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**“El sexenio de la guerra”: Legitimization of
Mexico's Drug War in the Presidential
Discourse of Felipe Calderón**

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Abstrakt

Vážnost problému pašování drog v Mexiku se naplno projevila v průběhu 90. let 20. století ve spojitosti s politickými změnami v zemi a geopolitickou transformací v regionu. Začalo se ukazovat, že drogové kartely představují zásadní součást systému fungování státu a také každodenní reality. Felipe Calderón, nový prezident zvolený za stranu PAN v kontroverzních volbách v roce 2006, se rozhodl zasvětit své období v úřadu boji proti organizovanému zločinu, který mu měl přinést legitimitu ztracenou při volebním boji. Jeho strategie v podobě otevřené konfrontace zpočátku přinesla úspěchy, ale velmi brzy začala být ostře kritizována. Negativní důsledky vojenské kampaně jako například nedodržování lidských práv, militarizace země a ignorování vážných problémů, kterými trpěla mexická společnost, ovlivňovaly život Mexičanů více než kladné výsledky ozbrojeného střetu. Calderón se během šesti let v prezidentském úřadě snažil o získání legitimacy pro vojenskou kampaň proti delikventům pomocí řady strategií. Cílem autora této práce je představit některé z těchto metod a ukázat, jak byla mexická drogová válka legitimizována v kontextu strategií využívaných ve válečných projevech. Autoři diskurzů tohoto typu obvykle k přesvědčení publika o nutnosti boje využívají čtyři generické elementy – odvolání se na externí zdroj moci, odvolání se na historii, konstrukci nepřítele a výzvy k jednotě. Záměrem této práce je pomocí tematické diskurzivní analýzy ukázat aplikaci těchto generických elementů na příkladě prezidentského diskurzu Felipe Calderóna.

Abstract

The gravity of the problem of drug trafficking in Mexico became clearly visible in the 1990s in connection with the political changes in the country and geopolitical transformations in the region. It became obvious that the drug cartels formed a key part of the system and of the everyday reality. Felipe Calderón, a new president from the

PAN party elected in the disputed election of 2006, chose to dedicate his presidency to the fight against organized crime in order to regain legitimacy lost in the electoral process. His open confrontation strategy brought success at first, however, the praise it received was soon replaced by criticism. Negative consequences such as human rights abuses, militarization and ignorance of other problems of the society overcame any possible successes of the military campaign. During the six years of his presidency Calderón strived to obtain support for his strategy by using various legitimization strategies. The aim of the author of this thesis is to introduce some of the existing methods and to show how Mexico's Drug War was legitimized in the context of the strategies within the “call to arms” genre. The authors of these discourses tend to use four generic elements – appeals to a legitimate power source, appeals to history, construction of the “evil other” and calls for unity behind the greater good – in order to persuade the public to support the fight for the common cause. The objective of this thesis is to use the thematic discourse analysis in order to show the application of these elements in the presidential discourse of Felipe Calderón.

Klíčová slova

Mexiko, legitimizace, mexická drogová válka, diskurzivní analýza, Felipe Calderón

Keywords

Mexico, legitimization, Mexico's War on Drugs, discourse analysis, Felipe Calderón

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V Praze dne 30. července 2015

Pavel Šára

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Introduction

Images and news from Mexico have in recent years filled the title pages and prime time slots not only of Mexican newspapers and TV stations but had a very similar impact on the media around the world as well. The military campaign of the newly elected president Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, who entered the office after a highly disputed electoral process and result, called the attention of experts and scholars since it seemed very ambitious. Moreover, it broke with the tradition of former Mexican presidents who instead of a direct confrontation sought accommodation with the drug cartels and the contemporary thinking that considers drugs more as a public health than security issue. Felipe Calderón declared war against the Mexican drug cartels and started Mexico's Drug War that lasted during his entire presidential term.

According to Felipe Calderón, the problem of drugs and drug trafficking reached earlier unexperienced gravity and had to be dealt with immediately in order to protect the future of Mexican families and to strengthen the presence of the government in the whole state's territory since some of the areas were being taken over by the powerful cartels and criminal organizations. The justification for the military campaign was based on three pillars. First, the president claimed that the Mexican population had started consuming drugs more than before and Mexico had thus transformed from a country of transit to a country of consumption. Second, he argued that the violence had reached intolerable levels. Third, he warned that the cartels had penetrated the political sphere which led to increased corruption and loss of state's control over certain territories. Nevertheless, later studies and analyses proved Calderón wrong and illustrated that the problems that he had pointed out were not as alarming as he was trying to show them to be.

The discourse employed by the president was very confrontational and intended to describe the drug cartels as an evil threat to the national security. Security as such was proclaimed as one of the three key topics of his presidency together with fighting extreme poverty and job creation and therefore a great part of his discourses was dedicated to the topic of security and organized crime in particular. Calderón's speeches attempted to ostracize the criminal groups and isolate them from the rest of the Mexican population, thus making the distinction between 'Us' interested in the well-being and safety of the population and 'Them' whose interest is to put in danger the lives of 'Us.'

This discursive strategy known as binary opposition as well as other legitimization strategies used by the president will be the main focus of this thesis.

Even though Felipe Calderón's presidential term ended in 2012 and Enrique Peña Nieto from the opposition PRI party who succeeded him in the office declared that he would focus on other means of fighting the drug cartels, the topic of the war on drugs is still omnipresent in the politics and discourse as the problem not only did not disappear but it even did not come any closer to its solution.¹ The investigation focused on the legitimization strategies that reacted upon the actions on the ground but at the same time helped to discursively constitute them is relevant as it illustrates how a military action against an internal enemy, which has historically been tolerated by the presidents, has been justified by Calderón's presidency.

The necessity to legitimize the armed actions stemmed from the unpopularity of the war which was not considered indispensable by the public mostly preoccupied by other problems and not directly affected by the actions of the delinquents and from employing a strategy different from the policies of the previous presidents. Calderón had to present the problem of drug trafficking as graver than it really was. It is important to keep in mind the case of the American Global War on Terror declared by George W. Bush as both of these crusades are based on similar constructs² and in both cases it is unclear whether they can be classified as wars even though they were discursively presented this way. While the discursive aspects of the War on Terror have been investigated many times, Mexico's Drug War remains almost untouched by academic research.

This thesis called *“El sexenio de la guerra”*: *Legitimization of Mexico's Drug War in the presidential discourse of Felipe Calderón*³ has two objectives. First, the concept of legitimization in general and the generic elements of the “call to arms” genre in particular will be introduced and later applied to the case of Mexico's War on Drugs. This will allow for putting the case of Calderón's discursive strategies into a broader context of legitimization within the “call to arms” genre. Secondly, the author will

1 The most recent event that shocked Mexico were the acts of the organized crime in the state of Jalisco on May 1, 2015. Members of the newly formed cartel called Jalisco Nueva Generación (Jalisco New Generation) set on fire various banks and gas stations in Puerto Vallarta and Guadalajara which were generally considered safe cities not influenced by the delinquency.

2 Both the international terrorism and international organized crime pose a new kind of threat different from the traditional perception in which the enemy was associated with a state. Moreover, the organizational structure of the enemies is not very clear as well as their financing, the connections with the state apparatus and the real objectives.

3 The author has decided to keep the first part of the title of this thesis in Spanish as the word “sexenio” cannot be translated well into English. Its meaning is the six-year long term limit. “El sexenio de la guerra” thus stands for the six-year long presidential term of war.

identify in the presidential discourse of Calderón the legitimization strategies that correspond to the generic elements of the “call to arms” texts and will illustrate why particular strategies were employed and will explain their importance and relevance in the Mexican context.

The principal research question the author will answer in this thesis is: *How was the military campaign against the organized crime (also known as Mexico's Drug War) discursively legitimized by the president Felipe Calderón in the context of the “call to arms” genre?* This research question can be subdivided into four partial research questions based on the four generic elements identified by Phil Graham in *A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror* and the author of this thesis can thus ask whether all of the four elements were part of the official discourse and how were they represented. Secondary questions that can be inferred from the main question are whether the Mexican discourse is different from the other “call to arms” texts analyzed by Graham and what are the discrepancies if there are any.

Geographically, this thesis deals primarily with the United Mexican States⁴ and international context is mentioned only when relevant to the research. The time span is limited by the years of Calderón's presidency (2006-2012); however, a historical background introducing the situation in Mexico and also the role of the drug cartels is necessary in order to provide a complex image of the issue.

The research conducted in this thesis belongs to the interpretative tradition. Discourse analysis is not understood as a particular method but as a broadly defined strategy that encompasses various methods. The premise here is that there is no universally accepted and used discourse analysis but concrete strategies and methods that applied together form discourse analysis.

A particular method that the author uses for the identification of the key themes that belong to the categories corresponding to the four generic elements of “call to arms” texts in the Mexican presidential discourse is a thematic discourse analysis. The thematic discourse analysis stems from the presumption that meanings are constructed directly by the discourse, not only reflected by it. In practice this method requires repeated reading of the texts that are the subject of analysis. There are various possibilities of operationalization within the thematic discourse analysis, however, an operationalization based on key words was chosen for this thesis. The aim of the author

4 The term Mexico will be used in this thesis.

is to analyze the discourse and look for words or phrases that in their nature correspond with the four categories defined by the generic elements of the “call to arms” texts.

This study will be conducted as follows. The first part will be dedicated to the notion of legitimization in social sciences in general and war legitimization in particular. Various authors dealing with the topic as well as various legitimization methods will be shown. Furthermore, the genre of “call to arms” texts and their four generic elements as postulated by Graham will be introduced.

In the second chapter the author will look into the problem of drug cartels and drug trafficking in Mexico. Historical background of the drug problem and the disputed electoral results of 2006 presidential election will be shown in order to provide a better understanding of the situation when Felipe Calderón entered the office. The author will also analyze the military campaign conducted during Calderón's presidency with its successes and deficiencies as it still remains a highly discussed topic.

The final chapter of this thesis will be dedicated to the discursive legitimization of Mexico's Drug War. The author will apply the thematic discourses analysis in order to identify the key topics that correspond to the four generic elements of “call to arms” texts and in the end answer the postulated research questions.

The corpus of the data used for this investigation is formed by materials that are available on the official website of Calderón's presidency.⁵ It includes Calderón's speeches, interviews, messages to the nation and participations in various events. The most important sources include Calderón's opening statements during the meetings of the national security council and his speeches commemorating anniversaries of important events from Mexican history. As stated earlier, the materials cover the entire period of Calderón's presidential term from December 2006 until November 2012 since legitimization strategies were employed during his entire presidency mostly because the long war was unpopular and Calderón thus had to strive for public support and understanding until the very end of his term.

Overview of Sources

The sources used for the purpose of this thesis can be divided into two groups. The first collection of articles deals with the topic of legitimization in social sciences and with the texts of the “call to arms” genre. The key text used for this investigation is the

5 Presidencia de la República, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

article by Phil Graham, Thomas Keenan and Anne-Maree Dowd titled *A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror* in which the authors conduct an analysis of 120 “call to arms” texts and provide a detailed account of four “call to arms” speeches. Using examples drawn from the four chosen proclamations they show that the leaders tend to utilize in their discourses four generic elements in order to persuade the public to sacrifice their lives and fight against an enemy. Moreover, they show that the four generic elements have not changed substantially despite being drawn from texts that come from different periods. They have been modified slightly in order to correspond with the realities of the period when they were used. This article is further examined and dealt with in the section dedicated to “call to arms” texts.

The topic of legitimization has been further analyzed by other authors who not only investigate a specific topic but also mention more general characteristics of legitimization and its various types. Theo Van Leeuwen in his work *Legitimation in Discourse and Communication* draws upon examples connected to compulsory primary education and establishes four categories of legitimization. The categories established by Van Leeuwen are further developed by Antonio Reyes in *Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions*. Reyes provides a detailed analysis from the linguistic point of view and illustrates how various discourses are structured on the examples of the justification of the US military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan during the “War on Terror.”

While the above mentioned articles analyze legitimization in the general context of social sciences, the investigation presented by John Oddo in *War Legitimation Discourse: Representing 'Us' and 'Them' in Four US Presidential Addresses* focuses on a more specific issue of war legitimization. The author compares discourses of George W. Bush and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and shows how war actions were legitimized by these two presidents. He concludes that both of them used similar methods and drew upon similar strategies in order to lead the public into war. Oddo's main objective is to challenge the stereotype as Franklin Delano Roosevelt is often praised for his actions while George W. Bush is demonized, and their reputation as presidents is very different. Nevertheless, according to the author, both leaders used manipulation and misrepresentation to achieve their goals and persuade the public.

The discourse employed by Calderón during his presidency has not received much attention of scholars around the world; however, one analysis comparing the

presidential discourse with the discourse of *narcocorridos*⁶ was conducted by Alejandro Madrazo Lajous. He establishes a distinction between a criminal and an enemy and analyzes how these two categories are used in the presidential discourse. The author's main argument is that Calderón politicizes the criminal and describes him as someone posing a threat to the political community which falls within the 'Us' vs. 'Them' type of legitimization.

The second group of sources that served as a basis for this investigation deals with the topic of Mexico's Drug War from different perspectives. These sources were valuable as they provided a more detailed historical background and allowed the author to better understand the realities of drug trafficking, drug cartels, their role in the Mexican society and politics. Furthermore, these sources focus on the military actions realized during Calderón's presidential term and offer to their readers a critical account of the campaign.

Ricardo Ravelo in the book *El narco en México: Historia e historias de una guerra* comments on the situation of the cartels in the beginning of the mandate of Felipe Calderón. The author illustrates the development and the connections between the cartels and the government through statements of protected witnesses and tells the stories of various people who participated directly in the operations conducted as a part of the “war on drugs.” The interviews with people involved in the military operations show the unpreparedness of the actions and lack of coordination between federal and state level bodies but also among various governmental agencies and the police and the military. Stories of important figures connected to drug trafficking complete the picture of the war on drugs and affirm that it is impossible to separate politics from the drug problems.

Two prominent Mexican experts Rubén Aguilar V., journalist and professor of communication and social sciences, and Jorge G. Castañeda, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs who extensively publishes about the drug problems in Mexico, deal in the book *El narco: la guerra fallida* mainly with the issue of the justification provided by Calderón when he declared Mexico's Drug War. The authors analyze Calderón's reasoning and show how the arguments used by the administration were not fully correct and that the discourse employed in the justification did not correspond with the reality in Mexico. The authors claim that because none of the arguments used by

6 Narcocorrido can be translated as drug ballad. It evolved out of the folk music and its texts mention real events and people.

Calderón to justify the war can be proven by relevant data, it is clear that declaration of Mexico's Drug War was a clearly political decision through which Calderón sought to gain legitimacy after the controversial elections.

Los saldos del narco: el fracaso de una guerra is the second book by Aguilar and Castañeda used for the purpose of this thesis. It provides an updated version of the research already published in *El narco: La guerra fallida*. While some arguments and data did not change, this book benefits from better and updated information which allows the authors to reconfirm and better develop their arguments. Moreover, a more general evaluation of the war is provided as the book was published just a few months before the end of the presidency of Felipe Calderón. Besides claiming that the declaration of the war on drugs was a political decision that should have restored Calderón's lost legitimacy, they also advocate the legalization of drugs which they deem better than the prohibitionist and restrictive regime imposed by Calderón.

1. Theoretical Background

1.1. Legitimization Strategies

Legitimization is in general a process “by which speakers accredit or license a type of social behavior.”⁷ Legitimization achieved by speech act, which is the most common type, is analyzed in this thesis. However, it can be also accomplished by other means that do not require using words such as elections or other political acts and events. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that language occupies the central position when speaking about legitimization, in some cases legitimization might be obtained using visual or even musical means.⁸ For the legitimization by speech act to work, it is important to keep in mind that discourse is on one hand affected by institutional and situational context but it also has influence over political and social reality. As summarized by Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, two prominent scholars that study discourse, “discourse constitutes social practices and is at the same time constituted by it.”⁹

Legitimization provides an answer to the questions “Why?” – “Why should we do this?” and “Why should we do this in this way?”¹⁰ The response might be explicit but not necessarily. The process of legitimization requires arguments that justify the act that the speaker is trying to legitimize through discourse. These arguments can be of different types and they can vary from data collected by scientific research to emotional phrases and personal experience. The various forms of legitimization can be made use of separately; however, a combination of methods is more frequent.¹¹ The author introduces the commonly defined categories in this chapter. The goal of legitimization is to gain the approval and support of the public to which the speech acts are directed.

Legitimization in politics and political discourse has received attention of scholars and researchers since political leaders, their actions and decisions have a great impact over the lives of their nations and possibly over the entire world. As Antonio Reyes, a scholar interested in the research of the relationship between language and society, comments, “political discourse refers to a genre that involves political actors speaking

7 Antonio Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions,” *Discourse and Society* 22, No. 6 (2011): 782.

8 Theo Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,” *Discourse and Communication*, No. 1 (2007): 107.

9 Theo Van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, “Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-historical Analysis,” *Discourse Studies* 1, No. 1 (1999): 92.

10 Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse,” 93.

11 Ibidem, 92.

publicly, those speech events are commonly made in public forums in which politicians attempt to project their political agendas.”¹² Political speeches represent an example of the discourse of persuasive nature which authorizes the politicians to persuade without force the public that their goals are also the goals of the audience. John Oddo labels the power of the politicians to persuade as a kind of soft power that they possess.¹³ Furthermore, the politicians tend to locate themselves within the audience that performs “rational, moral, correct, and respectful behavior”¹⁴ or in other words, the group that fights for the right cause and which is known in the binary opposition strategy as the group of 'Us.'

According to Luisa Martín Rojo and Teun A. van Dijk, two professors whose research focuses on linguistics and discourse, there are three conditions that need to be satisfied in order for the discourse to be seen as legitimate. Firstly, the sources and authors of the discourse (understood as speakers or institutions) must be legitimate. Secondly, their account of the events must be perceived as true and trustworthy. Thirdly, the speech must be constructed discursively and linguistically in a way that is socially appropriate and authorized.¹⁵ The above mentioned conditions can be applied to political discourse. The power and legitimacy of politicians is drawn from their status and position, their credibility is connected to the institutional authority they possess. Thanks to their rank they enjoy privileged access to media and they are able to reach and affect enormous audiences. The trustworthiness of their representation of the events might be achieved by different strategies and the use of certain methods such as the inclusion of numbers, detailed description of events, as well as citation of authorities and sources generally thought to be credible.

As mentioned earlier, various types of arguments that are used in legitimization discourses have been identified and grouped in order to define certain categories of legitimization. It must be kept in mind that the same discourse strategies might also be used to de-legitimize or criticize certain things and actions, not only to legitimize them.¹⁶ The author of this thesis takes a closer look on two authors and their categorization. The first text introduced is *Legitimation in Discourse and*

12 Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization,” 783.

13 John Oddo, “War Legitimation Discourse: Representing 'Us' and 'Them' in Four US Presidential Addresses,” *Discourse and Society* 22, No. 3 (2011): 289.

14 Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization,” 788.

15 Luisa Martín Rojo and Teun A. van Dijk, “There Was a Problem and It Was Solved!”: Legitimizing the Expulsion of 'Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse,” *Discourse and Society* 8, No. 4 (1997): 550.

16 Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse,” 92.

Communication by Theo Van Leeuwen, professor and scholar who concentrates on linguistics and communication, in which the author uses the example of compulsory primary education and divides legitimation strategies into four classes that are invoked when the speaker strives to persuade the public. The second division of legitimation strategies into categories is by Antonio Reyes in the article *Strategies of Legitimation in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions* in which he shows the methods used in social sciences on the example of the justification of the US military presence abroad during the “War on Terror.”

The first category of contents of legitimation that Theo Van Leeuwen distinguishes is “authorization.” In this case the ability to justify is given by the status or position of the speaker within a certain institution. The answer to the question “Why?” is simple – “because I say so.”¹⁷ The authority of the person does not allow for doubts or questioning. Status is not the only characteristics that gives the speaker the necessary authority. For example, the legitimacy of expert authority is provided by the knowledge and expertise they possess.

Role model authority is also part of the broader category of legitimization by authorization. People who are widely recognized as opinion leaders or role models do not have to explain their steps or beliefs as the mere fact of their status in the society or certain social group is sufficient for their followers to deem the actions of the leader legitimate.

Authority in some cases does not materialize in the form of a human being as the so called impersonal authority also serves as a legitimating mechanism. This authority exists in the form of laws, rules and obligations. Another strand of impersonal authority is tradition. Even though Theo Van Leeuwen claims that tradition does not serve as a powerful legitimating tool anymore, it might still be used in some occasions, especially when key words such as “tradition,” “practice,” “custom,” or “habit” are utilized.¹⁸

The last strategy listed as part of authorization strategies is the authority of conformity. When conformity is invoked by the speaker, he refers to the necessity to take a certain step or to adopt a certain belief because that is what everybody else does.

The second form of legitimation strategies defined by Van Leeuwen is called “moral evaluation.” It is embedded in moral values rather than established by a certain authority which is not obliged to provide further justification. The labels that are used within this

17 Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse,” 94.

18 Ibidem, 96.

legitimation form can include the basic “good” and “bad” but more frequently words such as “healthy,” “natural,” or “useful” are made use of.¹⁹ As there is no accepted linguistic method that would allow the analysts to identify moral evaluations, they can only be recognized on the basis of one's common-sense cultural knowledge. Historical discourse analysts who have a deeper knowledge of the society and its history thus have to step in to provide a deeper account of the moral expressions that the speakers occupy.

Van Leeuwen draws on three types of moral evaluation. He speaks about simple evaluation, abstraction, and analogy.²⁰ Simple evaluation employs certain labels that are clearly stated. When applying abstraction, the speaker does not say directly what he wants to say but resorts to expressions that partly hide the actual meaning. In addition, phrases that imply a more positive interpretation are used. Lastly, the speakers adopt analogies and comparisons. Moral evaluations are omitted while associations with other notions thought to be moral are appropriated.

In the case of the third type of the above mentioned strategies which is rationalization, Van Leeuwen points out two forms – instrumental and theoretical rationalization. When employing instrumental rationality, the speakers desire to legitimize practices via referring to their effects, uses, and goals. On the other hand, those who apply theoretical rationalization focus on legitimizing their actions “by reference to a natural order of things.”²¹ It must be noted that even though rationalization submerges moralization, it cannot function without it.

The fourth and last class of legitimation strategies Van Leeuwen speaks about is “mythopoesis” or “legitimation through storytelling.” He distinguishes between moral tales where those who participate in legitimate social activities are praised and rewarded, and cautionary tales whose protagonists are punished if they engage in activities that are considered to be disrespectful to the established order and norms.²²

Antonio Reyes draws upon the previously introduced text by Theo Van Leeuwen and identifies five categories of legitimation: emotions, a hypothetical future, rationality, voices of expertise, and altruism. While Theo Van Leeuwen's text is dedicated to the phenomenon of legitimation in a variety of social practices, Antonio Reyes deals with legitimation in the realm of politics.

19 Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse,” 97.

20 Ibidem, 97-101.

21 Ibidem, 101.

22 Ibidem, 105-107.

The first group Reyes talks about is legitimization through emotions. Appealing to emotions allows the speaker to manipulate and change the opinion of its audience. According to Reyes, “emotions are key in the legitimization process”²³ since thanks to the emotional reaction on the part of the audience, the public is made ready to accept and support the course of actions proposed by the speaker. Negative and positive representation of certain groups leads to the creation of the 'Us' versus 'Them' dichotomy.

The second category called legitimization through a hypothetical future connects our past, present, and future. This strategy requires certain linguistic and structural choices that have a goal to persuade the audience that the present is a period in which imminent actions must be taken in order to ward off a threat in the future.²⁴ The speakers urge that if the suggested course of action is not taken at the moment, the threat might materialize in the future. Moreover, the cause of the future threat is found in the past which allows the speakers to warn against repeating mistakes of the past and to make use of the collective memory of the public. The discursive representation of the connection of the causes in the past and consequences in the future leads to the acceptance of the proposed course of actions as natural and basically the only possible way to proceed.²⁵ Moreover, attention is deviated from the present situation which serves the interests of the political leaders.

The third class identified by Reyes is legitimization through rationality which is related to the concept of rationalization introduced by Theo Van Leeuwen; however, rationality is not understood in the same way by the two authors. While according to Van Leeuwen, rational is presumed as legitimate because of the goals or because it follows the natural order of things, Reyes describes rational as something that makes sense. The course of action taken by the speaker is presented as rational since the decisions have been taken following an evaluated process. The image of thoughtfulness is supported by references to consultations and agreements among various parties. This impedes associating the course of action with hasty decisions that have not been well considered.

In the fourth category Reyes points out voices of expertise as another legitimizing mechanism. This strategy is similar to the one labeled as expert authority by Van Leeuwen. Besides citing experts in the field to show that they are standing behind the

23 Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization,” 789.

24 Ibidem, 793.

25 Ibidem, 794.

actions proposed by the speakers, exact numbers and other details are also mentioned in order to show the accuracy.

The fifth and last category analyzed by Reyes is labeled as altruism. It refers to the practice when the speakers justify their actions as common good that has nothing to do with their personal interests. This strategy works even better if the audience is persuaded that the actions are taken in order to help vulnerable groups such as the poor or the innocent as the steps of this type are generally perceived as more admirable.²⁶

1.2. Call to Arms

While the previous parts of the thesis were dedicated to legitimization strategies in various social contexts ranging from education or immigration to military presence, this part will look into war legitimization. It will allow the author to move to the genre of “call to arms” texts. As John Oddo correctly states, “war is certainly one social practice that begs the question – why? Indeed – as a dangerous, deadly activity – war must be assigned legitimacy before it is undertaken.”²⁷ Moreover, Oddo claims that manipulation is a frequent part of war legitimization. Manipulations can be witnessed when leaders withhold certain information or misstate events because they want the audience to accept and support certain beliefs or courses of action that serve the interests of the speakers.²⁸

War as a social phenomenon serves as a perfect legitimization moment as it provides the leaders with the opportunity to describe the events and circumstances as exceptional and threatening. The more the events are presented in this way, the easier it is for the leaders to legitimate their actions.²⁹ Furthermore, it is important to take into account that the reference to the seriousness of the events also allows for justification of controversial actions as necessary and defensible in the presence of a threat.

The type of political speech that outlines the case of war has emerged as a genre of its own and has become to be known as “call to arms.” The purpose of this speech is to convince “people, en masse, to kill and to die on behalf of some other cause”³⁰ and to be willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause that does not correspond to their individual interests and aims. According to Graham, Keenan and Dowd, the “call to arms” texts

26 Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization,” 801.

27 Oddo, “War Legitimation Discourse,” 289.

28 Ibidem, 291.

29 Martín Rojo and van Dijk, “There Was a Problem,” 546.

30 Phil Graham, Thomas Keenan and Anne-Maree Dowd, “A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror,” *Discourse and Society* 15, No. 2-3 (2004): 200.

are generic since they are composed of “a common structure of functional units (...) that is repeated again and again from text to text.”³¹ The four elements and legitimization strategies, an appeal to a legitimate power source, an appeal to history, construction of the evil other, and an appeal for unification, are introduced in the following paragraphs.

The first generic element is labeled as an appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the speaker. The independent power authority presented as inherently good is necessarily “the ultimate moral force within the societal order of discourse of the day.”³² Historically, this source has evolved. In the highly religious societies of the past with a moral universe driven by theological beliefs, God represented the only moral authority. Nevertheless, other sources have been added without completely displacing the anterior authorities and for example in the speeches of George W. Bush, the nation-state served as the primary referent but remarks about religion were also mentioned. The most important part of an appeal to an external power source is to show that the course of action is not similar to the orator's will but that it is justified by something greater.

The second generic element is called an appeal to history. The history referred to in the discourse might be conceived mythologically, world-historically, or otherwise. The speaker tends to represent the history and past actions of the society as magnificent and successful.³³ Furthermore, the expectations of the future have to be also presented in this way in order to justify the actions that serve as the only tool to assure that the future will be as glorious as the past. Connections must be drawn between the course of action proposed in the discourse and the consciousness of the audience based in the common history and culture of the society. Links must be created to popular perceptions of events and moments that previously happened in the society. Appeals to history correspond to the legitimization through a hypothetical future introduced by Reyes as connections are established between the past, the present, and the future and actions are presented as absolutely necessary in order to assure prosperous future for the people.

Construction of the evil and aberrant other or the legitimization strategy known as binary opposition constitutes the third generic element. The evil other is determined in order to set up a dichotomy known as 'Us' versus 'Them.' The manner in which the evil other is constructed is closely connected to the legitimate power source as it is constituted in opposition to the values of the society.³⁴ The speaker establishes a

31 Graham, Keenan and Dowd, “A Call to Arms,” 202.

32 Ibidem, 204.

33 Oddo, “War Legitimation Discourse,” 297.

34 Graham, Keenan and Dowd, “A Call to Arms,” 211.

distinction between the positively described 'Us' and 'Them' presented in a very negative light. A very important aspect of the description is also the focus on numbers as the side of 'Them' is frequently mentioned as a relatively small force. At the same time it is presented as unusually threatening and potentially responsible for very destructive actions that will negatively affect 'Us.' The underestimation of the numbers of the other allows 'Us' to perceive the task of defeating 'Them' as easily achievable.³⁵

The negative characterization of the group of 'Them' is accomplished through the use of pejorative terms that have as an objective to demonize 'Them.' Generally, words that create negative associations are utilized to describe 'Them.'³⁶ On the other hand, the group of 'Us' is presented in terms that strive to glorify and sanitize.³⁷ The negative impact that the actions or even the mere existence of 'Them' has on 'Us' might also be highlighted.

The fourth and last element is known as a call to unification behind the greater good. When this strategy is invoked, the speakers are likely to point out that the proposed actions are coherent with the order of the society (laws, norms, agreements, and aims) agreed upon by its members - the citizens.³⁸ Moreover, they remind the audience that the threat is so grave that all differences must be put aside in order to deal successfully with the problem. The unifying construct might be of religious, racial, political, philosophical, or nationalistic nature.³⁹

Graham, Keenan and Dowd also bring the reader's attention to the fact that many of the "call to arms" speeches that they analyze have been produced during moments of crisis of political legitimacy. Rojo and van Dijk agree with the above mentioned and claim that such a discourse provides an opportunity to reestablish the lost authority and regain legitimacy with the audience.⁴⁰ Leaders thus seek to preserve the status quo in which they are the dominant group and undermine the standing of the group that strives to alter the present state of affairs by using strategies that are considered to be outside of the accepted norms of political competition.⁴¹

The thematic discourse analysis conducted in this thesis uses the generic elements from the "call to arms" genre as its main research categories complemented with

35 Oddo, "War Legitimation Discourse," 304.

36 Martín Rojo and van Dijk, "There Was a Problem," 545.

37 Oddo, "War Legitimation Discourse," 296.

38 Martín Rojo and van Dijk, "There Was a Problem," 528.

39 Graham, Keenan and Dowd, "A Call to Arms," 202.

40 Martín Rojo and van Dijk, "There Was a Problem," 530.

41 Graham, Keenan and Dowd, "A Call to Arms," 201.

relevant legitimization methods from the previously introduced categorizations. For the purpose of the investigation, the observed categories were established as follows.

In the first category defined as an appeal to a legitimate power source the author looks for elements that are used by the speaker as referents showing that the decision to participate in the war is forced by something greater than his own will. Moreover, they also indicate that the war effort is undertaken as common good highlighting the speaker's altruism as shown by Reyes. The speaker should avoid using authorization which would imply that the actions are personal and based on a decision taken by the speaker. The power sources should among others include religion and the nation state.

The second category is constituted by the appeals to history. The author's objective is to identify the part of the discourse where the speaker talks about lessons that should be taken from the history and also about particular glorious moments from the past, defined by key words such as years, names or events, that should be remembered. The purpose of employing these elements is to inspire those active in the current effort and give them example that should be followed. Furthermore, the author will look for parts of discourse dedicated to expectations of bright future. They are mentioned in order to contrast them with the hypothetical future that would follow if the actions against the threat were not taken.

In the third category the speaker constitutes a distinction between 'Us' and 'Them.' The speaker uses emotions as pointed out by Reyes to highlight the division. The concrete elements the author looks for are the pieces of discourse which refer to the exclusion from the society, numerical advantage, positive representation of 'Us,' and negative characteristics of 'Them' and their actions.

The elements from the fourth category of uniting behind the greater good the author is interested in singling out are calls for unification in spite of differences of any types and behind a legitimate power source present in the first category.

2. Mexico and Drug Trafficking

2.1. Historical Background

The boom of the problem of drug trafficking and the expansion of the drug cartels in Mexico dates to the 1990s when the so called Caribbean route through which the drugs moved directly from Colombia to the United States was closed due to the repressive actions of the USA. Mexico became more important as a transit and producer country since the cartels based in Colombia weakened and the organizations from Mexico started to play a major role in the world drug trade and to dominate the drug market in the United States.⁴² The growing importance of the cartels and their visibility was also connected to the increasing effects of globalization and neoliberal policies, and the political transformation that Mexico underwent in the 1990s that resulted in the loss of the monopoly on power of the PRI (*Partido de la Revolución Institucional, the Party of the Institutional Revolution*) party.⁴³

The relationship between the organized crime groups and the successive governments of the PRI party during the 20th century continues to represent a highly debated issue. Calderón on many occasions said that the gravity of the situation in his era was the consequence of the years of negligence of the problem by the previous governments.⁴⁴ Even though the claims of the connections between the PRI party and the cartels have never been formally proven, as Aguilar and Castañeda argue, “it results as difficult to show and prove that some presidential administrations have been accomplices, active or passive, of the organized crime as to imagine that they have not had any relation at all.”⁴⁵ The informal relations between the government and cartels led to high levels of corruption, however, levels of violence were kept low as both parties to some extent shared the same interests and agreed on what should and should not be done.

The cartels gradually became an important part of Mexican everyday reality. Even though worries have been expressed about the real objectives of the cartels, a complete substitution of the state and its functions does not seem to be one of them. The cartels have formed part of the political system and coexistence with the state apparatus and

42 Ricardo Ravelo, *El narco en México: Historia e historias de una guerra* (D.F., México: Grijalbo, 2011): 43.

43 Arturo Anguiano, “La guerra que no dice su nombre,” *Viento Sur*, No. 120 (Enero 2012): 27.

44 Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “La estrategia fallida,” *Nexos*, December 1, 2012, available at: <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=15083> (accessed June 16, 2015).

45 Rubén Aguilar and Jorge Castañeda, *El narco: la guerra fallida* (D.F., México: Punto de lectura, 2009): 57.

some kind of pacts and agreements with those in power are thus of greater value for them than replacing the current order from which they benefit.⁴⁶ In some parts of the Mexican territory the cartels have become the real sources of authority because of the weakness of the local governments. Furthermore, the elected representatives in some cases worked with the cartels as their passive accomplices but sometimes they collaborated actively. The cartels demanded that their own rules were followed in the territories under their authority. The strategy employed by the cartels to win over the people was centered mainly in the replacement of the insufficient social programs administered by the government. The economically weak whose loyalty was easy to buy for the cartels were the main and also the easiest targets of the organized crime.⁴⁷

The capacities of the cartels have been largely improved due to the flow of arms from the United States and other parts of the world.⁴⁸ The vicious cycle of violence has been enhanced by the militarization of the strategy of the government.⁴⁹ The cartels are forced to obtain new forms of arms to defend their positions and also the Mexican military has to buy new weapons in order to be able to face off the cartels that possess weaponry of higher quality.

2.2. Calderón's Crisis of Legitimacy and Mexico's Drug War

Felipe Calderón Hinojosa was elected to the presidential office in the controversial election of 2006. Calderón represented the PAN (*Partido de la Acción Nacional, the National Action Party*) party that held the office since 2000 when Vicente Fox won the election and ended the 71-year-long presidential monopoly of the PRI party. Calderón's election was considered highly problematic for various reasons. Even the electoral campaign itself was surrounded with controversies and rumors of manipulation and misuse of governmental funds as the administration of Vicente Fox was accused of using money to support the campaign of the next PAN candidate.

The results of the election were not announced on the same day after a quick count as was the custom in Mexico. The IFE (*Instituto Federal Electoral, the Federal Electoral Institute*) rejected to announce the results as the margin between the two

46 César Morales Oyarvide, "La guerra contra el narcotráfico en México: Debilidad del estado, orden local y fracaso de una estrategia," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, No. 50 (julio, agosto y septiembre 2011): 11.

47 Ravelo, *El narco en México*, 32.

48 It must be noted that while the discourse that connects the flow of weapons from the United States to Mexico dominates, weapons from Central American and other parts of the worlds also make an important part of the fire power of the cartels.

49 Morales Oyarvide, "La guerra contra el narcotráfico," 19.

leading candidates – Felipe Calderón and Andrés Manuel López Obrador from the PRD (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática, the Party of the Democratic Revolution*) party – was too small. However, both candidates proclaimed themselves winners of the election almost immediately in spite of the fact that the official results were not published yet.

Four days after the election the IFE called Felipe Calderón winner of the election with the margin of about 0,6% or 243,934 votes.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, various controversies and irregularities resulted in the weak position of Felipe Calderón and caused doubts among the Mexican population about the real winner of the presidential election.⁵¹ Evidence has been shown that irregularities such as vote buying, ballots found in trash, annulled votes, and others were observed during the election. Many Mexicans participated in public protests organized by López Obrador against Calderón. Furthermore, López Obrador formed a parallel administration rejecting his electoral loss and undermining the authority of Calderón. Arturo Anguiano, a professor and investigator at the Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM), even claims that because of the disputed electoral results, the state institutions, which never enjoyed a high level of trust of the population, lost their legitimacy for good.⁵² César Morales Oyarvide and the experts Rubén Aguilar and Jorge Castañeda claim that once in the office Calderón wanted to restore his legitimacy lost in the urns through “a war in the fields, streets and roads, now populated by men in uniforms.”⁵³

Their claim that starting the war against the cartels was a clearly political decision is supported by the fact that crime did not form part of the presidential campaign. The decision of the administration to face off the drug cartels came as a surprise as Calderón did not run on an anticrime platform but focused mainly on economic problems and only a minority of the citizens considered drug trafficking to be one of the key issues that troubled Mexico.⁵⁴ The population never felt directly affected by the violence among the cartels as they thought themselves far away from the disputes.

50 Antonio Ugues Jr. and D. Xavier Medina Vidal, “Candidate Appeal in the Aftermath of the 2006 Mexican Elections,” paper prepared for presentation at the 2009 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 6.

51 It must be noted that the position of the president in Mexico is already weakened by the presence of three strong political parties. The elected president usually does not obtain more than 40 % of the votes. Calderón received 35,89 % of the votes.

52 Anguiano, “La guerra que no dice su nombre,” 25.

53 Morales Oyarvide, “La guerra contra el narcotráfico,” 13, Aguilar and Castañeda, *El narco: la guerra fallida*, 13.

54 Nathaniel Parish Flannery, “Calderón's War,” *Journal of International Affairs* 66, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2013): 192.

Felipe Calderón's presidential term officially started on December 1, 2006, and the security situation together with fighting extreme poverty and job creation were mentioned as the three priorities of his presidency during the inauguration speech.⁵⁵ The formal beginning of Mexico's Drug War dates back to December 11, 2006, when the president officially introduced the Operation Michoacán. Federal troops were sent to Calderón's home state in order to restore the security situation in the area and protect the population against the influence and actions of the organized crime. In total, the number of troops deployed into various areas of the country reached more than 45,000 during Calderón's presidency.⁵⁶

The open confrontation strategy was based on three premises that Calderón used to justify the military actions. The first justification was rooted in the increasing consumption of drugs among the Mexican population, especially the youth. In reality, the consumption remains very low both in absolute and relative numbers and stays low in comparison with other states in the world and in the region.⁵⁷ Calderón was preoccupied mainly with the youth and therefore he often mentioned them as a vulnerable group that must be protected as it is mainly affected by the drug trade. Mexico offers such a small domestic market that it is overlooked by the cartels that direct their activities outside of its borders where the economic opportunities are much bigger.

The unprecedented and no longer tolerable level of violence constitutes the second premise used by Calderón. According to the statistics, Mexicans suffered from a general sense of insecurity; however, it was understood in a much broader sense and not connected strictly to organized crime.⁵⁸ It is paradoxical to note that in the beginning of Calderón's term, Mexico experienced the least violent period in its history and that the perception of insecurity during Calderón's presidency significantly increased.⁵⁹ It was caused mainly by the upswing in petty crime, robberies, and assaults. Moreover, the relatively stable relations of power between the organized crime and the state authorities

55 Felipe Calderón, 2006b, "Palabras al pueblo de México desde el Auditorio Nacional," December 1, 2006, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2006/12/palabras-al-pueblo-de-mexico-desde-el-auditorio-nacional/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

56 Laura Carlsen, "Mexico's False Dilemma: Human Rights or Security," *Northwestern Journal of Human Rights* 10, No. 3 (2012): 147.

57 Morales Oyarvide, "La guerra contra el narcotráfico," 9.

58 Aguilar and Castañeda, *El narco: la guerra fallida*, 39.

59 Rubén Aguilar and Jorge Castañeda, *Los saldos del narco: el fracaso de una guerra* (D.F., México: Punto de lectura, 2012): 70.

began to dismantle by the military actions which caused the increase in the levels of violence caused by the delinquents as well as the state forces.

The third premise is connected to the penetration of organized crime into the state structures and its growing influence over Mexican territory and its inhabitants. This claim of Calderón has been highly disputed and his belief that the drug trafficking organizations want to challenge the territoriality of the state was rejected. The objectives and interests of the organized crime seem far from trying to govern a certain territory. Furthermore, the connections between the cartels and the local and municipal authorities were not anything new but a practice that had a long tradition.⁶⁰ Aguilar and Castañeda point out a paradox in Calderón's discourse. On one hand, he rejected the US claims that Mexico was close to becoming another failed state. On the other hand, his description of the situation of some areas that were under the rule of the organized crime, which he used as a justification for the military actions, corresponds exactly to one of the characteristics of the failed state.⁶¹

Even though the arguments presented by Calderón proved not to be completely correct, he succeeded in creating an atmosphere of crisis and exception that required taking controversial measures. As a consequence, the justification of the presence of the military forces was facilitated and presented as absolutely necessary despite its devastating effects.⁶² With the declaration of the war and the corresponding actions the state seemed to be promoting the fear. Insecurity as well as violence were spread to other areas instead of being reduced and eliminated. The president in his discourse directed not only to the opposition parties but to the public in general called for not questioning and doubting his policies which according to him, only led to strengthening the delinquency:

If (...) the political momentum and the energy of the country focuses on attacking, or questioning, or weakening, it weakens the state. Yes, the legitimacy of the actions gets lost. Yes, the moral of the troops and the police lowers. But who wins are not the political parties but who wins are the criminals.⁶³

60 Aguilar and Castañeda, *El narco: la guerra fallida*, 13.

61 Ibidem, 51.

62 Anguiano, "La guerra que no dice su nombre," 30-31.

63 Felipe Calderón, 2010f, "Segunda intervención del presidente Calderón en el Diálogo por la seguridad. Hacia una política de Estado con los presidentes de los partidos políticos," August 10, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/08/segunda-intervencion-del-presidente-calderon-en-el-dialogo-por-la-seguridad-hacia-una-politica-de-estado-con-los-presidentes-de-los-partidos-politicos/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

Kryštof Kozák, head of the Department of American studies of the Charles University who focuses on the problems of migration and the situation in Mexico, adds another comment to the topic of crisis which is, in his opinion, enhanced by the US support and creates an image of permanent war which does not help to solve the problem of drug trafficking but it is beneficial to the emergence and acceptance of a strong executive branch.⁶⁴

Ricardo Ravelo claims that the real objective of Calderón's war against the drug trafficking organizations was not to destroy the organized crime but to recover the public spaces and to assure peaceful social coexistence.⁶⁵ However, the obstacle the president chose to overcome in order to reach this objective was too powerful. He promised the elimination of the organized crime which he was not able to fulfill. Nancy Flores Nandéz, an investigative journalist who chose to confront the victorious discourse of the Calderón administration, adds another point to this argument and indicates that the war contra the drug trafficking served to confront a more broadly defined enemy which besides others included social movements and organizations whose activities went against the interests of the government.⁶⁶

The violence and murder rates rapidly increased in the first years of Calderón's presidency. The administration considered it a positive sign since they believed that the drug cartels were struggling to maintain their positions and that they were fighting each other to survive and get access to the decreasing opportunities. Nevertheless, even after years of open confrontation, the cartels do not seem to be less powerful than before, their influence is undisputed and it keeps spreading to the previously non-affected areas.⁶⁷ What happened was a transfer of power from some cartels to others, the eradication of some, and the emergence of other groups that used to be less powerful or not even existed. Calderón claimed that the violence was a price that had to be paid in order to accomplish the weakening of the structure of the organized crime that had been in place for years.⁶⁸

64 Kryštof Kozák. "Sérii vítězství k porážce? Asymetrický boj proti drogám v Mexiku a USA," *Studia Territoralia* 9, No. 1 (2009): 53.

65 Ravelo, *El narco en México*, 34.

66 Nancy Flores Nandéz, *La Farsa: Detrás de la guerra contra el narco* (D.F., México: Océano de México, 2012): 36-37, 108-109.

67 David Lier, "Mexico's Sword of Damocles: Institutionalized Securitization and the War on Drugs," *Grupo de Estudios Internacionales Contemporáneos*, April 9, 2012, 3.

68 Aguilar and Castañeda, *El narco: la guerra fallida*, 48.

The strategy employed by the Calderón administration focused on capturing and killing the cartel leaders. Nevertheless, the leader itself is not so important for the functioning of the cartel as the government strived to present it. The structure of the cartels is more hierarchical than vertical and therefore the extermination of the leader had little effect on the cartel and tended to cause more violence since there were usually more candidates that wanted to become leaders and their rivalry caused tensions among the competing factions.⁶⁹

The strategy of joint operations of the police and the armed forces originally seemed to bring success but later proved not to be so fruitful. The problem was that the surprise factor disappeared and the cartels prepared their defense against the offensive actions of the government. Moreover, the increasing number of the operations was more difficult to control and the individual operations did not receive as much attention and resources as required.⁷⁰ Public support for the strategy also diminished, most of the citizens considered the war lost and agreed that the next president should employ a different type of plan.⁷¹

The strategy employed by Calderón had one big contradiction that makes one doubt its complexity. His administration did not destroy more acres of fields where illicit drugs were planted than the previous governments, nor it focused much attention on confiscation of marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and other drugs.⁷² Even though the fight against drug trafficking was presented as the main preoccupation of his presidential term, in the above mentioned field his administration was lacking behind the previous presidencies. This can be explained by the employment of the military that focused mainly on direct confrontation with the cartels and did not put sufficient resources to other activities that would lead to confiscation of drugs or eradication of the fields.

2.3. Critical evaluation of Calderón's policies

Calderón's strategy of open confrontation and militarization received generally negative comments and criticism. It was labeled as mistaken, wrong, and inadequate. The levels of violence in Mexico rapidly went up during Calderón's presidency and Mexico became a symbol of insecurity at the global scene. International media

69 Keegan Hamilton, "Why Killing Kingpins Won't Stop Mexico's Drug Cartels," *The Atlantic*, February 27, 2013, available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/why-killing-kingpins-wont-stop-mexicos-drug-cartels/273558/> (accessed June 24, 2015).

70 Guerrero Gutiérrez, "La estrategia fallida".

71 Aguilar and Castañeda, *Los saldos del narco*, 38.

72 Flores Nández, *La Farsa: Detrás de la guerra contra el narco*, 21.

published stories of victims of Mexico's Drug War and openly criticized the negative effects of the employed strategy. Despite some successes in capturing the leaders or dismantling the organizations, the challenges and negative outcomes were much more visible.

The main point of criticism centers around the focus on the drug cartels without paying sufficient attention to the violence and human rights abuses it produced, and other problems of the Mexican society. Many Mexican regions suffered from inefficiency of social services and communication lines and unemployment. Inflation and other economic problems presented something that preoccupied the people much more than drug trafficking.⁷³ Furthermore, the application of the rule of law is not a natural thing everywhere, local and federal governments are weak and cannot be considered the real sources of power and authority in many parts of the country.

Forced internal displacement of the population was also one of the negative consequences of the war against which the government was not able to protect its people.⁷⁴ The situation was especially grave in the areas originally ruled by the organized crime and later protected by the state armed forces as these at some point left the territory and the drug trafficking organizations sought vengeance in the newly created security vacuum.

Experts point out that while the administration focused on organized crime, local security problems such as ordinary street crime, carjacking and extortion, or petty crime flourished. These issues did not receive sufficient attention because local policing activities were not given preference. Mexican population was thus affected by the side effects of Calderón's strategy like violence and actions of local criminals and gangs more directly than before.⁷⁵ To hide the high homicide rates, to deny the actions by the state security forces, and to connect most of the brutality to the violence among the cartels, the administration created a new category of crime called "victims of alleged criminal rivalry."⁷⁶

A series of human rights abuses carried out by the military has also been reported during Mexico's Drug War which has added to an already long list of human rights problems in Mexico which has historically been known for weak respect to human rights of its citizens. Moreover, the innocent citizens killed during the conflict were

73 Aguilar and Castañeda, *El narco: la guerra fallida*, 46-47.

74 Edur Velasco Arregui, "México en el laberinto de la Guerra Deforme: Una perspectiva histórica de la raíz del conflicto," *Alegatos*, No. 80 (enero/abril 2012): 192.

75 Parish Flannery, "Calderón's War," 182-183.

76 Aguilar and Castañeda, *Los saldos del narco*, 71.

reported as “collateral damage” by the administration. The outcry about the problem was not limited only to international media, civil rights organizations and NGOs published alarming reports about the situation during Calderón's presidency as well.⁷⁷

Other negative consequence of targeting the organized crime that became a grave issue during Calderón's presidency is the insecurity and danger faced by the journalists who write about drug trafficking and organized crime. Their lives are often at risk as their articles and investigations might threaten one of the real authorities more important than the political power.⁷⁸

Another point of criticism stems from the internationalist view of the situation in Mexico. According to Nathaniel Parish Flannery, “Calderón adopted a unilateral response to an international problem”⁷⁹ and his strategy was thus doomed to fail from the very beginning. Arturo Anguiano claims that the declared war was “a degraded expression of the incapacity to formulate alternatives to the never ending state crisis.”⁸⁰ The open military confrontation in Mexico led to the dispersion of the drug problem to the entire region. Honduras has reached the top of the list of the most violent countries in the world as the delinquents originally located in Mexico began to use new territories as a base for their activities.⁸¹

US support and assistance constituted an important factor of Mexico Drug War. The USA provided funds mostly via the Mérida Initiative which to some extent corresponds to the Plan Colombia applied in Colombia. Nevertheless, the US presence and assistance also represents a destabilizing factor as the involved countries cannot rely on such a strong institutional structure and do not possess enough funds to sustain the efforts against drug trafficking and their negative consequences.⁸² The US support should, therefore, focus not only on the organized crime but should also assist the countries in other issues such as in strengthening of their institutions and improving the rule of law.

Militarization of security in general and of public space in particular is another issue closely related to Mexico's Drug War. Some of its repercussions are already visible and have been analyzed, while some long-term aftereffects remain to be seen. The problem of militarization stems from the fundamental differences between the police and the

77 Aguilar and Castañeda, *Los saldos del narco*, 26.

78 Ravelo, *El narco en México*, 14.

79 Parish Flannery, “Calderón's War,” 182.

80 Anguiano, “La guerra que no dice su nombre,” 29.

81 Parish Flannery, “Calderón's War,” 191.

82 Kozák, “Sérií vítězství k porážce?,” 61.

military, while the primary purpose of the former is to respect the law, the latter's task is to destroy the enemy. On the one hand, the police in Mexico has a negative reputation because of the corruption of its members, its ineffectiveness, lack of experience and preparation, little credibility, and the existence of connections with the organized crime. On the other hand, the belief in the positive role of the military in Mexico originates from its long tradition, its perceived integrity, and the image of nonexistence of corruption.⁸³ Calderón himself highlights the virtues of the armed forces:

The first virtue of the Mexican Army is its patriotism, patriotism which is expressed in the values, in the discipline, in the loyalty to Mexico, in the loyalty to the Constitution, to the republican institutions, to the causes of the society; loyalty which has been and will be fundamental to boost the progress of the country and to seek the well-being of the Mexicans.⁸⁴

The president strived to make the deployment of the armed forces to be seen as an evidence that the government is ready to do what it takes to defeat the criminals.⁸⁵ Calderón used the tradition and reputation of the military for its own image as he positioned himself among the soldiers. He chose to be seen in a uniform and accompanied by military leaders as a strong commander that is capable of solving the problems of the country. This step has drawn many questions and was not only criticized but also ridiculed. Calderón's close relations with the armed forces were seen as a sign of strength but at the same time they were perceived as a proof of his weakness.

The Mexican experience showed that soldiers “have responded too often with arbitrary arrests, personal agendas and corruption, extrajudicial executions, the use of torture, and excessive use of force.”⁸⁶ The lack of specification and division of tasks between the military and the police, and the existing rivalry has also led to open disputes between the members of the two groups.

83 Miguel David Norzagaray López, “El narcotráfico en México desde el discurso oficial. Un análisis de los sexenios comprendidos en el periodo 1988 – 2009 (MA thesis, FLACSO México, 2010): 171, available at: <http://repositorio.flacsoandes.edu.ec/bitstream/10469/2796/1/TFLACSO-2010MDNL.pdf> (accessed June 21, 2015).

84 Felipe Calderón, 2007f, “Palabras del presidente Felipe Calderón durante el desayuno conmemorativo del Día del Ejército,” February 19, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/02/palabras-del-presidente-felipe-calderon-durante-el-desayuno-conmemorativo-del-dia-del-ejercito/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

85 Flores Nández, *La Farsa: Detrás de la guerra contra el narco*, 20.

86 Carlsen, “Mexico's False Dilemma,” 147.

The problem with the deployment of the military to deal with the domestic security problems is that it takes over the tasks generally performed by the police which therefore does not undergo the reforms and preparation that it needs in order to be able to fulfill its tasks and to take back the authority from the military. All in all, using the military indefinitely postpones the formation of a working police. Furthermore, the deployment of the military was not seen positively by the opposition and many sectors of the Mexican society. They considered the presence of armed forces in the streets as a clear sign of the weakness of the state that is no longer able to cope with its problems using standard measures.⁸⁷

In general, the war strategy employed by Calderón lacked a clear vision and the necessary planning that would allow the government to anticipate the actions of the cartels under attack. The fragmentation of the cartels resulted in more violence and this was something unexpected by the administration.⁸⁸ Moreover, the administration failed in communicating its message and strategy to the citizens. The public was never absolutely persuaded that the war was necessary and inevitable; the objectives of the operations and individual actions were not sufficiently explained and remained unclear to the population.

The data show that there was not a direct relationship between the discourse presented by the presidential administration and the statistics published by the government itself as they did not confirm that the situation was as grave as the presidency strived to present it.⁸⁹ Calderón will thus be remembered by the history as a president who put all his attention to the problem of drug trafficking while his country suffered from corruption, social tensions, or health and education issues.

The failure of the open confrontation strategy in Mexico led to a wide international debate as it remains unclear how to deal effectively with the issue of drug trafficking. The punitive strategies not only do not solve the problem but also bring about a huge number of negative externalities such as social upheaval, high number of victims, and ineffective use of government resources. The reluctance of the United States towards the punitive strategies stems from the perception of the drug problem in the USA. While in Mexico drug trafficking and drug consumption is considered a security problem, in the United States it is treated like a public health problem that cannot be solved by deploying the military to the streets as consumption constitutes a graver problem than

87 Ravelo, *El narco en México*, 35.

88 Guerrero Gutiérrez, "La estrategia fallida".

89 Aguilar and Castañeda, *El narco: la guerra fallida*, 19.

drug trafficking.⁹⁰ According to the critics of the punitive strategy, a realistic policy thus has to focus on the reduction of the damages caused by the drug trafficking such as the abductions, corruption, and problems directly affecting the people, not on eliminating the problem itself by force.

Besides not spending sufficient resources on the elimination of fields and confiscation of drugs, money laundering and the financial markets were other aspects of the drug problem that the administration of Calderón basically overlooked.⁹¹ The money that belongs to the organized crime tends to come not only from the activities directly connected to drug trafficking but also from extortion, human trafficking, or protection services. Nevertheless, the efforts of the government have been really mild. Ricardo Ravelo argues that even though everybody knows that the banking system is infiltrated by the organized crime and therefore acts as an accomplice by omission, no effective measures have been taken to deal with the problem.⁹²

90 Aguilar and Castañeda, *Los saldos del narco*, 14.

91 Velasco Arregui, "México en el laberinto," 171.

92 Ravelo, *El narco en México*, 78.

3. Presidential discourse during Mexico's Drug War

The thematic analysis of the discourses available on the official website of Calderón's presidency has led to the identification of key themes within the four categories corresponding to the generic elements defined by Graham in the texts of the “call to arms” genre. These broadly defined groups (appeals to a legitimate power source, appeals to history, construction of the evil other and calls for unity behind the greater good) constitute the primary categories the author has been looking for during the analysis of the discourses' corpus.

Within the category defined by the generic element labeled as an appeal to a legitimating power source, the author has found the following principal themes:

- (i) family and above all the children
- (ii) Constitution and the law system
- (iii) homeland (*Patria* in the Spanish original)
- (iv) Mexico and the values it represents

The author has classified the key points mentioned within the category of the appeals to history into these themes:

- (i) general lessons learnt from Mexican history
- (ii) striving for independence and Spanish attempts to reconquer Mexico
- (iii) the actions of the Boy Heroes during the US-Mexican War
- (iv) the Battle of Puebla in 1862
- (v) beginning of the Mexican Revolution
- (vi) defense of Mexico against the invasion of the USA in 1914
- (vii) Mexico's involvement in the Second World War
- (viii) bright and prosperous future

The construction of the evil other can be divided into the subsequent thematic categories:

- (i) exclusion of the criminals from the society
- (ii) positive characteristics of the Mexican society
- (iii) numerical advantage
- (iv) negative characteristics of the enemy:
 - 1. undermining the territorial unity and state authority
 - 2. taking over public spaces
 - 3. posing a threat to personal integrity and personal liberties
 - 4. putting in danger the economy and the way to a prosperous future

5. spreading the culture of crime
6. putting the children into slavery through drugs and addictions
7. meddling into elections and influencing the democratic system

The themes that belong to the last category called uniting behind the greater good can be observed in these categories:

- (i) putting aside the differences
- (ii) success depends on the participation of everybody, everyone is affected

What has to be pointed out before the analysis itself is the different terminology that Calderón employed to label the confrontation between the organized crime and the government forces. The label has not gone through an evolution, terms like battle (*batalla*), fight (*combate*), fight (*lucha*), war (*guerra frontal*) have been used interchangeably as synonyms during the six years of his presidency which can be seen in the following examples.

...my government is working hard to win the **war** (*guerra*) against the delinquency...⁹³

...we are employing all the forces of the state to win the **battle** (*batalla*) against the insecurity...⁹⁴

We have taken on this **fight** (*lucha*) with firmness and determination because what is in play is nothing less than the present and the future of Mexico.⁹⁵

The **fight** (*combate*) that we Mexicans wage against the crime is for liberty and justice of Mexico...⁹⁶

93 Felipe Calderón. 2006c, "Palabras del presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Lic. Felipe Calderón durante la ceremonia de inauguración del Foro de inversiones y cooperación empresarial hispano-mexicano," December 4, 2006, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2006/12/palabras-del-presidente-de-los-estados-unidos-mexicanos-lic-felipe-calderon-durante-la-ceremonia-de-inauguracion-del-foro-de-inversiones-y-cooperacion-empresarial-hispano-mexicano/> (accessed June 9, 2015). The bold face accentuation is of the author of the thesis.

94 Felipe Calderón. 2007b, "El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia de inauguración del complejo industrial Siemens Monterrey," January 17, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/01/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-de-inauguracion-del-complejo-industrial-siemens-monterrey/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

95 Felipe Calderón, 2007g, "El presidente Calderón en el anuncio de la estrategia integral para la prevención del delito y combate a la delincuencia," March 7, 2007, Available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/03/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-anuncio-de-la-estrategia-integral-para-la-prevencion-del-delito-y-combate-a-la-delincuencia/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

96 Felipe Calderón, 2010b, "El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia conmemorativa del CXLVIII aniversario de la Batalla del 5 de mayo de 1862 y toma de protesta de bandera a los soldados del servicio militar nacional," May 5, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/05/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-conmemorativa-del-cxlviii-aniversario-de-la-batalla-del-5-de-mayo-de-1862-y-toma-de-protesta-de-bandera-a-los-soldados-del-servicio-militar-nacional/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

3.1. Appeals to a Legitimate Power Source

Family and especially its most vulnerable members – children, youngsters, and the elder people, stand for the theme that has been mentioned by Calderón the most and thus represents the major legitimating power source employed. The president indicated that children composed the group most affected by the criminal actions and also the most valuable elements of the society. Moreover, they also constituted hope for the future because of their potential and it was therefore in the interest of every single Mexican to assure that children lived in a more secure country. The focus on children corresponds with the strategy called altruism by Reyes who claims that mentioning vulnerable and innocent members of the society facilitates legitimization.

...the insecurity and the violence, drug trafficking and the addictions are the major threat for the **most valuable** thing we Mexicans have which is the family, the children, and the young people.⁹⁷

Our cause are the children, to liberate the young from the claws of the drugs and the delinquency of those who want to put them in chains of slavery and addiction to make them permanent servants of their perfidious interests.⁹⁸

...in this war contra the delinquency, against the enemies of Mexico, (...) we will recover one by one the public spaces and the villages and the cities governed by the evil in order to give them back to the children, the citizens, the mothers of the families, and the grandparents.⁹⁹

You (the public/people) are the reason for this fight for security. **We are fighting for you, for your family and for Mexico.**¹⁰⁰

In connection with the family Calderón also pointed out its own role as a father in order to provide a better justification of the actions that were directed against the

⁹⁷ Calderón, 2007g.

⁹⁸ Felipe Calderón, 2007i, “El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia conmemorativa del XCIII aniversario de la defensa del puerto de Veracruz y jura de bandera de los cadetes de primer año de la Heroica escuela naval militar,” April 21, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/04/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-conmemorativa-del-xciii-aniversario-de-la-defensa-del-puerto-de-veracruz-y-jura-de-bandera-de-los-cadetes-de-primer-ano-de-la-heroica-escuela-naval-militar/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

⁹⁹ Felipe Calderón. 2008h, “El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia de clausura y apertura de cursos del sistema educativo militar,” September 12, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/09/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-de-clausura-y-apertura-de-cursos-del-sistema-educativo-militar/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

¹⁰⁰ Felipe Calderón, 2011a, “Mensaje del presidente Calderón sobre seguridad,” May 4, 2011, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2011/05/mensaje-del-presidente-felipe-calderon-sobre-seguridad/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

organized crime but their aim was to protect the children as shown in the previous examples of his discourse.

As a father of a family, I understand the preoccupation of the Mexicans, the Mexicans that are scared, scared of the possibility that their kids might become victims of the delinquency when going to school, in the parks, and in the streets.¹⁰¹

The second power source used by Calderón was the constitutionality and the law system. Calderón mentioned that the war against the organized delinquency was not his personal choice but something that the law obliged him and his government to do. He basically stated that he had no other choice but to confront the cartels in order to fulfill his legal obligations as a president of Mexico who had to provide for security of his citizens. He portrayed the actions as something that any government and president in his position would have to do.

...**the first obligation of the government** is to guarantee security of the families.¹⁰²

Public security in general and the fight against the organized crime in particular (...) represent a **constitutional responsibility** of the federal government...¹⁰³

It would have been easy to ignore the problem as some suggested but **the duty of the government** is to protect its citizens, respect the law, and make sure that the law is respected.¹⁰⁴

...in the face of this clear threat it is necessary to remember that the constitutional, political, legal, and ethic **duty** of any democratic government is to fight the delinquency...¹⁰⁵

Through the third power source employed, the president called upon the Mexicans to fulfill their destiny and confront the organized crime in the name of the homeland (*la*

101 Felipe Calderón, 2007m, "El presidente Calderón en el evento 'Limpiemos México' estrategia nacional de seguridad. Programa en zona de recuperación," July 2, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/07/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-evento-limpiemos-mexico-estrategia-nacional-de-seguridad-programa-en-zona-de-recuperacion/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

102 Felipe Calderón, 2006a, "Presentación del gabinete de seguridad," November 30, 2006, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2006/11/presentacion-del-gabinete-de-seguridad/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

103 Felipe Calderón, 2009d, "Palabras del presidente durante el evento tres años de gobierno," November 29, 2009, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2009/11/palabras-del-presidente-calderon-durante-el-evento-tres-anos-de-gobierno/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

104 Felipe Calderón, 2010d, "Mensaje a la Nación del presidente Felipe Calderón Hinojosa," June 15, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/06/mensaje-a-la-nacion-del-presidente-felipe-calderon-hinojosa/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

105 Felipe Calderón, 2011b, "El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia cívica del centenario de la promulgación del Plan de Ayala," November 28, 2011, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2011/11/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-civica-del-centenario-de-la-promulgacion-del-plan-de-ayala/> (accessed June 15, 2015).

Patria) and the patriotism of Mexicans as citizens. The fatherland served as a unifying factor that reminded everyone of the glorious moments of the past and also as a way to assure prosperity in the future. Furthermore, Calderón described the service to the homeland as absolutely indispensable and labeled it as something that all Mexicans who wanted to be considered as real patriots would do without any hesitation.

Today **the homeland requires** us to have in mind the glorious morning of the fifth of May (1862) when our fathers gained victory over an enemy that was thought to be unbeatable.¹⁰⁶

...every single day, every single day we pull away from the delinquency the spaces that belong to the citizens and we do this because **in the service to the homeland** there is no hesitation, no bargaining.¹⁰⁷

We commemorate those who turned up to the call of the history and the **demands of the homeland** to join the fight for liberty and human dignity. They acted like who they really are, true patriots fulfilling their duty.¹⁰⁸

...**the homeland exhorts all of us** and requires us to build it with our ideas of liberty, justice, equality and democracy. The homeland is the land of our fathers (...), our homeland is a homeland that is being constructed.¹⁰⁹

...there is no enemy that would be strong enough (...) when the will, **the values, and the fatherland are put first.**¹¹⁰

The last category that played an important role in the discourses of Calderón was Mexico and the values such as democracy, peace, security, sovereignty, and justice it

106 Felipe Calderón, 2007k, “El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia conmemorativa al CXLV aniversario de la Batalla del 5 de mayo de 1862,” May 5, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/05/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-conmemorativa-al-cxlv-aniversario-de-la-batalla-del-5-de-mayo-de-1862/> (accessed June 10, 2015).

107 Felipe Calderón, 2008a, “El presidente Calderón en el desayuno conmemorativo al Día de la Fuerza aérea mexicana,” February 10, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/02/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-desayuno-conmemorativo-al-dia-de-la-fuerza-aerea-mexicana/> (accessed June 9, 2015).

108 Felipe Calderón, 2008d, “El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia alusiva a los pilotos de la fuerza aérea expedicionaria mexicana, Escuadrón 201, en la II Guerra Mundial,” May 1, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/05/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-alusiva-a-los-pilotos-de-la-fuerza-aerea-expedicionaria-mexicana-escuadron-201-en-la-ii-guerra-mundial/> (accessed June 11, 2015).

109 Felipe Calderón, 2010g, “El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia conmemorativa al CLXIII aniversario de la gesta heroica de los Niños Héroes de Chapultepec,” September 13, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/09/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-conmemorativa-al-clxiii-aniversario-de-la-gesta-heroica-de-los-ninos-heroes-de-chapultepec/> (accessed June 12, 2015).

110 Felipe Calderón, 2012d, “El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia 200 años, ataque y sitio de Cuautla de 1812-2012,” May 2, 2012, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2012/05/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-200-anos-ataque-y-sitio-de-cuautla-de-1812-2012/> (accessed June 8, 2015).

symbolized. The struggle against the organized crime represented a way to make sure that these values would be respected and enhanced in the future.

Together with the fight against the crime, the tasks of our **sovereignty and national security** that you (the armed forces) carry out serve as a guarantee of peace and tranquility for the Mexicans.¹¹¹

We are fighting for **the cause of liberty, security, tranquility** of the Mexicans. We fight to save the new generations from the threat of drugs and delinquency.¹¹²

The fight that currently lead our institutions is precisely to **preserve the liberty**. It is precisely to **preserve and promote justice**. It is precisely to strengthen national sovereignty and to fully **establish the rule of law** without which there are no liberties, no justice, and no progress.¹¹³

...it is indispensable to say that the **democratic institutions** of the country and the **fundamental values** such as the liberty of expression are in danger because of the criminality.¹¹⁴

While religion has always constituted a very important legitimizing power source and it is pointed out in the article by Graham as one of the key aspects of legitimization within the “call to arms” genre, Calderón has not mentioned God or religion once during the six years of his presidential term. This might come as a surprise due to the religiosity of the Mexican population and the role that religion plays in the everyday life. Nevertheless, the absence of religious references can be explained by the strong division between the state and the church originally established in 1857 by Benito Juárez and affirmed in the Article 130 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 which has since been strictly respected.¹¹⁵

3.2. Appeals to History

References to events from history in Calderón's discourse are of two types. First, he spoke in general about Mexican past and the struggles that Mexico had to go through in order to gain its independence and later on to assure the acceptance of its national

111 Calderón, 2007f.

112 Felipe Calderón, 2007i, “El presidente Calderón en la reunión del Consejo estatal de seguridad pública,” May 22, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/05/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-reunion-del-consejo-estatal-de-seguridad-publica/> (accessed June 10, 2015).

113 Calderón, 2010b.

114 Felipe Calderón, 2010e, “El presidente Calderón en el evento Diálogo por la seguridad. Evaluación y fortalecimiento,” August 5, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/08/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-evento-dialogo-por-la-seguridad-evaluacion-y-fortalecimiento/> (accessed June 10, 2015).

115 *Constitución política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, February 5, 1917, available at: <http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Constitucion/cn16.pdf> (accessed June 14, 2015).

sovereignty, democracy, and liberty. Second, during the anniversaries of important events, Calderón made direct connections between the historic moments and the current situation, especially between the courage and resolution of the figures and soldiers involved and the legacy that the heroes involved left for today's and future generations.

The events mentioned are almost exclusively armed struggles, both external and internal, in which Mexicans gained victories over their enemies. In the discourses Calderón usually reminded the citizens of the attributes and conditions that led to the victory of Mexico in the past and then said that the same thing had to be done nowadays in order to win against the new enemy threatening Mexico in the form of delinquency.

It has to be noted that Calderón included exclusively events that took place after Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1810. He did not make connections with any events that happened during the Spanish colonial rule nor with the events from the pre-hispanic past. In addition, more recent events have not been mentioned either. The newest moment that Calderón used to remind the Mexicans of the courage of their ancestors was the participation of the national air-force in the Second World War on the side of the Allies.

Besides reminding the citizens of concrete events and struggles from the past, Calderón on various occasions also spoke about general lessons that should be taken from the history. The most important one lied in unity and ignorance of particular interests that not only once put in danger the fate of the country. He also compared the enemies that Mexico faced in the past and their characteristics with the organized crime.

Today in 2010 like in 1847, 1913, 1810 or 1910 Mexico also faces **enemies that wish to impose their perverse rules**, terrify the Mexicans, paralyze the authority and put everyone through their violence.¹¹⁶

...when instead of being united, the Mexicans are divided, when instead of contributing to the fight in favor of the homeland, fear and discouragement is planted to satisfy personal or group ambitions and interests, who loses is not one person or one group, **who loses is Mexico and those who suffer the consequences are all of us Mexicans.**¹¹⁷

116 Felipe Calderón, 2010h, "El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia de clausura y apertura de cursos de los planteles militares," September 14, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/09/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-de-clausura-y-apertura-de-cursos-de-los-planteles-militares/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

117 Felipe Calderón, 2008i, "El presidente en la ceremonia del CXCVIII aniversario del inicio de la gesta de independencia," September 16, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/09/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-del-cxcviii-aniversario-del-inicio-de-la-gesta-de-independencia/> (accessed September 16, 2015).

...throughout our history we Mexicans have faced numerous times grave problems, challenges, and obstacles, including tragedies that have hit our homeland but they have never destroyed it because Mexico has **solid foundations of unity, identity, and integrity** that are able to resist whichever adversity.¹¹⁸

The first concrete moment mentioned by the president is the struggle that Mexico underwent in order to gain its independence from Spain and the role that the founders of the country played in the process. Moreover, Calderón also pointed out the courage of those who defended the newly obtained independence against Spain that strived to reconquer Mexican territory. The ability to defend national sovereignty and to protect the newly gained independence against the former colonial oppressor definitely represents one of the key moments forming the Mexican nation.

We Mexicans will get ahead, united, inspired, strengthened by **the example of the heroes such as Hidalgo and Morelos** who gave us free and independent Mexico; because it has been almost 200 years during which we Mexicans have learnt to fight for liberty and to preserve it.¹¹⁹

The independence would have been impossible without the dreams, the values, and the determination of those who started it in 1810, on a day like today. **Inspired by the glorious memory**, we Mexicans like in that time, like always, will have to face and get over the challenges, we will have to defeat the enemies of the nation, and we will overcome whichever adversity.¹²⁰

The threats and the enemies that the country faces today are very different from those with whom dealt the first Mexican marines but **the devotion and bravery, the fairness and dignity, the loyalty, patriotism, and the service are the same.**¹²¹

118 Felipe Calderón, 2010i, "El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia del CC aniversario del inicio de la Independencia de México en el Monumento a la Independencia," September 16, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/09/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-del-cc-aniversario-del-inicio-de-la-independencia-de-mexico-en-el-monumento-a-la-independencia/> (accessed June 14, 2015).

119 Calderón, 2008i.

120 Ibidem.

121 Felipe Calderón, 2007o, "El presidente en la ceremonia con motivo del Día de la Armada de México," November 23, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/11/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-con-motivo-del-dia-de-la-armada-de-mexico/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

Like the Captain Sainz de Baranda¹²² and the marines he commanded we Mexicans are not willing to yield the arena to the enemy; in the protection of the population and in the defense of the homeland not even one step back...¹²³

The second event from the 19th century utilized by Calderón that forms a part of the national consciousness was the struggle against the United States during the Mexican-American War between 1846 and 1848. Even though Mexico suffered a defeat in this war, the conflict still produced a memorable act which was later used for nationalistic purposes. This moment came in 1847 when the US soldiers were about to capture Chapultepec, a well known military school in Mexico City. However, a few valiant Boy Heroes (*Niños Héroes*) defended the school and one of them, according to the myth that was posteriorly diffused, jumped to death from the walls of the castle wrapped in the national flag thus symbolizing the innocence of the young independent country.¹²⁴

The boy soldiers consequently became an important symbol of Mexican heroism and national sovereignty as they did not let the flag, a symbol of Mexico and its national sovereignty, to be captured by the enemy and therefore protected the honor of Mexico. A lesson drawn from this war also warns against not being united because in this case it led to a loss of a great part of Mexican territory.

Inspired by the example of the Boy Heroes of Chapultepec all of the Mexicans of our generation should declare war against the enemies of Mexico because we know that in this fight the nation prevails as it has prevailed in these almost 200 years of its glorious independence and liberty.¹²⁵

The third event that Calderón made connections to is the defense of Mexico against the French invasion in 1862. The objective of France was to occupy Mexican territory since Mexico was not able to pay the debt it had with European countries. The Battle of Puebla which the Mexicans won stands as an important symbol since the soldiers did not give up even though they faced the most potent army in the world of that time which

122 Together with Miguel Barragán, Pedro Sainz de Baranda y Borreiro defended the port of Veracruz against the Spanish navy that tried to reestablish Spanish rule over Mexico. The final acts of this struggle on November 23, 1825 led to the consolidation of Mexican independence. The events of 1825 are commemorated through a Day of the Army on November 23.

123 Calderón, 2007o.

124 Arturo J. Aldama and Naomi H. Quiñonez, eds. *Chicana and Chicano Cultural Studies in the 21st Century* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002): 368.

125 Calderón, 2008h.

had more soldiers and was better equipped, a fact which Calderón highlighted various times.

The lesson of unity was also drawn from this armed conflict as Mexico at that time suffered from a division between the republicans and those who sympathized with the invaders and were eager to install a monarchy. From today's perspective, the defeat of France serves as an important nationalistic boost as Mexico realized that a strong European country is not unbeatable and that it could defend itself against foreign invasions with which it had dealt unsuccessfully in the past.¹²⁶

The heroes of the Battle of Puebla left us a lesson of patriotism, they wrote in our history a great testimony that we Mexicans can deal with and win against any enemy of the nation but only if we do it united.¹²⁷

Today the homeland calls upon the Mexicans to form a united front against the enemies of Mexico **like those brave of the Battle of Puebla**, we Mexicans have to act now with unity and patriotism to win against the whip of insecurity and criminality.¹²⁸

Like the heroes of the Battle of Puebla we will be intransigent with those who intend to destroy the fabric of our society and poison our young people, with those who prefer to see our homeland demolished to gain power and material goods.¹²⁹

From the 20th century, Calderón used the example of the heroes of the Mexican Revolution, especially of Francisco I. Madero who did not kneel before the oppressors of the nation in the form of the long-standing authoritarian regime of Porfirio Díaz and started the revolt and fight for justice and democracy. Mexican Revolution serves as a principal symbol nowadays as the current regime is presented as an institutionalized continuation of the revolutionary struggle. The revolution is considered to have provided the foundation of the current system and to have rooted the principles of democracy, justice, and respect in the society.

126 Mark Johanson, "What is Cinco de Mayo? The Mexican Battle That Became an American Fiesta," *International Business Times*, May 4, 2012, available at: <http://www.ibtimes.com/what-cinco-de-mayo-mexican-battle-became-american-fiesta-696059> (accessed June 17, 2015).

127 Calderón, 2007k.

128 Ibidem.

129 Felipe Calderón, 2008e, "El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia conmemorativa al CXLVI aniversario de la Batalla del 5 de mayo de 1862 y toma de protesta de bandera a los soldados del servicio militar nacional clase 1989, anticipados y remisos," May 5, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/05/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-conmemorativa-al-cxlv-aniversario-de-la-batalla-del-5-de-mayo-de-1862-y-toma-de-protesta-de-bandera-a-los-soldados-del-servicio-militar-nacional-clase-1989-anti/> (accessed June 15, 2015).

I exhort you to **fight like Madero did** almost a hundred years ago, like he would have said, with resolution and serenity to definitely consolidate the peace...¹³⁰

Heroes like Francisco I. Madero who started with determination a historic fight for justice and democracy in Mexico.¹³¹

If the generation of 1910 gained liberty, the duty of our generation is to preserve liberty. If the generation of 1910 fought for democracy, our duty is to expand and strengthen democracy. **The legacy of the revolutionaries** is the heritage of the Mexicans of today but it should be made even greater for the Mexicans of tomorrow.¹³²

The US intervention in the port of Veracruz was also mentioned by the president. As Mexico was already in chaos because of the ongoing revolution, a regular army was not present to defend the city and the inhabitants of the area themselves had to protect it against the Americans. The moral of these events is that the enemies profit from divisions and seek allies who are willing to cooperate with them. Furthermore, the courage of those who did not fear the powerful invader was also repeated. The invasion left resentment against the invading country as the USA was criticized for being present not to impede the deliveries of arms to Mexico from Germany but to protect its economic interests, especially those connected with the oil fields in the area.¹³³

Like in 1914 today we also face powerful and new enemies that put in danger the well-being of the nation and the Mexicans.¹³⁴

...to collude with those who threaten the security of our people signifies the betrayal of our Mexico, it means **betraying our history and our future**.¹³⁵

130 Felipe Calderón, 2008g, “El presidente en la ceremonia de ascensos y reconocimientos en la policía federal,” September 8, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/09/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-de-ascensos-y-reconocimientos-en-la-policia-federal/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

131 Calderón, 2008i.

132 Felipe Calderón, 2012e, “El presidente en la ceremonia conmemorativa del CII aniversario del inicio de la Revolución mexicana y homenaje a don Francisco I. Madero,” November 20, 2012, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2012/11/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-conmemorativa-del-cii-aniversario-del-inicio-de-la-revolucion-mexicana-y-homenaje-a-don-francisco-i-madero/> (accessed June 12, 2015).

133 Enrique Krauze, “The April Invasion of Veracruz,” *The New York Times*, April 20, 2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/opinion/krauze-the-april-invasion-of-veracruz.html?_r=0 (accessed June 17, 2015).

134 Calderón, 2007i.

135 Ibidem.

Today we commemorate the lieutenant José Azueta and the cadet Virgilio Uribe, **brave patriots who defended with their own blood our national sovereignty in April 1914**, one day like today, when the US troops attacked the port of Veracruz and aimed to invade the country.¹³⁶

The last event to which Calderón made connection is the Mexican involvement in the Second World War. Even though Mexico's participation was brief, its air-force helped the USA to liberate the islands of the Philippines; it constitutes an important moment that is remembered as Mexico contributed to the defeat of the Axis powers. Furthermore, the members of the air-force were also considered defenders of national sovereignty as they fulfilled the moral duty of the nation and fought for the ideals of democracy and liberty against the enemy that stood for totalitarianism.¹³⁷

Like the pilots and mechanics of the 201st Fighter Squadron did today every Mexican should act with patriotism, uniting forces and always working for the progress and strengthening of Mexico.¹³⁸

Today, 65 years after **the glorious feat of the 201st Fighter Squadron**, the homeland faces the challenge of those who with illegality and crime threaten the liberty and the security of the Mexicans.¹³⁹

Apart from the references to glorious moments in the history of the country, Calderón also spoke about the future that lied ahead and could be fulfilled only if the enemy in the form of the organized crime was eliminated. With the defeat of this major threat Mexico would be able to fully use its potential and become a secure, just, and economically prosperous country. Mentioning the future complies with the theoretical framework established as Graham and Reyes also show that connections are made between the heroic past and bright future in order to provide legitimization for war.

136 Felipe Calderón, 2009a, “El presidente en la ceremonia conmemorativa del XCV aniversario de la defensa del puerto de Veracruz y jura de bandera de los cadetes del primer año de la Heroica escuela naval militar,” April 21, 2009, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2009/04/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-conmemorativa-del-xcv-aniversario-de-la-defensa-del-puerto-de-veracruz-y-jura-de-bandera-de-los-cadetes-del-primer-ano-de-la-heroica-escuela-naval-militar/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

137 “México en la II guerra mundial,” Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, available at: <http://www.sedena.gob.mx/mexico-en-la-ii-guerra-mundial> (accessed June 17, 2015).

138 Calderón, 2008d.

139 Felipe Calderón, 2010a, “El presidente Calderón en el evento de el Día de la Fuerza aérea mexicana,” February 10, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/02/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-evento-de-el-dia-de-la-fuerza-aerea-mexicana/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

I aspire that Mexico will be **a nation of order, peace, liberty, justice, and democracy**; Mexico more secure, Mexico cleaner, Mexico more righteous, Mexico freer. Finally, this was the desire of our heroes, our founders.¹⁴⁰

The objective of this fight, friends, is nothing else but to guarantee the men and women of Mexico **an environment of liberty, an environment of peace, an environment of public security**, to which we Mexicans, especially the following generations and this one as well, have a right.¹⁴¹

We have to do it because there is future for the nation only if the state recovers minimal conditions of security and tranquility for the citizens because **without public peace there is no future**.¹⁴²

3.3. Constructing the Evil Other

Construction of the enemy and the description of his characteristics form an important part of the discourses produced by Calderón. On many occasions he openly labeled the organized crime and delinquency with the word enemy (*el enemigo*) and pointed out that they did not belong to the Mexican society and were not part of the nation. The enemy was not the only label that the president employed, he also called the delinquency simply as evil (*el mal*). Excluding the criminals was achieved by various strategies. Calderón very often repeated the phrase “*we Mexicans*” and pointed out that if the organized crime was weakened, Mexico would be strengthened. The same logic was applied in other discursive moments since if something was taken from the delinquency, it would be given back to the people of Mexico.

The ground that we win over from the delinquency represents **a space that we give back to the Mexicans**.¹⁴³

140 Felipe Calderón, 2006d, “El presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Lic. Felipe Calderón en la transferencia de personal de la Secretaría de la defensa nacional y de la Secretaría de marina,” December 13, 2006, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2006/12/el-presidente-de-los-estados-unidos-mexicanos-lic-felipe-calderon-en-la-transferencia-de-personal-de-la-secretaria-de-la-defensa-nacional-y-de-la-secretaria-de-marina/> (accessed June 10, 2015).

141 Felipe Calderón, 2009c, “El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia de entrega de condecoraciones de la policía federal,” August 7, 2009, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2009/08/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-de-entrega-de-condecoraciones-de-la-policia-federal/> (accessed June 10, 2015).

142 Calderón, 2007f.

143 Felipe Calderón, 2006e, “El presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Lic. Felipe Calderón durante la cancelación del timbre conmemorativo del 90 aniversario del periódico El Universal,” December 22, 2006, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2006/12/el-presidente-de-los-estados-unidos-mexicanos-lic-felipe-calderon-durante-la-cancelacion-del-timbre-conmemorativo-del-90-aniversario-del-periodico-el-universal/> (accessed June 16, 2015).

...this battle for security will be long, it will cost a lot of money, it will take time, it will cost human lives, (...) but in the end, **we Mexicans will win** it.¹⁴⁴

The adversaries of the society are the criminals, **this is not some Mexicans against others...**¹⁴⁵

An important part of the binary opposition strategy was also to describe 'Us' with positive characteristics and highlight that the group of 'Them' did not possess these attributes. While the criminals were associated with violence or criminality, the Mexicans were referred to as hard-working, honest, loyal, or simply good persons.

In addition, the president various times employed the legitimization tactics that had as an objective to persuade the public that there was a very small group of 'Them' while there were many more of 'Us.' The victory over the enemy was therefore assured due to this numerical advantage and Calderón reminded the citizens of this.

If we continue working like this, our cities and our land will not be in the hands of the delinquents anymore but it will be transferred to the hands of **honest people who work to get ahead their families.**¹⁴⁶

There are much more of us who believe that **hard work and effort constitute the correct way** for the country, there are much more of us who say “no” to the violence and the delinquency...¹⁴⁷

...we are more, millions and millions more, **the Mexicans who want to live in peace**, we are more than the criminals who attack the peace that we deserve.¹⁴⁸

I am absolutely convinced that in our dear Mexico **the good people form the majority**. There is an overwhelming majority of women and men, youngsters, elder people that are good persons, brave persons, noble persons, loyal persons, people who wake up every day to earn the livelihood for their homes, who **work honestly** and want to move forward in a clean way.¹⁴⁹

Calderón associated the enemies of Mexico with a number of activities that went against the interests of the society and the country. These actions influenced negatively

144 Felipe Calderón, 2007d, “Sesión plenaria: 'Conversación con el Lic. Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, presidente de México',” January 26, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/01/sesion-plenaria-conversacion-con-el-lic-felipe-calderon-hinojosa-presidente-de-mexico/> (accesses June 13, 2015).

145 Calderón, 2010e.

146 Felipe Calderón, 2007a, “El presidente de México Lic. Felipe Calderón durante la visita y saludo a las fuerzas federales en el estado de Michoacán,” January 3, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/01/el-presidente-de-mexico-lic-felipe-calderon-durante-la-visita-y-saludo-a-las-fuerzas-federales-en-el-estado-de-michoacan/> (accessed June 14, 2015).

147 Felipe Calderón, 2007j, “Palabras del presidente Calderón en la ceremonia de izamiento de bandera blanca,” May 4, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/05/palabras-del-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-de-izamiento-de-bandera-blanca/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

148 Calderón, 2007g.

149 Calderón, 2007l.

not only the functioning of the government but also many aspects of life of every Mexican and because of that it was in the interest of everyone to do away with the criminal activities and delinquency.

First, Calderón indicated that the organized crime undermines the territorial unity and state authority due to the special relationship the crime organizations had built with the politicians and state institutions. The president openly blamed the corrupt authorities and their ignorance for this state of affairs. He also associated the increased presence of the delinquency with the evolution of drug trafficking. In the past, the objective of the organizations was to work in secret and dominate the important routes. However, recently they began to be involved in more activities for which they needed territorial bases and control of institutions.¹⁵⁰

We will not tolerate challenges to the authority of Mexico; **nobody should try to put themselves above the law**. In my government there will not be impunity for none.¹⁵¹

The problem is not only the presence of the organized crime but also the belligerence and impunity with which **various organizations took over territorial control of different regions** of the country.¹⁵²

We Mexicans cannot and should not **permit the existence of de facto powers** that every single day attack the society and **disrespect the authority** of the state.¹⁵³

...the organized crime in the last decade started to attack territories; that is to say to **dominate villages, communities**, and to achieve this to also **dominate authorities, the police, and those in power**...¹⁵⁴

Second, the president accused the delinquency of taking over public spaces which should have belonged to every Mexican; however, because of the fear and violence, the

150 This phenomenon is characterized by Calderón as *narcomenudeo* (the state of affairs when the cartels dominate the territory and the authorities in order to not only traffic the drugs but also to sell them). On the contrary, the objective of *narcotráfico* was to get the drugs to the United States through the domination of a certain route without becoming visible.

151 Felipe Calderón, 2007c, “El presidente Calderón en la ceremonia de entrega del sable de mando de la marina armada de México,” January 19, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/01/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-ceremonia-de-entrega-del-sable-de-mando-de-la-marina-armada-de-mexico/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

152 Felipe Calderón, 2007n, “Mensaje a la Nación del presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos con motivo de su primer informe de gobierno,” September 2, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/09/mensaje-a-la-nacion-del-presidente-de-los-estados-unidos-mexicanos-con-motivo-de-su-primer-informe-de-gobierno/> (accessed June 12, 2015).

153 Calderón, 2006a.

154 Felipe, Calderón, 2010c “El presidente Calderón en la inauguración del segundo Foro de seguridad y justicia,” May 24, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/05/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-inauguracion-del-segundo-foro-de-seguridad-y-justicia/> (accessed June 25, 2015).

public spaces were governed by the criminal organizations. Recuperation of public spaces represented one of the key themes of the presidency and Calderón dedicated a great part of his discourses and strategies to this phenomenon.

Public spaces for our children and **not a territory for the delinquents...**¹⁵⁵

We have to win this battle (...) through recovery of **public spaces that currently belong to the delinquency...**¹⁵⁶

Third, according to the presidential discourse, the criminals posed a threat to personal integrity and personal liberties of the citizens. Its actions made the organized crime responsible for undermining the quality of life of the society and for immobilizing it. Calderón highlighted that the criminals did not distinguish between people and everybody could become their victim.

...the organized crime **attacks the security and peace of our homes**, the health of our families...¹⁵⁷

...the crime organizations that **threaten the integrity and the security of our families**, the liberty of our people...¹⁵⁸

...one of the major challenges that we Mexicans face today is precisely **a force that aims to impose its will, intervene in our lives**, in our matters, and in our decisions.¹⁵⁹

...it is a fight of all Mexicans because **the criminals do not make differences** and harm everyone in the same manner. Because of that your participation is vital...¹⁶⁰

Fourth, Calderón pointed out that due to the problems with the organized crime the way to a prosperous future was obstructed, the national economy was put in danger and could not develop as it would have in a peaceful environment. Because of the presence of the organized crime, investors from abroad were discouraged from investing money

155 Calderón, 2006b.

156 Felipe Calderón, 2008f, "El presidente Calderón en la XXIII sesión del Consejo nacional de seguridad pública," August 21, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/08/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-xxiii-sesion-del-consejo-nacional-de-seguridad-publica/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

157 Calderón, 2007k.

158 Felipe Calderón, 2008b, "El presidente Calderón en el desayuno conmemorativo del Día del Ejército," February 19, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/02/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-desayuno-conmemorativo-del-dia-del-ejercito/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

159 Calderón, 2009d.

160 Calderón, 2010d.

in Mexico. Moreover, skilled workers from other countries were hesitant to work in Mexico because they feared the consequences of the activities of the delinquency.

...the lack of security **has undermined** to a very alarming point **the quality of life** of the Mexicans and the ability of the country to develop.¹⁶¹

In a few words, we are working to **make Mexico a safe place to invest, work, and live.**¹⁶²

We will not allow the criminals to continue **obstructing Mexico from a future of major prosperity and development.**¹⁶³

The insecurity in Mexico (...) has profoundly **damaged the quality of life** of our families and **the capacity of our country to grow** and to be successful in the world.¹⁶⁴

Fifth, spreading the culture of crime was also mentioned as one of the consequences of the actions of the delinquency. Calderón showed that while the main preoccupation of the organized crime was drug trafficking, it was also responsible for other wrongs that affected more directly the lives of the people. In addition, the president dealt with the critics who claimed that the increased presence of the police and armed forces led to the escalation of violence. He numerous times repeated that the government was not responsible for the violence. The only entity to be blamed for the wrongs of any type was the organized crime.

...the organized crime **has corrupted and degraded the social life of our communities** and robberies, abductions, extortions, and violence that dramatically affect the lives of the citizens have flourished in this permissive environment.¹⁶⁵

This is how the violence started because in order to control the drug market and to kick the rivals out of the territories they wanted to control, **the delinquents had to intimidate** not only the other criminals but also the authorities and the society.¹⁶⁶

...it is false that the federal presence has motivated the violence. On the contrary, **the criminal violence is what motivated the federal presence** that wants to fight and overcome the violence.¹⁶⁷

161 Calderón, 2006d.

162 Calderón, 2006c.

163 Calderón, 2006d.

164 Calderón, 2007a.

165 Felipe Calderón, 2009b, "El presidente Calderón en la inauguración del Foro nacional seguridad con justicia," June 24, 2009, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2009/06/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-inauguracion-del-foro-nacional-seguridad-con-justicia/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

166 Calderón, 2010d.

167 Felipe Calderón, 2012a, "El presidente Calderón en el desayuno del Día del Ejército y Fuerza aérea," February 19, 2012, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2012/02/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-desayuno-del-dia-del-ejercito-y-fuerza-aerea/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

Sixth, as the cartels were not satisfied with their economic opportunities abroad and strived for expanding their market, they had begun to put the Mexican children into slavery through drugs and addictions. These claims went hand in hand with the justifications provided by Calderón according to which Mexico had become a country of consumption and was also connected to the legitimizing power source in the form of the family.

...fight all of those who **poison the body and the soul of the children** and the young people of Mexico...¹⁶⁸

We know that the organized crime seeks to transform Mexico from a country of trafficking to the United States to **a destination of sale and consumption** and therefore strives to give away drugs even to our children and youngsters outside of the schools.¹⁶⁹

Seventh, the delinquency influenced directly the democratic functioning of the country since it had threatened the democratic institutions and it had been meddling into elections through the assassinations of candidates, financial support of certain politicians, and threats against others that forced them to step down from the electoral process. Furthermore, he called the organized crime the major threat that the Mexican democracy has to deal with.

...their actions constitute a threat (...) also for **the democratic institutions** which we have constructed with the effort of many generations...¹⁷⁰

In the last five years 28 mayors have lost their lives in the hands of the criminals. In recent elections there have been registered cases of candidates of all political affiliations that have been **strongly pressured by the delinquents**.¹⁷¹

168 Felipe Calderón, 2007e, "Palabras del presidente Calderón durante el desayuno conmemorativo al Día de la Fuerza aérea mexicana," February 10, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/02/palabras-del-presidente-calderon-durante-el-desayuno-conmemorativo-al-dia-de-la-fuerza-aerea-mexicana/> (accessed June 14, 2015).

169 Felipe Calderón, 2007h, "El presidente Calderón en la presentación del programa nacional contra las adicciones," April 17, 2007, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/04/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-presentacion-del-programa-nacional-contra-las-adicciones/> (accessed June 14, 2015).

170 Calderón, 2010e.

171 Felipe Calderón, 2012b, "El presidente Calderón en la XXXII sesión del Consejo nacional de seguridad pública," February 29, 2012, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2012/02/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-xxxii-sesion-del-consejo-nacional-de-seguridad-publica/> (accessed June 15, 2015).

The criminality and violence constitute a **principal threat to the democratic regimes** we have constructed in our region...¹⁷²

Calderón also used in his speeches the metaphor of organized crime as cancer that benefited from the ignorance of the authorities that governed in the past and was not cured in time. It was therefore indispensable to take a resolute action to remove the tumor once for all. This metaphor corresponded to the claims that during the previous PRI administrations the problem of drug trafficking was ignored and Calderón thus had to clean up what had become an enormous problem.

This cancer ignored in its genesis and development for a long time nowadays threatens the well-being and the future of our families...¹⁷³

The actions of the organized crime, **the actions of the delinquency and the drug traffickers are like a cancer**. Its presence is not fully perceived until its harmful symptoms appear. Nevertheless, when the symptoms become visible, it is too late and therefore the treatment to cure the patient, the only treatment possible, has to be much more drastic and much more intense.¹⁷⁴

Maybe if it had been attacked in time, it would have been cured and overcome quicker. But today **this cancer has to be removed**, this cancer has to be fought and we will persevere until we leave Mexico free of this cancer, the organized crime.¹⁷⁵

3.4. Uniting Behind the Greater Good

The last generic element of the discourse that the author takes a look into is the call for unification. Calderón on various occasions asked the people of Mexico to put aside their differences of any kind – political, social, religious – to fight the biggest enemy of our time in the form of delinquency. Appeals to unity were frequently connected with the legitimizing sources of power already mentioned such as the family or the homeland. The president claimed that support of everyone was more than indispensable

172 Felipe Calderón, 2012c, “El presidente Calderón en la reunión hemisférica de alto nivel contra la delincuencia organizada transnacional,” March 1, 2012, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2012/03/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-reunion-hemisferica-de-alto-nivel-contra-la-delincuencia-organizada-transnacional/> (accessed June 13, 2015).

173 Calderón, 2008f.

174 Felipe Calderón, 2010j, “El presidente en el Día de la Armada de México,” November 23, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/11/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-dia-de-la-armada-de-mexico/> (accessed June 15, 2015).

175 Felipe Calderón, 2010k, “El presidente Calderón en el encuentro ciudadano con motivo del cuarto año de gobierno,” November 28, 2010, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/11/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-encuentro-ciudadano-con-motivo-del-cuarto-ano-de-gobierno/> (accessed June 15, 2015).

for the success of the military campaign. Unity was put into a historical context because Calderón reminded the Mexicans of the problems that the country faced in the past when the nation was not united. He claimed that unity against an enemy was absolutely necessary in order to preserve the nation and its well-being.

...the homeland demands that all of us put **the supreme interest of the nation** above our political differences.¹⁷⁶

In this battle **we should stay united** despite the political, social, regional, or religious differences and should not yield a single space to the enemy.¹⁷⁷

Let every female citizen, every male citizen, every mother and every father of a family join this battle for one Mexico in peace and order. If we do it like this, the delinquency will lose its ground for actions and impunity.¹⁷⁸

When we were united, we conquered our independence, when we were divided, we lost the half of our territory, united we won our revolution the fruits of which we enjoy until nowadays. **Only united we prosper.** This is the great lesson from our history.¹⁷⁹

The support of every Mexican was crucial and therefore Calderón on occasions spoke directly to the citizens and provided negative examples of what might have happen if the individual citizens did not join the fight against the criminals. Furthermore, Calderón also dedicated parts of his discourses to the assurance given to the audience. He strived to show that the individual Mexicans were not alone because they could count on the support of the government and the security forces.

Not joining the effort against the delinquency, not joining the common front for a country more secure, it is a way to consent to the fact that our communities fall under the pressure of insecurity and violence.¹⁸⁰

We will show to the citizens that **they are not alone**, that the institutions and the government, we are here to support them, that their police, their marines, and their soldiers fulfill and fulfill effectively the duty to protect.¹⁸¹

176 Calderón, 2006b.

177 Calderón, 2007g.

178 Calderón, 2007m.

179 Calderón, 2010g.

180 Felipe Calderón, 2008c, “El presidente Calderón en la inauguración del edificio de seguridad pública del estado de Morelos y lanzamiento del programa 'Limpiemos México' en la zona metropolitana de Cuernavaca,” March 27, 2008, available at: <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/03/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-inauguracion-del-edificio-de-seguridad-publica-del-estado-de-morelos-y-lanzamiento-del-programa-limpiemos-mexico-en-la-zona-metropolitana-de-cuernavaca/> (accessed June 16, 2015).

181 Calderón, 2007a.

Conclusion

Drug trafficking represents a problem from which Mexico had suffered for many years but which became more visible during the 1990s given the political changes in Mexico and in the world and also the transit of power from Columbian cartels to their Mexican counterparts. Signs of the influence of the organized crime over politics began to be more visible and the association of the drug problem with the country turned into a constant of the discourse about Mexico.

The author introduced in the first part of this thesis the concept of legitimization in social sciences in order to provide a basis for the ensuing analysis. Legitimization represents a way to justify why certain things should be done and why the audience should support the proposed actions. The author looked into various methods of legitimization which allowed him to move to war legitimization and the texts of the “call to arms” genre and the legitimization strategies used within this particular type of discourses (appeal to a legitimate power source, appeal to history, construction of the evil other, and calls for unity behind the greater good).

The second part of this thesis is dedicated to Mexico's Drug War which was declared by the Calderón administration in December 2006. Calderón justified and based the course of action of his government on various premises that proved not to be absolutely true by the subsequent research. His strategy of joint operations originally seemed to be successful but the negative consequences of the direct conflict strategy soon became predominant and criticized. Disrespecting human rights, increased militarization of Mexican public security, a great number of civilian victims, and other problems constituted the phenomena that preoccupied not only the nation but also people and experts around the world.

The aim of the author in this chapter was to show that the declaration of the war was a reaction to the crisis of legitimacy that Calderón went through as his electoral victory was highly disputed. Even though security did not seem to be high on the list of his priorities during the campaign, he dedicated his presidency to the conflict against the organized crime through which he strived to regain legitimacy lost during the elections. The other reason can be identified in the effort to leave positive legacy that would ensure the election of another PAN candidate in the next presidential election. In order to justify the armed struggle sometimes labeled as war, on other occasions as battle or fight, and to persuade the public that it was indispensable, Calderón employed a number

of legitimization strategies which were the subject of the research conducted by the author and introduced in the next chapter.

The third chapter of this thesis dealt with the discourse analysis of Calderón's speeches and interventions. In order to answer the main research question, the author chose the method of a thematic discourse analysis. The results of the analysis showed that the conflict against the internal enemy in the form of the delinquency was legitimized within the genre of "call to arms" texts as defined by Phil Graham because all four generic elements were made use of by Calderón. It is evident from the thematic analysis that various legitimization strategies were employed during the entire six years of the presidency as even during the last days of his term Calderón made references to themes that belong to the four categories corresponding to the generic elements.

The key themes from the first category (appeal to a legitimate power source) presented in Calderón's discourses included the family, the Constitution and the law system, the homeland, and the values associated with Mexico. Calderón pointed out that it was his duty to carry out the conflict in order to fulfill his constitutional role as a president that had to protect the families and especially the children. Moreover, he presented himself as the protector of the values that form Mexico chosen by the homeland to fulfill this patriotic mission.

Appeals to history were made by Calderón on various occasions. He made references to general lessons that should be taken from Mexican history, especially those of unity and valiance in the confrontation with a more powerful enemy. Moreover, he tried to establish connections to six particular events (the Mexican Independence, the Boy Heroes of Chapultepec, the Battle of Puebla, the Revolution, defense against the US invasion, and involvement in the Second War World) from which today's Mexicans should take example in order to defend their nation and its future.

The enemy in the form of the organized crime was constructed by Calderón using different strategies. Calderón described the Mexicans with positive characteristics and claimed that the delinquents constituted the enemy of Mexico and thus excluded them from the society. Furthermore, he indicated that the enemy was not numerous and therefore the millions of Mexicans had to win the fight. The enemy was also associated with a number of negative attributes. Calderón showed that its action influenced negatively not only the lives of individuals but also the functioning of the government and its democratic institutions.

Calls for unity were also present in Calderón's discourse. The president said that unity was indispensable and that differences of any kind must be put aside in order to win the fight against the delinquency. Moreover, he suggested that if someone did not join the battle, it might have had negative consequences and that it was everybody's fight since every single person was affected in the same way and might become a victim of the organized crime at any time.

In conclusion, the topics pointed out in the Calderón's discourse fully correspond with the general themes that constitute the basis of the "call to arms" genre. The only discrepancy identified by the author of the thesis is the absence of religion as a legitimate source of power. It stems from a strong separation of church and the state in Mexico enshrined in its constitution and strictly followed since then.

Although Calderón used a great number of different legitimization strategies in order to gain support for the conflict and in order to justify it, his effort was not successful as he did not achieve legitimacy for his actions and his steps were not understood by the public that was more interested in other topics such as the economy, social policies, and employment. The author considers that Calderón's chances of successfully legitimizing the war were very limited as his position was weak from the beginning of his mandate given the disputed electoral process and result. In addition, while the actions of the organized crime did not substantially affect the lives of the people, the consequences of the armed confrontation influenced the Mexicans directly.

The war has been seen as a failure as the organized crime did not disappear but remains in place. If recent actions are taken into account, it does not seem less powerful than before and the government does not seem to know how to confront it. Moreover, the war has had many undesired consequences that have had and will likely have a negative influence over the course of the country and the lives of its people in the future as well.

Souhrn

Problém pašování drog a vlivu organizovaného zločinu v Mexiku se stal velmi aktuálním a diskutovaným tématem v průběhu 90. let 20. století, kdy kvůli politickým změnám v zemi a geopolitickým proměnám v regionu, začala být zřejmá propojenost kartelů s politikou a každodenní realitou. Cílem této diplomové práce je za použití tematické diskurzivní analýzy zkoumat diskurz prezidenta Felipe Calderóna Hinojosa, jenž na začátku svého působení v úřadě vyhlásil válku drogovým kartelům.

Legitimizace v sociálních vědách se snaží odpovědět na otázku, proč by se lidé měli chovat tak, jak je navrhováno řečníkem. Základními předpoklady úspěšné legitimizace určitého jednání je postavení řečníka, věrohodnost informací, které poskytuje, a použití nutných lingvistických spojení. V této práci jsou představeny dvě různé typologie legitimizace dle Thea Van Leeuwena a Antonia Reyese.

Hlavním předmětem zkoumání v této práci je válečná legitimizace. Diskurzy, které vyzývají k válce a snaží se posluchače přesvědčit o nutnosti obětovat život za někoho jiného, patří do samotného žánru válečných projevů. Podle Phila Grahama, který ve své práci zkoumal více než stovku diskurzů, tyto projevy obsahují čtyři generické elementy – odvolání se na legitimní zdroj moci, odvolání se na historii, konstrukci nepřítele a výzvy k jednotě. Autor této práce si kladl otázku, zda a v jaké podobě byly tyto čtyři generické elementy přítomné v diskurzech Felipe Calderóna.

Calderón se ihned po svém zvolení potýkal s krizí legitimacy následkem nesrovnalostí jak ve volební kampani, tak hlavně při samotném průběhu voleb. Konečný výsledek hlasování byl velmi těsný. Poražený kandidát Andrés Manuel López Obrador odmítl jeho platnost a následně vytvořil paralelní vládu, která Calderónovi ztěžovala výkon funkce. Calderón ihned po nástupu do úřadu vyhlásil válku organizovanému zločinu, přestože bezpečnost nepatřila k hlavním tématům jeho kampaně ani mezi problémy, které by nejvíce tížily mexické občany. Svůj krok zdůvodňoval zvýšenou konzumací drog v Mexiku, nadále netolerovatelnou úrovní násilí a propojeností kartelů s politikou, které vedlo k tomu, že kartely začaly ovládat části mexického teritoria a společenského prostoru.

Otevřená konfrontace s kartely vedla k narušení zavedených struktur a zvýšení úrovně násilí. Navíc se začaly projevovat negativní důsledky vojenského střetu, které souvisely s militarizací mexického území, porušováním lidských práv či s ignorací dalších problémů, kterými trpěla mexická společnost. Zároveň byl Calderón kritizován za neschopnost přesvědčit Mexičany o nutnosti zásahu proti kartelům. Malá popularita

střetu vedla k využívání velkého množství legitimizačních prostředků v průběhu celého prezidentského období.

Calderón ve svých projevech aplikoval všechny čtyři generické elementy typické pro válečné projevy. K hlavním legitimizačním zdrojům moci, na které se odvolával, patřila rodina a především pak děti a mladí lidé, ústava a právní systém, vlast a hodnoty spojené s Mexikem. Děti byly představeny jako nejhodnotnější součást společnosti, která musí být chráněna. Zákony zároveň Calderóna nutily k tomu, aby proti delikventům bojoval. Důležitým poznatkem je nepřítomnost náboženství a Boha jako legitimizačního zdroje, která vyplývá ze striktní separace státu a církve v Mexiku.

Odvolání se na historii se projevilo v podobě připomínek slavné minulosti a útrap, které museli Mexičané překonat. Nejdůležitější byly lekce jednoty a odvahy. Mezi konkrétní události využití Calderónem patřily boj za nezávislost, hrdinství Niños Héroes ve válce proti USA, obrana teritoria proti francouzské invazi a bitva u Puebly, začátek mexické revoluce, zabránění americké invazi v roce 1914 a zapojení Mexika do bojů v Pacifiku v rámci druhé světové války. Zároveň byla slavná minulost diskurzivně spojena i se zářnou budoucností, která Mexičany čeká.

Nepřítel v podobě drogových kartelů byl konstruován pomocí několika strategií. Calderón delikventy vyloučil ze společnosti a připomínal, že Mexičanů, kteří byli charakterizováni pozitivními vlastnostmi, bylo mnohem více. Taktéž kladl důraz na negativní jednání organizovaného zločinu, které neblaze ovlivňovalo nejen fungování a budoucnost státu, ale také život každého jedince. Důležitá bylo i metafora kartelů jako rakoviny, která byla léta ignorovaná prezidenty ze strany PRI, a proto musela být radikálně odstraněna.

Posledním identifikovaným elementem byla výzva k jednotě. Calderón apeloval na všechny Mexičany, aby odložili své politické, náboženské, sociální či jiné rozdíly a spojili se v boji proti společnému nepříteli. Kromě toho připomínal, že ignorace nepřítele může mít negativní důsledky pro každého, kdo se do boje nezapojí, a také to, že nepřítel nedělá rozdíly a každý občan je zranitelný.

Přestože Calderónova snaha o legitimizaci konfliktu byla zjevná, podpory obyvatel nedosáhl. Mexičany zajímaly jiné problémy, především pak jejich nepříznivá ekonomická situace. V kampani proti organizovanému zločinu nebylo dosaženo výrazných úspěchů a kartely se z dnešního pohledu zdají silnější než dříve. Ozbrojený střet navíc vedl k řadě negativních jevů, jejichž následky budou Mexiko ovlivňovat i v následujících letech.

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Projekt diplomové práce

Legitimizace mexické drogové války: analýza mexického oficiálního diskurzu za Calderónova prezidenství

VOLBA TÉMATU

Problematika drogových kartelů v Mexiku je dlouhodobou záležitostí, která však razantně nabyla na vážnosti v 90. letech 20. století v souvislosti se zvýšením významu Mexika jako tranzitní země pro kolumbijské kartely. Mexické drogové kartely začaly ve velké míře ovlivňovat politickou, ekonomickou a sociální situaci v Mexiku a v určité době se dokonce hovořilo o tom, kdy se Mexiko stane dalším „zhrouceným státem“ (*failed state*).

Po dramatických volbách v roce 2006, doprovázených spekulacemi o volebních manipulacích, nově zvolený prezident Felipe Calderón v prosinci 2006 odstartoval operaci Michoacán, v rámci které bylo 6500 vládních jednotek vysláno do státu Michoacán, aby zakročily proti místním drogovým kartelům. Právě tento krok je považován za oficiální začátek ozbrojeného střetu mexické vlády s drogovými kartely, známého též jak mexická drogová válka.

V následujících letech se vládní jednotky soustředily na likvidaci čelních představitelů kartelů, což vedlo k rozdrobení ustavených struktur a k ještě větší eskalaci násilí mezi jednotlivými skupinami, které soupeřily o moc v nově vzniklém vakuu. Přestože byla eskalace násilí silně kritizována, prezident Calderón ji považoval za pozitivní, protože ji pokládal za znak toho, že kartely jsou oslabovány a dochází jim dech. Vyhrocené situaci odpovídaly nejen vojenské akce, ale také oficiální mexický diskurz, jehož úkolem bylo násilí legitimizovat.

Kvůli tomu, že oficiální diskurz reagoval na právě probíhající ozbrojené operace a zároveň je pomáhal konstituovat, má charakteristiky odpovídající textům žánru „*call to arms*“, a proto tato práce může konkrétní případ mexické války proti drogám zkoumat pohledem tohoto konceptu. Přínosem práce bude zasazení mexického diskurzu do obecnějšího konceptu „*call to arms*“ a také zjištění toho, jakým způsobem byly obecné rysy těchto textů aplikovány v podmínkách mexické drogové války za Calderónova prezidenství.

VÝZKUMNÁ OTÁZKA

Autor si v této diplomové práci bude klást otázku *Jakým způsobem bylo v kontextu textů žánru „call to arms“ diskurzivně legitimizováno zakročení proti organizovanému zločinu (známé též jako mexická válka proti drogám) prezidentem Calderónem?*

Navrhovanou zastřešující výzkumnou otázku lze poté rozložit na 4 části a ptát se, jakým způsobem byly v mexickém oficiálním diskurzu prezentovány čtyři rysy identifikované Philem Grahamem a kol. v žánru textů „*call to arms*“, které jsou podrobně rozebrány v teoretickém zakončení práce, a jestli mexický diskurz v porovnání s dalšími texty tohoto žánru zapadá do obecného konceptu „*call to arms*“, či jestli se nějakým způsobem odlišuje, a případně v čem.

HYPOTÉZA

Hypotéza pro tuto práci byla stanovena tak, že mexický prezidentský diskurz odpovídá obecnému konceptu „*call to arms*“ ve všech čtyřech stanovených kategoriích. Tato hypotéza bude potvrzena či vyvrácena zkoumáním toho, jestli mexický diskurz využívá prostředky stejné či velmi podobné těm, které byly identifikovány Grahamem. Cílem práce samozřejmě bude tyto konkrétní prostředky rozebrat a zasadit je do kontextu situace a vývoje v Mexiku.

TEORETICKÉ UKOTVENÍ

Navrhovaná diplomová práce bude vycházet z textu *A call to arms at the end of history: a discourse-historical analysis of George W. Bush's declaration of war on terror*, jenž na příkladu textů vyzývajících k válce (žánr „*call to arms*“), jejichž cílem je přesvědčit posluchače o legitimitě ozbrojeného střetu a vyzvat je k boji či položení života za někoho jiného, identifikuje čtyři základní rysy, které texty tohoto typu mají společné. Předmětem této práce je právě zkoumání mexické války proti drogám pohledem těchto čtyř tematických kategorií. Využitím konceptu „*call to arms*“ se političtí představitelé v době krize obecně snaží využít společenského kontextu a vyzývají jeho prostřednictvím k boji či položení života, čímž zároveň posilují svoje postavení.

Zprv se jedná o odvolání se na zdroj moci, který je vůči autorovi diskurzu externí a je prezentován jako dobrý ve své podstatě. Odvolání se na externí zdroj, který je v dané společnosti přijímaný jako nejvyšší morální autorita, slouží k legitimizaci a posvěcení násilí. Podoba autority, na kterou se texty žánru „*call to arms*“ odvolávají, se postupně proměňovala – nejprve to byl Bůh, poté lid, národ či státní zřízení a hodnoty, které představuje.

Zadruhé je to odvolání se na historický význam společnosti, ve které je diskurz situován, a její historické povědomí. Napojení na historii, národní mytologii, kulturní dědictví, významné postavy historie a důležité momenty z minulosti slouží k lepšímu objasnění toho, co je po publiku vyžadováno.

Třetím rysem je konstrukce absolutně nepřátelského druhého, který musí být smazán z povrchu zemského. Konstrukce nepřítele stejně jako ostatní tři faktory reflektuje aktuální společenské uspořádání a jeho diskurz a vychází ze specifických podmínek dané společnosti.

Posledním je žádost o sjednocení za legitimním externím zdrojem moci. Tímto sjednocujícím konstruktem, který spojuje členy společnosti a legitimizující zdroj moci, může být náboženství, rasa, nacionalismus, politická či filozofická entita.

METODOLOGIE A OPERACIONALIZACE

Tato práce bude využívat metodologii diskurzivní analýzy, která není v kontextu tohoto výzkumu chápána jako specifická metoda, nýbrž jako epistemologický rámeček a zastřešující metodologie, v jejímž rámci budou kombinovány různé konkrétní metody. Vychází se z toho, že v podstatě neexistuje žádná univerzálně přijímaná a používaná diskurzivní analýza, ale pouze různé konkrétní strategie a metody, jež poté jako celek tvoří diskurzivní analýzu. Jazyk je chápán nikoliv jako nástroj, kterým by byla popisováno reálné fungování světa, ale jako prvek, jenž sociálně-politickou realitu vytváří.

Diskurzivní korpus budou tvořit projevy, rozhovory a tisková prohlášení prezidenta Felipe Calderóna, která jsou v převážné většině dostupná na oficiálních stránkách Calderónova prezidentství. Bude se jednat o materiály z období prosinec 2006 až listopad 2012. V seznamu literatury je Calderónových výstupů uvedeno jen několik pro ilustraci.

Konkrétní metodou, která bude využita pro identifikaci klíčových témat v mexickém diskurzu spadajících do výše rozebraných čtyř základních rysů textů žánru „*call to arms*“, bude tematická analýza. Tematická diskurzivní analýza je založena na předpokladu, že významy jsou diskurzem přímo vytvářeny, a ne pouze reflektovány. Praktické provedení této metody je založeno na opakované četbě zkoumaných textů. Přestože existuje několik možností operacionalizace, pro tuto práci byla zvolena operacionalizace založená na klíčových slovech. V diskurzu budou hledána slova či slovní spojení, která svým významem spadají do čtyř analyzovaných celků/kategorií, které odpovídají obecným rysům textů žánru „*call to arms*“.

Čtyřmi analyzovanými kategoriemi budou odvolání se na externí zdroj moci, odvolání se na historii, konstrukce nepřítele (dichotomie my vs. oni) a žádost o jednotu.

KRITIKA ZDROJŮ

Základním teoretickým zdrojem pro tuto práci je text *A call to arms at the end of history: a discourse-historical analysis of George W. Bush's declaration of war on terror*, jenž analyzuje 120 textů z žánru „*call to arms*“ z posledního tisíciletí, jejichž účelem je přesvědčit posluchače, aby zabíjeli či umírali za někoho jiného. Autoři tohoto textu dochází k závěru, že všechny jimi zkoumané texty si jsou velice podobné. Jsou téměř identické ve čtyřech základních rysech, jak bylo podrobně popsáno v části zabývající se teoretickým ukotvením a metodologií. Dalším specifickým znakem je, že se objevují v dobách krize politické legitimacy.

V teoretické kapitole zabývající se obecně diskurzem a důležitostmi textů žánru „*call to arms*“ budou využity zdroje Normana Fairclougha, který se zabývá důležitostmi diskurzu a jeho specifičností v návaznosti na aktuální společenské uspořádání.

K zasazení tématu mexické války proti drogám do historického kontextu poslouží publikace *Měkký podbříšek navěky: Důsledky asymetrie mezi Spojenými státy a Mexikem* od Kryštofa Kozáka, jež zkoumá problematiku mexických drogových kartelů v kontextu vztahů se Spojenými státy. Pro práci je též zásadní nastínění politické situace v Mexiku v souvislosti s volbami v roce 2006, která měla podle některých autorů na další kroky Calderóna přímý vliv.

Aktuální a zároveň kritický pohled na problematiku drogové války přináší kniha *El Narco: La Guerra Fallida* od Rubéna Aguilara a Jorgeho Castañedy, kteří působili v prezidentské administrativě Vicente Foxe (2000-2006). Tématu se věnuje též nedávno vydaná kniha *El narco en México: Historia e historias de una guerra* od Ricarda Ravela, jež představuje důvody, které prezidenta Calderóna vedly k vyhlášení války a zabývá se celou situací z odlišných perspektiv, např. drogových kartelů, mexické armády, představitelů mexických států atd.

Diskurzem mexické prezidentské administrativy v průběhu drogové války se zabývá kniha *La Farsa: Detrás de la guerra contra el narco (El dedo en la llaga)*, jež se snaží kriticky dekonstruovat triumfalistický oficiální diskurz a porovnat ho s reálnou situací v Mexiku (moc jednotlivých kartelů, úroveň korupce a zasahování kartelů do fungování státu atd.).

Z anglicky psané literatury k tématu stojí za pozornost kniha *Drug War Mexico: Neoliberalism and Violence in the New Narcoeconomy*, jež tvrdí, že vyhlášení války proti drogám mělo za účel podpořit nepopulární neoliberální strategie, slabou autoritativní mexickou vládu a nespravedlivý status quo.

Při výzkumu tématu budou taktéž velmi přínosné dvě závěrečné práce mexických studentů. Jedna z nich systematicky mapuje vývoj prezidentského diskurzu od roku 1988 a zkoumá, jakým způsobem byl fenomén obchodu s drogami (*narcotráfico*) v diskurzu prezentován. Druhá práce se zabývá osmi Calderónovými projevy a analyzuje je z lingvistického hlediska pomocí statistických metod. Zároveň se na Calderónův diskurz dívá pomocí kritické diskurzivní analýzy od van Dijka.

OSNOVA

Úvod

Teoretické zakotvení a uvedení do tématu

1. Význam diskurzu
2. Koncept „call to arms“
3. Drogové kartely a obchod s drogami v Mexiku

II. Mexická drogová válka pohledem konceptu „call to arms“

1. Odvolání se na externí zdroj moci
2. Odvolání se na historii
3. Konstrukce nepřítele (dichotomie my vs. oni)
4. Žádost o jednotu

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