

**UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE**

**FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD**

Institut politologických studií

Katedra mezinárodních vztahů

**Tomáš Pavlíček**

**The Eurasian Economic Union: Towards  
Economic Prosperity, or Towards Power Gains?**

*Diplomová práce*

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Autor práce: **Bc. Tomáš Pavlíček**

Vedoucí práce: **Michal Parížek, Ph.D.**

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## **Abstrakt**

Eurasijský ekonomický svaz začal fungovat více než před rokem, ale stále úplně není jasné, jakou by měla mít tato regionální organizace podobu. Zatímco někteří analytici zdůrazňují ekonomické motivy integrace, jiní ji vnímají organizaci jako prostředek nejsilnějších členů jak zvětšit svou moc, ať už regionálně nebo externě v mezinárodních vztazích. Spíše než k Evropské unii, kterou považují členové v jistém ohledu za vzor, bývá organizace přirovnávána k bývalému Sovětskému svazu. Tato práce se snaží vyjasnit tento rozkol a ptá se: Jaké jsou hlavní motivy účastnit se projektu? Jaké jsou hlavní výhody, které chtějí členové získat? Odpovědi hledá prostřednictvím obsahové analýzy verbálních projevů pěti prezidentů, kteří rozhodují o hlavních otázkách zahraniční politiky země. Analýza staví na teoreticky vytvořených kategoriích, které umožňují provést kvantitativní rozbor diskurzu. Výsledky jsou následně diskutovány s ohledem na specifika a postavení států post-sovětského prostoru. Hlavní zjištění přibližují motivy, které prezidenti využívají k legitimizaci vstupu do unie, a odhalují třecí plochy mezi perspektivami jednotlivých členů.

## **Abstract**

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) emerged more than one year ago but so far there has been no consensus on the nature and the main aspects of the cooperation. Whereas some observers underline pure economic incentives of the integration, others see the regional organization as a tool for increasing the power of the strongest members, and especially Russia. Strongly echoed in public discourse is a comparison to the former Soviet Union. To tackle the issue, the thesis asks: What are the main motives for participation in the project? Which main benefits are expected by the members to be gained? These questions are answered through a content analysis of verbal expressions of five presidents who hold the main decision-making powers in EEU's member states. Based on theoretically generated analytical categories, the thesis conducts a

quantitative analysis of the discourse, which is then discussed in the context of the post-Soviet space. The findings reveal the motives which the presidents use to legitimize the membership and show the main cleavages that threaten to undermine the development of the organization.

## **Klíčová slova**

Obsahová analýza, Eurasijský ekonomický svaz, diskurz, Rusko, Kazachstán, Bělorusko, Arménie, Kyrgyzstán, motivace

## **Keywords**

Content analysis, the Eurasian Economic Union, discourse, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, motivations

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## **Prohlášení**

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V Praze dne 13. května 2016

Tomáš Pavlíček

## **Poděkování**

Rád bych na tomto místě poděkoval vedoucímu práce Michalu Parízkovi, Ph.D. Nejen za nadhled a trpělivost, s níž se věnuje konzultacím, ale také za jím vedené semináře, které rozšířily moje znalosti.

# Diploma project

## The Eurasian Economic Union: Towards Economic Prosperity, or towards Power Gains?

### Introduction

The international order in Europe after the Cold War driven by Western-centric forces has never faced such a challenge as now when the new regional organization has emerged in the eastern part of the European continent, Caucasus and Central Asia. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) which officially launched on the 1st of January of 2015 is here to “build upon the best values of the Soviet Union”<sup>1</sup>, Russian President Vladimir Putin has declared.

The new effort to integrate former Soviet states into the common Union raises many questions among Western leaders as well as academic researchers. For many it is the clear sign of the return to Cold War times which separated the development in Europe and severed ties with the close neighbours for more than forty years.

Others - including the founding fathers of the EEU - stress the exclusive economic role of the project and praise it as an important step in increasing the market efficiency. Narratives provided by both politicians and researchers differ from each other so much that there is truly no agreement on the nature of the EEU.

This thesis aims to determine the main incentives of member states behind their decision to join and develop the EEU in order to explain by which motives is this union genuinely driven. The thesis looks into four hypotheses and seeks to provide the most likely rationale for establishing the union. Out of the main focus, we also ask who the EEU serves for and which kinds of benefits the members are expecting to get.

Nevertheless, the priority of this research is not focused on examining the functional design nor the interaction of the EEU with external actors, it is rather to analyse the internal conditions among and between member states, leading to their decision to join the EEU. This

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<sup>1</sup> Bryanski, Gleb. Putin, *Medvedev praised value of Soviet Union*. Reuters. Online: <<http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/idINIndia-60590820111117>>

integration process on the territory of former the Soviet Union in fact means the exclusion of acceded states from either Western or Chinese regional and economic integration processes.

Not many researchers have examined this topic and the EEU in general so far since the organization is very young and it finds itself under the construction. There is a lack of credible and information-rich resources as well as resources available in other than local languages. It seems to be the main reasons for insufficient research on the subject which shake today's world and the international diplomacy.

The EEU and geopolitics in the post-Soviet area are strongly connected to the numerous crisis in post-Soviet republics, Russia's decision to turn back against approaching the Western integration and rising hostility between Russia and the West in general. All of them are very up-to-date issues filling the front pages of newspapers. The emergence of the EEU also carries important external implications, especially for the EU's strategy in the post-Soviet space.

This research works with the international relations theory, in particular with the theory of regional integration or global governance, including e.g. concepts of hegemony and multipolarity. The thesis seeks to find where the EEU is placed in the current international order.

## **Research plan**

The research is expected to bring a new perspective and better understanding of the EEU. Moreover, it seeks to find the role of the organization in the international system and current affairs. The very main goal of the research is to find the incentives for the EEU member states for joining the Union. The meaning of EEU might differ for each of them, therefore, it is needed to examine them separately and eventually draw up the meaning of the EEU which is constructed by the attitude of its members. Consequently, the meaning affects the understanding and perception of the EEU not only by the members but also by external actors.

Research questions stand as follow: *“What explains the attitudes of EEU members towards this integration project? What incentives do the EEU member states have to join this integration project, and what they want to achieve?”* In simple words, the work asks about the main rationale for establishing the EEU among its member states.

Seeking a meaning through the reality constructed by the members might be seen fluid but theoretical and methodological framework gives the clear barriers for the research. There is four hypothesis which might explain the motivation of the EEU members to join the Union.



*1) The EEU members seek to promote economic effectiveness and the inward market integration; 2) Some of the EEU members seek to strengthen their political and military power in the region; 3) The EEU members seek to regionalize behind the common idea of Eurasianism; 4) The EEU members seek to challenge the institutions forming the existing global order.*

## **Review of the current state of knowledge**

As it was mentioned above, the EEU is newly emerging institution founded in 2015. Therefore, the amount of academic literature on this topic is limited. One of few really comprehensive studies of the EEU is made by Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk under the name “Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy, and Politics“. Authors describe the development of post-Soviet integration since the beginning until today’s foundation of the EEU.

It analyses individual stages as well as its legal design and politics among the member states. This book can serve as a very good secondary source for everyone who seeks to make research on the EEU. Nevertheless, since the focus is very wide and general, there is plenty room left for the research on the particular features of the EEU. Dragneva and Wolczuk’s book can serve as the basis for further research but not as the final statement on this broad issue.

There was conducted research on some of the specific features of the EEU. The external relations with the EU, the architecture of the organization, etc. Among the most interesting publications we can name “Creating a Eurasian Union: Economic Integration of Former Soviet Republics” written by research fellows in St. Petersburg University Yulia Vymiatnina and Daria Antonov, focusing on the economics perspectives of the Union, and 2015 publication called “The Eurasian Project and Europe” by David Lane and Vsevolod Samokhvalov who looked into the ideological aspect of Eurasianism.

This thesis seeks to present one of these particular topics about the EEU, specifically, the narrative under which is the Union established. Nobody hasn’t made a comprehensive research on the motives for establishing the EEU, although this is one of the basic characteristics which determines the attitude and relations with the outer world.

It is possible to find a similar topic in the study of Central Asia-Caucasus Institute which is affiliated with Washington-based John Hopkins University and Stockholm Institute for Security and Development Policy. The joint work of experts called “Putin’s Grand Strategy” and edited by Frederick Stall and Svante Cornell is well focused on the prominent character

Vladimir Putin. Besides other, it concludes that the EEU is a major danger for post-Soviet states as “it would jeopardize the gains of two decades of independence in countries ranging from Moldova to Tajikistan”<sup>2</sup>.

The study is one-sided and tends to consider the EEU as a one-man project. It claims that „Putin needs to paint his grand vision as inevitable but in the end he knows its realization depends on him alone and on his tactical focus and speed.”<sup>3</sup> We seek to achieve a balanced analysis rather based on empirical findings than to bet on the decisive influence of one’s politics.

In contrary to “Putin’s Grand Strategy”, we can find the book “Eurasian Regionalism and Russian Foreign Policy” of Russian author Mikhail Molkhanov who argues the EEU emerged as the response to neo-liberal globalization and addresses the project as a subset of the new regionalism development. He rejects the theory of marking the EEU as “neo-hegemonic and perhaps, neo-imperialist in nature”<sup>4</sup>.

In fact, both theories (conducted by Central Asia-Caucasus institute and by Mikhail Molkhanov) correspond to our hypotheses in our research that we will examine.

Well-respected Carnegie scholar Dmitri Trenin in his book „Post-imperium: Eurasian story“ does not exactly focus on the integration in the EEU but in a more general way he analyses Russian behaviour in post-Soviet space. His work is largely cited in the English-written academic literature and also in the one of the last recent big study dedicated to the EEU called „the Eurasian Integration - The View from Within“ and edited by Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa.

This policy-oriented work is rather searching how to achieve efficient economic integration in Eurasia and does not examine the discourse in which the EEU moves forward. The work deals with attempts for the economic integration, however, our aim is to find out whether is the economic integration in the way known from the similar integration projects in the world is the ultimate goal due to the EEU was established at all.

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<sup>2</sup> [Starr, Frederic](#), and [Svante E. Cornell](#). *Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents*. Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2014. p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> [Starr, Frederic](#), and [Svante E. Cornell](#). *Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents*. Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2014. p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Molkhanov, Mikhail. 2015. *Eurasian regionalism and Russian foreign policy*. New York: Ashgate. p. 1.

## **Theories and concepts**

The theoretical framework comes from the work of authors who describe the role of the EEU and seek to conceptualize the foundation of the EEU as a part of the bigger strategy in the post-Soviet area. The theories are rooted mostly in the theory of economic integration and regional integration as it is supposed to be the main reason for the establishing Union.

In contrary to this, some researchers and politicians stress the spread of Russian power in the area and concept of hegemony. As we mentioned above, on the one hand, there is sort of notion of "Putin's grand strategy", on the other, especially on the Russian territory, some researchers pursue to show the EEU as a project from the branch of new regionalism.

More generally, hypotheses are underpinned by different theoretical concepts that most likely explain the meaning of the EEU.

First of all, there is a theory of classical economic integration which is summarized in the work of Bela Ballasa in the book "The Theory of Economic Integration". The states seek to remove economic boundaries in order to increase the inner market and trade inside the Union.

The second hypothesis is based on the concept of regional hegemony pursued by John Mearsheimer who describes regional hegemony as one of the strategies of great powers such as Russia for "state survival". In this case, the regional organization becomes a tool for imposing a regional hegemony.

The third hypothesis is framed by the theories of new regionalism and work of Fredrik Söderbaum who made a first systematic attempt to summarize the "new wave" of the new regionalism theories.

The fourth hypothesis is laid by the concept of counter-multilateralism which was drawn by Robert Keohane and Julia Morse in the paper "Counter-Multilateralism and Regime Complexes". Relevant is also another work of authors who research regime complexes and regime shifting such as "The Politics of International Regime Complexity" by Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier.

## **Conceptualization**

In the work, we examine the incentives of the member states to join the integration process within the EEU. It means by which arguments and expectations the decision to join the EEU is driven.

Hypotheses are four. The positive attitude towards the integration might be explained by either “defensive” or “active” narratives towards the integration. We can introduce them in short within the scale of this project.

### **Defensive**

“Economic integration” - the motive is to increase the economic effectiveness by the inward market integration. It is an example of attitude in the framework of the classical regional economic integration. This narrative assumes that the EEU emerged as a response to the neo-liberal globalization. It seeks to expand the role of the member states in the global economy. There are no clear signs of political integration.

“Regional hegemony” - the motive is to strengthen the political and military power in the region under the Russian security, political and economic hegemony. It is a response to the raising US, Chinese and the EU military and political influence in the post-Soviet space.

### **Active**

“New regionalism” - the EEU members choose to integrate beyond the idea of Eurasianism. The common historical, geographical and socio-politic background give them better possibilities to face common challenges in the region. Regional integration led by the common notion of identity should “merge” the territory and adopt some cohesive regional policy stances.

„Counter-multilateralism” - the EEU members seek to challenge the institutions forming the existing global order. They reject the global leadership of the West and Western values and they want to establish an independent platform in the multi-polar world by the creation of competitive regime.

By the word “defensive” we mean the reaction to the events imposed on the actors externally, in contrary to “active” ones which assume that behaviour of member states in the international system is creative and pro-active.

## **Operationalization**

We look for determinants which can prove or disprove the hypothesis mentioned above.

“Economic integration” – correctness of the hypothesis can be indicated by the presence of statements and expressions which are incentivized by deep market integration such as increasing the market space, economic effectivity, common labour market and etc.

“Regional hegemony” – correctness of the hypothesis can be indicated by the presence of statements and expressions which contain the reaction to the EU, American or Chinese influence in the post-Soviet space, the defence against the external threat, etc.

“New regionalism” – correctness of the hypothesis can be indicated by the statements and expressions which address the common identity of Eurasianism or the post-Soviet fellowship. It might be expressions which indicate the effort to synchronize not only trade rules but also policy and economy in the broader sense.

“Counter-multilateralism” – correctness of the hypothesis can be indicated by the statements and expressions which address unfair and dysfunctional international order and which stress the incorrectness of Western values and look up to emerging economies such as BRIC.

## **Methods**

Diploma thesis is researched through content analysis which gives us the advantage in uncovering competing narratives. Determinants found in the public appearances of the leaders of member states are expected to identify the most likely hypothesis carrying the narrative behind the EEU.

The public expressions of high representatives of member states are selected in regards to their relation towards the EEU, coded and grouped by their common determinants into one out of four established content categories, eventually into another one.

Consequently, the empiric findings are related to the theory. The discourse in each member state is found and it provides us the opportunity to construct the meaning and purpose of the EEU itself, though, it does not have to be necessarily a consistent image.

It also does not mean that this reality which is presented is objective but it is rather socially constructed by the members and it might eventually differ from the further institutional development which follows.

## Data

Sources for preparation this research entails public speeches of high representatives of member states, official documents of the EEU and governments of the members, public appearances in audio-video media as well as statements published by the press and internet media. Secondary sources help to consolidate the discourse under which the member states have decided to join the EEU.

The speeches of high representatives are mostly available on-line as well as official documentation of the EEU. It is possible to find it on the websites of Eurasian Economic Commission on [www.eurasiancommission.org](http://www.eurasiancommission.org).

The more complicated part comes with the research of the media statements which might be available only in the local languages of the member states.

Nevertheless, the Russian language still remains widely used in the post-Soviet countries and it serves as the main language in the official communication between the members of the EEU. Therefore, there is no evidence about the lack of available data for making a good research.

A wide range of sources among Russian mainstream media might be used such as Russia Today, Gazeta.ru, Kommersant, Izvestiya or press agency RIA Novosti. Zakon.kz or portal nur.kz inform about Kazakhstan. Expressions of politicians in Belarus are possible to find on Naviny.by, websites of TV Belarus 24 or Belta.by. Gala TV and Mamul.am are large media in Armenia.

Data will be collected within the period of two years before the official foundation of the EEU. This limitation of data set will put the emphasis only on the final stage of admission process into the EEU and final stage in the decision-making of political leaders.

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## Introduction

On the geopolitical map of the world, one year ago a new name emerged – the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Since then, scholars, politicians and media have sought to discover what sort of project is actually being developed. Is it a trade bloc of post-Soviet states? Political-military alliance of authoritarians? The new European Union located in Eurasia? Reminiscence of the Soviet Union? Or even one of the new poles of long-time expected new global order?

When the president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev first introduced a concept of the Eurasian Union at Moscow State University in 1994, he drew a picture of single Eurasian market akin to the European community. "There will be no customs barriers. No obstacles for transportation of people, goods or capital. I purpose to have no borders for people inside the Union" (Nazarbayev-15).

Nonetheless, it lasted two decades until the action has been finally taken. During that time, the circumstances changed significantly. Not only that the post-Soviet space undertook transformation from socialism to capitalism, but also the geopolitics shifted from unipolarity towards multipolarity. The more or less cooperative post-Cold war period has been replaced by a new competition between the West and Russia and hopes for the democratic development of the region in many cases faded away. These changes influenced and shaped the new project of the Eurasian Union.

The Eurasian Union of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is different from the one that was described by Nazarbayev in early 1990s. Nowadays, even Kazakhstani president himself often stresses that the union is not called the Eurasian Union, suggesting integration of many spheres of politics, but *the Eurasian Economic Union*, thus the strictly economic association of states.

On the other hand, is this view shared by the other participants of Eurasian integration? Authors seeking to analyse the EEU often remind now-famous quote of Russian president Vladimir Putin from 2005 when he called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (Washington Times, 2005). This statement has been interpreted as a power-based effort to restore the Russian empire. When Putin was asked ten years later by Charlie Rose on his show about a meaning of this statement in regards to the EEU, he replied that it had been a great tragedy because “25 million of Russian people found themselves beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. Before they were living in the unified state and always traditionally, Soviet Union had been called Russia, Soviet Russia” (Putin-15).

His approach to the Eurasian integration adds more colour to the debate on the nature of the EEU.

This thesis seeks to explain two basic questions: What explains the attitudes of EEU members towards this integration project? What incentives do the EEU member states have to join this integration project, and what they want to achieve? In another way, do the member states want to embrace their *economic prosperity*, or they are rather more interested in *power gains*? Or their motivations of membership are even different?

I will introduce some of the possible answers to these questions through the analysis of the public rhetoric of five presidents who are considered as the main decision-makers in the EEU member states. More specifically, I will use the content analysis to categorize the verbal expressions of Alexander Lukashenko from Belarus, Nursultan Nazarbayev from Kazakhstan, Vladimir Putin from Russia, Serzh Sargsyan from Armenia and Almazbek Atambayev from Kyrgyzstan.

The analysis combines a qualitative assessment of each expression with the subsequent quantitative survey of the final dataset. The focus is on statements which were used by presidents to explain or legitimize the accession to the EEU, therefore, most of them are collected prior the launch of the union or the member state's accession.

The final outcomes are expected to reveal which theoretical categories are most frequently used in the discourse and may the best interpret the current state of the Eurasian Economic Union. The attitude towards the EEU suggests how the members would like to shape the organization, but it may also highlight the main cleavages between them. Thanks to these findings it is even possible to some extent assess the prospects of the project into the future. Will the Eurasian integration reach a deeper level integration, or it will remain shallow as the previous attempts? It depends, among other factors, on expectations which the member states carry with them and on their consensus on the nature of integration process. Whether the organization should remain strictly economic, or it should cover even more segments of national policies.

The thesis does not analyse all arguments used for justifying the membership but rather is asking what are the general tendencies of member states decision-making on the participation in the EEU and how they affect the face of the most significant project in the region.

The thesis is divided into four main sections. The first one reviews the academic debate on the post-Soviet integration, outlines its character and introduces the main approaches to the analysis. The second part describes the formal development of the post-Soviet integration and examines divergent foreign policy priorities which commonly reflect the attitude towards regional integration. The third section draws an analytical framework for the following content analysis of public statements of five presidents. The last part presents outcomes of the content analysis and discusses them in the context of the historical and theoretical framework.

The complete dataset used for the content analysis is available on-line. In appendix is attached the coding table and the table of primary sources containing the verbal expressions of the presidents. The citations of primary sources in the text refer to this table in the appendix. For the easier orientation, each statement is labelled as a combination of a name and number of a particular statement, e. g. Lukashenko-1, Lukashenko-2, Lukashenko-3, etc.

## **1. Debate on post-Soviet integration**

The post-Soviet integration as a complex phenomenon has been in the West, and generally in the English-written works, for a long time more or less under-researched, or even neglected (Libman, 2012). The reasons are both technical, as a study of the region usually requires a good knowledge of Russian, and conceptual, as the level of integration had been remaining low for a long time compared to the European Union, ASEAN or other projects.

Therefore, one cannot find many comprehensive accounts of the post-Soviet integration, except few (Libman, 2007; Molchanov, 2009). Authors dealing with the topic used to focus on institutional aspects of the regional projects, or only on a single country, mostly Russia. The perspective on the integration processes used to be very often Russia-centred (Trenin, 2011). In sum, there has been no systematic study of the formation, and dissolution of the post-Soviet integration projects (Wirringhaus, 2013, p. 26), which is accompanied by the lack of empirical data.

This lack of literature has changed with the beginning of new and deeper initiative around the Customs Union and subsequently the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Some well-researched monographs have emerged (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013; Dutkiewitz & Sakwa, 2014; Vymyatnina & Antonova, 2014), aiming to explain the emergence of the EEU, and in more general manner, to cover the recent development in the region. The several empirical

studies of the topic tend to deal with the political feasibility of the EEU (Roberts & Moshes, 2015), or they are particularly focused on economic features of the integration (Weng, 2014).

## **1.2. Approaches to the study of post-Soviet integration**

The more comprehensive studies of the post-Soviet or later the Eurasian integration, approached the topic through many perspectives, making difficult to determine the main stream of thoughts. Nevertheless, I will try to draw up a brute description of main approaches conceived by authors in order to assess the origin, the role, and the future of the regional cooperation on the post-Soviet territory.

The process had been gradually changing, since the beginning of the 1990s, in the days after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So were the approaches of scholars, who had to reflect external aspects influencing intra-regional cooperation, such as the development of the energy market, the economic crisis or the role of great powers - the involvement of the United States and the emergence of China. Furthermore, the new leaders took power, amongst Vladimir Putin is the most prominent, and applied their own vision of the post-Soviet order.

*Imitating integration.* The dynamics of integration has shifted over years to less extensive but tighter and deeper cooperation. All the new republics of the former USSR, with the exception of the Baltic States, were associated in the Commonwealth of Independent States, but the integration did not reach ambitious goals in economic or political cooperation, and soon it has remained only empty shell or so-called “ink on paper integration” (Libman, 2007, p. 414).

As Qoraboyev (2010) noticing, this early integration within CIS had not set a clear objective to build upon, moreover, the organization was harbouring even conflictual linkages (p. 215), regarding the break-up of the Soviet Union, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia or Ukraine, that were dividing the post-Soviet space, and even further hampering possible cooperation.

Russia, hammered by internal political and economic struggles, sought to play the role of regional leader, but she could not prevent the disintegration of already loose association, and had to watch what is in words of scholars and commentators called “a form of civilized divorce” (Dutkiewitz & Sakwa, 2014, p. 62).

Nevertheless, despite frequent hostilities among the states and divergent preferences, elites in the post-Soviet state had not stopped declaring their commitment to full range-

cooperation. New projects, mostly based on the CIS, had mushroomed in full power. Libman (2007) describes this attitude towards regional organizations as “imitating cooperation” without real institutionalization. The regional integration issue was slowly becoming merely “a *rhetorical construction* used by elites to achieve their internal and external goal” (p. 414).

This approach may be particularly useful in the effort to analyse the member’s motivations for joining the Eurasian integration which is often not driven by real needs, but rather by the “constructed rationales” of leaders, functioning as a tool in achieving particular goals towards own population (e. g. “Kazakhstanisation”<sup>5</sup>) or towards external power, such as Russia, the EU or China.

**Regionalism.** A sound pro-integration attitude of elites anticipates another distinctive feature – the top-down direction of integration. It is reflected in following patterns. The framework of the integration, scope and depth are decided at the highest level of policymaking, mostly involving the countries’ presidents. Secondly, “the top-down drive of the project means also that its legitimacy and sustainability have become closely connected with the personality of the respective leaders promoting it” (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2014, p. 13).

It is unquestionable fact in the case of president Nazarbayev who has been given the role of the founding father of Eurasian integration. The Eurasian integration became a “presidential issue” also in all other participating countries, even though perhaps less covered by local media compared to a massive echo in Kazakhstan. The importance of personal involvement of presidents suggests that the deeper integration around the EEU had not triggered until new Russian president Putin entered office after more domestically concerned Yeltsin.

Even the official brochure describes the process of forming the EEU as managed by the presidents. “The discussion to agree upon the most sensitive issues was tense but the Commission in a mutual effort with the partners from the Member States was confident and diligent in pursuit to achieve the goal set by the Presidents” (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015).

With the top-down integration is the closely connected concept of regionalism. Using the frameworks developed for research on regional integration, one can distinguish between “regionalisation” defined as “de facto economic integration through market process”, and

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<sup>5</sup> The term defines the search of the national identity in the newly independent state of Kazakhstan. The multi-ethnic population struggled to identify with the new state, therefore, the president Nazarbayev started promoting newly developed construct of “Kazakhstani nationality”. See more in Matveeva (2009).

regionalism which “refers to institutional frameworks set up by the governments in the region to promote regional economic integration” (Munakata, 2004, p. 2).

Assessing the Eurasian initiative and the EEU as a project from the category of new regionalism is widely heard in the political debate as well as among Russian scholars (Molchanov, 2012, p. 14; Vinokurov & Libman, 2012, pp. 90-91). This type of integration is viewed for the post-Soviet region as a necessity in the global world in lines with Hettne’s argument considering new regionalism as a “process from within the emerging regions, where the constituent states and other actors experienced the imperative of cooperation, an urge to merge, or the pooling of sovereignty in order to tackle new global challenges” (Hettne, 2003, p. 23).

***Eurasian turn.*** The shift from what was viewed as sluggish and symbolic to high-speed integration was triggered in 2006 when political statements of leaders were followed by fast action and legal and institutional framework was established. In this stage, some scholars noticed the shift from the “post-Soviet” to the “Eurasian” integration, limited in number but more coherent with a goal to establish the deeper form integration in the Eurasian Union.

This rhetorical, political and geographical shift was followed by the ideological turn when Eurasian identity began to be more frequently defined in contrast to the European or Asian. Vinokurov and Libman (2012) introduced three different types of concepts of “Eurasianism” that have emerged throughout those years and have been shaping the processes.

The so-called Post-Soviet Eurasianism deals with the region through its common historical, and also economic and political ties with the origin in the former Soviet Union. The second one, the ideological Eurasianism follows the tradition of Russian philosophers of early 20<sup>th</sup> century, when Lev Gumilev defined many commonalities of the territory. More recently Alexander Dugin has become the self-appointed leader of this stream. His concept considers the path towards the Eurasian Union as an imperative in the foreign policy. He sees the Eurasian Union as a tool in promoting Russian interest and natural superiority in the post-Soviet space. According to him, Eurasian identity is common for the region but incompatible with the Western values and lifestyle, and this distinction must be reflected on the geopolitical map of the world.

The third type is defined as a “pragmatic Eurasianism” which builds on the blueprint of Western success and doesn’t intend to isolate the region. It focuses attention on

interdependencies between Europe and Asia and seeks, mainly economically, to “bridge” the two continents” (pp. 81-87).

Vinokurov and Libman (2012) conclude that “what we see is rather a combination of Eurasian rhetoric (paying tribute to various branches of Eurasianism, e.g. to Lev Gumilev, and also to the idea of the ‘post-Soviet Eurasia’)” (p. 86). Hence, it poses a question how solid the basis of the Eurasian idea has, and how is perceived by various leaders of the region.

***Response to neoliberalism.*** There is also rather a new perspective which sees the newly emerged initiatives less based on commonalities and interdependence but rather defined as a counter-alternative to existing neo-liberal and Western-centred order which led to “economic and moral decline” in the post-Soviet states (Lane, 2014, p. 3).

Lane suggests that Eurasian Union could succeed when cooperating with other “semi-core” structures such as BRICS or Shanghai Cooperative Organization. In this case “the Eurasian Union could legitimate a different state system and more collectivist traditional values, including those developed in Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in the past” (Lane, 2014, p. 7).

***Russian hegemony.*** The big challenge of both, practice and analysis of the post-Soviet integration, has always been an effort to assess a role of Russia in the post-Soviet area. Authors agree on the considerable Russian influence but they disagree on intensity. While Qoraboyev (2010) considers Russian hegemony as “an established fact” (p. 222), others underline evidence that Moscow leaders face considerable constraints, when dealing with the regional partners, and their influence over the foreign policy orientation of formerly dependent republics is very limited (Trenin, 2009, p. 18).

Any regional projects have to reckon with the problem of big and strong Russia. The lower number of participants in an organization automatically strengthens the problem of Russian hegemony (Libman, 2007, p. 411). Thus, states are forced to balance Russian influence or, at least, consider the endeavours with Russia as partner in terms of relative gains.

On the other hand, the discussion on Russian hegemony is not always viewed only in purely power-based terms and security perspectives. Within various regional groupings Russia might be seen as an external hegemon, but within the Eurasian framework, encompassing more diverse environment with a higher number of members, Russian domination might be coupled with authority as it is in the Central Asia (Qoraboyev, 2010, p. 225).

The attitude towards Russian position is to a great extent essential for the scholars in search of the rationale behind the EEU. While some see the organization as a Russian “tool to enforce obedience” (Jarosiewicz & Fischer, 2015, p. 8), and similarly in Weitz (2014, p. 39), or at least as politically driven in favour of Russia (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013), some other studies acknowledge only her limited role and rather enhance market-driven incentives and economic necessity of new regionalism approach (Vinokurov & Libman, 2012, p. 89; Molchanov, 2012).

From the theoretical perspective, a completely different approach is based on ideological worldview which regards Russian involvement in the Eurasian Union as a part of her global interests (Dugin, 2012), or another approach is based on the role of “shared identities” and influence of Eurasianism in Russia’s consideration to push the project forward (Moldashev & Aslam, 2015).

I seek to contribute to the debate on the post-Soviet cooperation and the Eurasian integration through the look “beyond Russia”. I will assess each member states’ position separately, considering the arguments taken up by leaders to explain and legitimize their decision to join the most robust project ever made in the post-Soviet space.

In broader terms, each outlined approach corresponds to one of four categories that stand in the core of this thesis. Although the frameworks of authors dealing with the Eurasian integration are usually more specific, categories of my content analysis have got wider theoretical underpinning. Such a decision allows me to cover a bigger part of the political reality, and what is even more important, to divide this reality into clearly bounded segments.

Hence, the market-drive regionalism can to a great extent represent the *economic motives*, while *political-security motives* encompass the problem of Russian hegemony. Eurasian turn is part of the *constructivist perspective*, and response to the neo-liberalism order is reflected by the *counter-multilateralism* efforts.

This general framework forms a backbone of the thesis.



## **2. Cooperation in post-Soviet space**

Before proceeding to the final goal, it is needed first to understand the historical background of the region and its development. It contains knowledge on process and timeframe of consolidation of the post-Soviet or Eurasian integration and its formal arrangements.

In the second part of this section, I will introduce foreign policy orientation of participating countries and their stance on regional cooperation in the past and nowadays.

### **2.1. Origins and process of Eurasian integration**

Among 39 initiatives out of which 36 came into effect (Wirminghaus, 2013, p. 25) I will mention only the most significant attempts that have shaped a path towards the Eurasian Union.

#### **2.1.1. CIS fundament**

The starting point of the post-Soviet integration dates back to 1991 when the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed by 12 out of 15 former republics of the USSR. The agreement of Minsk set up framework in very general manner, the members had committed themselves to „develop equal and mutually beneficial co-operation of the nations and states in the fields of politics, economy, culture, education, health, environment, science, trade, humanitarian and other fields, and to promote the broad exchange of information,” (CIS, 1991) but failed to specify the further steps. The agreement also, in particular, underlined the fact that no supranational institution will be established.

Nevertheless, the organization achieved to bring together most of the republics, and therefore, it laid down sort of „fundament“, as president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko later called the core of the other regional projects on the territory (Lukashenko, 2014). The military cooperation was enhanced among selected states in 1992 by the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, which later transformed into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1999. The CSTO, the first military alliance on the post-Soviet territory, has been since 1999 (with the exception of six-year long CSTO membership of Uzbekistan between 2006 – 2012) encompassing six states in total, namely Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, thus all the members of future Eurasian integration.

The economic component of the regional integration for a long time had not reached a level of integration as deep as the military realm. Agreement of 1992 evolved into the Customs Union in 1994 and Single Economic Space in 1999. However, despite rhetorical pledges, the agreement failed to specify the timeline of the integration, and no concrete steps towards common market were undertaken. Such a development clashes in contrast with EU's Single European Act of 1986 which led to the common market and foundation of the European Union (Sakwa, 2015, p. 16).

The Eurasian countries had to wait a lot longer to find a consent on a creation of genuine trade bloc. The same countries, which had been participating in the previous projects (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), signed in 2010 a treaty "strengthening the Eurasian integration", and one year later Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) was established, forming a free trade zone and common customs system coordinated on WTO rules.

This development already falls under the umbrella of "Eurasian stream" of integration without an active participation of many countries of the region, including some good Russian allies. More critical states towards Russian led-initiative did not follow the suit and were to promote competing projects, such as GUAM<sup>6</sup> of 1997. GUAM consisted of four more pro-European oriented countries Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova, which were keen on exploring possibilities within Western-oriented integration projects. The initiative had been seen as the first sign of Brzezinski's formulated term "geopolitical pluralism" (Brzezinski, 1994) which purposed to deal with the region independently on Russia, and to reflect a power division between two largest actors in the post-Soviet region Russia and Ukraine (Kuzio, 2000).

The main priorities of GUAM were listing "democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law" in a clear effort to create an alternative of the "alliance of semi-authoritarian states" in the Eurasian grouping (Molchanov, 2012, p. 7). Nevertheless, most GUAM decisions remained only on the paper, and the organization has not never moved further in fulfilling its goals, due to internal political reasons of member governments but also due to a vocal disapproval of Russia which threatened to sever economic and security guarantees of countries "disloyal" to Moscow.

Similarly, another non-Russia sponsored initiative, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, a first attempt to unite a majority of the Central Asia countries, had not reached

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<sup>6</sup> Later transformed into GUAAM when Uzbekistan acceded.

any of its proclaimed goals, and in 2005 merged with EurAsEc into one organization, additionally boosting the Eurasian stream of integration.

### **2.1.1. Towards the Eurasian Economic Union**

The endeavour directly leading to the Eurasian Economic Union was launched in 2008 when Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed customs union, covering tariffs, anti-dumping measures and taxation issues in the economic zone. Subsequently, the Eurasian Customs Union, the first organization with some supranational powers, was established in 2010. The other three members of EurAsEc – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan – were excluded from this deeper form of integration due to their low level of economic development.

The initial efforts entailed abolishing of many trade tariffs and removal of customs controls between the members, and the establishment of the common external tariffs towards non-member countries, based mainly on the rates prevailing in Russia. Members also allowed the citizens to travel within the Union without using a passport for foreign travels.

The integration into the Single Economic Space was launched in 2012 in order to allow free movement of goods, labour, and services, with the Eurasian Economic Commission as an executive body managing the integration. The regulative powers were handed to the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, but the Customs Union had stayed yet predominantly intergovernmental, whereas the Eurasian Economic Union was laid down to be governed by supranational institutions (Weitz, 2014, p. 33).

The treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union, which is in the focus of this thesis, was signed on the ceremony on the 28<sup>th</sup> of May 2014 in Astana by presidents of three founding member states – Alexander Lukashenko for Belarus, Nursultan Nazarbayev for Kazakhstan, and Vladimir Putin for Russia. The agreements came into effect on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2015, and quickly after the two other members, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, joined the union. Armenia signed the agreement on 10<sup>th</sup> of October 2014 and acceded on 2<sup>nd</sup> of January 2015 (thus not as a founding state). Kyrgyzstan had signed on 23<sup>rd</sup> of December and joined on 12<sup>th</sup> of August 2015.

The EEU covers over 20 million square kilometers and the market consisting of 182 million people which represents the largest and most significant regional project in Eurasia since the EU eastern expansion in 2004 (Roberts & Moshes, 2015, p. 1). In addition, the EEU

as a first integration grouping has declared the „international legal personality“, in a substantial contrast to the previous projects (Khitakhunov, Mukhamediyev, & Pomfret, 2015).

The inspiration by the constituency of the European Union is clear and unequivocal (Popescu, 2014, p. 1; Roberts & Moshes, 2015, p. 4), although the structure of institutions with a decision-making power is not as diffuse as in the EU. One of the main reasons, as Roberts, Moshe convincingly describe, lies in the fact that the Eurasian Economic Commission, formulated on the basis of European Commission, is actually more an inter-governmental institution than supranational one, and the decision-making bodies are arranged in sort of pyramid scheme with presidents of the countries on the top (Roberts & Moshes, 2015, p. 8).

The Eurasian Economic Commission itself consists of the two parts: the College and the Council. College of the Eurasian Economic Commission is the executive body of the Commission which consists of 14 members directly appointed by the member's governments, thus, their loyalty to the supranational institution compared to their governments rather low. Each EEU country delegates 3 members of the Commission (Kyrgyzstan just two until the end of 2016), and they are called ministers or members of the board, which preside over 23 departments. The chairman of the Commission, appointed for a mandate of four years, is currently Viktor Khristenko from Russia.

The Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission, the equivalent of the Council of the EU, oversees the executive. The Council consists of three serving deputy prime ministers of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan who formally take most decisions over the proposals of the Commission.

All the Eurasian Commission decisions shall be binding on the territory of the EAEU member states. Nevertheless, even if the Commissioners were pursuing policy independent on the member's government and pursued “supranational interests”, their power is constrained. Firstly, all disputable issues are passed over to the Council (deputy prime ministers of countries), or subsequently to the Supreme Council, the third, and the most important pillar of the EEU. The Eurasian Supreme Council is the highest decision-making body seated by heads of states, and it enjoys a de facto veto power over all major decisions of the EEU.

Secondly, the Commission is provided by any really strong enforcing tools, as the Court has been given no genuine power to force the member states to comply with its decisions. Additional, any dispute between the states must be notified to the Supreme Council, headed by presidents, before actual proceeding to the Court. This mechanism then „opens up opportunities

for behind-the-scenes negotiations among the EAEU heads of state” (Roberts & Moshes, 2015, p. 8).

Hence, the cornerstones of deeper integration have remained unresolved and they are not expected to be settled in the short-term horizon. There is neither a close perspective to achieve a smooth working of the common market of goods and labour, nor the plans for the common market of transportation and energy. Harmonization and liberalization of markets move forward slowly, as the member states do not want to give up their advantages to others. Regulated by the EEU are neither monetary policies of member states, although president Putin has already announced to take an initiative on this issue soon (Dyomkin & Nurshayeva, 2015).

## **2.2. Attitudes towards regional integration**

The post-Soviet region is a grouping of states connected by common history, economic linkages, and Russian *lingua franca*. Nevertheless, the politics in the region is more diverse than it can seem to an outsider, and so is an attitude towards regional, or any type of integration.

Take an example of one excerpt of the large post-Soviet space – Central Asia. Although most countries and international organizations, including the EU, the U.S. or the Czech Republic, deal with Central Asia in their foreign policy strategies as with one inter-connected block based on the similar characteristic, the description reflects the reality to some extent only.

In fact, some of the countries tend to pursue strong isolationism (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), while other belong to the main drivers of integration processes in the post-Soviet area (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). The situation even more complicated seems to occur in Caucasus, where a topic of regional integration places lower in agenda, and in the Eastern Europe, where the question about the direction of integration provokes even violent conflicts (Ukraine, Moldova).

Although it does not say anything about specific motivations, these divergent attitudes are indicators of how the states perceive an opportunity to participate in the Eurasian Economic Union, instead of other possible projects or an option to engage in no integration at all.

What are the factors causing either positive or negative attitude towards a regional integration? The stance on sovereignty proved to be central in this context. While two isolationist countries Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan hold a rigid approach to sovereignty, and

the latter one has even declared international neutrality, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan opt for more flexible approach, and Kazakhstan alone engages as a leader in many integration projects (Qoraboyev, 2010, p. 221). Defence of sovereignty and independence has quickly become the most important value of many republics and significant element of post-Soviet politics. “One of the persistent features of post-Soviet integration has been the reluctance of member states to sacrifice their newly-won sovereignty in favour of binding common arrangements. Accordingly, regional institutions were strictly intergovernmental and weak” (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2014, p. 12). Similarly argue also Glazyev and Tkachuk (2015, p. 61).

Moreover, empirical research suggests that a deficit of democracy strongly correlates with lower demand for regional cooperation (Mansfield et al., 2002). There is also an evidence of causal connection between regime type and leader’s will for regionalism. “Patrimonial states in which power is more fragmented—generally due to partial reforms that allowed the development of a private business sector—are more likely to commit to regional initiatives, at least de jure” (Collins, 2009, p. 276).

Hence, we might assume, that more a regime is undemocratic or patrimonial, a more isolationist stance in political-economic regional initiatives will be taken. Following this reasoning, the prospects for regional integration in the post-Soviet area tend to be higher in the case of Kyrgyzstan, rather than in Turkmenistan, or similarly, in Georgia than in Azerbaijan.

Another issue affecting the attitude and orientation of integration is related to what Libman (2007) calls “Trap of integration illusions” in which states have an available option of two competing integration schemes (p. 412). As Libman noticed, the effort to access one grouping can exclude the path into the competing one. Therefore, only the choice itself is already a very important question for the future of the country. For instance, the reluctance might cause turbulent events as it happened in Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova. The competition of two projects might also have a profound effect on the relations between the EU and the EEU.

### **2.3. Foreign policy concepts**

A student interested in states’ motivations of the regional integration must also take into account the general foreign policy priorities of each state and context of their constitution, as the incentive for the integration might be linked to domestic or neighbourhood issues.

In general, it is possible to say that foreign policy concepts of the EEU countries are divergent, even though they share several similar features. All of the countries do always mention their vital partnership with Russia, and most of them vocally emphasize joint regional policy as a priority. What they differ from each other is the form, scope, and field in which such a regional cooperation should take place.

The short analysis of member countries' foreign policy will point out some distinctive features which affect their foreign policy orientation. Russia, as a great power with more global interests, will be examined not by general policy orientation, but only through her neighbourhood policy towards so-called "Near Abroad".

### **2.3.1. Russia in Near Abroad**

Russia, the largest world's country, and nuclear power with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, has a complex foreign policy strategy, dealing with the large scale of issues ranging from the Arctic to the Middle East. However, the immediate neighbourhood and regional policy have prevailed as a high priority, especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century when the country finally consolidated after years of despair.

In the first years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders articulated a term "Near Abroad" (*ближнее зарубежье*) that referred to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and to the special relationship being maintained between them and Moscow.

These republics, with an exception of the Baltic States, under a lead of authoritarian leaders, had not undertaken a full democratic transformation, and in many ways, they have kept strong economic, political and cultural linkages to Russia up to nowadays. Some of these states demarcated according to the virtual state borders within the Soviet Union, inherited on their territories large and influential Russian ethnic minorities which often opposed to the smooth integration into the new state entity and looked up to Moscow in moments of tension.

The term Near Abroad itself may beside a geographic delimitation bear also a significant political meaning. In the political rhetoric, the term has earned a connotation of conditions under which the newly formed states are not entirely independent (Huseinov, undated) from Moscow, or at least, they fall into the zone of "privileged interests", as the president Dmitry Medvedev declared in 2008 (Economist, 2008).

Geographically, the Near Abroad to a great extent follows the border of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose union of former Soviet republics. Russian leaders tend to defend their special role of authority within the grouping by similar words that were used by the minister of foreign affairs Sergei Lavrov. “This is a common civilization area for all the peoples living here. It preserves our historical and spiritual heritage” (Lavrov, 2008).

The most recent foreign policy concept developed by the ministry of foreign affairs calls for an intensification of the regional interaction and “sees as a priority the task of establishing the Eurasian Economic Union aiming not only to make the best use of mutually beneficial economic ties in the CIS space but also to become a model of association open to other states, a model that would determine the future of the Commonwealth states” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, 2013). Beyond a regional perspective, Moscow sees the Eurasian Economic Union on a global scale “as an effective link between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region” (ibid).

One of the most prominent Russian authors writing about Kremlin’s foreign policy Dmitri Trenin argues that the concept of spheres of influence has been affecting Russian foreign policy already since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Nevertheless, he concludes, that Russia has only limited tools to interfere into the affairs of states in the Near Abroad, therefore, instead of “sphere of influence” requiring loyalty and obedience, one can merely talk about “sphere of interest” (Trenin, 2009, p. 18). Similar conclusions are presented also by Libman (Libman, 2007, p. 411).

However, other scholars underline that Russia’s actions in the region “consistently strengthen autocrats’ coercive state capacity and destabilize democratizing states in the region” (Tolstrup, 2009, p. 940), and that deepening of the regional integration through new political-military and economic projects might increase a leverage vis-à-vis post-Soviet states in the Near Abroad (Cameron & Orenstein, 2013, p. 40).

While not dismissing the differences in insights into the assessment of the real influence of Moscow in her neighbourhood, it is possible to assume that Russia sees the political-military and economic development in Near Abroad as one of the priorities of its foreign policy. Russia vocally commits herself to be very actively engaged in integration processes and seeks to project her influence.



### **2.3.2. Armenia**

The foreign policy of Armenia focuses primarily on the security and neighbourhood relations which are emphasized at several places of the introduction to the official concept.

“The foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia is aimed at strengthening the country’s external security [...] raising the efficiency of protecting the interests of Armenia and its citizens abroad [...] resolving regional problems and creating an atmosphere of cooperation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, 2015).

In a core of the foreign policy is a conflict for the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh which is claimed by Azerbaijan but since the cease-fire in 1994 continuously held by Armenia, including the occupation of seven surrounding territories indisputably belonging to Azerbaijan. A landlocked position affected by the “frozen war” with Azerbaijan at the one frontier, and historically poor relations with Turkey at another, to a great extent, limits any foreign policy maneuvering. Armenia is more or less trapped in conditions of permanent insecurity.

This focus of Armenian foreign policy shows a clear continuity. The study of Armenian foreign policy till 2003 argues that geography, history and Karabakh issue has remained as the main factors determining the foreign policy of Armenia since the independence in 1991 (Papazian, 2006, p. 237).

The concept of the new government dedicates particular space to the goal of an active work within the international community, presenting the position of Armenia and seeking “to ensure the international community's understanding of Armenia's positions, as well as provide support to them” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, 2015).

Armenian long-standing efforts seek to achieve the resolution of two main subjects: the international recognition of the Armenian genocide during the Ottoman Empire, strongly opposed by Turkey; and the acknowledgement of a right to self-determination of ethnically Armenian enclave in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In this effort, Armenian foreign policy seeks to build up alignments with countries containing a large and influential Armenian diaspora. It is the case of the United States, France and especially Russia, which is also strategically important in geopolitical, economic and military spheres.

As Papazian concludes, “the double blockade of Armenia, by Azerbaijan, since 1991, and Turkey, since 1993, and the status quo of relations between Armenia and Turkey left Armenia with no choice but to shift toward Russia” (Papazian, 2006, p. 239).

Under these circumstances, Armenian elites do not pursue an economic integration of the country into any organization as its main priority and the official concept does not mention the regional economic cooperation by a word, let alone the Eurasian Integration. On the other hand, Armenia actively looks for international backup enhancing her interest in the struggle with neighbours. A part of such a strategy may also entail an active involvement in international organizations and especially regional projects that would foster Armenian security.

### **2.3.3. Belarus**

The strong orientation towards neighbouring Russia has been traditionally a core of foreign policy concepts of Belarus since the independence in 1991. Declared foreign policy priorities call for using “in full the potential of strategic partnership” and besides bilateral agreements, it enhances a cooperation with Russian within “the framework of Union State and integration structures in the post-Soviet area” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, 2015).

Belarus has been taking part of all integration projects in the post-Soviet space sponsored by Russia: the Commonwealth of the Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Community, and the Customs Union. Moreover, the country encompassing on its territory a large Russian-ethnic minority maintains a special relationship with Russia within the Union State and joint military alliance.

Despite several occasions of worsening of the relationship during international crises in the post-Soviet area (Georgia, Ukraine) or presidential elections in Belarus, Russia remains a key strategical partner with a great economic and energetic importance for the country. Hence, the Eurasian initiative, as a project offering a lower level of integration with Russia compared to the current state, is rather perceived as a second level foreign policy priority.

Papers seeking to conceptualize foreign policy of Belarus tend to describe it by the terms, such as a “sandwich position” (Preiherman, 2014), “balancing act” (Wilson, 2015) or “geopolitical shopping” (Jarabik & Silitski, 2008, p. 107) which refer to the specific position of Belarus in the buffer zone between Russia and the European Union.

However, autocratic regime of president Lukashenko faces the infamous reputation in Europe. His counterparts tend to blame his undemocratic and corrupted rule in Belarus, thus, his bargaining position vis-à-vis the West is severely constrained. Consequently, the economy of the country and, thereby president's position, is significantly dependent on Russia, especially in terms of subsidies on energy and as an import market for Belarusian goods (Jarabik & Silitski, 2008, p. 104).

The Eurasian integration should reach a high level of standardization of the common market but except strategic partnership with Russia, markets of other members do not have a greater importance for Belarusian trade (Frear, 2014, p. 10). It is even possible that the influx of foreign goods in Belarus and Russia may cause undesired competition to domestic producers.

#### **2.3.4. Kazakhstan**

The foreign policy of Kazakhstan is characterized by clear inclinations towards an active role in international affairs. Kazakhstan has profiled as a responsible and open member of the international community, actively pursuing so-called multi-vector foreign policy (*многовекторная внешняя политика*) and the regional co-operation, since the very beginning of its independence in 1991 (Cummings, 2003, p. 140).

President Nazarbayev had in the beginning paid series of visits around the world to establish good relations with the great powers, including the U.S. and China. The most burning issue of nuclear disarmament of Soviet weapons had been resolved smoothly, as Kazakhstan had returned all warheads to Russia, gaining international credit. The state quickly joined all kinds of international regimes and organizations and even initiated the creation of new international structures (Schatz, 2004, p. 270).

Nazarbayev put himself into the role of father of Eurasianism aiming to bridge Asia and Europe. Although, some scholars express doubts about the fulfilment of his effort and argue that Kazakhstan is “floating between, rather than anchoring, East and West” (Cummings, 2003, p. 152), for the purpose of this study it is essential that Nazarbayev's concepts of “Eurasianism” and “multi-vector policy” have been forming foreign policy of Kazakhstan for decades.

The role of Kazakhstan in the Eurasian integration has been enhanced by strategic documents “Kazakhstan 2030” and more recently “Kazakhstan 2050” which puts the intra-regional integration on the top of the list of priorities. The Eurasian integration is expected to

work in both directions, externally as “an effective tool for promotion of a sustainable position in the modern world”, and internally, „with the purpose of diminishing conflict potential, solving social-economic problems, and tackling water-energy issues and other considerations.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 2014).

Despite specific distinctions, authors extensively agree on the motives which have been leading Kazakhstan towards current multilateral and integrationist policy. They convincingly argue that the newly-born state of Kazakhstan had to defend the legitimacy of own existence in the fragile environment of a multi-ethnic entity with powerful Russia as a neighbour (Schatz, 2004, p. 272; Cummings, 2003; Matveeva, 2009; Qoraboyev, 2010). Therefore, president Nazarbayev sought in the first years of independence to reach an external recognition of the state and his rule by the politics that has significantly affected the following two decades.

### **2.3.5. Kyrgyzstan**

Kyrgyzstan has experienced turbulent political years both internally and towards outer world. Due to political instability and ethnic tensions, the foreign policy tends to be inconsistent with frequent turnovers.

The last change of policy has been undertaken in 2011 by president Atambayev who fostered pro-Russian orientation, in sharp contrast to the pro-American policy of his predecessor Bakiyev. Today, the relations with Washington are considered on the historical low, while the position of Moscow in Kyrgyzstan is being strengthened (Schenkkan, 2015).

Kyrgyzstan has been enjoying productive relations with China and profiting from the re-export of cheap Chinese goods to the Post-Soviet market. Nevertheless, president Atambayev has recently announced the effort to re-structuralise the economy into a modern production-based and service-based market economy (Eurasian Center, 2015).

Foreign policy priorities mention a strong interest in a cooperation within Central Asia and support the integration processes under the leadership of Russia. The relations with Russia should reach a “new level of strategic cooperation” and Kyrgyzstan strives to support “the country's integration into the economy of the EurAsEC countries through Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Customs Union” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, 2013).

Kyrgyzstan is interested in joining the common market not only due to the potential inflow of investments and increase of export opportunities but the state also reflects an

opportunity to improve the status of approximately more than 700,000 migrants working in Russia. Therefore, among the policy priorities, Kyrgyzstan highlights the need to “continue development of inter-governmental cooperation mechanisms to protect labour migrants abroad” (ibid).

## **2.4. Intergovernmental relations**

There is no confusion that some member states of the EEU have a particular interest in some links, and they are less interested in the others. As I showed above, for Armenia is a priority the regional security which requires gaining the international support. Both issues are significantly connected to Russia. Not only that Russian guards watch the Armenian borders, Russians supply Armenia with armaments and military technologies in the war against Azerbaijan, and provide another strategic commodity – energy. Russia is also capable of intervening in Armenian favour from the position of the regional power and the member of the UN Security Council.

Russia is the most vocal to invite new members and expand the EEU among all post-Soviet states (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2014, p. 14). Russia takes an advantage that she has kept strong economic and political ties in most countries of the former Soviet Union, unlike the rest of the EEU that has stakes bigger among external markets rather than inside the union. Moreover, bilateral agreements between Russia and the rest of the countries in the region are a good habit that threatens to hamper some other multilateral efforts, including the EEU.

The exception among the member states which are usually interested solely in the cooperation with Russia is Kyrgyzstan. The little state is eager to strengthen the relations with ethnically similar Kazakhstan. In contrary, Belarus pursues a more vigorous approach to the idea of widening the union, since her main markets are located in Russia, Ukraine, and the EU. Only very little interdependence does exist between Belarus and Central Asia or Caucasus which might limit Belarus gains from the potential economic integration.

## **3. Content analysis**

The previous parts have shown the complexity of integration processes in the post-Soviet region, and more interestingly, different interpretations of goals that were meant to be

achieved. The fragmentation of discourse is not that much caused by uncertainty about motivations of states that are involved but rather by divergent preferences of theirs. Cleavages between members, naturally, must be reflected also in the public rhetoric, as each political representation tend to underline different layers of cooperation, or sometimes, non-cooperation.

My thesis aims to shed some light on those cleavages which are in my opinion powerful enough to shape a face of the Eurasian Economic Union. As suggested, the approach to the analysis of this problem is based on the public rhetoric, which set relevant empirical data to my work. More specifically, I focus on verbal expressions of five member states' presidents who are believed to be the main decision-makers of their respective countries. Their rhetoric is examined through a content analysis of arguments used by them for justifying a membership in the EEU. This approach is expected to bring a better understanding of motivations behind a decision to establish or join such a union, and in general, to interpret the nature of the EEU.

This method can reveal answers to my research question along with some of the most discussed issues regarding the post-Soviet space. What is the motivation of states for joining the Eurasian Union? What are key driving forces behind the project and how can theoretical framework help to explain it? How does the political representation perceive the goals of the organizations? How is defined the national interest within the regional integration framework?

Such a design of thesis must necessarily reflect constructivist approach to international relations underlining a fact that understanding of politics is dependent on verbal symbols, even if they did not have always a match in the real world (Graber, 1976, p. 6). A sufficient number of arguments can be found for such a claim.

Firstly, it is well researched that “phenomena which exist only in symbols or in the imagination can stimulate thought an action nonetheless, at least as much as their physically verifiable counterparts can” (Graber, 1976, p. 9). Secondly, expressed perceptions of leaders may become a reason for action for subordinates and followers, as well as for the opposition force. “Moreover, most information about prospective actions, as well as the motivations and reasoning process which underline the activities of political actors, comes to us through their words” (Graber, 1976, p. 17).

Last but not the least, it is simply very important and useful to know how influential actors perceive the political scene, since they are in many cases provided by significant powers, and especially in the post-Soviet space which is mostly ruled by regimes described as “patrimonial authoritarianism” (Collins, 2009).

When the right approach is selected, I can concentrate on the own process of analysis and describe the method by which the research is carried out. The content analysis is defined by Weber as “a set of procedures to make inferences from text” (as cited in Hermann, 2009, p. 151); according to Moyser and Wagstaffe, it is a method “capable of throwing light on the ways [people]... use or manipulate symbols and invest communication with meaning“ (as cited in Hermann, 2009, p. 151).

As a unit of analysis from which I make inferences is considered any statement, speech or interview of five member states presidents responding to the research question: What is the motivation of state to join the EEU? The subjects of analysis include particularly presidents of the EEU member states, since they concentrate in hands a large bulk of the power, and they are constitutionally authorized to unilaterally decide on all strategic issues of foreign policy.

Citing the Constitution of Kazakhstan, the president is supposed to determine “the main directions of the foreign policy of the country and represents Kazakhstan in international relations” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 2014). A similar mechanism works in the rest of the countries. The presidents authorized to constitute a policy and legitimize it in front of the public. Hence, the verbal expressions of the president might disclose motivations of states in foreign policy issues better than any other figure.

Their statements are coded according to a procedure that I describe in one of the later parts. For now, I assume that the statements might be representational, but also instrumental in nature, and frequency should indicate a salience to the speaker. The important stage is the operationalization when the expressions must be coded and sorted into the categories.

Categorization of arguments may reveal a certain image of reality. The patterns of the rhetoric of presidents of the EEU member states. Therefore, it says a lot about the EEU itself. The categories in this thesis are widely conceptualize and underpinned by the main theoretical approaches to the international relations. They are presumed to carry formative factors of the motivation to join the EEU. I selected them – the total of four generic categories - after the preliminary research of published literature, media analyses, and political statements.

In the previous parts, I have described the origins and process of the regional integration in the post-Soviet space as well as a variety of concepts related to that. Hence, I can easily put my findings in the context, and after drawing outcomes of content analysis, to interpret collected data. Bearing in mind the argument that anything that has been said shapes decision-making, I

seek to qualitatively interpret interactions between the actors, to assess their prospects for cooperation.

This approach has, of course, its strict limitations. The difference between rhetorical justifications and real motivations may be profound as the leaders can distort the reality, or intentionally lie. In spite of this disadvantage I have mentioned some of the reasons making me believe that “verbal images of reality deserve to be studied in their own right” (Graber, 1976, p. 9).

Scholars also tend to raise a question about accountability of authoritarian leaders to their domestic audience. However, the disconnection between public statements and real motives do not have to be necessarily as wide as it may seem at first glance. Recently, they have been published studies, acknowledging that also autocratic regimes must do their foreign policy decision, knowing that eventually, they might be domestically punished (Weeks, 2010).

In conclusion, the content analysis seems to be a viable method of conducting research on such a topic seeking to identify a motivation of regional integration. This work is rather empirically focused, therefore, the results are expected to be tied to a development of the Eurasian Economic Union. Another approach is difficult to carry out due to the scope of a thesis and because conceptually like-wise regional projects are often considered to be *sui generis*.

### **3.1. Categories**

When we seek to understand why states decide to join a regional organization such as the EEU, it is fruitful to consider perspectives of all main approaches of international relations theory. The decision to form theoretically broad underpinning has two main advantages.

Firstly, the main theories provide a stable framework for a wide range of arguments. This is particularly useful in the research focused on the collection of data from public discourse and categorization of this data. Secondly, they are also pertinent to the general understanding of regional organizations since the “main theoretical approaches to international institutions are some of the main theoretical approaches to the international relations” (Karlson, 2008, p. 28).

Hence, three out of four categories for content analysis are grounded in so-called great theories of international relations and their respective schools of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These theoretical approaches certainly do not find always the exact reflection in the real world but they should be in broader terms adequately reflected in political rhetoric.



Selected categories are not generated only on the basis of literature that I described in the beginning but they are also partly reflected in the public discourse and media. The preliminary testing showed that arguments based on neorealism (focusing on security concerns that may stimulate either regional cooperation or conflict) and neoliberalism (which emphasizes the importance of economic interdependence) are widely used among academics, journalists or politicians themselves. Moreover, this division addresses to a great extent absolute-relative gains dichotomy of political reality.

Although described approaches represent the mainstream perspective, some authors see the EEU through constructivist perception and stress the role of shared Eurasian identity as the main constituent of the integration. Besides that, I added to the final selection a category based on the concept of counter-multilateralism, in order to involve the stream of thoughts that is also widely heard in the debate but does not fit in any of greater theoretical categories. Thus, the last category covers a narrower segment of political rhetoric, but it is a popular hypothesis specifically targeting the issue of the Eurasian integration.

### **3.1.1. Economic motives**

The logic of category which considers primarily economic motives as a priority is underpinned by liberalism and neoliberalism.

The liberal approach to international relations focuses on the economic reasoning behind the state decisions in the international affairs and emphasizes the importance of interdependence. The first one who has introduced the concept of interdependence has been in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Norman Angell. He puts a stress on the importance of trade and economic well-being and argues that the security depends upon no profit clause for the conqueror (Angell, 1910, pp. 27-29).

Although the higher level of economic interaction brings to states economic benefits, they also have to bear inseparable costs, as the unilateral policies of one state may harm the economy of the other state, and create *negative externalities* (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 485). Hence, the interdependence motivates national governments “to co-operate where policy coordination increases their control over domestic politics outcomes” (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 485).

Consequently, states seek to reduce the costs by engaging in two types of cooperation: economic liberalization and harmonization of economic policies (Karlás, 2015, p. 49).

The liberal thinking builds on the premise that foreign policy of states is based on preferences of domestic actors. In contrary to realism, these preferences might be influenced and changed, for instance by growing interdependence. Consequently, domestic actors push the state institutions to reduce the costs of interdependence, and they project their preferences to the preferences of the state.

Neoliberals took over the realist assumption about the state as the main actor in the international arena but they do not see their mutual relations primarily conflictual. In their perspective, states are still egoistic, but in most cases they are able to cooperate in order to maximize their profit, and they are involved in *rent-seeking* (Keohane, 1984, p. 79). Their belief about the existence of volunteer cooperation beneficial for all bridges neoliberalism and liberalism.

Neoliberals intensively focus on a question how to overcome so-called cooperation problems – collaborative, coordination and distributive problems, which arise during the interaction. These problems along others that hamper cooperation, such as uncertainty and incomplete information, might be reduced by international organizations, as “they have been expected to increase the welfare of its creators” (Keohane, 1984, p. 80).

Finally, I can assume when states are more economically interdependent (or they want to allow it), and they want to boost their cooperation (e.g. in Eurasia), they feel a necessity cooperate also politically (e.g. harmonize their policies) in order to prevent unneeded costs.

### **3.1.2. Political-security motives**

This category reflects a realist approach to international relations that considers state interests and distribution of power within the structure as the main drivers of international politics.

The tradition of realist school goes back to Edward H. Carr’s critics of idealism in which he rejects idealist’s stress on ethics of politics and the claim that theory may change the political practice (Carr, 1939). In his perception - and more generally in the realist tradition – the states, not the individuals, are the primary actors in the international relations. Secondly, realists, unlike others, believe that preferences of states are defined in terms of power (Morgenthau, 1948/1980, p. 12), and distribution of power is the only factor that affects a state’s behaviour.

Since the focal point of this thesis is in the motives of states, the particular attention is given to the realist assumption that main motives of states in the international arena are to *strengthen the power or security* (Carr, 1939; Waltz, 1979). However, only a few authors actually assume that both motives play the same role in the international relations. Some authors stress the significance of power (Morgenthau, 1948/1980), or security (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1994-1995).

Since the international relations are conflictual *per se*,<sup>7</sup> the cooperation between states is non-existent or very rare. When it occurs it has to be in favour of someone, especially strongest states or great powers. Given Russia's central position in the post-Soviet space, the realist perspective on post-Soviet regional integration tends to be particularly attractive in the academic and political discourse, which assesses that the EEU was created to boost Russian power.

In realist perspective, the international institutions are laid down and dominated merely by state interests and their power. "They are based on the self-interested calculations of great powers" (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995, p. 7). They do not have project an independent influence on the preference of states that remain fixed, so they matter only "on a margin" (p. 7).

International institutions are stable only under the hegemonic order. According to the theory of hegemonic stability are institutions dependent on a hegemon and when this structure weakens, the institutions necessarily weakens as well or even ceases to exist (Keohane, 1980, p. 132). The hegemonic order might be widely beneficial (sometimes even more) for the other members of the institution, as the hegemon is capable of providing the public goods for all. When he provides public goods just alone, other members of the hegemonic order behave as "free riders" and do not carry any costs. Hence, they benefit from the hegemony (Snidal, 1985, p. 581).

According to the offensive realists, especially the great powers, such as Russia, primarily seek to achieve regional hegemony as a part of their effort for survival (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 83). The security concerns, in particular, are the primary motivation of cooperation or non-cooperation with other states. Any other attempts at making alignments in a region without a participation of a hegemon are considered by the hegemon as a threat to its security.

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<sup>7</sup> The conflictual nature of international relations is in realist perspective given by human nature (Morgenthau, 1948), or in neo-realist perspective by anarchical structure (Waltz, 1979) which causes a zero-sum struggle.

### 3.1.3. Eurasianism

To introduce category that seeks to represent the constructivist perspective of the regional integration in the post-Soviet space, one may paraphrase Wendt (1992) and consider that described process is nothing but what actors actually make of it (Söderbaum, 2004, p. 44).

Constructivists consider ideas as a main constituent of the international structure, particularly *shared ideas*. The shared ideas might exist in a form of discourse, identities or norms. Secondly, the constructivists argue that the interests and identities of states are not given and fixed but they are determined by the actor's role in the idea structure (Karlson, 2008, p. 62).

Decision-making of actors proceeds according to the "logics of appropriateness". They decide according to their social position and a role, and not according to the "logics of consequences". Hence, they are not always rational and egoistic utility maximizers but they are rather involved in the role-playing (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997, p. 155).

Furthermore, international institutions are not the consequences of actors' interests but they are a prerequisite for the existence of these interests and identities. (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997, p. 139). To be precise, the institutions are made from identities of actors but at the same time the institutions create these identities because they are "mutually constitutive" (Wendt, 1994, p. 389).

In this light, the Eurasian integration is not only being motivated by material factors and power distribution. The joint decisions and their content are mainly being formed by shared ideas and identities, which are constantly changing in the process of interaction (Moldashev & Aslam, 2015, p. 1).

The Eurasian integration is suggested to be built on the shared idea of *Eurasianism* that is linked to the collective *Eurasian identity*. Nevertheless, there is no unity on vague terms Eurasianism and Eurasian identity at all. The main theoretical concepts most common in the discourse are summarized in Vinokurov-Libman (2012). I will briefly introduce two of them relevant for this category that provides the umbrella for motives based on ideas and identity.

For a sake of this thesis, it is possible to distinguish between "Russian notion" of Eurasianism and the concept of the president Nursultan Nazarbayev who introduced it as a state ideology. This division is certainly not overwhelming but within the larger constructivist

framework, it is sufficient to see the main distinctions before interpreting data of content analysis.

*Russian-centric Eurasianism* is based on work of Lev Gumilev and other Russian philosophers of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century who were promoting a common Slavic-Turkic-Mongol ethnographic origin, and focusing on a socio-cultural core of the movement with the central role of Russia. Today's development of Eurasianism is connected with Alexandr Dugin who reflects mainly geopolitical nature of Eurasianism. His conception has a clear ideological connotation: "it represents the 'Eurasian' world as a distinct reality from the European 'Western' civilisation, but also from the Asian cultures" (Vinokurov & Libman, 2012, p. 83), and establishes "quasi-eternal teleological confrontation between a Continental power (represented actually by Russia) and a Maritime power (represented by USA)" (Qoraboyev, 2010, p. 214).

However, the founders and participants of the Eurasian community are not willing to share such an idea, since they usually enjoy productive relations with both Russia and the United States. Eurasianism for them contains the need to build cooperative relationships rather than confrontation. Nazarbayev's *pragmatic Eurasianism* sees this concept as a link between Turk and Slavic culture, but not synonymous with Russia. In this conception, the Eurasia should work as a bridge between the Europe and Asia, especially in terms of trade and infrastructure.

### **3.1.4. Counter-multilateralism**

This category is unlike other three not based on any of the grand theories but it is to a great extent generated by the public and academic discussion, addressing popular opinions that assess the Eurasian project as an effort of Putin's Russia to establish a sort of "New World Order" (Gregory, 2015). By this approach, the Eurasian Union is viewed as a first step and a counter-initiative to the current system of international relations being managed through establishing a new multilateral platform.

In order to bring this stream of arguments together, I will seek to conceptualize this category through the proposed approach of Morse and Keohane (2014) which is summarized in their paper *Contested Multilateralism*.

The paper defines counter-multilateralism, or contested multilateralism as follows:

“Contested multilateralism involves the use of different multilateral institutions to challenge the rules, practices, or missions of existing multilateral institutions. More precisely, the phenomenon of contested multilateralism occurs when states and/or nonstate actors either shift their focus from one existing institution to another or create an alternative multilateral institution to compete with existing ones” (Morse & Keohane, 2014, p. 4).

Conceptual framework divides counter-multilateralism into two parts. Regime shifting and competitive regime creation. I will deal only with the second concept according to which states react on the unsatisfactory situation within or outside existing structure with an initiative to establish a new multilateral institution which is their favour. As Keohane and Morse note, counter-multilateralism refers to the conflict *between*, not *within*, multilateral institutions. (p. 8).

*Competitive regime creation* seeks to challenge the existing institutional *status quo*. A challenging actor or coalition of actors first take action to create a new multilateral institution that more conveniently represents members’ interests. The new policy orientation might be ensured by various “direct control strategies”, such as limiting membership to like-minded states, establishing informal channels of control, or structuring voting in a favourable manner (Morse & Keohane, 2014, p. 16).

Alternatively, the new institution might be created with a more favourable mandate and conditions for its members. As a challenge to the *status quo*, the dissatisfied actors of previous institutional structure create extra bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the *status quo* institution (Morse & Keohane, 2014, p. 16). Hence, through this mechanism the potential member states of the EEU might get leverage vis-à-vis their potential membership in the EU, or vice versa.

Although this concept has a limited scope and does not cover a wide range of arguments, different alternatives of “contested multilateralism”, “counter-multilateralism” or “New World Order” were so widely used in the public discourse, that it seemed practical to create a separate category. The counter-multilateralism is different from the category of political-military motives which is primarily aimed at states’ effort to strengthen power or security, and the motivation is not as much focused on dysfunctions of the previous system as the counter-multilateralism.

As I have once already argued, the main advantage of this category is a concreteness of its definition. A specifically defined concept related to a matter strictly limits sometimes

ambiguous interpretation of more general categories. It is an important component especially during the phase of data categorization.

### **3.2. Data**

Political discourse in particular countries can take different forms and shapes that produce arguments relevant to the cause of study. In regards to this thesis, it would be feasible to opt for the analysis of wide range of sources, such as expressions of wider political representation, media content, or political opposition. As in any work of this kind, one has to take into account the advantages and disadvantages of wider or more narrow dataset.

Originally, I was planning to cover the expressions of all main political figures of the EEU's member countries. Nevertheless, after the early beginning of data collection, I had to reconsider this idea in favour of less extensive conception, focused merely on the heads of state.

This decision is easily defensible based on three points.

1) Covering the main arguments for accession in five countries of the union is an extremely time-consuming task, and the capacity of a research for any master's thesis is externally limited. Therefore, it makes a bigger sense to narrow the search and conduct the analysis more accurately.

2) The argument is supported by the fact that main and very influential decision-makers of respective countries are matched with the figures of all five presidents. Given both formal and informal political structure, I assume that the presidents are ones who form and legitimize foreign policy moves. Furthermore, the EEU is to a great extent considered as a presidential project involving a great personal input. For most mentioned presidents it is a domestically sensitive issue on which they may lose or gain popularity. Due to all these reasons, they give only a limited space for expressions of other representatives and more diverse opinions whatsoever.

3) Due to high personal stake of presidents in the project and their positions as undisputable leaders of their countries, their opinions and views of the world are the most available to a broader public. Not only that presidents of the EEU meet regularly at several platforms, their rhetoric is often followed by national media of other states. Therefore, without a need to carry out the interviews with politicians and officials, who hide in the shadow of presidents, we know about presidents' views more than about any other person of a country.

As I have already mentioned, the availability of presidents' opinions makes them accessible for the research purposes. They express their thoughts during formal speeches after joint meetings of the EEU and other organizations in which they are involved, such as CIS. They are often being quoted in the official documents of important agreements and declarations. Naturally, they are frequently a subject of coverage of various media outlets. Particularly useful are long one-hour interviews in the Russian TV where the presidents describe their foreign policy plans. But other national media also use a similar format of long one-on-one discussions with a president. In spite of sometimes chaotic environment of post-Soviet media, much of content is available on-line and free of charge, which allows conducting research easier (and cheaper).

Another advantage of selected sample is a language commonly used for communication. Since the only official language of the EEU is Russian, and Russian is not only in Armenia the official state language, most of the public statements regarding the EEU are available in Russian. This factor of Russian working as *lingua franca* of the post-Soviet territory might be discouraging for some researchers since they are able to find only minimum material in English. Whereas for me, it is a considerable advantage, as there is no pressing need to deal with translations from Kazakh or Kyrgyz.

On the other hand, the volume of the final data set is limited by several factors. Firstly, it is uneasy task to find a specific answer to the research question. Even if presidents mention the EEU, they do not necessarily explain the general benefits of accession or their motives, but they often deal with particular challenges which they face at the moment. Secondly, the Eurasian integration is not always on the agenda, and for some presidents, it is an even minor issue in their foreign policy orientation. Thirdly, perhaps most importantly, the EEU is a relatively new project whose development accelerated very quickly. Hence, over a short time period, there are not many statements and verbal expressions related to the rationale behind the EEU, especially in cases of Kyrgyzstan and Armenia which joined the union in later stages.

Prior to the start of data collection, I had been suggesting that each president would provide at least 20 different arguments for the analysis. However, after had read hundreds of pieces of texts and watched hours of videos retrieved from open sources I could manage to ensure as low minimum as eight or ten specific statements of each president. Yet I believe that I have covered more than 80 percent of all public expressions related to the research question.



To sum up, the final outcomes are limited by the unequal distribution of data in time and their relative shortage, on the other hand, the dataset covers a large part of the discourse, fostering a relevance of the research.

The final data set accounts for 58 different arguments identified out of 53 public appearances of five presidents. First, I translated the exact statements used for analysis from Russian to English, then I coded them according to the scheme described below and assigned them to the one of four categories. Moreover, I have been tracking two secondary variables in order to get a more complex picture of actors' behaviour. The first one regards to the place where the expression was stated. The second one distinguishes the type of expression, and logs whether it occurred as a part of a speech or interview.

The whole data set in the excel sheet is available on-line attached to this thesis. Most of the data are also included in the appendix. To make data set more transparent and enable a replicability of the research, I mention not only a source of a particular statement included in the analysis but also the hypertext link and in the case of the video also a precise timestamp.

### **3.3. Operationalization**

Content analysis as a specific method of this thesis is to examine the content of communication by counting *keywords* corresponding to one of the specific categories in the text. A meaning is attributed to words or broader units according to given coding system (Drulák, 2008, p. 98).

In this thesis, *keywords* are linked to theoretically based categories that I have addressed earlier. Before I proceed to the coding process itself I have to clarify how the unit of analysis was selected. The final data set consists only of the expressions of leaders that were related to the EEU (or its direct predecessor the Eurasian Customs Union) and at the same time they must have been sufficiently explicit to indicate the type of motivations leading the state to the decision of joining the project.

The result is a two-level analysis of presidents' expressions. The first step is a qualitative analysis of arguments which were used to support the accession to the EEU. As I mentioned, they must have been linked to the research question. Consequently, the expressions were sorted by their content into four categories, or if they could not fit into any, they were registered in the dataset but not assigned to any group.

When one of the arguments referred to more than one category, it was assigned to that one which was stressed the most, or that one standing in the core of a statement. Sometimes an argument from one category (e. g. economic welfare) may serve only as a foothold for another (e. g. security and stability). In this case, the preference was given to the latter one, at the end of a chain.

The key for categorization were not only keywords but also phrases and sentences referring to particular categories. The category of economic motives includes references to the economic cooperation, issues of interdependence, benefits of free trade, but also covers such issues, such as the access to the bigger market and modern technologies.

The arguments of Nursultan Nazarbayev and Almazbek Atambayev provide an example. *“We have clear and pragmatic economic interests - to develop the country, to support the economy and to increase the export of Kazakhstan. And where to sell it? If it is not possible to sell it, there are no products [made] and nobody has a work”* (Nazarbayev-6).

*„We expect totally different perspectives for the development of the economy, business and inflow of investments which we expect both from the EEU and from the non-CIS countries (из стран дальнего зарубежья)”* (Atambayev-5).

To the category of political-security arguments were assigned those referring to security and military cooperation, the presence of external threats, regional stability or state interests in terms of power in international relations.

For instance, Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin stated: *“I believe that we create a new economic, political centre of power on the Eurasian territory. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation move forward in the right way because the success of EEU is important not only for our states but also for our closest neighbours. It will become a significant factor for all large international centres”* (Lukashenko-2).

*“We can create convenient conditions for the development of our economies, in terms of stability, security and prosperity in the Eurasian territory”* (Putin-5).

Motives linked to the idea of Eurasianism and more general constructivist perspective could be represented by references to the shared Eurasian identity, the common set of values or the post-Soviet unity. Kyrgyz president Atambayev declared, for instance: *„We have to be necessarily in one block, in one union with brother countries Kazakhstan and Russia. When we presidents of Eurasian Union meet, I always say that there has been a historical commonality*

*of the territory. (...) We are independent countries and we will be independent countries but this historical and blood commonality we must maintain” (Atambayev-5).*

The last category called counter-multilateralism includes the arguments referring to the dysfunctional world order, incorrectness of policies and values of the West and the need for establishing new multilateral platforms based on cooperation with emerging economies, such as BRIC or Shanghai Cooperation Agreement. For example, Kazakhstani president Nazarbayev talked about the erosion of the Western values.

*“Everyone talks about the world erosion of, we can say, “the Western values”. In general, we have to rather talk about the erosion of the society of consumption which was using the easy loans to reach groundless wealth. The time came when it broke down. Therefore, our Customs Union of common economic space as a path towards the Economic Union is both our way out and the response to the situation in our condition” (Nazarbayev-3).*

During the testing, a special category arose which could be called “a fear of exclusion”. Some statements referred to the decision on membership in the EEU that does not leave any other choice since any non-integrated country would get isolated and worse off.

*„I can see it will be difficult if we don’t join this union. Fuel, flour in Kyrgyzstan will get more expensive and the borders will shut down. Therefore, it is necessary to get in while we are invited so that we don’t have to wait afterwards when we think over” (Atambayev-6).*

*“Had we not acceded to the Eurasian Union, we would have faced more painful problems” (Sargsyan-8).*

Nevertheless, these expressions do not form a special theoretical category. In most cases the arguments are linked to the economy, politics, or security. Hence, they were coded to their respective categories, but at the same time, I registered into the dataset whether presidents used such an argument, perceiving the integration as a better option to the exclusion from the system.

The process of identification of concrete arguments and assigning them to the categories is certainly prone to the subjective interpretation. Hence, the bias must be limited by undertaking several measures. Firstly, all arguments are precisely recorded and repeatedly compared to each other. Secondly, they are always considered in the context of the situation – not assessed separately, out of context. Thirdly, due to the relatively lower amount of data, it was possible to carry out the qualitative evaluation in a relatively short period of time,

decreasing the possibility of different interpretation at a different time and under different conditions.

The qualitative evaluation is followed by the quantitative assessment of coded expressions and final interpretation of data. Coding of expressions was simplified into the basic split regarding the presence of argument that is possible to assign to one of the categories, then coded with a value 1. In opposite case, the value was set to 0. The aim was not to assess the intensity of arguments in the expressions but rather to track which category of arguments tends to be used more frequently, thus, considered as relevant for the discourse.

In sum, the final result is not a statistical outline of all arguments used, as the thesis does not seek to provide a complex picture of public discourse. It shows which categories of arguments of presidents were used, or on the other hand, which were left out of the discussion.

## **4. Outcomes and Interpretation**

The following Table 1 summarizes the results of public expressions of all five presidents stated in favour of Eurasian integration and the accession to the Eurasian Economic Union.

The first striking point lies in a fact that no clearly shaped results emerged. Neither the economic motives nor the political-security motives - two most discussed categories - did not accumulate the overwhelming majority of arguments. On the contrary, arguments out of all four categories are actually present in the discourse, even though some categories gets significantly more attention than others.

To proceed to concrete figures, most arguments throughout the debate on the Eurasian integration have referred to the *economic advantages* in terms of market harmonization, free trade or inflow of investments. Nevertheless, all leaders at least once underlined *political-security motivation*, mostly referring to the regional stability or the essential linkages between the EEU and CSTO, and a notable part of their statements has been devoted to *shared identity and Eurasianism*. In contrast, the arguments possibly falling within a category of *counter-multilateralism* have been mentioned very rarely, even negligibly in absolute terms.

**Table no. 1**

<b>Leader (country)</b>	<b>Economic motives</b>	<b>Eurasianism</b>	<b>Political-security</b>	<b>Counter-Multilateralism</b>
Lukashenko (BLR) (11)	3 (27 %)	0	8 (73 %)	0
Nazarbayev (KAZ) (17)	9 (53 %)	4 (29 %)	2 (12%)	1 (6 %)
Putin (RUS) (12)	3 (25 %)	4 (33 %)	4 (33 %)	1 (8 %)
Sargsyan (ARM) (7)	3 (43 %)	1 (29 %)	3 (43 %)	0
Atambayev (KGZ) (11)	8 (73 %)	2 (18 %)	1 (9 %)	0
<b>Total (58)</b>	<b>26 (45 %)</b>	<b>12 (21 %)</b>	<b>18 (31 %)</b>	<b>2 (3 %)</b>

In the light of these findings, it seems easier to start with a question what the EEU is considered *not to be* than how the leaders publically perceive the entire project. Since the counter-multilateralism category is very marginal in the results, we can assume that countries seek to integrate *within* the current system, and *not outside* it.

It is a very important finding since it persuasively rejects a view very popular among media and public figures claiming that Russia and her allies seek to leave the neo-liberal global order and build an alternative one. Such ideological shift would have certainly been reflected in public rhetoric, however, there is no such evidence. Only two arguments were counted and both relatively long time before the actual launch of the EEU.

Expectedly, very frequent has been the argumentation by economic advantages, since formally the economic integration should be the formative goal of the union. They were found at least three references to the economic motives by each president, and overall 45 % of the arguments were linked to economic issues. Presidents were in the discourse often promising “to increase the export” (Nazarbayev-6), “to increase competitiveness” (Putin-6) or “to create job places” (Atambayev-10). To conclude, the reasoning, or at least legitimization of the accession to the EEU, has been to a great extent built on economic development perspectives.

More interestingly, the outcomes indicate that the economic rationale is not the only one involved, but the Eurasian project is also enhanced by other two types of motivation. Firstly, arguments stressing the political-security nature, thus underlining the state interests in terms of power or security, have covered 31 % of all arguments. This result may indicate that the states are concerned of they own security (e. g. terrorism or external threat such as NATO), or they


might be interested in increasing their power and political position in the international relations. Consequently, the EEU as a large block with a strong leader should ensure these gains.

Secondly, and probably the most surprisingly, the results revealed a considerable impact of constructivist collective Eurasian identity and even shared idea of the union similar to the USSR. Although this tendency has been omitted by most of the scholars (Moldashev & Aslam, 2015, pp. 2-3), it might be an important factor in forming a functional regional organization. The leaders were usually addressing terms, such as “common humanitarian space” (Putin-10), “common mentality” (Nazarbayev-7) or “common motherland” (Atambayev-5) which shall be drivers of deeper integration.

In the first part, I have shown certain patterns of general reasoning which might have made some points on the nature of Eurasian integration, but a closer look at the table shows that the argumentation among the leaders is not entirely coherent, and arguments are rather diffused.

Whereas the presidents of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan frequently refer to the economic nature of the integration, Russia and particularly Belarus tend to stress more often the political-security meaning for the member countries. Armenia stands in the middle in the specific position which I will clarify later. For now, the most distinct point of the results is a sharp division between the position of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on one side, and Belarus and partly Russia on the other. This evidence is displayed in Table 2.

**Table no. 2**



The major cause of this split might be explained by two factors. Firstly, the strong alliance between Russia and Belarus, which is stamped by their own political-economic Union state, is projecting influence and characteristics of their own union into a new project of the EEU.

Secondly, Belarus and Russia with strong links to Europe, and relatively developed economy compared to the other members lack significant incentives to open the market for not very populated and less developed countries, and they have other motives of regional integration. It was apparent in Lukashenko's reluctance to approve the membership of Kyrgyzstan which is the least developed country of the EEU with GDP per capita as low as \$3,169, fighting structural problems of the economy, internal instability, and which is geographically remote from the European periphery.

On the other hand, for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the membership is a good opportunity to access big Russia-Belarus market, and consequently, make their way to Europe and the European standard. Both presidents have repeatedly claimed that the EEU could help their countries to access Europe. *"We are an inland country, we have no access to the sea. I always say that our sea is China and Russia. We are opening the big market for Kazakhstani products"* (Nazarbayev-15). *"We particularly rely on that, that we have only way to Europe – through Russia and Kazakhstan. I think that we move together in that direction"* (Atambayev-9).

How do the final results look like when they are sorted by date? I divided a timeframe into four periods which managed to accumulate a relatively balanced number of arguments in each section, and at the same time, they determine four different stages of the EEU development. The first period *between years 2011 and 2013* preceded the actual signing of an agreement by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, and therefore, it might be assumed that presidents had been expressing their long-term plans, and the rhetoric regarding Eurasian integration had been taking shape yet.

The *first half of 2014* is regarded as a final stage of negotiation before the ceremonial in Astana of 29<sup>th</sup> of May when the agreement was signed. In this period, the annexation of Crimea by Russia had been finalized which could have had a profound effect on the prospects of the union. The *second half of the same year* was topped by the launch of the EEU on 1<sup>st</sup> of January

2015. In this period, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan signed the agreement about the accession. The enlargement process *was completed in 2015* when Armenia joined and later also Kyrgyzstan.

The Table 3 summarizes the distribution of arguments within the given timeframe. It is fair to note, that the factor deeply affecting total figures is a division between new members, who acceded later, and three old members. Whereas, the presidents of three “old members” had been the most active before signing the agreement and the launch of the EEU, Sargsyan of Armenia and Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan, were naturally pushed to explain and legitimize their steps towards the EEU later on, mainly in the second half of 2014, by the time of the accession agreement.

The figures show that presidents of original member countries were particularly active in explaining the core motivations before signing the agreement of May 2014. In the second half of 2014, their attention shifted towards more specific problems or even different foreign policy issues. Hence, the total figures in the first two of four time periods reflect especially arguments of Lukashenko (9 arguments), Nazarbayev (11 arguments) and Putin (8 arguments), whereas the second half of table is more influenced by the expressions of Atambayev (11 arguments).

**Table no. 3**

	<b>2011–2013</b>	<b>1/2014–6/2014</b>	<b>7/2014 – 12/2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>LUKASHENKO</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>
Economic	2	0	0	1
Eurasianism	0	0	0	0
Political-security	4	3	0	1
Counter-multilateralism	0	0	0	0
<b>NAZARBAYEV</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
Economic	2	3	2	2
Eurasianism	1	2	1	1
Political-security	1	1	0	0
Counter-multilateralism	1	0	0	0
<b>PUTIN</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>
Economic	1	1	1	0
Eurasianism	2	1	0	1
Political-security	1	1	2	0



Counter-multilateralism	1	0	0	0
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<b>SARGSYAN</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
Economic	1	0	1	1
Eurasianism	0	1	0	0
Political-security	1	1	1	0
Counter-multilateralism	0	0	0	0

<b>ATAMBAYEV</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>
Economic	0	0	6	2
Eurasianism	0	0	2	0
Political-security	0	0	0	1
Counter-multilateralism	0	0	0	0

<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>10</b>
Economic	6	4	10	6
Eurasianism	3	4	3	2
Political-security	7	6	3	2
Counter-multilateralism	2	0	0	0

Assessing final outcomes, there is a slight evidence of a shift in rhetoric over time that is displayed by Table 4.

Firstly, the shift contains a move from more diffused argumentation in the beginning, towards more coherent one. In the first period between 2011 and 2013, the arguments were distributed into all four categories in relatively balanced ratio 33% of economic motives, 18% of Eurasianism, 38 % of political-security and 11% of counter-multilateralism. More recently, in 2015, it was already 60% of economic, 20% of Eurasianism, 20% of political-security, 0% counter-multilateralism.


Secondly, there is an evidence of a more frequent use of economic arguments in the more recent periods compared to the beginnings of the project. Partly it is caused by a clear Atambayev’s preference of economic based arguments, having a large impact due to his high contribution into the debate in later stages.

Nevertheless, as some articles suggest, this argumentation shift might be linked with the unexpected annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, which according to some authors “terrified Belarus and Kazakhstan” (Schenkkan, 2014), and that is the reason why they were

“diversifying their economic and political options” (Standish, 2015). The more precise interpretation of the influence of “Crimea factor” on political rhetoric would require bigger data set and different focus of the work.

I can conclude that the arguments pointing at the political-military meaning of the EEU in given time periods were dropping from 38 % (2011 – 2013), to 28 % (first half of 2014), to 19 % (second half of 2014), and 20 % (2015). In contrast, the focus on economic nature of the EEU was on the rise from 33%, over 29 % up to 62 % and 60 % in 2015.

**Table no. 4**



Interpretation of total figures might be influenced by the unequal distribution of data in time, however, it is apparent that the leaders were steadily referring to the economic motives while they abandoned arguments from the other categories. Counter-multilateralism tendencies were visible only in the early stages but no more while approaching the actual deal. References to the Eurasianism or shared identity kept the stable presence over time, as they served as a supporting argument for usually economic, or political-security aims of Eurasian integration.

There is one more pattern worth noticing. It is connected to the “fear of exclusion” that some members express while describing their motivation. The salience of this factor increased with the accession of new members Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, and as the analysis showed, it is

one of the crucial factors that affects their behaviour. Both president of Kyrgyzstan Atambayev and Armenian leader Sargsyan several times publicly admitted their concerns about the future of their country when isolated from the Eurasian space. More than one-third of their arguments touched upon this issue and pointed out the necessity to cooperate with their allies in any matter.

Although this similarity connects a motivation of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, in fact, their concerns take a different shape. Atambayev clearly stresses a risk of isolation from the economic space for Kyrgyzstan's development, taking the form of customs controls and tariffs.


*“Kyrgyzstan needs a market in order to move goods and working labour freely, and to receive financial resources. When someone scares us by these performances [about Russia's weakness], I always ask the representatives of the EU and the U.S: Which alternative do we have? To lock ourselves in our tiny world?”* (Atambayev-3).

Sargsyan's rhetoric is rather vague and equivocal. Sometimes he speaks about the viable link between the military-security cooperation and economic integration. Sometimes he does not formulate the concern clearly and mysteriously refers to “more painful problems” (Sargsyan-8) or difficulties that would have been bigger “under any other circumstance” (Sargsyan-7) if had not participating in the EEU. Armenian position, as well as positions of the rest of members, will be interpreted in following pages.

*Kazakhstan* long lasting pursue of the EEU is usually presented in two dimensions. Firstly, it is important to international status in an effort to show geostrategic centrality (Schatz, 2004) and “the ‘Eurasian’ label better describes Kazakhstan's position in the world than the ‘Central Asia’ denomination” (Qoraboyev, 2010, p. 218).

Secondly, due to the weak association of citizens with the new multi-ethnic state, incentives towards the union beyond interstate borders took place. The EEU was proposed as a “resentment of which creates a powerful emotional resonance among populations who had been happy living in a common state of the USSR without internal borders” (Matveeva, 2009, p. 1119).

**Table no. 5**




My analysis cannot confirm or disprove these hypotheses, nevertheless, it can show whether president Nazarbayev’s rhetoric supports these claims. According to the results, his views most of all reflected the economic nature and sort of common identity glue of the EEU. Alongside Russian president Putin, he became the most vocal in defending arguments from the category of Eurasianism, moreover, other presidents were commonly referring to him as an ideological leader of the project.

Therefore, I can assume that president Nazarbayev considers economic gains and shared identity as the main fundament of the Eurasian Economic Union, helping the country either in internal or external issues. The significant point came up with his clear rejection of any deeper political integration, as he seeks to keep the union rather inter-governmental, focused on economic issues.

In contrast, *Belarus* and her president Lukashenko tend to promote deeper political and security cooperation of all members. As I have already mentioned in the section of Belarus priorities in foreign policy, the country is highly dependent on Russia, while having no significant economic connections to markets of Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. There are some indications that cost-benefit analysis of Belarus accession to the EEU would show a negative outcome (Frear, 2014, p. 11).

**Table no. 6**



Why then Belarus is keen to participate in the EEU? The author of book “Belarus under Lukashenka” Matthew Frear concludes that Lukashenko is just supporting the rhetoric of Russia and president Putin “in return for specific economic benefits, which help secure Lukashenko’s hold on power” (Frear, 2014, p. 10).


If this hypothesis is internally correct, my data fosters this reasoning, as the coherent attitude towards the EEU goes in lines with Moscow. Lukashenko calls for deeper cooperation between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, but also believe in the rise of the international significance of the region. He also does not avoid recalling memories of times under the Soviet rule. That is for some members, such as Kazakhstan, unacceptable, though, not so for Russia.

To conclude, Belarus seems to remain a loyal partner of Russia with a stable and predictable rhetoric. Even if the Lukashenko’s rhetoric was instrumental and aimed at gaining side-payments within Belarus-Russia partnership, his public expressions promote certain goals which reflect political-security incentives.

*Russia’s* position is the most discussed among the EEU countries, but perhaps also the least clear of all. The rhetoric of Russian representatives is expected to be to greater extent instrumental, as they have a larger capacity to use in promoting their goals, and they deal with the larger scope of issues. The content analysis revealed that president Putin has been using a broad range of arguments in an effort to legitimize the establishment of the EEU. Interestingly,

the economic reasoning (only 25 %) occurred less frequent than arguments referring to political-security gains, or references to the shared identity reflecting common language, history, and culture.

**Table no. 7**




Putin’s rhetoric regarding the Eurasian integration and the EEU contains three dimensions which legitimize the decision to maintain the project. Firstly, it is “a common humanitarian space” (*общее гуманитарное пространство*) which he considers being the territory of former Soviet space where the population is still partly Russian, mixed or it has strong links to the former centre. In American produced Charlie Rose’s show he explained that Russia should seek to preserve this space and that Russia wants “to ensure that there are no national boundaries” (Putin-10).

Secondly, Putin promises “convenient conditions in terms of stability and security” (Putin-5) and assures that “Russia’s security is guaranteed”. Besides the focus on security and stability, Putin underlines that the EEU’s power capability, as he vows to become “one of the poles of the modern world.” Thirdly, Putin is in terms of economic motivations often preoccupied with the “competitiveness” which should increase thanks to a creation of a large economic and trade bloc.

To conclude, president Putin uses a combination of all categories to endorse the membership in the EEU, seeking to show the variety of advantages that the opportunity offers.

In the most precarious position out of all states joining the Eurasian integration stands *Armenia* which was negotiating the Association agreement with the EU but in 2013, president Sargsyan suddenly halted the process and decided to join the Customs Union, and then the EEU.

**Table no. 8**




According to observers, the “u-turn” was made under the pressure of Russian threats (Grigoryan, 2014, p. 98). Due to energy and security vulnerability, the country became too dependent on Russia and forced to follow the suit with the great power. This hypothesis might be one of the explanatory factors of Sargsyan's mysterious rhetoric when entire 38 % arguments seeking to justify the accession to the EEU referred to indistinct threat and problems of development without participation in the EEU. The second dimension of Sargsyan’s rhetoric was concerned with partly economic benefits (43% of arguments), including energy, and partly with regional security (43 % of arguments). Hence, Armenia’s motivations tend to be rather driven by realist arguments, stressing the vulnerable position, especially in terms of security.

Nevertheless, Sargsyan except several times expressed concern about difficult problems which would country face isolated from the EEU, provided only a little for explaining or justifying main motives. In the open sources I could find only seven arguments connected to the research question – the lowest number of all presidents – and out of which one argument

could be assigned to any category, but “fear of exclusion”. The dataset, in this case, cannot be entirely revealing, although it brings some interesting insights of Armenia’s decision-making.

The last member *Kyrgyzstan* is the least developed and the most unstable country in the EEU. President Atambayev is keen to point out that membership primarily based on economic calculations and not a political consideration, even though some authors consider the economic effects as contentious (Engvall, 2014, p. 112). Engvall highlights the structure of Kyrgyzstan’s economy which is based on the advantage of low tariffs and re-export of goods from China. Sometimes Kyrgyzstan’s economy is even called “bazaar economy” after the big markets on the suburbs of large cities, operating in sort of grey zone, but employing one-fifth of Kyrgyzstan’s population and significantly contributing to country’s GDP. The membership in the EEU is very likely to harm this sort of business.

**Table no. 9**



In spite of these facts, president Atambayev consistently refers to the EEU as to a trigger of economic re-structuralization and a boost to development in terms of free trade and foreign investments. Almost 73% of all arguments referred to economic benefits which the EEU is expected to bring. Hence, it is by far clearest rhetoric in favour of economically motivated membership.

On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, as well as Armenia, fears to be excluded from the regional integration of allies. Nevertheless, not in terms of military and energy alliance with



Russia, which is the main concern of Armenia, but president Atambayev is rather concerned about conditions of large Kyrgyz labour force in Russia, and of increase in tariffs which would be imposed against non-participating countries.

In sum, the Kyrgyzstan's motivations seem to be purely economic either in terms of new opportunities in the bigger market, or in terms of possible economic isolation, while not taking part in the most recent regional projects.

## Conclusions

The results confirmed that it is an uneasy task to assess the nature of the Eurasian Economic Union since the rhetoric of main decision-makers is very ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a clear tendency to consider the EEU as a vehicle for smoother integration into the world market. Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan underline the economic importance of the project for the development and see their chance to increase the cooperation with Europe. On the other hand, Russia, vocally supported by her loyal partner Belarus, tends to see the EEU as a new political centre of power and enhances the economic competition. Hence, I have to concur with Lane (2014) that the EEU has to be interpreted as a "movement in-progress" that has not found its face yet (p. 4).

Yet, I could find empirical evidence of three significant patterns which shape the current EEU. Firstly, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the presidents claim that they seek to integrate within and not outside the current world order. The so-called counter-multilateral efforts, which reacts to the unsatisfactory situation in the international organization by creating new ones that are more in favour of founding states, seems to be very weak, even negligible. At least rhetorically, the EEU does not bind itself to alternate the neo-liberal world order.

Secondly, although all countries acknowledge the economic benefits of regional integration, there are still profound cleavages between them. Whereas Russia, Belarus, and Armenia to some extent perceive the participation in the regional organization by realist binoculars in terms of security and power, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are mostly motivated by liberal arguments for cooperation. What might be a little surprising is a finding that presidents either more or less strongly subscribe to constructivist concept of Eurasianism. Especially it is valid for two main fathers of Eurasian integration Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vladimir Putin,

even though their own definitions of Eurasianism are often equivocal, and sometimes they seem to be even in clash with each other.

The last general pattern of the results is related to the legitimization of the regional integration. The presidents of founding states seek to point out the main benefits which such an integration bring, but the president of Armenia Sargsyan and president of Kyrgyzstan Atambayev in many occasions express their fear of exclusion.

They did not claim what they can gain but rather what they can lose. It only highlights their dependence on regional powers, especially on Russia, which is well-described in the literature. Armenia's case is more connected with security concerns and long-lasting conflicts with neighbours, while in the case of Kyrgyzstan the relation to Russia is more important in the political-economic category. To go to specifics, the high number of Kyrgyz *gastarbeiters* who live and work in Russia significantly contribute to the GDP of the country, and secondly, there is a political consideration of president Atambayev who took over the office after pro-Western oriented Kurmanbek Bakiyev, discredited by Russian propaganda.

Another dimension revealed by the content analysis is a slight shift of rhetoric over time. Although this outcome is partly influenced by unequal distribution of data in time (Armenia and Kyrgyzstan acceded later, therefore, they commented on the membership in the EEU also later than other three members), there is the evidence that the presidents were abandoning the argumentation based on political-security motives, and were rather emphasizing the economic nature of the project.

Literature links this feature to the events in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea by Russia which threatens also to the sovereignty of other post-Soviet states. However, the outcomes cannot prove or disprove this hypothesis due to the scope of this work and the amount of collected data. Particularly this section, which assesses the shift of rhetoric over time, requires larger dataset. Unfortunately, the presidents of some countries, especially Armenia and Russia, did not provide enough public expressions related to this cause, limiting the final outcome.

Finally, the prospects of the EEU are highly dependent on the political consensus of the main engines of the regional integration Kazakhstan and Russia. The rhetoric of Nazarbayev and Putin is ideologically different and they have no consent on basic issues of the EEU, such as Eurasianism. While Putin would prefer a deeper form of political integration, Nazarbayev, especially in more recent stages, stresses a pure economic orientation of the union. In the end,

their considerations should decide whether the EEU will significantly increase the economic prosperity of the community, or it will just bring more power gains to some of its members.

## Summary

The thesis sought to find which kinds of motivations the states have when deciding whether to participate in the Eurasian Economic Union. After introducing the approaches to study of the Eurasian integration, I described the formal framework and identified the foreign policy positions of each member. Subsequently, I defined theoretically based categories which in broad terms correspond to arguments used in the public discourse. The final content analysis included verbal expressions of five presidents of the EEU's member states and found several noteworthy tendencies of president's rhetoric in their effort to legitimize the membership.

Firstly, the most frequently the arguments referred to the economic or political-security incentives for regional integration. These two perspectives also create a main cleavage between the members, since Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan tend to promote purely economic motives while Belarus and Russia are rather keen on laying deeper political-security cooperation. In contrast to popular views of media and public, the tendency of counter-multilateralism, the effort to alternate the current world order, has been proved very weak, even negligible.

Secondly, the shift of rhetoric in time goes in favour of economic-driven motivations. Although this factor might be directly influenced by the unequal distribution of data in time, it might also signal that the members became more vigilant after Russia's annexation of Crimea. Thirdly, among smaller member states is evident a fear of exclusion which would bring unneeded costs.

To sum up, the diversity of perspectives on the Eurasian integration is a significant factor that may undermine the prospects of the EEU, and it depends on resulting consensus of members which form the union shall take in the end.

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## Appendix

### Appendix no. 1: Table of sources

	Date	Type	Town	Source
Lukashenko-1	7-10-2011	Essay	Minsk	<a href="http://izvestia.ru/news/504081">http://izvestia.ru/news/504081</a>
Lukashenko-2	18-11-2011	Press-conference	Moscow	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3da4fYPB18">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3da4fYPB18</a> (16:20)
Lukashenko-3	9-12-2012	Interview to radio “Mir”	Moscow	<a href="http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1579163.html">http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1579163.html</a>
Lukashenko-4	17-3-2013	Interview to “Russia Today”	Minsk	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZQYxBp5Jf8">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZQYxBp5Jf8</a> (2:22)
Lukashenko-5	27-12-2013	Press-conference	Moscow	<a href="http://www.respublika-kz.info/news/politics/34607/">http://www.respublika-kz.info/news/politics/34607/</a>
Lukashenko-6	19-2-2014	Quote from the meeting	Minsk	<a href="http://www.respublika-kz.info/news/politics/34607/">http://www.respublika-kz.info/news/politics/34607/</a> (8:45)
Lukashenko-7	29-5-2014	Signing the EEU agreement	Astana	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEwW7ahY0sk">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEwW7ahY0sk</a> (3:50)
Lukashenko-8	9-6-2014	Interview to Serbian media	Minsk	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEwW7ahY0sk">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEwW7ahY0sk</a> (9:23)
Lukashenko-9	21-1-2015	Speech at the EEU	Moscow	<a href="http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/21-01-2015.aspx">http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/21-01-2015.aspx</a>
Lukashenko-10	1-12-2015	Press-conference	Minsk	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2_anHdSoCY">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2_anHdSoCY</a> (22:20)

	Date	Type	Town	Source
Nazarbayev-1	25-10-2011	essay	Astana	<a href="http://izvestia.ru/news/504908#ixzz42Ln9cchv">http://izvestia.ru/news/504908#ixzz42Ln9cchv</a>
Nazarbayev-2	26-4-2012	Interview to “Russia 24”	Moscow	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnDxRLfSaGY">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnDxRLfSaGY</a> (4:52; 5:50)
Nazarbayev-3	7-10-2012	Interview to “Channel 1”	Astana	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMEc1GAY6rw">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMEc1GAY6rw</a> (1:16)

Nazarbayev-4	18-1-2013	Quote from the meeting with national diplomats	Astana	<a href="http://ria.ru/world/20130118/918636520.html">http://ria.ru/world/20130118/918636520.html</a>
Nazarbayev-5	5-2-2014	Quote from the meeting with foreign diplomats	Astana	<a href="http://vz.ru/news/2014/2/5/671174.html">http://vz.ru/news/2014/2/5/671174.html</a>
Nazarbayev-6	25-3-2014	Meeting with journalists	The Hague	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UL12jWAjSr8&amp;feature=youtu.be">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UL12jWAjSr8&amp;feature=youtu.be</a> (0:01)
Nazarbayev-7	24-4-2014	Interview to TV “Khabar”	Kazakhstan	<a href="http://forbes.kz/process/nazarbaev_v_sluchae_peregibov_s_gosyazyikom_nas_jdet_sudba_ukrainyi">http://forbes.kz/process/nazarbaev_v_sluchae_peregibov_s_gosyazyikom_nas_jdet_sudba_ukrainyi</a>
Nazarbayev-8	28-4-2014	Speech at Moscow State University	Moscow	<a href="http://www.akorda.kz/ru/speeches/external_political_affairs/ext_speeches_and_addresses/page_216601_vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-v-moskovskom-gosudarstvennom-universit">http://www.akorda.kz/ru/speeches/external_political_affairs/ext_speeches_and_addresses/page_216601_vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-v-moskovskom-gosudarstvennom-universit</a>
Nazarbayev-9	29-5-2014	Signing the EEU agreement	Astana	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H32b31xYBgg">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H32b31xYBgg</a> (3:37; 8:00)
Nazarbayev-10	5-7-2014	Interview to press agency “TASS”	Astana	<a href="http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2094499">http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2094499</a>
Nazarbayev-11	6-12-2014	Speech at business forum	Paris	<a href="https://finance.nur.kz/343877-nazarbaev-rasskazal-o-sotrudnichestve-eaes-i-es.html">https://finance.nur.kz/343877-nazarbaev-rasskazal-o-sotrudnichestve-eaes-i-es.html</a>
Nazarbayev-12	23-12-2014	Press-conference	Moscow	<a href="https://www.nur.kz/346488-nazarbaev-v-moskve-obyavil-o-nachale-novoj-ery-v-eaes.html">https://www.nur.kz/346488-nazarbaev-v-moskve-obyavil-o-nachale-novoj-ery-v-eaes.html</a>
Nazarbayev-13	4-7-2015	Interview to TV “Russia 24”	Astana	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iT4h5pMRefs">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iT4h5pMRefs</a> (23:18)
Nazarbayev-14	31-12-2015	Interview to TV “24.kz”	Astana	<a href="http://tengrinews.kz/tv/novosti/politika/5666/">http://tengrinews.kz/tv/novosti/politika/5666/</a> (9:53)
Nazarbayev-15	1-7-2015	Interview to TV “Khabar”	Astana	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpRmWZMUNss">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpRmWZMUNss</a> (3:05)

	Date	Type	Town	Source
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Putin-1	3-10-2011	essay	Moscow	<a href="http://izvestia.ru/news/502761">http://izvestia.ru/news/502761</a>
Putin-2	24-4-2012	Speech at party convent	Moscow	<a href="http://archive.premier.gov.ru/events/news/18763/">http://archive.premier.gov.ru/events/news/18763/</a>
Putin-3	19-9-2013	Speech at business forum	Valdai	<a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243">http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243</a>
Putin-4	16-4-2014	TV discussion with citizens	Moscow	<a href="http://www.ritmeurasia.org/news--2015-04-17--v.putin-smysl-eaes-podnjat-uroven-zhizni-17578">http://www.ritmeurasia.org/news--2015-04-17--v.putin-smysl-eaes-podnjat-uroven-zhizni-17578</a>
Putin-5	29-5-2014	Signing the EEU agreement	Astana	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H32b31xYBgg">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H32b31xYBgg</a> (21:10)
Putin-6	4-6-2014	Interview to French media	Sochi	<a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45832">http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45832</a>
Putin-7	29-8-2014	Discussion at youth forum	Seliger	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uUzC69rK-rw">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uUzC69rK-rw</a> (1:03)
Putin-8	10-10-2014	Summit of countries EEU	Minsk	<a href="http://rg.ru/2014/10/10/intergaciya-site.html">http://rg.ru/2014/10/10/intergaciya-site.html</a>
Putin-9	4-12-2014	Speech at Parliament	Moscow	<a href="http://www.pravda.ru/news/districts/04-12-2014/1238603-putin-0/">http://www.pravda.ru/news/districts/04-12-2014/1238603-putin-0/</a>
Putin-10	29-9-2015	Interview to “CBS”	Moscow	<a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380">http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380</a>

	Date	Type	Town	Source
Sargsyan-1	21-12-2012	Interview to TV “Russia 24”	Moscow	<a href="http://www.vesti.ru/videos/show/vid/473551/#">http://www.vesti.ru/videos/show/vid/473551/#</a> (17:05)
Sargsyan-2	3-9-2013	Meeting with Vladimir Putin	Moscow	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8EUZq5lqmTA">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8EUZq5lqmTA</a> (6:10)
Sargsyan-3	13-5-2014	Meeting with Francois Hollande	Yerevan	<a href="http://eurasiancenter.ru/politicsnews/20140513/1003443470.html">http://eurasiancenter.ru/politicsnews/20140513/1003443470.html</a>
Sargsyan-4	19-6-2014	Interview to Georgian media	Tbilisi	<a href="http://eurasiancenter.ru/politicsnews/20140513/1003443470.html">http://eurasiancenter.ru/politicsnews/20140513/1003443470.html</a>
Sargsyan-5	21-9-2014	Speech on the Independence Day	Yerevan	<a href="https://www.armenianow.com/news/56981/armenia_independence_day_eurasian_union_president_sargsyan?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feedburner&amp;utm_campaign=armenianow">https://www.armenianow.com/news/56981/armenia_independence_day_eurasian_union_president_sargsyan?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feedburner&amp;utm_campaign=armenianow</a>

				medium=feed&amp%253Butm_campa aign=Feed:%2520an_daily_eng%2520 (Daily%2520News%2520%257C%25 20ArmeniaNow.com)
Sargsyan-6	15-10-2014	Meeting with Serbian president	Yerevan	<a href="http://www.ra.am/archives/1288">http://www.ra.am/archives/1288</a>
Sargsyan-7	6-4-2015	Interview to “Russia 24”	Yerevan	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1cMT-nC-aQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1cMT-nC-aQ</a> (8:05)
Sargsyan-8	7-5-2015	Commemoration of 100 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of Armen. genocide	Washington	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blog/post-partisan/wp/2015/05/07/why-armenia-turned-to-russia-instead-of-the-west/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/blog/post-partisan/wp/2015/05/07/why-armenia-turned-to-russia-instead-of-the-west/</a>

	Date	Type	Town	Source
Atambayev-1	27-10-2014	Interview to radio “Mir”	Bishkek	<a href="http://mir24.tv/news/politics/11487816">http://mir24.tv/news/politics/11487816</a>
Atambayev-2	5-11-2014	Interview to TV “Khabar”	Astana	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-VvJcOK8TI">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-VvJcOK8TI</a> (5:53)
Atambayev-3	1-12-2014	Interview to “KRTK”	Bishkek	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MhdMN8qwLnM">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MhdMN8qwLnM</a> (7:17)
Atambayev-4	21-12-2014	Interview to “RG”		<a href="http://rg.ru/2014/12/22/atambaev.html">http://rg.ru/2014/12/22/atambaev.html</a>
Atambayev-5	22-12-2014	Interview to “Russia 24”	Bishkek	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZwbiGBSqXI">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZwbiGBSqXI</a> (6:12)
Atambayev-6	27-12-2014	Press-conference	Bishkek	<a href="http://www.gezitter.org/politic/36270_almazbek_atambaev_myi_yasno_i_tochno_znaem_kuda_i_zachem_idem/">http://www.gezitter.org/politic/36270_almazbek_atambaev_myi_yasno_i_tochno_znaem_kuda_i_zachem_idem/</a>
Atambayev-7	31-12-2014	Speech	Bishkek	<a href="http://kloop.kg/blog/2014/12/31/atambaev-obyavil-2015-god-">http://kloop.kg/blog/2014/12/31/atambaev-obyavil-2015-god-</a>

				godom-ukrepleniya-natsionalnoj-ekonomiki/
Atambayev-8	31-1-2015	Speech on Day of Independence	Bishkek	<a href="http://ria.ru/economy/20150831/1218451056.html#ixzz43vP8BEMW">http://ria.ru/economy/20150831/1218451056.html#ixzz43vP8BEMW</a>
Atambayev-9	1-4-2014	Interview to TV “Euronews”	Brussels	<a href="http://ru.euronews.com/2015/04/01/kyrgyzstan-will-push-for-close-engagement-with-eu-says-president-almazbek/">http://ru.euronews.com/2015/04/01/kyrgyzstan-will-push-for-close-engagement-with-eu-says-president-almazbek-/</a>
Atambayev-10	21-5-2015	Signing an agreement of the accession to the EEU	Moscow	<a href="http://www.interfax.ru/world/442855">http://www.interfax.ru/world/442855</a>

## Appendix no. 2: Coding table

	Type	Economic motives	Eurasianism	Political-security motives			Fear of exclusion
Lukashenko							
17-Oct-11	S	0	0	1	0		
18-Nov-11	S	0	0	1	0		
9-Dec-12	I	1	0	0	0		
17-Mar-13	I	0	0	1	0		
27-Dec-13	S	1	0	1	0		
19-Feb-14	S	0	0	1	0		
29-May-14	S	0	0	1	0		
9-Jun-14	S	0	0	1	0		
21-Jan-15	S	0	0	1	0		
1-Dec-15	I	1	0	0	0		
total		3	0	8	0		
percent		27%	0	73%	0		
Nazarbayev							

25-Oct-11	S	1	0	0	0		
26-Apr-12	I	0	1	1	0		
7-Oct-12	I	0	0	0	1		
18-Jan-13	I	1	0	0	0		
5-Feb-14	I	1	0	0	0		
25-Mar-14	I	1	0	0	0		
24-Apr-14	I	0	0	1	0		
28-Apr-14	S	0	1	0	0		
29-May-14	S	1	1	0	0		
5-Jul-14	I	0	1	0	0		
6-Dec-14	I	1	0	0	0		
23-Dec-14	S	1	0	0	0		
4-Jul-15	I	0	1	0	0		
13-Dec-15	I	1	0	0	0		
1-Jul-15	I	1	0	0	0		
total		9	5	2	1		
percent		53%	29%	12%	6%		
Putin							
3-Oct-11	I	0	0	1	0		
24-Apr-12	I	1	1	0	0		
19-Sep-13	S	0	1	0	1		
16-Apr-14	S	0	1	0	0		
29-May-14	S	0	0	1	0		
4-Jun-14	I	1	0	0	0		
29-Aug-14	I	0	0	1	0		
10-Oct-14	S	1	0	0	0		
4-Dec-14	S	0	0	1	0		
29-Sep-15	I	0	1	0	0		
total		3	4	4	1		
percent		25%	33%	33%	8%		
Sargsyan							

21-Dec-12	I	1	0	0	0		
3-Sep-13	S	0	0	1	0		1
13-May-14	S	0	1	0	0		
19-Jun-14	I	0	0	1	0		
21-Sep-14	S	0	0	1	0		
15-Oct-14	S	1	0	0	0		
6-Apr-15	I	1	0	0	0		1
7-May-15	I	0	0	0	0		1
total		3	1	3	0		3
percent		43%	29%	43%	0%		38%
Atambayev							
27-Oct-14	S	1	0	0	0		1
5-Nov-14	I	0	1	0	0		
1-Dec-14	I	1	0	0	0		1
21-Dec-14	I	1	0	0	0		
22-Dec-14	I	1	1	0	0		
27-Dec-14	I	1	0	0	0		1
31-Dec-14	S	1	0	0	0		
31-Jan-15	S	1	0	0	0		
1-Apr-15	I	0	0	1	0		1
21-May-15	S	1	0	0	0		
total		8	2	1	0		4
percent		73%	18%	9%	0%		36%
total		26	12	18	2		7
percent		45%	21%	31%	3%		12%