the Sharia council oversees each *wali* (the governor of a *wilayat*) who then oversees a 'shariadeputy' who then supervises the *wilayat*-level shariacommision (March and Revkin 2015). The Shariacommision oversees the courts and the works of judges, often disciplining judges for misconduct (March and Revkin 2015).

The Islamic State Administration and Governance

Caris and Reynolds (2014) state that IS's governance is "an extension of what it calls *imamah*, or leadership...the concept of *imamah* extends to both religious and political affairs" (9). Al-Baghdadi oversees both the religious and political activities that the Islamic State is involved in. The Islamic State divides its governance into two broad categories: Administration and Muslim Services. Administrations consists of "Islamic outreach, sharia institutes, elementary education, law enforcement (both local and religious) courts, recruitment, and tribal relations..." while Muslim services (under the Department of Muslim Services) consist of "humanitarian aid, bakeries, water, and electricity..." (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 14).

Zelin (2016) asserts that once IS gains basic territorial control, it moves to its *dawa* phase, which "consist(s) of stationary stalls, small shacks, or roving cars or Winnebagos that distribute printed literature, CDs/DVDs, and/or USB drives of IS official media to locals, with a target audience comprising primarily children and young teenagers" and will also place billboards in areas they control that convey their messages and narratives (3). *Da'wai* is

‘religious outreach and proselytization’ where IS will conduct religious events targeted towards younger civilians in territories that have less control or are warranted less administrative provision (Caris and Reynolds 2015, 15). Furthering control, IS will raise its infamous black flag in most visible parts of the city, create custom road signs, and build gates to certain regions (Zelin 2016, 4). IS also undertakes many public works projects in areas of strong territorial control, such as paving gravel roads, landscaping, and “building new mosques, markets and shops” (Zelin 2016, 4).

The Islamic state is also extremely media focused. The organization posts videos on its al-Hayat media center, which include beheadings and executions as well as propaganda videos for fighting and combat operations. The group even used kidnapped British journalist John Cantile in videos showing the city of Mosul that is “business as usual” and walking through bombed out areas from the “failed US air strategy” (Canale 25 News video 2015; Wyke 2016). The group’s purpose for such videos is to present to possible foreign fighters their success of brutality and raw power, as well as to suppress dissent internally (Cronin 2015). The videos are also top quality, well edited, and are often in English as well. IS also has a well-edited and graphically aesthetic online magazine called *Dabiq*.

The Islamic State’s economy is also worthy of note. Using documents from IS’s financial ministry (Diwan Bayt al-Mal) in Syria’s Deir az-Zor province, al-Tamimi (2015) calculates the budget of IS for the December 2014- January 2015 period. In an oil-rich province, one would assume a large sum of revenue would come from oil. But according to the documents, 27.7% came from oil and gas, with 23.7% from taxes and 44.7% from confiscations (al-Tamimi 2015). A majority of its funding goes towards military expenditures, such as upkeep of equipment and paying fighters. The creation of the ‘Euphrates Province’, an area between Iraq and Syria, has

made it more accessible for IS to conduct business, including the fact that they also paved roads in this area (al-Tamimi 2015).

In 2014, IS controlled eight oil and gas fields in Syria producing between 300,000bbp and 700,000bbp and some additional fields in Iraq (Nuruzzaman 2015, 74). But since the US led bombing campaign that began in August 2014, oil facilities and refineries had been some of the primary targets. This created difficulty and destroyed some income from oil and gas. But IS still makes revenue through other activities, such as imposing *zakat* in areas of control. *Zakat* is a pillar of Islam, meaning to purify your wealth for Allah, giving around 2.5% tax (Muslim Aid 2016). The provincial *wali* oversees the collection of taxes through the Zakat Council; taxes on government salaries alone in 2015 were estimated at 23 million US dollars, with other profitable areas from agriculture and farming (Soloman and Jones, 2015). Though the figures would point to positive gains for IS to where they could provide goods and services to the citizens, it is not always the case. In 2014 in Mosul, heavy inflation occurred with food prices doubling and kerosene prices quadrupling (Alami 2014). As well, electricity and water fell in 2014 in various controlled parts of Iraq, mainly due to their lack of fuel (Shaver and Ensign 2015).

Service Provision

Health

The Islamic State's health department *Diwan al-Siha* is the governing body over any medical and health services. It also establishes "regulations for smoking, consumption of alcohol, recruitment of volunteers and medical personnel, pharmaceutical price controls, gender segregation, medical supply distribution, etc." (Baskaran 2015). Their health service, known as ISHS (Islamic State

Health service) has been established in Raqqa, with graphics and videos showing a foreign speaking doctor with proper medical equipment. Its logo is also an almost exact replica of the British Health Service logo (BBC 2015). Though the video is top-notch and offers a view that IS is dedicated to its health services, the truth is a different matter. Shortages of medical supplies and lack of personnel are continuous, as well as their “lack of innovation” by resorting to original institutional methods of health service and co-option of the Iraqi government to pay salaries of health workers in Ninawa. (al-Tamimi 2015).

During the Islamic State’s military push in 2014, the organization “stormed and bombed hospitals treating wounded civilians, abducted and assassinated patients and health providers, and imposed restrictive measures against women, serving a dehumanizing function that has led to the mass exodus of medical personnel out of Syria” (Baskaran 2015). Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, an estimated 15,000 medical personnel fled the country (Al-Jadda 2014), creating a lack of trained medical workers to provide aid to civilians. The WHO and the Syrian American Medical society report that “60% of hospitals have been destroyed, 60 percent of hospitals have been destroyed, 90 percent of the local pharmaceutical industry has been destroyed, 78 percent of ambulances are severely damaged, and 70 percent of whatever medical staff is left cannot access their workplaces” (al-Jadda 2014).

For women health workers, living under Islamic state rule is no easy task. Women in Mosul are banned from hospitals if they do not wear a veil and in Raqqa hospitals “are almost completely devoid of female doctors” where those that are there must receive permission or be in the company of a man (Baskaran 2015). As well, in areas with medical facilities, military members and their families often get preference over civilians when it comes to medical provision. Certain decrees were issued, stating that if medical personnel and doctors who fled do

not return within a certain time, their houses and belongings would be confiscated by IS (al-Tamimi 2015). Interestingly, IS acknowledges its lack of health services in certain instances, with a *fatwa* asserting that if one's medical issue cannot be solved within the *wilayat* then one can travel into "areas of the Assad regime if needed" (al-Tamimi 2015).

Education

The Islamic State's education ministry *Diwan al-Ta'aleem* is headed by Dhu al-Qarnain, a German national originating from Egypt (al-Tamimi 2016) education is not focused on math, life sciences, or language but on "the Islamic sciences, such as the study of the Quran" (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 17). In areas that IS invest in governance, they open classrooms and organize lesson plans. Conversely, in areas that are less influenced or not key to the Islamic state, they use *Da'wa* events, which is religious outreach that IS uses in many towns and villages (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 15-17). IS has also reopened and renamed universities in its territory. For example, Mosul's medical college of Mosul University is now Medical Sciences University, where they encourage recent graduate applications (al-Tamimi 2015). According to reports, IS installed its members "at the top of existing institutions...to make sure employees follow ISIS rule..." (Cambanis and Collard, 2015).

In Iraq, IS encourages those with chemistry and engineering skills to teach within the limits of their line of religion, but bans other subjects such as evolution and Iraq's history (Spencer 2014). On twitter accounts linked to IS, images of textbooks that IS uses in its education system were posted and authenticated to some degree (Tolan 2015). The textbooks feature high-end graphics and pictures relative to a publishing company, ranging from "Politics

in Islamic Law” and “Islamic Manners” to “Physical Activity” and “Physics” (Tolan 2015). According to Spencer (2014) members of the community are stating they are not sending their children to IS run schools, though this would be difficult to judge if true; nonetheless, schools in September 2015 were delayed for more than a month, and many schools in IS territory remain closed due to lack of students (al-Tamimi 2016). In Syria, IS actively encourages teachers to participate and even requests resumes from those who want to teach in their schools (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 18). As well, IS’s education system requires that classrooms be segregated and that military training is mandatory (Nabeel 2014).

Education has been high up in the list of priorities for IS, with records showing that in 2013, IS in Raqqa confirmed an education facility, and education programs in Aleppo in 2013, with pictures of students that donned backpacks with the ISIS logo (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 17). As argued by Caris and Reynolds (2014), IS’s insistence on primarily teaching Islamic sciences will eventually lead to a stagnation of technical skills within communities. Fighters or persons recruited from abroad may be able to provide these skills, but this is short term. Long term, a lack of technical skills will make for ineffective governance efforts on behalf of IS (18).

Security

With regards to judiciary, IS splits its judiciary structure into three subsections: A division for complaints (*Mazalim*) that deals with public or combatant grievances; Islamic Courts (the Supreme Court located in Mosul) which has to do with IS’s laws and matters of government; and the Diwan al-Hisba, which is the Islamic police, and deals with enforcing public morality (March and Revkin 2015). An example of the Diwan al-Hisba is issuing an order to shut shops down

during prayer time or punishment for those in possession of cigarettes or alcohol (Al-Tamimi 2015).

The Sharia courts do a variety of work. In al-Raqqa, the courts provide “provision of public goods and humanitarian aid, to the enforcement of its own form of law and justice system” and control “housing policies, commercial laws, civil affairs, etc”, including tribal affairs and tribal offices (Khalaf 2015, 61). One of the aspects of shari’a administration is the religious police, or *al-Hisba*. *Al-Hisba*’s mandate is to “promote virtue and prevent vice to dry up sources of evil, prevent manifestation of disobedience, and urge Muslims towards well-being” (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 16). The religious police are tasked with recording any violations of sharia and, depending on the crime, refer the accused to the Islamic court for punishment (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 16). When IS first took Raqqa, the religious police and sharia courts were “the only provider of security on the ground with its Islamic Police as its implementing arm and sharia court as the policy maker or ‘state’” (Khalaf 2015, 61). In 2014, there were 10 *al-Hisba* buildings in Aleppo alone which fall under separate jurisdiction from its police force (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 16). The Islamic State carries out traditional *hudud* punishments, *al-Hisba* (religious police) either taking the suspect to the courts for punishment or carrying it out on the spot (al-Tamimi 2015). This makes for a somewhat swift justice system, but IS tends to publicly show their punishments for residents and the broader world to see. Saudi Arabia, a sovereign, internationally recognized nation, carries out *hudud* punishments as well but “hides them because of international censure” (McCants 2015, ch.4, Loc 2387). According to McCants (2015), IS “goes the extra mile in its penalties...eighty lashes for drinking and slander rather than leaving it to judge’s discretion...throwing people off buildings or crucifying them after shooting them in the head...”(ch. 4, Loc2387).

IS's police force are uniformed men who "serve as the executive arm of the court" (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 19). They maintain internal security through patrols and are under separate jurisdiction than the religious police. In 2014, IS stated they had 10 police stations in Aleppo province as well as some in Raqqa (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 19) though this has likely changed. Also, the Islamic State maintains a number of prisons across its territory that it controls, though evidence has come about that a variety of human rights violations have taken place within these prisons including torture, psychological abuse, and murder (Morris 2016; Dearden 2014). Overall, security seems to be one of IS's strongest provisions, one person stating "You can travel from Raqqa to Mosul, and no one will dare to stop you even if you carry \$1 million" (Arango 2015).

Comparative Insurgent Governance

In the next pages, I put forth Mampilly's (2011, 209) framework for understanding variation in insurgent governance systems as well as the factors that affect the effectiveness of both cases of rebel governance. One of Mampilly's concerns was whether his framework had any merit outside of the three cases he had used. I intended to address these concerns by utilizing his framework on the two cases of the Taliban and the Islamic State.

State Penetration: Habituation and Cooptation

H1a: If an insurgency emerges in a state with minimal penetration into society, it is less likely to develop an effective governance system than one that emerges in a state that is penetrated deeply into society

H1b: If an insurgency emerges in a state with high penetration into society, it is more likely to be able to co-opt preexisting institutions and networks into its civil administration, thereby improving governance provision.

The 'civilian expectations' shows little evidence of being at work for the Taliban, since preconflict relationships with the state were almost non-existent. First, the Taliban made no proclamations or acted in any way to show concern with civilian feedback. Mullah Omar had become the Commander of the Faithful; rule of law was considered absolute and to provide negative feedback would have been un-Islamic. The laws and governance was to be Islamicized and therefore feedback was not necessary.

Civilian demands were consistent with the prior relationship to state authority. There were either limited to none, or their demands were so opposed that violence occurred, such as when hundreds of Taliban fighters and Pashtun villagers were massacred by Hazaras in and around Kabul (Rashid 2000, 64). In 1997, villagers in Kandahar revolted against the Taliban for forced conscription, killing four Taliban recruiters (Rashid 2000, 103). As the Taliban became stricter and more forceful, anti-Taliban protests would occur in cities over various instances (Rashid 2000, 103). But when the Taliban began, many of the civilians supported them, as they promised to remove the mujahedeen factions that were causing difficulty for the populace. This mechanism is also affected by the second, ‘state capacity’.

For the Islamic State, in both Iraq and Syria, there were protests against IS’s strict and violent rule, much like the protests against Assad and Maliki. As well, in both Syria and Iraq, civilians feared being arrested, tortured, and possibly killed by the ruling parties for making demands. This is evident with civilians living under IS rule. IS has not made any significant efforts that would solicit civilian input for its rule, which follows more through the Syrian experience. In Iraq, democratic elections were held, but eventually undermined by Maliki’s insistence to hold power. Essentially, this mechanism is functioning and is possibly reflective of the “state capacity” mechanism. There wasn’t any meaningful interactions prior to the conflict in both Iraq and Syria because both (more in the Syrian case) were met with retaliation from the government and state forces. Assad’s three pillars and Maliki’s constant forcing led to a less-than-meaningful relationship between civilian and government prior to the conflict. There is also evidence of IS utilizing state institutions.

For example, in Damascus, “most of the civil servants who make the city function remained in their old jobs, still paid by the government in Damascus” including school teachers and

municipal workers, but under IS rule. It also renamed the University in Mosul, but operates similarity as prior to the conflict added their subjects based on Islam. In Iraq, IS's services department employees and workers are still paid their salaries via the institutions of the Baghdad government, but IS renamed this public service sector, instating its monopolization over the provision of services (al-Tamimi 2015). For the larger established institutions that Syria and Iraq were known for, IS did not decide to coopt, as their socialist, Ba'athist (for Syria) and democratic pro-Shiite (for Iraq) style is unIslamic. What has been done to the institutions though is IS's tough stance on corruption, which affected both Iraq and Syria's institutions for the worse (al-Tamimi 2015). Now, these "services may be better than before" (al-Tamimi 2015).

For the 'state capacity' mechanism in the case of the Taliban, Afghanistan had been a rentier state for a long period of time and increased its necessity of income from outside sources during wartime (Barfield 2010, 205; Goodson 2001, 101). Afghanistan saw virtually no peaceful break between 1979-2001, seeing much of its industry and infrastructure destroyed, relying on outside aid and service. Therefore, Afghanistan became progressively more of a rentier state overtime. Mampilly (2011) argues that "civilians habituated by rentier state fiscal policies are unaware of their ability to influence political authority, a condition that carries over to political formations that develop in the face of a conflict-produced state withdrawal" (71). The Taliban created their own structures, the Shuras that essentially advised Mullah Omar on decisions. These structures did not allow for civilian participation but only for the *uelma* and members of the Taliban. As well, Goodson (2001) states that the Taliban's religious police are "modeled on the similar institution in Saudi Arabia and reflect the Saudi influence among Taliban leadership" (117). Though this is not the pre-existing state's institutions, it is worth noting since it shows the Taliban's governance strategy had been influenced by foreign entities.

There was little to no meaningful interaction between the state and civilians before the conflict, even during peaceful times. Usually tribes or “qawms” handled their own issues and did not interact with the state. Afghanistan was considered a rentier state at this time (governance under the Musahibans) but became even more so when conflict arose, politically habituating the populace. As well, since the pre-existing state lacked the institutions that insurgents could utilize. In hindsight, this wouldn’t have mattered, since the Taliban were strongly opposed to even pre-conflict government members and the institutions they had worked for. It is arguable that the Taliban would not have adopted and utilized these institutions even if they had existed, due to their regressive and conservative ideological nature.

For the ‘multiplex governance’ mechanism, it is difficult to distinguish the ‘before the outbreak’ period in the case of the Taliban. During Soviet occupation, the mujahedeen were the opposing factions, both modernists and traditionalists. After the Soviets withdrew, peace did not last long as mujahedeen continued to fight as well as create conflict amongst themselves. The Taliban only existed due to the mujahedeen civil war but conflict existed prior to this as well. If we consider the Mujahadeen as well as the PDPA (though conflict still existed in this period) as the political actors, then there were multiple nodes of power prior to the conflict and the Taliban were unsuccessful in negotiating with them. But the PDPA crumbled when the USSR did, therefore the only political actors left in the 1992-1994 period (when the Taliban first began their campaign) were the Mujahadeen. But fighting among factions occurred, making this mechanism a difficult one to analyze for the case of the Taliban: conflict was a continuous occurrence.

For the case of IS in Iraq and Syria, both regimes held and monopolized power. Mainly in Syria, Assad was able to direct power towards the ruling elite and create a dynamic to where institutions relied on the regime and each other to prosper. In Iraq, the democracy that was

supposed to flourish was soon weakened by Maliki's policies and actions. He assumed an authoritarian-type hold over Iraq, and disposed of those who were against him. Therefore, both Iraq and Syria lacked multiple nodes of power, more so in Syria. IS, with its brand of violence and strict Islam, did not try to negotiate with the political actors since IS vehemently opposed their ideologies, policies, and actions of corruption and 'anti-Sunni Islam'. In Iraq, Maliki's installation via US occupation and oppressive Sunni policies was what IS was fighting against; IS massacred Iraq security forces rather than negotiate their release.

Secessionism and Ehtnonationalism

H2: If the insurgency is secessionist or ethnonationalist, it is more likely to develop an effective system of governance than groups that seek to capture power at the center

The Taliban actually portrays qualities of both reformist and secessionist agendas. At the outset of conflict, the Taliban stated they had no plans as their stated mission was to bring Islamic purity to Afghanistan and end the corruption of the mujahedeen factions. The human resources they developed were more dedicated to morality, with the religious police and The Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice extremely active within most communities, though this did come into effect later on and not at the outset of fighting. Conflict dynamics did somewhat determine area of operations but the Taliban did operate within specific territory. The Taliban wanted total control of Afghanistan and, though they supported other jihadist organizations that carried out attacks globally, their activities remained within the region. The

Taliban was vehemently against the Shia Islam sect, yet they did not try to attack Iran and remained in Afghanistan. The destruction of the Northern Alliance was their primary goal and fighting between the two groups did determine area of operations. But what parts of Afghanistan the Taliban controlled, they operated in.

The organization did devote resources to portray itself as the true government, though not necessarily “national”. Islam and Afghanistan are intertwined (Barfield 2010); the Taliban portrayed itself as the true Islamic government that would provide Afghanistan with Islamic purity, Islamic laws, and Islamic justice. And since ethnicity plays such a major role in identity in Afghanistan (Barfield 2010), a “national” rhetoric would have limited effect, as different tribes and ethnicities have their own ideas of what it means to be Afghan. Though limited, the resources provided did establish their dominance as the Islamic government it promised to be, by Islamicizing laws, enforcing religious ideals, and establishing Islamic court systems.

The Islamic State’s governance leans towards more secessionist than the Taliban’s, but to a degree. The organization devoted resources to areas in Syria when it first came in control of them in 2013, cementing their presence (Caris and Reynolds, 2014). IS also rebuilt markets, paved streets, set up billboards and flags, and has begun to try to establish their own currency. Though this makes it seem like a portrayal of national government, the organization is against nationalism and has even taken out history of Iraq and Syria in their educational curriculum (al-Tamimi 2015). Speaking in “state-centric” terms, the organization does put in place resources so that civilians view it as a ‘national’ government, though it seeks recognition as an Islamic Caliphate. But on the other hand, the group’s goals are for a world caliphate; they have members in Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan but do not hold any significant territory or established structures for civilian governance in these areas. As well, the group has devoted resources to

carry out terrorist attacks outside of its controlled territory and in ones with almost no military or administrative presence. Therefore, though the group leans towards a more secessionist agenda, they still adhere to their own jihadi ideals.

For the insurgent promises mechanism, the Taliban shows both qualities of secessionist and reformist. The organization portrayed itself as the true Islamic government during the war, with Mullah Omar donning the Cloak of the Prophet and being pledged as the “Commander of the Faithful”. This symbolically showed civilians that they were trying to install their pure Islamic ideals during the war, and Mullah Omar had the right to do so. The Taliban and Mullah Omar positioned themselves in such a way to show they were the incorruptible and the proper organization to control Afghanistan, not the mujahedeen factions. But, the Taliban also promised to improve conditions after they got rid of the Northern Alliance and controlled Afghanistan (Rashid 2000) often stating that they could focus on civilian governance when that task is completed.

This mechanism is at work with the Islamic State, entering territory and cementing its presence with violent executions, raising flags and its al-Hisba, alongside establishing religious outreach and Islamic education classes for children. Documents released show the rules, plans, and regulations the Islamic State establishes when it controls territory, all in order to signify its governance (Malik 2015). Though not an ‘ideal’ strategy, the Islamic State’s monopoly on violence allows for their presence to be feared yet understood. Almost immediately, the organization police streets, collect tax, enforce laws, and establish security and provisional structures; Cambanis and Collard (2015) quote an Iraqi civilian saying that IS’s administrative methods create “a sense of order in a time of civil war”.

To summarize, the Taliban and the Islamic state shows aspects of both reformist and secessionist agendas. While not devoting financial resources at the outset of fighting, the Taliban did have a strategic objective of a particular territorial space (Afghanistan) that had significance beyond its military utility. The Islamic State, on the other hand, would establish schools and religious outreach when first contacting a region. Though the Taliban did not portray themselves as “national”, the effect of a pious and virtuous Islamic organization that calls for jihad was targeted towards Afghans and Muslims, despite their ethnic backgrounds. The Islamic State’s established Caliphate brought Muslims from many countries to fight for their cause, calling jihad to extend their territory. As well, the established this and provided resources to civilians in order to show the security and provision they could provide as an Islamic Caliphate.

Both IS and the Taliban also made efforts to condition civilians to view the organization as *the* government during the war while also promising to improve civilian conditions after the war. This ambiguity, for the Taliban, may stem from their lack of governance experience and education; most of the members were primarily educated in madrassas and they killed or expelled anyone who had worked for the government in the past. But for the Islamic State, the organization has enough resources to constitute it as the government itself in certain areas. The promises made for post war change are merely a part of their larger grand strategy; IS indeed carried out civil projects, established *fatwas* for both fighter and civilian, and quickly established civil administration in cities and territories that it came to control.

Ideology

H3: If an insurgency chooses to implement a Maoist organizational structure, it is more likely to develop and effective governance system.

Both cases meet the requirements for the first two general mechanisms but to a certain degree. In some areas, the Taliban developed effective governance capabilities to gain popular support, and in other areas they failed in this regard. In Kandahar and Kabul, they had Sharia court systems that did function. The Ministry of Virtue and Prevention of Vice also functioned fluidly in most cities, though this sometimes did not gain support from many civilians. As well, they provided security for opium farmers. Conversely, the Taliban failed to pay salaries to government officials often and government offices did not function well. The Taliban targeted the Hazara region by cutting off access to food and blocking roads and openly committed mass killings of Hazaras (Rashid 2000, 67). The Taliban did fulfill the second mechanism of conducting conventional warfare and held territory against the North Alliance, who was also a conventional force. A majority of resources went to their military operations, much of these resources being provided by Pakistan (Rashid 2000; Goodson 2001; Barfield 2010; Tanner 2002).

The first two general mechanisms are seen in the case of the Islamic State, but also to a certain degree regarding the first mechanism. For the first general mechanism and ‘political mobilization, often IS gives provisions and establishes services in areas it comes into control from the beginning. The organization is also known to provide solid security for the civilians within its territories. But often, popular support is not met. IS’s actions such as destruction of historic monuments or religious relicts garnered protest from civilians, such as the civilians blocking the destruction of famous minarets in Mosul in 2014 (Kaplan 2015). Though IS has established structures to foster noncoercive support that carry out functions such as rebuilding roadways, reinstalling powerlines, and providing security, their efforts are undermined by their actual public rhetoric and propaganda.

IS's main concern is providing their version of strict Islam and Sharia law, evidence of which can be seen with the amount of resources that are given to those structures, as well as al-Baghdadi himself overseeing these functions. Because of their stringent necessity to do this, IS is somewhat ambiguous with popular support: in some instances they try to show civilians and those abroad that they are trying to establish a real Islamic Caliphate; videos on their media website establish a theme fighting the unjust and providing for the poor. But in reality, their actions spark resistance, both violent and non-violent: harassment, arbitrary detentions, kidnapping children to fight on the front lines (Bennett 2015) reverts the popular support they have been trying to gain. Violent resistance has also come in the form of a group called "Ketaib Mosul" that targets and assassinates Islamic State fighters in Mosul (Cockburn 2016).

The international jihad rhetoric, seen in the case of the Taliban, is also shown here and is one of the organization's main proclamations. Therefore, it seems that some of its popular support is not necessarily aimed at civilians but at international audiences, hence its ability to gain mass amounts of foreign fighters. In actuality, the political mobilization is overshadowed by its coercive control of the citizenry through military and its local and religious police.

The Islamic State is well known in conducting conventional warfare and has the military and economic resources to do so, therefore meeting the requirements for the second general mechanism. Not only has IS been engaged in conventional warfare with the incumbent governments of Iraq and Syria, but other groups of rebels and international actors, such as PKK forces, Free Syrian Army, Turkish forces, Iranian, Russian, and American Special Forces.

In regards to the ‘political mobilization’ mechanism, Taliban’s ability to gain popular support came from its Islamic principles; to uphold the values of Islam was the utmost priority for the Taliban. Rashid (2000) states:

“Islam...sanctions rebellion against an unjust ruler, whether Muslim or not and jihad is the mobilizing mechanism to achieve change... the life of the Prophet Mohammed has become the jihadi model of impeccable Muslim behavior and political change as the Prophet himself rebelled” (87)

Using jihad as a mobilization tool was their method to engage Afghans and their Islamic values. Despite their ethnicity and Islamic ideals, a call for jihad from the Commander of the Faithful mobilized popular support, and was overall a symbolic move, which is often utilized by rebel governments (Mampilly 2011, 56-57). But the Taliban failed to foster noncoercive participation through structures. The Minister of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, a structure heavily relied upon to promote their interpretation of Islamic ideals and values, carried out *hudud* punishments which were violent and draconian, even for the slightest offences such as trimming beards. Evidence of Taliban constricting soldiers, and entering mosques and taking worshippers denotes their coercive measures for support from the population to join their ranks (Rashid 2000, 53).

For the ‘cadre discipline’ mechanism, the Taliban would punish their own fighters if they broke their laws since breaking their laws was breaking the laws of Islam. Discipline for fighters was similar for civilians, prayer five times a day and proper beard length (Rashid 2000, 219). But according to Rashid (2000), the make-up of the Taliban made it difficult the creation of a disciplined army, with soldiers coming and going, Pakistani madrassa students who “by 1999 made up 30% of the Taliban’s manpower”, and their haphazard style of enlistment (100). This

made for the Taliban resembling a *lashkar* which is a “traditional tribal militia force” that were historically “strictly volunteers who were not paid salaries...” (Rashid 2000, 100). Nonetheless, Taliban troops were restricted from looting and were disciplined early on in the campaign, but less so “after the 1997 Mazar defeat” (Rashid 2000, 100). Deserters were also executed and arrests were made on suspicion of a coup attempt in 1998 (Rashid 2000, 103). In 1999, six Taliban soldiers had their limbs dismembered for looting, “reflecting the growing indiscipline from economic hardship” (Rashid 2000, 104).

The Taliban did discipline their troops but as reactionary measures, rather than making it public that discipline was a major concern. But by carrying out such harsh punishments during times of war where every fighter is needed, it’s obvious that the Taliban were concerned with the indiscipline of their fighters.

This mechanism is also shown with the case of the Islamic State. The Islamic State often punished its fighters for something as simple as smoking, as it was against their laws. McCants (2015) states “some smokers had to pay fines, others received forty lashes of the whip. Repeat offenders faced jail time, severed fingers and even death” and that “the severed head of a state commander in Syria was found with a cigarette dangling from his mouth and a sign that read: ‘this is not permissible, Sheikh’” (Loc 2428). IS sees smoking as ‘un-Islamic’ and therefore a violation no matter who commits the act, civilian or fighter. The fact that IS puts the videos of the punishments on its media website, though somewhat barbaric, shows their concern for fighter discipline.

Though Mampilly (2011) argues that ideological proclamations are of no significance (218), for the case of the Islamic State, it is important to note that “jihadi insurgencies may be harbingers of a new post-Maoist model of insurgency in which the primary point of gravity or

the “insurgent energy” is no longer located in rebel-controlled areas” Lia (2015). Targeting foreigners and Muslims to come and fight for their cause is produced by the ideological proclamation of jihad. Though its effectiveness to garner civilian support seems hindered, it is important of note nonetheless that “jihad” did create a form of political mobilization.

Conflict Intensity

H4: If a civil war exhibits periods of relative peace—through either a stalemate or a ceasefire—the insurgents are more likely to devote resources to the civil administration, and this results in more effective governance overtime.

For the Taliban, the ‘resource allocation’ mechanism isn’t at work due to the continuous fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. When international bodies would try to create frameworks for peace talks, the Taliban would only offer discussion if they were to recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Masaki 2000). The winter of 1997 created a lull in operations (Tanner 2002, 284) but only small instances of civilian governance are noticed. In December 1997, the Taliban organized a sport race in Kabul and in January 1997 organized a bicycle race and martial arts show (Bleimann 1997). As well, the University of Kabul reopened in March 1997, but the Taliban replaced the rector with an Islamic scholar (Bleimann 1997). Members of both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance met for talks in Ashkhabad on March 11th 1999, but “both sides had used the lull and the talks to prepare for a renewed spring offensive” (Rashid 2000, 78).

For the Islamic State, many ceasefires conducted in the area disregarded the group. IS rejected a ceasefire constructed by four rebel groups in January 2014 (Simon 2014) and

continued fighting. When there was a lull in fighting, the Islamic State resorted to terrorist attacks, such as the one in Kobani in 2014 when fighting was low between IS and the Kurds (cbsnews.com 2014). This shows that resources were devoted towards conducting a suicide bombing, targeting government offices and police headquarters, when there was a lull in fighting rather than towards civilian provisions. As well, IS brought its religious police al-Hisba to fight with its troops when numbers were low and fighting was slowed (cbsnewsc.com 2014). It's structures and personell to patrol and make sure the citizens were following Islamic law, one of its more financed structures, was used in fighting. This shows the lack of resources allocation towards civilians during lull in fighting. But again, like the Taliban, lulls in fighting were very few and far between, and when they occurred, fighting picked up in a short amount of time.

There is also no evidence of the “stability” mechanism in both cases. For the Taliban, it was due to their strict policies against women and treatment of civilians which caused humanitarian and aid activities to decrease continuously in 1999 and then further worsened in 2000 where “all non-Afghan personnel working for the UN were temporarily withdrawn from the country” (Goodson 2001, 122). Also, NGOs were expelled from the country in 1998 (Abassi 1998). This was also caused by the lack of ceasefires and lulls in operations, as the Taliban's vehement goal was to end the Northern Alliance. For the Islamic state, aid workers fear to enter IS controlled territory since structures for protection of aid organizations have not been establish and IS is known to kidnap aid workers and humanitarian activists. In fact, the WFP accidently dropped aid into IS territory when it was meant for the Syrian army (Alalam 2016).

During an earthquake in mid-1998, the Taliban's information minister publicly rejected a ceasefire and did not intend to send relief goods to the civilians affected (ABC 1998). This was a chance for the Taliban to reduce fighting and allocate resources towards citizens, yet took the

advantage to continue their military advance. This also has relevance to the ‘peace dividends’ mechanism, where populations did require aid, but the Taliban decided to forego the help. Also, though not necessarily during lulls in operations, the Taliban did eventually relax certain laws on sports and games later in their rein (Goodson 2001, 128).

The ‘peace dividends’ mechanism may also be difficult to find evidence for in this case since historically tribal areas dealt with their own issues and remained withdrawn from the larger governmental bodies. A major societal organization called the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), created in Kabul in 1977, supports women rights and strongly opposed the Taliban’s policies, with demands for change in government, the right to wear what they want, democratic values, and women’s rights. The Taliban made no efforts to address these demands.

For the Islamic State, protests and demands from civilian in IS controlled areas were met with arrests and gunfire (Bennett 2015), specifically in the town of Manbij in Aleppo, who held more than one protest but were met with coercive resistance from the rebel organization (now.me 2015).

Supporters

H5: If an insurgency is able to co-opt humanitarian organizations into its governance project, then it is more likely develop an effective system of governance.

Both groups interacted with aid organizations, but to differing degrees. But both organizations failed in developing effective structures to coordinate with aid organizations, and often humanitarian organizations did not accept direction from the groups.

This mechanism is active within the Taliban, but to a low degree. Though the Taliban did have a Minister of Health, structures dedicated to health, and allowed aid workers in Afghanistan, the structures were often confusing, delayed, and mismanaged. Doctors were scarce to the point that “virtually the only medical practitioners in the country are the hospitals of the International Committee of the Red Cross” (Rashid 2000, 18). The co-option of humanitarian organizations didn’t last long; the Taliban was relentlessly suspicious of the UN and Western NGOs. Added to this, many NGOs ended their programs because of the Taliban’s refusal to allow them to help women. In 1997 alone: Heads of three UN agencies in Kandahar were ordered to leave the country, UNHCR suspended all its programs after the Taliban arrested four staff member, and Save the Children shut down programs because of “the Taliban’s refusal to allow women to participate in mine-awareness classes” (Rashid 2000, 65).

The Taliban made it extremely difficult for aid organizations to work in Afghanistan. They expelled aid organizations that were Christian based, such as the International Assistance Mission and Serve, who provided eye care to Afghans, and banned the use of computers and electronic communication “severely disrupting essential food deliveries” (Sharp et al. 2002). In 1998, they tried to relocate all NGOs to a destroyed polytechnic university which the NGOs refused (Abassi 1998). This led to their expulsion by the Taliban. Attacks on relief agencies has also occurred in Taliban held areas, and in September 2001, 1,400 tons of food aid was seized from the UN World Food Program in Kandahar (HRW 2001).

Though not humanitarian organizations, Mullah Omar did co-opt religious leaders in the beginning of his campaign, in which he was declared the ‘Commander of the Faithful’. This was at a time where fighting between mujahedeen factions was causing more problems and making it

difficult for society to function; the Taliban was their choice of allegiance due to their promises of Islamic virtue and justice for corruption.

In short, the Taliban wasn't able to develop significantly applicable structures to deal with aid organizations. When the Taliban tried to direct the organizations, they protested and disagreed with their decision, due usually to the pointlessness and compromising manner. Though they did accept aid and work with organizations such as the UN and ICRC, they tended to make it more difficult for them to provide aid, undermining the purpose of these organizations. As time drew on, the Taliban co-opted less and less, creating more problems for aid agencies by providing less security and regressing their programs. The Taliban government failed to properly and effectively co-opt humanitarian organizations into its governance project.

For the Islamic State, the organization initially allowed aid organizations to work within its controlled territory while they were claiming parts of Syria. But as the Islamic State gained power and implemented its strict laws, it restricted access to a lot of areas and separated aid workers by their gender (Abi-Habib 2014). The insurgent organization does not oppose aid organizations but its actions on the battlefield and towards targeted populations undermines their ability to receive aid. IS's co-opts aid organizations "as long as certain terms are agreed, such as no labelling and no international staff members, and assistance serves the group's wider aims" (IRIN 2014, 4). But this in itself causes a problem, as IS has been reported to take the aid for themselves and distribute it under the Islamic State's Department of Relief (Chang 2016). , legitimizing the group even further within the local populace. Another issue is that the Islamic State is an internationally designated terrorist organization. Legislation pertaining to terrorism from the US and EU prevents aid organizations from working with the group as there are legal

repercussions if doing so (IRIN 2014, 2). Often, a third party within the territory is contacted and aid is sent through via a middle man. For example, IS in Syria allowed Polio Task Force in Syria, a Syrian opposition humanitarian organization, into its territory to distribute polio vaccinations (Buncombe 2015). Finally, IS has been known to capture and kill aid workers⁵, which would make it incredibly difficult for any aid organization to try and provide relief within IS controlled territory.

IS has aimed to create a dependency of aid distribution on the group, not through international organizations. The organization delivered its own aid to civilians within its territory “in the form of food, clothing, gasoline, or medical services” and has been “able to provide below market rates to civilians who are suffering financially” (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 21). This has been seen in Aleppo (prior to withdrawal), Raqqa, Idlib, and Jarablus: IS is essentially monopolizing its service to local populations, trying to rid of international or outside influence. Therefore, the insurgent organization’s strategy of local dependency, actions towards aid workers and organizations, and coupled with their inability to create structures that would facilitate their co-optation, has thus far lead to failure in co-opting aid organizations into its governance system.

Competitors

⁵ Peter Kassing, an American aid worker, was killed and the execution was released on video. Often IS captures foreign aid workers, targeting Americans after the bombing campaign began in 2014.

H6: If an insurgent leadership faces challenges to its rule from local and transnational civil society actors, then it may develop a more effective system of governance under certain conditions.

In both cases, local and transnational actors constantly pressured the rebel organizations due to their treatment of civilians. Evidence of both mechanisms varied between the Taliban and the Islamic state. In regards to the Taliban, evidence of international pressure is there but the Taliban failed by resorting to coercive means.

The Taliban were slammed with human rights violations from Amnesty International, the UN, NGOs and other watchdogs for their treatment of women, their destruction of religious artifacts, their treatment of ethnic minorities, their protection of designated foreign terrorists, and their hand in the illegal opium trade. The UN helped to create the “Six plus Two” framework in 1997, consisting of the six nations bordering Afghanistan (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) plus the US and Russia. The framework was implemented to find peaceful means to end the violence in Afghanistan and to install a suitable government. When the Tashkent Declaration was signed in 1999, where the nations agreed not to send military aid to any party in Afghanistan, the Taliban led a military offensive a week later, gaining condemnation from the UN. As stated before, all of the NGOs operating in Afghanistan in 1998 were ordered to move to a crumpled polytechnic university, in which they refused (Abassi 1998). This led to the Taliban eventually expelling them from Afghanistan.

In regards to the pressure from transnational actors and opium, only in 2000 did the Taliban responded without coercive means when Mullah Omar decided to destroy virtually all of the opium fields in Afghanistan. But reports suggest that Taliban members forced farmers to destroy

poppy field through bullying and violence. Also, a large population of Afghan farmers' livelihood depended on the poppy crop, leaving many with no hope for income.

IS received immense pressure from international organizations and human rights activists, as the group is notorious for its mistreatment of civilians. One particular theme of IS's violence towards civilians is its targeting of the Yazidi ethnicity. Yazidi's religion has been deemed satanic by IS, leading to violence towards the group as they are considered "infidels" (Jalabi 2014). The organizations violence towards Yazidis, Christians and Shiites has been stated as war crimes and genocide by world leaders and institutions (Labott and Kopan 2016; Westcott 2016; UN News 2015). Added to genocide is the sexual slavery of young Yazidi women. The organization itself proclaims that this is occurring and justifies its action on its online magazine *Dabiq*, having captured over 2,000 Yazidi women and children in 2014 (The Economist 2014). These actions have been condemned by countless institutions and international organizations, yet the organization has not responded in any meaningful way. IS justifies its actions through its ideological proclamations and their interpretation of Islam. In summary, no response, coercive or noncoercive, has occurred from the group towards pressure from human rights activists or religious institutions.

For the 'switching sides' mechanism, both the Taliban and the Islamic state failed in varying degrees to incorporate *critical* society actors into their broader political project. For the Taliban, this began with their shelling of Kabul in the spring of 1996, killing civilians and injuring even more. The UN mediator for Afghanistan Norbert Hall was in Kabul during the attacks, stating "This is no way to treat a peace emissary, by shooting at him..." (Rashid 2000, 47). Another instance was the killing, torture and public mutilation of Najibullah by breaking into the UN

compound and dragging him and his brother in the streets. The Taliban then hung them from a traffic post outside the Palace (Rashid 2000, 49). Najjubullah Ahmadzi, the former president from 1987-1992, had been under UN protection for the past four years. This not only enraged the UN, but also the people of Kabul and the Muslim community at large, as the Taliban denied Najjubullah a fair trial as well as an Islamic burial (Rashid 2000, 50).

Another *critical* society actor was Abdul Ali Mazari, who was killed in Taliban custody in March of 1995. Mazari was the leader of the Hazaras, an ethnic division of Afghanistan who are predominately Shi'ite. This had extreme negative effects with the Afghan Shias and Iran (Rashid 2000, 35). Co-opting such a prominent figure would have allowed for ease of tensions between the two ethnic and religious groups, but the Taliban failed in this regard. As well, the Taliban reportedly tried to offer Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance, a position within their government yet he declined on the basis of differing views (Balcerowicz 2001).

Mullah Omar did meet with UN Special Representative for Afghanistan in October 1998, the first time the Taliban leader ever met with a foreign diplomat. Apparently this was because the Taliban was expecting an attack from Iran at the time (Rashid 2000, 23). During fighting between the Taliban and “their counterparts” the same year, a joint commission of religious scholars was established to decide on “a framework for negotiations, based on their knowledge of the sharia and Islamic norms of warfare” but only halted fighting for small periods and never accomplished anything of significance (Borchgrevnik and Harpviken 2008, 4).

The Taliban government received a vast amount of international pressure and, though responded rarely, did so by coercive means. The insurgent organization failed to incorporate critical society actors within its political project, and even when they tried, the actors did not

willingly cooperate. Under these conditions, the Taliban government failed to develop an effective governance system.

The Islamic State continuously committed violence towards critical society actors of religious institutions. In late 2013, the group attacked three Christian church in Raqqa, destroyed a Greek Catholic church, occupied an Armenian orthodox church in Raqqa city and burnt another Armenian church in Tel Abyad (UN Report 2014, 5). The targeting of minorities and religions not of its own has alienated IS from co-opting their leaders or institutions into its governance. IS has also tried to incorporate scholars into its governance project, though coercively and selectively. As stated before, the organization advertises that teachers and education professionals are needed, but insinuated to the ones that have fled that their belongings are forfeited unless they return to the city. When IS took over Mosul, they “dismissed hundreds of researchers -- some for being Shia Muslim, others for being female” and targeted scholars who had connections to the US (Glum 2014).

IS has incorporated tribes into its governance project, even creating an office of tribal affairs that “responds to the demands of the citizenry, liaises with community elders, and conducts tribal outreach” (Caris and Reynolds 2014, 20). But Khalaf (2015) asserts that IS does this through a “divide-and-rule” tactics, where IS indirectly manages the tribes by “empowering tribes to govern their own state of affairs in allegiance to it” (63). Those that agree and allege a “Bayaa” to IS receive aid and non-coercion, but those that resist have been met with violence, such as the Al-Shaitat tribe being attacked in Deir al-Zor province of Syria (Holmes and Al-Khalidi 2014). This in itself was a fear tactic, as videos of the massacre of the al-Shaitat tribe were posted online, showing the consequence of resisting IS. But many tribes who supported the Assad regime in Syria willingly switched their support for IS, as the organization has supported

tribal elders and gave them opportunities to rule their own areas if allegiance was pledged (Dukhan and Hawat 2014, 52).

In summary, both groups for the most part failed to incorporate critical society actors into its governance project. When IS did, such as some scholars and tribes, it used coercive means to do so. The Taliban was similar, often ostracizing or killing critical society actors, then only engaging them when it was of strategic use for them.

Conclusion

Using Mampilly's (2011) framework, I have comparatively analyzed the Islamic Jihadist governance systems of both the Taliban and the Islamic State. Through this analysis, we can see that variation does exist between the two organizations. For the Taliban, the organization failed to establish an effective system of governance. This was due to the Taliban's strict rules and harsh laws and punishments towards civilians (especially women) and societal actors. There was large amounts of international pressure on the Taliban to change its policies, but they denied nearly every challenge. This, in turn, forced aid organizations and humanitarian activities to engage less and less with the regime and civilians within its territories. Since Afghanistan was traditionally a rentier state, and the Taliban organization got its start from relying on foreign investments, dispersing the activities of aid organizations and essentially forcing them out of the country led to the Taliban's inability to gain legitimacy among international audiences. In turn, the group was unable to provide basic goods and services towards its citizens. Though it did provide some security and ended corruption and banditry from the ruling mujahedeen within its territories, it only faced a real threat from the north in the form of the Northern Alliance. Often, Taliban security and leadership in administrative positions was called to battle, leaving their positions and service to civilians.

Political mobilization was initially high due to the ideological mobilization implications of Islamic Jihad and Mullah Omar's status as the Commander of the Faithful, but the regime failed to put in place noncoercive structures for civilian participation. Civilians were used to the almost non-existent pre-conflict relationship with Afghanistan government, often having their own tribes and *qawms* deal with issues, rather than resorting to the state. The institutions put in place by the Taliban were not regularly utilized and often did not function well. Towards the end

of the Taliban regime's rule, banditry and dissidence rose again. Though conventional warfare was fought against the Northern Alliance, the Taliban fell to US led coalition forces, failing to hold territory and provide security to its citizenry. At times during its rule, the Taliban was a partially effective system of governance, as it was "able to provide security but not other public goods" (Mampilly 2011, 17). But the Taliban often targeted segments of the population and purposefully cut off supplies; the Northern Alliance also constantly attacked areas where the Taliban provided minimal security and lost territory Overall, the Taliban failed to provide an effective system of governance.

The Islamic State so far has been able to meet the requirements of and provide an effective governance system, though sometimes it leans towards partially effective. I argue this because at times the organization has been able to provide security and public goods to its citizens, and at other times it has essentially gave the illusion of providing public goods. The example of stealing food aid and labeling it as "Islamic State" aid is one example. If it were an effective governance system, this would not be necessary, as this actually delegitimizes the organization among international institutions and actors. As well, its security it provides is often security through fear. Public punishments of executions, then displaying the bodies in the town square for days is a tactic of fear and repression. Effective security provision would ideally have the citizens' fearing less from outside forces and the governing body. Nonetheless, IS has shown to be more than capable to engage in conventional warfare. But with the recent loss of the city of Fallujah, the ability to provide security seems less and less.

IS's goal of a global caliphate also makes it difficult to establish a truly effective governance system. By devoting resources to establishing small yet ineffective fighting forces in Yemen, Libya, and Afghanistan, less go to the citizenry of their established territories in Iraq and

Syria. As well, funding terrorist attacks throughout the world and within its territories not only takes resources away from civilians, but also destroys the organization's appeal in the areas of these attacks. This undermines their 'global' initiative. The organization is effectively biting off more than they can chew. But their mobilization efforts through Islamic jihad brings recruits and added security to the territories it holds and fights in. IS also established offices of recruitment, a noncoercive approach but still has policies of forced conscription, which has been a problem with many civilians in their territories.

IS has provided public services in the form of providing food and water, rebuilding roads, a waste management system, and others. This was often done at the beginning of the conflict in areas that were of strategic interest to the group. In other areas, it provided mostly religious outreach and aid. But its insistence to not recognize international institutions and attack aid organizations and its members pushes the group towards a partially effective governance system, as some areas that IS hold require this assistance.

Implications

Since the governance abilities of both organizations varied throughout their rule, I believe it would be important to note that there ought to be distinguishing continuous factors that denote effective governance. Slating a rebel government as either effective, partially effective, or noneffective leaves an image of 'either or', where in reality there were times it was partially effective rather than non effective, or vice versa. What I mean is an effective governance system may not always be truly effective and may be partially effective at one point in time, while effective in another. Conflict and civil wars change constantly, and dynamics of these conflicts are affected by this change. It is sensible to state that a rebel organization was effective at point A

in time but partially effective at point B. This can be seen in the case of both the Taliban and the Islamic State. The Taliban was able to provide some form security to its citizens in the beginning of its rule and even was able to work with aid organizations. But later on, it lost the help of many aid organizations and humanitarian activities. Security also became less and less provided, to where they were ousted in 2001.

IS has been able to provide both security and provision of services, but often those provisions are not of their own, and can only provide minimal services to areas it is not strategically interested in. As well, IS started out as ISI in 2007 but was unable to establish any effective governance, but came back with a vengeance during the Arab Spring. Since then the organization has gained and lost territory throughout Iraq and Syria.

Both cases show effective governance is not static; it changes throughout the conflict and is affected by the factors purported by Mampilly (2011). Perhaps an “Insurgent governance effectiveness index” would assist in analysis. This can be beneficial for not only researchers but policy makers as well. Seeing where and when the insurgency was effective, partially effective, or non effective can help to build methods to work with or try and defeat rebel organizations, depending on a state’s foreign policy towards the group. In this way, we can see trends of rebel organizations and their effectiveness, at what times they were effective or not, and why or what caused their effectiveness to change. As well, we can make two graphs for a rebel organization depending on cities or regions it lays claim to. For example, IS holds territory in both Iraq and Syria. A rebel governance system index can be applied to show where and at what time their effectiveness changed in these two areas, allowing researchers to try and correlate with real-time events. A brief example can be seen in *figure 4* and *figure 5*.

The numerical values on the vertical axis represent the effectiveness of the rebel organization. 10 represents true effective rebel governance, where security and provision of services is not only strongly provided by the rebel organization, but also regularly utilized by citizens and receives positive feedback. 7-10 represents an effective governance system, but 7 is where security and provisions are provided, but not as efficiently and receives negative feedback from civilians. Goods and services are still provided but are inadequate and possibly unused. 4-6 represents a partially effective rebel governance, where 6 is providing strong security for its populace and beginning to establish structures for provisional services. 4 is providing security but weaker than 5. Both 4 and 5 lack the provision of goods and services for civilians. 0-3 represent a noneffective rebel governance system. 0 may represent a rebel governance system that has completely failed in its endeavors to provide security and services, most likely being the demise of the organization itself. 1-3 are noneffective but the organization still exists, holding territory with civilians and engaging in violent acts against the state. 3 represents where an organizations is beginning to provide security to its populace.

Through this, we can see in *Figure 3* that IS began with an effective governance system, but changed throughout the conflict. Conflicts are extremely dynamic and change constantly, which then effects rebel organizations and their governance efforts. It is understandable that a rebel governance system may decrease or increase in effectiveness throughout a conflict. To say that an insurgent governance system is “either or” seems static, when clearly things tend to change. Of course, this is even more pertinent for rebel organizations that are still engaging in governance and conflict. These are very basic graphs and only exist to present an idea. Of course, more research and clearer methods of data inquiry would be needed to solidify this method, but the possibilities exist. Graphing two rebel organizations in the same conflict, seeing

where and when the effectiveness changed and why it changed can help to understand this phenomenon and further inquiry into the subject.

These findings, along with the idea of a ‘rebel governance index’ help to broaden the view of rebel governance for not just academics but for policy makers and security/counterinsurgency specialists. As variation does exist between Islamic Jihadist rebel governments, then a variation of policy and counterinsurgency strategy should exist as well. Tailoring policy and strategy towards an individual rebel organization, rather than create one large mandate, would help to address the issues at hand. One policy towards a rebel group may not work the same towards another, as separate groups face separate challenges from ‘below’, ‘within’, and ‘above’. The index would help to track where and when insurgent organizations were met with challenges and opportunities, and how they handled them. Through this, policy makers and counterinsurgent specialists can adjust accordingly, and depending on their stance (conflict transition, peaceful negotiations, military engagement, etc.), address the rebel government in a specific manner that coincides with the dynamics of conflict.

Figure 3. Islamic State Governance System’s Effectiveness Index





Figure 4. The Taliban Governance System’s Effectiveness Index



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