Securitization of Migration in the European Union during 2015
An analysis of the discourse in Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic

Master Thesis

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Abstract

This study seeks to analyse how migration has been constructed into a security question in the European Union during 2015. As denoted by the Copenhagen School, something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so, and securitization legitimises extraordinary measures beyond the political established norms. Migration has been portrayed as a potential threat for the continuity of the cultural identity, the preservation of the public order as well as for the economy stability of the Member States, and consequently it has been securitized. The implication of the European integration process in the construction of the concept of migration into a security question, with the creation of common migration strategy, an increased in surveillance and a reinforcement of border control will be developed. From this standpoint, during 2015 the Union has attended to the biggest refugee influx since the end of the Second World War, and the current research aims to analyse how the Member States have responded to it. To that end, the political discourse of three selected countries: Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic, is going to be examined and compared.

Key Words: European Union, securitization, refugee crisis, migration, asylum-seeker
Proposed Topic:

The Securitization of Migration in the European Union during 2015
An analysis of the discourse in Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic

Topic Characteristics:

As expressed by the European Commission, “Migration is now firmly at the top of the European Union’s political agenda”¹. Over the past decades, migration has begun to be pointed out as a matter that concerns state security, and as a result, border control has started to be addressed as a matter of security². The discourse that links security and migration in the EU countries, specifically concerning non-European citizens, has increased³, and accordingly, it is important to analyse the political and mass media role have on it.

Hypotheses:

1. **Hypothesis**: During 2015, the discourse over migration in Europe has evolved from a humanitarian perspective to a securitization one.

2. **Sub-hypotheses 1**: The creation of a common European migration policy, and the strengthening of the border security management and surveillance is the expression of the securitization of migration.

3. **Sub-hypotheses 2**: The securitization of migration in Europe is driven through the discursive representation of the migrant as a threat for the cultural identity and the welfare of the member states.

Methodology:

Ole Waeber, scholar from the Copenhagen School, claimed that something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so\(^4\). In the redefinition of ‘security’, The Copenhagen School has played a key role by introducing the concept of ‘securitization’. According to this school of thought, the term refers to the claim by the political powers of some situations pointed out as existential threats that would justify emergency measures and, as described by these authors, “actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure”\(^5\). Therefore ‘security’ is defined as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue over a special kind of politics or as above politics”\(^6\), while securitization refers to “a more extreme version of politicization”\(^7\), understanding ‘politicization’ when an issue “is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations [or] some other form of communal governance”\(^8\). In this regard, my approach considers that the concept of security is socially constructed, and therefore migration and security are connected due to the political and media construction of the meaning. As expressed by Huysmans, “to make the issues of border control a security question [...] the internal market had to be connected to an internal security *problematique*”\(^9\). This happened by the discourse that would connect the idea that a free-movement market would also promote criminality, illegal activities by “terrorists, international criminal organizations, asylum-seekers and immigrants”\(^10\), as well as by the institutionalization of policy. Taking this into consideration, I look upon discourse analysis as the appropriate tool to develop this inquiry. Language plays

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\(^4\) BENAM, op. cit.: 194  
\(^6\) Ibidem: 23  
\(^7\) Ibid.: 23  
\(^8\) Ibidem: 23  
\(^9\) HUYSMANS, op. cit.: 760  
\(^10\) Ibidem
an active role in the performance of human activities as well as for the creation of social identities, and affiliates it with social groups and to how the world is perceived by these. While many people have the perception that language is only a means of communication, I contemplate that the implications of the language and the way it is used is much more extensive and in any case neutral. Discourse analysis considers the way in which the discourse is a social practice that shapes the social world. Referring to discourse as ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world’ (or an aspect to the world), that creates the meaning of things. Accordingly, the political construction of the threatening "Other", and the image of migration projected by the media in EU countries is going to be analyzed. In addition, It will also be assessed how the migrant is associated to this concept of ‘threat’ to the national identity of European society. The research focuses its attention on the discourse throughout 2015, with the aim of evaluating the shift from humanitarianism to securitization of migration looking at three study cases. First of all, a target country, that is to say, a European country that migrants are trying to reach from their country of origin; secondly a transit country, that means a country that migrants cross in their way towards the country of destination, as well as a third country that does not account any of these characteristics. The countries selected for this research are Germany as a target country. The country is one of the main migration destinations during 2015 and one of the top three countries that account two thirds of the asylum applications in 2015, and according to the last report of Frontex in September 2015, it has been the most final destination for migrants during that year. Secondly, Hungary will be analysed as a transit country since it has become a hot spot of transit migrants from the Middle East countries in their way to wealthier nations as Germany, and finally Czech Republic as the third study case that does not account any of the previous features. To carry out this goal, a comparative analysis between the target country with the other two cases will be conducted in order to attend to the similarities and differences in the securitization of migration that I claim.

12 PAUL GEE, James: Discourse Analysis. Theory and method, 2005: 12
13 HUYSMANS, Jef, op. cit
15 Ibidem: 8
17 Czech Republic is not within the migrant influx route in 2015, as reported by Frontex, FRONTEX, op. cit.: 17
Outline:

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2. Theoretical foundation
   - Justification of theory and methodology

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   - European Union policies over migration: European External Action

   - Comparative analysis of the discourse during 2015 attending to the three study cases: Spain, Czech Republic and Hungary

6. Conclusions and possible implications of the Spanish experiences in dealing with migration from African countries, for the rest of Europe.

7. Annexes

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Declaration of Authorship

The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 13/05/2016                Laura Martínez Carreño                Signature:
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6.1. Critical Outlook

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Annexes
1. Introduction

As expressed by the European Commission (2011b: 2), “Migration is now firmly at the top of the European Union’s political agenda”. Over the past decades, migration has begun to be pointed out as a matter that concerns state’s security (Benam, 2011: 196), and the discourse that links security and migration in the European Union (EU), specifically concerning non-European citizens, has increased (Vaughan-Williams, 2015:2). Nevertheless, the meaning of migration and security remains highly controversial. Both are used to describe various practices that explain different rationale, and immigration debates are characterized by different perceptions that pose opportunities and challenges.

The geopolitical dislocation at the end of the Cold War set the beginning of a reconceptualization of the security term, bringing with it a theoretical debate around it. From the mid-1990s, security has not only been referred to the state and the military sphere, but it has also been related to social, economic, environmental and cultural concerns (Burgess, 2011: 14). Accordingly, due to the social and political changes that a globalized world has brought, migration has arisen as a security issue (Huysmans and Squire, 2005: 1), and it has been linked with criminality, social instability, as well as a cultural and economic challenge for the identity of the hosting countries. In this context, the so-called Copenhagen School has had a key role, bringing new approaches and understandings of the security concept, and developing the notion of ‘securitization’ (Benam, 2011: 194). That is to say, situations constructed as existential threats in order to justify emergency measures and actions that go beyond the political established rules (Buzan et al, 1998: 24).

The European integration process has brought a vanishing of the internal borders while, and at the same time, has promoted a control-oriented approach at the external borders as well as the development of a common migration policy, that according to Huysmans (2000: 751), is
implicated in the “social construction of migration into a security question”. Consequently, the dominant discourses of migration are being congested with notions of security threats (Wæver, 1995: 17). As Del Sarto and Steindler (2015: 370) highlight, “concerns about democratization and human rights have been increasingly moved to the back burner, security and stability taking their place in the order of priorities”. In this regard, migration has been portrayed as a challenge for the protection of the European identity and the welfare system, and the political rhetoric has linked the migrant with notions of threat and risk (Kmak, 2015: 402).

1.1. Research questions and hypotheses

This research aims to evaluate a change of the approach of the European countries towards migration. Specifically, the shift from a humanitarian perspective to a security approach during 2015. Accordingly, the following research questions try to achieve this goal:

- How migration is constructed into a security issue?
- How securitization of migration in the European Union has evolved during 2015?
- How the European Union has responded to the refugee crisis in 2015?
- How the development of a common migration policy is implicated in the securitization of migration?

To this end, this research establishes the following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis**: During 2015, the discourse over migration in Europe has evolved from a humanitarian perspective to a securitization approach.

  - **Sub-hypothesis 1**: The creation of a common European migration policy and the strengthening of the border security management and surveillance is the expression of the securitization of migration.

  - **Sub-hypothesis 2**: The securitization of migration in Europe is driven through the discursive representation of the migrant as a threat for the cultural identity and the welfare of the Member States.
In this regard, the research considers that the concept of security is socially constructed. As Sommer (2013: 44) asserts, “within social constructivist theory, the concept of securitisation helps identifying economisation, securitisation and human rights-based framing of EU migration policy and the underlying interests”. Accordingly, discourse analysis is going to be used as the appropriate tool to develop this inquiry throughout three case studies. First of all, a target country, that is to say, a country that migrants are trying to reach from their country of origin; secondly a transit country, that means a country that migrants cross in their way towards the country of destination, as well as a third country that does not account any of these characteristics. The discourse of Germany as a target country, Hungary as a transit country and the Czech Republic as the third example are going to be analysed.

The empirical data to develop the theoretical framework has been taken from books, reports and documents of researchers, specialized institutions and international organizations. In addition, the information examined is going to consider relevant articles, news and websites that dissect the subject of study. Furthermore, qualitative data attempt to endorse the information analysed.

1.2. Research structure

The research is divided into four main chapters:

First of all, the ‘Theoretical and Methodological foundation’ chapter will expound the theory and methodology in which this inquiry is based. Accordingly, the Securitization Theory developed by the Copenhagen School will be explained, as well as its role in the redefinition of the concept of security based on social constructivism. Moreover, a description of the selected methodology will be presented in order to understand how the empirical part of the research is going to be pursued.
Secondly, the chapter ‘Identities, Security and Migration’, will lay a conceptual background for this inquiry. To achieve this goal, it will be explained how migration is understood as a security issue of the human collectives and within the societal concerns. Moreover, it will be expounded how the conception of a common European identity has been constructed in opposition to the conception of the ‘Other’, that have been attached to the immigrant and linked to notions of threat and risk. Finally, and after having understood all the concepts from which the securitization of migration set its foundations, how migration is securitized will be explained.

The third chapter of this research is going to focus on ‘Securitization of Migration in Europe’. Firstly, it will be given an overview on general considerations of migration in Europe. Furthermore, a historical outlook will present the common immigration policies developed by the EU. Moreover, the externalization of border control and the measures used for surveillance will be explained.

Finally, the ‘Case Studies’ chapter will carry out the empirical part of the research. Specifically, it will be focused on the so-called European migration crisis during 2015, and it will present the key developments of the refugee inflow in Europe throughout the year. In the end, the discourse analysis of the selected case studies will be developed, based on national perspectives on migration, to later analyse the proper discourse of each country, and finally extract the conclusions over the study.
1.3. Migration in Global Politics: concepts and terminologies

Since the aim of this inquiry is to analyse securitization of migration, it becomes essential to understand the terminologies, along with its complexes and differences that are going to be used along the research.

The International Organization of Migration (IOM) defines the following concepts as such:

**Migrant:** Any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.

**Migration:** The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.

**Asylum Seeker:** A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments.

**Refugee:** A person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.

**Irregular Migrant:** A person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. (…) The
The term “irregular” is preferable to “illegal” because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants’ humanity.

(IOM, 2011)

The European Union defines the following concepts as such:

**Illegal/irregular entry**: Crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the country.

**Illegal/irregular stay**: The presence on the territory of an EU country of a non-EU citizen who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions for entry, stay or residence in that country.

(European Commission, 2015e)

The 1951 Geneva Convention defines a **refugee** as someone who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country” (UNCHR, 2016). In addition, the OCDE (2016: 2) defines an **asylum seeker** as “a person fleeing persecution and conflict, and seeking protection under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”. Accordingly, “A refugee is an asylum seeker whose claim has been endorsed” (OCDE 2016: 2).

“Under the terms of Article 14 of the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights, all people have the right to see asylum from persecution in other states” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 136). Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that this does not guarantee automatically the refugee status. Because, “in practice, the term state sovereignty means that states decide whom they will admit and recognise as a legitimate asylum seeker” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 136).
According to Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010: 135) *irregular migrants* “are those who have not met the criteria for admission to a given state: these individuals can be further classified in terms of ‘clandestine immigrants’ (because they have crossed the border illegally) or ‘illegal immigrants’ (if they have outstayed a formerly legal visa”).

The EU ‘Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection’, defines *immigration* as the action by which a person “establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a third country” (European Union, 2007: 24).

The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly over the past fifteen years, reaching 244 million in 2015, up from 222 million in 2010, 191 million in 2005 and 173 million in 2000. “Nearly two thirds of all international migrants live in Europe (76 million) or Asia (75 million)” (UN, 2015:1). In this regard, migration is increasingly seen as a challenge for Europe. According to the May 2015 Eurobarometer survey, it is considered by the society as the most important issue, where in 2014 ranked fourth (Juhász *et al*, 2016: 15).
2. Theoretical and Methodological foundation

This chapter is going to introduce the reader into the theoretical scope and the methodological means in which the research is based. To do so, the theoretical perspective of the Copenhagen School (CS) will be presented. Along with it, its Securitization Theory, developed after the Cold War, and its implication for the traditional conception of security into the Security Studies field will be exposed. Furthermore, it will be argued that the concept of security is socially constructed and by which means based on the Copenhagen School perspective. According to this idea, the selected methodology, namely, discourse analysis, will be justified according to the approach that is taken in order to develop this inquiry.

2.1. Theoretical scope

2.1.1. Traditional approach to security and broadening of the agenda

Throughout the last decades, the field of security studies has become one of the most controversial areas of research within International Relations, and it has been a ground for new social constructivist approaches to develop, challenging traditional visions and understandings (Williams, 2003: 47; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Accordingly, Joseph Huysmans (2002: 41) argues:

In Western Europe--but also elsewhere--we have recently witnessed an offensive of security language in the societal and internal-affairs sector. The multiple references in political and academic debates to a new security construction that relates terrorism, drugs, immigration, and asylum has generated a new agenda in security studies

The concept of security started to be re-thought at the end of the Cold War, and a theoretical debate regarding the term began. In the redefinition of ‘security’ a group of scholars that have been labelled as the Copenhagen School have played a key role by introducing the concept of ‘Securitization’. With Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver as their main theorists, this school of
thought has also brought the so-called ‘Securitization Theory’, a constructivist and critical approach into the Security Studies field.

The traditional approach to security, according to political realism, was focused on the military discourse and addressed to the state, that is to say, with the state as its main referent object. “Throughout most of the Cold War, security was conceived as being coterminous with military security as against other states’ military power” (Saleh, 2010: 230). One of the first main critiques to this approach to security is found in Barry Buzan’s book ‘People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era’, edited in 1991. In his analysis, the author argues that the traditional military perspective is limited due to the fact that people is threatened in other spheres, as the political, economic, societal and ecological areas. Nevertheless, the author points at the state as the main referent object of security (Buzan, 2007).

As Wæver claims, “security problems are developments that threaten the sovereignty or independence of a state in a particularly rapid or dramatic fashion, and deprive it of the capacity to manage by itself” (1995: 6). From this approach, international security is perceived principally in the way that “human collectivities relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities” (Buzan et al, 1998: 10). According to the traditional political-military understanding “security is about survival” (Buzan et al, 1998: 21), therefore, “It is when an issue is presented posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” (Buzan et al, 1998: 36). A way to indicate what is assessed as an existential threat can be looking at the level of response that it produces, and whether or not it legitimizes the use of these exceptional political measures (Wæver, 1995; Buzan et al, 1998).
In this regard, the Copenhagen School points at the fact that:

The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally [...] to mobilize or to take special powers, to handle existential threats (Buzan et al, 1998: 21)

In addition, this school of thought defines a referent object as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al, 1998: 36), is the one to which one may point at and say “It has to survive, therefore it is necessary to…” (Buzan et al, 1998: 36). Looking at the traditional common characteristics of the problems labelled as security issues, one finds: “Urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political "we" from dealing with any other questions” (Wæver, 1995: 4). The reason why the state is seen as the legitimate actor to decide or point out at what a security issue is because:

At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defense and the state. As a result, addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it (Wæver, 1995: 1)

2.1.2. CS and the Securitization Theory

The Copenhagen School’s critique towards the traditional approach implies that the understanding of security, concerning just a political and military scope, would constitute a narrow perspective according to the nowadays international relations security field (Buzan et al, 1998: 16). The aim of this school of thought was hence to wider the analysis of the range of sectors covered by the classical approach (Buzan et al, 1998). The securitization Theory has been described for some authors as a new challenge to security studies in international relations. Accordingly, as Huysmans asserts: “[It is] possibly the most thorough and
continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a widening security agenda for security studies” (1997:186 cited in Williams, 2003: 47), Likewise “is one of the most significant conceptual innovations to emerge out of debates over the nature of security in recent decades” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 75).

In the article ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, Ole Wæver (1995: 1) claims that the traditional approach to security is based in two assumptions. First of all, that security is out there and consequently, is prior to language; and that the more the security the better. Secondly, that security should encompass more that it does, namely by taking issues as migration, welfare and so on into the field. In this regard, the aim of these scholars is to widen the agenda of the security studies, concerning issues related to the security of the society (Wæver, 1995; Buzan et al, 1998). This conception includes issues as “economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political rights” (Wæver, 1995: 2).

Wæver (1995: 2) claim, nevertheless, that the concept of security remains uncontested, and that “as concepts, neither individual security nor international security exist”, arguing that they are socially constructed by means of language.

As previously discussed, the problem arises when one is to define what does concern within the security sphere. Securitization Theory possesses two assumptions regarding the military sector. Firstly, that the security of the military sector is not the only to be considered as worthy into the security studies; and second, that non-military threats do not have to be as threatening as war (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 80). The analysis of these authors suggests that “something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority” (Buzan et al, 1998: 24).
As Wæver (1995: 3) holds, “The label of “security” has become the indicator of a specific problematique, a specific field of practice”. Namely, it designates the existence a specific problem for which some measures are presented as necessary to response. In this regard, Buzan et al (1998: 24) assert:

the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means to break the normal political rules of the game [...] “Security” is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat

According to the Copenhagen School approach, security is “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue over a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al, 1998: 23). In this regard, the concept of ‘securitization’ is introduced in the security agenda, defining it as “a more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan et al, 1998: 23). Here, the term ‘politicization’ is understood when an issue “is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations [or] some other form of communal governance” (Buzan et al, 1998: 23).

Thus, the process of securitization would go run from a non-politicized issue, to the politicization of it, and finally to its securitization. Hence, securitization refers to a shift of “an issue out of the realm of ‘normal’ political debate into the realm of emergency by presenting it as an existential threat” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 76).

In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, buy labelling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means (Buzan et al, 1998: 26)
How does securitization happen then? According to the Securitization Theory, “when an issue comes to be treated as a security issue, it is justifiable to use exceptional political measures to deal with it” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 76), using the same approach as to a military threat. Buzan et al (1998: 24), highlight that although this link generally goes through the state, it could be enacted by other holder too. Nevertheless, the role of the state in addressing security as well as other actors involved in the securitization process will be discussed throughout the research.

Accordingly, the action in which something is taken from the normal sphere to the realm of emergency is done by a so-called ‘Securitization Speech Act’, that is to say, “The act of ‘saying security’ in relation to an issue” (Wæver, 1995: 6). As previously mentioned, this implies that securitization is tied to language theory. Following this idea, CS asserts that something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so (Wæver, 1995: 6). The utterance itself is what creates the act (Buzan et al, 1998: 26). Thus, “the structure of securitization theory is organized around securitization as an act, as a productive moment, as a discontinuous reconfiguration of a social state” (Wæver, 2011: 468). Consequently, as Wæver (1995: 7) claims, “By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it”.

Hence, the distinctive characteristic of securitization is found on its specific rhetorical structure in which survival is assessed as the primary priority, and this feature may function as the way to find security out of the military realm (Buzan et al, 1998: 26). If the referent object is the one that is given the characteristic of posing an existential threat and therefore, to have the legitimation to claim its survival, securitizing actors are those that declare the referent object as posing such existential threat (Buzan et al, 1998).
From this standpoint and as previously mentioned, since the state is seen as the most legitimate actor to designate security problems within the nowadays international relations system, one may claim that in the final instance those problems concerning security mostly going to be defined by the state and its elites (Waever, 1995: 6). Generally, those holding positions of power are usually accepted voices to define security (Buzan et al, 1998).

According to the analysis of the theory one may observe that the concept of security is understood as “context-free meaning” (Waever 1995: 3); assuming that “the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted but the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). By simply presenting something as an existential threat, one does not automatically create securitization. In this regard, an “issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such”, and acceptance implies both, coercion and consent from the audience (Buzan et al, 1998).

Securitization denotes, portraying a problem as an “existential threat” [...] Acceptance of the audience will legitimize taking measures beyond the daily routines, putting the issue on top of the agenda and even breaching the rules which would normally be binding for the securitizing actor (Benam, 2011: 194)

The act of securitization happens when one may observe that the securitizing actor has been able to break those rules that otherwise, without defining an issue as a security concern, would have to obey (Buzan et al, 1998: 25. If there are not indications of such acceptance of the audience, we would be in front of a securitizing move, an action which would constitute an attempt to securitize an issue, and not of an object actually securitized.

whenever something took the form of the particular speech act of securitization, with a securitizing actor claiming an existential threat to a valued referent object in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary measures that otherwise would not have been acceptable, this was a case of securitization (Waever, 2011: 469)
Securitization must define what a threat argument must contain in order to justify these extraordinary measures. As exposed by Wæver (2011: 473), the argument might perform “(1) that there is a threat; (2) that the threat is potentially existential; and (3) the possibility and relative advantages of security handling compared to non-securitized handling”.

As previously mentioned, threats conceived as relevant are especially those in which the sovereignty and self-determination of the unit is seen in danger (Buzan et al, 1998: 5). One point highlighted by these scholars concerns to the fact that elites frequently may attempt to present their political interests in terms of ‘national security’ (Wæver 1995). Security is a status quo concept, typically played by those who are privileged under existing conditions and who feel threatened by new powers (Wæver, 2011: 476). Therefore, one would be in front of a matter that concerns security but with the aim of achieve some goals according to the elite’s perceptions and interests. As Wæver (1995: 8) claims, “All such attempts to define people's "objective interests” have failed. Security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites”. In one hand, “Securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object” (Buzan et al, 1998: 36), but on the other hand, in the practical realm “security is not totally subjective. There are socially defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized although those limits can be changed” (Buzan et al, 1998: 39).

Buzan et al (1998: 27) argue that securitization has been institutionalized in some cases, and this implies that is not always necessary to present or explain the issue, but by saying “defence”, security and priority is said as well. In this regard, CS claims that security is a general concept with distinct meaning that varies in form, “Security mean survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors” (Buzan et al, 1998: 27), and moreover, “One could not take something out of the budget without giving a reason for the use of such an extraordinary procedure. When this
procedure has been legitimized through security rhetoric, it becomes institutionalized as a package legitimation” (Buzan et al, 1998: 28).

2.2. Methodological scope

2.2.1. Discourse Analysis

Due the fact that the Securitization Theory assumes that security is a socially constructed term by means of language, discourse analysis is considered as the appropriate tool to develop this research. Language plays an active role in the performance of human activities as well as for the creation of social identities, and affiliates it with social groups and to how the world is perceived by these (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). While many people have the perception that language is only a means of communication, this inquiry contemplates that the implications of the language and the way it is used it is much more extensive and in any case neutral. Discourse analysis considers the way in which the discourse is a social practice that shapes the social world. Referring to discourse as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world” (or an aspect to the world) (Paul Gee, 2005: 12), that creates the meaning of things. Accordingly, the image of migration projected by the elites and politicians in charge who are seen as legitimate actors to declare what is a security issue, is going to be analyzed.

Accordingly, discourse analysis must be considered not just as a method, but also as a perspective “on the nature of language and its relationship to the central issues of the social sciences” (Phillips, 2003: 222), and moreover, as a related compilation of approaches to discourse that “entail not only practices of data collection and analysis, but also a set of metatheoretical and theoretical assumptions and a body of research claims and studies” (Phillips, 2003: 222).
Discourse is used “to engage in discursive activity and to access different discourse to generate new meaning that help-or hinder-to enactment of particular strategies” (Hardy et al, 2000: 1228). I reflect on the need to consider discourse “as a constitutive part of (the) local and global social and cultural contexts” (Phillips, 2000: 223).

2.2.2. Analysis of the discourse: Case studies

In this regard, to analyze securitization of migration in the EU, this research is going to focus on three case studies: Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Germany has been selected since it has been the main target country for asylum seekers in 2015. Moreover, Hungary has been one of the principal transit states and it has also accounted the highest number of asylum applications relative to its population. Finally, the Czech Republic has different features regarding the two other case studies: it has not received a large number of asylum applications, and on the other hand, it has not been used as a transit country to reach the country of destination. Nevertheless, the central European state has a relevant leading role in the Visegrad Group, the regional alliance between Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland in Central Europe, and therefore it is considerer relevant for the comparative analysis.

2.2.3. Empirical data

As discussed in the previous section, according to the Securitization Theory, the way to study securitization is through discourse. Therefore, this inquiry is going to focus on the speech acts produced in the political sphere. Specifically, on the discourse of the heads of the state: the German chancellor Angela Merkel, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán and the Czech president Miloš Zeman, during parliamentary debates, press conferences and public speeches. Furthermore, the discourse of other governmental representatives will also be taken
into account. That is to say, interior ministers, economy ministers and foreign affairs ministers. The empirical data will be extracted from media coverages: articles, reports, interviews; in their electronic format, and from both international media and local media of the specific country. Furthermore, official state websites and press releases will be used. On the other hand, in order to complement the information, official data from the European level will be used as well.

The aim is to evaluate the general political perception of these countries towards migration throughout 2015, regarding the growing number of asylum applications received and the inflow of people entering into EU borders. The actors chosen are considered as relevant and influential as voices of the state towards public opinion. Moreover, not only the discourse will be assessed, but also the main policies that those governments have carried out regarding migration will be analyzed, considered as practices and processes of securitization since, according to Balzacq (2005: 171) an effective securitization is audience-centered; it is context-dependent; and it is power-laden. Therefore, measures taken in connection to discourse would be examined as securitization instruments. Since the study to be carried out aims to make a qualitative analysis, it is going to be used similar material between the units, in order to draw comparable conclusions. Accordingly, as Holmes and Castañeda (2016: 13) assert: “How displaced people are framed reveals a great deal about anxieties in Europe regarding diversity and change within a paradigm of limited good […] informed by debt, austerity, and neoliberal disassembling of social systems”. The authors highlight how “political statements project these anxieties onto displaced people by morally delineating the deserving refugee from the undeserving migrant while casting both groups as outsiders threatening the well-being of an imagined homogenous Europe” (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016: 13).
3. Identities, Security and Migration

3.1. Migration as a security issue

The conception of migration as a security threat has developed due to a geopolitical dislocation after the Cold War, as well as a shift in the social and political sphere connected to the ‘globalization’ (Huysmans and Squire. 2009: 1). In this regard, new paradigms have arisen in security studies which involve migration as a security concern. Consequently, the emergence of human and societal security, in contrast to the notion of state security and in connexion to migration as a security threat is going to be analysed.

3.1.1. Human Security

Human security emerged as a challenge to the traditional conception of national security since “conceives international security beyond military defence of states interests and territory” (Paris, 2001: 87). For the United Nations (UN) the concept of human security is necessary in order to tackle and respond to the new security concerns that have arisen within the last decades, and for which the traditional mechanisms do not have the adequate tools (UN, 2009: 5). In this regard the intergovernmental organization established in 2001 a Commission on Human Security (CHS) and in 2003 defined the term as “protection for peoples suffering through violent conflict, for those who are on the move whether out of migration or in refugee status, for those in post-conflict situations, and for protecting and improving conditions of poverty, health and knowledge” (Liotta et al, 2007: 15). From this standpoint, the concept of human security is understood as the need to protect the vulnerability of human beings, and therefore in defense of human rights, where migration caused by poverty or war also is included.
Nevertheless, critics have argued its vagueness. Ronald Paris (2001: 93) claims the ambiguity of the term due to its inclusive characteristic since the concept embraces a wide range of issues. The author argues that “if human security means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing” (Paris, 2001: 93). In this regard, Paris (2001: 95) highlights the risk that organizations and states may use the term for political and financial purposes. That is to say, using the concept of human security within political strategy. In a revised second edition of “People, States and Fear: An Agenda for international Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era” (2007), Barry Buzan also highlights how the concept of human security “is largely redundant in analytical terms, adding almost nothing to the concept of human rights” (Buzan, 2000: 7). For Huysmans and Squire (2009: 7), “human security approaches to the migration/security nexus are problematic in terms of their potential reification of migration as a ‘threat’” (2009: 6). The authors highlight how this nexus does not automatically connect migration and security, but rather legitimises distinctions that have become widespread, as it has happened the case in Europe, bringing the conception of securitization of migration to critical security studies. From this standpoint, Huysmans and Squire (2009: 6) argue the fact that human security “is largely incorporated as a dimension internal to global migration management, and thus risks doing little more than pragmatically tinkering within the strategic frame of state security”.

3.1.2. Societal Security

Societal security arises from the widening of the security agenda and as a critical perspective (Wæver, 1995: 14). The CS goes beyond the state-centric approach and understands human collectives as possible referent objects of security (Buzan et al, 1998: 119; Burgess, 2011: 14). While the principal feature of the state is based in the possession of a defined physical territory managed by an administrative skeleton (Montevideo Convention, 1933: 3; Buzan et
society is about identity and the way in which a community of people perceive themselves (Saleh, 2010: 232). Accordingly, “State security has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and societal security has identity” (Wæver, 1995: 15) in which both concepts imply survival (Wæver, 1995: 15).

Wæver describes societal security as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (cited in Moller, 2003: 281). Hence, societal insecurity exists when communities point at a development or an issue as a potential threat to the survival of them as a community (Buzan et al, 1998: 119), that is to say, when they feel their identity is potentially threatened (Saleh, 2010: 232). From this standpoint, migration is the main issue seen as a possible cause of social insecurity since it is perceived as a potential element that can cause a change in the nature of the society (Buzan et al, 1998: 121). Nevertheless, one may wonder, as Jutila (2006: 175) poses: “what kind of agent is society? Who speaks for it? Who perceives the threats in identity terms?”. According to the author and following the CS theory, the legitimacy of the speaker is related to its position in society, and it affects at the same time the success in the securitization act (but not determined it) (Jutila, 2005: 173). Consequently, “We cannot predict who will voice the “societal security” concerns, we can only see afterwards how much legitimacy an actor does have when trying to speak on behalf of society’ (Wæver et al, 1993: 188 cited in Jutila, 2006: 175).

For Wæver, to expand the realm of security involves a risk on embracing the whole society and the political agenda. The author argues that, the concept of security from a social scope is just a critical idea “played out against the concept and practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any meaning” (Wæver, 1995: 2).
3.2. Europe, Identities and Migration

In order to define migration as a security issue, a conception of ‘we’ have been built in opposition to ‘the Other’, the different, the foreigner, and in this case, the immigrant. It is important to describe these elements in order to comprehend how does the securitization of migration in Europe occurs.

3.2.1 The East-West dichotomy

In his thesis ‘Orientalism’, Edward Said, lays the foundations for the critical analysis of the cultural representations in which this inquiry is based. The study of Said relies on the notion that the Oriental realities have been based on a sovereign Western consciousness, as a result of an imaginary exam of a geographical representation of a divided world between ‘Occident’ and ‘Orient’. This idea, have led to the flourishing of such an imaginary ‘Oriental world’, according to certain logics and governed not only by an empirical reality, but also by desires, repressions and projections from the so-called Western cultures (1997: 28). Furthermore, the author notes that in Western countries it has been produced the idea that every knowledge is constituted by non-political ideas, as erudite, academic, impartial and non-partisan ideas. To this regard, the author asserts that knowledge is less partial than the person who produces it, and therefore, knowledge cannot be non-political, and moreover, that it is tightly conditioned by a dense and complex political reality (Said, 1997: 31-33). By saying this, the author assumes that there is not a reality ‘out there’ to be observed, rather it is tied to a context and to the person who observes, writes and produced knowledge as well (Said, 1997: 31-33).

As Said’s thesis develops, ‘Orientalism’ is a product of a discourse embedded in a solid structure of texts that tries to depict the Oriental as the different, arguing that this has to do with the relations of power and interests that the Western societies have had in these
territories since very long time until today. Accordingly, “from its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-and-fast distinctions as “East” and “West’” (Said, 1978: 54). Consequently, since this tendency is in the middle of the Orientalist theory and practise of the Western countries, the way in which the so-called West understands power is accepted with no hesitation as and as a scientific truth (Said, 1997: 76). As the author claims “The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said, 1978: 14). In short, the author understands “Orientalism as a Western style for dominating restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 1978: 11), and this idea is pivotal in order to understand from which structural notions the securitization of migration is embedded in the minds of the European society.

3.2.2 Europeaness vs. ‘the Other’

The perception of a potential threat to a community depends on the conception that these communities have of themselves. Buzan et al (1998: 122) notes that “some types of societal security issues are fought in the hearts and minds of individuals”. As a result, following Said’s ideas, Buzan et al (1998: 120) argue that identity is a socially constructed conception, is a self-constructed notion as a consequence of ‘imagined communities’. From this standpoint, threats to identity are a question that relies on the perception of something as a threat to 'we', and which usually also contributes to the construction and reproduction of ‘us’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 120).

Looking at the nowadays European continent, one may highlight a deepening of a mentality of self-consciousness as nation-states. Such conception, however, differ from other regions of the world in which other features (such as religion or racial groups) prevail above the state
(Buzan et al, 1998: 120). In Heisler and Layton-Henry (1993:158) words, “Most European states have considered themselves to be relatively homogeneous nation-states whose members felt a common membership of the national community due to such binding factors as shared history, ethnic identity, language, culture and political experience”.

Consequently, the European integration and the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a transnational layer above the nation-states, has led to the emerging of a so-called ‘Europeanness’ conception as an additional layer to the basic national identity (Spohn and Triandafyllidou, 2003: 8). However, whether ‘Europeanness’ is stronger than the primary national identity it is arguably. In this regard Giesen (2003: 21) claims that there is not a preexisting collective European identity as such, rather it is a political body as a consequence of a representation and imagination process. The author argues in accordance with the philosopher Habermas’ thesis, that the participation in a political practice is what constructs the citizenship conception (Giesen 2003: 22; Habermas, 1994: 22-23). For Habermas (1994: 22) the nationalistic sentiment is constructed and, furthermore, susceptible of being manipulated by political elites.

As Ceyhan and Tshoukla (2002: 28) note, “In securitarian discourses, culture, migration, and identity are linked one to another by the perception of the migrant as a “cultural other” who comes into Western countries and disturbs their cultural identity”. In this regard, the enhancement of a European identity generates a divergent conception of the migrant as the “Other”, represented in a conflictual way and portrayed as a potential disturbing element of the harmony of the society (Ceyhan and Tshoukla, 2002: 29). In this sense, Huysmans (2000: 751) claims that the European integration process has had as spillover the construction of migration into a security issue, and within this process, 'Othering' the immigrant seems to have emerged as a functional element for the development of national identity, as well as to
strengthen national cohesion (Spohn and Triandafyllidou, 2003: 10; Wæver, 1995: 16). Migration has been linked to a fear of a lack of control from institutions to maintain the cultural tradition (Buzan et al, 1998: 122). As a result, a profound feeling of insecurity has arisen, and furthermore, it has been translated into a wide variety of political consequences (Burgess, 2011:14), which includes a securitization of migration.

3.3. Securitization of Migration

As previously exposed, since the beginning of the post-bipolar era, migration from developing countries has relied mainly on a discourse of fear, referring to the migrant as the non-European, the stranger, ‘the Other’. Throughout the last decades, migration has been increasingly introduced in the political agenda that concerns the security of the Western nation-states, and therefore, it has been securitized.

3.3.1. Discourses and actors in Securitization of Migration

As Huysmans (2000: 762) notes, “migration has become a meta-issue”, that it to say, that it can be referred to many other problems. The appearance of security policies in the migration field may be explained by two factors: “the political use of security language in the migration field […] and by the use of references to migration related issues in security debates”, (Huysmans and Squire, 2009: 10), where both aspects are mutually supportive. In this regard, Western societies have developed new conceptual anxieties and fears about their identities, their security and welfare (Ceyhan and Tshoukla, 2002: 21), that represent migration as a potential threat (Huysmans and Squire, 2009: 2).

In the connexion between migration and security, three axes highlight within the discourse: its connexion with criminality; its connexion with the illegal benefit of the welfare system, public services and social provisions; and its connexion with social instability due to a
cultural and religious convergence (Huysmans and Squire, 2009; Ceyhan and Tshoukla, 2002: 24; den Boer, 1995:98). Therefore, by using such discourse, the topic of migration, which was not inherently addressed to security, starts to legitimize the use of restrictive public policies within the state (Ceyhan and Tshoukla, 2002: 22).

As Buonfino (2004, 24) claims: “Immigration as a threat and a security concern has become the hegemonic discourse type in government policy”, referring to Western states. The discourse produced in the political sphere becomes substantial to the way in which migration in perceived within the society, and influences the migration policies implemented (Androvičová, 2013: 7). In this regard, some authors stress that to address migration as a security issue has been an element of social and political agency in a struggle over power, resources and knowledge (Huysmans, 2000: 762). In this regard, securitization of migration may respond to the interests of certain political elites, and as a strategy with electoral purposes to obtain political support (Huysmans, 2000: 762; Ceyhan and Tshoukla, 2002: 29; Caviedes, 2015).

On the other hand, the media has also a decisive role on migration representation (Caviedes, 2015: 897). Several scholars have assessed the impact of the media in the construction of migration issues as a threat, creating concerns of loss of control from institutions, and portraying it as a dangerous invasion (Benson, 2008; Boomgaard and Vliegenthart, 2009; Threadgold, 2009). According to Buzan et al (1998: 124), this is due to the fact that in Western countries, media describes migration issues in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘Othering’ the immigrant within a negative framework.
As Boswell (2012: 385-387) notes in her study of media representation of immigration in the UK, the amount of information from media determines the political attention towards a topic. In this sense, “Once a problem does surface and gain mass media attention, however, it is likely to elicit considerable political attention” (Boswell, 2012, 374). As analysed, media and political frames are decisive in securitization of migration since demarcate “the population,” whose life must be protected from the Other, who is portrayed as a threat to be turned away” (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016: 20).
4. Securitization of Migration in Europe

4.1. Background

Migration is a phenomenon as old as the world history (Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993:149). After the Second World War, migrant workers were required in order to help for the reconstruction of Europe (Huysmans, 2000: 753). The 1990s was the onset of a period in which, the technological developments, including a cheaper and faster transportation, as well as the rapid spread of information with the beginning of the internet revolution, contributed to a noteworthy rise in global migration\(^{18}\) (Figure 1) (Oberoi, 2002: 8; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 135). It occurred simultaneously with the growth of European countries’ economies, becoming welfare states (Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993: 153), a context that enabled the configuration of a new sense of national identity. From this standpoint: “Over the generations it took to construct such societies, there was an accreditation of collective memories or myths by which the welfare state became part of the national identity” (Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993: 153).

As previously exposed, migration as a security issue has been mainly connected with the illegal benefit of the welfare system. In regard to the former, the OCDE (2015: 1) has asserted that migration flows tend to concentrate in countries with the most favorable economic conditions. A strong labour market seems to be the most important element for refugee groups, creating a type of migrant known as the Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘*homo economicus*’ (Kmak, 2015: 396), that is to say “an asylum seeker who carefully calculates and analyses the risks and gains of choosing a particular destination of refuge” (Kmak, 2015: 401).

\(^{18}\) One of the facts that contributed to the rapid growth in the number of international migrants was the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1992, that resulted in internal migrants (UN, 2006: 1)
In this sense, the transformation of the world into a globalized economy has encouraged international mobility (Gerard, 2014: 33), as the division of labour has provided incentives for societies from developing countries to seek for better opportunities in more industrialized countries (Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993: 149-150). According to the UN report on international migration (2015: 5-6), nowadays “High-income countries host more than two thirds of all international migrants” (Figure 2), and two thirds of these live in Europe or Asia (Figure 3). The growth of European economies together with a deepening of self-conception as homogeneous nation-states, laid the foundations that allowed the onset of a security approach towards migration in Europe (Huysmans, 2000: 751). From this perspective, in a world conceived as scarce in resources, migrants and asylum-seekers are seen as “rivals to national citizens in the labour market and the distribution of the social goods” (Huysmans, 2006: 77). In this sense, Gerard (2014: 31-33) argues that globalization has dynamite the conception of international migration, and furthermore, this has been used by governments to bolster securitization.

On the other hand, notions that connect non-regulated migration with social disorder have leaded its link with criminality. Nevertheless, there is not a causal link between immigration control and a decrease in criminality (Miles and Thränhardt, 1995:97), which makes the argument poor in causality. On the other hand, this connexion is boosted because the distinction between migrants and asylum-seekers is getting weak within the political discourse, in which, asylum-seekers have been divided between the ‘genuine’ and the ‘bogus’ (Ceyhan and Tshoukla, 2002: 28). The former refers to the refugee who flees from poverty, persecution or war; and the latter to the person who calculates the advantages of asking for asylum (Kmak, 2015: 401). The concept of ‘bogus’ asylum-seekers has been increasingly embedded in the EU discourse on migration, especially since the 1990s. Currently, within the
Commission, the idea that the asylum applicants are mainly ‘bogus’ it is also presented (Kmak, 2015: 403-404). Accordingly, the Commission (2015: 12) reported in September:

Strengthening the Common European Asylum System also means a more effective approach to abuses. Too many requests are unfounded: in 2014, 55% of the asylum requests resulted in a negative decision and for some nationalities almost all asylum requests were rejected, hampering the capacity of Member States to provide swift protection to those in need.

According to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees, the EU has to offer protection or refugee to those asylum seekers fleeing from vulnerable and dangerous circumstances (as war, persecution or dictatorial oppression regimes). In the case of economic migrants (referred as bogus asylum-seekers), looking for prosperity and better economic conditions, even if fleeing from poverty, the EU is not obliged to provide asylum or protection (Eurostat, 2016), applying its sovereign right to decide over migration issues.

4.2. Common policies on Migration

It is argued the fact that European governments has pursued a common strategy in securitizing migration (Caviedes, 2015: 898), and several authors have claimed that the EU integration process has been the onset of the construction of migration into a security question (Kmak, 2015; Gerard, 2014, Huysmans, 2000, 2006; der Boer, 1996) since it has brought the creation of a privileged group of EU citizens, and as a consequence the exclusion of an ‘outside group’ of third countries’ nationals (Ugur, 1995: 974).

One of most important turning points for it was the “Council Regulation 1612/68 which distinguished between the right of free movement of national of Member States and […] national from third countries”, based on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (ECC, 1968). In this sense Kmak (2015: 396) argues: “Whereas migration of EU
citizens using their right to freedom of movement within the common territory is encouraged and protected, the attempt of asylum seekers to enter the EU is discouraged”.

Moreover, the declaration of the special rights for EU citizens, as well as the desire to formulate a legislation for foreigners was confirmed at the Paris summit in 1973 (Huysmans, 2000: 754). Huysmans (2000: 754) argues that the transition of the issue from politicisation to securitization took place from the late 1980s onwards. Since then, migration and the development of networks for cooperative regulation began to be an issue of intergovernmental fora, which was translated into a “gradual incorporation of migration policy into the constitutional structure of the EU”, (Huysmans, 2000: 755). From this standpoint, Androvičová (2013: 7) argues that the migration policy of EU “is based on intergovernmental approach […] only those measures are put into practice on which all of the strong nation states agree – and usually these are mainly restrictive”.

The Europeanization of migration policy started then to stick into the security discourses. Accordingly, as Huysmans (2000: 756) asserts, “One of the best examples is the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 of June 1985 which connect immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control”. Accordingly, the instrument for this securitization move was the implementation of security policies, portraying migration as one of the main elements for the debilitation of the national tradition and the societal homogeneity (Huysmans, 2000: 757-758).

Furthermore, by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) the European countries bound themselves in core functions of the nation-state as border-control and policing of citizens and immigration (Hutchinson, 2003: 36). The process of migration control has sought to engage not only countries of destination, but also countries of origin and transit, aimed at the restriction of migration flows before reaching the EU borders (Lavenex, 2006: 330). In this regard, with
the adoption of the ‘safe third country’ rule, the EU embraced the mobilisation of countries of origin in the control of the migration flows (Lavenex, 2006: 334). In this regard, and as expressed by the Council of Europe (2015: 1), “Migration policy should be seen in a global perspective, involving co-operation and co-ordination between countries of origin, transit and destination, and focusing on the situation of the individuals”.

The Dublin Regulation (EU, 2013), set another control-oriented measure by restricting states from transferring the asylum applications. It establishes criteria for which country should take the application (Huysmans, 2000: 756). This measure makes impossible to submit applications in different Member States, and, as some scholars argue, it is aimed to prevent and reduce them (Huysmans, 2000: 756; Lavenex, 2006: 334).

Furthermore, the heads of the EU’s states adopted The Hague Programme in November 2004, which established a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Accordingly, the European Commission’s Policy Plan on Asylum signed in 2008 included three pillars for the development of CEAS, aimed at bringing harmonization to standards of protection, practical cooperation and increased solidarity among Member states (Eurostat, 2016). Among these measures is the introduction of visa requirement for a large number of countries, among which are those ones that mainly produce refugees (Kmak, 2012: 402): According to Kmak (2012: 403), “the aim of this process is indeed not to limit numbers of irregular migrants but to make irregular migration manageable by their subjectivation as bogus asylum seekers”.

The 11th of September 2001 attacks to the Twin Towers in New York, have even more tightly linked migration to national security in Western countries (Burgess, 2011:14; Peoples and Vaughan Williams, 2010: 137; Karyotis: 2007: 2); and migration was explicitly appearing in the political campaign against terrorism (Karyotis: 2007: 2) since one of the premises was that terrorist may abuse of asylum procedures to move into a country (Huysmans, 2006: 64).
This fact, together with some other events occurred within the EU\textsuperscript{19} have contributed to the development of new dimensions in the security scope (Fauser, 2006: 7). Accordingly, an increased in surveillance based on a network of mechanisms for identity control have developed, as the creation of biometric passports and databases that try to work as preventive tools for asylum applications (Benam, 2011: 202-203). From this standpoint, the Commission (2015: 11) declares:

The EU today has three large-scale IT systems, dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information System), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe's capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants.

Consequently, the link between migration and terrorism (which is largely arguable) has brought back an approach of ‘exclusion’ instead of ‘inclusion’ policy towards non EU-citizens, based on restrictive policies on migration and asylum (Karyotis: 2007: 2).

4.2.1. Externalization of border control

For Ceyhan and Tshoukla (2002: 25), “in today’s context of globalization […] border continues to be the pivotal term of securitarian discourses”. One may highlight how the EU integration process has been gradually shifting the responsibility for the management of its borders, externalizing border control with political and institutional configurations at intergovernmental and supranational level (Del Sarto and Steindler, 2015: 371).

In order to connect the border control issue into a security question, the internal market has to be identified to an internal security problem (Huysmans, 2000: 756). The securitization of the internal market in the EU is based on the assumption that with the abolition of internal border controls there is a challenge on public order and the rule of law from possible ‘intruders’

(Ceyhan and Tshoukla, 2002: 32). This correlation, according to Huysmans (2000: 758-759), lays on the idea that the diminishing the internal borders have to bring, on the other hand, a reinforcement at the external border in order to guarantee a sufficient level of control within the free movement area. As Szalai and Göbl (2015: 26) notes, “The logic of the Schengen Zone reinforces securitizing acts when it comes to migration, and elevates member states with external borders into a special role”. In this regard, the Commission has stated: “Upholding our international commitments and values while securing our borders and at the same time creating the right conditions for Europe's economic prosperity and societal cohesion is a difficult balancing act that requires coordinated action at the European level” (European Commission, 2015: 2). Moreover, the regulation of the European borders has been militarized, especially since the creation of Frontex, the European agency for border control (Benam, 2011: 192):

The core mentality is linked to the notion of risk and the goal of fortifying external borders through compensatory measures that increasingly benefit from the advance of technological methods of profiling and generalized surveillance, keeping “the unwanted” out and returning them at the easiest and most cost-effective manner, yet facilitating the movement of goods and “the desired ones” as much as possible (Benam, 2011: 196)

The agency was created by the Council Regulation in October of 2004 with the aim of providing operational support and cooperation for the EU coordination and management of external borders. Nevertheless, the activities of Frontex have generated a debate coming from NGOs, international organizations and the civil society, questioning issues related with the protection of human rights and the role of the EU in safeguarding its borders (Franko Aas and. Gundhus, 2015: 3). Within these activities, the pushbacks of migrants at the external borders, especially at the Mediterranean have been very controversial, with several organizations, as Human Rights Watch, addressing Frontex’s negative treatment to migrants at the EU borders (HRW, 2011).
On the other hand, several authors have argued the EU enlargement as a way to export borders at the periphery (Del Sarto and Steindler, 2015: 371). According to Benam (2011: 197), enlargement has acted as a major component of pre-emptive action, creating a new buffer zone for the core. Topic that has become a debate in geopolitics studies, since its implementation has lead to the creation of new geopolitical conformations in Europe. According to the EU ‘Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection’: “Enlargement of the European Union has brought an added geographical and political dimension to the scale of the phenomena associated with migration” (European Union, 2007).

With all the practices, mechanisms and common policies of the EU, one may highlight that securitization policy has been presented as necessary. Nevertheless, the issue of the civil rights of migrants are still questioned (Gerard, 2014: 38), and whereas some restrictive measures are being implemented, the Council of Europe (2015: 2) has declared in September 2015:

externalization of European Union border control has serious consequences for migrants and refugees. Large numbers may find their intended onward journey blocked and thus be stranded in the transit country. This may leave them in a situation of precarity and vulnerability, without legal status or protection or access to basic needs and therefore at risk of exploitation, abuse and violence. This is especially the case where domestic legal systems contain insufficient safeguards and do not effectively implement relevant international standards, including those of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. Conditions may become so intolerable that even those who had not intended doing so are constrained to move on, often forced into the hands of migrant smugglers or traffickers”
5. Case studies

This chapter is going to develop the empirical part of the research looking at the analysis of Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic in Securitization of Migration. First of all, from this scope it is necessary to understand the contextual framework of the EU in 2015 regarding migration. Secondly, the discourse of the selected countries is going to be analysed along with the policies implemented on the area.

5.1. Key developments of the European Migrant Crisis 2015

The year 2015 has been a cornerstone concerning the influx of migration trying to reach EU countries, and it has recorded the largest number of asylum applications since the World War II. The EU Member states have accounted over 1.2 million first time applications in 2015, a number more than double that of the year 2014 (Eurostat, 2016). This has been described as a migration refugee crisis (Figure 4). The International Organization for Migration has accounted 1.011.700 arrivals by sea and 34.900 by land in 2015 (BBC, 2016) (Figure 5).

The Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan routes have gained popularity due to the flux of migrants coming via Turkey. “In Europe, most people who seek asylum have entered through illegal border crossings. According to Frontex data for the first eight months of 2015, 500 000 illegal border crossings were detected, compared with 280 000 for all of 2014” (OCDE, 2015: 2). The OCDE reported that in the first six months of 2015, 66.000 people crossed the Mediterranean through Turkey and Greece, and 137.000 crossings were detected during July and August in the same route (OCDE, 2015: 2) (Figure 6 and 7).

Italy, Greece and Hungary are being on the front line of the migratory flow as transit countries within the EU, that is to say between countries of origin and destination (OCDE, 2015: 4). Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis have been the three citizenships with a highest rate of
asylum applications. Syrians, with 362,800 applications, have double the previous year rate; 79,300 applications from Afghans, four times more than in 2014; and 121,500 applications from Iraq citizens (Eurostat, 2016) (Figure 8 and 9). Over 60% of the asylum applications from Syrians were in Germany, and about 20% in Sweden. In addition, 75% of the Afghans seeking asylum applied in EU states, mainly Sweden, Germany and Austria (Eurostat, 2016). Accordingly, Germany got the highest number of first time applicants in the last quarter of 2015 (162,500 applicants, or 38% of total applicants in the EU Member States), followed by Sweden and Austria with 21% and 7% of applications respectively (Eurostat, 2016).

For the whole 2015, Germany, Hungary, Sweden and Austria have received two thirds of the applications in Member States. (Figure 10). Despite the fact that Germany accounted the highest number of applications, Hungary has recorded the highest number of first time applicants in 2015 relative to the number of inhabitants (17,699 applications per million inhabitants), followed by Sweden (16,016), Austria (9,970), Finland (5,876) and Germany (5,441) (Eurostat, 2016) (Figure 11 and 12).

Looking at the three selected case studies, Germany had the maximum asylum applications in October with 58,125 (Eurostat, 2016). Hungary reached the maximum number of applications in August, with 46,720. Due to the closing of its borders with Serbia, in October and November the number decreased to 490 and 195 respectively (Eurostat, 2016). Czech Republic, has maintained an average since the large scale of asylum seekers has not affected it, with around 100 applications per month (Eurostat, 2016).

As expressed by the OCDE, the exact reasons for the rapid increase in migration from these territories are not clear enough. It is likely to be driven by poor economic conditions, dictatorial oppression and war (OCDE, 2015: 2), as is the case of the Syrian Civil War, ongoing since 2011, and which has provoked already almost five million refugees (UNCHR,
Since the influx of migrants asking for asylum has been considerably fast and large in number, the European Commission has highlighted three axis of action, focused on saving lives at the Mediterranean Sea, targeting criminal networks and responding to the high-volume on arrivals with re-allocation (European Commission, 2015: 3-4). Accordingly, the Commission announced a triple in the budget of Frontex and the onset of the Triton Operational Plan, claiming that its aim is to coordinate border control at the frontline and save lives of migrants at the sea (European Commission, 2015: 3; Frontex 2015). Furthermore, the Commission has declared a necessity in sharing the responsibility for the large number of refugees and asylum seekers trying to reach the EU countries during 2015, claiming at the same time the need to implement frameworks to reach legal paths for migrants with an efficient asylum and visa system. Accordingly, the Commission (2015: 4-6) claims that these measures would improve the security at the borders while contributing to the safety of the migratory flows: “The EU has an established policy to help Member States build up sound and consistent external borders. The Internal Security Fund already provides over €2.7 billion to Member States for the period from 2014-2020” (European Commission, 2015: 11).

5.2. Case Study: Germany

5.2.1. National Perspectives on Migration

For decades, Germany has been a destiny country for migrants, leading ranks of non-nationals residents among the Member States in absolute numbers (Lehr, 2015: 113). By 2013, it was receiving the largest number of asylum applications, accounting 126,995, 30% of all EU applications (Lehr, 2015: 116). During 2015 and facing the ongoing increased on the migration scale, Germany has remained as the main target country. In this sense, it has received the highest number of asylum applications in absolute numbers within the EU,
which has increased from 173,000 in 2014 to 442,000 in 2015 (Eurostat, 2015). Nevertheless, the government announced at the beginning of January 2016 that approximately, 1.1 million people entered in the country in search of asylum (Thomas, 2016). (Figure 13). Which in absolute numbers is “the largest annual inflow of people seeking asylum of any OECD country ever recorded” (OCDE, 2015: 4). In the first six months of 2015, Kosovo and Syria each accounted around 20% of the total asylum seekers, followed by Albanian citizens (15%). (Figure 14). Furthermore, according to instance decisions within the Member States, the largest number have been taken also in Germany, accounting more than 40% of the whole EU positive instances (Eurostat, 2015). Nevertheless, as previously explained, Germany did not represent the largest number of applications relative to its population, since in this category in 2015 Hungary has been the number one. It is important to analyse the role of Germany in responding to the migrant crisis due to its European leading position, as well as for being the main target country within the Member States.

5.2.2. Key developments in national discourse and policies on migration in 2015

In April 2015, Europe witnessed on the biggest tragedy in which 800 people died in sinking boat in the attempt to reach its lands (International Organization for Migration, 2015b). To these events Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany since 2005, stated: “We will do everything to prevent further victims from perishing in the most agonizing way on our doorstep” (Mackenzie and Emmott, 2015). Throughout this period, the German government did not relate the migrant flow with a crisis, and the discourse did not stress on the possible repercussion at the national level. Instead, Merkel insisted on the tragedy perspective (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016). In this regard, 2015 accounted more than 3,370 human lives that were lost trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea, which has been according to the International Organization for Migration (2015b), the deadliest year.
At the beginning of July, Merkel encounter a controversial situation in a discussion entitled "Good Life in Germany" in the city of Rostock, where a Palestinian girl declared that she and her family were threatened with deportation due to the denial of residence permit for her and her family after four years living in the country. The 14 years old girl, Reem Sahwil, declared: "It's really very hard to watch how other people can enjoy life and you yourself can not. I do not know what my future will bring". To which Merkel replied: “Sometimes politics is hard. You're right in front of me now and you're an extremely nice person. But you know also in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are thousands and thousands and if we were to say you can all come...we just can not manage it” (Connolly, 2015). After it, the girl broke into tears, and the video became viral among the social networks reaching the international attention (Connolly, 2015). The impact of this event and the responses it provoked, especially on the social media, may have influenced the further discourse over refugees and migration of the German chancellor, as Holmes and Castañeda argue (2016: 14).

Facing the growing number of people arriving in Germany, in August 2015 Merkel’s government announced that it would stop following the Dublin Regulation for Syrian’s asylum seekers. The new approach meant that the country would not return migrants to the entry country as the regulation notes. Instead, it would allow them to apply for asylum regardless the way in which they had entered Europe (Wang, 2015), which relieved the entry countries for some of its responsibility, as Hungary (See Case Study: Hungary). Accordingly, the open-arms policy of the chancellor put the situation of migration as a priority. In this sense, Merkel claimed, “We can do it!” (Stelzenmüller, 2015), referring to whether Germany could handle the amount of people arriving; and declared that to accommodate the number of migrants is a “herculean task that now deeply moves us and demands from us a national effort” (Troianovski, 2015), highlighting the necessity to converge strategies among the EU and Turkey to overcome the situation.
Regarding this policy, the president of the Social Democratic Party, Sigmar Gabriel, stated that the growing number of refugees could provoke the justified ire from German’s taxpayers (Balhorn, 2015). Merkel declared that the way in which the issue of refugees is treated, will decide the future of Europe, and whether Europe will be continue to be accepted as a continent of values and individual freedom. Furthermore, the chancellor called for solidarity among the other Member states (Nusch, 2015) stressing the necessity to establish a distribution, which was finally translated in the approval of a plan by the EU ministers to reallocate 120,000 refugees among the Member States (BBC, 2015). The mandatory quota’s plan was firmly opposed by the Visegrad Group (V4) (See Case Study: Hungary and Case Study: Czech Republic), and created debate among those politicians not willing to follow Merkel’s coordination in the refugee crisis.

The German government has used the so-called "Koenigsteiner Key" in order to distribute the asylum seekers across the sixteen federal states according to their tax revenue and their population (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2015) (Figure 15). Consequently, Merkel has declared that the country is going to take responsibility of integration, and she added: “I appeal for us not to reject it – there’s no point in that – but for us to take it on board ... and then to shape it so that it grows into something that is of benefit to us all” (Connolly, 2015). In this sense, the government has sought to spread a positive message that Germany will be benefited from the migrant wave on its labour market (Connolly, 2015; Harding, Oltermann and Watt, 2015). Furthermore, some attitudes towards the migration issue from Member States, as the Hungarian erection of a fence on its southern borders, have been highly criticised by the chancellor, described it as an un-European behaviour, adding: “There is no tolerance for those who are not ready to help” (Hetch, 2015).
On the other hand, by mid-September Angela Merkel’s Government ordered temporary restrictions that included border checks and cancellations of rail connexions from Austria (Eddy et al., 2015), measures that have remained along 2016 (Alderman and Kanter, 2016). Border checks were also implemented by some other states, as for example the Czech Republic (see Case Study: Czech Republic), and have provoked large debate being considered as a threat to the free-movement of people, the core symbol of the European integration (Sommers, 2015). The Interior Minister, Maizière, accordingly declared: “This step has become necessary. The great readiness to help that Germany has shown in recent weeks... must not be overstretched” (Burrows and Tonkin, 2015). This Minister point out that the aim of the measure was “to limit the current influx to Germany and to return to orderly entry procedures” (BBC, 2015d), and added that asylum seekers had to understand that “they cannot choose the states where they are seeking protection” (Harding, 2015).

The measure was described by the Commission (2015c) as an exceptional regulation in the Schengen Borders Code for crisis situations. The German Economy Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, declared that it was the consequence of a European lack of action that has pushed Germany to the limit of its ability (Burrows and Tonkin, 2015). In this sense, Maizière described it as a measure of security due to the full capacity, as well as a signal to Europe to collaborate (Harding, 2015). Consequently, the discourse shifted towards a perspective in which extraordinary measures were needed in order to prevent a risk: an overflow of migrants in the country. This approach relies on the urgency to apply measures, and the refugee flow is perceived as a management challenge for both the country as well as for the EU.
Moreover, in October the German government approved a new legislation called ‘Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act’, in order to speed up the asylum process. Its aim is that those applicants with good prospects could receive asylum faster, whereas on the other hand, as the government stated, “People not entitled to asylum must leave Germany more quickly” (The Federal Government, 2015). In addition, applications from countries considered as ‘safe’ (as Albania, Kosovo or Montenegro) are to be rejected automatically (Huggler, 2015). Referring to the new legislation Merkel stated: “The refugee crisis is not only a "national effort", but a "historic test for Europe”” (The Federal Government, 2015). Furthermore, the Minister of Interior Maizière declared: "Refugees must respect our laws […] That applies to respecting our constitution or Basic Law, to respecting fundamental civil rights and to showing respect and decency in the way we live together” (The Federal Government, 2015).

In this sense, both parties of the grand German coalition (Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democrats), have concentrated the discourse of “deserving” and “undeserving” asylum seekers. The former refers to refugees, those fleeing from war and oppression, whereas the latter refers to economic migrants fleeing from poverty conditions (Balhorn, 2015; Harding, Oltermann and Watt, 2015).

At the end of the year, the chancellor declared her will to significantly stem the number of migrants arriving in both the country and the EU country. Merkel stated in an annual conference of her party that Germany will be “overwhelmed in the long run”, adding, “We want to, and we will, noticeably reduce the number of refugees”, using the slogan: “we can do this” (Carrel and Barkin, 2015), very similar to the welcoming approach slogan, but in another direction. Furthermore, she also stressed: “It is very important to me that we achieve both a noticeable reduction in the flow of refugees…and at the same time preserve the free movement of people within the European Union” (Gómez, 2015). Maizière declared in this
sense: “We are determined to achieve a notable and sustainable reduction for the year 2016 by a bundle of foreign policy, European policy and national measures” (Gómez, 2015). This has led to that during 2016 many asylum seekers have been returned to Austria (Dearden, 2016).

Along this line, by fall of 2015 Angela Merkel started a series of meetings with her Turkish counterparts to try and stem the migrant flow (since Turkey is the main transit country before the migrants reach EU’s land). This has been translated in the signature of the UE-Turkey agreements in March 2016. According to the European Council, all new irregular migrants that cross the border between Turkey and the Greek islands from March 20, 2016 will be returned to Turkey (European Council, 2016). One may highlight that nowadays this route accounts more than 80% of migrants entering the EU (Garcia, 2016). Furthermore, pointing at ‘irregular migrants’ the EU includes all those refugees which aim is to apply for asylum. Moreover, the agreements declare that Turkey will take all the necessary measures to prevent new land or sea routes for illegal migration from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate to that effect with neighbouring states, as well as with the EU (European Council, 2016). In the theory of Merkel’s plan is to take a range between 200,000 and 300,000 refugees each year and distribute them among Europe (Knaup et al, 2016). Helmes and Castañeda (2015) highlight how this approach evokes a myth of invasion.

On the other hand, the humanitarian welcoming approach of Merkel has collided with an anti-migration rhetoric that has penetrated in a part of the German society and has led to the emergence of certain nationalist anti-immigrant groups (Lehr, 2015: 113), as for example Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West), a political movement founded in Dresden in 2014, that stands against Islam while claiming not to be racist but against the growing immigration. The group have organized demonstrations with slogans like
"we don't want Mosques in Dresden", which has been criticized openly by Merkel, called in public television not to follow these groups. Anti-PEGIDA protesters have also raised their voices through demonstrations (BBC, 2015c). Furthermore, right-populist demonstrations and violent and racist attacks have taken place along 2015 against the asylum seekers coming to Germany. Over thirty arson attacks on shelters were accounted from January to March (Balhorn, 2015).

The opposing voices to the open policy of Merkel have also stressed that terrorists or followers of the Islamic State (ISIS)\(^{20}\) might infiltrate among the newcomers (Browne, 2016; Reuters, 2016). Along this line, the Chief of the German Intelligence agency, Hans-Georg Maassen, asserted in an interview for the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag in April 2016 that they had misjudged the ISIS strategy, referring to the infiltration claim. Furthermore, Maassen stated, “Although they did not need to mix their people among the refugees, they did it” and “I am concerned that we [...] and our partner agencies may, in fact, have information about dangerous individuals saved in our databases. However, we might fail to notice that they are here because they enter with false identities” (DW, 2016; Schwartz, 2016). These statements might have implications for securitization of migration in Europe in view of the upcoming future, and it may be relevant for further research on the topic. Nevertheless, there is no public evidence about it so far and the opposite voices highlight that refugees are exactly fleeing from terrorism on its countries.

5.2.3. Conclusions on Securitization of Migration in Germany

Merkel, as the head of the largest European economy, has had an essential role in leading the refugee influx in Europe, which seems to remain for 2016. Her open-door policy has been

\(^{20}\)The Islamic State, also referred as ISIS, is an insurgent and terrorist group existed since 2014 in the international sphere that has seized parts of the territory of Syria and Iraq, proclaiming a 'caliphate' and ruled by the Sharia law. The groups ask for authority over the whole Muslim world (BBC, 2015c)
object of debate and argued as how Germany has accepted a role of the liberal political hegemony by pursuing unsentimental realpolitik (Schwarz, 2016). Nevertheless, despite the fact that Germany’s discourse has evolved and shifted in tone (Amann et al, 2015) it has mainly relied in the humanitarian approach. Moreover, the open country perspective has been followed by thousands of German volunteers assisting and providing help to the asylum seekers arriving daily in the country (Harding, Oltermann and Watt, 2015). Along with this line, ‘solidarity’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘Willkommenskultur’ (culture of welcome) have dominated Merkel’s discourse to the migrant flow (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016: 19). However, the emphasis on the necessity to stem the influx by the end of 2015 that has been translated in the EU-Turkey agreements in 2016 would need of further research on the possible implications on securitization of migration of Germany and the EU.

On the other hand, the temporary border checks declared by Germany have been criticized by the anti-migrant discourses as a failure of the welcoming and humanitarian Merkel’s policy (Knipp, 2015), and as a consequence of the chancellor’s idealist vision (Hoffmann, 2016). Nevertheless, Angela Merkel has stick to her open arms policy, and in March 2016 the chancellor declared that she would “do her damned duty” on refugees (Waters, 2016). In a summit in Turkey by the end of 2015 the chancellor declared: “We live based on shared humanity, on charity [...] We believe in...every individual’s right to pursue happiness [...] and in tolerance” (Walker and Troianovski, 2015) adding that while fighting against terrorism is a European duty “also to the innocent refugees who are fleeing from war and terror” is a European responsibility (Walker and Troianovski, 2015).

According to polls in October 2015, 51% of the population said that Germany could not handle the current influx of refugees and 48% of respondents evaluated Merkel’s work negatively (Figure 16), an increase of five percentage points (Reuters, 2015). However,
analysts have declared that Germans support the fact that Merkel does not change her position constantly, as a symbol of trust, which may help to the chancellor’s popularity (Waters, 2016). Nevertheless, the political consequences of it will not be tested until the next elections in October 2017.

5.3. Case Study: Hungary

5.3.1. National Perspectives on Migration

As defined by the European Council, transit countries are states that migrants cross on their way to their target country. However, many of those become also countries where migrants might ask for asylum (Council of Europe, 2015). As previously exposed, due to its geographical location, Hungary has been one of the main transit countries in the migration flow since during 2015 in their way towards other EU states (IOM, 2015). Moreover, it has had the highest number of asylum applications relative to its population with approximately 1.800 refugees per 100.000 Hungarian inhabitants (BBC, 2016), and it has been one of the main entry points into the Balkan route. Nevertheless, “many applications are terminated prematurely as people leave the country, most likely to re-apply in another EU member state” (OCDE, 2015: 4). According to the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), in 2015 80% of asylum seekers have left Hungary within less than ten days after the submission (ECRE, 2015), and 30-40% have left within the first 24 hours (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2015). Hungary, together with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland is part of the Visegrad Group (also called the Visegrand Four or V4), a platform for the cooperation of the Central European countries. Encouraged by the sharing cultural, intellectual and religious traditions and roots, the Group claim that its aim is to strengthen stability in the region and contribute to the construction of an effective European security structure (Visegrad Group).
Moreover, Hungary is a country that has not a long tradition as a destination country for international migration (OCDE, 2012; Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2015). Its situation has specially changed since it has entered in the EU in 2004, and the majority of migrants are from Member states, especially ethnic Hungarians from Serbia, Romania or Ukraine, which accounted 68% in 2015 (IOM, 2015). On the other hand, the largest community of migrants outside the EU are coming from Asia, especially from China, and which constituted 23% of the migrant community in 2013 (IOM, 2015). Census data shows a rate of 1.4% of foreigners living in Hungary in 2015 (Hungarian Helsinki Committee). Moreover, the economic crisis has provoked the deterioration on the employment situation. Consequently, the state has issued less work permits, and migration rate saw a decreased of 32% from 2008 to 2010 (Moricz, 2013, OCDE, 2012). The Hungarian policy on migration is based on three axis: a support of movement within EU countries, a support of migration of ethnic Hungarians living in neighbour countries, and a strict and non-supportive policy for third country nationals (that establishes one can get the Hungarian citizenship after eight years of permanent residence permit, which at the same time requires a minimum of three years living in the country (Moricz, 2013).

According to the IOM (2015), Hungary accounted 173.804 irregular border crossings in the January-August period. A significant increased taking into consideration the 50.065 irregular border crossings in 2014. Regarding the nationalities, in 2014 Kosovars (24.316), Afghans (10.428) and Syrians (8.988) were the top three citizenships in border crossing, whereas in 2015 number of Syrians rapidly increased (57.175 only in the first half of 2015), as well as the number of Iraqis (5.543 in the first half of 2015). 97.097 out of 173.804 asked for asylum in the first six months of 2015, which has been the highest number of applications since 1989. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, these are mainly transitory since most of the applicants are just in route towards another target country (IOM, 2015).
5.3.2. Key developments in national discourse on migration in 2015

The Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, won the absolute majority both, in 2010 and 2014 elections with his conservative national party Fidesz; and nowadays Fidesz is one of the most popular political groups in the country (Mudde, 2014). The speech of Fidesz has been based on a strong nationalistic approach, claiming the exceptionalism of the Hungarians as an ethnic group. Accordingly, the party has sought to absorb the political space, claiming a model of “illiberal state” with no room for multiculturalism (Hungarian Government, 2014). In addition, it is important to highlight an almost total control of the government over the media (Dunai, 2014) and a large amount of corruption scandals (Hajba and Given, 2014).

To combat illegal immigration has been one of the priorities of the political agenda of the Hungarian government. After the attacks to the satiric journal Charlie Hedbo, on January 7th 2015 in Paris, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, stated:

Economic immigration is a bad phenomenon in Europe, and we cannot view it as something that has yielded benefits, since the only thing it brings upon European people is danger […] we have to stop immigration (Jambor, 2015)

Furthermore, Orbán, emphasized:

While I am PM, Hungary will definitely not become an immigration destination. We don't want to see significantly sized minorities with different cultural characteristics and backgrounds among us. We want to keep Hungary as Hungary (Rettman, 2015)

Besides of offering its condolences and condemning any kind of violent act, the discourse of Orbán connected migration with terrorism and portrayed it as a dangerous issue to preserve both the European identity and the Hungarian composition. Additionally, the Prime Minister emphasized in an interview for the public radio, the necessity to establish security measures in order to prevent migration, stating that its task is to make sure that the country is secure in an insecure world (Hungary Today, 2015). This was the turning point in which illegal
migration was presented as the main issue within the domestic discourse (Rácz, 2015). Moreover, in a public communication from the government the 16\textsuperscript{th} of January, migration and terrorism was claimed as an interconnected issue regarding Paris attacks, and the government declared that Europe it is not prepared for mass migrations problems, claiming a necessity of a stricter regulatory framework. The government started to develop then an anti-migration campaign with warming messages (Rácz, 2015) that has been attached to a decline in popularity in polls (Mudde, 2015) (Figure 17) facing the midterm elections. In this sense, the 10\textsuperscript{th} on February, Antal Rogán, the head of the parliamentary group of Fidesz, stated:

We are preparing for a decision that applies very strict treatment against immigrants and which, in a certain sense, clashes with the practice accepted by Brussels. We believe that the solution for this problem is the immediate detention of illegal migrants; we would like to apply this and we will ask the people whether they agree. Then, while they are in Hungary, they should be under control and we should enact legislation that allows us to deport them back to their homeland fast and without delay (ECRE, 2015)

Furthermore, the 20\textsuperscript{th} of February a parliamentary debate entitled "Hungary does not need livelihood immigrants" took place (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2015: 2) and the 24\textsuperscript{th} of April a ‘National consultation on immigration, economic migration and terrorism’ was held (Hungarian Government, 2015), in which the government sent letters to every Hungarian household (Krekó and Juhász, 2015; Juhász et al, 2016: 6). The consultation contained questions as:

“We hear different views on the issue of immigration. There are some who think that economic migrants jeopardize the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Do you agree?”

“Do you agree with the Hungarian government that support should be focused more on Hungarian families and the children they can have, rather than on immigration?”

(Krekó and Juhász, 2015)
In the meantime, the official website of the Hungarian Government asserted that the number of illegal immigrants had dramatically increased in Hungary, and furthermore, “We cannot allow illegal immigrants to endanger the Hungarian people's jobs and safety”\textsuperscript{21} (Hungarian Government, 2015b).

The government's position is clear: the borders of Europe and Hungary should be protected by all means! The Cabinet therefore decided to construct a temporary technical closing of borders to the Hungarian-Serbian and Croatian-Hungarian border. The government strengthened to deal with the immigration situation in the police, the army also became possible involvement of the southern border\textsuperscript{22} (Hungarian Government, 2015b).

Despite the fact that approximately only 10% of the population responded to the poll (Pollet and Mouzourakis, 2015b), the government declared on the survey that an overwhelming majority agreed with the contents (Lázár, 2015).

On the other hand, the consultation created a debate among several organizations and the civil society, to which some demonstrations were organized. With this controversial situation, Viktor Orbán participated on a debate in the European Parliament about the situation in Hungary regarding the issue on the 30\textsuperscript{th} of April (European Parliament, 2015). The government claimed that the purpose of the poll was “to find out citizens’ opinions on whether there should be scope for immediately deporting migrants who prove to have merely abused the European rules which “encourage illegal migration”” (Hungarian Government, 2015).

Nevertheless, as claimed by Fidesz, the consultation sought to put migration in the center of the national agenda (Krekó and Juhász, 2015). As expressed by the social media company, Bekamo.Social, “Since 1 April, when Hungarians made seven comments on immigrants on

\textsuperscript{21} Translated by the author
\textsuperscript{22} Translated by the author
social media, that number has proliferated, peaking at 422 on Thursday, which suggests that Orbán has successfully put the issue at the centre of national debate” (cited in Nolan, 2015). Meanwhile, a conducted poll showed that 46% of the Hungarian citizens would define themselves as xenophobic; with the highest rate against the Arab population (Nolan, 2015; Maters, 2015).

In May, Orbán asked to close the refugee camp in Debrecen declaring that their inhabitants were taking advantage of the state’s aid: “This is not a refugee camp, but an immigrant camp [...] We don’t want more immigrants to come, the ones who are here should go home” (Krekó and Juhász, 2015).

Furthermore, an anti-migrant billboard campaign launched by Orbán in June 2015 marked another important turning point. Funded with public taxes and estimated in £693.150 (Nolan, 2015), the Hungarian government deployed over 1.000 billboards all around the country, with slogans as: “If you come to Hungary, don’t take the job of Hungarians”; “If you come to Hungary, you should respect our laws!”; “If you come to Hungary, you should respect our culture!” (Thorpe, 2015; Krekó and Juhász, 2015). Whereas the aim was to target migrants, the language used was Hungarian (Krekó and Juhász, 2015). A campaign against the anti-migration campaign was also deployed in which several activists repaint the billboards and set new ones with slogans in English as: “Come to Hungary by all means, we are already working in London!”; “Please, excuse our empty country, we’ve gone to England!” or “Sorry for our Prime Minister” (Nolan, 2015) (Figure 18).

According to Szalai and Göbl (2015: 26), its aim was to ridicule the government’s dramatization, arise awareness about systemic political problems and reach the international public opinion.
Along these lines, the government claimed a necessity of applying stricter laws at the borders and deploying military forces (Hungarian Government, 2015). Even before the large-scale migration flow had begun, there was planned the construction of a fence on Hungary’s southern border, as well as to introduce a law to allow the push back of asylum seekers to Serbia (Thorpe, 2015). Moreover, Viktor Orbán declared: “Today mass migration is taking place around the globe that could change the face of Europe’s civilisation. If that happens, that is irreversible […] If we make a mistake now, it will be forever” (The Telegraph, 2015).

The refugee migration crisis has affected Hungary, as previously exposed. With an unprecedented number of arrivals and a significant increased number of asylum applications (Figure 19). The number of applications passed from 6,485 and 9,800 in April and May respectively, to 16,385 in June (double than the previous month) and 30,870 in July (Eurostat, 2015). With 175,963 applications accounted between 1 January and 30 September, only in August 47,000 claims were registered (Pollet and Mouzourakis, 2015b: 9).

Since 99% of the crossings were through its border with Serbia (Pollet and Mouzourakis, 2015b: 9), (Figure 21), the Hungarian government announced the at the mid of June its plan to construct a 175 km long fence along its border with Serbia (HVG magazine, 2015b) arguing that “is a necessary step […] We need to stop the flow” (Kingsley, 2015). The legislative process to allow the construction of the fence was approved rapidly and not living room for other stakeholders for consultation (Pollet and Mouzourakis, 2015b). The Hungarian-Serbian razor-wire fence was effectively completed by the 15th of September (Reynolds, 2015) and estimated in $106 million (Townsend, 2015). Soldiers were used to build the fence, depicting the situation as a national emergency (Thorpe, 2015). Accordingly, Orbán (2015) asserted at a press conference in September “It is not for fun that we are doing
what we are doing; no one likes serving in a border fortress [...] But this historic role of protecting the external borders has now fallen to Hungary”.

A poll carried out by the conservative magazine Heti Válasz in July exposed that that 63% of Hungarians believe that migration really possess a threat for the country’s security. Furthermore, opinion surveys indicated in the same month that since Orbán announced the erection of the fence, Fidesz had risen in popular support after eight months of declining rates (Byrne, 2015). Despite the criticism that the construction of the fence got from human rights organizations, the UN’s refugee agency and the European Commission, the Hungarian PM claimed, “border security is a national obligation” (Byrne, 2015).

Furthermore, the 23rd of June Fidesz declared that it will stop receiving refugees of asylum seekers transferred from other EU states under the Dublin III Regulation (Pintér, 2015), claiming a lack of technical capacity to deal with the requests (Pollet and Mouzourakis, 2015b). On the contrary, Angela Merkel announced that Germany would not proceed according to the Dublin Regulation and therefore, asylum seekers from Syria would be accepted regardless its entry point (See Case Study: Germany).

When in August the number of people crossing Hungarian borders reached its highest number, the Orbán’s government announced its intention to start a campaign against migration in transit countries, including Serbia, Macedonia and Greece, in order to shrink migrants from taking the road that passes through Hungary (Pollet and Mouzourakis, 2015b). During this time, modifications were introduced on its asylum law, designating Serbia as a safe third country, allowing the expedition of expedited asylum determination and limiting the procedural safeguards. Furthermore, illegal jumping of the fence became a crime punished with prison (IOM, 2015).
In spite of being aware about the coming influx, the Hungarian government did not provide with policy instruments, nor it asked for help to Brussels (Rácz, 2015). This is argued as how the Hungarian government wanted to avoid camps to be settled on its territory (Robinson, 2015). The situation culminated when in August thousands of people were camped around the main train stations for weeks (Akkoc, 2015). Accordingly, information was not provided to the migrants, neither about their rights and duties, nor about travel routes. Instead, NGO’s and volunteers gave the aid. As a consequence, transit zones were crowded with disoriented and uninformed migrants (HVG, 2015), which portrayed the issued as a disorderly mass of people making use of the Hungarian’s land. Moreover, the official communications of the government were mainly in the public media, in which asylum seekers themselves did not appeared talking about their opinions or stories, and silent images when predominant in those cases (Juhász et al, 2015: 27).

Kosovars accounted the highest number of migrants crossing the Hungarian border in 2014 and early 2015. However, when the Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis began to dominate the crowds crossing Hungarian border, the government started blaming Islam and connecting it with terrorism (Rácz, 2015) (Figure 20). At the beginning of September, Hungary’s PM declared to the German newspaper Allgemeine Zeitung, an importance of securing the EU borders for Muslim’s migrants “to keep Europe Christian” (Mackey, 2015). In this regard, Orbán, stated: “Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims” (Mackey, 2015), claiming the necessity to keep the European identity, rooted in Christian religion. Invoking the Ottoman empire occupation, the discourse, was based on the construction of the migrant as a cultural threat as the stranger ‘Other’, “Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian?” (Mackey, 2015); demanding the need for securitization: “There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our
“borders” (Mackey, 2015). Accordingly, Donal Tusk, the president of the European Council, showed it gratitude to Orbán for securing the EU borders, while at the same time declared it discomfort with the Hungarian PM about religion, calling for solidarity with all races and religions as part of humanity (Mackey, 2015). Moreover, the President stated

We do not like the consequences of having a large number of Muslim communities that we see in other countries, and I do not see any reason for anyone else to force us to create ways of living together in Hungary that we do not want to see (Mackey, 2015)

The 16th of October, the government completed the construction of a fence also on its border with Croatia (the new route taken by migrants after the construction of the Hungarian-Serbian border) diverting migrants to Slovenia. The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Peter Szijjarto, declared that his country was taking the action “because the European Union had yet to come up with a comprehensive plan to deal with the flow of migrants” (Lyman, 2015) (Figure 22).

Moreover, a polemic issue concerned to the approval of the compulsory quota plan to relocate 120,000 refugees approved by the European ministers at the end of September (BBC, 2015). Within the plan, Hungary was assigned to take 360 refugees from Italy and 988 from Greece (Council of the European Union, 2015: 93-94). The plan was firmly opposed by Viktor Orbán, together with the governments of the V4 (BBC, 2015b). Accordingly, the Hungarian PM declared in December that an appeal would be submitted on behalf of its government, describing the decision as “illegal, unreasonable and unfair” (Sandhu, 2015). However, public opinion polls conducted by the European Parliament showed a divided attitude towards the quota plan (Juhász et al, 2015, p. 18) (Figure 23). In this sense, Orbán blamed Merkel for her open-arms policy towards asylum seekers, declaring “These migrants are not coming our way from war zones but from camps in Syria’s neighbours. So these people are not fleeing danger and don’t need to be scared for their lives” (Harding, 2015).
5.3.3. Conclusions to Securitization of Migration in Hungary

The surveys showed that in 2015 Fidesz increased considerably its public support, namely by 4-5% in comparison with the beginning of the Summer, and the popularity of Viktor Orbán even more (Juhász et al., 2016: 6). The strategy of Fidesz to gain anti-migration supporters has been based on the division of the political panorama into the pro-nationals (the true Hungarians) and the anti-nationals (liberal left branch that support multiculturalism), and placing them state’s concerns into one of these fields (Juhász et al., 2016: 20), as the speech about the ‘illiberal state’ showed (Hungarian Government, 2014).

Moreover, in order to assess the effect of the anti-migration campaign that, together, a poll showed that, while in May 13% of the population said that migration is among the top three problems in the country (unemployment was considered the most urgent issue), in the fall the number reached 65% (Juhász et al., 2016: 17). In this regard, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2015: 3) declared that the government relied “on false and purposely misinterpreted information to mislead public opinion”, as the followings statements:

- Asylum-seekers constantly labelled as “livelihood immigrants”
- The mass influx of “livelihood immigrants” places an unbearable burden on Hungarian society
- The EU does not allow Hungary to detain asylum-seekers
- The EU does not support Hungary’s “fight” to protect its borders and does not listen to Hungary’s needs

(Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2015: 3)

As the study carried out for the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung think tank by Political Capital Institute notes, “this cannot just be explained by Hungarian society’s seemingly irreversible xenophobic attitude; instead, this is the result of a well-planned, manipulative propaganda campaign” (Juhász et al., 2015: 6), arguing that its strategy is aimed at winning political rise
in the wake of the refugee crisis. Hence, putting the issue at the center of the national political agenda has served to achieve certain domestic political purposes (Krekó and Juhász, 2015). At mid-September Orbán bragged that the anti-migration campaign had favourably diverted the attention on other domestic scandals (Hungarian Free Press, 2015) at the beginning of 2015 (Rényi, 2015).

The discourse of the Hungarian government has warned on cultural and economic migration as a potential threat. Since the Charlie Hedbo events at the beginning of 2015, the government rhetoric has been consistently following this pattern and it had become more aggressive with the rising number on border crossing at the beginning of the Summer, culminating with the construction of the fence along its southern border with Serbia and Croatia, and ratified with the restrictive policies already expressed. Migration has been portrayed by the government as a potential dangerous invasion that might have a negative impact on the preservation of both, the European Union’s identity and the Hungarian state.

Furthermore, the focus of Fidesz has targeted Islam, since the majority of the asylum applications in the second half of the year have been submitted from Muslim-majority’s countries (which does not imply automatically that this population belong to Islam or support Islam), as the element that might cause instability in the European society. By doing so, the government assumes that Europe is based on Christian values, something that in the nowadays secular Western states is arguable.

The Hungarian securitization of migration has been based on the creation of the threatening ‘Other’, coming from the Far East; on the risk towards the destabilization of the European welfare states, criminalizing migration while connecting it to terrorism, as well as on the assertion of the existence of a homogenous European identity. Furthermore, it has involved non-discursive instruments as the construction of the fence on its southern border shows; and
non-action approach, with no provision of management from the government. Additionally, the anti-migration rhetoric has continued along 2016, and the government has keep on asserting that mass migration can be stopped (Orbán, 2016). Orbán’s hard line has been severely criticized by several European leaders, as the German chancellor Angela Merkel, the French president François Hollande (Robert, 2015), or the Austria’s chancellor Werner Fayamnnn, that has reprimanded the Hungary’s Prime Minister policies and treatment to refugees (Harding, 2015). Nevertheless, Orbán’s decision to build a fence on its borders have been imitated by the Austrian state, which in October 2015 announced the erection of a fence on its border with Slovenia (Hall, 2015). The consequences of these measures along several EU nations, and its impact on the core idea of a Union free of internal borders, is an interesting object for further research about securitization of migration in Europe.

5.4. Case Study: Czech Republic

5.4.1. National perspectives on migration

Immigration in the Czech Republic has especially grown since the country entered the EU. According to numbers, the Ministery of the Interior have declared that 458.000 foreign nationals are living legally in the country, out of 10,5 million inhabitants (Cameron, 2015), mainly for work or business reasons and with long-term perspectives (Figure 24) (MRCV, 2015). According to the World Bank (2015), along the period 2011-2015 the country has received a number of 29.999 net immigrants. Overall the largest immigrant communities come from Ukraine (119.000), followed by Slovaks (81.000) and Vietnamese (58.000) (Blahoutová, 2013). Regarding 2015, the Czech Republic has not been neither one of the direct target countries for asylum seekers, nor as a transit country, registering 1.235 asylum applications throughout the year, 0,1% of the EU. The top three citizenships in asylum applications have been Ukraine, Syria and Cuba (Eurostat, 2016).
5.4.2. Key developments in national discourse on migration in 2015

The Czech government of Miloš Zeman, in charge since 2013 and with a leading role in the Visegrad Group, has strongly refused the compulsory quota plan approved to distribute refugees among Europe (Government of the Czech Republic, 2015), claiming that Muslim refugees are ‘practically impossible’ to integrate (The Economist, 2016). In this regard, after the quota voting, the Interior Minister, Milan Chovanec, published in the social network Tweeter: “We will soon realise that the emperor has no clothes. Common sense lost today” (Holehouse, 2015). The Czech Republic was assigned 1.591 refugees to reallocate (Council of the European Union, 2015: 93-94) and its opposition relies in three main ideas: (1) the quota system deprives countries of their sovereign right to decide about asylum, (2) quotas would encourage more refugees to go to their countries, and (3) the plan would fail since the refugees do not want to stay in the Czech Republic (Cameron, 2015). Accordingly, Zeman wrote to Brussels arguing that mandatory quotas were illegal and declaring that it could take the matter to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg (Gotev, 2015). On the other hand, the Czech government claimed its willing to accept more refugees than the initial quota if it would remain voluntary and not compulsory (Cameron, 2015).

Zeman’s discourse throughout 2015 has been based on the idea that the refugee inflow is a ‘tsunami’ that threatens to overwhelm Europe, and together with his V4 counterparts, the Czech president has advocated a necessity on reinforcing the European external borders (Cameron, 2015). Accordingly, during an official visit to Moravia, the president was asked about his opinion on whether or not refugees would accept Czech rules, answering: “Of course they will not. Unfaithful women will be stoned, thieves‘ hands will be cut off and we will be deprived of the beauty of women because they will have to have their faces covered. I can imagine that in some cases this might be beneficial, though” (briskélity, 2015; Malm, 2015).
The Czech president has also declared that the country’s defence budget should be increased in order to deploy Czech soldiers at the border "so that illegal migrants come here, they will be deported to where they came from” (briskélity, 2015). Moreover, Zeman expressed his support to the idea of financing voluntary armed units of local citizens, adding: “I would like very much that if those citizens who want to defend this country should be able to receive military training and be used to defend the borders of this country, as and when it might be necessary” (briskélity, 2015). In this regard, by mid-September the Czech government deployed temporary checks on its border with Austria, as its neighbouring country, Germany (Sommers, 2015). The Czech Prime Minister Sobotka declared that the aim of this measure was “to ensure that laws and rules inside the Schengen zone are not violated”. In this sense, the Interior Minister, Milan Chovanec, stated: "We are doing our best to send a clear signal that we will observe the European law on our borders ... and boost the performance of our people on the border so that we would be able to return migrants to the neighboring country" (Winsor, 2015).

Moreover, in October the Czech president declared that refugees were using children as human shields in order to get asylum in the Union (TN CZ, 2015), asserting that “migrants are not in desperate need, but are economically wealthy and are using their children in order to gain sympathy from Europe” (Malm, 2015). Zeman also added: “They serve as human shields for guys with iPhones to justify the wave of migrants” (Malm, 2015). In November, Zeman declared that refugees are criminals, claiming that they have illegally crossed the EU national borders, violating the international law (referring to the Dublin Regulation), travelling around the Union and not registering in the first safety country they have reached (Echo24, 2015). Furthermore, the president declared: “I recommend to look at the current photos of refugees in the Balkans, of which ninety percent are young, healthy men who
certainly do not look miserable"\textsuperscript{23} (Schwarzenberg, 2015). Moreover, he stated that refugees should not be in detention facilities, instead they should be returned with the help of police and the army when attempting to cross European borders\textsuperscript{24} (Schwarzenberg, 2015).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Raad Hussein, has accused the Czech government of systematic violations of the rights of refugees, especially because of detentions by the Czech police to refugees during the Summer 2015 (Malm, 2015). Zeman responded by saying that the Czech authorities are allowed to detain immigrants between 40-90 days if they cross the border illegally (Masopustová, 2015). Raad Hussein claimed that many of this people are refugees who have suffered terribly in their countries of origin, and stressed that the international law is very clear and that immigration detention should be a measure only of last resort (Masopustová, 2015).

The Czech president has maintained a discursive line describing the refugee inflow in 2015 as an ‘organized invasion’. During a public Christmas speech in the Czech television, Zeman claimed that Syrians and Iraqis should stay in their countries and fight ISIS instead of flee and ask for asylum in Europe (Safdar, 2015; The Telegraph, 2015b). In this sense, Zeman stated: “I am profoundly convinced that we are facing an organised invasion and not a spontaneous movement of refugees” adding that “A large majority of the illegal migrants are young men in good health, and single. I wonder why these men are not taking up arms to go fight for the freedom of their countries against the Islamic State” (The Telegraph, 2015b).

On the other hand, the Czech Prime Minister, Bohuslav Sobotka, has declared that the president’s Christmas message was based "on prejudices and his habitual simplification of things" (Safdar, 2015). In this sense, Sobotka has criticized and opposed Zeman’s speech towards refugees, claiming: “Our anger must turn against (radical Islamists), not refugees

\textsuperscript{23} Translated by the author
\textsuperscript{24} Translated by the author
who are often escaping religious or ethnic violence spread by murderous fanatics” (EuroActiv, 2015). Nevertheless, the Prime Minister has showed his rejection towards the acceptance of refugees in the Czech Republic, opposing the compulsory quota system and declaring its willingness to mitigate the refugee inflow. In this regard, the Prime Minister argued: "We reject the pressure to accept a centrally managed migration policy, which only strengthens the radicals and can damage the idea of Europe" (DW, 2015b). Sobotka has also claimed to be in solidarity with EU countries: "We have sent police to Slovenia, Hungary and Macedonia. We have granted humanitarian aid to Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia” (DW, 2015b).

5.4.3. Conclusions on Securitization of Migration in the Czech Republic

The Zeman’s anti-refugee perspective has been depicted as an attempt to dissuade asylum-seekers of going to the Czech Republic, and it has been criticized as contrary to EU values (Safdar, 2015). According to a poll conducted in the country, 71% showed an attitude of rejection towards the acceptance of refugees from Syria and North Africa (Figure 25) (České Noviny, 2015; EuroActiv.com, 2015). During 2015, the Czech president has used a securitizing discourse of migration, by portraying refugees as existential threats, relating migration with criminality and evoking a risk of invasion. Especially, the discourse of Zeman has been characterized by an anti-Muslim approach, (as in the case of Hungary) in which the president refuses multiculturalism by declaring that is something impossible to achieve. This has been observed through the president’s participation in anti-Muslim rallies in Prague (EuroActiv.com, 2015).

One may highlight the fact that the Czech Republic has not been exposed to the kind of migration from African, Asian or Latin-American countries (Cameron, 2015) as other EU states (as France, Germany or Spain). Something that it may have an influence since the
population is more vulnerable to anti-migration political discourses. In this regard, the Czech public opinion shows a less positive attitude towards immigrants in their country than the European average, as just one out of four people believe that immigrants enrich the society economically and culturally (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2015).

Accordingly, looking at the previous context, one may observe an anti-migrant tendency already:

Czech public opinion has been strongly influenced by negatives stereotypes of immigrants presented by media, which has tended to concentrate in growing numbers of immigrants in the country and the problem of integrating newcomers in the West European societies (Murad, 2014).

The anti-migrant and anti-refugee discourse of the president Zeman has continued during 2016. In this sense, he has declared: “The experience of western European countries which have ghettos and excluded localities shows that the integration of the Muslim community is practically impossible” (The Guardian, 2016), and added, “Let them have their culture in their countries and not take it to Europe” (The Guardian, 2016). Nevertheless, since the number of asylum seekers have been small relative to other EU countries, the leading role of the country in the V4 anti-migrant position it is remarkable.
6. Conclusions

According to the analysis developed throughout the three study cases, it is possible to assess a different approach towards the migration crisis between Germany and the V4 countries (Hungary and the Czech Republic). From this standpoint, the German government of Angela Merkel has mainly followed a humanitarian discourse based on solidarity and translated in her ‘open-door policy’, whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Czech President have taken a securitarian perspective.

The main hypothesis of the research: ‘During 2015, the discourse over migration in Europe has evolved from a humanitarian perspective to a securitization approach’, has been confirmed through the study. In this regard, a shift in tone and perspective of the European attitude towards the refugee crisis can be appreciated looking at the emphasis on the necessity to stem the migrant flow by the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016. This has been translated in the compulsory quota plan, a strengthening of the security at the EU external borders, and the EU-Turkey agreements in March 2016. Accordingly, all the new comers crossing the Turkish-Greek border have to be returned back to Turkey. Angela Merkel, as the head of the largest EU economy, has had an essential role in reaching the signature of these agreements.

Moreover, the tone in which the refugee inflow is being managed might keep evolving since, as we have observed, the Chief of the German Intelligence Agency has declared a link between refugees and the presence of terrorist among them. In this regard, Manuel Navarrete, director of the European Anti-terrorism Center has declared that Europe is deploying specialists in terrorism in various hot spots of Greece and Italy, in order to identify potential terrorists and “possible people that having the opportunity to use this flow of thousands of
refugees coming to Europe, can disguise between them and enter”25 (Ortega Dolz, 2016). The evolution of such discourse is to be observed in further research since several terrorist attacks in European capitals are serving a common ground to link migration with terrorism.

The sub-hypothesis 1: “The creation of a common European migration policy, and the strengthening of the border security management and surveillance is the expression of the securitization of migration” has been also confirmed along the analysis. As exposed, the integration process has been based on the construction of migration as an internal security problem that connects the diminishing of internal borders with a necessity on strengthening external border control. Assuming, as Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010: 141) argue, that “Is the very act of crossing the border that produces the international migrant in the first place”, the securitization of migration in Europe has used the strengthening of the external border control in order to securitize migration and protect the territorial geopolitical sphere. Along with it, the Union has also implemented surveillance measures, coordination with countries of origin and transit, as well as identity identification through biometrical control.

One may argue that borders are the result of a social construction (Del Sarto and Steindler, 2015: 370), as thus, territoriality is socially constructed (Sack, 1986: 20). From this standpoint, territoriality is hence “primary geographical expression of social power” and “geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling area” (Sack 1986, 5). Consequently, territory is used with political, economic and social aims (Agnew, 2009: 112). In this sense, borders “are markers of identity, invested with mythic significance in building national and political identities” (Ceyhan and Tshoukla, 2002: 25), defining the legal understanding of the sovereign state. As analysed, it is argued that the European enlargement has acted as a EU buffer zone, which can be also observed from the migration scope, in

25 Translated by the author
which the periphery countries have had a pre-emptive role in stemming the incoming migration influx. Despite the fact that the protection of refugees has been ratified by the Member states in the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, as Holmes and Castañeda (2015: 17) highlight, “how states respond to asylum seekers always reflects geopolitical interests that reinscribe ideas about which groups deserve support and at which historical moments”. In this regard, territory is being constructed as a protection of the geopolitical EU idea, and securitization of migration is connected to that.

The sub-hypothesis 2: “The securitization of migration in Europe is driven through the discursive representation of the migrant as a threat for the cultural identity and the welfare of the Member States” has been also confirmed through the discourse analysis of the case studies of Hungary and the Czech Republic. Both leaders have followed an approach in which migration has been described as a threat for the cultural European identity, as well as warned as a potential economic threat. The V4 elites’ have portrayed refugees as threatening ‘Others’, and represent the refugee inflow as an invasion. Furthermore, they have revealed themselves as skeptical on multiculturalism and integration, and the acceptance of this discourse by the population has allowed these governments to adopt extraordinary measures, as the construction of border fences, the refusal to distribution of quotas, the rejection to accept Muslim refugees and the strengthening of security controls. The decision of whether to accept refugees or not based on religion is a violation of the European Union non-discrimination law (European Union, 2011). Through this shared common ground, the four small countries of the V4 seem to gather weight by having a common voice and strategy (The Economist, 2015).
As Said (1978: 35) exposes, the conception of the European citizen in confrontation with the stranger ‘Other’ that is coming especially from the East, is due to a construction of a whole industry of literature, philosophy, and an extend and long discursive material that represents the ‘Eastern man’ as a passive agent, in relation to a ‘superior European identity man’. And this has been done since early centuries until today. The securitarian discourses on migration regarding the case studies rely on these ideas. Nevertheless, one may highlight that the asylum applicants are not a homogeneous mass of people. As the anthropological study from Holmes and Castañeda (2015: 17) reveals, the refugees in Europe in 2015 vary greatly from working-class people, to graduate and English-speaking professionals.

### 6.1. Critical Outlook

While securitization of migration has brought a control-oriented approach, enhancement of immigration regulations has not been proved to be effective and eliminate the structural problems that provoke the migratory flows. From this standpoint, securitization of migration does not seem to solve the underlying factors that have caused an increased flow of refugees to Europe in 2015. Moreover, European governments have been generally focused on how to stem the influx of refugees, framing the issue as a security concern, rather than on possible benefits. Accordingly, the main stream media has focused its attention in the growing number of asylum applications and border crossings, rather than in the situation of refugees or the reasons behind it (Balhorn, 2015), and overall, the political and media discourse about the crisis has paid relatively little attention to the structural roots of it (Holmes and Castañeda, 2015).

On the other hand, the continuous distinctions between ‘deserved’ and ‘undeserved’ asylum applicants due to political or economic issues remain to be questioned. In this regard, people fleeing due to bad economic conditions in their countries or origin demarks a situation driven
by politics. Consequently, political and economic reasons become indivisible. As highlighted by Holmes and Castañeda (2015: 17), “the idea of the “voluntary” economic migrant elides the realities of structural violence and postcolonial economic inequalities that push people to migrate in order to survive”. In this regard, one might take into account the difficulties that the decision to migrate or flee, with all the cultural and language barriers that it implies, is far from being easy. However, the narratives in both cases are based in the ‘deserving refugee’ in contrast to the ‘underserving immigrant’, both portrayed as the stranger and threatening ‘Other’ (Holmes and Castañeda, 2015: 19). According to Holmes and Castañeda (2016: 16), “the phrase “migrant crisis” subtly delegitimizes calls for protection […] whereas the phrase “refugee crisis” reinforces them”. The authors highlight how these categories are usually blurred, which may contribute to the confusion of the public opinion, and therefore shape the legal and practical framework used by the states and the political actors to respond to the issue.

Migration presented as a security issue, however, deters critical examination of the policies and practices in securitization (Burgess, 2011: 14). As discussed, it can be argued that politicians have used the anti-migration rhetoric for domestic purposes. Partly, as a way to distract public opinion from other domestic issues, as well as to gain short-term political gains (Juhász et al, 2016: 20). Without underestimating the security aspects of migration, as claimed by Kratochvíl et al (2015: 3) in their paper for the European Prague Summit 2015 “we should reframe the refugee crisis as a humanitarian disaster and take the security of the refugees more seriously”. It is needed a more critical understanding of the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, and for it is required a shift in the political approach that focuses on the low level of threat that refugees might pose, and also to stress the resilience capacity of the European Union, its values and structures (Kratochvíl et al, 2015: 3).
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Websites


Annexes

Figure 1

![Figure 1: Trends in the number of international migrants for the world and major development groups, 1960-2005](source_UN_2006)

Source: UN, 2006

Figure 2

![Figure 2: Number of international migrants by income group of country or area of destination, 2000 to 2015](source_UN_2015)

Note: The classification of countries and areas by income level is based on 2014 gross national income (GNI) per capita, in U.S. dollars, calculated by the World Bank.

Source: UN, 2015
Figure 3

Number of international migrants by major area of destination, 2000 and 2015

Source: UN, 2015

Figure 4

Source: Eurostat 2015
Figure 5

Source: BBC

Figure 6

Source: OCDE
Figure 7

Source: Eurostat 2015

Figure 8

Top 10 origins of people applying for asylum in the EU
First-time applications in 2015, in thousands

Source: Eurostat

Source: BBC
Figure 9

First time asylum applicants registered in the EU Member States, 2015/2014

Source: BBC

Figure 10

Asylum claims in Europe, 2015

Source: Eurostat

Source: BBC
Figure 11

Asylum applications per 100,000 local population, 2015

Source: Eurostat

Figure 12

Source: Eurostat 2015
Germany

Figure 13

Asylum Surge
Number of migrants who registered to seek asylum in Germany, by country of origin, which totaled nearly 1.1 million in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>428,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>154,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>121,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>69,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>33,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>285,243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Source: The Wall Street Journal

Figure 14

Top ten nationalities applying for asylum in Germany
Figures from January to August 2015

Source: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

Source: BBC
Figure 15

Distribution of Asylum Seekers in Germany

Source: Bamf

Source: BBC

Figure 16

Growing Unease

Source: The Wall Street Journal
Figure 17

![Bar chart showing election results in Hungary, labeled with sources](source: The Washington Post)

Figure 18

![Image of a poster encouraging people to come to Hungary](source: The Telegraph)
Figure 19

Asylum applicants in Hungary between January-October, 2015, by citizenship
Source: Eurostat

Figure 20

Asylum applicants in Hungary in January-October, 2015, by citizenship (in percent)
Source: Eurostat

Source: Eurostat 2015
Figure 22

Source: The New York Times

Figure 23

Source: Juházs et al, 2015
Czech Republic

Figure 24

**VÝVOJ POČTU CIZINCŮ V ČR PODLE TYPU Pobytu**
TREND IN THE NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS IN THE CR BY TYPE OF RESIDENCE
1993 - 2015 (31. 12.)

**Source:** Czech Statistical Office

Figure 25

**MĚLA BY ČR PŘIJÍMAT UPRCHLÍKY?**
názory české veřejnosti v procentech

**Source:** Ceske Noviny